1 00:00:09,664 --> 00:00:13,104 Speaker 1: Mission Implausible is now something you can watch. Just go 2 00:00:13,144 --> 00:00:16,823 Speaker 1: to YouTube and search Mission Implausible podcasts, or click on 3 00:00:16,864 --> 00:00:20,864 Speaker 1: the link to our channel. In our show notes, I'm 4 00:00:20,904 --> 00:00:22,784 Speaker 1: John Cipher and I'm Jerry O'Shea. 5 00:00:23,264 --> 00:00:26,544 Speaker 2: We have over sixty years of experience as clandestine officers 6 00:00:26,664 --> 00:00:29,544 Speaker 2: in the CIA, serving in high risk areas all around 7 00:00:29,544 --> 00:00:30,264 Speaker 2: the world, and. 8 00:00:30,304 --> 00:00:34,504 Speaker 3: Part of our job was creating conspiracies to deceive our adversaries. 9 00:00:34,784 --> 00:00:37,504 Speaker 2: Now we're going to use that experience to investigate the 10 00:00:37,504 --> 00:00:40,543 Speaker 2: conspiracy theories everyone's talking about, as well as some you 11 00:00:40,584 --> 00:00:41,224 Speaker 2: may not have heard. 12 00:00:41,304 --> 00:00:43,584 Speaker 4: Could they be true or are we being manipulated? 13 00:00:43,664 --> 00:00:50,264 Speaker 2: We'll find out now on Mission Implausible. Today's guest is 14 00:00:50,343 --> 00:00:53,623 Speaker 2: David McCluskey, a longtime friend of the pod. David's a 15 00:00:53,623 --> 00:00:57,144 Speaker 2: former CIA analyst, a best selling spy novelist these Days, 16 00:00:57,464 --> 00:01:00,304 Speaker 2: and co host of the popular The Rest Is Classified 17 00:01:00,344 --> 00:01:02,424 Speaker 2: podc David has written some of the most convincing modern 18 00:01:02,544 --> 00:01:07,224 Speaker 2: espionage fiction around, including Damascus Station, Moscow X, The Seventh Floor, 19 00:01:07,384 --> 00:01:09,904 Speaker 2: and most recently The Persian. So today we're to talk 20 00:01:09,904 --> 00:01:12,423 Speaker 2: about spy fiction, real intelligence work, and when the public 21 00:01:12,424 --> 00:01:15,184 Speaker 2: gets wrong about CIA and how current events look. When 22 00:01:15,224 --> 00:01:17,624 Speaker 2: you've spent time inside the business. Also, we promise not 23 00:01:17,664 --> 00:01:19,783 Speaker 2: to ambush him again like we did last time. We 24 00:01:19,824 --> 00:01:22,703 Speaker 2: realize that ambushing a professional analyst is just too easy. 25 00:01:22,744 --> 00:01:25,184 Speaker 2: There's no challenge to it. So welcome David. 26 00:01:25,664 --> 00:01:26,584 Speaker 4: I didn't promise. 27 00:01:26,744 --> 00:01:29,703 Speaker 5: Yeah, Jerry hasn't promised. I'm already regretting the decision to 28 00:01:29,783 --> 00:01:33,344 Speaker 5: return to submission. Implausible, I can't believe. And for those 29 00:01:33,384 --> 00:01:36,024 Speaker 5: who listened to the past episode that we all recorded, 30 00:01:36,063 --> 00:01:38,264 Speaker 5: I think they'll probably be surprised that I agreed to 31 00:01:38,264 --> 00:01:41,303 Speaker 5: come back on because I was treated so shabbily as 32 00:01:41,304 --> 00:01:41,904 Speaker 5: an analyst. 33 00:01:42,224 --> 00:01:44,423 Speaker 4: It's all about Kompromot exactly. 34 00:01:44,464 --> 00:01:46,144 Speaker 5: You guys have the goods on me, so I just 35 00:01:46,184 --> 00:01:48,144 Speaker 5: have to do pretty much whatever you whenever you said the. 36 00:01:48,144 --> 00:01:49,504 Speaker 2: Goods on us too, So you just got to be 37 00:01:49,864 --> 00:01:51,704 Speaker 2: you can't be afraid to use it. Let's just go 38 00:01:51,784 --> 00:01:52,384 Speaker 2: on the offense. 39 00:01:52,864 --> 00:01:54,464 Speaker 5: That's right, mutually assured destruction. 40 00:01:54,624 --> 00:01:57,224 Speaker 2: So damn your book The Persian came out just at 41 00:01:57,224 --> 00:02:01,224 Speaker 2: the right time. Understanding Iranian intelligence and the military mindset 42 00:02:01,304 --> 00:02:04,464 Speaker 2: is topical and relevant now. So given the recent a text, 43 00:02:04,464 --> 00:02:06,704 Speaker 2: do you wish you waited a little further to gather 44 00:02:06,824 --> 00:02:09,184 Speaker 2: more for real events before publishing In the book, or 45 00:02:09,624 --> 00:02:11,824 Speaker 2: did the war mostly confirm what you already believed about 46 00:02:11,824 --> 00:02:13,504 Speaker 2: that Iran Israel contest. 47 00:02:13,904 --> 00:02:18,224 Speaker 5: I was actually relieved that the book was done before 48 00:02:19,504 --> 00:02:22,304 Speaker 5: most of this broke, because I think if I were 49 00:02:22,304 --> 00:02:25,744 Speaker 5: in the middle of drafting now, for example, I would 50 00:02:25,784 --> 00:02:30,184 Speaker 5: feel compelled to rework plot lines, and actually, I mean 51 00:02:30,304 --> 00:02:33,344 Speaker 5: there'd be a significant amount of kind of context I 52 00:02:33,344 --> 00:02:35,144 Speaker 5: would have to bring to the story to make sure 53 00:02:35,144 --> 00:02:37,664 Speaker 5: that readers they read it six months or a year 54 00:02:37,664 --> 00:02:39,864 Speaker 5: from now, understand that I know that there was a 55 00:02:39,944 --> 00:02:42,864 Speaker 5: war on. I'm glad I just it's out there and 56 00:02:42,944 --> 00:02:45,584 Speaker 5: I don't have to do that because that sounds that 57 00:02:45,624 --> 00:02:46,464 Speaker 5: sounds exhausting. 58 00:02:47,904 --> 00:02:49,664 Speaker 2: You know, laziness. 59 00:02:49,864 --> 00:02:54,704 Speaker 5: Laziness is the primary motive motivation here. I think that 60 00:02:56,024 --> 00:02:59,304 Speaker 5: certainly the as I look at the way I tried 61 00:02:59,344 --> 00:03:02,344 Speaker 5: to capture how the Israelis operate. You know, the book 62 00:03:02,384 --> 00:03:05,504 Speaker 5: is set in the Israel Iron Shadow War. There's no 63 00:03:05,544 --> 00:03:08,104 Speaker 5: Agency CI component to it, no Americans in the book 64 00:03:08,104 --> 00:03:10,504 Speaker 5: at all. And as I look at the way that 65 00:03:10,864 --> 00:03:14,664 Speaker 5: the Israelis have operated inside Iran in the opening hours 66 00:03:14,664 --> 00:03:17,383 Speaker 5: of this conflict and look back at really the last 67 00:03:17,424 --> 00:03:19,264 Speaker 5: couple of years, I feel like the book does a 68 00:03:19,304 --> 00:03:23,984 Speaker 5: pretty good job of capturing both the zeitgeist of the 69 00:03:23,984 --> 00:03:28,584 Speaker 5: shadow War and also, frankly, just the mechanics of how 70 00:03:28,584 --> 00:03:31,544 Speaker 5: the Israelis work inside Iron So I feel like it's 71 00:03:31,584 --> 00:03:33,904 Speaker 5: held up. Well, I'm glad I didn't have any scenes 72 00:03:33,904 --> 00:03:36,824 Speaker 5: featuring the Supreme Leader because that would date things a bit. 73 00:03:36,984 --> 00:03:39,464 Speaker 5: And that was actually a conscious choice to not include 74 00:03:39,504 --> 00:03:43,744 Speaker 5: senior kind of politicians on either side because you just 75 00:03:43,784 --> 00:03:46,824 Speaker 5: don't know how long they're going to stick around. And 76 00:03:46,984 --> 00:03:48,264 Speaker 5: I'm glad I made that decision. 77 00:03:48,264 --> 00:03:52,304 Speaker 2: In retrospect, Well, they got lots of senior leaders backed up, 78 00:03:52,344 --> 00:03:53,464 Speaker 2: so it's not a problem for them. 79 00:03:53,624 --> 00:03:56,344 Speaker 5: That's true. That's true. I knew nothing. I just the 80 00:03:56,424 --> 00:03:59,824 Speaker 5: Israelis had made it fairly clear after the last round 81 00:03:59,824 --> 00:04:02,304 Speaker 5: that they considered him to be a viable target, and 82 00:04:02,664 --> 00:04:04,024 Speaker 5: sure enough, there we go. 83 00:04:04,944 --> 00:04:07,064 Speaker 4: So, David, it's one of the few analysts who'll still 84 00:04:07,104 --> 00:04:07,504 Speaker 4: talk to me. 85 00:04:07,544 --> 00:04:11,424 Speaker 6: I'd like to get I'd like to get your take 86 00:04:11,504 --> 00:04:14,664 Speaker 6: on what you think it's like inside the agency right 87 00:04:14,704 --> 00:04:18,384 Speaker 6: now with analysts who hear the executives say. 88 00:04:18,183 --> 00:04:21,984 Speaker 3: A the war is over, we won or will soon be, 89 00:04:22,824 --> 00:04:27,784 Speaker 3: or the war is over when we get unconditional surrender 90 00:04:27,904 --> 00:04:29,984 Speaker 3: from the ir audience and we get to pick who 91 00:04:30,024 --> 00:04:34,383 Speaker 3: the successor is right two completely different polls. And as 92 00:04:34,424 --> 00:04:37,584 Speaker 3: a as an analyst, you're expected to write, either here's 93 00:04:37,584 --> 00:04:41,863 Speaker 3: why we won A or B, here's why we have 94 00:04:41,904 --> 00:04:44,863 Speaker 3: to fight for the next five years or ten years 95 00:04:44,984 --> 00:04:47,944 Speaker 3: or whatever it is with this regime that will stick 96 00:04:47,984 --> 00:04:50,224 Speaker 3: around or won't stick around. So what do you think 97 00:04:50,303 --> 00:04:53,943 Speaker 3: is going on inside of like the analytic community in 98 00:04:53,984 --> 00:04:54,904 Speaker 3: the agency right now? 99 00:04:54,943 --> 00:04:55,823 Speaker 4: What's your best guess? 100 00:04:55,823 --> 00:04:58,303 Speaker 2: And it's nice, Jerry, that you think that the president 101 00:04:58,383 --> 00:05:01,424 Speaker 2: still read CIA analytic reports. That's so nice. 102 00:05:02,144 --> 00:05:04,063 Speaker 5: Yeah, that was gonna be. What I said was like, 103 00:05:04,584 --> 00:05:08,503 Speaker 5: I don't think they're reading them. I do. I also 104 00:05:08,584 --> 00:05:11,224 Speaker 5: get the sets, John, to your point that there isn't 105 00:05:11,664 --> 00:05:15,424 Speaker 5: a tremendous appetite kind of analyses at the White House 106 00:05:15,704 --> 00:05:18,023 Speaker 5: or down at the National Security Council. I think the 107 00:05:18,063 --> 00:05:20,664 Speaker 5: stuff that leaked out, like in the kind of opening 108 00:05:20,743 --> 00:05:22,943 Speaker 5: days of the conflict, about how the CI had put 109 00:05:22,943 --> 00:05:25,903 Speaker 5: together an assessment of oh, here's what happens, here's what 110 00:05:25,943 --> 00:05:28,384 Speaker 5: we think would happen if you know how many were 111 00:05:28,464 --> 00:05:32,824 Speaker 5: killed or replaced, and you know, indicates to me that 112 00:05:32,904 --> 00:05:35,863 Speaker 5: obviously there is still stuff being produced. It's a large 113 00:05:35,863 --> 00:05:39,503 Speaker 5: bureaucracy that's going to keep making stuff even if there 114 00:05:39,544 --> 00:05:42,863 Speaker 5: isn't a demand signal to read it. What does seem 115 00:05:42,904 --> 00:05:44,824 Speaker 5: to be the case though, I mean, Jerry, maybe more 116 00:05:44,863 --> 00:05:47,783 Speaker 5: to your point is like just reading the tea leaves 117 00:05:47,784 --> 00:05:53,503 Speaker 5: from outside. I don't get the sense that the analysis 118 00:05:53,704 --> 00:05:57,464 Speaker 5: is informing policy at all, whether it's the first customer 119 00:05:57,544 --> 00:05:58,984 Speaker 5: reading it like Trump. I think it is definitely not. 120 00:05:59,424 --> 00:06:02,224 Speaker 5: When you look at some of the underlying assumptions for 121 00:06:02,344 --> 00:06:04,743 Speaker 5: the conflict, I just don't. 122 00:06:06,183 --> 00:06:06,743 Speaker 4: That it would be. 123 00:06:07,863 --> 00:06:09,504 Speaker 5: Here's what I think they are. I think the underlying 124 00:06:09,544 --> 00:06:14,063 Speaker 5: assumptions where this will be kind of like Venezuela. Right 125 00:06:14,823 --> 00:06:18,463 Speaker 5: will hit them hard and fast, and we'll get a 126 00:06:18,544 --> 00:06:22,344 Speaker 5: group of people from inside the regime to do a 127 00:06:22,424 --> 00:06:25,623 Speaker 5: deal with on some of the stuff that we find objectionable, 128 00:06:25,704 --> 00:06:28,464 Speaker 5: so it'll be fast. There will be people from inside 129 00:06:28,503 --> 00:06:30,743 Speaker 5: the current structure that we'll be able to work with. 130 00:06:31,264 --> 00:06:33,023 Speaker 5: I think there was also an assumption which kind of 131 00:06:33,024 --> 00:06:36,063 Speaker 5: works counter to that. But you know, contradiction is something 132 00:06:36,104 --> 00:06:40,344 Speaker 5: this White House embraces occasionally that the war would and 133 00:06:40,464 --> 00:06:45,623 Speaker 5: in particular attacks on internal security installations would spur people 134 00:06:45,623 --> 00:06:49,024 Speaker 5: to rise up. I think that generally, I think underlying 135 00:06:49,144 --> 00:06:52,784 Speaker 5: all of this was an assumption that the regime was 136 00:06:53,784 --> 00:06:59,224 Speaker 5: extremely weak internally and externally, and it wasn't going to dissolve, 137 00:06:59,344 --> 00:07:01,743 Speaker 5: but it was probably going to have to remake itself 138 00:07:01,863 --> 00:07:04,904 Speaker 5: under pressure. And I think all of that has been 139 00:07:04,943 --> 00:07:06,823 Speaker 5: proven incorrect. For the most part. 140 00:07:07,464 --> 00:07:11,264 Speaker 2: Those assumptions weren't based done intelligence, right, They were basic 141 00:07:11,464 --> 00:07:14,904 Speaker 2: exactly yeah, things whatever. So it's it's interesting that the 142 00:07:14,944 --> 00:07:17,904 Speaker 2: White House probably had these assumptions that are based on nothing, 143 00:07:18,024 --> 00:07:21,664 Speaker 2: not on intelligence, but the Israelis actually know what's going 144 00:07:21,704 --> 00:07:23,504 Speaker 2: on there, but we're happy to go along for their 145 00:07:23,544 --> 00:07:24,944 Speaker 2: own purposes. Is that how you see it? 146 00:07:25,624 --> 00:07:28,704 Speaker 5: Yeah, I would be curious what you bring up A 147 00:07:28,784 --> 00:07:32,464 Speaker 5: good point because I felt like when I worked on Syria, 148 00:07:32,504 --> 00:07:37,143 Speaker 5: for example, like massad assessments of what was going on 149 00:07:37,224 --> 00:07:41,664 Speaker 5: in Syria and the sort of strength or lack thereof 150 00:07:41,664 --> 00:07:43,904 Speaker 5: of the Osid regime, we're like pretty I found them 151 00:07:43,944 --> 00:07:48,824 Speaker 5: to be thoughtful and very deeply researched, and obviously they're 152 00:07:48,904 --> 00:07:52,264 Speaker 5: taking advantage of great collection to build those assessments. So 153 00:07:52,384 --> 00:07:55,944 Speaker 5: I would assume, again I'm not reading it obviously that 154 00:07:56,104 --> 00:08:00,864 Speaker 5: Massad would have had similar thoughts about the Iranian regime, 155 00:08:00,904 --> 00:08:03,504 Speaker 5: but I think maybe to your point, John, from a 156 00:08:03,544 --> 00:08:07,904 Speaker 5: policy standpoint, the point for the Israelis was never get 157 00:08:07,944 --> 00:08:12,104 Speaker 5: a better political outcome. My humble opinion, the point was 158 00:08:12,184 --> 00:08:15,784 Speaker 5: to break a lot of stuff and to wreck as 159 00:08:15,864 --> 00:08:19,784 Speaker 5: much as they could Iran's capabilities, to essentially wreck the 160 00:08:19,784 --> 00:08:24,304 Speaker 5: ballistic missile force, wreck conventional military capabilities, kill a lot 161 00:08:24,304 --> 00:08:26,424 Speaker 5: of senior people, to make the sort of command and 162 00:08:26,464 --> 00:08:28,624 Speaker 5: control for a lot of the external stuff harder. And 163 00:08:28,664 --> 00:08:30,784 Speaker 5: I think the Israelis are also operating under assumption they're 164 00:08:30,784 --> 00:08:33,104 Speaker 5: going to have to do this with some consistency hold 165 00:08:33,104 --> 00:08:36,744 Speaker 5: al going forward, right, So, yeah, exactly, I think I 166 00:08:36,744 --> 00:08:39,904 Speaker 5: think the Israelis were probably from a policy standpoint, very 167 00:08:39,904 --> 00:08:42,224 Speaker 5: happy for us to believe whatever we wanted to believe 168 00:08:42,544 --> 00:08:45,223 Speaker 5: about the kind of political outcome we'd get with the regime, 169 00:08:45,583 --> 00:08:47,744 Speaker 5: as long as we would in tandem work on this 170 00:08:47,824 --> 00:08:50,503 Speaker 5: with them and help them mow the grass with a 171 00:08:50,544 --> 00:08:53,824 Speaker 5: significantly more powerful mower than they are capable of field. 172 00:08:53,864 --> 00:08:58,983 Speaker 3: I think they want us to whitewash their fence for them, basically, Yeah. 173 00:08:58,223 --> 00:09:01,144 Speaker 5: Exactly exactly, and obviously from because I think from the 174 00:09:01,223 --> 00:09:04,904 Speaker 5: from an Israeli standpoint, chaos in Iran is not is 175 00:09:04,904 --> 00:09:07,103 Speaker 5: that bad. No, I don't think that's bad. I don't 176 00:09:07,103 --> 00:09:09,144 Speaker 5: think that's a conspiratorial thing to say either. I think 177 00:09:09,144 --> 00:09:10,824 Speaker 5: that's not It's not bad for them. 178 00:09:10,864 --> 00:09:15,424 Speaker 3: As long as Iran doesn't acquire basically a nuclear weapon 179 00:09:15,424 --> 00:09:17,224 Speaker 3: and the ability to deliver it. Those are the two 180 00:09:17,223 --> 00:09:19,704 Speaker 3: things that's an existential threat for Israel. It's the only 181 00:09:19,744 --> 00:09:21,624 Speaker 3: one that's out there really right now. 182 00:09:21,744 --> 00:09:23,824 Speaker 5: And I think a lot of the downside risks of 183 00:09:23,864 --> 00:09:27,904 Speaker 5: a like cornered Iran are probably going to be more 184 00:09:27,984 --> 00:09:32,904 Speaker 5: borne by golf countries, international oil market, whether if there's 185 00:09:32,944 --> 00:09:35,864 Speaker 5: asymmetric sort of terrorist stuff that happens at the US 186 00:09:35,944 --> 00:09:38,624 Speaker 5: or Europe. It's I think the Israelis, because it's a 187 00:09:38,624 --> 00:09:41,263 Speaker 5: garrison state, it's easier for them to weather those kind 188 00:09:41,304 --> 00:09:44,824 Speaker 5: of downside risks than like the golf neighbors or US 189 00:09:44,904 --> 00:09:47,384 Speaker 5: or the Europeans. So they'd be more willing to deal 190 00:09:47,384 --> 00:09:52,144 Speaker 5: with a weakened, cornered, more aggressive Iran if it was 191 00:09:52,184 --> 00:09:55,863 Speaker 5: defanged from its nuclear capabilities and a lot of its 192 00:09:55,864 --> 00:09:58,784 Speaker 5: ballistic missile launchers and production capabilities. 193 00:09:58,184 --> 00:10:00,664 Speaker 2: And the like. Tell us a little bit about your podcast, 194 00:10:00,744 --> 00:10:03,624 Speaker 2: Arrest is Classified. It's almost as popular as ours, and 195 00:10:03,824 --> 00:10:07,904 Speaker 2: you have Gordon Carrera, BBC Intelligence Analyst on there with you. 196 00:10:08,384 --> 00:10:11,304 Speaker 2: So what makes a story? Because you're a writer now 197 00:10:11,343 --> 00:10:15,144 Speaker 2: too and a former professional, what is it about podcasting 198 00:10:15,184 --> 00:10:17,544 Speaker 2: allows you to tell stories that are different from print. 199 00:10:17,664 --> 00:10:19,304 Speaker 5: One of us typically does a little bit more of 200 00:10:19,343 --> 00:10:22,704 Speaker 5: the storytelling in each episode, but we tell a story together, 201 00:10:22,984 --> 00:10:26,744 Speaker 5: and it's a narrative format. We could tell stories that 202 00:10:26,824 --> 00:10:30,304 Speaker 5: are two episodes long. Episodes are typically forty five minutes 203 00:10:30,343 --> 00:10:32,464 Speaker 5: to an hour or up to six right. We just 204 00:10:32,504 --> 00:10:35,544 Speaker 5: did a six partner on Russian interference in the twenty 205 00:10:35,544 --> 00:10:40,144 Speaker 5: sixteen election. That was six parts. We're looking for really 206 00:10:40,184 --> 00:10:44,864 Speaker 5: good stories. Ultimately, we're looking for stories that have high stakes, 207 00:10:44,904 --> 00:10:47,264 Speaker 5: that have a lot of conflict, that have really interesting 208 00:10:47,384 --> 00:10:51,144 Speaker 5: characters in them that oftentimes makes the stories all on 209 00:10:51,144 --> 00:10:55,104 Speaker 5: their own. We did six parts last year in the 210 00:10:55,144 --> 00:10:58,464 Speaker 5: Spring on the Hunt, not the Hunt, but really the 211 00:10:58,463 --> 00:11:01,624 Speaker 5: whole arc of Osama bin Laden's life and his conflict 212 00:11:01,664 --> 00:11:05,024 Speaker 5: with America and the CIA. And you have a sort 213 00:11:05,064 --> 00:11:09,383 Speaker 5: of murderous, maybe borderline sociopathic character at the heart of 214 00:11:09,424 --> 00:11:13,264 Speaker 5: the story. But he's really interesting, you know, Somvid Latin's 215 00:11:13,384 --> 00:11:16,024 Speaker 5: a fascinating character. We just did a two parterre on 216 00:11:16,784 --> 00:11:19,384 Speaker 5: the roots of the conflict with Iran, going back to 217 00:11:20,103 --> 00:11:21,824 Speaker 5: going back to the Second World War and telling the 218 00:11:21,864 --> 00:11:23,664 Speaker 5: story up to the present. We did that with an 219 00:11:23,703 --> 00:11:26,744 Speaker 5: Iranian historian and gord I had a bunch of detail 220 00:11:26,784 --> 00:11:29,384 Speaker 5: in there on how EFP's work, because the whole our 221 00:11:29,504 --> 00:11:31,624 Speaker 5: conflict with the Iranians in Iraq was a big part 222 00:11:31,624 --> 00:11:35,264 Speaker 5: of that story. And we did two parts last year 223 00:11:35,544 --> 00:11:39,824 Speaker 5: on an effort by the Brits with some Norwegian assets 224 00:11:39,904 --> 00:11:42,743 Speaker 5: during the Second World War to blow up a kind 225 00:11:42,744 --> 00:11:46,024 Speaker 5: of heavy water reactor that was potentially going to be 226 00:11:46,103 --> 00:11:49,143 Speaker 5: part of a Nazi nuclear bomb program, and that's a 227 00:11:49,184 --> 00:11:51,904 Speaker 5: Second World War kind of spy story. And then we've 228 00:11:51,944 --> 00:11:53,944 Speaker 5: done them all the way up to episodes on Iran 229 00:11:53,944 --> 00:11:55,424 Speaker 5: Today and everything in between. 230 00:11:55,544 --> 00:11:59,144 Speaker 3: Your series on the coast attack with Blawi was really good. 231 00:11:59,583 --> 00:12:02,584 Speaker 3: Thank you, and someone who was knew a lot of 232 00:12:02,583 --> 00:12:04,984 Speaker 3: those people, I thought it hit a lot of hard 233 00:12:04,984 --> 00:12:07,664 Speaker 3: I would recommend anybody anybody listened to that. I think 234 00:12:07,703 --> 00:12:10,544 Speaker 3: it gave you also a really good set of an 235 00:12:10,583 --> 00:12:14,104 Speaker 3: intelligence story being told through people right, and to include 236 00:12:14,103 --> 00:12:18,023 Speaker 3: Balawi right, who was also very interesting guy. Spy stories 237 00:12:18,583 --> 00:12:21,024 Speaker 3: in Hollywood tend to be like bad guys and good guys, 238 00:12:21,064 --> 00:12:23,184 Speaker 3: white hats and black hats, and there's a twist in 239 00:12:23,223 --> 00:12:24,344 Speaker 3: the end, in the rogue. 240 00:12:24,664 --> 00:12:28,104 Speaker 4: This is just this was just like Balawi wasn't you know? 241 00:12:28,223 --> 00:12:31,544 Speaker 3: He was just somebody who gave his life for his cause. 242 00:12:32,064 --> 00:12:33,824 Speaker 2: Tell our listeners who Blawi. 243 00:12:33,504 --> 00:12:35,984 Speaker 5: Was, so, I mean he was essentially he was a 244 00:12:36,064 --> 00:12:43,544 Speaker 5: Jordanian physician who's a pediatrician, Humama Balawi, and he he 245 00:12:43,703 --> 00:12:48,944 Speaker 5: became radicalized online. He was kind of a I guess 246 00:12:48,944 --> 00:12:50,824 Speaker 5: one of these guys who back in the sort of 247 00:12:51,343 --> 00:12:55,824 Speaker 5: mid aughts in two thousands, was on these Jihati message boards. 248 00:12:55,864 --> 00:12:57,503 Speaker 5: You know, this is before the kind of age of 249 00:12:57,583 --> 00:13:00,944 Speaker 5: social media, and he was a big poster on Jihati 250 00:13:00,944 --> 00:13:05,504 Speaker 5: message boards about following the Iraqi insurgency, celebrating the death 251 00:13:05,504 --> 00:13:09,744 Speaker 5: of American soldiers. Really pretty nasty stuff. But he's this 252 00:13:09,824 --> 00:13:14,743 Speaker 5: kind of meek, mild manner doctor who eventually we discover, 253 00:13:14,864 --> 00:13:18,784 Speaker 5: along with the Jordanians, is this very active presence on 254 00:13:18,864 --> 00:13:23,984 Speaker 5: these blogs. And he gets arrested by Jordanian intelligence and 255 00:13:24,103 --> 00:13:28,384 Speaker 5: he the Jordanians effectively think they've recruited this guy and 256 00:13:28,424 --> 00:13:32,784 Speaker 5: they run him into the tribal areas of Pakistan under 257 00:13:32,784 --> 00:13:35,743 Speaker 5: the belief and assumption that he is their asset, he's 258 00:13:35,784 --> 00:13:39,544 Speaker 5: their ban and while he's there, he is recruited by 259 00:13:39,544 --> 00:13:43,824 Speaker 5: al Qaeda and run back against US and the Jordanians, 260 00:13:43,824 --> 00:13:47,224 Speaker 5: and he ends up detonating himself in a suicide bombing 261 00:13:47,664 --> 00:13:51,344 Speaker 5: at our basin coast Afghanistan in I guess it would 262 00:13:51,384 --> 00:13:54,504 Speaker 5: have been December thirtieth, I believe of two thousand and nine, 263 00:13:55,184 --> 00:13:57,583 Speaker 5: and killed seven officers. In that story, I appreciate the 264 00:13:57,664 --> 00:14:00,384 Speaker 5: kind words on that, Jerry. It was a really hard 265 00:14:00,384 --> 00:14:01,304 Speaker 5: one to tell. 266 00:14:01,664 --> 00:14:02,743 Speaker 4: And then Nason was good. 267 00:14:02,864 --> 00:14:05,984 Speaker 3: I mean, we conspired to put him inside of al Qaeda, 268 00:14:06,184 --> 00:14:10,184 Speaker 3: they conspired to use him to kill our own officers. 269 00:14:10,544 --> 00:14:12,944 Speaker 3: And it was about how an operation, an operation that 270 00:14:12,984 --> 00:14:16,144 Speaker 3: went bad because we wanted it too badly, we didn't 271 00:14:16,144 --> 00:14:18,944 Speaker 3: look close enough at it, and how an operation and 272 00:14:18,984 --> 00:14:21,224 Speaker 3: how conspiracy could go terribly wrong. 273 00:14:21,744 --> 00:14:23,144 Speaker 4: But but yeah, it was. 274 00:14:23,384 --> 00:14:23,584 Speaker 2: It was. 275 00:14:23,704 --> 00:14:25,544 Speaker 3: It was a hard knock for for those of us 276 00:14:25,544 --> 00:14:27,624 Speaker 3: who were involved or tindentially involved. 277 00:14:28,344 --> 00:14:31,424 Speaker 5: Yeah, and for and for me it was also there's 278 00:14:31,464 --> 00:14:35,864 Speaker 5: the human piece of it, which is still utterly tragic, 279 00:14:35,944 --> 00:14:38,384 Speaker 5: and talking with some of the officers who were involved 280 00:14:38,384 --> 00:14:41,504 Speaker 5: in the case in various forms, that's it's very much 281 00:14:41,504 --> 00:14:43,784 Speaker 5: alive and today in their hearts and minds. This is 282 00:14:43,784 --> 00:14:46,504 Speaker 5: not the kind of thing that that anyone is really over. 283 00:14:47,344 --> 00:14:49,104 Speaker 5: But it was also I think it was a really 284 00:14:49,224 --> 00:14:52,984 Speaker 5: fascinating case study in all the different ways that a 285 00:14:53,064 --> 00:14:58,584 Speaker 5: case can kind of a bad case can be. You know, 286 00:14:58,824 --> 00:15:02,424 Speaker 5: an organization can convince itself collectively it's not actually bad. 287 00:15:02,904 --> 00:15:04,984 Speaker 5: And the word that kept coming up in the research 288 00:15:05,144 --> 00:15:08,424 Speaker 5: was it's like a plane crash where there's there's not 289 00:15:09,264 --> 00:15:14,424 Speaker 5: one thing, there's fifteen things. There's systemic, structural, bureaucratic stuff 290 00:15:14,424 --> 00:15:17,544 Speaker 5: all the way up to bad decisions that get made 291 00:15:17,544 --> 00:15:20,664 Speaker 5: on the fly in real time seconds before the crash. 292 00:15:20,824 --> 00:15:23,704 Speaker 5: And if you're trying to assign blame for something or 293 00:15:23,784 --> 00:15:27,024 Speaker 5: understand why it happened, you have to see the sum 294 00:15:27,104 --> 00:15:31,304 Speaker 5: total of all the different factors that led to this disaster. 295 00:15:31,544 --> 00:15:34,744 Speaker 2: For your books, and you've written about Syria and Russia 296 00:15:34,784 --> 00:15:37,864 Speaker 2: and Persia, Iran now or something, which one of those 297 00:15:37,904 --> 00:15:39,944 Speaker 2: was the hardest for you and which one was the easiest. 298 00:15:40,224 --> 00:15:43,144 Speaker 5: The books have all been challenging in their own ways. 299 00:15:43,264 --> 00:15:46,263 Speaker 5: Second ones Moscow Exit said in Russia, I didn't work 300 00:15:46,264 --> 00:15:48,784 Speaker 5: on Russia at the agency. I've never been to Russia. 301 00:15:48,984 --> 00:15:51,384 Speaker 5: I don't speak Russian, so I had to do a 302 00:15:51,424 --> 00:15:54,584 Speaker 5: lot of kind of research to make that feel in 303 00:15:54,584 --> 00:15:56,824 Speaker 5: any way, shape or form credible. So that was hard 304 00:15:56,824 --> 00:16:00,384 Speaker 5: from that sense. The third novel, The Seventh Floor, is 305 00:16:00,584 --> 00:16:02,984 Speaker 5: more of an internal CIA story in a lot of ways, 306 00:16:03,544 --> 00:16:06,224 Speaker 5: and so from a research standpoint, it felt a little 307 00:16:06,224 --> 00:16:07,904 Speaker 5: bit easier to me, just because it was like, I'm 308 00:16:07,904 --> 00:16:10,464 Speaker 5: not I'm not trying to wrap my arms around and Russia. 309 00:16:10,504 --> 00:16:13,064 Speaker 5: I'm not trying to wrap my arms around Iran. But 310 00:16:13,144 --> 00:16:15,664 Speaker 5: at the same time, mechanically that story was hard because 311 00:16:15,664 --> 00:16:18,344 Speaker 5: it's a mole hunt, and so it's got aspects of 312 00:16:18,424 --> 00:16:20,944 Speaker 5: kind of a mystery mixed in with a thriller, and 313 00:16:21,024 --> 00:16:24,264 Speaker 5: you have to be really smart from a storytelling standpoint 314 00:16:24,304 --> 00:16:29,384 Speaker 5: about how you direct people to presume it might be 315 00:16:29,424 --> 00:16:31,744 Speaker 5: this suspect over this suspect, and not give the whole 316 00:16:31,744 --> 00:16:34,624 Speaker 5: thing away until the last possible moment. So from a 317 00:16:34,664 --> 00:16:37,384 Speaker 5: story architecture standpoint, that one was really challenging. 318 00:16:37,424 --> 00:16:39,344 Speaker 3: When one of these is made into a movie, which 319 00:16:39,384 --> 00:16:41,424 Speaker 3: is going to be I just want here to get 320 00:16:41,464 --> 00:16:44,944 Speaker 3: your promise here on air that you will allow me 321 00:16:45,024 --> 00:16:47,104 Speaker 3: to be at least an extra I would make a 322 00:16:47,104 --> 00:16:48,864 Speaker 3: great corpse better than John. 323 00:16:49,104 --> 00:16:51,264 Speaker 5: You both have tremendous futures as corpses. 324 00:16:51,344 --> 00:16:53,344 Speaker 2: Although from our experience in Hollywood, one of the things 325 00:16:53,344 --> 00:16:56,424 Speaker 2: I can tell you with very clearly is Hollywood doesn't 326 00:16:56,424 --> 00:16:59,304 Speaker 2: care what the writer wants to exactly. 327 00:16:59,424 --> 00:17:01,704 Speaker 5: This guy wrote this writer. It keeps coming up and 328 00:17:01,744 --> 00:17:04,424 Speaker 5: saying he's got two corpses for us. He made a 329 00:17:04,464 --> 00:17:07,224 Speaker 5: promise on air, get this guy out of here. 330 00:17:07,864 --> 00:17:08,823 Speaker 4: Female. That's right. 331 00:17:08,904 --> 00:17:11,624 Speaker 5: Well, yeah, exactly, We'll find our own corpses. We don't 332 00:17:11,624 --> 00:17:12,464 Speaker 5: need these corpses. 333 00:17:24,744 --> 00:17:27,344 Speaker 3: I've had a number of people over the past couple 334 00:17:27,384 --> 00:17:29,624 Speaker 3: of months ask me, in light of what's going on 335 00:17:29,784 --> 00:17:32,664 Speaker 3: Washington some of the things you've said about whether they 336 00:17:32,664 --> 00:17:35,504 Speaker 3: should apply to the agency, and I've talked I've told 337 00:17:35,544 --> 00:17:37,864 Speaker 3: them my answer as a case officer. 338 00:17:38,144 --> 00:17:39,184 Speaker 4: But what would you say, is some. 339 00:17:39,624 --> 00:17:44,424 Speaker 3: Aspiring, really highly motivated young person comes to you and says, 340 00:17:45,024 --> 00:17:46,584 Speaker 3: I want to apply to become an analyst. 341 00:17:46,624 --> 00:17:48,864 Speaker 5: No, I'd still say yes. And I would say yes 342 00:17:48,904 --> 00:17:52,304 Speaker 5: for the simple reason that I think the mission of 343 00:17:52,344 --> 00:17:55,384 Speaker 5: the agency is really important. It's really important that we 344 00:17:55,504 --> 00:17:59,824 Speaker 5: have a highly effective for an intelligence service that's really 345 00:17:59,864 --> 00:18:02,704 Speaker 5: good at collecting things and stealing secrets, and also really 346 00:18:02,704 --> 00:18:06,584 Speaker 5: good at analyzing the world around us and being able 347 00:18:06,624 --> 00:18:09,344 Speaker 5: to convey the truth of what's going on in the 348 00:18:09,344 --> 00:18:12,544 Speaker 5: world world to people in positions of power, even if 349 00:18:12,544 --> 00:18:15,944 Speaker 5: they're not like this administration probably paying that much attention 350 00:18:16,024 --> 00:18:18,424 Speaker 5: to the analysts. But you know, Bill Clinton wasn't really 351 00:18:18,464 --> 00:18:21,344 Speaker 5: reading the PDB either, wasn't really that interested in it. 352 00:18:21,744 --> 00:18:25,344 Speaker 5: There are ups and downs. Administrations consume this stuff differently, 353 00:18:25,944 --> 00:18:29,744 Speaker 5: and we need really smart analysts. When we get the 354 00:18:29,784 --> 00:18:34,184 Speaker 5: analysis wrong, there are often consequences for that, And I 355 00:18:34,184 --> 00:18:37,384 Speaker 5: think better people in general will mean better analysis. So 356 00:18:37,424 --> 00:18:41,344 Speaker 5: I would hardly encourage anyone who's considering applying to do so. 357 00:18:41,704 --> 00:18:44,464 Speaker 2: I also think that for the bulk of your career, 358 00:18:44,504 --> 00:18:46,784 Speaker 2: when you start, for at least ten fifteen years before 359 00:18:46,824 --> 00:18:49,304 Speaker 2: you become senior, you have nothing to do with politics 360 00:18:49,304 --> 00:18:50,023 Speaker 2: inside the Beltway. 361 00:18:50,064 --> 00:18:50,384 Speaker 5: That's right. 362 00:18:51,264 --> 00:18:52,984 Speaker 2: But I do think nowadays you have to be more 363 00:18:53,024 --> 00:18:55,584 Speaker 2: clear perhaps about what are your ethical red lines. At 364 00:18:55,584 --> 00:18:58,264 Speaker 2: what point if someone tells you and we've seen this 365 00:18:58,824 --> 00:19:01,023 Speaker 2: D and I coming in and say this is what 366 00:19:01,064 --> 00:19:03,544 Speaker 2: we want you to write, and if you disagree with that, 367 00:19:03,584 --> 00:19:05,184 Speaker 2: you have to have be clear to say no and 368 00:19:05,224 --> 00:19:07,584 Speaker 2: be ready to be fired. So I think people coming 369 00:19:07,624 --> 00:19:09,944 Speaker 2: in now have to be aware of this. But I 370 00:19:09,944 --> 00:19:12,224 Speaker 2: also agree with you. I don't think the people at 371 00:19:12,264 --> 00:19:14,104 Speaker 2: the lower level is doing the work day to day 372 00:19:14,304 --> 00:19:16,384 Speaker 2: are tied up in the stuff that's bothering us from 373 00:19:16,424 --> 00:19:17,384 Speaker 2: the outside right now. 374 00:19:17,424 --> 00:19:19,304 Speaker 5: But when I talk to friends who are still inside, 375 00:19:19,304 --> 00:19:21,744 Speaker 5: who were even you know, US analysts get promoted more 376 00:19:21,824 --> 00:19:25,824 Speaker 5: quickly than U case officers, so they're not quite SIS 377 00:19:25,944 --> 00:19:29,264 Speaker 5: yet or anything like that, but they're relatively senior. You 378 00:19:29,344 --> 00:19:31,144 Speaker 5: talk about the day to day work, most of them 379 00:19:31,144 --> 00:19:34,384 Speaker 5: are like, it hasn't changed, It just continues on, And 380 00:19:35,504 --> 00:19:39,544 Speaker 5: it's the reality of a really big bureaucracy and the 381 00:19:39,584 --> 00:19:41,824 Speaker 5: fact that, yeah, when you're hired on, if you come 382 00:19:41,864 --> 00:19:44,384 Speaker 5: in as a GS nine or eight or whatever, like, 383 00:19:44,704 --> 00:19:48,224 Speaker 5: you're not writing the Iran PDB for the president. You're 384 00:19:48,224 --> 00:19:50,304 Speaker 5: a cog in a machine and you're writing much lower 385 00:19:50,344 --> 00:19:53,104 Speaker 5: profile stuff. So you're right, it's not as much of 386 00:19:53,144 --> 00:19:55,624 Speaker 5: a concern for early to mid tenure officers. 387 00:19:56,064 --> 00:19:58,704 Speaker 4: David, what was your first snowflake? You have to explain 388 00:19:58,744 --> 00:19:59,744 Speaker 4: what a snowflake is. 389 00:20:01,464 --> 00:20:03,744 Speaker 5: I think the name had changed, Jerry by the time 390 00:20:03,824 --> 00:20:06,824 Speaker 5: I joined. I think it was called a whib a 391 00:20:06,904 --> 00:20:11,944 Speaker 5: world in brief, which was like like snowflake's better. Snowflake 392 00:20:12,024 --> 00:20:15,144 Speaker 5: is better. So my understanding is a snowflake. Was it 393 00:20:15,184 --> 00:20:19,184 Speaker 5: a like three sentence piece of analysis or something like that, 394 00:20:19,224 --> 00:20:24,144 Speaker 5: two sentences? Yeah, a squip. I do remember writing whibs 395 00:20:24,264 --> 00:20:27,904 Speaker 5: as they were then called, and there were definitely these 396 00:20:27,984 --> 00:20:30,104 Speaker 5: dark Knight of the soul moments where you're late, you're 397 00:20:30,144 --> 00:20:34,704 Speaker 5: staying late at headquarters, it's eleven PM, and you're waiting 398 00:20:34,744 --> 00:20:37,944 Speaker 5: for someone to do the tenth layer of review on 399 00:20:37,984 --> 00:20:41,144 Speaker 5: your three sentences that when you look at when you 400 00:20:41,184 --> 00:20:43,984 Speaker 5: look at them at the end of the day, you're like, 401 00:20:44,224 --> 00:20:46,904 Speaker 5: this doesn't say much of anything at all, Like here 402 00:20:46,944 --> 00:20:50,864 Speaker 5: I am eating off the hot dog vending machine, can't 403 00:20:50,984 --> 00:20:54,384 Speaker 5: having not gone home. It's just what like wait for 404 00:20:54,424 --> 00:20:56,224 Speaker 5: someone to change a couple of words in the wib 405 00:20:56,224 --> 00:20:58,544 Speaker 5: But you know, so, yeah, my first what was my 406 00:20:58,584 --> 00:21:01,704 Speaker 5: first whib about? I was an intern? And the first 407 00:21:01,704 --> 00:21:04,264 Speaker 5: summer I was an intern was two thousand and six, 408 00:21:04,784 --> 00:21:07,144 Speaker 5: and there was a thirty four day war between Israel 409 00:21:07,144 --> 00:21:08,824 Speaker 5: and Hezbola in two thousand and six, and I was 410 00:21:08,824 --> 00:21:11,304 Speaker 5: working on Syria YEA, and so it was a whib 411 00:21:11,384 --> 00:21:16,624 Speaker 5: about what amount of humanitarian aid had made it into Lebanon. 412 00:21:17,344 --> 00:21:19,064 Speaker 5: Like a week or two into the conflict. 413 00:21:19,144 --> 00:21:24,544 Speaker 2: That sounds very woke. They probably just crossed the analysis. 414 00:21:24,664 --> 00:21:27,344 Speaker 5: It was an assessment of Hiballa's DEI programs. 415 00:21:27,544 --> 00:21:32,024 Speaker 4: Yeah, well, let me ask you this. 416 00:21:32,064 --> 00:21:34,384 Speaker 2: Did your analytic training do you think make you a 417 00:21:34,424 --> 00:21:36,384 Speaker 2: better novelist or did it give you sort of bad 418 00:21:36,424 --> 00:21:39,264 Speaker 2: habits of over contextualizing or over explaining? What do you think? 419 00:21:39,504 --> 00:21:42,024 Speaker 5: I think it has worked both for me and against me. 420 00:21:42,424 --> 00:21:44,904 Speaker 5: I think in the four column it does give you. 421 00:21:46,024 --> 00:21:49,984 Speaker 5: The analytic training gives you an appreciation for precision of 422 00:21:50,064 --> 00:21:55,184 Speaker 5: language and writing in a very excuse me, economical way 423 00:21:55,704 --> 00:21:59,424 Speaker 5: that is helpful as a novelist, like the usually the 424 00:21:59,504 --> 00:22:02,424 Speaker 5: right number of words to communicate something is the fewest number, 425 00:22:02,504 --> 00:22:04,544 Speaker 5: and that's true in analytic writing, and I think it's 426 00:22:04,544 --> 00:22:07,704 Speaker 5: also true in novels. What it doesn't help you with, though, 427 00:22:07,784 --> 00:22:11,344 Speaker 5: is like the kind of the old logical way that 428 00:22:11,424 --> 00:22:14,784 Speaker 5: we write in the then d I and now DA. 429 00:22:15,304 --> 00:22:16,344 Speaker 2: We called that boring. 430 00:22:16,584 --> 00:22:20,984 Speaker 5: It is it's very boring, and it's voiceless, and you 431 00:22:21,224 --> 00:22:26,624 Speaker 5: are in some ways trying to eliminate any sense of 432 00:22:26,824 --> 00:22:29,504 Speaker 5: your own voice or character voice in that it's supposed 433 00:22:29,504 --> 00:22:31,704 Speaker 5: to be a cold piece of bureaucratic writing that is 434 00:22:31,784 --> 00:22:35,824 Speaker 5: not yours. It belongs it's the CIA's analysis. Right. If 435 00:22:35,824 --> 00:22:37,424 Speaker 5: you write that way, you're not going to sell a 436 00:22:37,424 --> 00:22:40,424 Speaker 5: lot of novels. You can't adopt the DI style Guide 437 00:22:40,544 --> 00:22:42,784 Speaker 5: as we used to call it, and layer that into 438 00:22:42,824 --> 00:22:43,424 Speaker 5: fiction writing. 439 00:22:43,864 --> 00:22:46,144 Speaker 4: But where when you're writing, where do you say, Okay, 440 00:22:46,224 --> 00:22:49,424 Speaker 4: we wouldn't do this, or this almost never happens, but 441 00:22:49,464 --> 00:22:51,424 Speaker 4: I'm still going to do it, or this doesn't happen 442 00:22:51,464 --> 00:22:51,984 Speaker 4: at all. 443 00:22:52,664 --> 00:22:54,584 Speaker 3: So I guess the question is where do you Where 444 00:22:54,624 --> 00:22:57,464 Speaker 3: do you how far do you take out artistic license 445 00:22:58,104 --> 00:23:00,624 Speaker 3: and how often do you do so in order to 446 00:23:00,664 --> 00:23:02,424 Speaker 3: make a better yarn? I mean, nobody wants to read 447 00:23:02,424 --> 00:23:04,944 Speaker 3: about it a boring successful op, right, It's something's got 448 00:23:04,944 --> 00:23:06,864 Speaker 3: to go wrong, and you know there's got to be 449 00:23:06,904 --> 00:23:10,744 Speaker 3: fuck ups and characters and in real life, weird shit 450 00:23:10,864 --> 00:23:11,424 Speaker 3: does happen. 451 00:23:11,504 --> 00:23:15,544 Speaker 5: I think the essential answer is that the story comes first. 452 00:23:16,224 --> 00:23:20,184 Speaker 5: The way you typically inject that into the book is 453 00:23:20,224 --> 00:23:23,304 Speaker 5: through the characters. And so if your characters are actually 454 00:23:23,584 --> 00:23:29,144 Speaker 5: like mine, are CIA case officers or MASAD case officers, like, 455 00:23:29,264 --> 00:23:32,144 Speaker 5: if it's an actual it's based on an actual kind 456 00:23:32,144 --> 00:23:35,464 Speaker 5: of person who's doing an actual job. You're starting from 457 00:23:35,504 --> 00:23:38,424 Speaker 5: a good basis right there, because then you're looking at 458 00:23:38,424 --> 00:23:41,464 Speaker 5: the things that kind of motivate them, that drive them, 459 00:23:41,784 --> 00:23:45,264 Speaker 5: are the actual demands of what case officers really do, 460 00:23:45,824 --> 00:23:48,464 Speaker 5: the real bureaucracy that they happen to be in, the 461 00:23:48,504 --> 00:23:50,984 Speaker 5: type of target they're going after. All of that kind 462 00:23:51,024 --> 00:23:53,344 Speaker 5: of stuff will just come from the characters, and a 463 00:23:53,384 --> 00:23:55,264 Speaker 5: lot of where I think some of the really fun 464 00:23:55,344 --> 00:23:57,624 Speaker 5: spy fiction that doesn't really have much to do with 465 00:23:57,744 --> 00:24:00,864 Speaker 5: espionage at all comes from the fact that the types 466 00:24:00,864 --> 00:24:03,664 Speaker 5: of protagonists that are being chosen for these books are 467 00:24:03,664 --> 00:24:07,944 Speaker 5: not like any real people, right, They're not actually doing 468 00:24:07,984 --> 00:24:12,224 Speaker 5: a real job that are human somewhere does yeah, yeah, 469 00:24:12,224 --> 00:24:15,144 Speaker 5: they're superhero spies exactly. I'll give you an example of 470 00:24:15,184 --> 00:24:17,584 Speaker 5: this in the fifth book, which I'm writing now. There's 471 00:24:17,584 --> 00:24:20,104 Speaker 5: a point later in the novel where a kind of 472 00:24:20,184 --> 00:24:22,664 Speaker 5: minor character that we saw in the first few chapters 473 00:24:22,704 --> 00:24:27,344 Speaker 5: has to reappear because there's information that the CIA and 474 00:24:27,464 --> 00:24:30,384 Speaker 5: MI six. Indeed, at this particular point in the story, 475 00:24:30,504 --> 00:24:32,704 Speaker 5: there's a character on the British side that has to 476 00:24:32,744 --> 00:24:36,904 Speaker 5: have this conversation with this Chinese intelligence officer. Now, in reality, 477 00:24:38,464 --> 00:24:41,664 Speaker 5: this guy, his background, he's not going to be the 478 00:24:41,704 --> 00:24:44,064 Speaker 5: one who's making the picture having the conversation. It would 479 00:24:44,064 --> 00:24:48,024 Speaker 5: be someone else in the bureaucracy, but I have to 480 00:24:48,224 --> 00:24:49,744 Speaker 5: it has to be him, because I'm not going to 481 00:24:49,784 --> 00:24:53,984 Speaker 5: randomly introduce some new character like we would have in 482 00:24:53,984 --> 00:24:56,744 Speaker 5: real life, where it's like someone from our China Ops 483 00:24:56,784 --> 00:24:59,144 Speaker 5: back room goes and has the conversation, not some random 484 00:24:59,144 --> 00:25:03,464 Speaker 5: guy who's got iron experience. But from a character storytelling standpoint, 485 00:25:03,904 --> 00:25:05,344 Speaker 5: I'm not going to just have a whole bunch of 486 00:25:05,384 --> 00:25:08,144 Speaker 5: random people coming in and out throughout the whole novel 487 00:25:08,224 --> 00:25:10,464 Speaker 5: like you would in real life, because that actual operation 488 00:25:10,584 --> 00:25:12,984 Speaker 5: isn't done by two people, right, It's a bureaucratic thing. 489 00:25:27,624 --> 00:25:30,264 Speaker 2: So while we were recording this, there actually is a 490 00:25:30,384 --> 00:25:33,864 Speaker 2: controversy dealing with CI analysts right now. So there was 491 00:25:33,904 --> 00:25:37,264 Speaker 2: a sixty minutes piece and a piece by Michael Weiss 492 00:25:37,264 --> 00:25:39,784 Speaker 2: and The Insider and a few follow up pieces to 493 00:25:39,824 --> 00:25:43,264 Speaker 2: talk about this issue. It's sometimes called Havana syndrome. The 494 00:25:43,264 --> 00:25:46,824 Speaker 2: government calls it HI and anomalous health incidents, and it's 495 00:25:46,864 --> 00:25:49,704 Speaker 2: these diplomat CI officers and some military officers around the 496 00:25:49,704 --> 00:25:51,904 Speaker 2: world that have been they believe they've been hit by 497 00:25:51,904 --> 00:25:55,304 Speaker 2: this sort of pulse weapon that has created brain injuries 498 00:25:55,304 --> 00:25:57,704 Speaker 2: on them. And as part of this process, the CI, 499 00:25:57,864 --> 00:26:01,184 Speaker 2: the analytic cadriate, the CI is essentially disputed it. They said, 500 00:26:01,224 --> 00:26:03,144 Speaker 2: we don't think there's anything there. We don't think foreign 501 00:26:03,184 --> 00:26:06,464 Speaker 2: actor did this. And these pieces go into detail about 502 00:26:06,464 --> 00:26:08,824 Speaker 2: some of the internal workings that make it look even 503 00:26:08,824 --> 00:26:10,064 Speaker 2: potentially ugly than that. 504 00:26:11,424 --> 00:26:16,144 Speaker 7: Tonight we have details of a classified US intelligence mission 505 00:26:16,584 --> 00:26:21,264 Speaker 7: that has obtained a previously unknown weapon that may finally 506 00:26:21,424 --> 00:26:27,024 Speaker 7: unlock a mystery. Since at least twenty sixteen US diplomats, spies, 507 00:26:27,104 --> 00:26:32,464 Speaker 7: and military officers have suffered crippling brain injuries. They've told 508 00:26:32,504 --> 00:26:37,824 Speaker 7: of being hit by an overwhelming force, damaging their vision, hearing, 509 00:26:38,224 --> 00:26:42,904 Speaker 7: sense of balance, and cognition, but the government has doubted 510 00:26:42,944 --> 00:26:48,104 Speaker 7: their stories. They've been called delusional. Well, now sixty Minutes 511 00:26:48,184 --> 00:26:51,784 Speaker 7: has learned that a weapon that can inflict these injuries 512 00:26:52,304 --> 00:26:57,264 Speaker 7: was obtained overseas and secretly tested on animals on a 513 00:26:57,384 --> 00:27:02,664 Speaker 7: US military base. We've investigated this mystery for nine years. 514 00:27:04,064 --> 00:27:07,584 Speaker 2: What are your thoughts about that specific issue, because in 515 00:27:07,624 --> 00:27:10,064 Speaker 2: many ways it does make the analytic country look bad. Now, 516 00:27:10,064 --> 00:27:11,904 Speaker 2: there may be things that we don't know. This is 517 00:27:11,944 --> 00:27:13,984 Speaker 2: just based on the reporting we've seen publicly. 518 00:27:14,144 --> 00:27:18,104 Speaker 5: Having read that Insider piece and having seen the sixty 519 00:27:18,104 --> 00:27:21,064 Speaker 5: minutes segment and a few of the I think sixty 520 00:27:21,064 --> 00:27:22,504 Speaker 5: minutes has done a few of these over the last 521 00:27:22,504 --> 00:27:24,784 Speaker 5: few years, haven't they, And I think I've seen most 522 00:27:24,824 --> 00:27:28,944 Speaker 5: of them, not all of them. I think the depiction 523 00:27:29,104 --> 00:27:31,624 Speaker 5: of the analysts who, because of my understanding from the 524 00:27:31,664 --> 00:27:36,064 Speaker 5: Insider piece, is that there was a group inside sort 525 00:27:36,064 --> 00:27:39,544 Speaker 5: of a cell set up called the It was like 526 00:27:39,584 --> 00:27:43,184 Speaker 5: the Global Health Incident Cell, and it was run by analysts, 527 00:27:43,544 --> 00:27:46,864 Speaker 5: a couple analysts I think, who seem to have had 528 00:27:46,864 --> 00:27:52,584 Speaker 5: a real both both some personality problems, very strong personalities, which, 529 00:27:52,584 --> 00:27:55,784 Speaker 5: by the way, that type of analyst, that's a thing 530 00:27:56,064 --> 00:28:00,064 Speaker 5: right there. There are analysts who rise up in the organization, 531 00:28:00,984 --> 00:28:03,904 Speaker 5: and who rise up not because they're very good at 532 00:28:03,984 --> 00:28:06,864 Speaker 5: managing people, but in fact because they're just really they 533 00:28:06,864 --> 00:28:09,824 Speaker 5: were good analysts at some point in their careers, were 534 00:28:10,024 --> 00:28:12,224 Speaker 5: particularly good at navigating the bureaucracy. 535 00:28:12,304 --> 00:28:15,704 Speaker 4: I'm glaid. It doesn't happen with case officers, by the way. 536 00:28:15,224 --> 00:28:17,824 Speaker 5: Yeah, I know exactly. This is the case officers. They 537 00:28:17,904 --> 00:28:23,424 Speaker 5: rise up because of their managerial expertise, and so that 538 00:28:23,984 --> 00:28:27,584 Speaker 5: profile of a like a domineering analyst who runs a 539 00:28:27,624 --> 00:28:31,464 Speaker 5: group as their own personal fiefdom and oftentimes does the 540 00:28:31,504 --> 00:28:36,264 Speaker 5: analysis themselves, even from very senior positions, like got it? 541 00:28:36,344 --> 00:28:38,584 Speaker 5: That makes total sense to me. I encountered them all 542 00:28:38,624 --> 00:28:40,904 Speaker 5: the time when I was an analyst. The thing that 543 00:28:40,984 --> 00:28:42,864 Speaker 5: I have struggled with in the story, and I should 544 00:28:42,904 --> 00:28:46,904 Speaker 5: say that the Insider piece, I thought, maybe laid too 545 00:28:47,024 --> 00:28:48,704 Speaker 5: much of the blame for this at the feet of 546 00:28:48,704 --> 00:28:52,464 Speaker 5: like modernization in its emphasis, which I don't quite buy, 547 00:28:53,224 --> 00:28:56,184 Speaker 5: but I cannot understand it because this is the other 548 00:28:56,224 --> 00:28:59,544 Speaker 5: thing is like the analysts seem to have decided, according 549 00:28:59,584 --> 00:29:01,504 Speaker 5: to the Insider piece, which again I could buy this, 550 00:29:01,944 --> 00:29:04,984 Speaker 5: the analysts decided that there wasn't that there there, and 551 00:29:05,024 --> 00:29:09,464 Speaker 5: they essentially existed to discredit the testimony. Is the meta 552 00:29:09,864 --> 00:29:13,824 Speaker 5: evidence and frankly, what seems to be the intelligence, both 553 00:29:13,864 --> 00:29:18,304 Speaker 5: open source and otherwise to suggest that behind some of 554 00:29:18,344 --> 00:29:22,784 Speaker 5: these attacks or some of these anomalist health incidents, there 555 00:29:22,864 --> 00:29:26,824 Speaker 5: was a foreign adversary, the Russians. Let's be clear, Like again, 556 00:29:26,904 --> 00:29:28,904 Speaker 5: I'm outside, I'm not seeing the intelligence. I'm just seeing 557 00:29:28,904 --> 00:29:31,064 Speaker 5: the stuff that makes it out, and it seems based 558 00:29:31,064 --> 00:29:36,064 Speaker 5: on that information, it's not rocket science to assess that 559 00:29:36,384 --> 00:29:39,544 Speaker 5: behind some of these incidents laid the Russian intelligence services, 560 00:29:39,544 --> 00:29:42,424 Speaker 5: in particularly the GRU. And so when I look at 561 00:29:42,624 --> 00:29:47,104 Speaker 5: the insider reporting about these analysts insisting that it was 562 00:29:47,144 --> 00:29:52,424 Speaker 5: not the Russians, it's very confusing to me because I 563 00:29:52,464 --> 00:29:54,144 Speaker 5: was brought up in a DII that was reeling from 564 00:29:54,184 --> 00:30:00,064 Speaker 5: the IRAQ WMD stuff. And as a result, we had 565 00:30:00,104 --> 00:30:03,464 Speaker 5: it beat into us that there were a whole bunch 566 00:30:03,504 --> 00:30:06,984 Speaker 5: of analytic techniques that you would do frequently on major, 567 00:30:07,344 --> 00:30:12,384 Speaker 5: really important analytic lines to prevent or counteract the kind 568 00:30:12,384 --> 00:30:16,104 Speaker 5: of biases and problems that affected the way we wrote 569 00:30:16,344 --> 00:30:20,064 Speaker 5: about IRAQ WMD. And so there were things like looking 570 00:30:20,104 --> 00:30:22,584 Speaker 5: at the same set of information and trying to understand 571 00:30:22,624 --> 00:30:27,424 Speaker 5: if it could support multiple competing hypotheses, doing regular assumptions 572 00:30:27,504 --> 00:30:32,744 Speaker 5: checks on the major assumptions that underlie analytic lines, and frankly, 573 00:30:32,784 --> 00:30:35,624 Speaker 5: doing red cell kind of stuff, where like you might 574 00:30:35,664 --> 00:30:38,064 Speaker 5: have an existing analytic line, but someone would look at 575 00:30:38,064 --> 00:30:39,824 Speaker 5: all the same evidence and then write a piece that 576 00:30:40,224 --> 00:30:43,544 Speaker 5: contradicted it, ran against it to test it and harden it. 577 00:30:44,224 --> 00:30:46,544 Speaker 5: And so we spent a lot of time doing this stuff, 578 00:30:47,064 --> 00:30:50,904 Speaker 5: and to have an organization like this Global Health incident 579 00:30:50,944 --> 00:30:52,544 Speaker 5: cell that seems to not have done any of that 580 00:30:52,904 --> 00:30:57,024 Speaker 5: is perplexing to me, and it makes me, it does 581 00:30:57,064 --> 00:31:00,704 Speaker 5: make me feel conspiratorial really, because it's like, what is 582 00:31:00,744 --> 00:31:07,304 Speaker 5: the what is the reason for not investigating some of 583 00:31:07,344 --> 00:31:10,344 Speaker 5: these incidents, the credible ones really so seriously, these kind 584 00:31:10,344 --> 00:31:13,184 Speaker 5: of cornerstone incidents and trying to get to the bottom 585 00:31:13,184 --> 00:31:14,464 Speaker 5: of it. I don't understand. 586 00:31:15,064 --> 00:31:18,104 Speaker 3: Yeah, perplexing is a really good word, because I could 587 00:31:18,184 --> 00:31:22,224 Speaker 3: see under Trump one and now under Trump two then 588 00:31:22,344 --> 00:31:24,944 Speaker 3: not wanting to confront that this was the Russians, that 589 00:31:24,984 --> 00:31:27,744 Speaker 3: there would be some sort of pressure but under Briden 590 00:31:27,944 --> 00:31:30,464 Speaker 3: as well, and again maybe I'm reading this through but 591 00:31:30,624 --> 00:31:32,464 Speaker 3: reading too deeply into it, but there seemed to be 592 00:31:32,584 --> 00:31:35,224 Speaker 3: some sort of pressure not even from the group, but 593 00:31:35,304 --> 00:31:39,424 Speaker 3: just basically politically in the air that you don't want 594 00:31:39,464 --> 00:31:43,344 Speaker 3: to say it could be or likely was the Russians 595 00:31:43,904 --> 00:31:46,344 Speaker 3: because that's an act of war. People were being almost 596 00:31:46,464 --> 00:31:48,864 Speaker 3: like bending over backwards, not they have to say this, 597 00:31:49,624 --> 00:31:52,304 Speaker 3: And eventually they said it was very unlikely. I'm not 598 00:31:52,344 --> 00:31:55,264 Speaker 3: even sure what that even means for an analyst. Very 599 00:31:55,344 --> 00:31:59,824 Speaker 3: unlikely generally means like it's not possible, and to. 600 00:31:58,904 --> 00:32:00,624 Speaker 4: The incredible but unproven. 601 00:32:01,464 --> 00:32:03,784 Speaker 7: Are you saying this is a cover up? 602 00:32:04,104 --> 00:32:06,504 Speaker 8: This is a massive CIA cover up? And I'll say 603 00:32:06,544 --> 00:32:09,064 Speaker 8: I say this with great regret. It's an organization that 604 00:32:09,144 --> 00:32:11,464 Speaker 8: I love. I believe in the mission. I was really 605 00:32:11,464 --> 00:32:13,944 Speaker 8: good at this job. To this day, I want to 606 00:32:13,944 --> 00:32:17,224 Speaker 8: see the CIA operate in a strong and effective manner. 607 00:32:17,664 --> 00:32:21,344 Speaker 7: But Pauli Moropolis and other victims have been doubted for years. 608 00:32:21,704 --> 00:32:23,104 Speaker 7: Do you believe it was a cover up? 609 00:32:23,304 --> 00:32:27,944 Speaker 9: Yes, I do, through a variety of purposes and means, 610 00:32:28,464 --> 00:32:35,624 Speaker 9: not necessarily as a pre planned strategic operation, but in 611 00:32:35,864 --> 00:32:39,944 Speaker 9: essence it arrives at the same results. 612 00:32:40,824 --> 00:32:42,584 Speaker 2: Like the WMD thing. We don't want to put out 613 00:32:42,624 --> 00:32:44,304 Speaker 2: a piece of analysis that says you need to go 614 00:32:44,344 --> 00:32:47,224 Speaker 2: to war this enactive war thing that Jerry mentions, and 615 00:32:47,264 --> 00:32:50,144 Speaker 2: that's potentially possible. But there's also a bureaucratic potential reason 616 00:32:50,184 --> 00:32:52,744 Speaker 2: here is that if the analysts say, yes, this is 617 00:32:52,744 --> 00:32:57,184 Speaker 2: happening to our officers, that creates a whole problem for 618 00:32:57,224 --> 00:33:00,024 Speaker 2: the CIA because we're essentially sending people around the world 619 00:33:00,424 --> 00:33:04,784 Speaker 2: with families. Yeah, and you got a problem now if people, 620 00:33:04,944 --> 00:33:06,824 Speaker 2: if a number of people have been in the regular 621 00:33:06,904 --> 00:33:09,024 Speaker 2: life being hit by this thing and getting brain injuries, 622 00:33:09,024 --> 00:33:11,744 Speaker 2: in their kids and their families potentially too. You're not 623 00:33:11,744 --> 00:33:13,744 Speaker 2: going to get anybody to go to these places, and 624 00:33:13,784 --> 00:33:16,104 Speaker 2: it's the CI's job to collect this intelligence. You need 625 00:33:16,144 --> 00:33:19,144 Speaker 2: to have people in places, and if you can't get 626 00:33:19,144 --> 00:33:21,624 Speaker 2: people to go to these places, it's a real problem. 627 00:33:21,784 --> 00:33:24,984 Speaker 10: The second attack, I was standing in my kitchen looking 628 00:33:25,024 --> 00:33:28,664 Speaker 10: out at the backwoods, and it felt like an immediate 629 00:33:29,024 --> 00:33:33,504 Speaker 10: vice on my head. Immediately disoriented, confused, and dizzy. The 630 00:33:33,624 --> 00:33:38,064 Speaker 10: third attack, I was sitting in our living room and 631 00:33:38,184 --> 00:33:43,304 Speaker 10: instantaneously all of the muscles within my spine immediately cramped 632 00:33:43,384 --> 00:33:45,784 Speaker 10: and my spine felt like it was on fire. The 633 00:33:45,824 --> 00:33:48,584 Speaker 10: fifth one was by far the worst. I woke up 634 00:33:48,824 --> 00:33:52,344 Speaker 10: with a full body convulsion, the worst pain I have 635 00:33:52,424 --> 00:33:58,424 Speaker 10: ever felt. It felt like a vice gripping my brainstem. 636 00:33:58,464 --> 00:34:00,184 Speaker 2: So I can see there's lots of reasons why you 637 00:34:00,264 --> 00:34:03,224 Speaker 2: might not want to do that, but usually analysts go 638 00:34:03,304 --> 00:34:04,824 Speaker 2: beyond that and they say what they think is the 639 00:34:04,824 --> 00:34:07,184 Speaker 2: truth anyway. So that's why this is so perplexing. 640 00:34:07,544 --> 00:34:09,104 Speaker 5: One of the other things I'm just I'm curious for 641 00:34:09,143 --> 00:34:11,703 Speaker 5: you guys on this, because I found it interesting, is 642 00:34:11,744 --> 00:34:13,744 Speaker 5: that the sixty in particular, and maybe it was in 643 00:34:13,784 --> 00:34:15,744 Speaker 5: the insider piece as well, but in the sixty minute 644 00:34:15,744 --> 00:34:18,864 Speaker 5: segment they didn't belabor this point, but it was mentioned 645 00:34:18,904 --> 00:34:21,064 Speaker 5: a couple times, which was that there was like a 646 00:34:21,104 --> 00:34:23,863 Speaker 5: time bound aspect to these attacks. There seemed to be 647 00:34:23,904 --> 00:34:28,264 Speaker 5: the case like they'd stopped. So if I thought about bureaucratically, 648 00:34:29,024 --> 00:34:31,904 Speaker 5: why would you want to sweep this thing under the 649 00:34:31,984 --> 00:34:36,464 Speaker 5: rug and pretend it doesn't exist like if if it's stopped. 650 00:34:37,384 --> 00:34:41,823 Speaker 5: That also makes those kind of explanations more plausible. It 651 00:34:41,824 --> 00:34:45,703 Speaker 5: doesn't make them any less morally odious or dishonest, but 652 00:34:46,024 --> 00:34:49,823 Speaker 5: it makes it more logical why it's senior leaders of 653 00:34:49,864 --> 00:34:52,464 Speaker 5: this global health Incidents Sealer, even at the seventh floor, 654 00:34:52,783 --> 00:34:55,104 Speaker 5: would say, we don't want to talk about this anymore 655 00:34:55,183 --> 00:34:58,263 Speaker 5: because it's done. Was that uread as well? Because it's 656 00:34:58,304 --> 00:35:01,464 Speaker 5: been a it's minimized. But that's a really important analytic 657 00:35:01,504 --> 00:35:04,064 Speaker 5: point is have these things stopped? Do you guys know 658 00:35:05,104 --> 00:35:06,144 Speaker 5: what's the story there? 659 00:35:06,504 --> 00:35:08,823 Speaker 2: Don't know? Don't know like you we know some of 660 00:35:08,824 --> 00:35:10,984 Speaker 2: the people who've been hit, So we were engaged this 661 00:35:11,143 --> 00:35:14,663 Speaker 2: more from the outside than we It may make sense analytically, 662 00:35:14,703 --> 00:35:18,064 Speaker 2: but it does seem troubling. And what I hope is 663 00:35:18,743 --> 00:35:21,424 Speaker 2: that what we're reading and hearing isn't as bad as 664 00:35:21,424 --> 00:35:24,304 Speaker 2: it looks, because we saw the damage of the WMD 665 00:35:24,464 --> 00:35:26,584 Speaker 2: thing caused. We've seen that kind of you know, when 666 00:35:26,584 --> 00:35:30,424 Speaker 2: the agency get something wrong that badly for whatever reasons, 667 00:35:30,584 --> 00:35:33,303 Speaker 2: it creates problems. And with this administration, they're you know, 668 00:35:33,344 --> 00:35:36,424 Speaker 2: they're looking for opportunities to attack the deep state. So 669 00:35:36,464 --> 00:35:39,064 Speaker 2: if this is another opportunity to do that, that's a problem. 670 00:35:39,104 --> 00:35:41,064 Speaker 5: Could very well be one of those one of these 671 00:35:41,104 --> 00:35:46,104 Speaker 5: cases where you if there's enough uncertainty early in the process, 672 00:35:45,904 --> 00:35:49,223 Speaker 5: as this global health incident sell is being set up, Right, 673 00:35:49,344 --> 00:35:51,303 Speaker 5: if this is being set up at a point where you, 674 00:35:51,344 --> 00:35:54,544 Speaker 5: by definition, because you're standing up this group, you don't 675 00:35:54,584 --> 00:35:58,624 Speaker 5: have clarity on some of the big questions. Right If 676 00:35:58,944 --> 00:36:02,623 Speaker 5: at the same time, there's a desire to not talk 677 00:36:02,623 --> 00:36:04,823 Speaker 5: about this stuff because it's potentially going to be so 678 00:36:04,944 --> 00:36:08,863 Speaker 5: divisive and unsettling to the CIA workforce, and you also 679 00:36:08,904 --> 00:36:13,424 Speaker 5: have tyrannical analysts involved, let's be clear, who probably don't 680 00:36:13,504 --> 00:36:18,384 Speaker 5: like the DOO and who are maybe predisposed to discount 681 00:36:18,504 --> 00:36:22,183 Speaker 5: what case officers will say if you mash all of 682 00:36:22,183 --> 00:36:25,104 Speaker 5: that stuff up, or you have a really unclear, sort 683 00:36:25,143 --> 00:36:30,824 Speaker 5: of ambiguous information environment early on, and then you just anchor, 684 00:36:31,424 --> 00:36:36,223 Speaker 5: you anchor to those pre existing biases, and even as 685 00:36:36,223 --> 00:36:40,064 Speaker 5: you get better information, it doesn't change the view. Everyone 686 00:36:40,344 --> 00:36:42,584 Speaker 5: sort of the view hardens at a point in time 687 00:36:42,623 --> 00:36:45,783 Speaker 5: where maybe it's plausible, I don't know, two years ago, 688 00:36:45,944 --> 00:36:49,104 Speaker 5: three years ago to think, oh, the stuff's just psychosomatic 689 00:36:49,223 --> 00:36:52,584 Speaker 5: or whatever. That seems unlikely because we know some of 690 00:36:52,623 --> 00:36:55,584 Speaker 5: the victims of these things, and you're like, it's not psychosmatic. 691 00:36:55,663 --> 00:36:58,544 Speaker 5: But the view is more plausible three years ago, I suppose. 692 00:36:58,864 --> 00:37:00,703 Speaker 5: But now that you've got all of this kind of 693 00:37:00,783 --> 00:37:03,904 Speaker 5: open source stuff on the position of these gru guys 694 00:37:04,183 --> 00:37:07,104 Speaker 5: in the vicinity of particular attacks, now that DHS bought 695 00:37:07,143 --> 00:37:11,703 Speaker 5: one of these freaking machines right like you, it becomes 696 00:37:11,864 --> 00:37:13,783 Speaker 5: it's what are you talking about? But you just you're 697 00:37:13,783 --> 00:37:15,903 Speaker 5: wedded to this position and you just hold to it, 698 00:37:16,304 --> 00:37:19,344 Speaker 5: right and it becomes absurd, which is how it feels 699 00:37:19,384 --> 00:37:20,104 Speaker 5: from the outside. 700 00:37:20,663 --> 00:37:23,464 Speaker 3: There was one one particular piece that was absurd, but 701 00:37:23,504 --> 00:37:26,064 Speaker 3: apparently one of the analysts was telling one of the 702 00:37:26,143 --> 00:37:30,064 Speaker 3: experts about how this is the laws of physics don't 703 00:37:30,104 --> 00:37:34,303 Speaker 3: allow this and the end and the expert is like, a, yes, 704 00:37:34,384 --> 00:37:36,984 Speaker 3: they do, because you're not a physicist, but you're a 705 00:37:37,104 --> 00:37:37,784 Speaker 3: history major. 706 00:37:38,024 --> 00:37:39,743 Speaker 4: Yeah, let me explain physics to you. 707 00:37:39,984 --> 00:37:43,943 Speaker 3: Right, It is like and yeah, because because again, as 708 00:37:43,984 --> 00:37:47,264 Speaker 3: case officers are, we always predicted, and it's coming true 709 00:37:47,464 --> 00:37:51,383 Speaker 3: that it'll all become it'll all become obvious when we 710 00:37:51,424 --> 00:37:56,183 Speaker 3: get a walk in. Someday someone will walk in and go, 711 00:37:56,464 --> 00:38:00,024 Speaker 3: here's the explanation, just like a number of other people 712 00:38:00,024 --> 00:38:03,704 Speaker 3: who've been assassinated over time, and people walk in and go, yeah, 713 00:38:03,783 --> 00:38:06,904 Speaker 3: we know who that was. Like the the Ukrainian nationalist 714 00:38:06,904 --> 00:38:09,384 Speaker 3: in Munich who was killed a number of years ago. 715 00:38:09,223 --> 00:38:11,344 Speaker 4: Steph Bandero. So he died of a heart attack. 716 00:38:11,424 --> 00:38:13,544 Speaker 3: It was like, you know, finally the assassin came in 717 00:38:13,864 --> 00:38:17,223 Speaker 3: with the assassination, you know, cyanaid. 718 00:38:16,864 --> 00:38:19,703 Speaker 4: Gas gun and said yeah, no, it was me. Right, 719 00:38:19,743 --> 00:38:21,223 Speaker 4: He was like, oh, I guess he didn't die of 720 00:38:21,263 --> 00:38:21,824 Speaker 4: a heart attack. 721 00:38:21,944 --> 00:38:24,424 Speaker 5: I guess it's not quite equivalent to a walk in. 722 00:38:24,544 --> 00:38:28,944 Speaker 5: But now that we have apparently purchased purchased one of 723 00:38:28,984 --> 00:38:31,783 Speaker 5: these machines, you're okay, a lot of a lot of 724 00:38:31,783 --> 00:38:35,383 Speaker 5: the claims that you were making about the sort of 725 00:38:35,424 --> 00:38:40,183 Speaker 5: the physics of this and the mechanics of how operationally 726 00:38:40,263 --> 00:38:42,343 Speaker 5: challenging it would be if one of these devices had 727 00:38:42,384 --> 00:38:44,263 Speaker 5: to be the size of a semi truck or a 728 00:38:44,263 --> 00:38:47,183 Speaker 5: minivan or something. But now if it's like a backpack 729 00:38:47,263 --> 00:38:51,464 Speaker 5: portable thing, and you can evaluate the programming to understand 730 00:38:51,984 --> 00:38:54,703 Speaker 5: what physics it makes possible and the kind of damaging 731 00:38:54,703 --> 00:38:56,744 Speaker 5: attack it can do, and you've tested it on sheep 732 00:38:56,743 --> 00:38:59,944 Speaker 5: and rodents and it's had similar impacts to what you've observed, 733 00:39:00,384 --> 00:39:01,663 Speaker 5: you know, in a lot of these cases that have 734 00:39:01,703 --> 00:39:04,544 Speaker 5: been through, Walter reed like it feels to me like 735 00:39:05,223 --> 00:39:08,983 Speaker 5: these people are owed an apology, if not a lot 736 00:39:09,024 --> 00:39:10,143 Speaker 5: more from you. 737 00:39:10,183 --> 00:39:14,544 Speaker 3: Have not forget the Norwegian you know, the Norwegian scientists 738 00:39:14,544 --> 00:39:17,064 Speaker 3: who didn't believe in it, and then you know oopset 739 00:39:17,143 --> 00:39:17,984 Speaker 3: himself right. 740 00:39:17,824 --> 00:39:22,024 Speaker 5: And tested it on himself and injured himself. It's yeah, 741 00:39:22,104 --> 00:39:23,783 Speaker 5: it's it's remarkable tested on him. 742 00:39:23,944 --> 00:39:26,344 Speaker 3: My understanding was he thought it was on a setting 743 00:39:26,344 --> 00:39:29,223 Speaker 3: where it doesn't hurt anything, and it was like it 744 00:39:29,263 --> 00:39:31,064 Speaker 3: was way more powerful than he thought. 745 00:39:31,183 --> 00:39:32,823 Speaker 4: It wasn't like i'll try this. 746 00:39:32,864 --> 00:39:35,783 Speaker 3: It was like this is okay because it's on two 747 00:39:36,104 --> 00:39:37,104 Speaker 3: instead of eleven. 748 00:39:37,263 --> 00:39:39,743 Speaker 2: And David, we want to keep you as a front 749 00:39:39,743 --> 00:39:42,143 Speaker 2: of the pod. Can you tell people like where to 750 00:39:42,143 --> 00:39:44,703 Speaker 2: find you where to find your podcast, maybe what your 751 00:39:44,743 --> 00:39:46,423 Speaker 2: next book is and what you're working on now. 752 00:39:47,064 --> 00:39:50,064 Speaker 5: Yeah, sure thing. The podcast is called The Rest is Classified. 753 00:39:50,424 --> 00:39:54,224 Speaker 5: You can find it wherever you get your pod, Spotify, Apple, 754 00:39:54,584 --> 00:39:58,663 Speaker 5: We're on YouTube as well. Do check us out. We are. 755 00:39:58,904 --> 00:40:01,703 Speaker 5: We put out two episodes a week three for our 756 00:40:01,703 --> 00:40:04,263 Speaker 5: club members, so there's plenty of content out there. And 757 00:40:04,304 --> 00:40:07,743 Speaker 5: then from a book standpoint, I am finishing putting the 758 00:40:07,783 --> 00:40:10,343 Speaker 5: kind of final touches on my fifth novel, which is 759 00:40:10,384 --> 00:40:13,823 Speaker 5: called London Station and is a story about making the 760 00:40:13,864 --> 00:40:16,544 Speaker 5: relationship between us and the Brits as nasty as possible 761 00:40:16,544 --> 00:40:18,503 Speaker 5: to see if we can start spying on each other again, 762 00:40:19,064 --> 00:40:22,104 Speaker 5: which was not as hard to architect as it perhaps sounds. 763 00:40:22,544 --> 00:40:25,784 Speaker 5: And that novel is coming out on the twenty ninth 764 00:40:25,783 --> 00:40:29,223 Speaker 5: of September here in the States. And I am just 765 00:40:29,263 --> 00:40:31,823 Speaker 5: starting to kick the tires on the next novel, but 766 00:40:32,064 --> 00:40:34,183 Speaker 5: I have not quite summoned the moral courage yet to 767 00:40:34,183 --> 00:40:36,143 Speaker 5: start writing it, and so that'll be happening soon. 768 00:40:36,344 --> 00:40:37,584 Speaker 4: Well we're your corpses. 769 00:40:37,703 --> 00:40:38,383 Speaker 2: Just remember that. 770 00:40:42,584 --> 00:40:47,623 Speaker 11: Mission Implausible is produced by Adam Davidson, Jerry O'Shea, John Cipher, 771 00:40:47,944 --> 00:40:49,184 Speaker 11: and Jonathan Stern. 772 00:40:49,384 --> 00:40:51,744 Speaker 1: The Associate producer is Rachel Harner. 773 00:40:51,984 --> 00:40:55,783 Speaker 11: Mission Implausible is a production of honorable mention and abominable 774 00:40:55,824 --> 00:40:57,743 Speaker 11: pictures for iHeart Podcasts.