1 00:00:02,500 --> 00:00:06,080 Speaker 1: Happy Saturday. Today, at least on the day this episode 2 00:00:06,120 --> 00:00:09,760 Speaker 1: is publishing, is the anniversary of a nuclear close call 3 00:00:09,800 --> 00:00:14,090 Speaker 1: that happened in 1983 when an early warning system falsely 4 00:00:14,170 --> 00:00:18,810 Speaker 1: showed five U.S. missiles headed toward the Soviet Union. We 5 00:00:18,829 --> 00:00:22,200 Speaker 1: talked about this in our episode on nuclear close calls, 6 00:00:22,300 --> 00:00:25,319 Speaker 1: which is today's Saturday classic. It originally came out on 7 00:00:25,500 --> 00:00:30,810 Speaker 1: April 10th, 2017. September 26th is also now observed as 8 00:00:30,850 --> 00:00:34,850 Speaker 1: the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, 9 00:00:35,210 --> 00:00:38,269 Speaker 1: which was established by the United Nations in 2013. This 10 00:00:39,090 --> 00:00:45,460 Speaker 1: episode's a little stressful, but enjoy. Welcome to Stuff You 11 00:00:45,500 --> 00:00:56,050 Speaker 1: Missed in History Class, a production of iHeartRadio. Music Hello 12 00:00:56,130 --> 00:00:59,010 Speaker 1: and welcome to the podcast. I'm Tracy B. Wilson. And 13 00:00:59,070 --> 00:01:02,590 Speaker 1: I'm Holly Frey. Not long ago, I went to the 14 00:01:02,670 --> 00:01:06,289 Speaker 1: Maritime Museum in San Diego, California, which if you like 15 00:01:06,350 --> 00:01:09,649 Speaker 1: boats and ships and maritime history, it's worth a stop. 16 00:01:10,470 --> 00:01:13,610 Speaker 1: It's also right down the road from the USS Midway Museum. 17 00:01:13,830 --> 00:01:16,170 Speaker 1: So if you would like some military history and some 18 00:01:16,209 --> 00:01:18,890 Speaker 1: maritime history all together, like you can just spend a 19 00:01:18,890 --> 00:01:21,910 Speaker 1: whole day out there. Um, Don't do what I did 20 00:01:21,950 --> 00:01:24,390 Speaker 1: and lose your camera, though. If anyone saw my camera 21 00:01:24,550 --> 00:01:28,250 Speaker 1: in San Diego, let me know. Yeah, I think I 22 00:01:28,300 --> 00:01:30,310 Speaker 1: have the last known photo from that camera because you 23 00:01:30,330 --> 00:01:32,540 Speaker 1: texted it to me from the museum. Oh, I took 24 00:01:32,560 --> 00:01:35,679 Speaker 1: that from my iPhone. Fortunately, I didn't lose my phone. 25 00:01:35,720 --> 00:01:40,759 Speaker 1: I only lost my point-and-shoot camera. Anyway, the actual point is... 26 00:01:41,830 --> 00:01:45,770 Speaker 1: Among the many seafaring vessels at the Maritime Museum is 27 00:01:45,810 --> 00:01:50,860 Speaker 1: this Soviet Foxtrot-class submarine, which is home to an exhibit 28 00:01:50,920 --> 00:01:54,400 Speaker 1: about a really harrowing incident I had never heard about before. 29 00:01:54,420 --> 00:01:58,780 Speaker 1: It was one of the surprisingly many moments in history 30 00:01:58,860 --> 00:02:02,440 Speaker 1: when the world came perilously close to a full-scale nuclear war. 31 00:02:03,710 --> 00:02:06,210 Speaker 1: And I did not actually know there were that many 32 00:02:06,730 --> 00:02:09,940 Speaker 1: That's surprisingly many incidents until I started looking into it 33 00:02:09,980 --> 00:02:11,859 Speaker 1: for this episode today. So today we are just going 34 00:02:11,880 --> 00:02:15,139 Speaker 1: to look at three of them, including the one I 35 00:02:15,180 --> 00:02:18,820 Speaker 1: learned about in San Diego, which inspired today's show. The 36 00:02:18,900 --> 00:02:22,470 Speaker 1: incident aboard Soviet submarine B-59 is tangled up with the 37 00:02:22,500 --> 00:02:25,490 Speaker 1: Cuban Missile Crisis and the nuclear arms race between the 38 00:02:25,570 --> 00:02:28,930 Speaker 1: United States and the Soviet Union. With the help of 39 00:02:28,990 --> 00:02:32,829 Speaker 1: its allies, the United States developed the first nuclear weapons 40 00:02:32,950 --> 00:02:36,970 Speaker 1: through the Manhattan Project. Among the weapons the Manhattan Project 41 00:02:37,030 --> 00:02:40,550 Speaker 1: produced were the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 42 00:02:40,590 --> 00:02:44,590 Speaker 1: Japan in 1945. Not long after World War II, the 43 00:02:44,650 --> 00:02:48,890 Speaker 1: Soviet Union successfully detonated its own nuclear bomb, and soon 44 00:02:48,930 --> 00:02:51,390 Speaker 1: the United States and the Soviet Union were locked in 45 00:02:51,430 --> 00:02:55,010 Speaker 1: a Cold War and a nuclear arms race. Both nations 46 00:02:55,050 --> 00:02:59,630 Speaker 1: were simultaneously building more nuclear weapons and developing more powerful 47 00:02:59,690 --> 00:03:03,389 Speaker 1: weapons that were able to travel greater distances and deliver 48 00:03:03,490 --> 00:03:07,150 Speaker 1: bigger payloads. The Cuban Missile Crisis grew out of this 49 00:03:07,210 --> 00:03:11,270 Speaker 1: Cold War and arms race. In July of 1962, the 50 00:03:11,330 --> 00:03:14,740 Speaker 1: Soviet Union reached an agreement with Cuba to install several 51 00:03:14,790 --> 00:03:18,799 Speaker 1: missiles there. The negotiation and the transportation of missiles to 52 00:03:18,840 --> 00:03:22,100 Speaker 1: Cuba were conducted in secret, but the U.S. learned about 53 00:03:22,139 --> 00:03:27,670 Speaker 1: it through aerial surveillance photography on October 14, 1962. Those 54 00:03:27,690 --> 00:03:30,250 Speaker 1: photographs were delivered to the White House the next day. 55 00:03:31,850 --> 00:03:35,220 Speaker 1: At this point, the United States nuclear arsenal was far, 56 00:03:35,440 --> 00:03:38,600 Speaker 1: far bigger and more powerful than the Soviet Union's. And 57 00:03:38,620 --> 00:03:41,860 Speaker 1: the United States also already had missiles stationed in Turkey 58 00:03:42,140 --> 00:03:45,580 Speaker 1: in easy reach of Soviet territory. But with the placement 59 00:03:45,620 --> 00:03:48,720 Speaker 1: of missiles in Cuba for the first time, the Soviet 60 00:03:48,840 --> 00:03:52,840 Speaker 1: Union also had missiles in easy reach of American territory. 61 00:03:53,240 --> 00:03:56,080 Speaker 1: Even though the Soviets insisted that the missiles were only 62 00:03:56,180 --> 00:03:59,220 Speaker 1: in Cuba as a defensive measure, This was a move 63 00:03:59,280 --> 00:04:03,800 Speaker 1: that was both intended and interpreted as a threat. For 64 00:04:03,840 --> 00:04:06,750 Speaker 1: a few days, news of the missile installation was also 65 00:04:06,830 --> 00:04:10,670 Speaker 1: kept secret from the general public. But on October 22nd, 66 00:04:10,910 --> 00:04:15,110 Speaker 1: President John F. Kennedy gave a televised address, giving Americans 67 00:04:15,170 --> 00:04:18,880 Speaker 1: a detailed description of the missile sites being built. He 68 00:04:18,920 --> 00:04:23,060 Speaker 1: called Soviets' placement of missiles in Cuba a, quote, clandestine, reckless, 69 00:04:23,140 --> 00:04:26,940 Speaker 1: and provocative threat. And he announced a naval quarantine around 70 00:04:27,000 --> 00:04:30,820 Speaker 1: Cuba to prohibit the delivery of any further materials or weapons. 71 00:04:31,650 --> 00:04:35,610 Speaker 1: This quarantine really goes in air quotes. It was a blockade. 72 00:04:36,230 --> 00:04:39,130 Speaker 1: But calling it a blockade would have presumed a state 73 00:04:39,180 --> 00:04:42,500 Speaker 1: of war. So they chose the word quarantine to be 74 00:04:42,680 --> 00:04:46,900 Speaker 1: nicer about it. Kennedy also wrote to Nikita Khrushchev, the 75 00:04:46,980 --> 00:04:50,140 Speaker 1: first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party 76 00:04:50,160 --> 00:04:53,060 Speaker 1: of the Soviet Union, basically the leader of the Soviet Union, 77 00:04:53,260 --> 00:04:56,039 Speaker 1: to say that the United States would not tolerate the 78 00:04:56,080 --> 00:05:00,310 Speaker 1: presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba. He also spelled out 79 00:05:00,370 --> 00:05:04,450 Speaker 1: that any nuclear attack on any nation launched from Cuba 80 00:05:04,510 --> 00:05:07,330 Speaker 1: would be viewed as a Soviet attack on the United 81 00:05:07,370 --> 00:05:11,330 Speaker 1: States and the United States would retaliate in kind. Khrushchev, 82 00:05:11,350 --> 00:05:13,830 Speaker 1: for his part, insisted that these missiles were just being 83 00:05:13,890 --> 00:05:18,600 Speaker 1: placed there to defend Cuba from attack. For the whole 84 00:05:18,800 --> 00:05:21,820 Speaker 1: of the 13 days of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the 85 00:05:21,900 --> 00:05:25,080 Speaker 1: United States and the Soviet Union were in an incredibly 86 00:05:25,180 --> 00:05:28,610 Speaker 1: tense stalemate, with the U.S. demanding that the Soviet Union 87 00:05:28,670 --> 00:05:31,930 Speaker 1: remove the missiles and the Soviet Union both refusing and 88 00:05:32,029 --> 00:05:35,990 Speaker 1: continuing construction on the missile sites. And on October 27th, 89 00:05:36,589 --> 00:05:41,030 Speaker 1: things were particularly bad. The U.S. had been at DEFCON 90 00:05:41,029 --> 00:05:43,349 Speaker 1: 2 with the armed forces ready to launch an all-out 91 00:05:43,410 --> 00:05:47,310 Speaker 1: nuclear war for three days. And then that day, an 92 00:05:47,360 --> 00:05:50,560 Speaker 1: American U-2 spy plane was shot down by a Russian 93 00:05:50,720 --> 00:05:55,380 Speaker 1: missile over Cuba and its pilot, Major Rudolph Anderson, was killed. 94 00:05:56,460 --> 00:05:59,860 Speaker 1: So the prevailing description of the Cuban Missile Crisis is 95 00:05:59,900 --> 00:06:02,669 Speaker 1: that for this entire time, the world was on the 96 00:06:02,690 --> 00:06:06,440 Speaker 1: brink of a nuclear war. But there was also this 97 00:06:06,700 --> 00:06:08,960 Speaker 1: other element of it going on that wasn't known about 98 00:06:09,000 --> 00:06:12,540 Speaker 1: until much later. There were four Soviet submarines, each of 99 00:06:12,620 --> 00:06:16,580 Speaker 1: them with a nuclear-tipped torpedo among their armaments, and they 100 00:06:16,600 --> 00:06:19,169 Speaker 1: were en route to Cuba as part of a submarine 101 00:06:19,250 --> 00:06:21,650 Speaker 1: force that was going to be stationed there. These were 102 00:06:21,790 --> 00:06:25,289 Speaker 1: all Foxtrot-class submarines, and they were powered by a combination 103 00:06:25,330 --> 00:06:29,190 Speaker 1: of diesel and battery power. While they were submerged, they 104 00:06:29,230 --> 00:06:31,390 Speaker 1: ran on their batteries, and then they had to return 105 00:06:31,430 --> 00:06:35,849 Speaker 1: to the surface periodically to get recharged. Soviet navigators were 106 00:06:35,910 --> 00:06:39,810 Speaker 1: exceptionally skilled at using the varying temperatures of the ocean 107 00:06:39,880 --> 00:06:45,020 Speaker 1: depths to avoid detection on radar. But without periodically recharging 108 00:06:45,060 --> 00:06:47,410 Speaker 1: the batteries on the surface where they were much more 109 00:06:47,529 --> 00:06:51,690 Speaker 1: easy to spot, they could not stay underwater. Their last 110 00:06:51,770 --> 00:06:55,090 Speaker 1: instruction from Moscow had been to hold position not far 111 00:06:55,130 --> 00:06:59,890 Speaker 1: from Cuba, but they'd since lost contact. And the vessels themselves, 112 00:06:59,970 --> 00:07:02,910 Speaker 1: built for use in colder waters, were not tolerating the 113 00:07:02,950 --> 00:07:06,670 Speaker 1: warmer ocean near Cuba very well. The air conditioning failed, 114 00:07:07,029 --> 00:07:09,550 Speaker 1: and the temperatures in the subs started to rise well 115 00:07:09,610 --> 00:07:13,250 Speaker 1: above 100 degrees. To make matters worse, they were running 116 00:07:13,310 --> 00:07:16,110 Speaker 1: out of food and water. And since they'd lost contact 117 00:07:16,150 --> 00:07:18,770 Speaker 1: with Moscow, their only way of finding out what was 118 00:07:18,830 --> 00:07:21,860 Speaker 1: happening and whether the United States and the Soviet Union 119 00:07:21,890 --> 00:07:24,960 Speaker 1: had gone to war was to listen to a civilian 120 00:07:25,040 --> 00:07:30,000 Speaker 1: radio broadcast from Miami. On the 27th of October, a 121 00:07:30,080 --> 00:07:32,920 Speaker 1: spotter plane caught a glimpse of one of the submarines 122 00:07:33,000 --> 00:07:35,820 Speaker 1: near the surface of the ocean. And late that afternoon, 123 00:07:36,260 --> 00:07:39,600 Speaker 1: American reconnaissance had detected the presence of at least three 124 00:07:39,760 --> 00:07:43,410 Speaker 1: Soviet submarines near Cuba. Ships that were in the area 125 00:07:43,490 --> 00:07:45,770 Speaker 1: as part of the quarantine started to try to get 126 00:07:45,870 --> 00:07:49,550 Speaker 1: the submarines to the surface by dropping signaling charges into 127 00:07:49,570 --> 00:07:53,670 Speaker 1: the ocean. There's a little bit of discrepancy in accounts 128 00:07:53,790 --> 00:07:56,190 Speaker 1: among the people who were actually there. Some of them 129 00:07:56,270 --> 00:08:00,450 Speaker 1: say that dropping four or five loud but non-damaging charges 130 00:08:00,590 --> 00:08:05,190 Speaker 1: was an official signal to surface. But others say that 131 00:08:05,210 --> 00:08:09,540 Speaker 1: they were intentionally dropping these charges to harass the submerged 132 00:08:09,660 --> 00:08:12,860 Speaker 1: submarines in the hope of basically forcing them up to 133 00:08:12,880 --> 00:08:17,500 Speaker 1: the surface. Aboard the B-59, though, the Soviets had no 134 00:08:17,620 --> 00:08:20,540 Speaker 1: idea what was going on. They had not gotten new 135 00:08:20,600 --> 00:08:22,890 Speaker 1: orders from Moscow in more than a week, and they 136 00:08:22,930 --> 00:08:28,450 Speaker 1: were overheated, dehydrated, and exhausted. As battery power failed, life 137 00:08:28,490 --> 00:08:31,510 Speaker 1: support systems did as well, and the air aboard had 138 00:08:31,590 --> 00:08:35,090 Speaker 1: less and less oxygen. They didn't know if the explosions 139 00:08:35,130 --> 00:08:37,830 Speaker 1: that they were hearing around them could damage or destroy 140 00:08:37,850 --> 00:08:41,949 Speaker 1: their craft. And their only source of information was these 141 00:08:41,990 --> 00:08:45,100 Speaker 1: American news reports on the civilian radio, which were reporting 142 00:08:45,130 --> 00:08:48,640 Speaker 1: the extreme tensions and fears about the Cuban Missile Crisis. 143 00:08:50,400 --> 00:08:54,540 Speaker 1: The commanders of these four submarines had been authorized to 144 00:08:54,760 --> 00:08:58,320 Speaker 1: use their nuclear-tipped torpedoes if they were attacked, and aboard 145 00:08:58,360 --> 00:09:03,480 Speaker 1: the B-59, Captain Valentin Stavitsky concluded that they were. And 146 00:09:03,559 --> 00:09:13,699 Speaker 1: he gave orders to prepare their nuclear torpedo, saying, quote, Fortunately, 147 00:09:13,880 --> 00:09:17,849 Speaker 1: cooler heads prevailed. Savitsky had the agreement of his other 148 00:09:17,950 --> 00:09:21,790 Speaker 1: officers in launching the torpedo. But since the B-59 was 149 00:09:21,850 --> 00:09:25,390 Speaker 1: the flagship of the flotilla bound for Cuba, it also 150 00:09:25,450 --> 00:09:30,490 Speaker 1: carried the flotilla commander, Vasily Arkhipov. Since Arkhipov was aboard, 151 00:09:30,630 --> 00:09:34,310 Speaker 1: they needed his approval as well, and Arkhipov refused, and 152 00:09:34,370 --> 00:09:38,870 Speaker 1: he instead convinced Savitsky to surface. They got fresh air, 153 00:09:39,030 --> 00:09:43,489 Speaker 1: they recharged their batteries, and at the first opportunity, submerged 154 00:09:43,590 --> 00:09:48,140 Speaker 1: and slipped away again, evading American detection before apparently returning 155 00:09:48,240 --> 00:09:54,030 Speaker 1: to Soviet waters. Today, Arkhabov is generally regarded as a hero, 156 00:09:54,390 --> 00:09:57,990 Speaker 1: as somebody whose clear thinking prevented what surely would have 157 00:09:58,070 --> 00:10:01,329 Speaker 1: been a full-on nuclear war. But on his return to 158 00:10:01,370 --> 00:10:05,770 Speaker 1: the Soviet Union, his decisions were heavily criticized. The general 159 00:10:05,850 --> 00:10:07,989 Speaker 1: feeling was that he and the rest of them should 160 00:10:08,030 --> 00:10:11,770 Speaker 1: have gone down with a ship. Arkhipov later died of cancer, 161 00:10:12,250 --> 00:10:15,920 Speaker 1: probably a result of a previous incident aboard a submarine, 162 00:10:16,340 --> 00:10:19,520 Speaker 1: which was a near meltdown on the K-19 during its 163 00:10:19,640 --> 00:10:23,079 Speaker 1: maiden voyage. That killed seven people who were aboard almost 164 00:10:23,140 --> 00:10:26,319 Speaker 1: immediately and then caused delayed effects for many of the 165 00:10:26,400 --> 00:10:29,180 Speaker 1: others who had been there. Basically, they averted a total 166 00:10:29,260 --> 00:10:33,570 Speaker 1: meltdown situation, but it was at a high cost. The U.S. 167 00:10:33,660 --> 00:10:37,170 Speaker 1: was completely unaware that they had been dropping signaling charges 168 00:10:37,290 --> 00:10:41,449 Speaker 1: on a nuclear-armed submarine until much later. And the whole 169 00:10:41,530 --> 00:10:44,699 Speaker 1: incident was little known until documents related to it were 170 00:10:44,740 --> 00:10:49,330 Speaker 1: declassified in 1992. If you would like to know more, 171 00:10:49,370 --> 00:10:52,130 Speaker 1: there is a PBS Secrets of the Dead episode about 172 00:10:52,150 --> 00:10:55,190 Speaker 1: this whole incident that's called The Man Who Saved the World. 173 00:10:56,170 --> 00:10:59,590 Speaker 1: And to wrap up the Cuban Missile Crisis, eventually the 174 00:10:59,630 --> 00:11:02,610 Speaker 1: Soviet Union agreed to remove the missiles from Cuba in 175 00:11:02,670 --> 00:11:05,650 Speaker 1: exchange for a pledge that the United States wouldn't invade 176 00:11:05,700 --> 00:11:08,670 Speaker 1: the nation, something that the U.S. had already tried and 177 00:11:08,750 --> 00:11:13,580 Speaker 1: failed to do during the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961. 178 00:11:13,580 --> 00:11:17,199 Speaker 1: And in another move that wasn't publicly known until decades later... 179 00:11:17,550 --> 00:11:20,929 Speaker 1: The U.S. also removed its nuclear missiles from Turkey. I 180 00:11:23,270 --> 00:11:27,610 Speaker 1: kind of imagine this as being like, if you were 181 00:11:27,650 --> 00:11:30,500 Speaker 1: throwing rocks at a tree and not hitting it, and 182 00:11:30,510 --> 00:11:32,520 Speaker 1: then you realized later that the tree had a big 183 00:11:32,559 --> 00:11:36,940 Speaker 1: old hornet's nest inside, like, that's sort of what was 184 00:11:36,980 --> 00:11:41,540 Speaker 1: going on with dropping signaling charges onto this nuclear-armed submarine 185 00:11:41,620 --> 00:11:45,199 Speaker 1: full of people who were overheated, exhausted, dehydrated, and not 186 00:11:45,220 --> 00:11:48,330 Speaker 1: having enough oxygen. Yeah, but a hornet's nest that could 187 00:11:48,350 --> 00:11:51,350 Speaker 1: kill a lot of people. Yeah, a hornet's nest that 188 00:11:51,370 --> 00:11:54,130 Speaker 1: would destroy the entire world. So with that teary thought, 189 00:11:54,170 --> 00:11:56,910 Speaker 1: we're going to take a quick break. Take a word 190 00:11:56,960 --> 00:12:00,020 Speaker 1: from a sponsor before we move on to our next story. 191 00:12:06,420 --> 00:12:08,820 Speaker 1: Now we are going to move beyond the Cold War 192 00:12:09,140 --> 00:12:11,680 Speaker 1: into a story that's right on the cusp of our 193 00:12:11,760 --> 00:12:15,720 Speaker 1: typical window of history on the show. It took place 194 00:12:15,760 --> 00:12:19,590 Speaker 1: in 1983. And as was the case with the Soviet 195 00:12:19,630 --> 00:12:23,660 Speaker 1: submarine B-59, this also happened during a period of heightened 196 00:12:23,760 --> 00:12:27,460 Speaker 1: tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. Throughout 197 00:12:27,500 --> 00:12:30,360 Speaker 1: the Cold War, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union 198 00:12:30,440 --> 00:12:33,220 Speaker 1: were actively making plans for what they would do if 199 00:12:33,240 --> 00:12:36,340 Speaker 1: the other struck first in a nuclear attack. And for 200 00:12:36,380 --> 00:12:40,100 Speaker 1: a couple of years in the early 1980s, Yuri Andropov, 201 00:12:40,240 --> 00:12:43,240 Speaker 1: General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 202 00:12:43,660 --> 00:12:47,450 Speaker 1: was particularly convinced that the U.S. was making definite plans 203 00:12:47,510 --> 00:12:51,770 Speaker 1: for a nuclear attack that would devastate Soviet leadership. Under 204 00:12:51,830 --> 00:12:54,810 Speaker 1: his command, the Soviet Union was preparing for a certainty, 205 00:12:55,130 --> 00:12:58,890 Speaker 1: not an eventuality. Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union 206 00:12:58,929 --> 00:13:01,130 Speaker 1: had also made it clear that a nuclear strike by 207 00:13:01,410 --> 00:13:04,800 Speaker 1: one would prompt an immediate and devastating response from the other. 208 00:13:07,059 --> 00:13:10,280 Speaker 1: In 1983, a series of incidents had ratcheted up the 209 00:13:10,360 --> 00:13:14,890 Speaker 1: general sense of nuclear paranoia. On March 8th, President Ronald 210 00:13:14,950 --> 00:13:19,150 Speaker 1: Reagan had delivered a speech arguing against a proposed nuclear 211 00:13:19,250 --> 00:13:22,770 Speaker 1: freeze in which he called the Soviet Union an evil empire. 212 00:13:23,510 --> 00:13:26,140 Speaker 1: Later that month, he announced the missile defense system that 213 00:13:26,179 --> 00:13:29,700 Speaker 1: came to be known as Star Wars. Both nations undertook 214 00:13:29,780 --> 00:13:34,000 Speaker 1: maneuvers and drills purportedly for the sake of preparedness. but 215 00:13:34,120 --> 00:13:37,220 Speaker 1: often they were interpreted by the other as being anything 216 00:13:37,300 --> 00:13:40,240 Speaker 1: from a threatening show of force to a real effort 217 00:13:40,340 --> 00:13:44,370 Speaker 1: to secretly lay the groundwork for an upcoming World War III. 218 00:13:45,670 --> 00:13:48,710 Speaker 1: And when our next incident took place, the latest and 219 00:13:48,770 --> 00:13:52,090 Speaker 1: probably most alarming of these was the downing of Korean 220 00:13:52,190 --> 00:13:56,319 Speaker 1: Air Flight 007. The commercial flight was en route from 221 00:13:56,360 --> 00:13:59,240 Speaker 1: New York to Seoul with a stop in Anchorage to refuel. 222 00:14:00,110 --> 00:14:03,570 Speaker 1: After leaving Anchorage for reasons that aren't entirely clear, the 223 00:14:03,590 --> 00:14:06,700 Speaker 1: flight diverged from its planned course and wound up in 224 00:14:06,780 --> 00:14:11,540 Speaker 1: Soviet airspace. The Soviet Union, apparently believing it was a U.S. 225 00:14:11,580 --> 00:14:15,480 Speaker 1: spy plane, scrambled two fighter jets, which attacked the plane 226 00:14:15,520 --> 00:14:19,490 Speaker 1: with air-to-air missiles. The flight crashed into the sea, killing 227 00:14:19,610 --> 00:14:24,370 Speaker 1: all 269 people aboard, one of whom was U.S. Representative 228 00:14:24,430 --> 00:14:30,150 Speaker 1: Larry McDonald of Georgia. The incident sparked international outrage and 229 00:14:30,230 --> 00:14:34,310 Speaker 1: a slew of conspiracy theories, some of which still persist today. 230 00:14:35,090 --> 00:14:37,930 Speaker 1: The Soviet Union did not help the matter by being 231 00:14:37,990 --> 00:14:41,720 Speaker 1: incredibly secretive about the incident, at first not even admitting 232 00:14:41,740 --> 00:14:44,660 Speaker 1: that it had happened and not revealing whether it had 233 00:14:44,720 --> 00:14:47,940 Speaker 1: found the wreckage or flight data recorders. A lot of 234 00:14:47,960 --> 00:14:50,900 Speaker 1: the details remained completely unknown to the rest of the 235 00:14:50,940 --> 00:14:53,980 Speaker 1: world until after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and 236 00:14:54,100 --> 00:14:57,730 Speaker 1: some of the details are still a mystery. Three weeks 237 00:14:57,930 --> 00:15:02,530 Speaker 1: after the incident with Flight 007 on September 26th, Lieutenant 238 00:15:02,590 --> 00:15:06,230 Speaker 1: Colonel Stanislav Petrov of the Soviet Air Defense Forces was 239 00:15:06,290 --> 00:15:10,010 Speaker 1: stationed in a bunker known as Serpukhov-15, which was part 240 00:15:10,030 --> 00:15:14,090 Speaker 1: of the Soviet Union's newly enabled early warning satellite defense network. 241 00:15:14,910 --> 00:15:19,590 Speaker 1: At Serpukhov-15, satellite intelligence was received and analyzed, and in 242 00:15:19,630 --> 00:15:22,430 Speaker 1: the case of an attack, there was a telephone with 243 00:15:22,480 --> 00:15:26,490 Speaker 1: a direct line to commanding officers. Petrov's job there was 244 00:15:26,590 --> 00:15:29,190 Speaker 1: so secret that not even his wife knew where he 245 00:15:29,250 --> 00:15:33,130 Speaker 1: worked or what he did. By this point, both the 246 00:15:33,190 --> 00:15:36,770 Speaker 1: United States and the Soviet Union each had satellite systems 247 00:15:36,790 --> 00:15:39,350 Speaker 1: that were meant to help keep watch for the launch 248 00:15:39,390 --> 00:15:44,400 Speaker 1: of intercontinental ballistic missiles from the other. United States satellites 249 00:15:44,460 --> 00:15:47,340 Speaker 1: basically looked down on the Earth from above, but on 250 00:15:47,360 --> 00:15:50,780 Speaker 1: the Soviet side, the satellites looked at the planet on edge. 251 00:15:51,160 --> 00:15:53,540 Speaker 1: They were looking for missiles after they had already been launched. 252 00:15:54,040 --> 00:15:57,090 Speaker 1: It would sort of be silhouetted against the background of space. 253 00:15:57,990 --> 00:16:02,210 Speaker 1: In theory, this minimized the number of natural phenomena and 254 00:16:02,250 --> 00:16:06,130 Speaker 1: other non-threatening human activities that could cause a false alarm. 255 00:16:07,130 --> 00:16:11,060 Speaker 1: But on September 26th, just after midnight local time, a 256 00:16:11,140 --> 00:16:15,300 Speaker 1: false alarm did indeed happen, most likely thanks to sunlight 257 00:16:15,360 --> 00:16:20,270 Speaker 1: reflecting off of high-altitude clouds. The system detected the presence of, 258 00:16:20,470 --> 00:16:23,960 Speaker 1: at first, one missile. But in moments, that number grew 259 00:16:24,000 --> 00:16:28,320 Speaker 1: to five, all launched from the United States. The warning 260 00:16:28,420 --> 00:16:31,260 Speaker 1: of the detected incoming missile strike played out within the 261 00:16:31,320 --> 00:16:34,800 Speaker 1: Serpukhov-15 bunker like something out of a movie. There were 262 00:16:34,820 --> 00:16:38,600 Speaker 1: blaring alarms and warnings in huge red letters on the screens. 263 00:16:39,680 --> 00:16:45,300 Speaker 1: If you've ever seen a nuclear disaster movie in which 264 00:16:45,360 --> 00:16:49,520 Speaker 1: the launch happens and it's met with like giant wailing klaxons, 265 00:16:50,020 --> 00:16:53,220 Speaker 1: and the words LAUNCH in big red flashing letters on 266 00:16:53,240 --> 00:16:56,440 Speaker 1: the screen, and you thought, man, that looks ridiculous. Apparently, 267 00:16:56,480 --> 00:17:02,430 Speaker 1: that's really what happened. It looked exactly like that. Protocol 268 00:17:03,010 --> 00:17:06,489 Speaker 1: was for Petrov to immediately contact his superior officers to 269 00:17:06,550 --> 00:17:09,669 Speaker 1: report that the launch had been detected, but he had 270 00:17:09,710 --> 00:17:13,640 Speaker 1: some doubts that the report was accurate. This system was 271 00:17:13,720 --> 00:17:16,260 Speaker 1: brand new, and in his opinion, it had been rushed 272 00:17:16,280 --> 00:17:18,800 Speaker 1: into use when it was still, in his words, raw. 273 00:17:20,010 --> 00:17:24,170 Speaker 1: Five also seemed like an unusually low number of missiles 274 00:17:24,290 --> 00:17:27,470 Speaker 1: for a preemptive nuclear strike. He would later say, quote, 275 00:17:27,510 --> 00:17:30,659 Speaker 1: when people start a war, they don't start it with 276 00:17:30,740 --> 00:17:34,040 Speaker 1: only five missiles. You can do little damage with just 277 00:17:34,100 --> 00:17:38,859 Speaker 1: five missiles. So instead of contacting his superior officers to 278 00:17:38,920 --> 00:17:42,070 Speaker 1: say that a nuclear strike was incoming, he called to 279 00:17:42,130 --> 00:17:45,649 Speaker 1: report a false alarm. Even as he did, though, he 280 00:17:45,710 --> 00:17:49,190 Speaker 1: wasn't completely sure that he was right. It wasn't until 281 00:17:49,230 --> 00:17:52,580 Speaker 1: the missiles in question failed to reach the Soviet Union 282 00:17:52,630 --> 00:17:56,520 Speaker 1: that he knew for sure that his hunch had been correct. Yeah, 283 00:17:56,580 --> 00:17:58,659 Speaker 1: he was like, I thought it was maybe 50-50. And 284 00:18:00,020 --> 00:18:02,520 Speaker 1: he also later theorized that if someone else had been 285 00:18:02,600 --> 00:18:04,740 Speaker 1: on duty, it would not have been the same call. 286 00:18:05,640 --> 00:18:07,840 Speaker 1: By his own account, though, after this was all over, 287 00:18:07,920 --> 00:18:10,360 Speaker 1: he went home, he drank a whole lot of vodka, 288 00:18:10,380 --> 00:18:14,830 Speaker 1: and he slept for more than 24 consecutive hours. As 289 00:18:14,869 --> 00:18:18,450 Speaker 1: with the submarine B-59, the details of this incident only 290 00:18:18,490 --> 00:18:22,590 Speaker 1: became public much later. At the time, Petrov himself got 291 00:18:22,670 --> 00:18:25,340 Speaker 1: no recognition within the Soviet Union for what he had 292 00:18:25,380 --> 00:18:29,420 Speaker 1: done and the crisis averted under his watch. However, after 293 00:18:29,460 --> 00:18:32,619 Speaker 1: an investigation, he did get a reprimand for not keeping 294 00:18:32,660 --> 00:18:36,659 Speaker 1: a detailed enough log about what had happened. His explanation 295 00:18:36,720 --> 00:18:38,600 Speaker 1: was that he had a phone in one hand and 296 00:18:38,619 --> 00:18:41,379 Speaker 1: the facility's intercom in the other, and he couldn't juggle 297 00:18:41,440 --> 00:18:45,470 Speaker 1: both at once and also take notes. In the aftermath 298 00:18:45,510 --> 00:18:47,949 Speaker 1: of all this, the computer program that was designed to 299 00:18:48,050 --> 00:18:51,590 Speaker 1: filter out natural phenomena and other noise from the early 300 00:18:51,630 --> 00:18:55,700 Speaker 1: warning systems results was rewritten to account for this combination 301 00:18:55,740 --> 00:19:00,040 Speaker 1: of sun and high-altitude clouds. The world learned of Petrov's 302 00:19:00,140 --> 00:19:03,480 Speaker 1: actions about 15 years later when his commanding officer wrote 303 00:19:03,520 --> 00:19:06,679 Speaker 1: about it in his memoir. His wife learned of it 304 00:19:06,740 --> 00:19:09,590 Speaker 1: when a reporter came to their home following the publication 305 00:19:09,630 --> 00:19:13,500 Speaker 1: of that memoir. A documentary about this whole incident came 306 00:19:13,600 --> 00:19:15,480 Speaker 1: out in 2014, which was called The Man Who Saved 307 00:19:15,500 --> 00:19:18,710 Speaker 1: the World. That is not an error. It is the 308 00:19:18,770 --> 00:19:25,629 Speaker 1: same name as the one about the submarine. And we're 309 00:19:25,650 --> 00:19:27,520 Speaker 1: going to take another quick break before we talk through 310 00:19:27,640 --> 00:19:37,550 Speaker 1: one more of these. The last of these incidents that 311 00:19:37,570 --> 00:19:39,950 Speaker 1: we are going to talk about today is way more 312 00:19:40,010 --> 00:19:43,280 Speaker 1: recent than we generally get into on the show. We 313 00:19:43,320 --> 00:19:47,350 Speaker 1: have kind of a rule of thumb window. You know, 314 00:19:47,619 --> 00:19:49,780 Speaker 1: it's this is definitely newer than that but as i 315 00:19:49,820 --> 00:19:53,040 Speaker 1: was going through the surprisingly many events of this type 316 00:19:53,520 --> 00:19:56,010 Speaker 1: it stood out for reasons that are going to become 317 00:19:56,090 --> 00:20:00,629 Speaker 1: clear uh by this point the soviet union had dissolved 318 00:20:00,810 --> 00:20:03,609 Speaker 1: so the nuclear superpowers at play were the united states 319 00:20:03,670 --> 00:20:06,570 Speaker 1: and russia And we have a little less detail on 320 00:20:06,630 --> 00:20:08,409 Speaker 1: this one than we did on the other two in 321 00:20:08,470 --> 00:20:11,889 Speaker 1: part because any United States documents pertaining to it are 322 00:20:11,910 --> 00:20:19,859 Speaker 1: probably still classified. On January 25, 1995, Russian radar operators 323 00:20:19,930 --> 00:20:23,520 Speaker 1: near the coast spotted a fast-moving object that appeared to 324 00:20:23,560 --> 00:20:26,540 Speaker 1: be a missile. It was over the Barents Sea, roughly 325 00:20:26,580 --> 00:20:30,460 Speaker 1: between Russia's northern coast and the Arctic Ocean. And then 326 00:20:30,640 --> 00:20:35,080 Speaker 1: as it moved, the object separated into multiple pieces. It 327 00:20:35,100 --> 00:20:38,480 Speaker 1: was behaving like a Trident missile, and judging from where 328 00:20:38,500 --> 00:20:41,879 Speaker 1: it originated, it could have been launched from a U.S. submarine. 329 00:20:43,400 --> 00:20:46,830 Speaker 1: The radar technicians feared that this was an American nuclear 330 00:20:46,869 --> 00:20:50,429 Speaker 1: warhead set to detonate high in the atmosphere and to 331 00:20:50,470 --> 00:20:54,580 Speaker 1: put all of Russia's early warning satellite system, which was 332 00:20:54,680 --> 00:20:56,820 Speaker 1: still being maintained in spite of the end of the 333 00:20:56,880 --> 00:21:00,570 Speaker 1: Cold War, out of commission. That system, though, had not 334 00:21:00,609 --> 00:21:04,629 Speaker 1: detected any launches, but it was also primarily focused on 335 00:21:04,670 --> 00:21:07,370 Speaker 1: missile sites in North America. There was apparently also some 336 00:21:07,430 --> 00:21:12,930 Speaker 1: cloud cover. The satellite operators notified their commanding officers that 337 00:21:13,020 --> 00:21:16,760 Speaker 1: a suspected launch was in the works. In the United States, 338 00:21:17,080 --> 00:21:20,740 Speaker 1: Russia and other nations that have nuclear weapons, a specially 339 00:21:20,859 --> 00:21:24,760 Speaker 1: outfitted satchel known as the nuclear briefcase accompanies the head 340 00:21:24,800 --> 00:21:29,440 Speaker 1: of state. The briefcase's actual contents are secret, and the U.S. 341 00:21:29,500 --> 00:21:33,580 Speaker 1: version weighs about 45 pounds. Its purpose is to make 342 00:21:33,660 --> 00:21:36,540 Speaker 1: sure the head of state has all the necessary documentation 343 00:21:36,619 --> 00:21:41,270 Speaker 1: on hand, while also allowing them to receive information, make decisions, and, 344 00:21:41,400 --> 00:21:45,730 Speaker 1: if necessary, order a nuclear strike. The U.S. has also 345 00:21:45,790 --> 00:21:48,750 Speaker 1: noted that part of the briefcase's purpose is being able 346 00:21:48,810 --> 00:21:52,070 Speaker 1: to identify that it really is the president making the call. 347 00:21:54,440 --> 00:21:57,420 Speaker 1: Russia had a clear protocol in the event of a 348 00:21:57,460 --> 00:22:01,380 Speaker 1: missile launch. First, signal the president's nuclear briefcase, at this 349 00:22:01,480 --> 00:22:06,590 Speaker 1: point accompanying President Boris Yeltsin. Then, assess the situation, and 350 00:22:06,630 --> 00:22:10,109 Speaker 1: within 10 minutes, make a decision on whether to retaliate. 351 00:22:11,050 --> 00:22:14,590 Speaker 1: According to Russian defense protocols, incoming missiles didn't have to 352 00:22:14,730 --> 00:22:20,220 Speaker 1: actually strike anything before the retaliatory strike was ordered. In 353 00:22:20,320 --> 00:22:23,580 Speaker 1: spite of the discrepancy between what the radar operators and 354 00:22:23,600 --> 00:22:27,660 Speaker 1: the early warning satellites were reporting, about five minutes into 355 00:22:27,700 --> 00:22:31,480 Speaker 1: that 10-minute window, word went out to submarine commanders in 356 00:22:31,500 --> 00:22:34,680 Speaker 1: the area to maintain a state of readiness and prepare 357 00:22:34,770 --> 00:22:40,030 Speaker 1: for further instruction. Eight minutes into the 10-minute window, the 358 00:22:40,070 --> 00:22:44,230 Speaker 1: mystery objects on the radar fell into the sea, and everyone, thankfully, 359 00:22:44,450 --> 00:22:47,709 Speaker 1: stood down. And the culprit in this case was the 360 00:22:47,750 --> 00:22:51,450 Speaker 1: Black Brant 12, a sounding rocket, which is a scientific 361 00:22:51,530 --> 00:22:55,770 Speaker 1: rocket used to take measurements and conduct tests. A sounding 362 00:22:55,830 --> 00:22:58,710 Speaker 1: rocket typically has a rocket and a payload designed to 363 00:22:58,790 --> 00:23:02,709 Speaker 1: separate from it at a certain altitude. Often, once it's 364 00:23:02,750 --> 00:23:06,340 Speaker 1: taken its measurements or conducted its experiment, the payload portion 365 00:23:06,380 --> 00:23:09,480 Speaker 1: comes back to Earth with its descent slowed down by 366 00:23:09,540 --> 00:23:13,020 Speaker 1: a parachute. That separation of the instruments and the payload 367 00:23:13,040 --> 00:23:15,340 Speaker 1: from the rocket is is what the radar detectors had 368 00:23:15,400 --> 00:23:19,950 Speaker 1: interpreted as the separation of a Trident missile. It was 369 00:23:19,990 --> 00:23:22,670 Speaker 1: really a Norwegian rocket that was being used to study 370 00:23:22,710 --> 00:23:27,810 Speaker 1: the Northern Lights. And where it gets, yeah, where it 371 00:23:27,850 --> 00:23:32,130 Speaker 1: gets a little unnerving is that the Norwegian and American 372 00:23:32,190 --> 00:23:35,280 Speaker 1: team that was responsible for this thing had notified multiple 373 00:23:35,420 --> 00:23:38,119 Speaker 1: other countries, including Russia, of what was about to happen, 374 00:23:38,420 --> 00:23:41,580 Speaker 1: but nobody had told these satellite operators who raised money 375 00:23:41,980 --> 00:23:46,000 Speaker 1: the alarm about it. And apparently nobody made the connection 376 00:23:46,300 --> 00:23:50,239 Speaker 1: between this report of a launch from the coast and 377 00:23:50,640 --> 00:23:56,650 Speaker 1: the launch of a scientific rocket that was already known 378 00:23:56,710 --> 00:24:00,870 Speaker 1: to everyone. Like nobody connected those two things together. However, 379 00:24:00,890 --> 00:24:03,389 Speaker 1: the thing that made this so notable and made me 380 00:24:03,430 --> 00:24:05,770 Speaker 1: want to include it in today's episode, in spite of 381 00:24:05,810 --> 00:24:08,990 Speaker 1: its recency, is it's the only known time in world 382 00:24:09,030 --> 00:24:11,409 Speaker 1: history that a head of state has actually activated their 383 00:24:11,450 --> 00:24:15,240 Speaker 1: nuclear briefcase. I can't help but think how frustrating it 384 00:24:15,260 --> 00:24:17,180 Speaker 1: would be for the science team to be like, we 385 00:24:17,200 --> 00:24:23,540 Speaker 1: did everything right, and yet... We literally told you. Inadvertently, 386 00:24:24,320 --> 00:24:29,910 Speaker 1: we could have set off a horrible global incident, despite 387 00:24:29,950 --> 00:24:32,550 Speaker 1: having gone through the checklist and done everything we were 388 00:24:32,570 --> 00:24:36,090 Speaker 1: supposed to. To our knowledge, there is no movie or 389 00:24:36,130 --> 00:24:38,930 Speaker 1: TV show about this particular incident yet. But since this 390 00:24:38,990 --> 00:24:41,630 Speaker 1: incident was about 10 minutes of a long and sometimes 391 00:24:41,690 --> 00:24:45,680 Speaker 1: controversial political career for Boris Yeltsin, they will probably title 392 00:24:45,740 --> 00:24:49,440 Speaker 1: it something besides The Man Who Saved the World. Although 393 00:24:49,480 --> 00:24:55,160 Speaker 1: you never know. Maybe so. Maybe that's just the title 394 00:24:55,440 --> 00:25:03,090 Speaker 1: of all nearly near all incidents of just barely averting 395 00:25:03,640 --> 00:25:07,020 Speaker 1: Nuclear catastrophe. They will all be called the man who 396 00:25:07,060 --> 00:25:12,600 Speaker 1: saved the world. That does seem to definitely be the pattern. Yeah. 397 00:25:15,380 --> 00:25:18,359 Speaker 1: Thanks so much for joining us on this Saturday. If 398 00:25:18,380 --> 00:25:20,320 Speaker 1: you'd like to send us a note, our email address 399 00:25:20,400 --> 00:25:25,510 Speaker 1: is historypodcast at iheartradio.com. And you can subscribe to the 400 00:25:25,550 --> 00:25:28,950 Speaker 1: show on the iHeartRadio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you 401 00:25:28,970 --> 00:25:30,350 Speaker 1: listen to your favorite shows.