1 00:00:00,240 --> 00:00:04,680 Speaker 1: From UFOs to psychic powers and government conspiracies. History is 2 00:00:04,760 --> 00:00:09,080 Speaker 1: riddled with unexplained events. You can turn back now or 3 00:00:09,200 --> 00:00:12,079 Speaker 1: learn the stuff they don't want you to know. A 4 00:00:12,200 --> 00:00:25,520 Speaker 1: production of I Heart Radio. Hello, welcome back to the show. 5 00:00:25,600 --> 00:00:27,920 Speaker 1: My name is Matt, my name is Noe. They called 6 00:00:27,920 --> 00:00:30,280 Speaker 1: me Ben. We are joined as always with our super 7 00:00:30,360 --> 00:00:34,479 Speaker 1: producer Alexis code named Doc Holiday Jackson. Most importantly, you 8 00:00:34,560 --> 00:00:37,400 Speaker 1: are you, You are here, and that makes this the 9 00:00:37,560 --> 00:00:40,279 Speaker 1: stuff they don't want you to know. It is the 10 00:00:40,320 --> 00:00:44,919 Speaker 1: top of the week as we continue our march towards two. 11 00:00:45,400 --> 00:00:47,440 Speaker 1: So much stuff is going on in the news. The 12 00:00:47,520 --> 00:00:51,360 Speaker 1: trial of Glenn Maxwell has reached a new milestone as 13 00:00:51,840 --> 00:00:55,200 Speaker 1: the court tries to pick jurors that don't seem biased, 14 00:00:55,240 --> 00:00:58,280 Speaker 1: which is going to be a tall milkshake. Most interestingly, 15 00:00:58,400 --> 00:01:03,160 Speaker 1: perhaps defendants or co defendants have been published. They include 16 00:01:03,200 --> 00:01:06,320 Speaker 1: things like the Weinstein Company and Walt Disney a lot 17 00:01:06,400 --> 00:01:09,600 Speaker 1: of other people. It's available online. You can read it now, 18 00:01:10,280 --> 00:01:14,679 Speaker 1: but we're holding on an update for that until we 19 00:01:14,760 --> 00:01:18,400 Speaker 1: get more information and maybe see what the trial shakes 20 00:01:18,480 --> 00:01:21,800 Speaker 1: loose if it is indeed an actual trial and not 21 00:01:22,040 --> 00:01:26,800 Speaker 1: a very wealthy kangaroo court. But for now, for anyone 22 00:01:26,840 --> 00:01:33,000 Speaker 1: who's paying attention to news, things are things are looking fragile, folks. 23 00:01:33,080 --> 00:01:35,280 Speaker 1: They always have been kind of a house of cards, 24 00:01:35,360 --> 00:01:39,759 Speaker 1: but now we're seeing great growing unrest that was predicted 25 00:01:40,080 --> 00:01:44,160 Speaker 1: in countries across the world, places like Chile, A, places 26 00:01:44,240 --> 00:01:48,400 Speaker 1: like Eastern Europe, Central Europe, the United States, and the 27 00:01:48,520 --> 00:01:51,720 Speaker 1: United States. Spoiler alert, stay tuned for the entirety of 28 00:01:51,720 --> 00:01:55,400 Speaker 1: this segment. We're also we're also going to see something 29 00:01:55,440 --> 00:01:59,320 Speaker 1: that something is causing experts in the world of online 30 00:01:59,320 --> 00:02:03,520 Speaker 1: activity to say, hey, maybe people are getting dumber for now. 31 00:02:04,160 --> 00:02:08,560 Speaker 1: Maybe we open up with a story of unrest from 32 00:02:08,600 --> 00:02:12,160 Speaker 1: here in the good old us of A. You guys, 33 00:02:12,480 --> 00:02:15,320 Speaker 1: have you ever been in a Louis Vatton store. Yes, 34 00:02:15,880 --> 00:02:19,640 Speaker 1: there's a really bougie mall here in Atlanta. Uh is 35 00:02:19,639 --> 00:02:25,280 Speaker 1: it Lenox or Phips, one of the fips. They have 36 00:02:25,360 --> 00:02:27,360 Speaker 1: a Louis Vaton store. I think I didn't go in 37 00:02:27,440 --> 00:02:30,160 Speaker 1: because it was like COVID times and it was there 38 00:02:30,160 --> 00:02:33,079 Speaker 1: limiting them then they were limiting how many people could 39 00:02:33,080 --> 00:02:34,960 Speaker 1: be in there at once. But I did walk past 40 00:02:35,000 --> 00:02:38,000 Speaker 1: it and it sure looked fancy. Yeah, our office used 41 00:02:38,040 --> 00:02:41,400 Speaker 1: to be right by those two malls, which are walking 42 00:02:41,440 --> 00:02:44,440 Speaker 1: distance from one another Lenox Mall, which has by far 43 00:02:44,480 --> 00:02:47,600 Speaker 1: the better food court, and Phips Mall, which is very 44 00:02:47,680 --> 00:02:50,359 Speaker 1: much for the upper class and doesn't have the best 45 00:02:50,400 --> 00:02:53,680 Speaker 1: food court, which is mystifying to me. I guess, uh, 46 00:02:53,840 --> 00:02:56,080 Speaker 1: I guess. The idea is that if you, if you 47 00:02:56,120 --> 00:02:58,720 Speaker 1: have the wherewithal financially to shop at a place like 48 00:02:58,760 --> 00:03:01,840 Speaker 1: Phipps Plaza, and you are not the kind of person 49 00:03:02,080 --> 00:03:04,679 Speaker 1: who enjoys good greasy burger, which I feel like it 50 00:03:04,760 --> 00:03:08,359 Speaker 1: is an unfair stereotype. But they do have some really 51 00:03:08,400 --> 00:03:11,520 Speaker 1: expensive food over there, though they do. They do, they 52 00:03:11,520 --> 00:03:16,720 Speaker 1: have some unnecessarily fancy restaurants and weird themes to them 53 00:03:16,760 --> 00:03:19,120 Speaker 1: as well. Maybe there's an eyes wide shut kind of 54 00:03:19,200 --> 00:03:21,880 Speaker 1: vibe that we just weren't getting when we were a 55 00:03:21,919 --> 00:03:28,120 Speaker 1: bunch of like broke video makers. So so another store 56 00:03:28,200 --> 00:03:30,400 Speaker 1: that's kind of fancy or to some I don't know, 57 00:03:30,440 --> 00:03:33,240 Speaker 1: I don't know. Is Nordstrom a fancy store? Where is 58 00:03:33,280 --> 00:03:37,839 Speaker 1: it in like the hierarchy of department stores medium? I think? 59 00:03:37,880 --> 00:03:40,119 Speaker 1: And then there's also a Nordstrom Rack, which I think 60 00:03:40,160 --> 00:03:44,160 Speaker 1: is like the more like um middle class facing version 61 00:03:44,280 --> 00:03:46,240 Speaker 1: of Nordstrom. Maybe nor Strom was like one of those 62 00:03:46,320 --> 00:03:49,840 Speaker 1: Legacy New York kind of Fifth Avenue, you know, department store. 63 00:03:49,880 --> 00:03:51,720 Speaker 1: That's how I think of it. But I'm not really 64 00:03:51,720 --> 00:03:54,200 Speaker 1: sure it's it's like fancy or Macy's, I think. Can 65 00:03:54,240 --> 00:03:56,960 Speaker 1: I say this. I went into a Macy's to buy 66 00:03:56,960 --> 00:04:00,520 Speaker 1: some clothes recently for a thing, and I didn't realize 67 00:04:00,640 --> 00:04:05,160 Speaker 1: that it was all these big expensive brands that filled 68 00:04:05,240 --> 00:04:08,880 Speaker 1: Macy's when it comes to clothing. For some reason, in 69 00:04:08,960 --> 00:04:12,600 Speaker 1: my mind, it was like shopping at any other I 70 00:04:12,640 --> 00:04:16,159 Speaker 1: don't know, gosh, I just realized I don't spend enough money, 71 00:04:16,200 --> 00:04:20,159 Speaker 1: maybe on clothes. I don't know that. I've never seen 72 00:04:20,560 --> 00:04:23,640 Speaker 1: more expensive clothing in my life than that that Macy's. 73 00:04:23,760 --> 00:04:25,880 Speaker 1: And then I was told by a friend that that's 74 00:04:25,920 --> 00:04:28,760 Speaker 1: like on the cheap side. So now I just don't 75 00:04:28,760 --> 00:04:31,440 Speaker 1: know what to think. Guys, did did you get a suit? 76 00:04:31,839 --> 00:04:36,400 Speaker 1: I got some parts of a suit. Nice man nice. Uh. Yeah. 77 00:04:36,720 --> 00:04:40,120 Speaker 1: It's strange because also the era of brick and mortar 78 00:04:40,200 --> 00:04:42,800 Speaker 1: department stores has has been on the decline for a 79 00:04:42,839 --> 00:04:46,520 Speaker 1: while with the rise of online shopping exacerbated by the 80 00:04:46,640 --> 00:04:51,839 Speaker 1: rise of COVID. Here's what's going on. Looting, looting is happening, 81 00:04:51,960 --> 00:04:56,000 Speaker 1: and Moss it's not getting a ton of reporting, which 82 00:04:56,080 --> 00:04:59,400 Speaker 1: is kind of odd because it is red meat for 83 00:04:59,520 --> 00:05:03,040 Speaker 1: the sort of mainstream news that makes money by telling 84 00:05:03,080 --> 00:05:05,679 Speaker 1: people the sky is falling in the world is ending 85 00:05:06,200 --> 00:05:11,360 Speaker 1: one way or another. Just a few days ago, this 86 00:05:11,560 --> 00:05:16,480 Speaker 1: Nordstrom store in Walnut Creek, California, encountered a kind of 87 00:05:16,520 --> 00:05:20,640 Speaker 1: shoplifting that had had not occurred before since and probably 88 00:05:20,680 --> 00:05:24,279 Speaker 1: wouldn't occur outside of an old school riot were it 89 00:05:24,360 --> 00:05:29,360 Speaker 1: not for social media. Dozens and dozens of people, about 90 00:05:29,360 --> 00:05:33,640 Speaker 1: eight people rushed into this store in Walnut Creek and 91 00:05:34,920 --> 00:05:39,360 Speaker 1: robbed everything that wasn't tied down. One employee was pepper 92 00:05:39,400 --> 00:05:43,680 Speaker 1: sprayed to others were punched, kicked, subdued. All of those folks, 93 00:05:43,680 --> 00:05:47,240 Speaker 1: all three of those folks have minor injuries and thankfully 94 00:05:47,279 --> 00:05:51,560 Speaker 1: no one was killed. But the suspects we're attacking the 95 00:05:51,640 --> 00:05:56,599 Speaker 1: store as an organized group, and law enforcement isn't sure 96 00:05:56,920 --> 00:06:01,039 Speaker 1: how this happened. But think about this. This cinematic cars 97 00:06:01,120 --> 00:06:05,880 Speaker 1: or so blocked the street and ran interference while a 98 00:06:05,920 --> 00:06:09,040 Speaker 1: crowd of almost a hundred people ran into the same store. 99 00:06:09,520 --> 00:06:13,000 Speaker 1: Think about how understaff stores are now. There's no way 100 00:06:13,080 --> 00:06:15,840 Speaker 1: for people to stop them, even if you are one 101 00:06:15,880 --> 00:06:19,760 Speaker 1: of the security folks, and you're the best person. You're 102 00:06:19,800 --> 00:06:23,839 Speaker 1: like the Captain America of department store security. You have 103 00:06:23,960 --> 00:06:27,599 Speaker 1: no chance against a D people. In fact, also many 104 00:06:27,680 --> 00:06:33,960 Speaker 1: corporations have laws that prevent these security guards from physically 105 00:06:34,000 --> 00:06:38,400 Speaker 1: engaging with a shoplifter or something. Right, so we have 106 00:06:38,640 --> 00:06:42,320 Speaker 1: video from the scene thanks to the good efforts of 107 00:06:42,480 --> 00:06:46,960 Speaker 1: Jody Hernandez and Jodie Hernandez is and journalist in the area. 108 00:06:47,440 --> 00:06:51,719 Speaker 1: She found that of these a D people who are 109 00:06:51,760 --> 00:06:56,919 Speaker 1: in ski mask we were carrying crowbars, etcetera, three managed 110 00:06:56,960 --> 00:07:01,680 Speaker 1: to be arrested, and that is a terrible rate of 111 00:07:02,480 --> 00:07:05,600 Speaker 1: rate of success for law enforcement. I wanted to bring 112 00:07:05,640 --> 00:07:10,200 Speaker 1: this story to everyone because it tells us some pretty 113 00:07:10,560 --> 00:07:16,280 Speaker 1: fascinating things. First, it was clearly coordinated. This is like, 114 00:07:16,600 --> 00:07:19,840 Speaker 1: this is crowdsourcing, like the improv everywhere people, except instead 115 00:07:19,840 --> 00:07:24,480 Speaker 1: of doing acute see seemingly spontaneous dance party, they have 116 00:07:25,360 --> 00:07:28,000 Speaker 1: they have gone on TikTok or a telegram or a 117 00:07:28,000 --> 00:07:31,240 Speaker 1: signal or what have Probably not Facebook because Facebook is 118 00:07:31,280 --> 00:07:34,920 Speaker 1: so hilariously compromised Facebook as an op at this point, 119 00:07:35,160 --> 00:07:37,960 Speaker 1: but they've probably been on TikTok or something like that 120 00:07:38,640 --> 00:07:42,720 Speaker 1: planning to pull this off. So we've got short staffing, 121 00:07:42,920 --> 00:07:45,800 Speaker 1: we've got social media allowing for this kind of planning. 122 00:07:45,960 --> 00:07:50,040 Speaker 1: And then add to that, because of concerns about supply chains, 123 00:07:50,080 --> 00:07:54,360 Speaker 1: these brick and mortar stores, these physical locations are trying 124 00:07:54,400 --> 00:07:59,160 Speaker 1: to amass more inventory than they usually would have, right 125 00:07:59,280 --> 00:08:02,040 Speaker 1: so they they want to get ahead of possible shortages 126 00:08:02,320 --> 00:08:05,880 Speaker 1: as the holidays loom closer and closer. So this means 127 00:08:05,960 --> 00:08:09,920 Speaker 1: it's the perfect time to commit a crime like this, 128 00:08:10,040 --> 00:08:12,360 Speaker 1: And we're not condoning it. I don't think any of 129 00:08:12,440 --> 00:08:15,280 Speaker 1: us are, but we are saying the timing couldn't have 130 00:08:15,280 --> 00:08:17,800 Speaker 1: worked out better. Had you guys heard about this before 131 00:08:17,800 --> 00:08:20,480 Speaker 1: we talked about it on air, Nope, No, I just 132 00:08:20,520 --> 00:08:23,920 Speaker 1: heard about it looking through the news this morning. Seems 133 00:08:24,640 --> 00:08:27,200 Speaker 1: pretty intense. I've heard of things kind of like this before, 134 00:08:27,400 --> 00:08:31,680 Speaker 1: but we've like talked about just in in amongst the 135 00:08:31,720 --> 00:08:35,400 Speaker 1: three of us. But this seems like a whole operation 136 00:08:35,440 --> 00:08:38,160 Speaker 1: that you could make like a TV series about kind 137 00:08:38,200 --> 00:08:41,240 Speaker 1: of thing. And this isn't tied to any like opportunism 138 00:08:41,320 --> 00:08:44,080 Speaker 1: around like riots or unrest or anything. This is just 139 00:08:44,200 --> 00:08:48,080 Speaker 1: like its own thing. No ties to Ahmed Arebrey, no 140 00:08:48,240 --> 00:08:51,480 Speaker 1: ties to the Rittenhouse, decision. This did not occur in 141 00:08:51,480 --> 00:08:56,160 Speaker 1: a vacuum though, because there were other lootings the Friday 142 00:08:56,240 --> 00:09:00,600 Speaker 1: night before in Union Square another crowd attack UH and 143 00:09:00,760 --> 00:09:03,760 Speaker 1: other areas of San Francisco. A Louis Vuitton store got hit, 144 00:09:03,840 --> 00:09:08,880 Speaker 1: a berbery store, a jewelry store, of Walgreens, an eyeglass 145 00:09:08,920 --> 00:09:13,160 Speaker 1: shop for some reason, of Bloomingdale's, and even cannabis dispensaries. 146 00:09:13,200 --> 00:09:15,600 Speaker 1: And I understand there's money there, and I understand there's 147 00:09:15,640 --> 00:09:20,559 Speaker 1: marijuana there. But also, as one of the employees doubtlessly said, 148 00:09:20,640 --> 00:09:23,079 Speaker 1: like think about the karma, dude, what are you doing. 149 00:09:23,559 --> 00:09:26,640 Speaker 1: We're you know, we're not the man, We're not at 150 00:09:26,679 --> 00:09:29,840 Speaker 1: the power structure. But they still got they still got got, 151 00:09:29,920 --> 00:09:33,600 Speaker 1: they got hit, and they when they got rolled. The 152 00:09:33,640 --> 00:09:37,320 Speaker 1: people responsible for these crimes made off for the most 153 00:09:37,360 --> 00:09:40,520 Speaker 1: part hashtag no Bernie. What I'm saying is they got away. 154 00:09:40,880 --> 00:09:44,679 Speaker 1: And this this is something that I think the US 155 00:09:44,760 --> 00:09:47,840 Speaker 1: will see more of in the future. In response, law 156 00:09:47,960 --> 00:09:52,440 Speaker 1: enforcement in the area is pledging to quote flood the 157 00:09:52,480 --> 00:09:55,440 Speaker 1: street with cops. So they're going to be more police 158 00:09:55,480 --> 00:09:58,080 Speaker 1: out there, but they're out there after the fact. And 159 00:09:58,160 --> 00:10:01,360 Speaker 1: so what I what I before we get into a 160 00:10:01,360 --> 00:10:06,920 Speaker 1: thought experiment. I have to mention that in San Francisco alone, 161 00:10:07,200 --> 00:10:11,599 Speaker 1: overall crime is up almost fifty larceny and theft is 162 00:10:11,720 --> 00:10:15,719 Speaker 1: up almost eight percent from last year. And we know 163 00:10:15,840 --> 00:10:17,960 Speaker 1: that there are two big seasons for a lot of 164 00:10:17,960 --> 00:10:20,040 Speaker 1: these kinds of crimes. When the holidays are on the 165 00:10:20,040 --> 00:10:23,080 Speaker 1: way people need to get gifts where they feel social 166 00:10:23,080 --> 00:10:26,679 Speaker 1: pressure to do so. And summer when a lot of 167 00:10:26,760 --> 00:10:29,280 Speaker 1: older kids are out right and they're out of school 168 00:10:29,280 --> 00:10:32,800 Speaker 1: and they've got more free time. But with this, I 169 00:10:32,960 --> 00:10:36,360 Speaker 1: propose that the three of us and you there at home, 170 00:10:36,640 --> 00:10:40,160 Speaker 1: have a bit of a thought experiment. And it's similar 171 00:10:40,200 --> 00:10:43,240 Speaker 1: to something we had thought about several months ago. I 172 00:10:43,280 --> 00:10:47,920 Speaker 1: think time is odd h this. Let's say we're planning 173 00:10:47,960 --> 00:10:52,440 Speaker 1: a crime like this. We're not to anybody, our legal 174 00:10:52,440 --> 00:10:55,400 Speaker 1: department listening. But let's say let's say we're planning a 175 00:10:55,440 --> 00:11:01,760 Speaker 1: crime like this, and we crowdsource through some um online forum, 176 00:11:02,080 --> 00:11:06,080 Speaker 1: hopefully using proxies to hide our identities. Uh, the idea 177 00:11:06,160 --> 00:11:08,840 Speaker 1: that we're gonna get together, we're gonna hit up FIPS 178 00:11:08,960 --> 00:11:11,360 Speaker 1: or we're gonna hit up Lenox, and we do so, 179 00:11:12,240 --> 00:11:15,360 Speaker 1: and most of us get away right Uh, and then 180 00:11:15,840 --> 00:11:20,120 Speaker 1: the police presence is now being increasingly prioritized in Buckhead. 181 00:11:21,000 --> 00:11:24,240 Speaker 1: What have we done? Our next move, if we continue 182 00:11:24,320 --> 00:11:32,040 Speaker 1: this caper is to hit someplace far away from Buckhead, right, yeah, 183 00:11:32,240 --> 00:11:38,480 Speaker 1: Disney Store, the Mall of Georgia. Yeah, it's funny you 184 00:11:38,520 --> 00:11:41,679 Speaker 1: mentioned the summer situation. I can't rememberfer mention this in 185 00:11:41,679 --> 00:11:45,240 Speaker 1: the podcast before or not, but um, over fourth July weekend, 186 00:11:45,320 --> 00:11:48,959 Speaker 1: I went to get together at our buddy Alex's girlfriend's 187 00:11:49,000 --> 00:11:52,559 Speaker 1: family's place and came back and, uh, you know, I've 188 00:11:52,559 --> 00:11:55,120 Speaker 1: been drinking and stuff and went to play my Nintendo 189 00:11:55,200 --> 00:11:58,080 Speaker 1: Switch later that night, and my controller wouldn't connect and 190 00:11:58,120 --> 00:12:00,200 Speaker 1: I all of a sudden realized, oh, my controller won't 191 00:12:00,200 --> 00:12:02,800 Speaker 1: connect because the switch and the dock and the power 192 00:12:02,880 --> 00:12:05,720 Speaker 1: supply and everything are gone. Um. And it was the 193 00:12:05,760 --> 00:12:08,360 Speaker 1: only thing that was stolen. My daughter's room was kind 194 00:12:08,400 --> 00:12:10,880 Speaker 1: of rifled through, but it clearly was the kind of 195 00:12:10,880 --> 00:12:13,599 Speaker 1: crime that like, you know, kids on bikes looking to 196 00:12:13,720 --> 00:12:16,280 Speaker 1: just kind of like smash and grab or like you know, 197 00:12:16,400 --> 00:12:19,680 Speaker 1: just check doors and take whenever they could carry were 198 00:12:19,800 --> 00:12:23,360 Speaker 1: after um. And it was a really weird feeling I felt, 199 00:12:23,400 --> 00:12:25,440 Speaker 1: you know, especially after noticing that my kids room have 200 00:12:25,480 --> 00:12:27,280 Speaker 1: been rifled through, but nothing else was stolen, and I 201 00:12:27,280 --> 00:12:29,360 Speaker 1: have a whole room, you know, my house was full 202 00:12:29,400 --> 00:12:31,480 Speaker 1: of like, you know, thousands of dollars worth of equipment 203 00:12:31,480 --> 00:12:33,680 Speaker 1: for recording and music and stuff. And they didn't even 204 00:12:33,679 --> 00:12:37,559 Speaker 1: go in there. But clearly was a crime of opportunity. Yeah. 205 00:12:37,760 --> 00:12:43,960 Speaker 1: And conversely, or in contrast, these are crimes that are premeditated. Right, 206 00:12:44,040 --> 00:12:46,000 Speaker 1: those kids may have been on bikes saying let's see 207 00:12:46,000 --> 00:12:49,199 Speaker 1: if there or any houses without cars in the driveway, right, 208 00:12:49,480 --> 00:12:52,640 Speaker 1: that's right, Yeah, Yeah. I think the fact that it 209 00:12:52,640 --> 00:12:54,360 Speaker 1: was fourth of July and they knew that a lot 210 00:12:54,360 --> 00:12:56,400 Speaker 1: of people were off, you know, traveling or like at 211 00:12:56,400 --> 00:13:00,640 Speaker 1: parties or something, was what created the opportunity. And in 212 00:13:00,679 --> 00:13:05,360 Speaker 1: this case, what we're seeing is a incredibly effective tactic. 213 00:13:05,679 --> 00:13:08,240 Speaker 1: This has been employed in other parts of the world 214 00:13:08,240 --> 00:13:13,200 Speaker 1: before without social media. In fact, in Europe, I believe 215 00:13:13,679 --> 00:13:17,679 Speaker 1: some segments of the population have been accused of engaging 216 00:13:17,720 --> 00:13:21,280 Speaker 1: in this tactic pretty often, and it ties into, to 217 00:13:21,360 --> 00:13:25,120 Speaker 1: be candid with you, it ties into discrimination against the 218 00:13:25,200 --> 00:13:28,360 Speaker 1: roma population of various countries who are said to go 219 00:13:28,480 --> 00:13:31,959 Speaker 1: in mass into some kind of store that usually has 220 00:13:32,040 --> 00:13:37,080 Speaker 1: one to two, maybe three employees and just absolutely crowd bombit. 221 00:13:37,559 --> 00:13:40,600 Speaker 1: So you can't keep track of what everybody is doing, 222 00:13:41,000 --> 00:13:44,959 Speaker 1: much less stop one person amid that crowd. It's kind 223 00:13:44,960 --> 00:13:48,400 Speaker 1: of like that earlier example of could Travis Scott or 224 00:13:48,440 --> 00:13:52,120 Speaker 1: could any entertainer isolate one person in a crowd of 225 00:13:52,160 --> 00:13:55,120 Speaker 1: fifty thousand, you know, on a on a smaller level. 226 00:13:55,480 --> 00:13:58,200 Speaker 1: So this is a very successful strategy, which means it's 227 00:13:58,200 --> 00:14:02,280 Speaker 1: going to be used again. It's also occurred in Illinois 228 00:14:02,400 --> 00:14:05,200 Speaker 1: in oak Brook there were people who swarmed another Louis 229 00:14:05,280 --> 00:14:08,960 Speaker 1: Vuitton store. And we know that there was preparation because 230 00:14:08,960 --> 00:14:11,200 Speaker 1: they came with the right kit for the job. They 231 00:14:11,200 --> 00:14:13,960 Speaker 1: have garbage bags and their coats, They had their identities 232 00:14:14,000 --> 00:14:17,680 Speaker 1: concealed with a bala clava or a there a scheme 233 00:14:17,679 --> 00:14:20,120 Speaker 1: mask I guess you would call it here uh, And 234 00:14:20,200 --> 00:14:23,120 Speaker 1: they came with the tools they needed to open the 235 00:14:23,800 --> 00:14:28,200 Speaker 1: open the containers holding the high value stuff. What this 236 00:14:28,480 --> 00:14:32,640 Speaker 1: means now is that this presents a danger not just 237 00:14:32,720 --> 00:14:35,160 Speaker 1: to you if you work at these places, not just 238 00:14:35,320 --> 00:14:38,000 Speaker 1: to you if you live in the neighborhood, but it 239 00:14:38,080 --> 00:14:40,840 Speaker 1: presents a danger to you if you live in these cities, 240 00:14:40,880 --> 00:14:46,080 Speaker 1: because this could be also used as a pretext to 241 00:14:46,640 --> 00:14:51,120 Speaker 1: further uh further militarized the police force in your neck 242 00:14:51,160 --> 00:14:53,920 Speaker 1: of the woods, which I know sounds like a distant concern, 243 00:14:54,560 --> 00:14:57,640 Speaker 1: and people may say, well, this is a necessary thing. 244 00:14:58,120 --> 00:15:01,760 Speaker 1: Police are supposed to stop robberies and things like this. 245 00:15:02,440 --> 00:15:05,800 Speaker 1: But what happens when there is a group of eight 246 00:15:06,640 --> 00:15:09,640 Speaker 1: people who look like they could be anyone because of 247 00:15:09,680 --> 00:15:13,280 Speaker 1: their disguises, and you're someone who is in the area, 248 00:15:13,840 --> 00:15:18,960 Speaker 1: then you kind of become a suspect. It's it's unfair 249 00:15:19,360 --> 00:15:23,160 Speaker 1: to everyone involved. But um, this also I think maybe 250 00:15:23,240 --> 00:15:25,920 Speaker 1: leads us to some philosophical points. What do you guys think? 251 00:15:26,600 --> 00:15:28,440 Speaker 1: For me, I think we're going to see a lot 252 00:15:28,480 --> 00:15:33,840 Speaker 1: more of this as as the divide continues to widen 253 00:15:33,960 --> 00:15:36,880 Speaker 1: between those who are able to go and drop a 254 00:15:36,880 --> 00:15:39,400 Speaker 1: ton of money at them all and those who are 255 00:15:39,480 --> 00:15:41,720 Speaker 1: not or likely will never be able to do that. 256 00:15:41,800 --> 00:15:45,840 Speaker 1: And you know, within any short term future, and as 257 00:15:45,840 --> 00:15:49,080 Speaker 1: a society, as a culture, just through popular culture, we 258 00:15:49,160 --> 00:15:52,400 Speaker 1: are doing that to ourselves. You know, we think about 259 00:15:52,480 --> 00:15:56,440 Speaker 1: the television shows, the movies, everything, not everything, but most 260 00:15:56,480 --> 00:16:00,840 Speaker 1: things that exist for consumption that are very popular, you know, 261 00:16:00,920 --> 00:16:06,080 Speaker 1: involve clothing like this, involve watches and other just material 262 00:16:06,160 --> 00:16:09,040 Speaker 1: things that exist on characters and are part of a 263 00:16:09,120 --> 00:16:12,960 Speaker 1: character even in the reality TV shows. It's like the 264 00:16:13,040 --> 00:16:15,800 Speaker 1: thing to have if you're going to have status. And 265 00:16:15,840 --> 00:16:18,400 Speaker 1: if you cannot achieve those things or get those things 266 00:16:18,440 --> 00:16:23,000 Speaker 1: by normal means, then why not resort to something like this? Yeah, 267 00:16:23,000 --> 00:16:26,280 Speaker 1: I mean, all these things are like signifiers of this 268 00:16:26,480 --> 00:16:28,920 Speaker 1: class and status. And as that as those you know, 269 00:16:29,360 --> 00:16:33,480 Speaker 1: two polls become farther and farther apart, it becomes kind 270 00:16:33,480 --> 00:16:38,440 Speaker 1: of a stand in for a a widening discontented nous, 271 00:16:38,480 --> 00:16:41,120 Speaker 1: you know, I mean it. I think it's deeper than 272 00:16:41,160 --> 00:16:44,240 Speaker 1: just wanting the stuff. It's a way of like lashing out. 273 00:16:44,280 --> 00:16:46,600 Speaker 1: I mean, to me, these are the kind of signifiers 274 00:16:46,640 --> 00:16:49,640 Speaker 1: of what you might see in the climate leading to 275 00:16:49,720 --> 00:16:54,360 Speaker 1: an uprising, you know, like where people are truly unhappy 276 00:16:54,560 --> 00:16:57,520 Speaker 1: and and they're seeing this divide between the super rich 277 00:16:57,680 --> 00:17:00,640 Speaker 1: and the even just the middle class and letting let 278 00:17:00,640 --> 00:17:04,480 Speaker 1: alone if you're actually you know, quite poor or disenfranchised 279 00:17:04,480 --> 00:17:06,840 Speaker 1: in some way, or you've lost your job and never 280 00:17:06,880 --> 00:17:09,480 Speaker 1: gotten back on your feet after the pandemic, and all 281 00:17:09,520 --> 00:17:12,000 Speaker 1: the while while others are just raking it in, you 282 00:17:12,000 --> 00:17:14,719 Speaker 1: know and kind of maybe not intending to, but rubbing 283 00:17:14,720 --> 00:17:17,880 Speaker 1: it in your face in many ways. Um, I understand 284 00:17:18,520 --> 00:17:21,160 Speaker 1: where that that it's a it's a form of kind 285 00:17:21,200 --> 00:17:23,919 Speaker 1: of hurt, you know. I mean, I really do. I 286 00:17:23,960 --> 00:17:26,800 Speaker 1: think we all see it, even if we're very um 287 00:17:27,040 --> 00:17:29,879 Speaker 1: lucky to have the jobs that we have. You know, 288 00:17:30,040 --> 00:17:33,280 Speaker 1: there is this American ideal of kind of always wanting 289 00:17:33,320 --> 00:17:36,040 Speaker 1: more and always wanting the next thing, and not ever 290 00:17:36,359 --> 00:17:40,000 Speaker 1: having enough be enough. And that's a product of the 291 00:17:40,920 --> 00:17:43,560 Speaker 1: narratives were fed with reality TV, like you're saying, Matt, 292 00:17:43,600 --> 00:17:45,680 Speaker 1: and now more so with social media and just seeing 293 00:17:45,720 --> 00:17:49,200 Speaker 1: everyone over sharing, especially celebrity types and folks with like 294 00:17:49,320 --> 00:17:51,760 Speaker 1: just way too much money, and you start to be like, well, 295 00:17:51,760 --> 00:17:54,040 Speaker 1: I deserve that, I should have that. Why shouldn't I 296 00:17:54,080 --> 00:17:56,800 Speaker 1: have that? Um? And then I think for some it 297 00:17:56,800 --> 00:18:00,080 Speaker 1: causes them to lash out. Sure, yeah, like always I 298 00:18:00,080 --> 00:18:01,840 Speaker 1: was saying earlier. I can't remeber why I'm saying this, 299 00:18:01,920 --> 00:18:04,960 Speaker 1: But it's the coupons, Baby, who has the most coupons? 300 00:18:05,160 --> 00:18:09,320 Speaker 1: How many couples before you die? Yeah? Yeah, how many coupons? Oh, 301 00:18:10,359 --> 00:18:13,080 Speaker 1: let me get the name brand thing, whatever the I mean, 302 00:18:13,119 --> 00:18:15,320 Speaker 1: you make it. You guys are making really good points, 303 00:18:15,359 --> 00:18:18,080 Speaker 1: And I would like to end with a with a 304 00:18:18,160 --> 00:18:25,280 Speaker 1: message with a twofold message. First, to the folks who 305 00:18:25,560 --> 00:18:29,520 Speaker 1: hear about stories like this and agree with our prediction 306 00:18:29,640 --> 00:18:32,840 Speaker 1: that these will only continue in the future, I would 307 00:18:32,840 --> 00:18:36,520 Speaker 1: want to caution you from being misled by bad actors 308 00:18:36,560 --> 00:18:41,400 Speaker 1: in mainstream media. This is red meat for folks who 309 00:18:41,440 --> 00:18:46,360 Speaker 1: want to delegitimize various protests, and many protests have occurred 310 00:18:46,359 --> 00:18:50,679 Speaker 1: over this time. Um, when you hear about looting during 311 00:18:50,800 --> 00:18:54,040 Speaker 1: like a Black Lives Matter rally or something, you have 312 00:18:54,119 --> 00:18:59,280 Speaker 1: to ask yourself, were those actually conscientious protesters who suddenly 313 00:18:59,359 --> 00:19:03,160 Speaker 1: decided to break in some place for a scarf? Or 314 00:19:03,800 --> 00:19:09,200 Speaker 1: was this organized crime seeing a tremendous opportunity. I advanced 315 00:19:09,200 --> 00:19:12,000 Speaker 1: to you that it was the latter much more often 316 00:19:12,040 --> 00:19:13,960 Speaker 1: than the former. Ben I couldn't agree with you more. 317 00:19:14,000 --> 00:19:16,520 Speaker 1: I recently had at a private d M chat with 318 00:19:16,560 --> 00:19:20,360 Speaker 1: a listener who I posted something, you know, a political 319 00:19:20,400 --> 00:19:25,520 Speaker 1: opinion about the the Kyle Rittenhouse outcome. Uh, And somebody 320 00:19:25,840 --> 00:19:27,679 Speaker 1: um had a bit of a knees jerk reaction to 321 00:19:27,760 --> 00:19:30,040 Speaker 1: that and said, oh, all these Black Lives Matter protesters 322 00:19:30,080 --> 00:19:32,120 Speaker 1: are just a bunch opportunists and this, that and the other, 323 00:19:32,240 --> 00:19:35,000 Speaker 1: and you know it's disgusted to me where I live. 324 00:19:35,080 --> 00:19:37,720 Speaker 1: I just see them like literally you know, moving in 325 00:19:37,760 --> 00:19:40,280 Speaker 1: on targets and and all of these shopping centers and 326 00:19:40,320 --> 00:19:43,960 Speaker 1: just literally you know, disrupting people's lives and commerce and 327 00:19:44,000 --> 00:19:46,560 Speaker 1: just throwing bricks through windows and stealing stuff. And I 328 00:19:46,800 --> 00:19:49,080 Speaker 1: made the point to this individual that I think for 329 00:19:49,119 --> 00:19:51,359 Speaker 1: the most part, uh, there may be some issues in 330 00:19:51,440 --> 00:19:54,040 Speaker 1: leadership with BLM at times. I think for the most part, 331 00:19:54,119 --> 00:19:56,399 Speaker 1: he's talking about how they were paid, and I'm like, well, what, 332 00:19:56,480 --> 00:19:59,800 Speaker 1: it's more likely that they were paid by Black Lives 333 00:19:59,840 --> 00:20:02,119 Speaker 1: Matter or by the opposition, and an effort to just 334 00:20:02,280 --> 00:20:06,040 Speaker 1: you know, to delegitimize that movement um and and call 335 00:20:06,080 --> 00:20:08,560 Speaker 1: attention to the bad actors who are maybe not even 336 00:20:08,560 --> 00:20:10,960 Speaker 1: part of the movement at all. Yeah, And this my 337 00:20:11,119 --> 00:20:14,240 Speaker 1: second point, and this is the message that I that 338 00:20:14,320 --> 00:20:16,480 Speaker 1: we need to end on. You're going along, you know, 339 00:20:16,480 --> 00:20:18,840 Speaker 1: I want to thank everybody listening for your patients, because 340 00:20:18,920 --> 00:20:22,240 Speaker 1: what I'm about to say is mission critical here in 341 00:20:22,320 --> 00:20:26,720 Speaker 1: many ways. If you're involved with these things, if you 342 00:20:26,760 --> 00:20:30,320 Speaker 1: are an opportunist, I know how exciting it can be 343 00:20:30,680 --> 00:20:33,960 Speaker 1: too for any number of rationalizations. Say hey, we're fighting 344 00:20:34,000 --> 00:20:38,920 Speaker 1: the power, We're fighting these big evil corporations, We're fighting inequality. 345 00:20:38,920 --> 00:20:42,119 Speaker 1: We're taking stuff back, but the people who are going 346 00:20:42,160 --> 00:20:46,640 Speaker 1: to end up bearing the brunt of these actions the consequences. 347 00:20:47,440 --> 00:20:51,399 Speaker 1: Uh there, it goes way deeper than the three people 348 00:20:51,400 --> 00:20:55,080 Speaker 1: who got popped out of fifty to eighty or whatever. What. 349 00:20:55,080 --> 00:21:00,280 Speaker 1: What you will be doing results in red meat for 350 00:21:00,480 --> 00:21:03,719 Speaker 1: the same organizations that you are attempting to fight against. 351 00:21:03,880 --> 00:21:09,439 Speaker 1: It galvanizes them, It feeds them, it empowers them, it 352 00:21:09,680 --> 00:21:15,640 Speaker 1: gives them the wherewithal the causes belly. Two further oppress 353 00:21:15,720 --> 00:21:20,040 Speaker 1: people to do worse things to people who have nothing 354 00:21:20,080 --> 00:21:22,320 Speaker 1: to do with you that you will never meet, just 355 00:21:22,520 --> 00:21:27,400 Speaker 1: regular people. And ask yourself, you know, if it feels exciting. Two, 356 00:21:27,640 --> 00:21:30,879 Speaker 1: If it feels exciting to skirt the on the wrong 357 00:21:30,920 --> 00:21:32,879 Speaker 1: side of the law, I think everybody has done that 358 00:21:32,920 --> 00:21:35,239 Speaker 1: at a a time or two. How would you feel if 359 00:21:35,280 --> 00:21:37,439 Speaker 1: you like, had to look in the face of the 360 00:21:37,480 --> 00:21:41,280 Speaker 1: next person who was an elderly lady who dies because 361 00:21:41,320 --> 00:21:44,439 Speaker 1: there was a kick door at the wrong address. How 362 00:21:44,440 --> 00:21:47,160 Speaker 1: would you feel about that? Does the sweater still feel good? 363 00:21:48,240 --> 00:21:51,720 Speaker 1: Do you like walking around in the boots? How's that PlayStation? 364 00:21:52,000 --> 00:21:54,680 Speaker 1: Does it play the same? We're gonna leave it there 365 00:21:54,920 --> 00:21:57,119 Speaker 1: and pause for word from sponsor will be back with 366 00:21:57,160 --> 00:22:06,680 Speaker 1: more strange news, and we're back, and then I think 367 00:22:06,720 --> 00:22:09,520 Speaker 1: you made some excellent points in that last uh story. 368 00:22:09,720 --> 00:22:12,679 Speaker 1: It's obviously something that is very very relevant to all 369 00:22:12,720 --> 00:22:15,000 Speaker 1: of our lives and indicative of kind of like where 370 00:22:15,000 --> 00:22:19,000 Speaker 1: we're going as a culture. Unfortunately, another place that we're 371 00:22:19,000 --> 00:22:22,600 Speaker 1: going as a culture is in the direction of being 372 00:22:22,680 --> 00:22:26,000 Speaker 1: kind of dumb. Um that I think I've followed the 373 00:22:26,000 --> 00:22:28,600 Speaker 1: suit to that story, but also in terms of just 374 00:22:28,640 --> 00:22:32,159 Speaker 1: guarding our own personal data. Uh, it seems like a 375 00:22:32,240 --> 00:22:34,440 Speaker 1: day doesn't go by where we don't hear about some 376 00:22:34,600 --> 00:22:38,080 Speaker 1: giant hack of some corporation, you know, with all of 377 00:22:38,160 --> 00:22:42,240 Speaker 1: all of this uh personal information being compromised or financial 378 00:22:42,280 --> 00:22:45,280 Speaker 1: information or whatever. Uh, you think after all of that, 379 00:22:45,359 --> 00:22:47,879 Speaker 1: all of those news stories, all of these conversations about 380 00:22:48,160 --> 00:22:51,840 Speaker 1: Russian hacking, and you know, us being target of of 381 00:22:51,920 --> 00:22:56,160 Speaker 1: international um infiltration, you know, to to steal our identities 382 00:22:56,359 --> 00:22:59,359 Speaker 1: or whatever. The people would be a little more clever 383 00:22:59,480 --> 00:23:03,360 Speaker 1: with their path paswords, you know, use like two factor authentication, UM, 384 00:23:03,520 --> 00:23:07,919 Speaker 1: use one of those password wallets, etcetera. UM, But unfortunately 385 00:23:07,920 --> 00:23:10,320 Speaker 1: that doesn't seem to be the case. And full disclosure, 386 00:23:10,560 --> 00:23:12,520 Speaker 1: the study that I'm about The reference is in fact 387 00:23:12,640 --> 00:23:16,880 Speaker 1: from or or was financed by a password wallet company, 388 00:23:17,040 --> 00:23:21,640 Speaker 1: a company called Nord pass Um, which is very much 389 00:23:22,000 --> 00:23:24,640 Speaker 1: you know, it's a service where you can have them 390 00:23:24,640 --> 00:23:27,760 Speaker 1: create strong passwords, have them generate new passwords on the 391 00:23:27,800 --> 00:23:30,399 Speaker 1: regular one where you use like a master password to 392 00:23:30,480 --> 00:23:33,639 Speaker 1: keep your password wallet everything kind of safe. Um. But 393 00:23:33,760 --> 00:23:35,480 Speaker 1: they did, in fact, they have for for quite a 394 00:23:35,520 --> 00:23:38,199 Speaker 1: few years running been coming out with this list of 395 00:23:38,240 --> 00:23:43,080 Speaker 1: the most common passwords, and the list for one quite 396 00:23:43,080 --> 00:23:47,720 Speaker 1: closely resembles the list for with the number one most 397 00:23:47,760 --> 00:23:52,359 Speaker 1: popular password UH in all countries UM being one two, 398 00:23:52,440 --> 00:23:56,080 Speaker 1: three four five six UH in In their in their results, 399 00:23:56,160 --> 00:24:00,159 Speaker 1: the data they actually have UH a column of the 400 00:24:00,200 --> 00:24:02,679 Speaker 1: ranking the password, how long it took to crack it, 401 00:24:03,119 --> 00:24:05,800 Speaker 1: and then how many UH in their in their study 402 00:24:06,119 --> 00:24:08,959 Speaker 1: or their their analysis, how many there were UM of 403 00:24:09,080 --> 00:24:11,320 Speaker 1: one two, three, five six took them less than a 404 00:24:11,320 --> 00:24:13,240 Speaker 1: second to crack it, and there are a hundred and 405 00:24:13,359 --> 00:24:16,040 Speaker 1: three million, one hundred and seventy thousand, five hundred and 406 00:24:16,040 --> 00:24:18,960 Speaker 1: fifty two people. I think one five six is a 407 00:24:18,960 --> 00:24:22,560 Speaker 1: good one seconds only to one two, five six, seven 408 00:24:22,600 --> 00:24:25,040 Speaker 1: eight nine, which also took less than a second to 409 00:24:25,080 --> 00:24:27,159 Speaker 1: crack UH. The number goes down quite a bit to 410 00:24:27,240 --> 00:24:29,840 Speaker 1: forty six million and some change. Then you have one 411 00:24:29,880 --> 00:24:36,520 Speaker 1: two five, followed by forty password six seven eight one 412 00:24:36,640 --> 00:24:39,920 Speaker 1: one one one one one two three one two three 413 00:24:40,440 --> 00:24:43,880 Speaker 1: one two five, six seven eight nine zero ago. Still 414 00:24:43,960 --> 00:24:45,560 Speaker 1: all of these take less than a second to crack, 415 00:24:46,119 --> 00:24:47,719 Speaker 1: and then they start getting a little more interesting as 416 00:24:47,720 --> 00:24:50,159 Speaker 1: you go down the list. Um, you know, things like 417 00:24:50,440 --> 00:24:54,080 Speaker 1: swears are very popular. First names with no numbers are 418 00:24:54,160 --> 00:24:59,520 Speaker 1: very popular. Um, things like five six Q you know, surprise, 419 00:24:59,560 --> 00:25:01,879 Speaker 1: I'm not saying any like asterisks in any of this 420 00:25:02,040 --> 00:25:04,400 Speaker 1: or any like asking you know, Like I mean, I 421 00:25:04,440 --> 00:25:07,840 Speaker 1: try to always have you know, all of the hallmarks 422 00:25:07,920 --> 00:25:10,080 Speaker 1: of a of a strong password in my password, just 423 00:25:10,119 --> 00:25:15,119 Speaker 1: like a capital letter, some sort of non numeric symbol, uh, 424 00:25:15,160 --> 00:25:17,600 Speaker 1: a number, you know, and in a mix of letters 425 00:25:17,640 --> 00:25:22,680 Speaker 1: and numbers, um, Liverpool number one, I love you one 426 00:25:22,920 --> 00:25:26,920 Speaker 1: is number one two. You've got things like Michelle Funny enough. 427 00:25:27,440 --> 00:25:30,640 Speaker 1: First names take longer to crack for obvious reasons, because 428 00:25:30,640 --> 00:25:33,359 Speaker 1: I should just go through obvious first names. So Michelle 429 00:25:33,400 --> 00:25:37,520 Speaker 1: took three hours to crack. There's three thousand Michelle's uh Andrew, 430 00:25:37,800 --> 00:25:39,640 Speaker 1: But weirdly, Andrew only took two minutes. To crack. I'm 431 00:25:39,640 --> 00:25:41,959 Speaker 1: a little confused about that metric because if it's if 432 00:25:42,000 --> 00:25:44,800 Speaker 1: it's a brute force hack, it starts on a oh, 433 00:25:44,840 --> 00:25:48,040 Speaker 1: there you go, thank you, Ben nailed it. But there's 434 00:25:48,119 --> 00:25:50,440 Speaker 1: there's something really interesting before you go. I gotta say 435 00:25:50,880 --> 00:25:54,879 Speaker 1: I love this image. Doll of uh somebody doing a 436 00:25:54,920 --> 00:25:57,080 Speaker 1: one to three, four or five six, right, and that's 437 00:25:57,400 --> 00:25:59,480 Speaker 1: that's number one of the list. It's easily cracked. But 438 00:25:59,600 --> 00:26:02,920 Speaker 1: I love the idea that one through nine is somehow 439 00:26:02,960 --> 00:26:05,880 Speaker 1: more difficult, Like, so, what's cracking the code? They get 440 00:26:05,920 --> 00:26:08,120 Speaker 1: to one, two, three, four or five six and they're 441 00:26:08,160 --> 00:26:11,560 Speaker 1: like that doesn't work, and they're like, let's it. I 442 00:26:11,560 --> 00:26:14,240 Speaker 1: don't know, there's no there's no bigger number. What's this. 443 00:26:14,440 --> 00:26:18,080 Speaker 1: It's like it's bigger like that old Mr. Choke sketch it. 444 00:26:18,720 --> 00:26:20,760 Speaker 1: They can't think of it. They're like, surely this one's 445 00:26:20,840 --> 00:26:23,960 Speaker 1: one lauder, this one's one bigger. Can I just say 446 00:26:23,960 --> 00:26:27,359 Speaker 1: how much I love the password that is quirty U 447 00:26:27,560 --> 00:26:31,720 Speaker 1: I O P, Because theoretically, if you were going to 448 00:26:31,840 --> 00:26:34,480 Speaker 1: enter that password, let's say that open your computer, you 449 00:26:34,480 --> 00:26:36,320 Speaker 1: would just run your line. If you have a quirty 450 00:26:36,359 --> 00:26:39,240 Speaker 1: keyboard across one section or keyboard and it would open 451 00:26:39,280 --> 00:26:42,639 Speaker 1: your machine. Now there's some wacky ones in here. So 452 00:26:42,680 --> 00:26:44,560 Speaker 1: if you go to this is a neat study because 453 00:26:44,600 --> 00:26:47,800 Speaker 1: you can go through and look at them UM by country, 454 00:26:47,960 --> 00:26:50,680 Speaker 1: and so of course depending on different countries you get 455 00:26:50,720 --> 00:26:53,720 Speaker 1: different like kind of pop cultural touchstones and things like that. 456 00:26:53,920 --> 00:26:56,280 Speaker 1: One thing that I found really interesting is in Australia, 457 00:26:56,440 --> 00:26:59,360 Speaker 1: number twenty six is my space and the numeral one, 458 00:27:00,280 --> 00:27:02,840 Speaker 1: which took three hours to crack, and there are nineteen thousand, 459 00:27:02,840 --> 00:27:06,600 Speaker 1: two d forty seven Mycepace ones. UM. I didn't think 460 00:27:06,640 --> 00:27:09,160 Speaker 1: my Space was still in play, but maybe it's a different, 461 00:27:09,240 --> 00:27:12,920 Speaker 1: different deal in Australia. UM. But it's it's a it's 462 00:27:12,920 --> 00:27:16,800 Speaker 1: a thing people are being not particularly good stewards of 463 00:27:16,840 --> 00:27:19,880 Speaker 1: their data and of their personal information. It would seem 464 00:27:19,920 --> 00:27:23,200 Speaker 1: this whole study was funded by nord Pass, but it 465 00:27:23,320 --> 00:27:27,359 Speaker 1: was compiled in partnership with independent researchers that specialized in 466 00:27:27,440 --> 00:27:30,919 Speaker 1: cybersecurity research. Vice has a great article about it. UM. 467 00:27:30,960 --> 00:27:35,159 Speaker 1: They looked at four terabytes of data UM across fifty 468 00:27:35,200 --> 00:27:38,120 Speaker 1: different countries and this is the third year that they've 469 00:27:38,160 --> 00:27:40,760 Speaker 1: done the research. UH. And again you can also see 470 00:27:40,760 --> 00:27:45,560 Speaker 1: it broken down into individual countries. Patricia surni ascate excuse 471 00:27:45,600 --> 00:27:48,080 Speaker 1: me for butchering that it's a tricky one. Um, who's 472 00:27:48,080 --> 00:27:51,120 Speaker 1: a spokesperson for nord Pass, had this to say to Vice. 473 00:27:51,200 --> 00:27:54,280 Speaker 1: We honestly didn't expect to see so many cultural references 474 00:27:54,320 --> 00:27:57,359 Speaker 1: in the country lists. So depending on the country, you 475 00:27:57,359 --> 00:28:02,399 Speaker 1: would have, you know, references to the most popular sports teams. Um. 476 00:28:02,560 --> 00:28:06,080 Speaker 1: So in the U s that you've got Steelers quite popular. 477 00:28:06,119 --> 00:28:09,160 Speaker 1: In the UK, you've got Liverpool. In Chile, you've got 478 00:28:09,200 --> 00:28:14,000 Speaker 1: Colo Colo, and in Brazil, Nacional Sparta in the Czech Republic, 479 00:28:14,240 --> 00:28:18,720 Speaker 1: Marseille in France and Shalka oh four in Germany, and 480 00:28:18,760 --> 00:28:23,000 Speaker 1: then also in Greece you have Olympiacos um. Also lots 481 00:28:23,000 --> 00:28:26,640 Speaker 1: of beverage names like Guinness in Ireland. Um. And then 482 00:28:26,760 --> 00:28:31,440 Speaker 1: some religious password as well and Nigeria, christ was very popular. 483 00:28:31,480 --> 00:28:37,000 Speaker 1: In Saudi Arabia, Bismilla top the list. Um. So yeah, 484 00:28:37,040 --> 00:28:40,760 Speaker 1: it's pretty wild. Uh, let's see. Um. The spokesperson for 485 00:28:40,840 --> 00:28:43,400 Speaker 1: nord Pass also had this to say. For the first 486 00:28:43,400 --> 00:28:46,400 Speaker 1: time ever, eminem Is entered the list, and speculation in 487 00:28:46,440 --> 00:28:49,800 Speaker 1: this Vice article was this some sort of millennial revenge 488 00:28:49,880 --> 00:28:53,480 Speaker 1: for gen z TikToker Is trying to cancel eminem, which 489 00:28:53,520 --> 00:28:55,480 Speaker 1: is an icon that they grew up with. They're trying 490 00:28:55,480 --> 00:28:58,080 Speaker 1: to like keep them alive in a word that no 491 00:28:58,120 --> 00:29:01,640 Speaker 1: one will ever see in spirit. I those uh, Naruto 492 00:29:01,840 --> 00:29:06,560 Speaker 1: and Superman and Pokemon, we're also popular choices. Um yeah, 493 00:29:06,720 --> 00:29:09,880 Speaker 1: it's it's it's fascinating stuff. Uh. And of course you know, 494 00:29:09,920 --> 00:29:12,719 Speaker 1: if you go to the list and see God Forbid, 495 00:29:12,800 --> 00:29:15,240 Speaker 1: one of your password is on there, I would change 496 00:29:15,280 --> 00:29:18,440 Speaker 1: that bad boy right away and maybe considered subscribing to 497 00:29:18,560 --> 00:29:22,200 Speaker 1: Nord pass, who are not sponsoring this episode. So far 498 00:29:22,240 --> 00:29:24,560 Speaker 1: as we go, so far as we know. But what 499 00:29:24,600 --> 00:29:26,160 Speaker 1: do you guys think? I mean, you know, as part 500 00:29:26,200 --> 00:29:27,960 Speaker 1: of being part of a big company like we are, 501 00:29:28,240 --> 00:29:32,240 Speaker 1: we are literally forced to change our password regularly. Um, 502 00:29:32,720 --> 00:29:34,800 Speaker 1: and it and it can't it can't be the same 503 00:29:34,840 --> 00:29:37,520 Speaker 1: as the last like five we've had. So inevitably, what 504 00:29:37,560 --> 00:29:39,160 Speaker 1: a lot of people probably end up doing is just 505 00:29:39,160 --> 00:29:41,800 Speaker 1: adding a numeral at the end, or we're upping the 506 00:29:41,920 --> 00:29:43,960 Speaker 1: numeral by one digit at the end, because it gets 507 00:29:43,960 --> 00:29:46,520 Speaker 1: a little ridiculous. It starts to become very unwieldy to 508 00:29:46,560 --> 00:29:50,080 Speaker 1: remember all these passwords, especially if you're using one for work, 509 00:29:50,120 --> 00:29:52,680 Speaker 1: you're using one for your personal emails. Maybe you have 510 00:29:53,080 --> 00:29:56,720 Speaker 1: you know, bank accounts and uh crypto accounts and wallets 511 00:29:56,720 --> 00:29:59,080 Speaker 1: and things like that, you start getting in the password overload. 512 00:29:59,360 --> 00:30:02,280 Speaker 1: So I understand Dan the malaise around it a little bit, 513 00:30:02,520 --> 00:30:04,240 Speaker 1: but not to the degree of some of these. In 514 00:30:04,280 --> 00:30:06,360 Speaker 1: the top twenty five that I'm seeing, I mean, the 515 00:30:06,360 --> 00:30:11,560 Speaker 1: top number overall is six five four three to one, 516 00:30:11,640 --> 00:30:14,160 Speaker 1: and before that is six six six six six six. 517 00:30:14,760 --> 00:30:17,920 Speaker 1: So to go back to the question you would ask, UM, 518 00:30:18,080 --> 00:30:21,240 Speaker 1: I can't speak for anyone but myself here. One of 519 00:30:21,280 --> 00:30:25,680 Speaker 1: the easiest ways to guard against this is first, like 520 00:30:25,920 --> 00:30:29,400 Speaker 1: Matt said, to have a more secure password, but secondly, 521 00:30:29,760 --> 00:30:34,560 Speaker 1: to practice things like two factor authentication, which can feel 522 00:30:34,600 --> 00:30:36,760 Speaker 1: like a pain in the keyster, you know, because you 523 00:30:36,800 --> 00:30:38,920 Speaker 1: have to have your phone with you or some you know, 524 00:30:39,000 --> 00:30:42,959 Speaker 1: other channel of communication. And also that's something that not 525 00:30:43,120 --> 00:30:48,480 Speaker 1: everybody has. But it's an important and a relatively painless 526 00:30:48,560 --> 00:30:52,200 Speaker 1: way to circumvent a lot of these problems. And that's 527 00:30:52,200 --> 00:30:57,160 Speaker 1: why you'll only see two factor authentication UM exploding more 528 00:30:57,200 --> 00:31:02,440 Speaker 1: in the future. You will also see biometric identification, like, Hey, 529 00:31:02,480 --> 00:31:05,400 Speaker 1: it doesn't matter how complex this string of text, you 530 00:31:05,440 --> 00:31:08,280 Speaker 1: know is, we need your fingerprint. Let me get a 531 00:31:08,320 --> 00:31:11,400 Speaker 1: look at that eyeball. That kind of stuff, um, which 532 00:31:11,440 --> 00:31:14,080 Speaker 1: personally I'm not the biggest fan of. I understand when 533 00:31:14,080 --> 00:31:17,720 Speaker 1: it needs to be used in things like military applications 534 00:31:17,720 --> 00:31:23,000 Speaker 1: are very sensitive intellectual property kind of stuff. But for this, 535 00:31:23,200 --> 00:31:26,400 Speaker 1: like if you're going on Facebook or what have you, um, 536 00:31:26,720 --> 00:31:29,480 Speaker 1: then just have just have it set up to send 537 00:31:29,480 --> 00:31:31,239 Speaker 1: you a text. You can prove that you are who 538 00:31:31,320 --> 00:31:33,520 Speaker 1: you are and that should stop a lot of hackey. 539 00:31:33,920 --> 00:31:37,320 Speaker 1: Then I imagine you're not a iPhone user who uses 540 00:31:37,400 --> 00:31:40,200 Speaker 1: the face I d I don't care for it, and 541 00:31:40,240 --> 00:31:42,760 Speaker 1: I understand why not just over speculated, But maybe in 542 00:31:42,800 --> 00:31:46,920 Speaker 1: your thinking this is not military grade, you know, like 543 00:31:47,000 --> 00:31:49,720 Speaker 1: it's a new feature. It seems like maybe it hasn't 544 00:31:49,800 --> 00:31:52,800 Speaker 1: quite uh you know, met the same rigor as as 545 00:31:52,880 --> 00:31:55,040 Speaker 1: what they've been using, you know, in like spy movies 546 00:31:55,080 --> 00:31:57,280 Speaker 1: for years. I mean, Apple might argue otherwise, But is 547 00:31:57,320 --> 00:31:59,000 Speaker 1: that you're thinking or does it just kind of make 548 00:31:59,000 --> 00:32:04,560 Speaker 1: you uncomfortable? Yeah? I mean, I to be completely completely fair, 549 00:32:04,800 --> 00:32:09,200 Speaker 1: I do not think that anyone cares what my face 550 00:32:09,240 --> 00:32:13,080 Speaker 1: in particular looks like when I open an iPhone. However, 551 00:32:13,760 --> 00:32:16,920 Speaker 1: I also don't like the idea of all the dopey 552 00:32:17,000 --> 00:32:20,320 Speaker 1: faces that I might be making when I'm reading stuff. 553 00:32:20,360 --> 00:32:21,760 Speaker 1: You know what I mean, Think about when you read 554 00:32:21,800 --> 00:32:24,160 Speaker 1: out of the phone. The angle is terrible. It's right 555 00:32:24,240 --> 00:32:26,600 Speaker 1: up your nose. Everybody like if the n S A 556 00:32:26,760 --> 00:32:29,720 Speaker 1: is looking, they know all your bookers. And this is 557 00:32:29,880 --> 00:32:33,560 Speaker 1: so it's for much much more vain, much more petty 558 00:32:33,600 --> 00:32:37,160 Speaker 1: reasons on my part, though I do acknowledge there is 559 00:32:37,800 --> 00:32:42,240 Speaker 1: there is uh danger that comes along with pervasive facial recognition, 560 00:32:42,320 --> 00:32:46,160 Speaker 1: just as there is convenience. Well, I mean, I don't 561 00:32:46,200 --> 00:32:49,560 Speaker 1: want to get beat up, shot or stabbed and have 562 00:32:49,680 --> 00:32:57,560 Speaker 1: my assailant pick up my phone and just go. That's 563 00:32:57,600 --> 00:33:00,920 Speaker 1: like the like for me, that's the whole point of 564 00:33:00,960 --> 00:33:03,640 Speaker 1: facial recognition. So what do you get hurt and you 565 00:33:03,680 --> 00:33:06,680 Speaker 1: can still open their phone? Said in spy movies too, man, 566 00:33:06,720 --> 00:33:08,920 Speaker 1: whereas someone gets like the throat slit and then are 567 00:33:08,920 --> 00:33:11,000 Speaker 1: they they literally ripped their eyeball out and stick it 568 00:33:11,080 --> 00:33:13,640 Speaker 1: up to the eyeball scanner, or they dragged the body 569 00:33:13,720 --> 00:33:15,400 Speaker 1: up and hold the face up. I mean, that's a 570 00:33:15,400 --> 00:33:18,120 Speaker 1: really good point. In this case, it's literally you're on 571 00:33:18,160 --> 00:33:21,160 Speaker 1: the ground, somebody holds your phone by your face and 572 00:33:21,200 --> 00:33:24,240 Speaker 1: it's open and they've got everything. I don't know whatever, 573 00:33:24,280 --> 00:33:26,240 Speaker 1: I ain't even think about that. You're you're really causing 574 00:33:26,280 --> 00:33:34,000 Speaker 1: me to rethink my use of biometric recognition for my device. Yeah, Um, 575 00:33:34,240 --> 00:33:35,640 Speaker 1: what was I gonna say? Oh? I wanted to talk 576 00:33:35,680 --> 00:33:39,000 Speaker 1: about demographics. You guys age demographics across the world, and 577 00:33:39,000 --> 00:33:42,280 Speaker 1: when I'm thinking, when thinking about these passwords, I'm I'm 578 00:33:42,320 --> 00:33:45,240 Speaker 1: looking at Statista. I think that's how you say it. Um. 579 00:33:45,280 --> 00:33:48,920 Speaker 1: I don't know, maybe it's wrong, but just that in 580 00:33:49,040 --> 00:33:53,120 Speaker 1: North America, in I think Europe, in a couple other places, 581 00:33:53,960 --> 00:33:57,120 Speaker 1: you look at the over sixty five population and the 582 00:33:57,280 --> 00:34:01,440 Speaker 1: under fifteen population, and I'm imagining a lot of those groups, 583 00:34:01,960 --> 00:34:04,000 Speaker 1: and in North America there will be seventeen percent on 584 00:34:04,000 --> 00:34:07,000 Speaker 1: the older side, about eight percent on the younger side. 585 00:34:07,320 --> 00:34:10,719 Speaker 1: And I'm wondering if those demographics maybe line up with 586 00:34:10,760 --> 00:34:14,320 Speaker 1: some of these easier passwords to remember, or repeated passwords, 587 00:34:14,440 --> 00:34:17,560 Speaker 1: or even when you get Pokemon and some of the other, uh, 588 00:34:17,719 --> 00:34:20,400 Speaker 1: like really popular things like Spider Man showing up in 589 00:34:20,400 --> 00:34:22,759 Speaker 1: in passwords. If for dudes, you've got a lot of 590 00:34:22,760 --> 00:34:26,520 Speaker 1: people using Metallica and slip Knot and apparently the most 591 00:34:26,520 --> 00:34:29,080 Speaker 1: popular band name over the past three years, especially in 592 00:34:29,120 --> 00:34:32,400 Speaker 1: Australia and Canada and Ireland, is blink one two, I 593 00:34:32,400 --> 00:34:34,080 Speaker 1: guess because in their minds, you got a word, and 594 00:34:34,080 --> 00:34:36,600 Speaker 1: you've got some numbers, they're already halfway there and hats 595 00:34:36,600 --> 00:34:38,600 Speaker 1: and bold to the front of that, and you're technically 596 00:34:38,920 --> 00:34:42,840 Speaker 1: have a strong password. Maybe switch it up, do like, uh, 597 00:34:43,120 --> 00:34:46,759 Speaker 1: blink forty one and some one two you know of it? Yeah? 598 00:34:46,920 --> 00:34:49,799 Speaker 1: Hit hit him with the platsuist shamalan it. I mean 599 00:34:49,840 --> 00:34:52,040 Speaker 1: this is only going to be more important. But also 600 00:34:52,080 --> 00:34:56,720 Speaker 1: we have to remember the biometric information and the facial 601 00:34:56,800 --> 00:35:00,279 Speaker 1: recognition and all all that jazz, all the hits, that's 602 00:35:00,320 --> 00:35:04,640 Speaker 1: going to be inevitably more common, uh for the average 603 00:35:04,640 --> 00:35:08,640 Speaker 1: consumer over time, just because it feels more seamless, it 604 00:35:08,760 --> 00:35:13,880 Speaker 1: feels like it's more secure. Uh, it's gonna increasingly feel 605 00:35:14,360 --> 00:35:18,759 Speaker 1: maybe and a mark of antiquity to enter it, Like 606 00:35:18,800 --> 00:35:24,000 Speaker 1: we're we're quickly entering into um love part of technological 607 00:35:24,040 --> 00:35:27,880 Speaker 1: evolution where it'll seem old timey to use your hands 608 00:35:27,880 --> 00:35:31,560 Speaker 1: and computer things like I'm still I'm still fighting. I'll 609 00:35:32,000 --> 00:35:37,560 Speaker 1: say this, I'm still fighting voice recognition technology being increasingly 610 00:35:37,680 --> 00:35:41,800 Speaker 1: forced upon me and normalized in a very non consensual 611 00:35:41,840 --> 00:35:44,719 Speaker 1: way like you call a company, right, it could be 612 00:35:44,760 --> 00:35:48,239 Speaker 1: a financial services company, it could be a utility company. 613 00:35:48,320 --> 00:35:53,600 Speaker 1: And you can still in many cases access the touchtone menu, 614 00:35:53,760 --> 00:35:57,160 Speaker 1: but that menu is becoming increasingly more difficult to find. 615 00:35:57,560 --> 00:35:59,960 Speaker 1: Just the way that sesame credits started off as an 616 00:36:00,000 --> 00:36:03,879 Speaker 1: opt in thing and then became a mandate, vocal recognition 617 00:36:04,040 --> 00:36:07,840 Speaker 1: is becoming a mandated technology, and it's starting in the 618 00:36:07,880 --> 00:36:10,879 Speaker 1: private industry, right. And so the guy I would love 619 00:36:10,880 --> 00:36:14,200 Speaker 1: to hear from people who have complained to one of 620 00:36:14,239 --> 00:36:18,160 Speaker 1: these businesses or asked for details about what they're doing 621 00:36:18,640 --> 00:36:23,080 Speaker 1: with the audio data they're gathering from your voice. Are 622 00:36:23,120 --> 00:36:25,960 Speaker 1: you getting a cut of it? The answer is certainly 623 00:36:26,000 --> 00:36:28,480 Speaker 1: not if they are selling it, and there's nothing to 624 00:36:28,520 --> 00:36:31,160 Speaker 1: stop them from selling it in many many cases. Yeah, 625 00:36:31,360 --> 00:36:33,640 Speaker 1: even if we were getting a guy like we did, uh, 626 00:36:33,840 --> 00:36:37,160 Speaker 1: I forget it was it was it was maybe data story, yeah, 627 00:36:37,239 --> 00:36:39,319 Speaker 1: big data and you. But they boiled it down to 628 00:36:39,440 --> 00:36:42,360 Speaker 1: a monetary figure and it ended up being like fractions 629 00:36:42,360 --> 00:36:44,560 Speaker 1: of a penny per use of your data, so it 630 00:36:44,600 --> 00:36:47,560 Speaker 1: was like not even valuable to you, or at least 631 00:36:47,600 --> 00:36:50,520 Speaker 1: at market rate. I'm I'm probably misremembering that a little bit, 632 00:36:50,560 --> 00:36:56,000 Speaker 1: but um, it is wildly, all of it. The level 633 00:36:56,040 --> 00:36:59,120 Speaker 1: of head and the sand nous, of which I exhibit plenty. 634 00:36:59,239 --> 00:37:02,040 Speaker 1: Even you really did just kind of like pull my 635 00:37:02,120 --> 00:37:03,560 Speaker 1: head out of this hand when it comes to the 636 00:37:03,600 --> 00:37:06,440 Speaker 1: biometric face stuff. But like you know, I know some 637 00:37:06,480 --> 00:37:09,520 Speaker 1: people who are much more cautious about their cameras on 638 00:37:09,560 --> 00:37:11,439 Speaker 1: their phones and on their computers, and I just don't 639 00:37:11,480 --> 00:37:13,880 Speaker 1: give it, um, but I probably should. But at the 640 00:37:13,960 --> 00:37:16,440 Speaker 1: very least, I do have strong passwords. I have a 641 00:37:16,440 --> 00:37:18,120 Speaker 1: handful of them, and I don't think any of them 642 00:37:18,120 --> 00:37:20,880 Speaker 1: have been compromised yet, and I you know, don't change 643 00:37:20,920 --> 00:37:22,520 Speaker 1: them frequently. But I used to have one of those 644 00:37:22,520 --> 00:37:24,319 Speaker 1: passport while it's back in the day, but even that 645 00:37:24,360 --> 00:37:26,839 Speaker 1: got on wheeled deer. I have upgraded and I don't 646 00:37:26,840 --> 00:37:30,160 Speaker 1: remember exactly what happened, and I lost the software and 647 00:37:30,239 --> 00:37:34,239 Speaker 1: I never looked back. But um, yeah, right in, let 648 00:37:34,320 --> 00:37:37,080 Speaker 1: us know, use dumb passwords. This is a wake up 649 00:37:37,080 --> 00:37:40,080 Speaker 1: call for you or he does not really care, um, 650 00:37:40,239 --> 00:37:42,640 Speaker 1: let us know right to as a conspiracy I heart 651 00:37:42,719 --> 00:37:45,680 Speaker 1: radio dot com. Um. And in the meantime, we're gonna 652 00:37:45,680 --> 00:37:47,600 Speaker 1: take a quick break and then back with one more 653 00:37:47,800 --> 00:37:57,279 Speaker 1: piece of strange news. All right, We're back and We're 654 00:37:57,280 --> 00:38:01,279 Speaker 1: going to keep this short, but this is important, just 655 00:38:01,360 --> 00:38:04,279 Speaker 1: like that other podcast on our network, which is Yeah, 656 00:38:04,560 --> 00:38:09,800 Speaker 1: I didn't hope that was a purposeful reference. Yeah, I 657 00:38:09,600 --> 00:38:12,560 Speaker 1: love I really love that show. Okay, Um, I'm gonna 658 00:38:12,560 --> 00:38:15,480 Speaker 1: read to you from an Al Jazeera article that was 659 00:38:15,600 --> 00:38:18,520 Speaker 1: recently posted as of today when we record this November 660 00:38:21,280 --> 00:38:25,360 Speaker 1: in first United States added to annual list of quote 661 00:38:25,400 --> 00:38:30,359 Speaker 1: backsliding democracies. This is a report that was released by 662 00:38:30,400 --> 00:38:36,120 Speaker 1: the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. Now you 663 00:38:36,160 --> 00:38:39,080 Speaker 1: will know just by that name, this is one of 664 00:38:39,120 --> 00:38:42,600 Speaker 1: these organizations that we've mentioned in the past. Uh Ben, 665 00:38:42,760 --> 00:38:46,560 Speaker 1: It's an n g O. What are those those that 666 00:38:46,840 --> 00:38:52,960 Speaker 1: are non governmental organizations. It's also an umbrella term. It's 667 00:38:52,960 --> 00:38:57,760 Speaker 1: a very vague phrase. Not all of them are created equally. 668 00:38:58,000 --> 00:39:01,879 Speaker 1: Their association in the West January really is something like 669 00:39:02,239 --> 00:39:05,319 Speaker 1: these are not for profit entities that are trying to 670 00:39:05,360 --> 00:39:08,640 Speaker 1: make the world better in one specific way. However, not 671 00:39:08,719 --> 00:39:13,680 Speaker 1: everybody shares that opinion, and they aren't all not shady 672 00:39:13,960 --> 00:39:19,480 Speaker 1: correct definition as fairer as hell. So, um, this one 673 00:39:19,520 --> 00:39:22,480 Speaker 1: in particular, you can go to I D E A 674 00:39:22,920 --> 00:39:27,359 Speaker 1: DOT I n T. So that's their organization than International 675 00:39:27,719 --> 00:39:29,800 Speaker 1: and you can learn about them. They have a slash 676 00:39:29,880 --> 00:39:32,680 Speaker 1: about us page you can read there. You can read 677 00:39:32,680 --> 00:39:36,520 Speaker 1: all about the member states that exist within it, including 678 00:39:36,560 --> 00:39:40,560 Speaker 1: their chair from Australia, their first vice chair from Barbados, 679 00:39:40,640 --> 00:39:45,560 Speaker 1: and their second first vice chair from Germany. Um you 680 00:39:45,600 --> 00:39:48,160 Speaker 1: can learn all about what they do. It's this is 681 00:39:48,200 --> 00:39:50,680 Speaker 1: what they say. According to their website, they say that 682 00:39:50,719 --> 00:39:54,520 Speaker 1: membership to this organization is quote open to governments which demonstrate, 683 00:39:54,600 --> 00:39:57,200 Speaker 1: by example in their own state their commitment to the 684 00:39:57,280 --> 00:40:00,759 Speaker 1: rule of law, human rights, the basic principles of democratic 685 00:40:00,840 --> 00:40:06,480 Speaker 1: pluralism and strengthening democracy. Interesting stuff there, I do have 686 00:40:06,560 --> 00:40:11,400 Speaker 1: to say, at least on their official website, I'm seeing 687 00:40:11,440 --> 00:40:20,080 Speaker 1: countries like Belgium, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, India, Philippines, Peru, Panama, 688 00:40:20,239 --> 00:40:24,759 Speaker 1: Norway not seeing the United States, just putting that out there, 689 00:40:24,840 --> 00:40:26,920 Speaker 1: not seeing the US. They don't seem to be a 690 00:40:26,960 --> 00:40:31,400 Speaker 1: part of this organization. So this organization that does not 691 00:40:31,440 --> 00:40:33,759 Speaker 1: have the United States within it or at least as 692 00:40:33,760 --> 00:40:37,320 Speaker 1: a member state, has said that the United States is backsliding. 693 00:40:37,440 --> 00:40:41,240 Speaker 1: It is a backsliding democracy, as in it is deteriorating. 694 00:40:41,440 --> 00:40:44,520 Speaker 1: Things are happening, and it is being pushed more towards 695 00:40:44,560 --> 00:40:48,359 Speaker 1: an authoritarian or hybrid state, as they would describe it. 696 00:40:48,600 --> 00:40:50,840 Speaker 1: And one thing we could have told you that, well, 697 00:40:51,560 --> 00:40:54,200 Speaker 1: maybe that's the way it feels to me. It perhaps 698 00:40:54,280 --> 00:40:56,600 Speaker 1: feels that way a little bit personally, just when I 699 00:40:56,680 --> 00:41:00,360 Speaker 1: look out at events and how things have been shaped 700 00:41:00,360 --> 00:41:03,839 Speaker 1: and changed over the past gosh, several decades that I've 701 00:41:03,840 --> 00:41:08,840 Speaker 1: been paying attention. But um, to see it put out 702 00:41:08,920 --> 00:41:12,440 Speaker 1: here in a report that is fairly extensive if you 703 00:41:12,480 --> 00:41:15,520 Speaker 1: read the entire thing that you can find on their website, UM, 704 00:41:16,280 --> 00:41:19,880 Speaker 1: it is a bit alarming. It It specifically points to 705 00:41:20,680 --> 00:41:25,400 Speaker 1: nineteen and as being a flashpoint for a change that 706 00:41:25,480 --> 00:41:29,040 Speaker 1: has begun to occur within the United States. Specifically, they're 707 00:41:29,080 --> 00:41:33,080 Speaker 1: calling out the words and actions of President Donald Trump 708 00:41:33,320 --> 00:41:37,880 Speaker 1: upon losing his second term election and having a sitting 709 00:41:38,239 --> 00:41:44,160 Speaker 1: president who's on his way out questioning directly the results 710 00:41:44,440 --> 00:41:47,640 Speaker 1: of a democratic election within a country, right within the 711 00:41:47,680 --> 00:41:51,560 Speaker 1: country that that this president is serving. You know, that's 712 00:41:51,600 --> 00:41:55,200 Speaker 1: maybe one thing, but it is also it just love 713 00:41:55,280 --> 00:41:59,680 Speaker 1: read you this quote, kind of an alarming thing to 714 00:41:59,800 --> 00:42:03,320 Speaker 1: have a president question the results of an election, because 715 00:42:03,320 --> 00:42:06,600 Speaker 1: then you know, that makes everybody else question it. And 716 00:42:06,600 --> 00:42:10,840 Speaker 1: this is not casting as versions necessarily directly at President Trump. 717 00:42:10,920 --> 00:42:14,360 Speaker 1: It's just that that occurrence, no matter who it was 718 00:42:14,400 --> 00:42:17,560 Speaker 1: in office or who was questioning the authority of the 719 00:42:17,600 --> 00:42:23,960 Speaker 1: democratic process, would have eroded this, like the core democracy 720 00:42:24,000 --> 00:42:26,359 Speaker 1: of it all. So much of so much of that 721 00:42:26,440 --> 00:42:29,759 Speaker 1: core is based on following you know, kind of protocols 722 00:42:29,800 --> 00:42:33,640 Speaker 1: and following um tradition, you know, and none of it's 723 00:42:33,680 --> 00:42:37,600 Speaker 1: necessarily enforceable by law. It's just we just depend on 724 00:42:37,719 --> 00:42:41,040 Speaker 1: people kind of carrying this legacy of like accepting the 725 00:42:41,080 --> 00:42:43,279 Speaker 1: results of an election and like, you know, being a 726 00:42:43,320 --> 00:42:46,560 Speaker 1: good sport. But once you start having someone who said 727 00:42:46,560 --> 00:42:48,680 Speaker 1: in the president actually maybe that we don't need to 728 00:42:48,680 --> 00:42:51,799 Speaker 1: do that, then you start to see that backsliding. It 729 00:42:51,800 --> 00:42:55,680 Speaker 1: feels like, yeah, I've is something I've brought up over 730 00:42:55,880 --> 00:42:58,560 Speaker 1: over the years, and it's something it's easy for people 731 00:42:58,600 --> 00:43:02,200 Speaker 1: in the US and really the global West to forget. 732 00:43:02,600 --> 00:43:06,520 Speaker 1: It's that the most vulnerable time in any empire is 733 00:43:06,880 --> 00:43:10,160 Speaker 1: the time in which the transfer of power occurs. And 734 00:43:10,239 --> 00:43:13,359 Speaker 1: you might be surprised how many countries don't get it 735 00:43:13,480 --> 00:43:18,960 Speaker 1: right and how startlingly close they come to dissolution. The 736 00:43:19,239 --> 00:43:23,040 Speaker 1: peaceful transfer of power is like the number one most 737 00:43:23,120 --> 00:43:26,759 Speaker 1: vulnerable time. It is. It is literally the equivalent of 738 00:43:27,200 --> 00:43:31,600 Speaker 1: an animal's malting stage. It's very vulnerable. The skin is new, 739 00:43:31,920 --> 00:43:35,279 Speaker 1: will the core survive? And I don't think that's hyperbolic 740 00:43:35,360 --> 00:43:37,680 Speaker 1: to phrase it this way. I know we're going to get, 741 00:43:38,120 --> 00:43:41,799 Speaker 1: probably Matt, We're going to get to the writing of 742 00:43:41,920 --> 00:43:46,440 Speaker 1: John Bago or Bagot Glub, the guy who put a 743 00:43:46,560 --> 00:43:50,040 Speaker 1: time limit or proposed an expiration date for Empires right 744 00:43:50,239 --> 00:43:54,080 Speaker 1: two or fifty years ago. Talk about that, we can. 745 00:43:54,440 --> 00:43:57,160 Speaker 1: I mean, we've already talked about that on this segment. 746 00:43:58,480 --> 00:44:01,080 Speaker 1: That's true, that's true. So we refer back to that 747 00:44:01,120 --> 00:44:05,000 Speaker 1: and instead we say that this is this perceived thing, 748 00:44:05,400 --> 00:44:10,880 Speaker 1: American exceptionalism as an ideology, aside this perceived um danger. 749 00:44:11,480 --> 00:44:14,520 Speaker 1: If it is a thing that is happening, if this 750 00:44:14,680 --> 00:44:20,680 Speaker 1: in GEO is right, then they are also inherently seeing 751 00:44:20,719 --> 00:44:24,480 Speaker 1: it at a macro cosmic level. There are other things 752 00:44:24,840 --> 00:44:29,719 Speaker 1: happening in countries and they're similar. Like Chile is currently 753 00:44:30,320 --> 00:44:34,360 Speaker 1: in a runoff and one of the lead contenders is 754 00:44:34,920 --> 00:44:39,920 Speaker 1: um another Bolsonaro, you know, and that is the current 755 00:44:40,560 --> 00:44:45,319 Speaker 1: leader of Brazil. There is a far right resurgence and 756 00:44:45,360 --> 00:44:47,279 Speaker 1: it's been going on for a while. We talked about 757 00:44:47,280 --> 00:44:50,200 Speaker 1: it in the past. Isn't there a connection to with 758 00:44:50,400 --> 00:44:53,560 Speaker 1: um the COVID nineteen pandemic, And that is all something 759 00:44:53,600 --> 00:44:55,920 Speaker 1: you kind of see historically like a big upset, a 760 00:44:56,000 --> 00:44:59,640 Speaker 1: big you know, kind of inciting event is oftentimes when 761 00:45:00,000 --> 00:45:03,319 Speaker 1: an authoritarian regime can kind of grab the reins a 762 00:45:03,360 --> 00:45:07,920 Speaker 1: little bit. Well, it's also when you can most clearly 763 00:45:08,040 --> 00:45:12,000 Speaker 1: see discontent of the of people who live within a 764 00:45:12,080 --> 00:45:16,040 Speaker 1: state that is maybe slipping right a little bit. Well, 765 00:45:16,040 --> 00:45:19,799 Speaker 1: there's unrest, what better time to rob the nordstroms of democracy, 766 00:45:20,000 --> 00:45:21,960 Speaker 1: you know what I mean? See, it's all my god, 767 00:45:21,960 --> 00:45:24,880 Speaker 1: it's all coming together. Also, we have a full episode 768 00:45:24,880 --> 00:45:29,200 Speaker 1: on Empires expiration dates. We do, we do, and and 769 00:45:29,239 --> 00:45:32,760 Speaker 1: this is just to point out this one specific report. 770 00:45:33,040 --> 00:45:35,320 Speaker 1: And it is also not to say that just the 771 00:45:35,440 --> 00:45:37,920 Speaker 1: United States is in this boat and is you know, 772 00:45:37,960 --> 00:45:43,480 Speaker 1: backsliding into some other form of government non democratic. You 773 00:45:43,520 --> 00:45:45,800 Speaker 1: can read through the report. You can see Hungary, Poland 774 00:45:45,880 --> 00:45:50,000 Speaker 1: Slovenia as places that are backsliding, established democracies that are 775 00:45:50,000 --> 00:45:53,200 Speaker 1: having issues. You can look at a few countries that, 776 00:45:53,239 --> 00:45:56,000 Speaker 1: according to this n g O, are actually improving, like 777 00:45:56,239 --> 00:46:01,720 Speaker 1: Ukraine and North Macedonia. However, Ukraine is like as we record, 778 00:46:01,760 --> 00:46:05,040 Speaker 1: this appears to be dealing with some stuff with Russia. Again. 779 00:46:05,120 --> 00:46:08,239 Speaker 1: We'll see what happens if these intelligence reports actually pan 780 00:46:08,280 --> 00:46:14,399 Speaker 1: out into something terrible or not. Um. Other places like Turkey, Nicaragua, 781 00:46:14,800 --> 00:46:18,600 Speaker 1: Poland Serbia, Brazil were rated as having the quote most 782 00:46:18,680 --> 00:46:24,360 Speaker 1: significant democratic declines over the last decade. UM. I can't 783 00:46:24,440 --> 00:46:27,520 Speaker 1: urge you enough to actually head on over and read 784 00:46:27,560 --> 00:46:30,040 Speaker 1: the report. You can get it online. It's free. You 785 00:46:30,040 --> 00:46:33,040 Speaker 1: can look at the entire thing. Just check it in 786 00:46:33,120 --> 00:46:35,640 Speaker 1: the way it's divided up to you can select regions 787 00:46:35,680 --> 00:46:40,200 Speaker 1: and different attributes like representative government, fundamental rights, checks on government. 788 00:46:40,200 --> 00:46:43,480 Speaker 1: These are like they're I guess bell weathers for you 789 00:46:43,520 --> 00:46:47,320 Speaker 1: know how they're measuring whether this is into the backsliding. Yeah, 790 00:46:47,360 --> 00:46:50,799 Speaker 1: it's it's it's it's really good work. Uh. You know, 791 00:46:50,840 --> 00:46:54,239 Speaker 1: they're gonna be people who say that it has inherent 792 00:46:54,320 --> 00:46:58,680 Speaker 1: biases most works of humanity do and don't know why. 793 00:46:58,719 --> 00:47:03,000 Speaker 1: That's like some sort of news or surprise. But sometimes 794 00:47:03,040 --> 00:47:07,719 Speaker 1: that's a bad faith reaction too, because not everybody agrees 795 00:47:08,000 --> 00:47:12,279 Speaker 1: on the idea that democracy is necessarily a good thing. 796 00:47:12,360 --> 00:47:14,560 Speaker 1: There are a lot of people who think democracy is 797 00:47:14,640 --> 00:47:17,480 Speaker 1: it's sold to other countries is really a trojan horse 798 00:47:17,680 --> 00:47:20,560 Speaker 1: for resource extraction, and as much as I hate to 799 00:47:20,640 --> 00:47:23,440 Speaker 1: admit it, there is validity in that claim. And then, 800 00:47:23,480 --> 00:47:26,640 Speaker 1: of course there are other people who say fascism get 801 00:47:26,680 --> 00:47:29,399 Speaker 1: a bad name and should get a you know, let's 802 00:47:29,440 --> 00:47:32,040 Speaker 1: do it right this time. I don't agree with those folks, 803 00:47:32,440 --> 00:47:35,120 Speaker 1: but those are those different viewpoints. It's important to say 804 00:47:35,160 --> 00:47:39,520 Speaker 1: that not everybody agrees on the idea of democracy being 805 00:47:39,600 --> 00:47:42,600 Speaker 1: the best thing since sliced bread or what's that other quotation, 806 00:47:43,160 --> 00:47:50,120 Speaker 1: um the least worst or the best worst form of government. Uh. 807 00:47:50,320 --> 00:47:54,839 Speaker 1: The reason it's important is that this in theory, when 808 00:47:54,840 --> 00:47:58,239 Speaker 1: democracy works, it gives you the right to have a 809 00:47:58,280 --> 00:48:02,120 Speaker 1: problem without being black agged and disappeared. It gives you 810 00:48:02,160 --> 00:48:04,759 Speaker 1: the right to show up and publicly as long as 811 00:48:04,760 --> 00:48:07,719 Speaker 1: you're not trying to harm people say stuff like like 812 00:48:08,760 --> 00:48:13,120 Speaker 1: it's so weird. You'll see protests over like a reboot 813 00:48:13,840 --> 00:48:17,560 Speaker 1: of fantasy series that people don't like and we don't 814 00:48:17,560 --> 00:48:19,759 Speaker 1: like how they change this that or the third about 815 00:48:19,760 --> 00:48:22,600 Speaker 1: the characters. We're gonna protest the studio and they'll see 816 00:48:22,640 --> 00:48:26,080 Speaker 1: other people who are protesting political decisions. You can't do 817 00:48:26,120 --> 00:48:31,839 Speaker 1: that in every country, Like people forget how powerful that is. Like, 818 00:48:32,120 --> 00:48:35,680 Speaker 1: look at and this is not to be xenophobic, This 819 00:48:35,760 --> 00:48:39,319 Speaker 1: is certainly not to be nationalistic. Uh. This is in 820 00:48:39,360 --> 00:48:42,680 Speaker 1: the US, which is far from perfect. There are a 821 00:48:42,680 --> 00:48:45,000 Speaker 1: lot of things people take for granted. And one of 822 00:48:45,040 --> 00:48:47,960 Speaker 1: those things is the fact that you can stand up 823 00:48:48,440 --> 00:48:51,600 Speaker 1: and you can talk in public, and you can still 824 00:48:51,880 --> 00:48:55,759 Speaker 1: you know, live your life in many cases, as long 825 00:48:55,800 --> 00:48:57,799 Speaker 1: as you're not saying, like, hey, let's get together and 826 00:48:58,239 --> 00:49:00,960 Speaker 1: burned down the so and so. But that's not the 827 00:49:00,960 --> 00:49:04,319 Speaker 1: case in many other places. Try that in Belarus, you know, 828 00:49:04,800 --> 00:49:10,400 Speaker 1: try that publicly in Beijing, try try that. See see 829 00:49:10,880 --> 00:49:13,319 Speaker 1: see if the rules for Tenement Square today are the 830 00:49:13,360 --> 00:49:16,120 Speaker 1: same as they were when the tanks rolled through. The 831 00:49:16,160 --> 00:49:24,759 Speaker 1: answer is unfortunately yes, Jesus. So starting off the week 832 00:49:25,239 --> 00:49:31,440 Speaker 1: on a high note here, everybody check out. There's a 833 00:49:31,440 --> 00:49:38,240 Speaker 1: Reuter's article posted to yesterday, November one, titled democracy slipping 834 00:49:38,280 --> 00:49:42,280 Speaker 1: away at record rate. In her governmental body warns fun 835 00:49:42,880 --> 00:49:46,000 Speaker 1: really just puts the stuffing in the turkey for me. 836 00:49:46,920 --> 00:49:50,080 Speaker 1: So but again I'm saying, you're right, it is allarming 837 00:49:50,160 --> 00:49:51,839 Speaker 1: to see this, but it's also stuff that we can 838 00:49:51,920 --> 00:49:55,520 Speaker 1: kind of see with our eyes. Uh here with our 839 00:49:55,560 --> 00:49:58,000 Speaker 1: ears and and and just like we are, we are 840 00:49:58,080 --> 00:50:03,880 Speaker 1: living in a historical time of unrest um and device division, 841 00:50:04,040 --> 00:50:07,560 Speaker 1: you know, And I think a lot of what you're describing, 842 00:50:07,640 --> 00:50:12,880 Speaker 1: Matt is a manifestation of those divisions. Guy is gonna 843 00:50:12,920 --> 00:50:15,759 Speaker 1: silence us all real soon. Oh yeah, that Mother Earth's 844 00:50:15,800 --> 00:50:19,360 Speaker 1: sketch and Sorr. It's pretty funny. Earth is a super organism. 845 00:50:19,560 --> 00:50:22,600 Speaker 1: That's another interesting episode. We'll we'll see what happens. But 846 00:50:22,680 --> 00:50:26,160 Speaker 1: I've gotta I gotta say as we're closing out, Um, 847 00:50:26,200 --> 00:50:29,400 Speaker 1: the world is ending for someone every day. There hasn't 848 00:50:29,440 --> 00:50:34,520 Speaker 1: ever really been a peaceful time in human history since. 849 00:50:36,080 --> 00:50:38,200 Speaker 1: But it's been cool for some people at some points 850 00:50:38,200 --> 00:50:40,959 Speaker 1: in time, just not everybody at once. And that's the goal. 851 00:50:41,160 --> 00:50:44,040 Speaker 1: That's where you know, uh, that is that is when 852 00:50:44,040 --> 00:50:47,680 Speaker 1: you win the game. I guess. Uh. Now get that 853 00:50:47,719 --> 00:50:50,720 Speaker 1: shopping spirit at Nordstrom. When you get that shopping spirit 854 00:50:50,719 --> 00:50:55,439 Speaker 1: at Nordstrom, jeez. But for now, we're going to end 855 00:50:56,120 --> 00:50:59,040 Speaker 1: today's segment. We've we've asked some questions that we would 856 00:50:59,120 --> 00:51:02,440 Speaker 1: love to hear your take on. We would love to 857 00:51:02,440 --> 00:51:05,839 Speaker 1: hear your ideas about the future of crowdsourcing crimes through 858 00:51:05,880 --> 00:51:10,120 Speaker 1: social media. We'd love to hear your passwords, send along 859 00:51:10,520 --> 00:51:12,919 Speaker 1: with a list of your fears, your mother's maiden name, 860 00:51:13,360 --> 00:51:16,800 Speaker 1: the first car you drove, the city, yours, and the 861 00:51:16,880 --> 00:51:19,280 Speaker 1: last for digits of your social if you don't mind 862 00:51:19,640 --> 00:51:22,320 Speaker 1: h and then tell us in your opinion the ideas 863 00:51:22,680 --> 00:51:27,120 Speaker 1: of what a backslide from democracy is, what that means, 864 00:51:27,520 --> 00:51:30,440 Speaker 1: how to combat it? Is it being alarmist? Is it accurate? 865 00:51:30,600 --> 00:51:33,400 Speaker 1: And then also last, and perhaps this is most important, 866 00:51:33,840 --> 00:51:41,000 Speaker 1: when you order guacamole at the hips or should it 867 00:51:41,120 --> 00:51:43,840 Speaker 1: come by itself? Are you is it inherent in the 868 00:51:43,920 --> 00:51:47,040 Speaker 1: purchase price that you are also getting chips? Not gonna 869 00:51:47,160 --> 00:51:50,000 Speaker 1: name names, but this is uh, this is a matter 870 00:51:50,000 --> 00:51:54,600 Speaker 1: of great importance, matter of great importance to us the show. 871 00:51:55,160 --> 00:51:58,920 Speaker 1: So please answer that question for us. And even more importantly, 872 00:51:59,480 --> 00:52:03,120 Speaker 1: when David Busters finally does send some chips out to 873 00:52:03,200 --> 00:52:07,120 Speaker 1: you because they don't have servers anymore, they've just got electronics, 874 00:52:07,520 --> 00:52:10,280 Speaker 1: then they're supposed to know where you ordered, where you ordered. 875 00:52:10,560 --> 00:52:13,000 Speaker 1: If they bring you a tiny bit of cheese dip, 876 00:52:13,520 --> 00:52:18,399 Speaker 1: like a tiny, tiny single dips worth of cheese tap, 877 00:52:18,960 --> 00:52:21,360 Speaker 1: should you moray send that back because you did not 878 00:52:21,440 --> 00:52:23,520 Speaker 1: in fact order it, or should you just accept the 879 00:52:23,600 --> 00:52:28,640 Speaker 1: cheese dip, I asked Delphie. Actually, yeah, the Ai Delphi, Delphi, 880 00:52:29,640 --> 00:52:33,839 Speaker 1: the oracle of no, no, no, the Ai less aggressive, uh, 881 00:52:33,840 --> 00:52:36,880 Speaker 1: with a new version of it. Uh. And they said 882 00:52:37,200 --> 00:52:41,360 Speaker 1: it's good. Um. Afraid of the cheese dip though, or 883 00:52:41,400 --> 00:52:45,719 Speaker 1: the action like follow up? I tried to follow up, 884 00:52:45,760 --> 00:52:48,560 Speaker 1: but you know, the do we see as though through 885 00:52:48,560 --> 00:52:51,960 Speaker 1: a mirror darkened? I guess is the old line? But ever, 886 00:52:52,280 --> 00:52:55,920 Speaker 1: but this is. But we want to hear your opinion 887 00:52:56,000 --> 00:52:58,400 Speaker 1: on this. I love that we're alluding to this at 888 00:52:58,400 --> 00:53:01,480 Speaker 1: the end. Um. We also want to shout out everybody 889 00:53:01,560 --> 00:53:05,600 Speaker 1: on Twitter who wrote to us with their own I 890 00:53:05,640 --> 00:53:07,160 Speaker 1: mean this is more of a listener male thing, but 891 00:53:07,200 --> 00:53:10,680 Speaker 1: who wrote to us with their own experiments asking the oracle. 892 00:53:11,440 --> 00:53:14,640 Speaker 1: You can see those if you visit our Twitter handle 893 00:53:14,880 --> 00:53:18,080 Speaker 1: where we are at conspiracy Stuff. You can also find 894 00:53:18,160 --> 00:53:21,600 Speaker 1: us on Facebook. We love to shout out our Facebook page. 895 00:53:21,640 --> 00:53:23,799 Speaker 1: Here's where it gets crazy. You can meet with your 896 00:53:23,800 --> 00:53:27,919 Speaker 1: fellow conspiracy realists. The memes are good, the discussion is better. Uh. 897 00:53:27,960 --> 00:53:30,440 Speaker 1: And you can also find us on Instagram where we 898 00:53:30,480 --> 00:53:34,040 Speaker 1: are conspiracy Stuff show. But wait, you might be saying, 899 00:53:34,480 --> 00:53:37,719 Speaker 1: didn't you guys spend so much time telling me the dangerous, 900 00:53:37,719 --> 00:53:41,319 Speaker 1: dilatorious potential of social media. Aren't I supposed to be 901 00:53:41,360 --> 00:53:44,400 Speaker 1: off it? How can I contact you because I have 902 00:53:44,480 --> 00:53:47,840 Speaker 1: opinions about guacamole. Well, that's entirely up to you, but 903 00:53:48,080 --> 00:53:51,120 Speaker 1: if you wish, you may also contact us via telephone, 904 00:53:51,440 --> 00:53:54,040 Speaker 1: old school telephone kind of situation. You can. I think 905 00:53:54,040 --> 00:53:56,200 Speaker 1: even a rotary still works on that. It's one A 906 00:53:56,320 --> 00:53:58,160 Speaker 1: three three S td W I t K. You can 907 00:53:58,200 --> 00:54:00,520 Speaker 1: leave a message. You've got three minutes, let us know 908 00:54:00,600 --> 00:54:04,560 Speaker 1: what to call you, make up a cool nickname, first name, anonymous, whatever. 909 00:54:04,600 --> 00:54:07,319 Speaker 1: We will respect your wishes and most importantly, make sure 910 00:54:07,320 --> 00:54:09,200 Speaker 1: you let us know if we can use your audio 911 00:54:09,400 --> 00:54:12,720 Speaker 1: on the show, and then you yes, you might appear 912 00:54:12,719 --> 00:54:14,400 Speaker 1: on one of our weekly listener mail episodes. If you 913 00:54:14,400 --> 00:54:16,840 Speaker 1: don't want to do any of that, there's one final, 914 00:54:17,000 --> 00:54:19,920 Speaker 1: also somewhat old school way of contentting us. You can 915 00:54:19,920 --> 00:54:22,520 Speaker 1: send us a good old fashioned email. We are conspiracy 916 00:54:22,719 --> 00:54:43,839 Speaker 1: at our heart radio dot com. Stuff they don't want 917 00:54:43,880 --> 00:54:46,240 Speaker 1: you to know is a production of I Heart Radio. 918 00:54:46,560 --> 00:54:48,799 Speaker 1: For more podcasts from my heart Radio, visit the I 919 00:54:48,880 --> 00:54:51,799 Speaker 1: heart Radio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to 920 00:54:51,800 --> 00:54:52,600 Speaker 1: your favorite shows.