WEBVTT - Trump Grabs Agency Power & J&J Bankruptcy Trial

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<v Speaker 1>This is Bloomberg Law with June Brossel from Bloomberg Radio.

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<v Speaker 2>The President has already signed seventy three executive orders. That

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<v Speaker 2>is more than double the number signed by Joe Biden

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<v Speaker 2>and more than quadruple the number signed by Barack Obama

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<v Speaker 2>over the same period.

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<v Speaker 3>Despite the enthusiasm from the White House Press Secretary, a

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<v Speaker 3>president signing an executive order is not an indicator of success.

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<v Speaker 3>It's simply a directive. Witness how many of President Trump's

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<v Speaker 3>executive orders are already mired in legal battles. With his

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<v Speaker 3>executive orders, Trump is making a brond push to centralize

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<v Speaker 3>the power of the federal government in the White House.

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<v Speaker 1>And now a judge who's an activist judge wants to

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<v Speaker 1>try and stop us from doing this.

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<v Speaker 3>And why would they want to do that. I campaign

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<v Speaker 3>on this.

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<v Speaker 1>I campaign to the fact that I said government is corrupt.

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<v Speaker 3>And this week, in a to clamp down the power

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<v Speaker 3>of some of Washington's most powerful regulators, Trump issued an

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<v Speaker 3>executive order declaring he has direct control over dozens of

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<v Speaker 3>independent agencies like the Securities in Exchange Commission, the Federal

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<v Speaker 3>Trade Commission, and the Federal Communications Commission. It allows him

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<v Speaker 3>to direct their rulemaking, policy agendas, spending, and interpretations of

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<v Speaker 3>the law, undercutting the congressional protections against political influence that

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<v Speaker 3>independent agencies have historically operated under. Joining me is Carrie Colinisi,

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<v Speaker 3>who directs the University of Pennsylvania Carrie Law School's program

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<v Speaker 3>on Regulation. Carrie, will you broadly explain what Trump's executive

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<v Speaker 3>Order on independent Agencies entails?

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<v Speaker 4>It is taking several strands of White House review and

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<v Speaker 4>oversight of administrative agencies that have normally applied to those

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<v Speaker 4>agencies that are non independent, called executive branch agencies, and

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<v Speaker 4>now applying that same suite of oversight mechanisms to independent agencies.

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<v Speaker 4>The point is that this is now sort of treating

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<v Speaker 4>independent agencies as if they're no longer independent.

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<v Speaker 3>Yeah, explain what being an independent agency up until this

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<v Speaker 3>point entails as opposed to executive branch agencies.

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<v Speaker 4>So executive branch agencies are like the cabinet level departments

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<v Speaker 4>agencies like the Environmental Protection Agency that are headed by

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<v Speaker 4>officials who are appointed by the President, confirmed by the Senate,

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<v Speaker 4>but then they can be removed for any reason by

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<v Speaker 4>the President. So if the President just doesn't like the tie,

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<v Speaker 4>even that one of the administrators might be wearing or

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<v Speaker 4>whatever a tire they might have. You could fire them

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<v Speaker 4>for any reason whatsoever. Usually that be in the form

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<v Speaker 4>of policy disagreements. You know, if they're not following the

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<v Speaker 4>administration's agenda, then.

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<v Speaker 5>They can be fired.

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<v Speaker 4>And that puts a lot of leverage and control on

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<v Speaker 4>what agencies do or don't do. Needless to say, independent

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<v Speaker 4>agencies have been established by Congress with a kind of

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<v Speaker 4>tenure protection where the heads of those agencies can't be

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<v Speaker 4>removed just for any old reason or for policy disputes

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<v Speaker 4>with the president. There has to be some really good

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<v Speaker 4>cause before president can fire the head of an independent agency.

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<v Speaker 4>And those independent agencies include a lot of multi member

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<v Speaker 4>commissions like the Federal Communications Commission, the Federal Trade Commission,

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<v Speaker 4>the Federal Reserve Board. They are headed by officials who

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<v Speaker 4>have fixed terms of office and can enjoy some sense

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<v Speaker 4>of autonomy that comes from knowing that they can't be

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<v Speaker 4>fired just because they're adopting policy decisions that might not

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<v Speaker 4>be in a total alignment with what the White House wants.

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<v Speaker 3>But the President does appoint the heads of these agencies, right,

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<v Speaker 3>so they do share his philosophy.

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<v Speaker 4>Yeah, so there's often in practice a great deal of

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<v Speaker 4>alignment already between what at least a majority of the

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<v Speaker 4>members on these commissions want to do. Many of the

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<v Speaker 4>commissions have a political balance requirement, so they allow for

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<v Speaker 4>a majority of the commissioners to be of the same

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<v Speaker 4>political party as the president, but there needs to be

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<v Speaker 4>some minority of other commissioners. But once you have the

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<v Speaker 4>majority control on a commission and they're appointed by the president,

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<v Speaker 4>they are coming in with an ideology and a predisposition

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<v Speaker 4>to do the sorts of things that the president wants. Anyway,

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<v Speaker 4>so as a practical matter, these agencies are now as

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<v Speaker 4>totally independent as maybe the label an independent agency might

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<v Speaker 4>make them seem.

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<v Speaker 3>Yeah, because when a new administration comes in, you see

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<v Speaker 3>the different kinds of enforcements. For example, the SEC it

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<v Speaker 3>was very tough on crypto, for example, and now with

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<v Speaker 3>a new SEC under President Trump, it seems to be

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<v Speaker 3>letting go of crypto, so to speak. So, I mean,

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<v Speaker 3>you see, the difference is in the way the agencies

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<v Speaker 3>govern from president to president.

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<v Speaker 4>Right, So that always existed and you know, many respects.

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<v Speaker 4>It may be you know, eighty or ninety percent of

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<v Speaker 4>the way there for what a president wants by way

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<v Speaker 4>of controlling the direction of these agencies. This executive order, though, eliminates,

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<v Speaker 4>at least its claiming to eliminate what kind of hands

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<v Speaker 4>off approach that quite frankly many presidents have taken with.

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<v Speaker 5>Respect to some of the.

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<v Speaker 4>Very institutionalized review processes, of having budgets not reviewed by

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<v Speaker 4>the White House, of having regulations not.

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<v Speaker 5>Reviewed by the White House.

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<v Speaker 4>This administration is now claiming, well, We're not only going

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<v Speaker 4>to have our loyalists heading these agencies, but we also

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<v Speaker 4>want to scrutinize your budgets, we want to scrutinize your

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<v Speaker 4>strategic plans, we want to scrutinize your legal decision making,

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<v Speaker 4>we want to scrutinize your important regulations, just like we

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<v Speaker 4>do the Department of Transportation, just like we do the

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<v Speaker 4>Department of Labor. All of those are agencies that are

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<v Speaker 4>headed by folks that have been appointed by the president,

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<v Speaker 4>too right, and share the president's objectives. But you know

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<v Speaker 4>what white houses have found is that you know, they

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<v Speaker 4>want to coordinate and they want to make sure that

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<v Speaker 4>all of these you know, dozens of dozens of agencies

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<v Speaker 4>that are conducting activity, are doing the president's bidding and

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<v Speaker 4>sometimes you know, you can get heads of these agencies

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<v Speaker 4>that have viewpoints that do depart a little bit from

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<v Speaker 4>what the White House wants, or heads of agencies that

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<v Speaker 4>are not as vigilant about carrying out the president's agenda.

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<v Speaker 4>And these institutional processes that the Trump administration says now

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<v Speaker 4>it's going to apply to the independence are there to

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<v Speaker 4>try to really put the hammer down and make sure

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<v Speaker 4>that agencies follow what the White House wants them to do.

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<v Speaker 3>So under this executive order, the agencies would have to

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<v Speaker 3>take positions that are the same as the presidents and

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<v Speaker 3>the Attorney generals.

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<v Speaker 5>That's right.

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<v Speaker 4>Some independent agencies also have independent litigating authority That means

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<v Speaker 4>they can go into court and say some things about

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<v Speaker 4>what the laws that they're implementing say and what they

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<v Speaker 4>mean that haven't been vetted by the Department of Justice

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<v Speaker 4>like an executive branch agency has. And so this executive

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<v Speaker 4>order is aiming to bring that process of coming to

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<v Speaker 4>independent understandings of their statutes under an umbrella of White

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<v Speaker 4>House review and the Attorney General and Department of Justice review.

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<v Speaker 3>And it makes Russell Vaught, the OMB director, like a

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<v Speaker 3>super regulator. Everything goes through him.

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<v Speaker 4>Yeah, you could look at it that way, right, And

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<v Speaker 4>this has been a process for regulations at least that

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<v Speaker 4>have been that's been in place since nineteen eighty one,

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<v Speaker 4>where there's some centralized review of regulations of executive departments

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<v Speaker 4>and agencies. This is now saying independent agencies, you also

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<v Speaker 4>need to have your new regulations reviewed and approved by

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<v Speaker 4>O and B before you can go forward and put

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<v Speaker 4>them out.

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<v Speaker 3>I mean, the agencies have particular expertise, so then you're

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<v Speaker 3>going to have someone who doesn't have that expertise overseeing this.

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<v Speaker 5>That's right.

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<v Speaker 4>It's a particular problem with this latest move to bring

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<v Speaker 4>on board independent financial regulatory bodies under O and B

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<v Speaker 4>review because the particular office within O and B that

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<v Speaker 4>reviews regulations, known as OIRA or the Office of Information

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<v Speaker 4>and Regulatory Affairs, has built up expertise and capacity for

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<v Speaker 4>the kinds of regulations that they've been reviewing over the

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<v Speaker 4>last forty plus years, which are you know, tend to

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<v Speaker 4>be transportation, environmental, health and safety and so forth regulations,

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<v Speaker 4>not financial regulatory decisions, because the financial regulatory agencies haven't

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<v Speaker 4>fallen under the ambit of their review. So if this

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<v Speaker 4>is going to be any meaningful expert oversight of what

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<v Speaker 4>independent financial regulatory bodies are doing. OHIRA will need to

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<v Speaker 4>build up its internal capacity to understand and evaluate the

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<v Speaker 4>benefits and the costs of financial regulations, something it doesn't

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<v Speaker 4>currently possess.

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<v Speaker 3>And how does this order treat the Federal Reserve.

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<v Speaker 4>Well, it brings the Federal Reserve as a regulator under

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<v Speaker 4>the ambit of the Executive Order, but it specifically exempts

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<v Speaker 4>the Federal Reserve in its exercise of monetary policy decision

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<v Speaker 4>making from White House scrutiny and oversight and control under

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<v Speaker 4>the Executive Order.

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<v Speaker 5>So, at least for.

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<v Speaker 4>Now, and this is a good thing for the country,

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<v Speaker 4>the Federal Reserve's monetary policy is supposed to remain independent

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<v Speaker 4>and free from political interference from the White House. Not

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<v Speaker 4>so with respect to say, the banking regulatory functions of.

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<v Speaker 5>The Federal Reserve.

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<v Speaker 4>At least as this order is is now drafted.

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<v Speaker 3>Each agency would have to have a liaison to the

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<v Speaker 3>White House.

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<v Speaker 5>Yeah.

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<v Speaker 4>Yeah, there's supposed to be a liaison to the White House.

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<v Speaker 5>There's DOGE leaders.

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<v Speaker 4>That are now going to, you know, be helping the

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<v Speaker 4>White House oversee what's going on at these agencies. In

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<v Speaker 4>some ways, it seems a bit of an overkill. If

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<v Speaker 4>you already are putting in place loyalists at the very

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<v Speaker 4>top of the agency, why you would need this additional

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<v Speaker 4>layer of scrutiny or oversight. But yeah, that's what's contemplated here.

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<v Speaker 3>Coming up next on the Bloomberg Law Show, I'll continue

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<v Speaker 3>this conversation with Professor Carrie COLINIESI. Well, the Supreme Court

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<v Speaker 3>support Trump's power grab. You're listening to Bloomberg. I've been

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<v Speaker 3>talking to an expert in regulatory law, Professor Carry Colonies

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<v Speaker 3>of the University of Sylvania Law School, about an executive

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<v Speaker 3>order from President Trump this week claiming vast control over

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<v Speaker 3>independent agencies like the Securities and Exchange Commission and the

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<v Speaker 3>Federal Trade Commission. What do you think are some of

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<v Speaker 3>the dangers of a president taking control of independent agencies

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<v Speaker 3>in the way envisioned by this order.

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<v Speaker 4>Well, there's a lot of practicalities behind the order. At least,

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<v Speaker 4>let's start with the regulations that will need to be

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<v Speaker 4>worked out. I've already mentioned the need for expertise by

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<v Speaker 4>folks in the White House Regulatory Review Office, but there's

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<v Speaker 4>also other aspects of that traditional review process that just

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<v Speaker 4>don't fit structurally at all with a multi member commission.

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<v Speaker 4>It's really been a model designed for overseeing agencies that

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<v Speaker 4>are headed by a single administrator. The White House staff

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<v Speaker 4>goes back and forth with agency staff and ultimately even

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<v Speaker 4>with the agency head at times to work out any

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<v Speaker 4>disagreements or iron out any wrinkles that there might be.

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<v Speaker 5>How that works with a.

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<v Speaker 4>Multi member body. I don't really know. In fact, the

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<v Speaker 4>current process that this new Executive Order says will apply

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<v Speaker 4>to independent agencies regulations has a dispute resolution process that

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<v Speaker 4>specifically says the agency head shall be able to appeal

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<v Speaker 4>some disagreement with O and B to the President. It's

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<v Speaker 4>not clear who the agency head is in a multi

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<v Speaker 4>member commission. Do they all have to vote on whether

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<v Speaker 4>they go appeal something to the president or not. There

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<v Speaker 4>are going to be some guidelines that are supposedly issued

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<v Speaker 4>by O and B as to how this new executive

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<v Speaker 4>Order gets worked out, and so I think, you know,

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<v Speaker 4>some of these practicalities will have to remain as to

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<v Speaker 4>the large your issue about, you know, what we're getting

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<v Speaker 4>and what we're losing. I think all agencies, whether they're

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<v Speaker 4>executive branch agencies or independent regulatory agencies, need a degree

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<v Speaker 4>of autonomy from the kind of raw politics that can

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<v Speaker 4>often be important to presidents, and I think are clearly

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<v Speaker 4>important to this president.

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<v Speaker 5>We don't want a government where.

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<v Speaker 4>Agencies are acting on impulses of favoritism retribution, and some

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<v Speaker 4>presidents might want that, this president might want that. And

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<v Speaker 4>if we don't have a degree of autonomy and our

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<v Speaker 4>governmental institutions from that kind of raw politics, we really

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<v Speaker 4>suffer as a country.

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<v Speaker 3>This is all part of the theory of the unitary executive,

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<v Speaker 3>which gives the president sweeping powers sole authority over the

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<v Speaker 3>federal government's executive brand. And the speculation is that the

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<v Speaker 3>Trump administration wants to push the Supreme Court to adopt

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<v Speaker 3>the unitary executive theory.

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<v Speaker 4>Right they're basically acting is if the Court has already

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<v Speaker 4>adopted wholesale the unitary executive theory by in effect overturning

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<v Speaker 4>the nineteen thirty five Supreme Court decision called Humphrey's Executor.

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<v Speaker 4>That decision, the Supreme Court said that Congress can create

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<v Speaker 4>these independent agencies that are headed by officials who have

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<v Speaker 4>some kind of tenure protection and can't be removed at

0:15:40.600 --> 0:15:46.040
<v Speaker 4>will by presidents. You know, this administration is taking action

0:15:46.320 --> 0:15:50.240
<v Speaker 4>that one would expect to see if Humphrey's Executor had

0:15:50.280 --> 0:15:55.560
<v Speaker 4>already been determined to be unconstitutional, that is that Congress

0:15:55.760 --> 0:16:00.560
<v Speaker 4>isn't allowed to insulate any agencies from presidential removal. That

0:16:00.720 --> 0:16:05.240
<v Speaker 4>will they're firing already some officials at the NRB that

0:16:05.320 --> 0:16:09.520
<v Speaker 4>have had good cause protections and taking other actions like

0:16:09.560 --> 0:16:12.080
<v Speaker 4>this executive order that are very aggressive, and I think

0:16:12.080 --> 0:16:15.080
<v Speaker 4>they're setting up and hoping that they'll get the Supreme

0:16:15.120 --> 0:16:19.640
<v Speaker 4>Court to overturn Humphrey's Executor. It wouldn't be a big

0:16:19.680 --> 0:16:23.000
<v Speaker 4>stretch to expect the Supreme Court will do that. The

0:16:23.040 --> 0:16:24.880
<v Speaker 4>Supreme Court's been whittling away.

0:16:24.680 --> 0:16:27.560
<v Speaker 5>At Humphrey's Executor for easily.

0:16:27.440 --> 0:16:30.560
<v Speaker 4>Ten years or so now, and you know it's probably

0:16:30.840 --> 0:16:34.200
<v Speaker 4>expected by most observers to be on the chopping block.

0:16:34.240 --> 0:16:38.960
<v Speaker 4>The big deal will be if Humphrey's executor goes, Will

0:16:39.000 --> 0:16:43.560
<v Speaker 4>it go big time, that is, by sweeping in civil

0:16:43.560 --> 0:16:47.720
<v Speaker 4>service protections and protections for the federal reserves, monetary policy,

0:16:48.480 --> 0:16:52.400
<v Speaker 4>or will there be some way that the Supreme Court says, well,

0:16:52.440 --> 0:16:59.440
<v Speaker 4>it's unconstitutional for Congress to create insulation for every other

0:16:59.680 --> 0:17:05.320
<v Speaker 4>position in government, but we still think it's okay for

0:17:05.680 --> 0:17:09.840
<v Speaker 4>civil servants to be protected with some good cause protections

0:17:09.960 --> 0:17:14.040
<v Speaker 4>or for the Federal Reserve when it's adopting monetary policy

0:17:14.080 --> 0:17:17.200
<v Speaker 4>to have that. Hard to know exactly how the Supreme

0:17:17.240 --> 0:17:20.280
<v Speaker 4>Court will decide when this case comes before us, But

0:17:20.440 --> 0:17:23.800
<v Speaker 4>I think it's headed there, and this administration, I think

0:17:23.920 --> 0:17:27.880
<v Speaker 4>is already acting in effect as if it's been there.

0:17:27.920 --> 0:17:31.120
<v Speaker 5>And they want do we know.

0:17:31.240 --> 0:17:36.600
<v Speaker 3>Which Supreme Court justices are fully behind the unitary executive theory.

0:17:37.200 --> 0:17:40.280
<v Speaker 5>Well, I think there's probably a good majority.

0:17:39.920 --> 0:17:42.520
<v Speaker 4>That are inclined to this. I mean, you know, as

0:17:42.560 --> 0:17:47.600
<v Speaker 4>Chief Justice Roberts even has been kind of spearheading decisions

0:17:47.680 --> 0:17:51.879
<v Speaker 4>to whittle away at Humphrey's executor going back to the

0:17:51.920 --> 0:17:55.440
<v Speaker 4>decisions that first started to say that we couldn't have

0:17:55.680 --> 0:17:59.480
<v Speaker 4>sub agencies that have good cause protection if the head

0:17:59.520 --> 0:18:03.879
<v Speaker 4>agency did that was held to be unconstitutional. Then it

0:18:03.960 --> 0:18:07.280
<v Speaker 4>was held that you can't have a single headed body

0:18:07.480 --> 0:18:11.520
<v Speaker 4>that has an administrator that's got good cause protection. So

0:18:12.119 --> 0:18:16.520
<v Speaker 4>there's a clear majority that looks suspiciously on these They've

0:18:16.560 --> 0:18:21.920
<v Speaker 4>just been moving incrementally and maybe waiting for the case

0:18:21.960 --> 0:18:23.679
<v Speaker 4>that will take it to the next step.

0:18:24.480 --> 0:18:28.440
<v Speaker 3>I don't understand why a judge would want to give

0:18:29.080 --> 0:18:32.200
<v Speaker 3>more power to the head of the executive branch on

0:18:32.480 --> 0:18:35.160
<v Speaker 3>check power. I would think they want to keep more

0:18:35.240 --> 0:18:38.200
<v Speaker 3>balance between the branches of government.

0:18:38.880 --> 0:18:41.760
<v Speaker 4>Yeah, you know, I think if you look at at

0:18:41.800 --> 0:18:43.920
<v Speaker 4>a lot of the cases over the years, and there

0:18:44.000 --> 0:18:47.800
<v Speaker 4>haven't been that many, but when these issues have arisen,

0:18:48.080 --> 0:18:51.920
<v Speaker 4>the courts have been suspicious of Congress's power, believe it

0:18:52.040 --> 0:18:56.800
<v Speaker 4>or not, and Congress's power to kind of interfere with

0:18:56.960 --> 0:19:03.639
<v Speaker 4>the administration of government by putting in place limitations on

0:19:03.920 --> 0:19:08.480
<v Speaker 4>who can head up agencies or how they can be removed.

0:19:08.480 --> 0:19:13.120
<v Speaker 4>And I think there's been, you know, some sensible decisions

0:19:13.160 --> 0:19:16.760
<v Speaker 4>that have said, you know, Congress, you can't pick who

0:19:17.000 --> 0:19:21.720
<v Speaker 4>are the heads of agencies, or you can't yourself have

0:19:21.840 --> 0:19:25.800
<v Speaker 4>a role in deciding whether an agency head is removed

0:19:25.920 --> 0:19:29.520
<v Speaker 4>or not. But you know, now those cases and the

0:19:29.560 --> 0:19:33.080
<v Speaker 4>suspicion of Congress is sort of going to the extreme.

0:19:33.680 --> 0:19:37.560
<v Speaker 4>And you know, we do have justices on the Court

0:19:37.600 --> 0:19:42.000
<v Speaker 4>who have spent time, like Justice Roberts and Justice Kavanaugh

0:19:42.280 --> 0:19:45.520
<v Speaker 4>and so forth, who have spent time working in the

0:19:45.560 --> 0:19:50.080
<v Speaker 4>White House, and maybe that has emboldened them to think

0:19:50.200 --> 0:19:54.639
<v Speaker 4>in presidentialist terms. There's also I think a mindset of

0:19:55.600 --> 0:20:00.199
<v Speaker 4>sort of formalist, rigid hierarchical authority that some of our

0:20:00.960 --> 0:20:04.680
<v Speaker 4>justices and the majority seem to exhibit that they think

0:20:04.760 --> 0:20:07.680
<v Speaker 4>that there should be just one person at the top

0:20:07.920 --> 0:20:12.280
<v Speaker 4>of the executive branch who should get to say everything

0:20:12.680 --> 0:20:16.080
<v Speaker 4>that the government does and have the ability to shape

0:20:16.200 --> 0:20:20.320
<v Speaker 4>the course of all policies. Now that's not really I

0:20:20.359 --> 0:20:25.560
<v Speaker 4>think how the text of the Constitution is necessarily written.

0:20:25.680 --> 0:20:29.760
<v Speaker 4>There are actually no provisions in the Constitution dealing with

0:20:29.800 --> 0:20:35.000
<v Speaker 4>the removal of officials, So you know, it's not something

0:20:35.040 --> 0:20:38.399
<v Speaker 4>that's demanded by the text of the Constitution, Nor is

0:20:38.440 --> 0:20:42.480
<v Speaker 4>it really in our history, whether at the time of

0:20:42.520 --> 0:20:47.000
<v Speaker 4>the founding or subsequently, to say that Congress can't create

0:20:47.280 --> 0:20:51.080
<v Speaker 4>bodies that have some degree of autonomy from the president.

0:20:51.560 --> 0:20:54.439
<v Speaker 3>So we're a month into Trump's second term and the

0:20:54.480 --> 0:20:58.719
<v Speaker 3>administration is already going to the Supreme Court asking for

0:20:59.119 --> 0:21:04.080
<v Speaker 3>an unusual invention, asking the Justices to step into a

0:21:04.119 --> 0:21:08.320
<v Speaker 3>newly filed lawsuit and allow the president to fire the

0:21:08.359 --> 0:21:13.000
<v Speaker 3>head of a federal whistleblower agency Hampton Dellinger. Do you

0:21:13.040 --> 0:21:18.040
<v Speaker 3>think how the Court handles this will be an indication

0:21:18.280 --> 0:21:23.280
<v Speaker 3>of how they're going to respond to other attempts by

0:21:23.520 --> 0:21:25.320
<v Speaker 3>Trump to gain power.

0:21:25.440 --> 0:21:26.160
<v Speaker 5>Yes, or no.

0:21:26.400 --> 0:21:29.200
<v Speaker 4>I mean, it depends on how sweeping they want to

0:21:29.240 --> 0:21:33.000
<v Speaker 4>make their decision. It could be that this is just

0:21:33.040 --> 0:21:38.800
<v Speaker 4>a very narrow decision that follows from a prior precedent,

0:21:38.960 --> 0:21:41.520
<v Speaker 4>like I was saying before about where you know, there's

0:21:42.040 --> 0:21:46.200
<v Speaker 4>double layers of protection that can't exist, or so forth.

0:21:46.400 --> 0:21:49.280
<v Speaker 4>It may be a very narrow decision, in which case

0:21:49.280 --> 0:21:53.359
<v Speaker 4>we might not learn very much. I suspect that's probably

0:21:54.200 --> 0:21:58.520
<v Speaker 4>the easiest thing for the court to do, but you know,

0:21:58.760 --> 0:22:03.440
<v Speaker 4>I prize that Trump versus the United States says, yeah, well,

0:22:03.520 --> 0:22:07.159
<v Speaker 4>are the court wanted to really go at it and

0:22:07.440 --> 0:22:10.359
<v Speaker 4>make a very broad ruling about presidential immunity?

0:22:10.640 --> 0:22:12.920
<v Speaker 5>So we'll have to see.

0:22:12.960 --> 0:22:15.199
<v Speaker 3>Most people are assuming that lawsuits are going to be

0:22:15.240 --> 0:22:19.000
<v Speaker 3>brought over these executive orders, but we've seen that in

0:22:19.080 --> 0:22:24.840
<v Speaker 3>some of these cases over executive orders, the judges are

0:22:24.880 --> 0:22:29.200
<v Speaker 3>finding that the plaintiffs don't have standing to bring the case,

0:22:29.800 --> 0:22:32.760
<v Speaker 3>basically an interest in the outcome of the case. Who

0:22:32.800 --> 0:22:36.160
<v Speaker 3>would be able to bring a lawsuit over this executive order?

0:22:36.760 --> 0:22:39.320
<v Speaker 3>I mean, the heads of the agencies are Trump appointdee,

0:22:39.640 --> 0:22:42.480
<v Speaker 3>so they're not bringing a case right exactly.

0:22:42.760 --> 0:22:45.639
<v Speaker 4>It's going to be difficult because, first of all, the

0:22:45.680 --> 0:22:52.800
<v Speaker 4>executive order itself is hard to challenge. As an executive order.

0:22:52.920 --> 0:22:55.800
<v Speaker 4>It has to be some kind of concrete decision that

0:22:55.880 --> 0:23:01.160
<v Speaker 4>an agency's making that adversely affects somebody that you can

0:23:01.240 --> 0:23:03.960
<v Speaker 4>claim would not have been made that way but for

0:23:04.080 --> 0:23:08.800
<v Speaker 4>the executive order. And there's creative lawyers out there, and

0:23:09.000 --> 0:23:11.440
<v Speaker 4>there will be arguments in lawsuits that I think.

0:23:11.359 --> 0:23:12.280
<v Speaker 5>Will be filed.

0:23:12.400 --> 0:23:17.520
<v Speaker 4>Whether they're persuasive to the lower courts or ultimately to

0:23:17.560 --> 0:23:21.000
<v Speaker 4>the Supreme Court remains to be seen. It is though

0:23:21.040 --> 0:23:25.800
<v Speaker 4>the case that you know, executive orders rarely are themselves

0:23:26.400 --> 0:23:31.480
<v Speaker 4>directly vehicles for litigation. It's the actions that follow from them.

0:23:32.080 --> 0:23:35.600
<v Speaker 4>And as we were talking earlier, sometimes these actions that

0:23:35.720 --> 0:23:39.000
<v Speaker 4>might be thought to follow from them might be just

0:23:39.160 --> 0:23:43.960
<v Speaker 4>due to having a loyalist in these independent agencies to

0:23:44.040 --> 0:23:46.560
<v Speaker 4>begin with. So it may be hard to untangle how

0:23:46.640 --> 0:23:51.200
<v Speaker 4>much an adverse action that is being challenged is due

0:23:51.280 --> 0:23:55.240
<v Speaker 4>to the executive order versus just having a loyalist heading

0:23:55.320 --> 0:23:58.879
<v Speaker 4>up the commission. It's going to be probably facts specific,

0:23:59.240 --> 0:24:02.359
<v Speaker 4>and I think it also is a pretty long shot

0:24:02.440 --> 0:24:07.600
<v Speaker 4>given the predisposition of a majority of the Supreme Court

0:24:07.760 --> 0:24:10.720
<v Speaker 4>to be a pro presidentialist.

0:24:11.000 --> 0:24:13.840
<v Speaker 3>I'm sure Trump will keep the Supreme Court very busy.

0:24:14.040 --> 0:24:18.119
<v Speaker 3>Thanks so much, Carrie Death. Professor Kerry Coliniesi, who directs

0:24:18.160 --> 0:24:22.399
<v Speaker 3>the University of Pennsylvania Carry Law Schools program on regulation.

0:24:22.880 --> 0:24:25.840
<v Speaker 3>Coming up next on the Bloomberg Law Show, Jay and

0:24:25.960 --> 0:24:29.840
<v Speaker 3>Jay is on trial in bankruptcy court over its plan

0:24:29.960 --> 0:24:33.840
<v Speaker 3>to end thousands of lawsuits over its baby powder causing

0:24:33.920 --> 0:24:37.880
<v Speaker 3>cancer in a bankruptcy settlement. I'm June Grosso. When you're

0:24:37.920 --> 0:24:42.680
<v Speaker 3>listening to Bloomberg, Johnson and Johnson is trying to use

0:24:42.720 --> 0:24:46.480
<v Speaker 3>the power of bankruptcy to drive a settlement of thousands

0:24:46.480 --> 0:24:50.240
<v Speaker 3>of lawsuits filed by women or their family members who

0:24:50.280 --> 0:24:53.520
<v Speaker 3>claim it's baby powder gave them cancer. Jay and Jay,

0:24:53.600 --> 0:24:56.560
<v Speaker 3>one of the most profitable companies in the world, has

0:24:56.560 --> 0:25:00.600
<v Speaker 3>put a very small unit into bankruptcy to achieve this end.

0:25:00.960 --> 0:25:05.080
<v Speaker 3>Courts in New Jersey and Philadelphia stopped earlier attempts by

0:25:05.200 --> 0:25:08.320
<v Speaker 3>Jay and Jay to tap bankruptcy, but now the company

0:25:08.359 --> 0:25:11.520
<v Speaker 3>is betting on a different conclusion from a Texas court.

0:25:12.080 --> 0:25:16.200
<v Speaker 3>Joining me is Stephen Church, Bloomberg Bankruptcy Reporter. This case

0:25:16.240 --> 0:25:20.040
<v Speaker 3>has a long and complicated history. Tell us how we

0:25:20.080 --> 0:25:24.399
<v Speaker 3>got to this point. With a trial in Houston Texas Sure.

0:25:24.560 --> 0:25:27.880
<v Speaker 1>For the last ten years, Johnson and Johnson has been

0:25:27.960 --> 0:25:34.240
<v Speaker 1>fighting allegations that painted baby powder, something that has asbestos

0:25:34.320 --> 0:25:39.879
<v Speaker 1>in it, allegedly pauses ovarian cancer and other gynecological cancers

0:25:39.960 --> 0:25:43.640
<v Speaker 1>in women who use this powder just about every day.

0:25:44.200 --> 0:25:47.720
<v Speaker 1>Those lawsuits have slowly been building. There have been more

0:25:47.720 --> 0:25:51.680
<v Speaker 1>and more than filed. Now there are about sixty thousand

0:25:51.760 --> 0:25:55.240
<v Speaker 1>lawsuits that have been filed and another twenty five thousand

0:25:55.320 --> 0:25:58.040
<v Speaker 1>or so claims that have not yet been filed in

0:25:58.119 --> 0:26:01.880
<v Speaker 1>court but are still being prepared by lawyers. The company

0:26:01.920 --> 0:26:06.600
<v Speaker 1>has fought them throughout the entire time and has refused

0:26:06.600 --> 0:26:10.200
<v Speaker 1>to settle, and has claimed repeatedly that there is no

0:26:10.680 --> 0:26:15.199
<v Speaker 1>scientific link between bata by powder and other calc based

0:26:15.240 --> 0:26:18.680
<v Speaker 1>products and cancer. The problem is they've had at least

0:26:18.720 --> 0:26:21.399
<v Speaker 1>one major verdict that went all the way to the

0:26:21.400 --> 0:26:25.280
<v Speaker 1>Supreme Court, forcing Johnson and Johnson to pay out more

0:26:25.320 --> 0:26:29.480
<v Speaker 1>than two billion dollars two about twenty winning. That got

0:26:29.520 --> 0:26:33.320
<v Speaker 1>the company's attention, and they tried to find a new

0:26:33.359 --> 0:26:36.359
<v Speaker 1>way to resolve these all at once. That new way,

0:26:36.840 --> 0:26:39.640
<v Speaker 1>just a few years ago, was to go into bankruptcy court.

0:26:39.960 --> 0:26:44.000
<v Speaker 1>The theory is they took a small unit and made

0:26:44.080 --> 0:26:48.600
<v Speaker 1>this unit responsible for paying off all the CALC claims.

0:26:48.800 --> 0:26:51.919
<v Speaker 1>Then they gave this unit a contract that promised that

0:26:52.000 --> 0:26:55.359
<v Speaker 1>Johnson and Johnson would cover all the expenses. They've tried

0:26:55.400 --> 0:27:00.560
<v Speaker 1>this three times. The first two bankruptcy cases of a

0:27:00.680 --> 0:27:03.400
<v Speaker 1>unit of Johnson and Johnson where they tried to create

0:27:03.440 --> 0:27:07.360
<v Speaker 1>this settlement failed. They're now on their third attempt, and

0:27:07.680 --> 0:27:10.119
<v Speaker 1>this third attempt has gotten further than the other two.

0:27:10.640 --> 0:27:14.120
<v Speaker 1>They're after an actual trial where a judge will decide

0:27:14.600 --> 0:27:18.800
<v Speaker 1>whether the plan to pay nine billion dollars out is

0:27:19.440 --> 0:27:23.440
<v Speaker 1>legitimate or has fatal flaws that cannot be approved.

0:27:23.720 --> 0:27:25.399
<v Speaker 3>I don't know how many attorneys there are, but there

0:27:25.400 --> 0:27:29.000
<v Speaker 3>are many attorneys and they're fighting. Some want the settlement,

0:27:29.119 --> 0:27:31.160
<v Speaker 3>some don't want the settlement correct.

0:27:31.600 --> 0:27:35.920
<v Speaker 1>There are about two dozen or so prominent attorneys who

0:27:35.960 --> 0:27:40.200
<v Speaker 1>represent tens of thousands of women who have some sort

0:27:40.359 --> 0:27:43.320
<v Speaker 1>of health issues that they claim came from the baby

0:27:43.359 --> 0:27:47.560
<v Speaker 1>powder or related products. Most of those attorneys have settled

0:27:47.600 --> 0:27:51.080
<v Speaker 1>with Johnson and Johnson in this third effort, and they

0:27:51.160 --> 0:27:55.399
<v Speaker 1>have agreed that a trust fund with nine billion dollars

0:27:55.440 --> 0:27:59.120
<v Speaker 1>in it will be set up to handle almost all

0:27:59.200 --> 0:28:01.920
<v Speaker 1>of the talk really claims. There may be a few

0:28:02.000 --> 0:28:05.200
<v Speaker 1>hundreds that are exempt, but almost all of these claims

0:28:05.200 --> 0:28:07.880
<v Speaker 1>will go to a special trust where they have rules

0:28:07.880 --> 0:28:11.400
<v Speaker 1>set up to decide who gets paid and how much

0:28:11.440 --> 0:28:14.800
<v Speaker 1>they get paid. Holdouts, a handful of attorneys who represent

0:28:15.080 --> 0:28:18.720
<v Speaker 1>several thousand women object. They say there isn't enough money

0:28:18.840 --> 0:28:23.120
<v Speaker 1>and that the plan itself is flawed and legally can't

0:28:23.119 --> 0:28:23.879
<v Speaker 1>be justified.

0:28:24.080 --> 0:28:27.720
<v Speaker 3>What made it different this time around was that Johnson

0:28:27.760 --> 0:28:32.119
<v Speaker 3>and Johnson got pre approval from a majority of the claimants.

0:28:32.400 --> 0:28:35.159
<v Speaker 1>Yes, Johnson and Johnson made a couple of changes in

0:28:35.240 --> 0:28:38.760
<v Speaker 1>between their second failure and this third effort. After a

0:28:38.800 --> 0:28:44.120
<v Speaker 1>Philadelphia federal appeals court rejected their second attempt to win

0:28:44.200 --> 0:28:48.520
<v Speaker 1>approval of this trust fund, Johnson and Johnson negotiated heavily

0:28:48.600 --> 0:28:52.760
<v Speaker 1>with many of the plaintiffs firms and got a new deal.

0:28:52.880 --> 0:28:56.160
<v Speaker 1>They added more than a billion dollars on top of

0:28:56.240 --> 0:28:59.120
<v Speaker 1>the original offer, bringing it to nine billion. And they

0:28:59.120 --> 0:29:03.880
<v Speaker 1>also did something that happens in many bankruptcies, big giant bankruptcies,

0:29:03.920 --> 0:29:06.760
<v Speaker 1>where they took a vote of all of the claimants

0:29:07.240 --> 0:29:11.600
<v Speaker 1>in order to prepackage the bankruptcy case. They wrote the plan,

0:29:11.920 --> 0:29:15.440
<v Speaker 1>they developed the trust, and they asked more than eighty

0:29:15.440 --> 0:29:18.520
<v Speaker 1>thousand women to vote in favor of it. Many of

0:29:18.560 --> 0:29:21.200
<v Speaker 1>the women did, most of the women. Johnson and Johnson

0:29:21.320 --> 0:29:26.080
<v Speaker 1>claims that more than seventy five percent voted in favor

0:29:26.120 --> 0:29:29.720
<v Speaker 1>of the plan. The holdouts claim that those numbers are

0:29:29.760 --> 0:29:33.600
<v Speaker 1>not accurate because of some flaws in the way the

0:29:33.680 --> 0:29:37.720
<v Speaker 1>voting took place. They claimed Johnson and Johnson bought votes.

0:29:37.840 --> 0:29:40.880
<v Speaker 1>They claimed Johnson and Johnson counted votes in favor of

0:29:40.920 --> 0:29:43.120
<v Speaker 1>the plan that should have been counted against the plan.

0:29:43.760 --> 0:29:47.720
<v Speaker 1>And so that's a very technical aspect of this trial.

0:29:48.320 --> 0:29:51.960
<v Speaker 1>Was the voting fair? Was it in compliance with these

0:29:52.040 --> 0:29:55.800
<v Speaker 1>detailed rules that happen in bankruptcy court? Both sides have

0:29:55.920 --> 0:29:58.120
<v Speaker 1>spent a lot of money fighting on this case.

0:29:58.840 --> 0:30:01.280
<v Speaker 3>Is that the main question that the judge is going

0:30:01.320 --> 0:30:04.680
<v Speaker 3>to decide? Or is he going to decide the fairness

0:30:04.720 --> 0:30:07.840
<v Speaker 3>of this? I mean, what's his major question?

0:30:08.240 --> 0:30:11.360
<v Speaker 1>There are two big focuses. The one is the voting.

0:30:11.760 --> 0:30:13.960
<v Speaker 1>Was the voting does correctly? Then once you get past

0:30:13.960 --> 0:30:17.200
<v Speaker 1>the voting, there's another set of objections that might be

0:30:17.280 --> 0:30:22.000
<v Speaker 1>even more serious. Those complaints are mostly coming from the

0:30:22.360 --> 0:30:25.880
<v Speaker 1>US Trustee, that's the arm of the US Justice Department

0:30:25.960 --> 0:30:28.680
<v Speaker 1>that is a watchdog in corporate bankruptcies. Some of the

0:30:28.720 --> 0:30:31.520
<v Speaker 1>holdout playments, some of the holdout women who are assuming

0:30:31.640 --> 0:30:34.959
<v Speaker 1>also back this type of argument against the plan, and

0:30:35.000 --> 0:30:38.080
<v Speaker 1>that is Johnson and Johnson is one of the world's

0:30:38.120 --> 0:30:42.080
<v Speaker 1>most profitable companies. How is it possible that they can

0:30:42.280 --> 0:30:47.200
<v Speaker 1>use these special bankruptcy rules that are designed for companies

0:30:47.480 --> 0:30:52.760
<v Speaker 1>in financial distress, companies with serious financial problems in order

0:30:52.800 --> 0:30:56.800
<v Speaker 1>to cancel a bunch of debt and create this new trust.

0:30:57.080 --> 0:31:00.480
<v Speaker 1>Jaun Cheen Johnson argues, well, there's an exception under a

0:31:00.560 --> 0:31:04.200
<v Speaker 1>law that Congress passed many years ago, cases that are

0:31:04.280 --> 0:31:08.320
<v Speaker 1>about asbestos. If a company uses asbestos, which is a

0:31:08.400 --> 0:31:12.480
<v Speaker 1>known toxic substance in one of its products, and that

0:31:12.560 --> 0:31:18.240
<v Speaker 1>company files for bankruptcy, then related parties related companies can

0:31:18.400 --> 0:31:22.800
<v Speaker 1>also benefit from that bankruptcy case. So in this case,

0:31:23.120 --> 0:31:25.960
<v Speaker 1>the two big issues are was the voting done properly?

0:31:26.280 --> 0:31:28.880
<v Speaker 1>And then step back, did Johnson and Johnson even be

0:31:28.960 --> 0:31:32.080
<v Speaker 1>allowed to take advantage of these bankruptcy rules If the

0:31:32.200 --> 0:31:35.240
<v Speaker 1>company itself doesn't go bankrupt and they take advantage of

0:31:35.280 --> 0:31:38.280
<v Speaker 1>this tiny little unit put it in bankruptcy, and then

0:31:38.320 --> 0:31:40.360
<v Speaker 1>that giant corporation gets the benefit.

0:31:40.600 --> 0:31:45.000
<v Speaker 3>Is the bankruptcy trustee afraid that this would set a

0:31:45.040 --> 0:31:47.800
<v Speaker 3>precedent if Johnson and Johnson's allowed to do this.

0:31:48.280 --> 0:31:52.120
<v Speaker 1>There is that argument that this will encourage other very

0:31:52.120 --> 0:31:57.280
<v Speaker 1>profitable companies to use sort of a loophole to avoid

0:31:57.760 --> 0:32:02.480
<v Speaker 1>bankruptcy themselves. You can dump and eliminate these big lawsuits

0:32:03.120 --> 0:32:05.200
<v Speaker 1>without actually going bankrupt yourself.

0:32:05.640 --> 0:32:08.959
<v Speaker 3>Was one of the first witnesses, one of the plaintiff's

0:32:09.120 --> 0:32:11.960
<v Speaker 3>lawyers talking about, you know, the position that some of

0:32:12.200 --> 0:32:13.360
<v Speaker 3>his clients are in.

0:32:13.800 --> 0:32:17.520
<v Speaker 1>Yes. What's unusual about this is that there's only been

0:32:17.720 --> 0:32:22.040
<v Speaker 1>one major victory against Johnson and Johnson that made them

0:32:22.080 --> 0:32:24.960
<v Speaker 1>all the way through the appeal process, and that forced

0:32:25.040 --> 0:32:28.560
<v Speaker 1>Johnson Johnson to pay money to victims. What has happened

0:32:29.000 --> 0:32:31.840
<v Speaker 1>until now is many of these cases have been stuck

0:32:31.880 --> 0:32:36.360
<v Speaker 1>on appeal. So some women have won hundreds of millions

0:32:36.360 --> 0:32:40.120
<v Speaker 1>of dollars, but those cases were overturned on appeal, and

0:32:40.160 --> 0:32:43.640
<v Speaker 1>now there are still fights going on in state courts

0:32:43.680 --> 0:32:47.160
<v Speaker 1>and in federal courts over whether some of these cases

0:32:47.240 --> 0:32:52.200
<v Speaker 1>should eventually be upheld or rejected. That has stalled a

0:32:52.240 --> 0:32:56.400
<v Speaker 1>lot of the plaintiff's lawyers from being able to move forward.

0:32:56.880 --> 0:32:59.800
<v Speaker 1>So the net result is that none of these women

0:33:00.240 --> 0:33:03.680
<v Speaker 1>have actually collected money from Johnson and Johnson other than

0:33:03.720 --> 0:33:06.240
<v Speaker 1>that one unusual case that've been all the way to

0:33:06.240 --> 0:33:10.040
<v Speaker 1>the Supreme Court. One lawyer testified earlier this week that

0:33:10.160 --> 0:33:13.840
<v Speaker 1>he has at least twenty thousand women that he represents

0:33:14.080 --> 0:33:16.959
<v Speaker 1>who haven't collected the dining yet, and his argument in

0:33:17.040 --> 0:33:20.680
<v Speaker 1>favor of the cases, this is the fastest way to

0:33:20.720 --> 0:33:23.000
<v Speaker 1>get money to them. Put the money in the trust

0:33:23.480 --> 0:33:26.040
<v Speaker 1>and then let the women go to the trust explain

0:33:26.080 --> 0:33:29.960
<v Speaker 1>their situation, fill out a whole lot of incredibly complicated

0:33:30.040 --> 0:33:33.640
<v Speaker 1>forms explaining their health condition, how they got cancer, what

0:33:33.840 --> 0:33:37.480
<v Speaker 1>cancer stage they are in, what types of ailments they have,

0:33:38.440 --> 0:33:42.040
<v Speaker 1>and then a trust board will then decide, based on

0:33:42.320 --> 0:33:46.960
<v Speaker 1>complicated rules, how much they get paid. That this attorney

0:33:47.040 --> 0:33:50.440
<v Speaker 1>and many of his allies argue is the fastest way

0:33:50.640 --> 0:33:54.640
<v Speaker 1>to get money into the pockets of women who have cancer.

0:33:55.000 --> 0:33:58.840
<v Speaker 3>Is it expected that this decision here would be taken

0:33:58.920 --> 0:34:02.320
<v Speaker 3>up on appeal and then eventually end up at the

0:34:02.360 --> 0:34:03.280
<v Speaker 3>Supreme Court.

0:34:03.720 --> 0:34:05.880
<v Speaker 1>Most of the lawyers in the court room in this

0:34:06.040 --> 0:34:08.400
<v Speaker 1>trial have accepted the idea that there will be an

0:34:08.400 --> 0:34:10.800
<v Speaker 1>appeal no matter what. Whether that appeal goes all the

0:34:10.840 --> 0:34:13.920
<v Speaker 1>way to the Supreme Court is an open question. But

0:34:14.320 --> 0:34:18.520
<v Speaker 1>the Federal Appeals Court in Texas has a much different

0:34:18.640 --> 0:34:23.600
<v Speaker 1>standard when it comes to certain kinds of cases and

0:34:23.760 --> 0:34:28.439
<v Speaker 1>how you decide whether a case fits the law than

0:34:28.800 --> 0:34:33.279
<v Speaker 1>the Philadelphia Appeals Court. So the assumption is that when

0:34:33.320 --> 0:34:35.720
<v Speaker 1>this gets appealed, no matter who, whether one side wins

0:34:35.719 --> 0:34:37.600
<v Speaker 1>and one side loses, somebody is going to go to

0:34:37.760 --> 0:34:41.360
<v Speaker 1>the appeals court in Texas, the Federal Appeals Court in Texas,

0:34:41.520 --> 0:34:45.080
<v Speaker 1>and that's where a lot of the answers will come from,

0:34:45.280 --> 0:34:48.840
<v Speaker 1>probably the last stage. But even that could be appealed

0:34:48.920 --> 0:34:52.440
<v Speaker 1>to the US Supreme Court, and if that happens, we

0:34:52.520 --> 0:34:56.680
<v Speaker 1>could see a precedent that other companies will will try

0:34:56.680 --> 0:34:57.840
<v Speaker 1>to take advantage.

0:34:57.360 --> 0:35:01.040
<v Speaker 3>Of, and that appeals court will be the Fifth Circuit,

0:35:01.680 --> 0:35:05.440
<v Speaker 3>which is the most conservative circuit in the country and

0:35:06.120 --> 0:35:10.240
<v Speaker 3>has often come up with, shall we say, novel theories

0:35:10.280 --> 0:35:13.640
<v Speaker 3>of the law. Thanks so much, Steven, we'll check back

0:35:13.680 --> 0:35:17.040
<v Speaker 3>with you at the end of the trial. That's Stephen Church,

0:35:17.239 --> 0:35:20.600
<v Speaker 3>Bloomberg Bankruptcy Reporter, and that's it for this edition of

0:35:20.600 --> 0:35:23.239
<v Speaker 3>The Bloomberg Law Show. Remember you can always get the

0:35:23.320 --> 0:35:26.560
<v Speaker 3>latest legal news on our Bloomberg Law podcast. You can

0:35:26.560 --> 0:35:30.799
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0:35:30.840 --> 0:35:35.000
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0:35:35.040 --> 0:35:38.120
<v Speaker 3>tune into The Bloomberg Law Show every weeknight at ten

0:35:38.160 --> 0:35:41.920
<v Speaker 3>pm Wall Street Time. I'm June Grosso and you're listening

0:35:42.000 --> 0:35:42.680
<v Speaker 3>to Bloomberg