WEBVTT - From the Vault: Illusory Truth Effect, Part 1

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<v Speaker 1>Hey, you welcome to Stuff to Blow Your Mind. My

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<v Speaker 1>name is Robert Lamb and I'm Joe McCormick, and it's Saturday.

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<v Speaker 1>Time to go into the Old Vault. This episode originally

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<v Speaker 1>aired July, and this was part one of our discussion

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<v Speaker 1>of the illusory truth effect, one of the many biases

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<v Speaker 1>that that, unfortunately affects all of our brains and makes

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<v Speaker 1>it harder for us to know what's true. Yeah, this

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<v Speaker 1>is one that's, uh, you know, this is gonna shake

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<v Speaker 1>some of your your foundation stones. I think you know,

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<v Speaker 1>this one's gonna make you rethink the way you interact

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<v Speaker 1>with with the world and how you interact with truth. So, uh,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, it's maybe a harrowing journey at times, but

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<v Speaker 1>I think you're gonna emerge on the other end stronger.

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<v Speaker 1>And Part two will come a week from today. Your today,

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<v Speaker 1>not our today, as we record this. Welcome to Stuff

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<v Speaker 1>to Blow Your Mind from how Stuff Works dot Com. Hey,

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<v Speaker 1>you welcome to Stuff to Blow Your Mind. My name

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<v Speaker 1>is Robert Lamb and I'm Joe McCormick. In today, we're

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<v Speaker 1>gonna be talking about one of our favorite subjects, our

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<v Speaker 1>tendency to believe things that aren't true now, Robert, I

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<v Speaker 1>wonder is there a false factoid or claim that you

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<v Speaker 1>just always find yourself recalling as true even though you've

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<v Speaker 1>checked it before and discovered it to be false in

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<v Speaker 1>the past. Yeah, this is an interesting question because I

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<v Speaker 1>feel like there are things that come up in research

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<v Speaker 1>all the time, certainly key things over the years. Uh,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, as we research and riot different topics where

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<v Speaker 1>I have to correct on, you know, where I think

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<v Speaker 1>I knew something and then I'm like, oh, well that's

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<v Speaker 1>that's actually now that actually do the research, it's not

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<v Speaker 1>not a not a fact. And then then you know,

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<v Speaker 1>the same goes for false beliefs, that beliefs that they

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<v Speaker 1>creep in the sort of Mandela fact type of scenario.

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<v Speaker 1>For instance, there was a time when I thought Gene

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<v Speaker 1>Wilder was dead prior to his actual death, and then

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<v Speaker 1>as he actually dead now he is actual really dead now.

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<v Speaker 1>So I thought he was dead before he was dead

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<v Speaker 1>exactly because and I think it was just a combination

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<v Speaker 1>of he was not as active anymore, and I wasn't

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<v Speaker 1>really keeping up with the Gene Wilder filmography and like

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<v Speaker 1>current events related to Gene Wilder, and something maybe I

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<v Speaker 1>picked up on some news piece at some point, and

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<v Speaker 1>somehow he got clicked to the dead category. And then

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<v Speaker 1>when I found out he was alive, it was it

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<v Speaker 1>was really like he came back to life. And I

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<v Speaker 1>had the same thing happened literally just the other day

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<v Speaker 1>with a standout comedian, Larry Miller. I don't think I

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<v Speaker 1>remember who that is. Oh. He he had to kind

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<v Speaker 1>of you know, dry observational comedy he had. I think

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<v Speaker 1>he still acts, but he would show up on say

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<v Speaker 1>night Chord. I think, oh, wait a minute, is seeing

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<v Speaker 1>some Christopher guest movies. He may have been, Yeah, but

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<v Speaker 1>for some reason years ago, I got into my head

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<v Speaker 1>that he had passed away, and so occasionally I would

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<v Speaker 1>think of Larry Miller and was like, oh, yeah, I

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<v Speaker 1>remember Larry Miller. Too bad he passed. And then I

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<v Speaker 1>actually looked him up the other day and it turns

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<v Speaker 1>out he was not passed away. He's still very much

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<v Speaker 1>alive and active. And I was just living in this

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<v Speaker 1>fantasy world of dead and Larry Miller's. You know, I

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<v Speaker 1>have false beliefs that recur with much more significance, like

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<v Speaker 1>I keep remembering that, Yeah, maybe it's just because I

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<v Speaker 1>was told this all the time when I was a

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<v Speaker 1>kid that vitamin C supplements will ward off colds. That

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<v Speaker 1>is not experimentally proven. That that is like not a

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<v Speaker 1>finding of science. And yet I just always if I

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<v Speaker 1>haven't checked in a while, it just seeps right back in, like, yes,

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<v Speaker 1>that is true, vitamin C it'll keep colds away. Well,

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<v Speaker 1>it's easy to fall into the trap. I do this

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<v Speaker 1>all the time with with various vitamins and some supplements

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<v Speaker 1>where I'm like, I don't know if it works, probably

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<v Speaker 1>doesn't work, but I'm going to go and take it

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<v Speaker 1>just in case, because it's it's vitamin C. You know,

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<v Speaker 1>what's the what's what's the harm there? It's kind of

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<v Speaker 1>like believing in God just in cases that he exists,

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<v Speaker 1>believing in vitamins. Yeah, but then you end up with

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<v Speaker 1>like a weird sort of vitamin tentacle going out of

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<v Speaker 1>your neck. And you didn't see that come digit, that's

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<v Speaker 1>fake news. The Joe vidamin C will not cause a

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<v Speaker 1>tentacle to grow out of your neck. But now you've

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<v Speaker 1>heard it, it's true. Um. You know, I feel like

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<v Speaker 1>there are things that have popped up where where I'll think, well,

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<v Speaker 1>I've always heard X, but I've never actually looked it up. UM,

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<v Speaker 1>And and then that's where the problem seeps in, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>where I just I think I know something, but I'm

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<v Speaker 1>not sure, but I don't care enough to actually investigate. UM.

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<v Speaker 1>There is one possible example that that comes up, and

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<v Speaker 1>that is there was this, of course, the idea that

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<v Speaker 1>George Washington Carver invented peanut butter. He know, he had

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<v Speaker 1>something to do with peanuts. He had, so yeah, he was.

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<v Speaker 1>He was. He is a famous inventor, important to African

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<v Speaker 1>American inventor. And I just I didn't know a lot

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<v Speaker 1>about him, and I had always heard the peanut butter thing,

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<v Speaker 1>but I didn't actually research until I helped my son

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<v Speaker 1>with a class project about him earlier this year, and

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<v Speaker 1>then I was able to definitely, you know, check that

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<v Speaker 1>one off on the mental list, like, okay, this is

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<v Speaker 1>the is this is false. He did not invent peanut

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<v Speaker 1>better he did, but he did do stuff with peanuts,

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<v Speaker 1>could do stuff with peanuts, but not peanut butter. Okay.

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<v Speaker 1>You know a huge place where you can see false

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<v Speaker 1>beliefs persisting, UM is in people's beliefs about sort of

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<v Speaker 1>like political facts or sociological data. A very very common

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<v Speaker 1>one is people's beliefs about crime. I think it's because

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<v Speaker 1>like crime is one of those like sensational types of

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<v Speaker 1>subjects and makes people think about violence, images of blood

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<v Speaker 1>they see on the news and stuff like that. You know,

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<v Speaker 1>poll conducted by Pew in the fall of get this

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<v Speaker 1>fifty seven percent, So a majority of people who had

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<v Speaker 1>voted or planned to vote in sixteen said that crime

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<v Speaker 1>had gotten worse in the United States since two thousand

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<v Speaker 1>eight by every objective measure. Exactly, the opposite is true.

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<v Speaker 1>That's just not true. FBI statistics, based off of like

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<v Speaker 1>nationwide police reports, found that violent cry time and property

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<v Speaker 1>crime in the United States fell nineteen percent and twenty

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<v Speaker 1>three percent, respectively between two thousand eight and and so

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<v Speaker 1>you think, okay, well, maybe that if that's just police reports,

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<v Speaker 1>maybe fewer people are reporting crimes to the police, right,

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<v Speaker 1>But also the U. S. Department of Justice Bureau of

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<v Speaker 1>Justice Statistics does direct annual surveys of more than ninety

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<v Speaker 1>thou households to see about rates of crime that might

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<v Speaker 1>not be reported to police. And quote the b j

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<v Speaker 1>S state to show that violent crime and property crime

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<v Speaker 1>rates fell twenty six percent and twenty two percent, respectively,

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<v Speaker 1>between two thousand eight and so a majority of people

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<v Speaker 1>are believing something that by every measure we know, is

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<v Speaker 1>not true. Crime has gone down, and yet a majority

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<v Speaker 1>of people believe it has gone up. And it's not

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<v Speaker 1>hard to see why that might be true when you

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<v Speaker 1>consider like the political messaging of certain politicians. It's also

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<v Speaker 1>you could also, of course think about just people negativity bias, right,

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<v Speaker 1>the tendency to believe things are worse than they are

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<v Speaker 1>in the broad sense or mean world syndrome looking at

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<v Speaker 1>dangerous stuff happening on the news and thus having an

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<v Speaker 1>overrepresentation of it in your mind. But I think we

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<v Speaker 1>would be wrong to ignore the effects of hearing specific politicians. Well,

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<v Speaker 1>for for example, in twenty sixteen, specifically it was Donald

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<v Speaker 1>Trump a lot talking about how crime is through the

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<v Speaker 1>roof right, And and to your point, we can look

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<v Speaker 1>to statistics on this. This is not something that is uh.

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<v Speaker 1>That is just you know, in the ether, we have

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<v Speaker 1>hard data. It's not a matter of opinion. It's just

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<v Speaker 1>like every measure we have says that's not correct. But

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<v Speaker 1>what about other beliefs. I mean that that's certainly not

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<v Speaker 1>in isolation. There are lots of cases where there are

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<v Speaker 1>widespread beliefs in things that are just simply factually not true. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>I'll run through a few here that that range and topic.

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<v Speaker 1>For instance, here's a nice science related when to kick

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<v Speaker 1>off with. In a two thousand fifteen Pew survey, only

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<v Speaker 1>thirty percent of Americans knew that water boils at all

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<v Speaker 1>lower temperature at higher altitudes. Thirty nine percent said it

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<v Speaker 1>would boil at the same temperature in Denver in l A,

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<v Speaker 1>again Denver being at a far higher altitude, and had

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<v Speaker 1>it reversed. So the majority, something like two thirds of

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<v Speaker 1>people were just flat wrong yes and uh yeah. And

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<v Speaker 1>to put that in perspective with another science fact, most

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<v Speaker 1>Americans in this two thousand fifteen survey correctly identified the

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<v Speaker 1>Earth's inner layer, the core, as its hottest part, and

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<v Speaker 1>nearly as many two knew that uranium was needed to

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<v Speaker 1>make nuclear energy and nuclear weapons. Well, should we be

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<v Speaker 1>comforted by the fact that that's what people know? I don't, like,

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<v Speaker 1>they don't know much about water, but they know about

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<v Speaker 1>nuclear weapons. Well, I mean, on one hand, nuclear weapons

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<v Speaker 1>was is and was more in the news. Uh, And

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<v Speaker 1>then on the other hand, like the the inside of

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<v Speaker 1>the earth is more engaging and and also completely on politicize. Uh, well,

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<v Speaker 1>well water is not politically boiling point of water is

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<v Speaker 1>not politicized. But it's also not very sexy. I guess

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<v Speaker 1>like it's it's it's one of those things where unless

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<v Speaker 1>you're actively moving from low to high altitudes or you know,

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<v Speaker 1>living part of your time and dinner from part of

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<v Speaker 1>your time in l A, I guess it's it's very

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<v Speaker 1>possible to live your entire life without really having any

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<v Speaker 1>real world experience with the difference. Uh though, I do

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<v Speaker 1>feel like if you read enough baking manuals, it comes up. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>but maybe you just don't remember which way it goes.

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<v Speaker 1>I guess that you know one of the ones you've

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<v Speaker 1>got here that that has come up many times in

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<v Speaker 1>my life. It's come up enough that I know the

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<v Speaker 1>right answer now. But the misconception that you can see

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<v Speaker 1>the Great Wall of China from space, Oh yeah, this

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<v Speaker 1>is one that I have to admit. I think I

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<v Speaker 1>used to adhere to again without really referencing it, because

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<v Speaker 1>it just it had that kind of truthiness to it, right,

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<v Speaker 1>and you want it to be to be real. The

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<v Speaker 1>idea that that this this epic structure aided Uh, you

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<v Speaker 1>know long Ago is visible from space, but it's actually

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<v Speaker 1>been been disproven multiple times. It's it's only visible from

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<v Speaker 1>low orbit under very ideal conditions, and it's not visible

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<v Speaker 1>from the Moon at all. Because that's another version of

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<v Speaker 1>it that it's that that the Great Wall of China

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<v Speaker 1>can be seen from the moon. Yeah, I guess there

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<v Speaker 1>are nuances to the word visible. What's what I mean?

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<v Speaker 1>But in the normal sense that you would mean it's

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<v Speaker 1>not visible from space. Correct. Now a two thousand sixteen

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<v Speaker 1>you gov poll, this was this is a UK group.

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<v Speaker 1>They looked at how belief in pizza gate that thing, Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>how that shakes out across different voter groups. Now, that

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<v Speaker 1>was this vast conspiracy theory people had about how there

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<v Speaker 1>was a pizza restaurant in Washington, d C. That was

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<v Speaker 1>like running child slavery rings that was linked to the

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<v Speaker 1>Democratic Party. Yeah, it had to do with an idea

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<v Speaker 1>that Clinton campaign emails supposedly talked about human trafficking and pedophilia.

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<v Speaker 1>And according to this particular poll, sevent of polled Clinton

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<v Speaker 1>voters believed that that this was the case, this was

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<v Speaker 1>a reality, and of Trump voters did um. And then

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<v Speaker 1>there's another classic they looked out to to put this

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<v Speaker 1>in perspective, the idea that President Barack Obama was born

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<v Speaker 1>in Kenya. Kind of alarmingly enough, across both groups of voters,

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<v Speaker 1>both the Clinton voters and the Trump voters, they found

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<v Speaker 1>thirty six percent believed it, despite the fact that that too,

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<v Speaker 1>has been debunked time and time again. Yeah, I mean,

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<v Speaker 1>it's crazy that these types of beliefs can catch on

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<v Speaker 1>so well, especially like we we understand very well the

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<v Speaker 1>way that political ideology and tribal thinking affects the way

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<v Speaker 1>we form opinions. Obviously, our our opinions are deeply informed

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<v Speaker 1>by what people we view as are in group believe,

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<v Speaker 1>and so we want to be in line with the

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<v Speaker 1>in group and and stuff like that. But you also

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<v Speaker 1>can't really ignore the fact that these are things that

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<v Speaker 1>if you pay attention to certain sources, you're going to

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<v Speaker 1>be hearing over and over and over again. And what

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<v Speaker 1>effect that might have because it's you know, widely accepted

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<v Speaker 1>fulk wisdom that if you repeat a lie enough, people

0:12:14.400 --> 0:12:17.240
<v Speaker 1>start to believe that it's the truth. Right, That's one

0:12:17.240 --> 0:12:19.040
<v Speaker 1>of the things. I mean, I don't know, you've said

0:12:19.040 --> 0:12:22.079
<v Speaker 1>it enough times that I'm already convinced exactly, I mean

0:12:22.280 --> 0:12:24.600
<v Speaker 1>almost going along with this. Uh. There's a quote that

0:12:24.640 --> 0:12:29.480
<v Speaker 1>often gets sourced to the Nazi propaganda minister, Joseph Gebbles. Uh.

0:12:29.800 --> 0:12:32.040
<v Speaker 1>Some versions of the quote say something like, if you

0:12:32.120 --> 0:12:34.880
<v Speaker 1>repeat a lie often enough, people will believe it, and

0:12:34.960 --> 0:12:38.240
<v Speaker 1>you will even come to believe it yourself. I couldn't

0:12:38.240 --> 0:12:41.000
<v Speaker 1>find any evidence that just Gebbels actually said that. It

0:12:41.040 --> 0:12:43.880
<v Speaker 1>seems to be a misattribution, but it's sort of a

0:12:43.880 --> 0:12:47.679
<v Speaker 1>paraphrase of similar ideas that are, you know, within that

0:12:47.679 --> 0:12:50.920
<v Speaker 1>that frame of thinking. Like Adolf Hitler himself wrote in

0:12:51.040 --> 0:12:55.240
<v Speaker 1>mind comp quote, the most brilliant propagandist technique will yield

0:12:55.280 --> 0:12:58.640
<v Speaker 1>no success unless one fundamental principle is born in mind

0:12:58.679 --> 0:13:03.120
<v Speaker 1>constantly and with unflagging attention. It must confine itself to

0:13:03.160 --> 0:13:06.480
<v Speaker 1>a few points and repeat them over and over here

0:13:06.559 --> 0:13:09.440
<v Speaker 1>as so often in the world, persistence is the first

0:13:09.720 --> 0:13:13.760
<v Speaker 1>and most important requirement for success. So just the fact

0:13:13.840 --> 0:13:16.520
<v Speaker 1>that Hitler said it obviously shouldn't make us think, well,

0:13:16.559 --> 0:13:19.080
<v Speaker 1>you know, he's right with Hitler though. If if Hitler

0:13:19.160 --> 0:13:21.280
<v Speaker 1>was good at anything, it was getting lots of people

0:13:21.320 --> 0:13:25.080
<v Speaker 1>to believe lies. Certainly, so I think, because this is

0:13:25.080 --> 0:13:29.120
<v Speaker 1>such an important issue. And because widespread misconceptions are so common,

0:13:29.240 --> 0:13:33.160
<v Speaker 1>and because they can, in fact, especially in some political circumstances,

0:13:33.200 --> 0:13:36.400
<v Speaker 1>be so destructive, And because the repetition of lies and

0:13:36.760 --> 0:13:40.320
<v Speaker 1>false statements in in at every scale of existence, you know,

0:13:40.400 --> 0:13:43.280
<v Speaker 1>in in mass media and in our personal private lives,

0:13:43.840 --> 0:13:45.920
<v Speaker 1>is so common, I think it's worth looking at the

0:13:45.960 --> 0:13:50.559
<v Speaker 1>actual empirical case. Is this true, the idea that repeating

0:13:50.720 --> 0:13:55.960
<v Speaker 1>statements over and over does that actually change what we believe.

0:13:56.000 --> 0:13:57.760
<v Speaker 1>It's one of those things that you know, it sounds

0:13:57.760 --> 0:14:01.840
<v Speaker 1>so common sensical, you just assume it's true. But according

0:14:01.880 --> 0:14:03.920
<v Speaker 1>to the logic we're using now, those are exactly the

0:14:04.000 --> 0:14:07.560
<v Speaker 1>kinds of statements that maybe we should be careful about. Yeah,

0:14:07.559 --> 0:14:10.080
<v Speaker 1>and I think this is an important important topic for

0:14:10.080 --> 0:14:12.800
<v Speaker 1>for everybody. I don't care who you voted for in

0:14:12.840 --> 0:14:16.800
<v Speaker 1>any previous elections or which political party in your given

0:14:16.880 --> 0:14:19.120
<v Speaker 1>system that you adhere to. I think if you're listening

0:14:19.120 --> 0:14:22.479
<v Speaker 1>to this show especially, you want to think for yourself.

0:14:23.000 --> 0:14:27.080
<v Speaker 1>You want to reduce the amount of manipulation that's going

0:14:27.120 --> 0:14:30.560
<v Speaker 1>on with your your own view of reality. And and

0:14:30.720 --> 0:14:32.760
<v Speaker 1>and that's what we're going to discuss here today. We're

0:14:32.760 --> 0:14:39.560
<v Speaker 1>gonna discuss the degree to which false information can manipulate

0:14:39.680 --> 0:14:42.280
<v Speaker 1>our view of reality and ultimately, what are some of

0:14:42.280 --> 0:14:45.720
<v Speaker 1>the things we can do to to hold onto our

0:14:45.840 --> 0:14:49.040
<v Speaker 1>our our individuality and all of this exactly. So this

0:14:49.080 --> 0:14:50.400
<v Speaker 1>is going to be the first of a two part

0:14:50.400 --> 0:14:54.480
<v Speaker 1>episode where we explore the liar's best trick, the question

0:14:54.560 --> 0:14:58.680
<v Speaker 1>of repetition and exposure in forming our beliefs and changing

0:14:58.680 --> 0:15:01.720
<v Speaker 1>our attitudes. So that's going to be the jumping off

0:15:01.720 --> 0:15:05.480
<v Speaker 1>point for today's episode. Does exposure and repetition is hearing

0:15:05.480 --> 0:15:09.360
<v Speaker 1>a claim and hearing it repeated actually have the power

0:15:09.720 --> 0:15:14.240
<v Speaker 1>to change our beliefs? Or is that just unverified folk wisdom? Yeah?

0:15:14.280 --> 0:15:16.480
<v Speaker 1>And and of course it goes it goes well beyond politics.

0:15:16.480 --> 0:15:18.920
<v Speaker 1>It also gets into marketing. You know, we've we've touched

0:15:18.960 --> 0:15:23.400
<v Speaker 1>on the manipulative nature of marketing and advertisement on the

0:15:23.440 --> 0:15:26.880
<v Speaker 1>show before, and it's always one of the things you

0:15:26.880 --> 0:15:28.880
<v Speaker 1>always come back to. It's always about messaging, right, Like

0:15:28.960 --> 0:15:31.120
<v Speaker 1>what is the message of the product? What's the message

0:15:31.120 --> 0:15:34.240
<v Speaker 1>of the ad campaign? And how they just continue to

0:15:34.320 --> 0:15:38.000
<v Speaker 1>hammer that home. Why do brands have slogans? Yeah? Why

0:15:38.000 --> 0:15:40.880
<v Speaker 1>don't they just tell you a positive message about the

0:15:40.920 --> 0:15:43.600
<v Speaker 1>brand that's different every time? Why do they tell you

0:15:43.680 --> 0:15:48.000
<v Speaker 1>the same message in the same words in every commercial. Yeah,

0:15:48.040 --> 0:15:51.880
<v Speaker 1>why did those fabulous horror trailers from the nineteen seventies

0:15:51.880 --> 0:15:55.000
<v Speaker 1>say the name of the film eighteen times, don't go

0:15:55.040 --> 0:15:57.040
<v Speaker 1>in the basement, don't go in the basement, No one, no,

0:15:57.160 --> 0:16:00.880
<v Speaker 1>just seventeen will be admitted. Yeah, it's all. It's all

0:16:00.960 --> 0:16:03.240
<v Speaker 1>kind of part of the same situation. All right, Well,

0:16:03.240 --> 0:16:04.920
<v Speaker 1>we're going to take a quick break and when we

0:16:04.920 --> 0:16:07.800
<v Speaker 1>get back, we will dive into the research in the

0:16:07.880 --> 0:16:13.320
<v Speaker 1>history of psychology about repetition and exposure. Thank you, thank you.

0:16:13.920 --> 0:16:16.240
<v Speaker 1>All right, we're back. So the first question we're going

0:16:16.280 --> 0:16:19.360
<v Speaker 1>to be looking at today is whether anyone has actually

0:16:19.400 --> 0:16:23.280
<v Speaker 1>studied this question, this question of whether exposing people to

0:16:23.440 --> 0:16:27.040
<v Speaker 1>acclaim and then repeating the claim makes them believe it,

0:16:27.440 --> 0:16:30.920
<v Speaker 1>Whether anybody studied that in a controlled scientific context. And

0:16:30.960 --> 0:16:34.000
<v Speaker 1>the answer is a resounding yes. There are I think

0:16:34.160 --> 0:16:37.800
<v Speaker 1>dozens of studies on this subject in various forms. Probably

0:16:37.840 --> 0:16:40.840
<v Speaker 1>the flagship study on this, the first big one that

0:16:40.880 --> 0:16:44.440
<v Speaker 1>everybody sites that that really got people into the subject,

0:16:44.480 --> 0:16:46.760
<v Speaker 1>that got the ball rolling on it was from ninety

0:16:47.400 --> 0:16:51.120
<v Speaker 1>and it was by Lynn Hasher, David Goldstein, and Thomas Topino,

0:16:51.640 --> 0:16:55.360
<v Speaker 1>and it was called Frequency and the Conference of Referential

0:16:55.480 --> 0:16:59.200
<v Speaker 1>Validity in the Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior,

0:16:59.280 --> 0:17:02.160
<v Speaker 1>And that was as I said in nineteen seven. So

0:17:02.320 --> 0:17:04.520
<v Speaker 1>the authors start out in the study by talking about

0:17:04.520 --> 0:17:07.320
<v Speaker 1>how most studies of memory that take place in the

0:17:07.400 --> 0:17:13.000
<v Speaker 1>lab involved useless or meaningless information units. So researchers, for example,

0:17:13.080 --> 0:17:16.120
<v Speaker 1>might try to see how well subjects remember a phrase

0:17:16.240 --> 0:17:18.800
<v Speaker 1>like I just made this up. The purple donkey was

0:17:18.880 --> 0:17:22.640
<v Speaker 1>made of soft spoken muscular elves, Like, can you remember

0:17:22.680 --> 0:17:25.960
<v Speaker 1>that word for word? The purple donkey was made by

0:17:26.040 --> 0:17:31.520
<v Speaker 1>muscular elves. Now, now you're close, not made of Yeah,

0:17:31.800 --> 0:17:33.960
<v Speaker 1>it makes a lot more sense to say made by wow.

0:17:34.000 --> 0:17:36.520
<v Speaker 1>But I see, I've already missed up the origin story

0:17:36.600 --> 0:17:40.440
<v Speaker 1>of the purple donkey. Statements like this have no importance

0:17:40.440 --> 0:17:42.359
<v Speaker 1>in the real world, and part of what they were

0:17:42.359 --> 0:17:45.960
<v Speaker 1>talking about is that we're testing for memory and things

0:17:46.080 --> 0:17:49.960
<v Speaker 1>that don't have any validity to reality. Um. So the

0:17:50.000 --> 0:17:53.040
<v Speaker 1>authors write that they're curious about what kind of processing

0:17:53.080 --> 0:17:56.480
<v Speaker 1>subjects do with information units that might have validity in

0:17:56.520 --> 0:18:00.720
<v Speaker 1>the real world. For example, factual statements like quote, the

0:18:00.760 --> 0:18:04.560
<v Speaker 1>total population of Greenland is about fifty thou which at

0:18:04.560 --> 0:18:07.120
<v Speaker 1>the time of the study it was. I checked, though,

0:18:07.119 --> 0:18:08.840
<v Speaker 1>that seems like a lot more people than should be

0:18:08.920 --> 0:18:12.080
<v Speaker 1>in Greenland, right, I was. I was surprised by that. Well,

0:18:12.119 --> 0:18:15.320
<v Speaker 1>but I would agree based on I'll be a limited

0:18:15.320 --> 0:18:18.760
<v Speaker 1>amount of of information that I've I've read and viewed

0:18:18.800 --> 0:18:22.200
<v Speaker 1>about Greenland. You know, you typically, in my experience, Greenland

0:18:22.200 --> 0:18:25.520
<v Speaker 1>shows up in nature documentaries, and of course you're going

0:18:25.560 --> 0:18:29.280
<v Speaker 1>to see rather barren uh locations in those films. Well,

0:18:29.440 --> 0:18:31.959
<v Speaker 1>greenlanders out there in the audience. Let us know if

0:18:31.960 --> 0:18:35.000
<v Speaker 1>you're listening, what's life like up there in Greenland. I'm

0:18:35.080 --> 0:18:39.480
<v Speaker 1>interested now. But anyway back, So, yeah, population of Greenland

0:18:39.480 --> 0:18:42.400
<v Speaker 1>at the times about fifty and so statements like this

0:18:42.560 --> 0:18:45.400
<v Speaker 1>both refer to something that could be true or false

0:18:45.440 --> 0:18:47.439
<v Speaker 1>in the real world, and there are also things that

0:18:47.440 --> 0:18:50.439
<v Speaker 1>people are probably uncertain about, like do you know what

0:18:50.520 --> 0:18:53.320
<v Speaker 1>the actual population of Greenland is? I didn't know before

0:18:53.320 --> 0:18:55.560
<v Speaker 1>I looked it up, And so we know that the

0:18:55.600 --> 0:18:58.159
<v Speaker 1>statement is either true or false, but we aren't sure

0:18:58.400 --> 0:19:00.879
<v Speaker 1>whether it's true or false. And of course, to go

0:19:00.920 --> 0:19:03.720
<v Speaker 1>back to a previous episode, you're kind of anchoring my

0:19:03.800 --> 0:19:08.199
<v Speaker 1>expectations by throwing out without any population data in my

0:19:08.200 --> 0:19:10.840
<v Speaker 1>head about Greenland, like that's suddenly all I have to

0:19:10.880 --> 0:19:13.760
<v Speaker 1>go on, Oh yeah, that's interesting. Also, so like it

0:19:13.800 --> 0:19:17.160
<v Speaker 1>could be three thousand or it could be like a million,

0:19:17.680 --> 0:19:21.840
<v Speaker 1>and either you're sort of moving your guests range toward fifty.

0:19:22.960 --> 0:19:24.680
<v Speaker 1>So the thing they point out is, even though most

0:19:24.680 --> 0:19:27.320
<v Speaker 1>people don't know what the population of Greenland is, we're

0:19:27.320 --> 0:19:30.159
<v Speaker 1>often willing, into some extent able to make guesses as

0:19:30.200 --> 0:19:33.480
<v Speaker 1>to whether statements like this are true. So where does

0:19:33.560 --> 0:19:36.800
<v Speaker 1>this semantic knowledge come from? When we feel like we

0:19:36.880 --> 0:19:39.919
<v Speaker 1>have knowledge to offer a guess about what the population

0:19:39.960 --> 0:19:43.600
<v Speaker 1>of Greenland is even when we don't really know what

0:19:43.800 --> 0:19:47.520
<v Speaker 1>is that what allows us to judge these questions? And

0:19:47.560 --> 0:19:52.200
<v Speaker 1>the authors note that frequency is a really powerful variable

0:19:52.240 --> 0:19:54.600
<v Speaker 1>in all kinds of judgments we make about the world.

0:19:55.160 --> 0:19:59.439
<v Speaker 1>So they hypothesize that quote frequency might also serve as

0:19:59.480 --> 0:20:04.080
<v Speaker 1>the major access route that plausible statements have into our

0:20:04.119 --> 0:20:08.240
<v Speaker 1>pool of general knowledge. So the idea is that we

0:20:08.320 --> 0:20:12.000
<v Speaker 1>build our knowledge base based on how frequently we are

0:20:12.080 --> 0:20:14.959
<v Speaker 1>exposed to ideas. You hear an idea a lot, and

0:20:15.040 --> 0:20:17.960
<v Speaker 1>that gets reinforced in the knowledge base. You've never heard

0:20:18.040 --> 0:20:20.000
<v Speaker 1>an idea before, or you don't hear it a lot,

0:20:20.040 --> 0:20:22.480
<v Speaker 1>it doesn't get reinforced, and it doesn't exist in the

0:20:22.520 --> 0:20:26.520
<v Speaker 1>knowledge base. So here's the experimental part. Researchers came up

0:20:26.520 --> 0:20:28.720
<v Speaker 1>with a list of a hundred and forty true statements

0:20:28.760 --> 0:20:32.359
<v Speaker 1>and false statements, crafted so they all sound plausible. Yeah,

0:20:32.359 --> 0:20:34.600
<v Speaker 1>they could be true, you know, the average person would

0:20:34.600 --> 0:20:37.920
<v Speaker 1>be unsure whether or not they're true. And the statements

0:20:37.920 --> 0:20:42.480
<v Speaker 1>were on all kinds of subjects like geography, arts and literature, history, sports,

0:20:42.840 --> 0:20:47.040
<v Speaker 1>current events science. A few examples of true statements included

0:20:47.119 --> 0:20:52.000
<v Speaker 1>things like Cairo, Egypt has a larger population than Chicago, Illinois,

0:20:52.560 --> 0:20:55.800
<v Speaker 1>and French horn players get cash bonuses to stay in

0:20:55.800 --> 0:20:59.320
<v Speaker 1>the U. S. Arm True. Well, i'd see it. I

0:20:59.359 --> 0:21:01.680
<v Speaker 1>should have joined the army after all. See, I was

0:21:01.680 --> 0:21:04.000
<v Speaker 1>a french horn player really in high school. Yeah, I

0:21:04.040 --> 0:21:06.560
<v Speaker 1>didn't know that. What's it like playing the french horn.

0:21:07.000 --> 0:21:08.919
<v Speaker 1>It's just, you know, there's a lot of spit and

0:21:08.920 --> 0:21:12.480
<v Speaker 1>a lot of shoving your hand up horns. That's it.

0:21:13.200 --> 0:21:15.439
<v Speaker 1>Otherwise it's like playing a trumpet. Now. See I actually

0:21:15.440 --> 0:21:17.760
<v Speaker 1>played trumpet, and it's a lot less fun than what

0:21:17.800 --> 0:21:20.399
<v Speaker 1>you're describing. Yeah, I mean, I don't know. There is

0:21:20.400 --> 0:21:23.040
<v Speaker 1>an elegance to the way you hold it, and you again,

0:21:23.080 --> 0:21:26.200
<v Speaker 1>you have your hand in the inside the horn. I

0:21:26.240 --> 0:21:28.920
<v Speaker 1>don't know. Being a trumpet player to me always felt

0:21:28.960 --> 0:21:33.760
<v Speaker 1>like being a person who's complaining at full volume. Yeah, yeah,

0:21:33.800 --> 0:21:37.560
<v Speaker 1>there is. There's more of an outward stance with the trumpet, right,

0:21:37.560 --> 0:21:39.960
<v Speaker 1>you're blasting outward, But in the French horn, you it's

0:21:40.320 --> 0:21:45.040
<v Speaker 1>it's more like you're playing music into yourself. That's quite beautiful,

0:21:46.040 --> 0:21:47.960
<v Speaker 1>more beautiful than any music I ever played on the

0:21:47.960 --> 0:21:51.040
<v Speaker 1>French horn. Uh So we got to get back to

0:21:51.080 --> 0:21:53.920
<v Speaker 1>the study. Okay, so that's that's supposedly true. French horn

0:21:53.920 --> 0:21:55.960
<v Speaker 1>players at the time got cash bonuses to stay in

0:21:56.000 --> 0:21:58.600
<v Speaker 1>the U. S. Army. Examples of false statements where things

0:21:58.640 --> 0:22:01.680
<v Speaker 1>like the People's Republic of China was founded in ninety

0:22:01.720 --> 0:22:05.359
<v Speaker 1>seven it was actually ninety nine. Or the copy bara

0:22:05.600 --> 0:22:08.480
<v Speaker 1>is the largest of the marsupials. That's not true. The

0:22:08.560 --> 0:22:11.760
<v Speaker 1>largest marcipial is the red kangaroo. The largest known in

0:22:11.800 --> 0:22:15.560
<v Speaker 1>the fossil record is this thing called the extinct dip protodon.

0:22:16.840 --> 0:22:18.600
<v Speaker 1>Now that in the capy bar is a rodent, right,

0:22:18.960 --> 0:22:21.320
<v Speaker 1>I only is the capy bar and marsupial. I didn't

0:22:21.320 --> 0:22:23.159
<v Speaker 1>even look it up. I only know that because I

0:22:23.200 --> 0:22:25.679
<v Speaker 1>go to a lot of zoos these days. But it

0:22:25.760 --> 0:22:27.359
<v Speaker 1>is a mammal, it's a it's a rodent. It is

0:22:27.359 --> 0:22:29.960
<v Speaker 1>a mammal, and it is a rodent, not a marsupial. Well,

0:22:30.040 --> 0:22:32.560
<v Speaker 1>there we go. So it's wrong in multiple ways. So

0:22:32.600 --> 0:22:34.480
<v Speaker 1>you got this big list that came up with of

0:22:34.560 --> 0:22:37.480
<v Speaker 1>true and false statements, and all of them should sound

0:22:37.480 --> 0:22:39.880
<v Speaker 1>plausible to the average person, But most people are not

0:22:39.920 --> 0:22:41.880
<v Speaker 1>going to be likely to know for sure whether they're

0:22:41.880 --> 0:22:44.560
<v Speaker 1>true unless they just happened to have some special random

0:22:44.600 --> 0:22:49.800
<v Speaker 1>knowledge or expertise. And so researchers held three sessions with participants,

0:22:49.800 --> 0:22:53.520
<v Speaker 1>each separated by two weeks, and on each of the sessions,

0:22:53.560 --> 0:22:57.080
<v Speaker 1>the participants were played back a tape of a selection

0:22:57.160 --> 0:23:01.560
<v Speaker 1>of sixty recorded statements from that list, and the subjects

0:23:01.560 --> 0:23:04.639
<v Speaker 1>were asked to judge how confident they were that the

0:23:04.680 --> 0:23:06.720
<v Speaker 1>statements were true. And this was on a scale of

0:23:06.720 --> 0:23:10.120
<v Speaker 1>one to seven, with like four being uncertain, five being

0:23:10.200 --> 0:23:14.080
<v Speaker 1>possibly true, six being probably true, seven being definitely true.

0:23:14.640 --> 0:23:17.359
<v Speaker 1>And in each session, some of the statements were true,

0:23:17.400 --> 0:23:20.120
<v Speaker 1>some were false. But here's where the real magic happened.

0:23:20.320 --> 0:23:23.760
<v Speaker 1>At the second session and the third session, each time

0:23:24.240 --> 0:23:28.160
<v Speaker 1>subjects got a mix of new true and false statements

0:23:28.200 --> 0:23:31.520
<v Speaker 1>that they've never seen before, plus true and false statements

0:23:31.560 --> 0:23:34.919
<v Speaker 1>that they had already seen in the previous sessions. So

0:23:34.920 --> 0:23:36.840
<v Speaker 1>while most of the claims they saw were new, a

0:23:36.920 --> 0:23:41.040
<v Speaker 1>minority got repeated each time. And what the researchers found

0:23:41.160 --> 0:23:45.199
<v Speaker 1>was that whether a statement was true or false, the

0:23:45.320 --> 0:23:49.199
<v Speaker 1>more times the students saw it, the more they believed it.

0:23:50.240 --> 0:23:52.879
<v Speaker 1>So again, this would be this, this, this would be

0:23:52.880 --> 0:23:55.639
<v Speaker 1>the principle in action. The more they're hearing this, uh,

0:23:55.720 --> 0:23:59.320
<v Speaker 1>this this false fact, the more they're coming to believe

0:23:59.359 --> 0:24:02.080
<v Speaker 1>that it is true. Yeah, even in this constrained, kind

0:24:02.080 --> 0:24:05.439
<v Speaker 1>of weird experimental context where they're aware that some of

0:24:05.440 --> 0:24:07.360
<v Speaker 1>these facts are going to be false, it's not like

0:24:07.640 --> 0:24:10.679
<v Speaker 1>they're being told this persuasively by a person trying to

0:24:10.720 --> 0:24:14.159
<v Speaker 1>convince them. They're just reading this from a list of

0:24:14.200 --> 0:24:17.119
<v Speaker 1>statements that are known to be either true or false.

0:24:17.160 --> 0:24:21.479
<v Speaker 1>I mean, there's no there's no persuasive aspect to this

0:24:21.560 --> 0:24:24.399
<v Speaker 1>at all, right, Right, These are not politically charged or

0:24:24.440 --> 0:24:27.440
<v Speaker 1>really charged by worldview at all. They're they're just plain

0:24:27.640 --> 0:24:31.520
<v Speaker 1>neutral statements that really have very little interest to most people.

0:24:31.560 --> 0:24:35.439
<v Speaker 1>Also probably, but what happened was whether the statement was

0:24:35.480 --> 0:24:38.960
<v Speaker 1>true or false, people believed it more if they saw

0:24:39.000 --> 0:24:42.280
<v Speaker 1>it more times. So I've got a little chart in

0:24:42.320 --> 0:24:44.439
<v Speaker 1>here of what happened with the false statements. You can

0:24:44.480 --> 0:24:46.560
<v Speaker 1>have a look at Robert as you can see the

0:24:46.720 --> 0:24:50.119
<v Speaker 1>new false statements. The false statements people saw for the

0:24:50.200 --> 0:24:53.119
<v Speaker 1>very first time covered around, you know, like four or

0:24:53.119 --> 0:24:56.160
<v Speaker 1>four point one across all three sessions. That would correspond

0:24:56.160 --> 0:24:58.160
<v Speaker 1>to people saying they're uncertain. I don't know. I don't

0:24:58.160 --> 0:25:00.200
<v Speaker 1>know whether French horn players get a cash bone us

0:25:00.200 --> 0:25:02.480
<v Speaker 1>for staying in the army and playing into the self

0:25:02.600 --> 0:25:05.600
<v Speaker 1>and sticking the hand up the horn. But in the

0:25:05.640 --> 0:25:09.960
<v Speaker 1>second session there repeated false statements jumped up from about

0:25:10.080 --> 0:25:13.080
<v Speaker 1>four point over four point one to about four point five,

0:25:13.400 --> 0:25:16.159
<v Speaker 1>and then in the third session up again to about

0:25:16.160 --> 0:25:19.119
<v Speaker 1>four point seven. And we only saw what happened with

0:25:19.160 --> 0:25:21.520
<v Speaker 1>two sessions. Who knows what have happened what might have

0:25:21.520 --> 0:25:25.800
<v Speaker 1>happened if you had continued adding more sessions. So just

0:25:25.920 --> 0:25:28.119
<v Speaker 1>seeing a statement more than once appeared to make it

0:25:28.160 --> 0:25:31.280
<v Speaker 1>more believable even though it wasn't true. And the pattern

0:25:31.359 --> 0:25:33.840
<v Speaker 1>was roughly the same for true statements, which isn't all

0:25:33.840 --> 0:25:36.600
<v Speaker 1>that surprising since the experiment was based on, you know,

0:25:36.680 --> 0:25:38.600
<v Speaker 1>statements that people didn't know whether they were true or

0:25:38.600 --> 0:25:42.159
<v Speaker 1>false to begin with. So, the authors wrote in conclusion, quote,

0:25:42.280 --> 0:25:45.320
<v Speaker 1>the present research has demonstrated that the repetition of a

0:25:45.400 --> 0:25:50.680
<v Speaker 1>plausible statement increases a person's belief in the referential validity

0:25:50.760 --> 0:25:53.199
<v Speaker 1>or truth of that statement. I don't know why they

0:25:53.200 --> 0:25:55.840
<v Speaker 1>had to say referential validity. They could have just said truth.

0:25:56.480 --> 0:25:59.159
<v Speaker 1>And that's that's some science writing for you. Uh, in

0:25:59.240 --> 0:26:02.760
<v Speaker 1>the truth of that statement. And indeed, the present experiment

0:26:03.040 --> 0:26:06.359
<v Speaker 1>appears to lend empirical support to the idea that quote,

0:26:06.400 --> 0:26:09.800
<v Speaker 1>if people are told something often enough, they'll believe it.

0:26:10.760 --> 0:26:13.120
<v Speaker 1>Uh so, so yeah, this is this is the first

0:26:13.160 --> 0:26:15.000
<v Speaker 1>real study to find this and a few other things

0:26:15.040 --> 0:26:18.080
<v Speaker 1>the authors thought were worth considering. Uh. The fact that

0:26:18.119 --> 0:26:20.840
<v Speaker 1>this effect was displayed in statements from a big broad

0:26:20.920 --> 0:26:24.320
<v Speaker 1>pool of different types of subject matter suggests this is

0:26:24.359 --> 0:26:27.000
<v Speaker 1>not extremely context dependent. Right, It's not just going to

0:26:27.080 --> 0:26:30.000
<v Speaker 1>be political beliefs that are subject to this. It seems

0:26:30.040 --> 0:26:32.720
<v Speaker 1>to be all different kinds of statements in all different

0:26:32.800 --> 0:26:36.040
<v Speaker 1>kinds of domains. Another thing they noted was that the

0:26:36.080 --> 0:26:39.919
<v Speaker 1>effect was present for true statements and false statements. Either way,

0:26:40.000 --> 0:26:43.280
<v Speaker 1>if students saw the claims more often, they believed them

0:26:43.280 --> 0:26:46.880
<v Speaker 1>with greater confidence. But another takeaway is that the effect

0:26:46.960 --> 0:26:51.320
<v Speaker 1>is not huge for false statements. Three exposures was roughly

0:26:51.440 --> 0:26:55.280
<v Speaker 1>enough to get you from I'm uncertain to it's possibly true.

0:26:55.640 --> 0:26:58.119
<v Speaker 1>But as we mentioned before, how many this is just

0:26:58.200 --> 0:27:01.320
<v Speaker 1>two or three sessions right right? Who knows what what

0:27:01.400 --> 0:27:04.359
<v Speaker 1>would have happened if maybe you had done this more

0:27:04.400 --> 0:27:07.240
<v Speaker 1>times in a row, or if there had been other

0:27:07.359 --> 0:27:10.359
<v Speaker 1>factors affecting whether people were likely to believe these things

0:27:10.400 --> 0:27:13.639
<v Speaker 1>to begin with, say if they had valences to the

0:27:13.640 --> 0:27:17.080
<v Speaker 1>person's political identity or something like that. Yeah, you know,

0:27:17.119 --> 0:27:20.040
<v Speaker 1>as we're researching this into and discussing it, I couldn't

0:27:20.040 --> 0:27:25.960
<v Speaker 1>help but think of notable examples of uh false stories

0:27:26.000 --> 0:27:29.240
<v Speaker 1>about generally like like celebrities from the past. And I'm

0:27:29.240 --> 0:27:32.160
<v Speaker 1>not going to mention any of them specifically. Why not, Well,

0:27:32.200 --> 0:27:33.879
<v Speaker 1>because you know they all tend to be a bit crude.

0:27:33.960 --> 0:27:37.520
<v Speaker 1>There there are several of them about like carrying down

0:27:37.920 --> 0:27:41.600
<v Speaker 1>various sort of you know, pretty boy rockers or actors

0:27:41.720 --> 0:27:45.200
<v Speaker 1>from the past, uh in in the in. The interesting

0:27:45.240 --> 0:27:47.560
<v Speaker 1>thing about him is these are generally like pre internet

0:27:48.240 --> 0:27:51.960
<v Speaker 1>um stories that had to circulate the word of mouth

0:27:52.080 --> 0:27:53.840
<v Speaker 1>or I think in one case there was talk of

0:27:53.880 --> 0:27:56.160
<v Speaker 1>like a whole bunch of of facts is going out

0:27:56.600 --> 0:27:59.399
<v Speaker 1>in Hollywood where someone was just basically just wanted to

0:27:59.440 --> 0:28:01.639
<v Speaker 1>take somebody down because they didn't like them. I remember,

0:28:02.080 --> 0:28:04.480
<v Speaker 1>I think, like ninth grade here is starting to hear

0:28:04.520 --> 0:28:07.000
<v Speaker 1>this bizarre story about rich your gear. Yeah, that's that's

0:28:07.040 --> 0:28:09.159
<v Speaker 1>the main one I'm thinking of. And I think it

0:28:09.200 --> 0:28:13.040
<v Speaker 1>basically comes down to Richard Geary's is a handsome, successful

0:28:13.080 --> 0:28:15.760
<v Speaker 1>guy and and for a lot of people, you want

0:28:15.800 --> 0:28:18.560
<v Speaker 1>to like really you know, and knock him down or

0:28:18.600 --> 0:28:23.040
<v Speaker 1>not you Yeah, and uh, and so when you encounter

0:28:23.280 --> 0:28:27.600
<v Speaker 1>a bit of slander or libel like that, or uh,

0:28:27.840 --> 0:28:30.800
<v Speaker 1>just a ridiculous story, you're going to be more inclined

0:28:30.840 --> 0:28:33.080
<v Speaker 1>to believe it if you kind of want it to

0:28:33.080 --> 0:28:35.720
<v Speaker 1>be true, right or if you or you're like, yeah,

0:28:35.920 --> 0:28:37.920
<v Speaker 1>let screw that guy. I'm gonna I'm gonna go ahead

0:28:37.920 --> 0:28:39.160
<v Speaker 1>and believe this, or even if I don't believe it,

0:28:39.160 --> 0:28:41.320
<v Speaker 1>I'm going to pass it on. But either way, whether

0:28:41.440 --> 0:28:44.080
<v Speaker 1>or not you're predisposed to believe it's true, it looks

0:28:44.080 --> 0:28:46.800
<v Speaker 1>like this initial study at least provides evidence that you

0:28:46.800 --> 0:28:51.959
<v Speaker 1>would be more disposed to believe it's true in either case. Like,

0:28:52.000 --> 0:28:55.240
<v Speaker 1>so whatever you're starting point is it's gonna nudge you up,

0:28:55.680 --> 0:28:58.600
<v Speaker 1>like if nothing else becomes word association, Like if you're

0:28:58.600 --> 0:29:02.440
<v Speaker 1>not really a fan, say Richard Gear's work, uh, and

0:29:02.480 --> 0:29:05.400
<v Speaker 1>you can't name your your favorite Richard Gear film off

0:29:05.400 --> 0:29:07.680
<v Speaker 1>the top of your head, that might be the primary

0:29:07.800 --> 0:29:10.760
<v Speaker 1>keyword that pops up when you hear his name. Yeah,

0:29:10.760 --> 0:29:14.880
<v Speaker 1>it could be. Uh. Yeah. So so this bizarre effect

0:29:15.000 --> 0:29:18.440
<v Speaker 1>that we're talking about where hearing a fact repeated, even

0:29:18.480 --> 0:29:20.720
<v Speaker 1>if you've got no good reason to believe it's true,

0:29:21.080 --> 0:29:24.720
<v Speaker 1>just hearing it repeated causes you to be more likely

0:29:24.760 --> 0:29:26.640
<v Speaker 1>to believe it. This came to be known first as

0:29:26.760 --> 0:29:30.080
<v Speaker 1>the truth effect, and then later on probably a better

0:29:30.120 --> 0:29:32.920
<v Speaker 1>title was the illusory truth effect. I think we should

0:29:32.960 --> 0:29:36.280
<v Speaker 1>use the second one because otherwise that makes it sound true. Yeah,

0:29:36.680 --> 0:29:38.040
<v Speaker 1>it just makes it sound like yeah, if you if

0:29:38.080 --> 0:29:40.040
<v Speaker 1>you repeat something, then it is then it is true.

0:29:40.040 --> 0:29:42.480
<v Speaker 1>There is no question anymore. So. The basic version of

0:29:42.480 --> 0:29:45.760
<v Speaker 1>the illusory truth effect is quote. People are more likely

0:29:45.840 --> 0:29:49.920
<v Speaker 1>to judge repeated statements as true compared to new statements,

0:29:50.240 --> 0:29:52.200
<v Speaker 1>And another way of putting it is that all other

0:29:52.320 --> 0:29:55.040
<v Speaker 1>things being equal, you're more likely to believe a claim

0:29:55.080 --> 0:29:58.400
<v Speaker 1>if you've heard it before than one you haven't heard before,

0:29:58.920 --> 0:30:01.200
<v Speaker 1>and the more times you you're the claim, the more

0:30:01.280 --> 0:30:04.360
<v Speaker 1>likely you are to believe it. But so far we've

0:30:04.360 --> 0:30:06.640
<v Speaker 1>just talked about one study, right, this this one nineteen

0:30:06.680 --> 0:30:09.440
<v Speaker 1>seventy seven study, uh what we can call it the

0:30:09.440 --> 0:30:12.800
<v Speaker 1>Star Wars study. If you want the Star Wars study here.

0:30:12.880 --> 0:30:15.720
<v Speaker 1>It's a fairly small sample, just one study. If you

0:30:15.720 --> 0:30:18.200
<v Speaker 1>want to be skeptical and rigorous, maybe especially because this

0:30:18.240 --> 0:30:20.440
<v Speaker 1>backs up ful quisdom, which is always something you should

0:30:20.480 --> 0:30:22.719
<v Speaker 1>be careful about. We should see if the effect has

0:30:22.720 --> 0:30:27.120
<v Speaker 1>been replicated by other researchers, and boy, howdy it has.

0:30:27.400 --> 0:30:29.920
<v Speaker 1>That's right. This next one comes to us from nineteen

0:30:29.960 --> 0:30:33.880
<v Speaker 1>seventy nine Journal of Experimental Psychology, Human Learning and Memory,

0:30:34.360 --> 0:30:37.200
<v Speaker 1>the work of Frederick T. Bacon. Yeah, this was called

0:30:37.240 --> 0:30:42.120
<v Speaker 1>the Credibility of repeated Statements memory for trivia. So Bacon

0:30:42.240 --> 0:30:45.240
<v Speaker 1>performed he was trying to replicate this this effect. He

0:30:45.320 --> 0:30:49.239
<v Speaker 1>performed additional experiments to test the previous team's conclusions and

0:30:49.280 --> 0:30:52.280
<v Speaker 1>add some nuance. So his first experiment, you got ninety

0:30:52.280 --> 0:30:55.200
<v Speaker 1>eight undergrads and they had two sessions in which they

0:30:55.200 --> 0:30:57.840
<v Speaker 1>were asked to rate sentences as true or false, with

0:30:58.000 --> 0:31:01.200
<v Speaker 1>three weeks between the two Sessions, and Bacon found that

0:31:01.240 --> 0:31:05.480
<v Speaker 1>the repetition illusory truth effect was modulated by whether the

0:31:05.560 --> 0:31:10.280
<v Speaker 1>subjects consciously believed that a sentence had been repeated. That is,

0:31:10.520 --> 0:31:13.920
<v Speaker 1>if they remembered that they had seen the sentence last time,

0:31:14.280 --> 0:31:16.840
<v Speaker 1>they were more inclined to believe it. If they believed

0:31:16.880 --> 0:31:19.360
<v Speaker 1>they were seeing a sentence for the first time, they

0:31:19.360 --> 0:31:21.760
<v Speaker 1>were less likely to believe it. And this was true

0:31:21.840 --> 0:31:25.640
<v Speaker 1>regardless of the statements themselves. I can't help but think

0:31:25.680 --> 0:31:28.840
<v Speaker 1>of our modern version of this with Facebook feed right,

0:31:29.200 --> 0:31:32.520
<v Speaker 1>because you're inevitably, if you're your Facebook user, or perhaps

0:31:32.560 --> 0:31:34.800
<v Speaker 1>if you're a Twitter user or some other social media

0:31:35.040 --> 0:31:37.200
<v Speaker 1>you're you're scrolling down right and there are a lot

0:31:37.240 --> 0:31:39.640
<v Speaker 1>of sentences coming at you. Some you just kind of

0:31:39.640 --> 0:31:41.640
<v Speaker 1>read in passing. So maybe you don't read at all.

0:31:42.720 --> 0:31:45.560
<v Speaker 1>But are you actually stopping to really think about what

0:31:45.680 --> 0:31:49.400
<v Speaker 1>a particular headline or you know, or paragraph is saying

0:31:49.880 --> 0:31:51.920
<v Speaker 1>or is it just kind of scrolling in the background

0:31:51.920 --> 0:31:54.160
<v Speaker 1>of your mind. Yeah, And the result of this one

0:31:54.160 --> 0:31:57.640
<v Speaker 1>experiment here would seem to indicate if it has validity,

0:31:57.640 --> 0:31:59.840
<v Speaker 1>it would mean the ones you stop and pay attention

0:31:59.880 --> 0:32:02.280
<v Speaker 1>to you and make a memory about are the ones

0:32:02.320 --> 0:32:05.880
<v Speaker 1>you're more likely to believe later on. But then also

0:32:06.560 --> 0:32:08.840
<v Speaker 1>in another experiment, he had a group of sixty four

0:32:08.880 --> 0:32:12.480
<v Speaker 1>undergrads and he replicated the illusory truth effect and found

0:32:12.480 --> 0:32:15.800
<v Speaker 1>that students believed repeated statements to be more credible even

0:32:15.840 --> 0:32:19.120
<v Speaker 1>if the students were informed that the statements were being repeated.

0:32:19.400 --> 0:32:22.360
<v Speaker 1>So you can directly tell somebody, hey, I know, I

0:32:22.440 --> 0:32:25.000
<v Speaker 1>just asked you if it was true or false that

0:32:25.120 --> 0:32:28.200
<v Speaker 1>zebras could automatically detach their own tongues and fling the

0:32:28.200 --> 0:32:31.640
<v Speaker 1>tongues at attacking hyenas. I asked you that same thing

0:32:31.680 --> 0:32:33.960
<v Speaker 1>three weeks ago. It may or may not be true,

0:32:34.840 --> 0:32:38.240
<v Speaker 1>And even in this case, repeating the statement still makes

0:32:38.280 --> 0:32:40.440
<v Speaker 1>them judge it to be more true than statements they're

0:32:40.440 --> 0:32:43.000
<v Speaker 1>seeing for the first time. So you can warn people

0:32:43.080 --> 0:32:45.480
<v Speaker 1>that something fishy is going on and they still fall

0:32:45.560 --> 0:32:48.880
<v Speaker 1>for it. So you could you could straight up share

0:32:48.880 --> 0:32:54.000
<v Speaker 1>a piece of just undeniably fake news on social media

0:32:54.280 --> 0:32:56.800
<v Speaker 1>and and said, hey, guys, this is this is something news.

0:32:56.840 --> 0:33:00.040
<v Speaker 1>This has been totally debunked. Um, you can look it

0:33:00.120 --> 0:33:03.320
<v Speaker 1>up on Snopes, etcetera. And that's still not going to

0:33:03.360 --> 0:33:06.000
<v Speaker 1>completely disarm the piece that you're sharing. Well, we will

0:33:06.000 --> 0:33:08.680
<v Speaker 1>talk so I would say, yes, we will talk more

0:33:08.720 --> 0:33:11.160
<v Speaker 1>about that in the second episode where this kind of

0:33:11.160 --> 0:33:14.800
<v Speaker 1>thing comes into conflict with real world beliefs. And just

0:33:14.840 --> 0:33:16.800
<v Speaker 1>to be clear, I made up that zebra thing that

0:33:16.800 --> 0:33:19.320
<v Speaker 1>that wasn't from the vacant study. I thought that would

0:33:19.360 --> 0:33:22.280
<v Speaker 1>be clear. But that's number one, not true. Number two,

0:33:22.480 --> 0:33:24.200
<v Speaker 1>as far as I know, not one of the examples.

0:33:24.200 --> 0:33:26.160
<v Speaker 1>Bacon used, Right, Well, I'm sorry you had to drag

0:33:26.240 --> 0:33:28.680
<v Speaker 1>Zebras into all this. Joe. Well, you know, I like

0:33:28.760 --> 0:33:32.800
<v Speaker 1>the idea of a weaponized tongue that's gonna go beyond

0:33:32.840 --> 0:33:36.200
<v Speaker 1>the X Men. Surely that exists in reality. Well yes,

0:33:36.280 --> 0:33:38.520
<v Speaker 1>but but not with Zebras. No. No, I guess that's

0:33:38.560 --> 0:33:41.840
<v Speaker 1>amphibians and stuff. Okay, okay, So back to the study,

0:33:42.000 --> 0:33:45.080
<v Speaker 1>so Bacon says in his abstract quote. It was further

0:33:45.200 --> 0:33:49.800
<v Speaker 1>determined that statements that contradicted early ones were rated as

0:33:49.920 --> 0:33:55.720
<v Speaker 1>relatively true if misclassified as repetitions, but that statements judged

0:33:55.760 --> 0:33:59.440
<v Speaker 1>to be changed were rated as relatively false. So even

0:33:59.520 --> 0:34:02.840
<v Speaker 1>if you remember that you saw something before, you're more

0:34:02.920 --> 0:34:05.920
<v Speaker 1>likely to believe it's true. It's kind of odd. That

0:34:06.040 --> 0:34:09.960
<v Speaker 1>makes you wonder, what is the initial uh, what's the

0:34:10.000 --> 0:34:13.080
<v Speaker 1>initial stimulus that caused you to misremember that you had

0:34:13.120 --> 0:34:16.080
<v Speaker 1>seen it before. Well, as we've discussed on the show before,

0:34:16.120 --> 0:34:19.200
<v Speaker 1>I mean, there are multiple ways that false memories can

0:34:19.200 --> 0:34:22.640
<v Speaker 1>be can be encoded. Oh yeah, absolutely. And so Bacon

0:34:22.760 --> 0:34:26.520
<v Speaker 1>concludes that basically, people are predisposed to believe statements that

0:34:26.600 --> 0:34:31.320
<v Speaker 1>affirm existing knowledge and to disbelieve statements that contradict existing knowledge.

0:34:31.400 --> 0:34:34.840
<v Speaker 1>That's not all that unusual, right, But but it's specifically

0:34:34.920 --> 0:34:38.040
<v Speaker 1>the repetition effect that seems to be playing a role here.

0:34:38.600 --> 0:34:40.799
<v Speaker 1>Let's take a look at another study. How about nine

0:34:41.320 --> 0:34:45.800
<v Speaker 1>two Marian Schwartz Repetition and Rated Truth Value of Statements

0:34:45.840 --> 0:34:49.680
<v Speaker 1>from the American Journal of Psychology. So Schwartz here has

0:34:49.920 --> 0:34:53.239
<v Speaker 1>conducted two experiments on what psychologists were by this time

0:34:53.280 --> 0:34:56.120
<v Speaker 1>calling the truth effect what we're calling the illusory truth

0:34:56.160 --> 0:34:59.560
<v Speaker 1>effect UM. So, experiment one, you get a group of

0:34:59.560 --> 0:35:02.160
<v Speaker 1>subject and they rate claims on a seven point truth

0:35:02.239 --> 0:35:04.239
<v Speaker 1>value scale, just like in the first study, the star

0:35:04.280 --> 0:35:07.760
<v Speaker 1>Wars study, the seventy seven study, UM and a different

0:35:07.760 --> 0:35:10.640
<v Speaker 1>group of subjects rated the same statements on a seven

0:35:10.680 --> 0:35:13.960
<v Speaker 1>point scale of how familiar they were with the statements

0:35:14.000 --> 0:35:17.560
<v Speaker 1>before the experiment started. How familiar are you with this

0:35:18.400 --> 0:35:23.200
<v Speaker 1>repetition increased both ratings. So both pre experimental familiarity as

0:35:23.200 --> 0:35:26.319
<v Speaker 1>well as the perceived truth value. They both went up

0:35:26.320 --> 0:35:29.799
<v Speaker 1>when people saw them more than once. That's not surprising.

0:35:29.840 --> 0:35:33.400
<v Speaker 1>Again the replication, and then also the fact that you

0:35:33.440 --> 0:35:35.440
<v Speaker 1>have seen something before, we'll tend to make you more

0:35:35.480 --> 0:35:39.000
<v Speaker 1>familiar with it. Then you've got another experiment here. Second

0:35:39.040 --> 0:35:42.440
<v Speaker 1>one replicated the illusory truth effect. Again found that it

0:35:42.480 --> 0:35:45.879
<v Speaker 1>didn't matter whether you mixed up repeated statements that people

0:35:45.920 --> 0:35:49.160
<v Speaker 1>had seen before with new statements or only showed them

0:35:49.239 --> 0:35:53.799
<v Speaker 1>repeated statements. Either way, belief and repeated statements went up.

0:35:53.840 --> 0:35:55.640
<v Speaker 1>And this was done so that they could rule out

0:35:55.640 --> 0:35:57.879
<v Speaker 1>the possibility they're thinking, you know, maybe it's only by

0:35:57.920 --> 0:36:01.479
<v Speaker 1>contrast with new and unfamiliar statements that repeated one seem

0:36:01.520 --> 0:36:04.360
<v Speaker 1>more credible. That is not the case. Either way you

0:36:04.400 --> 0:36:06.839
<v Speaker 1>do it, if you've seen it before, you believe it more.

0:36:07.480 --> 0:36:09.920
<v Speaker 1>And so this study has taken as evidence that the

0:36:09.960 --> 0:36:13.640
<v Speaker 1>feeling of familiarity with an idea might be an important part,

0:36:13.719 --> 0:36:16.160
<v Speaker 1>or even the most important part, of how we judge

0:36:16.200 --> 0:36:19.520
<v Speaker 1>something as true or plausible. But we should shift to

0:36:19.560 --> 0:36:24.680
<v Speaker 1>asking the question of why why would increasing familiarity with

0:36:24.719 --> 0:36:28.640
<v Speaker 1>the statement through repetition make it seem more true to us.

0:36:29.320 --> 0:36:32.000
<v Speaker 1>It makes me think about this passage from Wittgenstein in

0:36:32.080 --> 0:36:35.480
<v Speaker 1>his Philosophical Investigations, about how absurd it would be to

0:36:35.560 --> 0:36:39.560
<v Speaker 1>use repetition of a mental representation as evidence that the

0:36:39.600 --> 0:36:43.800
<v Speaker 1>representation is correct. He writes, quote, for example, I don't

0:36:43.800 --> 0:36:46.480
<v Speaker 1>know if I've remembered the time of departure of a

0:36:46.560 --> 0:36:49.520
<v Speaker 1>train right, And to check it, I call to mind

0:36:49.600 --> 0:36:52.759
<v Speaker 1>how a page of the timetable looked. Is it the

0:36:52.800 --> 0:36:56.360
<v Speaker 1>same here? No, For this process has got to produce

0:36:56.360 --> 0:36:59.840
<v Speaker 1>a memory which is actually correct. If the mental image

0:36:59.840 --> 0:37:03.640
<v Speaker 1>of the timetable could not itself be tested for correctness,

0:37:03.680 --> 0:37:06.600
<v Speaker 1>how could it confirm the correctness of the first memory?

0:37:07.160 --> 0:37:10.080
<v Speaker 1>As if someone were to buy several copies of the

0:37:10.080 --> 0:37:13.520
<v Speaker 1>morning paper to assure himself that what it said was true.

0:37:14.040 --> 0:37:16.000
<v Speaker 1>And that's that's kind of what we're doing. Like he's

0:37:16.000 --> 0:37:18.440
<v Speaker 1>talking about mental images, But the general point is a

0:37:18.440 --> 0:37:22.040
<v Speaker 1>good one. We're essentially buying several copies of the same

0:37:22.120 --> 0:37:26.880
<v Speaker 1>newspaper to to increase our belief that what the newspaper

0:37:26.960 --> 0:37:32.319
<v Speaker 1>says is actually accurate. Now when it possible, interpretation that

0:37:32.360 --> 0:37:35.240
<v Speaker 1>comes to mind is just like the idea of say,

0:37:35.600 --> 0:37:39.600
<v Speaker 1>walking us picking out stepping stones to cross a creek. Right,

0:37:40.160 --> 0:37:42.480
<v Speaker 1>you step to one stone and it doesn't slip out

0:37:42.520 --> 0:37:44.719
<v Speaker 1>from underneath you, and so you use that too to

0:37:45.640 --> 0:37:47.879
<v Speaker 1>make your way across the other stones and hopefully make

0:37:47.880 --> 0:37:50.680
<v Speaker 1>it across the entire creek without getting your feet wet

0:37:50.760 --> 0:37:53.920
<v Speaker 1>or falling in being swept down stream to the to

0:37:53.960 --> 0:37:57.920
<v Speaker 1>the waterfall. So to what extent are we just like

0:37:58.040 --> 0:38:02.600
<v Speaker 1>trusting anything that hasn't resulted in catastrophe thus fire. Well,

0:38:02.800 --> 0:38:05.200
<v Speaker 1>I would say that it would make more sense for

0:38:05.280 --> 0:38:10.000
<v Speaker 1>that to be true with sort of embodied physical, experimental

0:38:10.120 --> 0:38:12.520
<v Speaker 1>knowledge about the world than it would for that to

0:38:12.560 --> 0:38:15.279
<v Speaker 1>make sense for that to apply to semantic knowledge of

0:38:15.400 --> 0:38:17.959
<v Speaker 1>things people tell us. Or maybe our brains just aren't

0:38:18.000 --> 0:38:22.080
<v Speaker 1>good at differentiating between semantic knowledge that's imparted through words.

0:38:22.160 --> 0:38:25.239
<v Speaker 1>You know, maybe somebody saying all those stones will hold

0:38:25.280 --> 0:38:27.400
<v Speaker 1>you up is encoded by the brain in sort of

0:38:27.400 --> 0:38:30.160
<v Speaker 1>the same way as testing out one stone at a time.

0:38:31.040 --> 0:38:33.440
<v Speaker 1>Uh yeah, I don't know. So this is what we

0:38:33.440 --> 0:38:35.319
<v Speaker 1>should explore for the rest of the episode. I think,

0:38:35.680 --> 0:38:40.520
<v Speaker 1>why should repeatedly exposing ourselves to the same information increase

0:38:40.560 --> 0:38:43.440
<v Speaker 1>our confidence in it? If we didn't have good reasons

0:38:43.480 --> 0:38:45.359
<v Speaker 1>to believe it the first time. It's clear that this

0:38:45.400 --> 0:38:48.040
<v Speaker 1>is what's happening, But why does it happen this way?

0:38:48.200 --> 0:38:49.920
<v Speaker 1>All right, we'll take one more break and when we

0:38:50.000 --> 0:38:55.000
<v Speaker 1>come back, we'll we'll jump into this. Thank alright, we're back.

0:38:55.480 --> 0:39:00.000
<v Speaker 1>So we're asking this question of why repeatedly exposing ourselves

0:39:00.080 --> 0:39:04.120
<v Speaker 1>to the same information would increase our confidence if we

0:39:04.160 --> 0:39:07.200
<v Speaker 1>didn't have good reasons to believe the information the first time.

0:39:07.520 --> 0:39:10.360
<v Speaker 1>It's clear from several experiments that this is what happens

0:39:10.400 --> 0:39:13.160
<v Speaker 1>in our brains. If if a statement is repeated, we

0:39:13.239 --> 0:39:16.319
<v Speaker 1>believe it more. But why do our brains work that way?

0:39:16.320 --> 0:39:20.920
<v Speaker 1>It doesn't necessarily make sense. Yeah, And one possible interpretation

0:39:20.920 --> 0:39:22.840
<v Speaker 1>that came to mind is, of course we've touched on

0:39:22.880 --> 0:39:26.719
<v Speaker 1>this before, that that we're all social animals. Yeah, so

0:39:26.880 --> 0:39:29.319
<v Speaker 1>I've I've wondered if there this is a byproduct of

0:39:29.320 --> 0:39:31.840
<v Speaker 1>the drive to fit in with a given group or tribe,

0:39:32.280 --> 0:39:35.560
<v Speaker 1>that there's ultimately a survival advantage and getting along with

0:39:35.560 --> 0:39:38.480
<v Speaker 1>the group, and so does that bleed over into highly

0:39:38.520 --> 0:39:42.279
<v Speaker 1>repeated or highly circulated lies or untruths. So basically like

0:39:42.400 --> 0:39:45.280
<v Speaker 1>if there is a lie going around in the group.

0:39:45.400 --> 0:39:47.600
<v Speaker 1>You'll get along with the group better if you just

0:39:47.680 --> 0:39:50.600
<v Speaker 1>accept the lie. Yeah, And I'm not you know, certainly

0:39:50.600 --> 0:39:52.520
<v Speaker 1>after looking at more of the research, I'm not arguing

0:39:52.520 --> 0:39:56.560
<v Speaker 1>that that is the core um mechanism involved here. This

0:39:56.680 --> 0:39:58.600
<v Speaker 1>is worth exploring that. But but I but I do

0:39:58.920 --> 0:40:01.040
<v Speaker 1>like wonder to what extent that is that's playing a role.

0:40:01.080 --> 0:40:03.360
<v Speaker 1>Because you we we all have our our groups that

0:40:03.400 --> 0:40:05.920
<v Speaker 1>we are involved in, our our our friends, our family,

0:40:06.000 --> 0:40:08.680
<v Speaker 1>or our work groups, our social media groups are are

0:40:08.680 --> 0:40:12.120
<v Speaker 1>sort of echo chambers that we find online. And uh,

0:40:12.440 --> 0:40:14.640
<v Speaker 1>does it make you more susceptible to the lie just

0:40:14.680 --> 0:40:20.440
<v Speaker 1>because there is this this ingrained need to fit in

0:40:20.600 --> 0:40:23.879
<v Speaker 1>with that group too, to share the same values, and

0:40:23.960 --> 0:40:27.080
<v Speaker 1>to put it on in the prehistoric framework, to to

0:40:27.480 --> 0:40:30.040
<v Speaker 1>continue to have access to the fire and the and

0:40:30.200 --> 0:40:32.560
<v Speaker 1>the feast. Yeah, I think I think that's a possibility

0:40:32.560 --> 0:40:35.560
<v Speaker 1>worth exploring. Let's let's take a look at it. Okay. Well,

0:40:35.360 --> 0:40:37.200
<v Speaker 1>I started looking into this a little bit and I

0:40:37.680 --> 0:40:42.200
<v Speaker 1>ran across a paper titled the Evolution of Misbelief misbelief

0:40:42.320 --> 0:40:45.880
<v Speaker 1>misbelief from two thousand nine. This is published in Behavioral

0:40:45.920 --> 0:40:48.800
<v Speaker 1>and Brain Sciences, and it was by Ryan T. McKay

0:40:49.000 --> 0:40:53.960
<v Speaker 1>and Daniel Dinnett. Daniel Dinnett, all right, so they approached

0:40:54.040 --> 0:40:56.920
<v Speaker 1>the following. I guess you could call it a paradox

0:40:56.920 --> 0:41:00.080
<v Speaker 1>in the paper. Given that we evolve to thrive in

0:41:00.239 --> 0:41:02.919
<v Speaker 1>a fact based world, what other kind of world could

0:41:02.920 --> 0:41:05.320
<v Speaker 1>there exactly? Yeah, I mean, we we're dealing with with

0:41:05.480 --> 0:41:09.000
<v Speaker 1>actual reality here. But but given that we've evolved to

0:41:09.040 --> 0:41:13.279
<v Speaker 1>thrive in this world, shouldn't true beliefs be adaptive and

0:41:13.400 --> 0:41:18.200
<v Speaker 1>misbeliefs be maladaptive. It's clear that in many cases, probably

0:41:18.239 --> 0:41:21.600
<v Speaker 1>most cases, that is the way things are. Right. Believing

0:41:21.640 --> 0:41:23.600
<v Speaker 1>that you are able to fly off the edge of

0:41:23.600 --> 0:41:27.000
<v Speaker 1>a cliff is not good for you. Believing that polar

0:41:27.040 --> 0:41:30.560
<v Speaker 1>bears want to cuddle with you is not advantageous. Holding

0:41:30.600 --> 0:41:34.200
<v Speaker 1>false beliefs like this doesn't work out well for people. Yeah,

0:41:34.200 --> 0:41:38.640
<v Speaker 1>they're they're they're reckless and dangerous misbeliefs that clearly like,

0:41:38.880 --> 0:41:40.920
<v Speaker 1>if you've reached the point where you're believing in that,

0:41:41.320 --> 0:41:43.640
<v Speaker 1>you're going to go extinct. So it's obvious that there

0:41:43.719 --> 0:41:45.640
<v Speaker 1>is going to be at least some kind of major

0:41:45.719 --> 0:41:49.760
<v Speaker 1>selection pressure in the brain for shaping brains that believe

0:41:49.920 --> 0:41:54.320
<v Speaker 1>mostly true things, unless there are cases where believing something

0:41:54.320 --> 0:41:59.879
<v Speaker 1>that's false outweighs the negative the drawbacks essentially. So here here,

0:42:00.320 --> 0:42:03.920
<v Speaker 1>here's what they wrote. Quote on this assumption, our beliefs

0:42:03.920 --> 0:42:06.880
<v Speaker 1>about the world are essentially tools that enable us to

0:42:07.040 --> 0:42:11.919
<v Speaker 1>act effectively in the world. Moreover, to be reliable, such

0:42:11.920 --> 0:42:14.879
<v Speaker 1>tools must be produced in us, it is assumed by

0:42:14.920 --> 0:42:18.880
<v Speaker 1>systems designed by evolution to be truth aiming and hence

0:42:19.239 --> 0:42:24.400
<v Speaker 1>barring miracles, These systems must be designed to generate grounded beliefs.

0:42:24.440 --> 0:42:28.200
<v Speaker 1>A system for generating ungrounded but mostly true beliefs would

0:42:28.239 --> 0:42:31.960
<v Speaker 1>be an oracle, as impossible as a perpetual motion machine.

0:42:32.280 --> 0:42:33.879
<v Speaker 1>I like that. Yeah, So there's got to be like

0:42:33.920 --> 0:42:37.720
<v Speaker 1>a grounding procedure through which we can discover true beliefs

0:42:37.800 --> 0:42:39.919
<v Speaker 1>if we're going to have them. Otherwise we're just talking

0:42:39.920 --> 0:42:43.000
<v Speaker 1>about magic. But we have to account for these varying

0:42:43.080 --> 0:42:46.120
<v Speaker 1>levels of misbelief and self deception in the human experience.

0:42:46.440 --> 0:42:49.640
<v Speaker 1>They write, If evolution has designed us to appraise the

0:42:49.640 --> 0:42:52.920
<v Speaker 1>world accurately and to form true beliefs, how are we

0:42:53.000 --> 0:42:56.640
<v Speaker 1>to account for the routine exceptions to this rule instances

0:42:56.680 --> 0:43:00.759
<v Speaker 1>of misbelief? Most of us, at times believe oppositions that

0:43:00.920 --> 0:43:04.279
<v Speaker 1>end up being disproved. Many of us produce beliefs that

0:43:04.320 --> 0:43:07.480
<v Speaker 1>others consider obviously false to begin with, and some of

0:43:07.520 --> 0:43:11.320
<v Speaker 1>his form beliefs that are not just manifestly but bizarrely false.

0:43:11.800 --> 0:43:15.880
<v Speaker 1>How can this be? Are all these misbeliefs just accidents,

0:43:15.920 --> 0:43:20.480
<v Speaker 1>incidences of pathology or breakdown or at best undesirable but

0:43:20.560 --> 0:43:24.920
<v Speaker 1>tolerable byproducts. Might some of them contrat the default presumption

0:43:25.320 --> 0:43:29.200
<v Speaker 1>be adaptive in and of themselves. I like this distinction

0:43:29.239 --> 0:43:31.520
<v Speaker 1>they're making. I think this is actually useful. So they're

0:43:31.520 --> 0:43:35.839
<v Speaker 1>breaking misbeliefs down into two basic kinds of categories, right

0:43:36.280 --> 0:43:39.600
<v Speaker 1>right that they're talking about. One those resulting from a

0:43:39.680 --> 0:43:43.440
<v Speaker 1>breakdown in the normal functioning of the belief formation system.

0:43:43.680 --> 0:43:48.279
<v Speaker 1>This would be delusions malfunctions, so things like face blindness

0:43:48.520 --> 0:43:51.720
<v Speaker 1>or or catard syndrome. Okay, this is when the brain

0:43:52.000 --> 0:43:56.239
<v Speaker 1>is creating incorrect beliefs because it's not working right, it's

0:43:56.280 --> 0:43:58.879
<v Speaker 1>not doing what it's supposed to be doing. But then

0:43:58.920 --> 0:44:02.600
<v Speaker 1>the second category are those that are arising in the

0:44:02.640 --> 0:44:06.680
<v Speaker 1>normal course of that system's operations, So beliefs based on

0:44:06.800 --> 0:44:10.000
<v Speaker 1>incomplete or inaccurate information. These would be This would be

0:44:10.000 --> 0:44:12.640
<v Speaker 1>a case of manufacture. And we'll get into examples of

0:44:12.640 --> 0:44:14.520
<v Speaker 1>this in a second There could be tons of examples.

0:44:14.520 --> 0:44:16.200
<v Speaker 1>One that comes to my mind that would be an

0:44:16.200 --> 0:44:18.919
<v Speaker 1>example of this would be optical illusions. When you when

0:44:18.920 --> 0:44:21.840
<v Speaker 1>you witness an optical illusion, you have a false belief

0:44:21.960 --> 0:44:23.840
<v Speaker 1>that has been generated by your brain. But it's not

0:44:23.880 --> 0:44:27.280
<v Speaker 1>because your brain is doing anything wrong. It's just because,

0:44:27.360 --> 0:44:30.200
<v Speaker 1>like it's being exploited by a situation that's not part

0:44:30.200 --> 0:44:33.879
<v Speaker 1>of its normal what it normally needs to do. Right. Yeah,

0:44:34.040 --> 0:44:36.319
<v Speaker 1>they point out that it's it's easy to think of

0:44:36.360 --> 0:44:39.080
<v Speaker 1>these in light of of an artifact. Is it failing

0:44:39.160 --> 0:44:41.279
<v Speaker 1>due to a limitation in the design in a way

0:44:41.280 --> 0:44:44.480
<v Speaker 1>that is culpable or tolerable? Examples here being say a

0:44:44.560 --> 0:44:47.680
<v Speaker 1>clock that doesn't keep time, keep good time versus a

0:44:47.719 --> 0:44:50.800
<v Speaker 1>toaster oven that doesn't keep time at all. You can't

0:44:50.800 --> 0:44:53.680
<v Speaker 1>expect the toaster of and to keep time unless it's

0:44:53.680 --> 0:44:55.680
<v Speaker 1>got a time right. Well, yes, so that's true. Yes,

0:44:55.960 --> 0:44:58.280
<v Speaker 1>I would have said a purple donkey built by muscular

0:44:58.280 --> 0:45:02.160
<v Speaker 1>elves that doesn't keep because you wouldn't even expect that's true?

0:45:02.280 --> 0:45:04.520
<v Speaker 1>Yes now, But but it gets more complicated when you

0:45:04.520 --> 0:45:08.839
<v Speaker 1>go into the biological realm, because what counts as immune function, dysfunction,

0:45:09.280 --> 0:45:13.040
<v Speaker 1>a pathogen infection, but what it would have. Ultimately, the

0:45:13.080 --> 0:45:16.160
<v Speaker 1>immune system airs by defending the body against say, a

0:45:16.239 --> 0:45:20.760
<v Speaker 1>transplant organ, and may ensure its survival because the body

0:45:20.840 --> 0:45:23.560
<v Speaker 1>is going to reject that attempt to reject that that

0:45:23.680 --> 0:45:28.000
<v Speaker 1>heart transplant, even though the heart transplant could save the patient,

0:45:28.080 --> 0:45:30.399
<v Speaker 1>will save the patients. So it seems like in order

0:45:30.440 --> 0:45:34.279
<v Speaker 1>to understand this, you almost have to understand the context, right, right,

0:45:34.320 --> 0:45:37.600
<v Speaker 1>They say that they invoked the work of Ruth Garrett Milliken,

0:45:38.120 --> 0:45:40.520
<v Speaker 1>who in saying that we can't look to an organ's

0:45:40.560 --> 0:45:43.360
<v Speaker 1>current properties or disposition, we have to look to its history.

0:45:43.640 --> 0:45:46.319
<v Speaker 1>That makes sense to me. Organ transplants, of course, are

0:45:46.400 --> 0:45:49.200
<v Speaker 1>not part of our evolutionary history. So this is just

0:45:49.239 --> 0:45:52.799
<v Speaker 1>the body functioning normally in rejecting the invader heart. Right.

0:45:52.840 --> 0:45:56.000
<v Speaker 1>The body is not malfunctioning, is doing what it's supposed

0:45:56.040 --> 0:45:58.000
<v Speaker 1>to do. We're just throwing a situation at it that

0:45:58.040 --> 0:46:01.160
<v Speaker 1>it's not prepared to deal with. Yeah, so that brings

0:46:01.200 --> 0:46:04.959
<v Speaker 1>us to the more human examples, you know, lies and

0:46:05.080 --> 0:46:07.920
<v Speaker 1>uh and so forth. Oh, that's interesting. So a lie

0:46:08.000 --> 0:46:11.000
<v Speaker 1>could be like a thing that our bodies were not

0:46:11.120 --> 0:46:14.239
<v Speaker 1>really a prepared to deal with very well, which is

0:46:14.280 --> 0:46:17.719
<v Speaker 1>weird to think of because of how common lies are. Yeah,

0:46:17.719 --> 0:46:20.160
<v Speaker 1>they right. However adaptive it may be for us to

0:46:20.200 --> 0:46:23.719
<v Speaker 1>believe truly, it may be adaptive for other parties if

0:46:23.760 --> 0:46:26.840
<v Speaker 1>we believe falsely. Now that, of course this is something

0:46:26.880 --> 0:46:29.080
<v Speaker 1>Just to to interject here, I think this is something

0:46:29.120 --> 0:46:33.040
<v Speaker 1>that we ultimately see holds holds true with other animals,

0:46:33.040 --> 0:46:36.080
<v Speaker 1>like the role of deception of course in u in

0:46:36.080 --> 0:46:40.240
<v Speaker 1>in in certainly in hunting and defense, in even acquiring mates,

0:46:40.960 --> 0:46:44.520
<v Speaker 1>they continue an evolutionary arms race of deceptive ploys and

0:46:44.560 --> 0:46:49.160
<v Speaker 1>counterploys may thus ensue. In some cases, the other parties

0:46:49.200 --> 0:46:52.560
<v Speaker 1>in question may not even be animate agents, but cultural

0:46:52.600 --> 0:46:55.920
<v Speaker 1>traits or systems. Although such cases are interesting in their

0:46:55.920 --> 0:46:59.480
<v Speaker 1>own right, the adaptive misbeliefs we pursue in this article

0:46:59.760 --> 0:47:03.440
<v Speaker 1>are beneficial to their consumers. Misbeliefs that evolved to the

0:47:03.480 --> 0:47:07.200
<v Speaker 1>detriment of their believers are not our quarries, so they

0:47:07.280 --> 0:47:10.400
<v Speaker 1>stress the difference between beliefs and what they referred to

0:47:10.440 --> 0:47:14.719
<v Speaker 1>as a leafs uh and uh. For for instance, if

0:47:14.719 --> 0:47:17.600
<v Speaker 1>I'm freaked out by tall buildings, I might not believe

0:47:17.680 --> 0:47:19.840
<v Speaker 1>that I'm going to fall off, but I might a

0:47:19.960 --> 0:47:22.680
<v Speaker 1>lieve that I'm going to fall off the leave as

0:47:22.719 --> 0:47:26.279
<v Speaker 1>in like like a moral yes. Yeah, and in this

0:47:26.320 --> 0:47:28.440
<v Speaker 1>case it seems to be something that is tall a

0:47:28.440 --> 0:47:31.960
<v Speaker 1>tolerated side effect of an imperfect system. But it's not

0:47:32.080 --> 0:47:33.960
<v Speaker 1>McKay and dinn itt that end up bringing up the

0:47:34.000 --> 0:47:39.600
<v Speaker 1>illusory truth effect, but psychologists Pascal boy Yer in commentary

0:47:39.719 --> 0:47:43.680
<v Speaker 1>on the paper, Uh, this particular paper from from McKay

0:47:43.680 --> 0:47:46.000
<v Speaker 1>and Dinnet, by the ways available online. I'll try to

0:47:46.000 --> 0:47:47.520
<v Speaker 1>include a link to it on the landing page for

0:47:47.560 --> 0:47:52.840
<v Speaker 1>this episode. But in his commentary, Boyer rights dramatic memory

0:47:52.880 --> 0:47:56.640
<v Speaker 1>distortion seem to influence belief fixation. For instance, in the

0:47:56.680 --> 0:48:00.200
<v Speaker 1>illusory truth effect, statements read several times are more likely

0:48:00.560 --> 0:48:04.080
<v Speaker 1>rated as true than statements read only once. People who

0:48:04.160 --> 0:48:07.440
<v Speaker 1>repeatedly imagine performing a particular action may end up believing

0:48:07.440 --> 0:48:09.879
<v Speaker 1>they actually performed it. Oh yeah, this is something I've

0:48:09.920 --> 0:48:12.279
<v Speaker 1>read before. If yeah, if so? If you just like

0:48:12.320 --> 0:48:15.440
<v Speaker 1>have people walk through a task in their mind and

0:48:15.440 --> 0:48:17.960
<v Speaker 1>then ask them later if they remember doing it. A

0:48:17.960 --> 0:48:21.120
<v Speaker 1>lot of times they remember physically acting it out. Yeah,

0:48:21.160 --> 0:48:24.160
<v Speaker 1>I've certainly had this occur with me, Like there'll be

0:48:24.200 --> 0:48:26.160
<v Speaker 1>something I need to do and I'm thinking about doing it,

0:48:26.440 --> 0:48:28.960
<v Speaker 1>and then I can't remember if I actually carried it out,

0:48:29.840 --> 0:48:33.680
<v Speaker 1>and this is uh, this is called imagination inflation, He writes.

0:48:34.160 --> 0:48:37.720
<v Speaker 1>Misinformation paradigms show that most people are vulnerable to memory

0:48:37.760 --> 0:48:42.400
<v Speaker 1>revision when plausible information is implied by experimenters in social

0:48:42.920 --> 0:48:45.799
<v Speaker 1>contagion protocols, people tend to believe they actually saw what

0:48:45.960 --> 0:48:48.920
<v Speaker 1>is in fact suggested by the confederate with whom they

0:48:48.920 --> 0:48:51.920
<v Speaker 1>watched a video. So that he's just listing lots of

0:48:51.960 --> 0:48:55.160
<v Speaker 1>the ways that we are end up with false beliefs.

0:48:55.200 --> 0:48:59.120
<v Speaker 1>There's a plethora of examples of mechanisms for putting false

0:48:59.120 --> 0:49:01.800
<v Speaker 1>beliefs in our brain. Right. Yeah, I know there's a

0:49:01.840 --> 0:49:05.080
<v Speaker 1>lot of territory covered in this paper in the attached responses,

0:49:05.120 --> 0:49:08.480
<v Speaker 1>but I can't I come back to the sort of

0:49:08.640 --> 0:49:11.759
<v Speaker 1>key reason that I sought it out, Like, like, when

0:49:11.840 --> 0:49:14.640
<v Speaker 1>is self self deception helpful? Is it necessary for the

0:49:14.680 --> 0:49:18.840
<v Speaker 1>deception of others? It doesn't quite seem to be, Like,

0:49:19.160 --> 0:49:21.200
<v Speaker 1>you don't have to believe the lie yourself to tell

0:49:21.200 --> 0:49:25.200
<v Speaker 1>someone else the lie, regardless of what telling the lie

0:49:25.239 --> 0:49:29.200
<v Speaker 1>repeatedly might do to you. Well, so, boy, he's skeptical

0:49:29.239 --> 0:49:31.560
<v Speaker 1>of the idea, right, So is he basically saying, like,

0:49:31.719 --> 0:49:36.080
<v Speaker 1>you don't want to overstate the the adaptiveness of believing lies.

0:49:36.719 --> 0:49:39.360
<v Speaker 1>But yeah, he drives something that memory need only be

0:49:39.400 --> 0:49:43.200
<v Speaker 1>as good as the advantage and decision making it affords. Okay,

0:49:43.200 --> 0:49:46.840
<v Speaker 1>so he's essentially going for the byproduct thing for most

0:49:47.160 --> 0:49:50.360
<v Speaker 1>most beliefs. He's he's saying like, look, you know, memory

0:49:50.440 --> 0:49:53.920
<v Speaker 1>needs to do certain things, and in the course of

0:49:53.960 --> 0:49:56.440
<v Speaker 1>doing those things, it may generate some false beliefs. We

0:49:56.480 --> 0:50:01.439
<v Speaker 1>don't have to assume that those false beliefs themselves are beneficial, right, Yeah,

0:50:01.520 --> 0:50:03.680
<v Speaker 1>And and to come back to McKay and Dinnett, they

0:50:03.680 --> 0:50:06.400
<v Speaker 1>point out that natural selection doesn't seem to care about truth.

0:50:06.880 --> 0:50:09.640
<v Speaker 1>It only cares about reproductive success, so that there are

0:50:09.680 --> 0:50:12.520
<v Speaker 1>various cases where a particular false belief or misbelief is

0:50:12.560 --> 0:50:16.760
<v Speaker 1>seemingly adaptive. You believe in a non existent fire god, Okay,

0:50:16.840 --> 0:50:20.880
<v Speaker 1>but say that its laws inhibit overt selfish behavior that

0:50:21.320 --> 0:50:23.319
<v Speaker 1>gets you in trouble and not work out for you

0:50:23.360 --> 0:50:25.960
<v Speaker 1>in the long run. So in that case, you have

0:50:26.000 --> 0:50:28.880
<v Speaker 1>an adaptive misbelief. Now, if the fire God wherever to

0:50:28.880 --> 0:50:32.279
<v Speaker 1>actually appear, then this would be an adaptive belief. But

0:50:32.320 --> 0:50:34.480
<v Speaker 1>then there are arguably a whole host of other false

0:50:34.520 --> 0:50:38.880
<v Speaker 1>ideas that seem adaptive positive self deceptions about ability the

0:50:38.880 --> 0:50:42.360
<v Speaker 1>placebo effect for instance. Um, they bring up the self

0:50:42.440 --> 0:50:47.160
<v Speaker 1>theories of intelligence, entity and incremental view of intelligence. Um.

0:50:47.200 --> 0:50:49.560
<v Speaker 1>This being like, m Am, I born with a certain

0:50:49.920 --> 0:50:52.760
<v Speaker 1>and uh intellect? Or do I develop it over time?

0:50:52.960 --> 0:50:57.720
<v Speaker 1>And how those different core beliefs can affect your effectiveness

0:50:57.880 --> 0:51:00.319
<v Speaker 1>in life Like doesn't mean like, oh, I've to work

0:51:00.360 --> 0:51:03.040
<v Speaker 1>really hard in order to stay stay on top of

0:51:03.080 --> 0:51:06.120
<v Speaker 1>this or is it a situation where oh, I'm I'm brilliant,

0:51:06.160 --> 0:51:08.440
<v Speaker 1>I can accomplish anything. And and of course I think

0:51:08.480 --> 0:51:11.800
<v Speaker 1>you can argue for pitfalls on both sides. And of

0:51:11.840 --> 0:51:14.440
<v Speaker 1>course there's always the optimal margin of illusion in play,

0:51:15.000 --> 0:51:18.200
<v Speaker 1>which comes to us from Roy f Ball moister. Uh.

0:51:18.239 --> 0:51:21.320
<v Speaker 1>And you know, ultimately crazy over confidence as we do,

0:51:21.400 --> 0:51:23.560
<v Speaker 1>as we discussed, is going to lead to extinction. Right,

0:51:23.640 --> 0:51:25.880
<v Speaker 1>you don't want to cuddle the polar bear. Right, cuddling

0:51:25.880 --> 0:51:28.560
<v Speaker 1>the polar bear thinking you can fly? Uh, These are

0:51:28.560 --> 0:51:31.400
<v Speaker 1>going to lead you falling off the side of a

0:51:31.400 --> 0:51:34.520
<v Speaker 1>mountain or winding up at a polar bear's tummy. Yeah. Now,

0:51:34.560 --> 0:51:38.440
<v Speaker 1>I could certainly understand the idea of socially adaptive misbeliefs.

0:51:38.480 --> 0:51:41.799
<v Speaker 1>I think that thing. Those things definitely do exist, and

0:51:41.800 --> 0:51:45.040
<v Speaker 1>in some cases there might be some overlap with the

0:51:45.080 --> 0:51:48.240
<v Speaker 1>types of things that get repeated so often, Like reasons

0:51:48.280 --> 0:51:53.359
<v Speaker 1>for believing untrue things can also compound each other. I mean,

0:51:53.360 --> 0:51:56.160
<v Speaker 1>I'm about to explain why I think false beliefs gained

0:51:56.160 --> 0:51:59.879
<v Speaker 1>through exposure and repetition are not adaptive in themselves. Uh,

0:52:00.040 --> 0:52:02.360
<v Speaker 1>but you can have more than one reason for believing

0:52:02.480 --> 0:52:07.120
<v Speaker 1>something that's untrue. Think about objectively untrue statements that get repeated,

0:52:07.120 --> 0:52:09.440
<v Speaker 1>as we were talking about earlier in a political context.

0:52:09.800 --> 0:52:12.680
<v Speaker 1>The evidence shows that we believe them partially because of

0:52:12.680 --> 0:52:16.399
<v Speaker 1>how often they repeated, but there's also social cognition and

0:52:16.440 --> 0:52:19.920
<v Speaker 1>also identity protective cognition. In other words, we tend to

0:52:19.920 --> 0:52:22.640
<v Speaker 1>believe things that members of our political tribe and social

0:52:22.680 --> 0:52:26.480
<v Speaker 1>in groups say, and for social cohesion reasons that that

0:52:26.600 --> 0:52:30.080
<v Speaker 1>is adaptive for us. We also believe things that validate

0:52:30.120 --> 0:52:32.320
<v Speaker 1>our sense of personal identity. But I think it's pretty

0:52:32.320 --> 0:52:35.480
<v Speaker 1>clear that that these types of effects can work in

0:52:35.520 --> 0:52:41.520
<v Speaker 1>a nasty perverse tag team format, boosting and complementing one another.

0:52:42.040 --> 0:52:45.240
<v Speaker 1>But even if we we put aside these complementary effects,

0:52:45.239 --> 0:52:49.680
<v Speaker 1>put aside uh, social and identity protective cognition, put those

0:52:49.719 --> 0:52:53.040
<v Speaker 1>aside and just focus on the explanation for the illusory

0:52:53.080 --> 0:52:56.880
<v Speaker 1>truth effect and repetition. There's a really interesting thing that

0:52:57.239 --> 0:52:59.560
<v Speaker 1>comes out, and this is based on the idea of

0:52:59.640 --> 0:53:03.799
<v Speaker 1>pros tessing fluency, which is it's a it's a concept

0:53:03.920 --> 0:53:06.239
<v Speaker 1>that is way more interesting than the name would let

0:53:06.239 --> 0:53:10.480
<v Speaker 1>you real. So the dominant explanation for the illusory truth

0:53:10.480 --> 0:53:15.239
<v Speaker 1>effect in the psychology literature, which we're about to get into, um,

0:53:15.280 --> 0:53:18.480
<v Speaker 1>it fits into this byproduct category that we were just

0:53:18.520 --> 0:53:20.759
<v Speaker 1>talking about. Based on all I read, it seems the

0:53:20.800 --> 0:53:24.759
<v Speaker 1>informed majority opinion of psychologists is that the illusion of

0:53:24.800 --> 0:53:27.520
<v Speaker 1>truth that we get from exposure and repetition is an

0:53:27.600 --> 0:53:33.719
<v Speaker 1>unfortunate byproduct of generally useful cognitive heuristic. Now, a heuristic,

0:53:33.760 --> 0:53:36.279
<v Speaker 1>as we've talked about before, is a mental shortcut. It's

0:53:36.280 --> 0:53:39.840
<v Speaker 1>a fast and cheap trick that the brain uses to

0:53:40.000 --> 0:53:42.840
<v Speaker 1>arrive at a judgment or produce some kind of result

0:53:42.920 --> 0:53:46.160
<v Speaker 1>without using too much effort. And it's it's worth driving

0:53:46.160 --> 0:53:50.000
<v Speaker 1>home that our brains need fast and cheap tricks. Brains

0:53:50.040 --> 0:53:53.160
<v Speaker 1>are very energy hungry. Yeah yeah, there's only there's only

0:53:53.239 --> 0:53:56.160
<v Speaker 1>so much power to go around there, so it's uh,

0:53:56.200 --> 0:53:58.640
<v Speaker 1>it's kind of has to hold everything together with a

0:53:58.680 --> 0:54:02.359
<v Speaker 1>bunch of tricks. Yeah, so it works something like this.

0:54:03.200 --> 0:54:05.800
<v Speaker 1>Let's go on, let's go with it. Assume that on balance,

0:54:06.080 --> 0:54:10.040
<v Speaker 1>true statements get uttered more often than lies. As cynical

0:54:10.080 --> 0:54:12.680
<v Speaker 1>as we like to be, that's probably true, right, True

0:54:12.680 --> 0:54:16.520
<v Speaker 1>statements are generally more useful to people. Also, there's a

0:54:16.560 --> 0:54:20.480
<v Speaker 1>sort of convergence effect where there's only one way for

0:54:20.520 --> 0:54:23.120
<v Speaker 1>a true statement to be true, but there are lots

0:54:23.160 --> 0:54:26.160
<v Speaker 1>of different ways to say a lie about the subject

0:54:26.200 --> 0:54:28.880
<v Speaker 1>of that statement. So like, true statements on a subject

0:54:28.960 --> 0:54:32.359
<v Speaker 1>are going to be more consistent usually than lies about

0:54:32.360 --> 0:54:35.600
<v Speaker 1>the subject, because a lie about the subject could be anything. Well,

0:54:35.640 --> 0:54:40.319
<v Speaker 1>and also lies lies it in large part have to

0:54:40.360 --> 0:54:44.080
<v Speaker 1>be believable. Like think about the various true statements and

0:54:44.200 --> 0:54:46.640
<v Speaker 1>uh and false statements that might be uttered during the

0:54:46.640 --> 0:54:49.839
<v Speaker 1>course of a given day at work. Yes, somebody, hey,

0:54:49.840 --> 0:54:52.320
<v Speaker 1>where's the bathroom? You know it's a new building. Say,

0:54:52.400 --> 0:54:54.759
<v Speaker 1>then they're they're gonna probably say, oh, it's over there,

0:54:54.800 --> 0:54:57.080
<v Speaker 1>and they're they're they're probably going to tell you the truth.

0:54:57.320 --> 0:55:00.239
<v Speaker 1>It generally does not serve people well to lie about

0:55:00.280 --> 0:55:02.479
<v Speaker 1>the location of the bathroom, right, because you're gonna find

0:55:02.480 --> 0:55:04.239
<v Speaker 1>out and then you're gonna say, hey, why did you

0:55:04.239 --> 0:55:06.600
<v Speaker 1>tell me the bathroom is over there and not over there?

0:55:06.640 --> 0:55:11.480
<v Speaker 1>Are you insane? But then some of the false statements

0:55:11.480 --> 0:55:14.359
<v Speaker 1>you're liable to hear might be, hey, if you, uh,

0:55:14.719 --> 0:55:16.239
<v Speaker 1>I don't know, let's see have you started on that

0:55:16.280 --> 0:55:19.040
<v Speaker 1>report yet, Let's do on Friday, And they'll say, oh, yeah,

0:55:19.040 --> 0:55:20.440
<v Speaker 1>I've got it, I've got it taken care of. I'll

0:55:20.440 --> 0:55:22.680
<v Speaker 1>get it to you on Friday. You know. There there's

0:55:22.800 --> 0:55:24.279
<v Speaker 1>there are a lot of statements like that that are

0:55:24.600 --> 0:55:26.879
<v Speaker 1>that ultimately you can't really check in on, like you're

0:55:26.880 --> 0:55:28.640
<v Speaker 1>just gonna have to take their word for it. Then

0:55:28.760 --> 0:55:31.719
<v Speaker 1>that kind of lie, yeah, you'll never find out, you know,

0:55:32.239 --> 0:55:34.879
<v Speaker 1>yeah exactly. Or I can't come into work today because

0:55:34.880 --> 0:55:36.719
<v Speaker 1>I'm sick, Well all right, I'm you know, we're not

0:55:36.760 --> 0:55:39.279
<v Speaker 1>going to ask for a doctor's note. You might be lying,

0:55:39.280 --> 0:55:41.680
<v Speaker 1>you might not, but it's just kind of a gimme

0:55:42.080 --> 0:55:44.719
<v Speaker 1>on that situation. Yeah, that's another reason that we're more

0:55:44.760 --> 0:55:48.239
<v Speaker 1>likely to be exposed to true statements generally, or at

0:55:48.320 --> 0:55:51.240
<v Speaker 1>least that were more likely to detect true statements generally,

0:55:51.560 --> 0:55:55.440
<v Speaker 1>because false statements are harder to verify, usually by design

0:55:55.480 --> 0:55:57.480
<v Speaker 1>of the person making them. So you're able to find

0:55:57.480 --> 0:56:00.200
<v Speaker 1>yourself in an environment that's mostly built out of uh

0:56:00.560 --> 0:56:05.440
<v Speaker 1>true statements and believable lies. Right, So, on this assumption,

0:56:06.120 --> 0:56:08.880
<v Speaker 1>you know you're you're in a hurry, and your brain

0:56:09.640 --> 0:56:13.000
<v Speaker 1>it is not designed to consume infinite energy. It wants

0:56:13.080 --> 0:56:15.360
<v Speaker 1>to try to be efficient. You don't have time to

0:56:15.440 --> 0:56:18.239
<v Speaker 1>evaluate all claims rigorously. I mean, even no matter how

0:56:18.360 --> 0:56:22.399
<v Speaker 1>skeptical you want to be, we can confirm this eventually.

0:56:22.520 --> 0:56:25.040
<v Speaker 1>You are just not going to have time to look

0:56:25.080 --> 0:56:27.480
<v Speaker 1>into everything you believe. You're just gonna have to take

0:56:27.520 --> 0:56:30.480
<v Speaker 1>somebody's word for it. It's not practical to try to

0:56:30.560 --> 0:56:34.080
<v Speaker 1>live by verifying every single belief. Oh yeah, I mean

0:56:34.120 --> 0:56:37.400
<v Speaker 1>it would. You've just got to have something firm underneath

0:56:37.440 --> 0:56:39.480
<v Speaker 1>your feet in order to proceed. Oh yeah, you've got

0:56:39.480 --> 0:56:41.480
<v Speaker 1>a bedrock. But then you've also got to have you

0:56:41.520 --> 0:56:43.800
<v Speaker 1>just I mean, you take somebody's word on where the

0:56:43.840 --> 0:56:47.719
<v Speaker 1>bathroom is, like, you're not gonna try to fact check them.

0:56:47.800 --> 0:56:49.719
<v Speaker 1>You know, well, I guess you will by trying to

0:56:49.719 --> 0:56:52.040
<v Speaker 1>go there. But other other things like that, mundane things

0:56:52.080 --> 0:56:54.520
<v Speaker 1>people tell you throughout the day, You're just gonna have

0:56:54.600 --> 0:56:57.959
<v Speaker 1>to believe them. There's just no, it doesn't make any

0:56:57.960 --> 0:57:00.560
<v Speaker 1>sense to try to verify all of it because you

0:57:00.600 --> 0:57:05.360
<v Speaker 1>don't have time. So therefore, an easy shortcut for assuming

0:57:05.400 --> 0:57:08.200
<v Speaker 1>that a statement is more likely true is have I

0:57:08.280 --> 0:57:12.520
<v Speaker 1>heard this statement before? Statements they get uttered more often

0:57:12.520 --> 0:57:16.560
<v Speaker 1>are more likely to be from that class of true statements. Okay,

0:57:16.640 --> 0:57:19.200
<v Speaker 1>I can roll with that. Now, there's another type of

0:57:19.240 --> 0:57:23.240
<v Speaker 1>parallel thinking that says, uh, that says, you know, also,

0:57:23.520 --> 0:57:26.480
<v Speaker 1>it's actually more difficult to disbelieve something than it is

0:57:26.480 --> 0:57:30.040
<v Speaker 1>to believe it, because and I don't know if this

0:57:30.120 --> 0:57:32.360
<v Speaker 1>is really confirmed or if this is just one theory

0:57:32.440 --> 0:57:35.240
<v Speaker 1>about how the information processing in the brain works. But

0:57:35.600 --> 0:57:39.440
<v Speaker 1>just as a quick tangent, there is a model of

0:57:39.480 --> 0:57:42.400
<v Speaker 1>thinking that says, Okay, to believe a statement is true,

0:57:42.520 --> 0:57:44.720
<v Speaker 1>To hear a statement and say I believe it is

0:57:44.760 --> 0:57:47.880
<v Speaker 1>just one step in the brain. To hear a statement

0:57:47.880 --> 0:57:50.880
<v Speaker 1>and reject it as false is a two step procedure

0:57:50.920 --> 0:57:53.440
<v Speaker 1>where first you have to hear it and believe it

0:57:53.520 --> 0:57:56.120
<v Speaker 1>to understand it, and then you have to go back

0:57:56.200 --> 0:57:59.040
<v Speaker 1>and revise what you just did and say, but it's

0:57:59.080 --> 0:58:02.200
<v Speaker 1>not true. Yeah. It's ultimately like a king setting down

0:58:02.440 --> 0:58:05.400
<v Speaker 1>at a banquet table, right, is the king to simply

0:58:06.000 --> 0:58:09.840
<v Speaker 1>eat every Uh? Every food item on the plate and

0:58:09.880 --> 0:58:11.840
<v Speaker 1>trust in it, and trust that he's not going to

0:58:11.920 --> 0:58:15.440
<v Speaker 1>be poisoned or is he going to independently test each thing.

0:58:15.600 --> 0:58:18.480
<v Speaker 1>Has the food taster come up, put the mid transfer

0:58:18.600 --> 0:58:21.840
<v Speaker 1>this gobblet of wine into the rhinoceros horn, etcetera. Hold

0:58:21.840 --> 0:58:24.640
<v Speaker 1>the magic crystal over this plate of beans. And you know,

0:58:24.680 --> 0:58:27.680
<v Speaker 1>another thing that came to mind was some of our

0:58:27.720 --> 0:58:30.840
<v Speaker 1>discussions we've had in the past about consciousness and imagination

0:58:30.880 --> 0:58:34.600
<v Speaker 1>as a simulation engine, that we use our imagination to

0:58:35.400 --> 0:58:40.440
<v Speaker 1>mentally simulate possible outcomes so that we can best choose

0:58:40.480 --> 0:58:42.760
<v Speaker 1>how we're going to react to the world. And when

0:58:42.760 --> 0:58:44.920
<v Speaker 1>I'm presented with something that might be a lie or

0:58:45.240 --> 0:58:47.840
<v Speaker 1>or of some sort of untruth or a bit of

0:58:47.840 --> 0:58:52.280
<v Speaker 1>of misinformation, I still can't help but imagine it, right,

0:58:52.320 --> 0:58:55.240
<v Speaker 1>I'm having to create a mental picture of it. Um

0:58:55.280 --> 0:58:58.760
<v Speaker 1>in a sense you're kind of believing it for the moment. Yeah, yeah,

0:58:58.800 --> 0:59:01.440
<v Speaker 1>because I have to simulated in my head. And in

0:59:01.760 --> 0:59:03.760
<v Speaker 1>cases of people who can form mental pictures, you have

0:59:03.800 --> 0:59:06.600
<v Speaker 1>to form those mental pictures. And uh, now you know,

0:59:06.600 --> 0:59:09.360
<v Speaker 1>and I imagine a lot of this what shakes out

0:59:09.360 --> 0:59:13.360
<v Speaker 1>after has to do with an individual's particular worldview. But

0:59:13.920 --> 0:59:16.560
<v Speaker 1>I wonder if in some cases it's like a type

0:59:16.560 --> 0:59:19.400
<v Speaker 1>one error in cognition, you know, it's a false positive.

0:59:19.880 --> 0:59:24.240
<v Speaker 1>Uh uh that uh, that I I'm imagining this is

0:59:24.280 --> 0:59:27.200
<v Speaker 1>a possible outcome, and then maybe I'm more inclined to

0:59:27.280 --> 0:59:29.720
<v Speaker 1>believe it just so that I can keep it from

0:59:29.760 --> 0:59:32.600
<v Speaker 1>harming me. Yeah. I think that's a very very reasonable

0:59:32.640 --> 0:59:35.280
<v Speaker 1>way of imagining it. But so here's where we get

0:59:35.320 --> 0:59:37.840
<v Speaker 1>into the final part of our discussion today, which is

0:59:37.880 --> 0:59:41.360
<v Speaker 1>the idea of what I mentioned a minute ago, processing fluency.

0:59:41.800 --> 0:59:45.280
<v Speaker 1>So processing fluency just means how easy it is to

0:59:45.400 --> 0:59:50.280
<v Speaker 1>process incoming information. And you wouldn't believe the research on

0:59:50.360 --> 0:59:53.560
<v Speaker 1>how many of our decisions and mental outcomes seem to

0:59:53.600 --> 0:59:56.880
<v Speaker 1>be based at least in part on processing fluency. The

0:59:57.000 --> 1:00:01.520
<v Speaker 1>brain really really likes things to be easy. It really

1:00:01.640 --> 1:00:04.440
<v Speaker 1>likes things to be to go smooth, to not be

1:00:04.520 --> 1:00:09.120
<v Speaker 1>too difficult. Uh So, to start off, based on existing research,

1:00:09.160 --> 1:00:12.000
<v Speaker 1>it definitely seems true that people have an easier time

1:00:12.520 --> 1:00:17.400
<v Speaker 1>processing statements and information they've heard before. In fact, Robert,

1:00:17.480 --> 1:00:20.680
<v Speaker 1>you probably know this from direct experience. Like a familiar

1:00:20.760 --> 1:00:23.600
<v Speaker 1>statement when used in the context of a sentence or

1:00:23.600 --> 1:00:27.920
<v Speaker 1>an argument, is processed quite smoothly, but a new, unfamiliar

1:00:28.120 --> 1:00:31.200
<v Speaker 1>statement in the same context often causes you to say, wait,

1:00:31.280 --> 1:00:33.000
<v Speaker 1>hold on, back up, I need to wrap my head

1:00:33.000 --> 1:00:38.040
<v Speaker 1>around this. Familiar is easy, unfamiliar is difficult. But how

1:00:38.040 --> 1:00:41.880
<v Speaker 1>would you test whether the ease of processing information we're

1:00:41.880 --> 1:00:45.760
<v Speaker 1>actually affecting our judgment of the truth of a statement.

1:00:46.200 --> 1:00:48.040
<v Speaker 1>And I want to get into a couple of quick,

1:00:48.120 --> 1:00:51.840
<v Speaker 1>really interesting studies on this that we're so simple and

1:00:51.880 --> 1:00:56.960
<v Speaker 1>so brilliant. So in Rayburn Schwartz did a study and

1:00:57.080 --> 1:01:01.320
<v Speaker 1>consciousness and cognition called Effects of perceptual Fluency on judgments

1:01:01.320 --> 1:01:04.400
<v Speaker 1>of truth, and they took true or false statements, kind

1:01:04.400 --> 1:01:06.480
<v Speaker 1>of like in the studies we've seen before of the

1:01:06.600 --> 1:01:10.200
<v Speaker 1>variety osorn no Is in Chile or Greenland has roughly

1:01:10.240 --> 1:01:14.200
<v Speaker 1>fifty inhabitants, and they presented those statements to people, and

1:01:14.240 --> 1:01:17.400
<v Speaker 1>the main independent variable was that they presented the statements

1:01:17.400 --> 1:01:21.160
<v Speaker 1>either against a white background, in a high contrast, easy

1:01:21.200 --> 1:01:24.520
<v Speaker 1>to read color, or in a low contrast, hard to

1:01:24.560 --> 1:01:27.920
<v Speaker 1>read color, And apparently that made all the difference in

1:01:27.920 --> 1:01:30.080
<v Speaker 1>the world. The idea is that the hard to read

1:01:30.160 --> 1:01:34.840
<v Speaker 1>one has low processing fluency, it's difficult, and the easy

1:01:34.880 --> 1:01:38.720
<v Speaker 1>to read one has high processing fluency. It's easy to process.

1:01:39.200 --> 1:01:41.720
<v Speaker 1>And they found that this made a big difference in

1:01:42.000 --> 1:01:46.120
<v Speaker 1>what people believed was true or false. Uh that quote.

1:01:46.280 --> 1:01:50.240
<v Speaker 1>Moderately visible statements were judged as true at chance level,

1:01:50.560 --> 1:01:54.520
<v Speaker 1>whereas highly visible statements were judged as true significantly above

1:01:54.640 --> 1:01:59.880
<v Speaker 1>chance level. We conclude the perceptual fluency affects judgments of truth.

1:02:00.400 --> 1:02:02.840
<v Speaker 1>This is another one that makes sense from a marketing standpoint, right,

1:02:02.880 --> 1:02:07.520
<v Speaker 1>just make your message very clear, very very easily absorbed,

1:02:07.720 --> 1:02:10.320
<v Speaker 1>and people will begin to buy into it. Oh. Absolutely,

1:02:10.360 --> 1:02:13.120
<v Speaker 1>And this has actually been studied in marketing and consumer

1:02:13.120 --> 1:02:16.640
<v Speaker 1>preference like there is one study from Novimski at All

1:02:16.720 --> 1:02:18.960
<v Speaker 1>published in two thousand seven in the Journal of Marketing

1:02:19.000 --> 1:02:22.360
<v Speaker 1>Research that in short, it found that consumers more often

1:02:22.400 --> 1:02:26.640
<v Speaker 1>tend to choose brands that represent ease and fluency. Like say,

1:02:26.680 --> 1:02:29.680
<v Speaker 1>if the information about a brand is easy to read,

1:02:29.960 --> 1:02:32.680
<v Speaker 1>consumers are more likely to choose that brand that's the

1:02:32.680 --> 1:02:35.040
<v Speaker 1>one they want. So that makes me wonder why Coca

1:02:35.040 --> 1:02:36.880
<v Speaker 1>cola is written in cursive. It's just like you would

1:02:36.920 --> 1:02:39.120
<v Speaker 1>want it just very clear, but old letters. Well, didn't

1:02:39.120 --> 1:02:42.000
<v Speaker 1>they try to change the can when agod I haven't

1:02:42.040 --> 1:02:46.080
<v Speaker 1>really looked at a can recently, maybe it's not incursive anymore,

1:02:46.200 --> 1:02:49.240
<v Speaker 1>you know, they're Actually you might have two things in conflict, right,

1:02:49.560 --> 1:02:52.200
<v Speaker 1>So you could have in conflict if you if you've

1:02:52.240 --> 1:02:55.000
<v Speaker 1>got an old logo that people are familiar with, but

1:02:55.040 --> 1:02:57.800
<v Speaker 1>it's hard to read, that the hard to read part

1:02:58.160 --> 1:03:01.280
<v Speaker 1>might be undercutting their preference for it, but the fact

1:03:01.280 --> 1:03:04.000
<v Speaker 1>that it's familiar might be boosting their preference for it.

1:03:04.000 --> 1:03:06.040
<v Speaker 1>If you try to change it to something that's easier

1:03:06.040 --> 1:03:10.280
<v Speaker 1>to read, the change might introduce more difficulty in processing

1:03:10.400 --> 1:03:13.680
<v Speaker 1>than the ease of reading would improve processing. Yeah, that

1:03:13.720 --> 1:03:15.680
<v Speaker 1>makes sense, all right, So I want to cite one

1:03:15.680 --> 1:03:18.480
<v Speaker 1>more study, a study by Christian uncle Bach in two

1:03:18.520 --> 1:03:22.840
<v Speaker 1>thousand seven from the Journal of Experimental Psychology, Learning, Memory,

1:03:22.840 --> 1:03:26.920
<v Speaker 1>and Cognition. And uncle Bach does an interesting thing in

1:03:26.920 --> 1:03:30.040
<v Speaker 1>the study where he's got a hypothesis he wants to test.

1:03:30.120 --> 1:03:34.400
<v Speaker 1>He writes, quote, I argue that experienced fluency is used

1:03:34.440 --> 1:03:36.960
<v Speaker 1>as a que in judgments of truth according to the

1:03:37.040 --> 1:03:43.240
<v Speaker 1>cues ecological validity, meaning like successfulness in the real world. Quote.

1:03:43.640 --> 1:03:46.840
<v Speaker 1>That is, the truth effect occurs because repetition leads to

1:03:47.000 --> 1:03:50.640
<v Speaker 1>more fluent processing of a statement, and people have learned

1:03:50.960 --> 1:03:55.040
<v Speaker 1>that the experience of processing fluency correlates positively with the

1:03:55.080 --> 1:03:57.440
<v Speaker 1>truth of a statement. So this is sort of what

1:03:57.440 --> 1:04:00.080
<v Speaker 1>we were talking about earlier. It's a heuristic that you know,

1:04:00.160 --> 1:04:02.720
<v Speaker 1>you're more likely to encounter true statements in the wild.

1:04:03.080 --> 1:04:07.360
<v Speaker 1>People learn this through experience, and then they use the

1:04:07.360 --> 1:04:11.800
<v Speaker 1>the the queue of processing fluency to to be the

1:04:11.920 --> 1:04:15.280
<v Speaker 1>judge of whether something is familiar or not. And if

1:04:15.320 --> 1:04:19.439
<v Speaker 1>it's familiar and they get that processing fluency bump it's

1:04:19.440 --> 1:04:22.200
<v Speaker 1>easy to process, then they're more likely to believe it's

1:04:22.200 --> 1:04:24.760
<v Speaker 1>true because that's what has worked for them in the past.

1:04:25.200 --> 1:04:27.640
<v Speaker 1>And if this is true, Uncle Box says, I bet

1:04:27.720 --> 1:04:29.760
<v Speaker 1>I could reverse it with a little bit of training,

1:04:30.280 --> 1:04:33.080
<v Speaker 1>and he does. He's got an experiment where with a

1:04:33.120 --> 1:04:37.040
<v Speaker 1>training phase he actually does three different experiments, and essentially

1:04:37.040 --> 1:04:40.000
<v Speaker 1>what he does is that he trains people in a

1:04:40.040 --> 1:04:43.560
<v Speaker 1>scenario where things that are easier to process, either because

1:04:43.720 --> 1:04:47.640
<v Speaker 1>of being easier to read or because of repetition and familiarity.

1:04:47.960 --> 1:04:51.360
<v Speaker 1>Either way, those things are more correlated with the thing

1:04:51.520 --> 1:04:54.560
<v Speaker 1>with the thing being false, and when people get trained

1:04:54.600 --> 1:04:57.920
<v Speaker 1>in sessions like that, they lose the effect. So the

1:04:58.480 --> 1:05:00.600
<v Speaker 1>good takeaway there is that if he's correct, it would

1:05:00.600 --> 1:05:03.720
<v Speaker 1>probably also mean that your susceptibility to the lusory truth

1:05:03.760 --> 1:05:07.320
<v Speaker 1>effect is dependent on what kind of environment you've trained in,

1:05:07.400 --> 1:05:11.520
<v Speaker 1>and that you could potentially untrain yourself on it. But

1:05:11.600 --> 1:05:13.480
<v Speaker 1>that would be hard to do because we all live

1:05:13.520 --> 1:05:15.200
<v Speaker 1>in this world all the time where most of the

1:05:15.200 --> 1:05:18.000
<v Speaker 1>time people are telling us true things, right, and and again,

1:05:18.040 --> 1:05:20.040
<v Speaker 1>the brain is still going to need all of these

1:05:20.080 --> 1:05:23.480
<v Speaker 1>shortcuts in order to function properly. Yeah, exactly, But you

1:05:23.520 --> 1:05:26.120
<v Speaker 1>could just be using the opposite shortcut, Like if you

1:05:26.200 --> 1:05:28.240
<v Speaker 1>live in a world where people lie to you all

1:05:28.320 --> 1:05:31.320
<v Speaker 1>the time. Uncle Bock's results here would suggest that you

1:05:31.320 --> 1:05:34.160
<v Speaker 1>would eventually adapt to this, and you would instead become

1:05:34.200 --> 1:05:37.080
<v Speaker 1>exactly the opposite. New claims you've never heard before would

1:05:37.080 --> 1:05:39.520
<v Speaker 1>seem more true to you, and repeated claims that you're

1:05:39.520 --> 1:05:42.080
<v Speaker 1>familiar with would seem like lies to you. Okay, so

1:05:42.120 --> 1:05:44.880
<v Speaker 1>there's hopeful us after all. Yeah, I mean, but we

1:05:44.920 --> 1:05:46.600
<v Speaker 1>can't expect to live in a world like that, and

1:05:46.640 --> 1:05:48.400
<v Speaker 1>we don't want to live in a world like like

1:05:48.400 --> 1:05:50.560
<v Speaker 1>like that, Like you don't want to train your brain

1:05:51.040 --> 1:05:53.800
<v Speaker 1>to live in a world where everything is assumed to

1:05:53.840 --> 1:05:58.640
<v Speaker 1>be a lie. And make surely somebody has has considered

1:05:58.640 --> 1:06:02.200
<v Speaker 1>exploring this in fiction. Yeah, it would be it would

1:06:02.240 --> 1:06:04.040
<v Speaker 1>be a delicate affair to to really put it together

1:06:04.040 --> 1:06:06.640
<v Speaker 1>and make it work on paper. But it's a world

1:06:06.640 --> 1:06:08.040
<v Speaker 1>that I don't want to live in, but I kind

1:06:08.040 --> 1:06:10.680
<v Speaker 1>of want to visit fictionally. Oh yeah, i'd go there

1:06:10.720 --> 1:06:12.520
<v Speaker 1>with you. That that's a good one to to come

1:06:12.560 --> 1:06:15.120
<v Speaker 1>back to. But just as a quick note before we

1:06:15.160 --> 1:06:18.760
<v Speaker 1>close out today, I think this idea of processing fluency

1:06:18.840 --> 1:06:22.600
<v Speaker 1>is a really interesting one. There's tons of research on it, Like, uh,

1:06:22.640 --> 1:06:27.560
<v Speaker 1>there is a study I found by Sasha Topalinski fromen

1:06:27.560 --> 1:06:31.120
<v Speaker 1>in Cognition and Emotion about how processing fluency affects how

1:06:31.160 --> 1:06:34.600
<v Speaker 1>funny we find jokes that apparently if a joke is

1:06:34.640 --> 1:06:38.240
<v Speaker 1>easier to process, we've got high processing fluency on the joke,

1:06:38.680 --> 1:06:41.200
<v Speaker 1>we think it's funnier. I guess it just like feels

1:06:41.200 --> 1:06:44.000
<v Speaker 1>good to get it without with less effort or something.

1:06:44.640 --> 1:06:48.760
<v Speaker 1>Uh So there were multiple experiments, but basically here, let

1:06:48.760 --> 1:06:50.280
<v Speaker 1>me let me give you a quick preview. I'm gonna

1:06:50.280 --> 1:06:53.440
<v Speaker 1>say a word, Robert, peanuts. Do you like that word

1:06:53.440 --> 1:06:56.760
<v Speaker 1>when you think about it? Peanuts? Peanuts? It's pretty good.

1:06:56.840 --> 1:06:59.520
<v Speaker 1>It's it's not the funniest, where's no cheese, but but

1:06:59.680 --> 1:07:01.520
<v Speaker 1>but I like it Okay, I just said that word.

1:07:01.600 --> 1:07:04.040
<v Speaker 1>So one example of this type of study would be

1:07:04.240 --> 1:07:07.760
<v Speaker 1>if you prime somebody with significant nouns from the punch

1:07:07.840 --> 1:07:10.760
<v Speaker 1>line of a joke fifteen minutes or even up to

1:07:11.000 --> 1:07:14.080
<v Speaker 1>just one minute before you tell them the joke, people

1:07:14.160 --> 1:07:18.320
<v Speaker 1>find the joke more hilarious. However, if you tell them

1:07:18.360 --> 1:07:21.720
<v Speaker 1>a significant noun from the punch line immediately before the joke,

1:07:21.800 --> 1:07:23.880
<v Speaker 1>they find the joke less funny, and the authors think

1:07:23.920 --> 1:07:26.080
<v Speaker 1>this is probably just or the author thinks this is

1:07:26.120 --> 1:07:28.680
<v Speaker 1>because if you tell them right before the joke, it

1:07:28.800 --> 1:07:35.200
<v Speaker 1>sort of spoils the punch line. But knock, knock, who's there? Cash? Cash? Who? No? Thanks?

1:07:35.200 --> 1:07:39.280
<v Speaker 1>I prefer peanuts. Ah see, it works. It's not even aigg,

1:07:39.720 --> 1:07:42.960
<v Speaker 1>not even but you already established peanuts, so it helped, right.

1:07:43.160 --> 1:07:45.280
<v Speaker 1>I tried to let a minute or so elapse there.

1:07:45.880 --> 1:07:48.120
<v Speaker 1>I don't know if it worked well. It's also complicated

1:07:48.120 --> 1:07:50.280
<v Speaker 1>because we did bring up peanuts and peanut better earlier

1:07:50.280 --> 1:07:52.720
<v Speaker 1>in the episode. I didn't even think about that, but

1:07:52.960 --> 1:07:56.320
<v Speaker 1>this actually I am not a student of stand up

1:07:56.360 --> 1:08:00.320
<v Speaker 1>comedy by any stretch of the imagination, but I watching

1:08:00.400 --> 1:08:02.960
<v Speaker 1>us stand up to see that just that that common

1:08:03.080 --> 1:08:05.640
<v Speaker 1>structural tool that they use where you have the call

1:08:05.720 --> 1:08:08.320
<v Speaker 1>back to a previous joke, and they'll often do it

1:08:08.680 --> 1:08:10.520
<v Speaker 1>right at the end and then it's good night everybody.

1:08:10.600 --> 1:08:13.760
<v Speaker 1>That's the high note. And it it's not even necessarily

1:08:14.000 --> 1:08:17.439
<v Speaker 1>like a call back to their to the funniest moment

1:08:17.479 --> 1:08:19.400
<v Speaker 1>in the bit or the funniest bit in the in

1:08:19.640 --> 1:08:22.120
<v Speaker 1>the stand up performance, but just the fact that they've

1:08:22.439 --> 1:08:26.439
<v Speaker 1>brought your mind back to it. Yeah, it generates laughter,

1:08:26.560 --> 1:08:28.800
<v Speaker 1>and it's the moment to end the show on. Yeah.

1:08:28.840 --> 1:08:32.400
<v Speaker 1>The theory is that it's it's very satisfying to have

1:08:32.479 --> 1:08:35.280
<v Speaker 1>a joke that you've where you've been primed for the

1:08:35.320 --> 1:08:39.120
<v Speaker 1>punch line already, because it's so much easier to get

1:08:39.160 --> 1:08:42.720
<v Speaker 1>the punchline quickly and have that experience of familiarity in

1:08:42.760 --> 1:08:45.719
<v Speaker 1>the yaha movement moment because when you say a word

1:08:46.080 --> 1:08:48.280
<v Speaker 1>and then you say the word again later, the second

1:08:48.280 --> 1:08:50.720
<v Speaker 1>time you hear the word, you've been primed, like you know,

1:08:50.760 --> 1:08:53.400
<v Speaker 1>it's more fluid. So Yeah, I think that may very

1:08:53.400 --> 1:08:56.160
<v Speaker 1>well be going on with callbacks. Another part of the

1:08:56.200 --> 1:08:59.160
<v Speaker 1>same study was that, like the studies we've been seeing before,

1:08:59.240 --> 1:09:02.200
<v Speaker 1>jokes presented in an easy to read font were rated

1:09:02.240 --> 1:09:04.880
<v Speaker 1>as funnier than jokes presented in a really hard to

1:09:04.880 --> 1:09:08.759
<v Speaker 1>read font that's kind of not surprising, but processing fluency

1:09:08.880 --> 1:09:11.479
<v Speaker 1>it plays into all this stuff like there is research

1:09:11.520 --> 1:09:16.439
<v Speaker 1>about how opinions that are repeated more often, even just

1:09:16.560 --> 1:09:19.679
<v Speaker 1>by a single person in a group, come to seem

1:09:19.720 --> 1:09:22.080
<v Speaker 1>more prevalent in a group. So you've got ten people

1:09:22.080 --> 1:09:24.680
<v Speaker 1>standing around, then you've just got Jeff over here, and

1:09:24.760 --> 1:09:27.679
<v Speaker 1>Jeff keeps saying the same opinion over and over again,

1:09:27.720 --> 1:09:30.439
<v Speaker 1>even if you're aware it's just Jeff saying it in

1:09:30.479 --> 1:09:32.760
<v Speaker 1>the end, if he does that, you will think that

1:09:32.760 --> 1:09:36.000
<v Speaker 1>that opinion is more prevalent in the entire group the

1:09:36.080 --> 1:09:38.400
<v Speaker 1>more people hold it. Well, that would make sense. You

1:09:38.439 --> 1:09:41.160
<v Speaker 1>have one person in a group who say continually trashes

1:09:41.240 --> 1:09:44.120
<v Speaker 1>on the movie Aliens. Oh no, why would that happen?

1:09:44.120 --> 1:09:45.760
<v Speaker 1>I don't know, but let's say it it happens. You know,

1:09:45.800 --> 1:09:47.320
<v Speaker 1>I could see where it could reach the point where

1:09:47.360 --> 1:09:48.760
<v Speaker 1>you're kind of like, I don't really know how I

1:09:48.760 --> 1:09:51.240
<v Speaker 1>feel about Aliens now, because I sure do here here

1:09:51.320 --> 1:09:54.640
<v Speaker 1>Jeff uh talking trash about it all the time. Or

1:09:54.760 --> 1:09:56.880
<v Speaker 1>you could walk away from it being like, man, I

1:09:56.880 --> 1:09:59.840
<v Speaker 1>don't understand all these people who hate Aliens, even though

1:09:59.880 --> 1:10:02.439
<v Speaker 1>it's just one person. Yeah, that that seems to be

1:10:02.479 --> 1:10:05.120
<v Speaker 1>something that would go on. Processing fluency also appears to

1:10:05.160 --> 1:10:07.559
<v Speaker 1>have something to do with aesthetic pleasure. There's been a

1:10:07.560 --> 1:10:10.760
<v Speaker 1>lot of research and theory about this that that's a

1:10:10.800 --> 1:10:14.920
<v Speaker 1>major component of what feels aesthetically pleasing to us is

1:10:14.960 --> 1:10:19.040
<v Speaker 1>based on what's easy to process. Another part is that

1:10:19.120 --> 1:10:22.599
<v Speaker 1>processing fluencing fluency apparently affects how credible a face looks.

1:10:23.439 --> 1:10:26.040
<v Speaker 1>So if are you going to believe somebody, well, it

1:10:26.080 --> 1:10:29.320
<v Speaker 1>turns out if their face is easier to process, especially

1:10:29.320 --> 1:10:31.800
<v Speaker 1>because you've seen it a bunch of times before, you're

1:10:31.840 --> 1:10:33.880
<v Speaker 1>more likely to believe it. Even if they're not famous

1:10:33.920 --> 1:10:36.439
<v Speaker 1>and they're not somebody you know, they're not like somebody

1:10:36.439 --> 1:10:39.320
<v Speaker 1>you've had experience with that you can you know, judge

1:10:39.360 --> 1:10:42.639
<v Speaker 1>their credibility just random faces shown to you in different

1:10:42.640 --> 1:10:45.280
<v Speaker 1>sessions of an experiment. If you've seen them before, they're

1:10:45.280 --> 1:10:48.600
<v Speaker 1>more credible. Of course, that reminds me of various experiments

1:10:49.040 --> 1:10:52.559
<v Speaker 1>over the years involving the believability of people with beards.

1:10:52.880 --> 1:10:56.960
<v Speaker 1>People with facial hair or beards harder to process. They

1:10:57.080 --> 1:10:59.040
<v Speaker 1>have I have not looked into it recently, so I

1:10:59.040 --> 1:11:01.760
<v Speaker 1>don't know if there any are recent studies that that

1:11:01.840 --> 1:11:04.200
<v Speaker 1>the crack this nut. But but there there have been

1:11:04.200 --> 1:11:05.880
<v Speaker 1>studies that have looked in the past where they make

1:11:05.880 --> 1:11:08.439
<v Speaker 1>the argument that, yes, an individual with a beard, you're

1:11:08.479 --> 1:11:11.120
<v Speaker 1>going to have a little more distrust towards them. Well,

1:11:11.160 --> 1:11:13.920
<v Speaker 1>obviously nobody should trust me. Well, no, we trust you

1:11:13.960 --> 1:11:17.320
<v Speaker 1>because we know you. Joe. Yeah, do you really? Do

1:11:17.360 --> 1:11:19.639
<v Speaker 1>you ever really know someone? Well, I'll tell you one

1:11:19.640 --> 1:11:23.400
<v Speaker 1>thing I know, and that's peanuts stuff. You got me,

1:11:23.520 --> 1:11:25.320
<v Speaker 1>You got me there, you made me laugh and my

1:11:25.439 --> 1:11:29.280
<v Speaker 1>joke didn't make you. Okay, Okay, So we gotta wrap

1:11:29.360 --> 1:11:31.960
<v Speaker 1>up there. We've gone long here, but so we'll be

1:11:32.000 --> 1:11:34.679
<v Speaker 1>back in the next episode to explore more recent findings

1:11:34.720 --> 1:11:37.000
<v Speaker 1>and some of the ways that the illusory truth effect

1:11:37.040 --> 1:11:41.559
<v Speaker 1>really does matter in our in our political and social world. Um,

1:11:41.600 --> 1:11:44.439
<v Speaker 1>but so main takeaways I would say today is that

1:11:44.720 --> 1:11:48.479
<v Speaker 1>the illusory truth effect is real. Exposure and repetition really

1:11:48.520 --> 1:11:52.080
<v Speaker 1>does change our beliefs. The illusory truth effect is small,

1:11:52.600 --> 1:11:56.759
<v Speaker 1>meaning it doesn't automatically overwhelm other criteria in our decision

1:11:56.800 --> 1:11:59.599
<v Speaker 1>making and judgment. In fact, in many cases it appears

1:11:59.600 --> 1:12:02.439
<v Speaker 1>that there are not a statement is actually true is

1:12:02.520 --> 1:12:04.880
<v Speaker 1>more important to our judgment than whether or not it's

1:12:04.920 --> 1:12:07.519
<v Speaker 1>repeated or made easier to read, or any of these

1:12:07.520 --> 1:12:12.240
<v Speaker 1>other processing fluency boosts. But on average, over lots of repetitions,

1:12:12.240 --> 1:12:14.240
<v Speaker 1>it's easy to see how this could have a big effect,

1:12:14.320 --> 1:12:17.320
<v Speaker 1>especially when you bring it back to propaganda purposes on

1:12:17.640 --> 1:12:20.759
<v Speaker 1>things we believe as a society, things that shift voting

1:12:20.800 --> 1:12:24.200
<v Speaker 1>patterns in small but significant ways, and stuff like that. Yeah,

1:12:24.200 --> 1:12:26.760
<v Speaker 1>that's the key. That it's not occurring within a vacuum.

1:12:27.080 --> 1:12:30.080
<v Speaker 1>It's uh, it's it's it's affecting and being affected by

1:12:30.080 --> 1:12:34.920
<v Speaker 1>all these other um mental processes and factors that are

1:12:34.960 --> 1:12:38.679
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