1 00:00:17,239 --> 00:00:21,280 Speaker 1: If it doesn't work, you're just not using enough. You're 2 00:00:21,320 --> 00:00:26,880 Speaker 1: listening to Software Radio Special operations, military news and straight 3 00:00:26,880 --> 00:00:41,560 Speaker 1: talk with the guys and the community. Hello and everyone, 4 00:00:41,600 --> 00:00:44,280 Speaker 1: welcome back to Software Radio. I'm your host today Steve 5 00:00:44,280 --> 00:00:47,680 Speaker 1: Balis Druri joining me today. We have a very special 6 00:00:47,720 --> 00:00:52,080 Speaker 1: guest and it's uh. It might be an uncomfortable topic 7 00:00:52,200 --> 00:00:55,360 Speaker 1: for some people today because we're gonna be talking with 8 00:00:55,880 --> 00:01:01,640 Speaker 1: Sam Culper. He's a former intelligence and uncommissioned officer in 9 00:01:01,680 --> 00:01:05,160 Speaker 1: the military. He runs a site now called forward Observer 10 00:01:05,400 --> 00:01:10,920 Speaker 1: that's www. Forward reservers dot com. And Sam had almost 11 00:01:10,920 --> 00:01:14,760 Speaker 1: a decade of experience within the military and the intel community, 12 00:01:14,840 --> 00:01:18,960 Speaker 1: but now he's working for himself and he wants UH 13 00:01:19,160 --> 00:01:22,680 Speaker 1: to talk about some stuff that's going on, not in 14 00:01:22,720 --> 00:01:26,160 Speaker 1: the Third World, not in in a foreign country, but 15 00:01:26,440 --> 00:01:29,240 Speaker 1: right here in the United States. And that's a low 16 00:01:29,280 --> 00:01:33,600 Speaker 1: intensity conflict and it's some really interesting stuff. We've had 17 00:01:33,600 --> 00:01:37,080 Speaker 1: a chance to read through it, uh, and I listened 18 00:01:37,120 --> 00:01:40,520 Speaker 1: to one of his podcasts, and I think our listeners 19 00:01:40,520 --> 00:01:44,640 Speaker 1: will really be interested in this. So without any further ado, 20 00:01:44,680 --> 00:01:48,120 Speaker 1: I want to welcome Sam to the podcast. Sam, Welcome 21 00:01:48,160 --> 00:01:50,520 Speaker 1: to Software Pradio. Thanks for taking the time to join 22 00:01:50,600 --> 00:01:54,920 Speaker 1: us this afternoon. Hey, Steve, I'm I'm glad to be here. 23 00:01:55,000 --> 00:01:58,400 Speaker 1: Thanks for having me. We're we're very glad to have you. 24 00:01:58,520 --> 00:02:01,960 Speaker 1: I think this is something that you know, a lot 25 00:02:02,040 --> 00:02:06,520 Speaker 1: of our might have heard a little bit about, UM. 26 00:02:07,360 --> 00:02:09,799 Speaker 1: But I want to get to this because I think 27 00:02:09,800 --> 00:02:14,160 Speaker 1: it's important. You know, UM, you talked about in some 28 00:02:14,320 --> 00:02:18,040 Speaker 1: of your some of your posts about you know, we're 29 00:02:18,080 --> 00:02:20,880 Speaker 1: in a kind of a fourth generation war, a low 30 00:02:20,919 --> 00:02:25,560 Speaker 1: intensity conflict, and explain, well, first of all, explain to 31 00:02:25,600 --> 00:02:29,640 Speaker 1: our listeners how you came about doing what you do, 32 00:02:29,800 --> 00:02:34,400 Speaker 1: some of your military experience and in the intelligence community 33 00:02:34,520 --> 00:02:37,080 Speaker 1: kind of given a background on you know, who you 34 00:02:37,120 --> 00:02:41,360 Speaker 1: are and what you've done. Sure, yeah, well I'm I'm 35 00:02:41,440 --> 00:02:44,880 Speaker 1: listed as a ninety six Bravo. It's now a thirty 36 00:02:44,880 --> 00:02:51,720 Speaker 1: five Fox all Sources of Intelligence Analysts and UM. I 37 00:02:51,760 --> 00:02:55,600 Speaker 1: was was also a contractor uh an intelligence contractor for 38 00:02:56,240 --> 00:02:59,400 Speaker 1: a few years. I spent three years in Iraq and Afghanistan, 39 00:03:00,880 --> 00:03:04,320 Speaker 1: and finally I've decided to separate all together. I left 40 00:03:04,360 --> 00:03:07,440 Speaker 1: intelligence community in two thousand twelve, and a few years 41 00:03:07,520 --> 00:03:11,880 Speaker 1: later I started this company because I saw a lot 42 00:03:11,919 --> 00:03:15,920 Speaker 1: of unrest in the United States, both among you know, 43 00:03:16,040 --> 00:03:18,800 Speaker 1: right wing groups and left wing groups, and you know, 44 00:03:18,840 --> 00:03:22,440 Speaker 1: in our study of insurgency and proto insurgency and these 45 00:03:22,520 --> 00:03:26,600 Speaker 1: kinds of low intensity conflicts, I just started seeing all 46 00:03:26,600 --> 00:03:31,040 Speaker 1: these indicators appear, and uh it led me to the 47 00:03:31,040 --> 00:03:34,040 Speaker 1: conclusion that things were gonna you know, of course, it 48 00:03:34,120 --> 00:03:36,040 Speaker 1: doesn't take a rocket surgeon to say, hey, you know, 49 00:03:36,080 --> 00:03:37,640 Speaker 1: things are gonna get a lot worse. But I thought, 50 00:03:38,000 --> 00:03:41,000 Speaker 1: what if we tracked this like you know, an ace, 51 00:03:41,240 --> 00:03:47,119 Speaker 1: like an S two shop, uh, somewhat professionally and use 52 00:03:47,560 --> 00:03:49,840 Speaker 1: similar processes that we did in the army and and 53 00:03:49,920 --> 00:03:53,120 Speaker 1: in the intelligence community at large to analyze what's happening 54 00:03:53,120 --> 00:03:55,280 Speaker 1: here in the United States. And so that's largely what 55 00:03:55,320 --> 00:04:01,280 Speaker 1: we do at Forward Observer today, right. And U I imagine, 56 00:04:01,480 --> 00:04:04,600 Speaker 1: you know, with your background and you started digging into things, 57 00:04:04,800 --> 00:04:08,280 Speaker 1: what you saw probably alarmed you more than you probably 58 00:04:08,280 --> 00:04:12,320 Speaker 1: thought you were going to find, you know, it did. 59 00:04:12,400 --> 00:04:16,160 Speaker 1: It's it's um just to kind of give you some 60 00:04:16,200 --> 00:04:18,920 Speaker 1: context here. Back in November two thousand sixteen. You know, 61 00:04:18,960 --> 00:04:22,520 Speaker 1: obviously that was a fairly tumultuous time as it was 62 00:04:22,720 --> 00:04:26,680 Speaker 1: four years ago. And I, you know, I had this 63 00:04:26,720 --> 00:04:29,839 Speaker 1: list of twenty indicators of organized political violence, and I 64 00:04:29,880 --> 00:04:34,360 Speaker 1: started seeing, Hey, which of these indicators are exhibited? Are 65 00:04:34,400 --> 00:04:37,039 Speaker 1: we seeing evidence for any of these twenty indicators? And 66 00:04:37,080 --> 00:04:39,520 Speaker 1: at the time there were six or maybe seven out 67 00:04:39,520 --> 00:04:43,560 Speaker 1: of twenty, And then I updated that matrix again one 68 00:04:43,600 --> 00:04:46,680 Speaker 1: year later and we were up to twelve out of twenty. 69 00:04:47,440 --> 00:04:50,720 Speaker 1: The year later in November, we're up to like sixteen 70 00:04:50,800 --> 00:04:53,520 Speaker 1: or maybe seventeen out of twenty. And since then it's 71 00:04:54,000 --> 00:04:56,840 Speaker 1: we have we really do have all the pieces here 72 00:04:56,880 --> 00:05:00,120 Speaker 1: in the United States for an armed conflict if there 73 00:05:00,320 --> 00:05:02,200 Speaker 1: were to be a trigger at some point in the future. 74 00:05:02,360 --> 00:05:05,600 Speaker 1: So it is incredibly alarming, and I'm talking about eighteen 75 00:05:05,680 --> 00:05:08,520 Speaker 1: sixty one here, but you know, we've seen a lot 76 00:05:08,560 --> 00:05:11,760 Speaker 1: of low intensity conflicts and a lot of other countries 77 00:05:12,320 --> 00:05:15,719 Speaker 1: where a tiny fraction less than one percent, maybe one 78 00:05:15,760 --> 00:05:19,479 Speaker 1: to three percent max. Of a of a population is 79 00:05:19,520 --> 00:05:23,600 Speaker 1: involved in the conflict. And I think that, I think 80 00:05:23,600 --> 00:05:26,880 Speaker 1: it's very likely to where we are headed, even though 81 00:05:26,880 --> 00:05:31,600 Speaker 1: it's relatively calm right now. Yeah, And it's funny because, 82 00:05:32,520 --> 00:05:34,560 Speaker 1: you know, reading some of your stuff, I went back 83 00:05:34,600 --> 00:05:39,280 Speaker 1: and I went back to seventeen seventy six and the 84 00:05:39,320 --> 00:05:42,000 Speaker 1: amount of people, you know, we we like to think 85 00:05:42,800 --> 00:05:46,520 Speaker 1: that the entire thirteen colonies. I mean, that's you know, 86 00:05:47,560 --> 00:05:50,640 Speaker 1: the way we were brought up and raised to believe 87 00:05:50,800 --> 00:05:54,760 Speaker 1: that the entire thirteen colonies just rose up as one 88 00:05:55,640 --> 00:05:58,520 Speaker 1: to fight the British. But in fact that number was very, 89 00:05:58,640 --> 00:06:04,040 Speaker 1: very small, wouldn't it. It was, Well, yeah, there's there's 90 00:06:04,080 --> 00:06:08,160 Speaker 1: kind of the uh a cultural legend of the three percent, 91 00:06:08,440 --> 00:06:12,480 Speaker 1: and I guess historians have cast some some doubt on that, 92 00:06:12,640 --> 00:06:15,440 Speaker 1: but yeah, it was not a you know, in these 93 00:06:15,480 --> 00:06:18,240 Speaker 1: types of conflicts, in the American Revolution and lots of others, 94 00:06:18,600 --> 00:06:21,680 Speaker 1: it's a small small fraction of the populace engaged and 95 00:06:21,680 --> 00:06:25,600 Speaker 1: everyone else is just trying to live their lives. Yeah, 96 00:06:25,839 --> 00:06:28,520 Speaker 1: that's that's correct. I mean, you know we heard that 97 00:06:29,040 --> 00:06:33,560 Speaker 1: only you know, a small percentage was actively involved in 98 00:06:33,600 --> 00:06:37,680 Speaker 1: the revolution. There was some that were actively against it, 99 00:06:37,960 --> 00:06:40,760 Speaker 1: but the vast majority of the people just wanted to 100 00:06:40,800 --> 00:06:44,200 Speaker 1: be left alone. They didn't care for one side or 101 00:06:44,200 --> 00:06:48,200 Speaker 1: the other. And I think you could uh draw a 102 00:06:48,200 --> 00:06:53,800 Speaker 1: parallel to what we're seeing right now, couldn't you. Well, yes, 103 00:06:53,880 --> 00:06:59,640 Speaker 1: I think we we're undergoing another experiencing another massive shift 104 00:07:00,040 --> 00:07:04,080 Speaker 1: in kind of cultural and ideological tectonic plates. Those plates 105 00:07:04,080 --> 00:07:07,039 Speaker 1: are shifting and we look all throughout history. You know, obviously, 106 00:07:07,080 --> 00:07:10,160 Speaker 1: the American Revolution, the lead up to the Civil War, 107 00:07:10,720 --> 00:07:15,120 Speaker 1: the Civil Rights era, those were the main three tectonic shifts, 108 00:07:15,880 --> 00:07:18,440 Speaker 1: and two out of those three resulted in an armed 109 00:07:18,480 --> 00:07:22,280 Speaker 1: conflict um. Even though I would say the Civil Rights 110 00:07:22,320 --> 00:07:25,200 Speaker 1: era was is a good example of low intensity conflict 111 00:07:25,200 --> 00:07:27,840 Speaker 1: as well. So I think at a minimum we're going 112 00:07:27,920 --> 00:07:31,960 Speaker 1: to we've already kind of relived the kind of scale 113 00:07:31,960 --> 00:07:36,320 Speaker 1: of violence, um that we saw in the Civil Rights era. 114 00:07:36,640 --> 00:07:40,120 Speaker 1: Although I will say with one caveat, and that's there's 115 00:07:40,160 --> 00:07:43,320 Speaker 1: a great book called Days of Rage by Brian Burrow, 116 00:07:44,280 --> 00:07:47,720 Speaker 1: and he talks about in in the first eighteen months 117 00:07:47,760 --> 00:07:50,160 Speaker 1: of nineteen seventy one. In nineteen seventy two, there were 118 00:07:50,160 --> 00:07:55,400 Speaker 1: over twenty hundred domestic bombings inside the United States. That's 119 00:07:55,440 --> 00:07:59,080 Speaker 1: according to the FBI data. So we obviously haven't gotten 120 00:07:59,120 --> 00:08:02,360 Speaker 1: to that bull of intensity yet. But who knows. Like 121 00:08:02,480 --> 00:08:05,040 Speaker 1: it's you know, it's two thousand twenty. I would not 122 00:08:05,080 --> 00:08:07,720 Speaker 1: be surprised if Godzilla popped up in the Gulf of 123 00:08:07,760 --> 00:08:10,760 Speaker 1: Mexico and burnt down half in New Orleans tomorrow. You know, 124 00:08:13,160 --> 00:08:15,640 Speaker 1: with all the rain New Orleans has been getting, they 125 00:08:15,680 --> 00:08:19,560 Speaker 1: might welcome Godzilla right at this point. But now you 126 00:08:19,600 --> 00:08:24,080 Speaker 1: know it's um this was a very tumultuous year. And 127 00:08:24,400 --> 00:08:31,520 Speaker 1: you know, uh between the COVID, the George Floyd, that 128 00:08:31,680 --> 00:08:36,720 Speaker 1: whole situation with George Floyd going viral. Really since I 129 00:08:36,760 --> 00:08:40,240 Speaker 1: want to say it was wasn't uh about mid May 130 00:08:40,360 --> 00:08:44,880 Speaker 1: that that happened, and then things just kept getting worse 131 00:08:44,960 --> 00:08:48,840 Speaker 1: and worse, especially out west. We were seeing things out 132 00:08:48,840 --> 00:08:54,760 Speaker 1: in Oregon and you know in other places you talked 133 00:08:54,800 --> 00:08:58,400 Speaker 1: about there might be one kind of a part of 134 00:08:58,480 --> 00:09:02,520 Speaker 1: cake type of incident. Do you think the national election 135 00:09:02,600 --> 00:09:08,120 Speaker 1: could could have been that type of thing? Absolutely? Yeah. 136 00:09:08,320 --> 00:09:11,440 Speaker 1: My most the most dangerous course of action MDC number 137 00:09:11,520 --> 00:09:17,800 Speaker 1: one was the effects of a Trump victory um in 138 00:09:18,000 --> 00:09:22,400 Speaker 1: in November, December, whenever it may have eventually been litigated out. 139 00:09:23,360 --> 00:09:25,120 Speaker 1: But yeah, I mean we saw it. We were you know, 140 00:09:25,200 --> 00:09:29,720 Speaker 1: we monitor a lot of these subversive, radical and revolutionary groups, 141 00:09:30,320 --> 00:09:33,400 Speaker 1: and I mean, I'm sure, I'm sure lots of folks 142 00:09:33,440 --> 00:09:35,920 Speaker 1: in the audience saw very similar things. But these people 143 00:09:35,920 --> 00:09:40,920 Speaker 1: were they really were planning for mass mobilization protests and 144 00:09:41,000 --> 00:09:43,960 Speaker 1: something like a Terrier Square or a euro may Don 145 00:09:44,559 --> 00:09:48,400 Speaker 1: where they tried to eject President Trump if he were 146 00:09:48,440 --> 00:09:50,800 Speaker 1: to be reelected. So I think, you know, that was 147 00:09:50,880 --> 00:09:54,240 Speaker 1: kind of the most immediate trigger that I was concerned 148 00:09:54,280 --> 00:09:58,160 Speaker 1: about the following effects if that happened. And today that 149 00:09:58,200 --> 00:10:03,120 Speaker 1: hasn't happened. Um, so we're kind of, uh, you know, 150 00:10:03,160 --> 00:10:05,600 Speaker 1: we're we've shifted into looking, Okay, well, what are some 151 00:10:05,640 --> 00:10:09,520 Speaker 1: post election triggers that might happen if not the general 152 00:10:09,559 --> 00:10:15,200 Speaker 1: election itself? M hm. And you know I noticed in 153 00:10:15,320 --> 00:10:18,120 Speaker 1: you're writing that you talked about there's not just far 154 00:10:18,280 --> 00:10:23,600 Speaker 1: right groups, there's fire left groups as well. And these 155 00:10:23,600 --> 00:10:29,080 Speaker 1: people are getting quite organized, aren't they. They are, Yeah, 156 00:10:29,080 --> 00:10:32,040 Speaker 1: they really are. So if back in two thousand and eighteen, 157 00:10:33,000 --> 00:10:35,480 Speaker 1: I started looking for you know, in the army, and 158 00:10:35,520 --> 00:10:38,439 Speaker 1: I guess probably the Marine Corps and maybe other places. 159 00:10:38,720 --> 00:10:41,480 Speaker 1: You know, Steve, you and I we know combat there's 160 00:10:41,520 --> 00:10:44,560 Speaker 1: combat arms, and there's combat support, and there's combat service 161 00:10:44,600 --> 00:10:49,719 Speaker 1: support classes, and you know you have the infantry out 162 00:10:49,720 --> 00:10:51,680 Speaker 1: in the field. Well, they can't produce their own food, 163 00:10:51,720 --> 00:10:55,200 Speaker 1: their own water, they can't create their own ammunition. You know, 164 00:10:55,280 --> 00:10:57,120 Speaker 1: they can't fix their own trucks. They can't do all 165 00:10:57,160 --> 00:11:00,240 Speaker 1: these things. So they have to have support personnel to 166 00:11:00,559 --> 00:11:03,760 Speaker 1: you know, to help keep those operations going. And we 167 00:11:03,880 --> 00:11:06,640 Speaker 1: have seen absolutely on the left, well I won't say 168 00:11:06,640 --> 00:11:08,760 Speaker 1: on the left, on the far left, the radical and 169 00:11:08,800 --> 00:11:14,600 Speaker 1: revolutionary groups, they absolutely have been building their own support 170 00:11:14,679 --> 00:11:19,199 Speaker 1: and service support um classes. We're talking about things about 171 00:11:19,880 --> 00:11:27,439 Speaker 1: examples like intelligence and communication support, medical support, logistics, transportation, 172 00:11:27,760 --> 00:11:31,600 Speaker 1: you know, the kind of the traditional support roles that 173 00:11:31,640 --> 00:11:35,160 Speaker 1: the army has, and they've been building that. And I'll 174 00:11:35,160 --> 00:11:38,840 Speaker 1: tell you they have done more. I started tracking these 175 00:11:38,880 --> 00:11:43,040 Speaker 1: groups back in two thousand sixteen. They have increased their 176 00:11:43,080 --> 00:11:45,920 Speaker 1: capability more over the past five months than they have 177 00:11:46,120 --> 00:11:50,080 Speaker 1: over the past four years. And there to the point 178 00:11:50,160 --> 00:11:52,800 Speaker 1: where you know, you actually start looking at the indicators 179 00:11:52,840 --> 00:11:58,440 Speaker 1: of armed political violence and they have most of them. 180 00:11:58,480 --> 00:12:01,560 Speaker 1: That that's the scary part. It's like, you know, we're 181 00:12:01,679 --> 00:12:04,760 Speaker 1: used to I guess you could say, looking through the 182 00:12:04,840 --> 00:12:10,760 Speaker 1: lens of working overseas, and we've all dealt with insurgencies 183 00:12:10,800 --> 00:12:14,360 Speaker 1: at different phases of our career and in different I 184 00:12:14,360 --> 00:12:17,600 Speaker 1: guess you could say, the levels. But we're not used 185 00:12:17,640 --> 00:12:22,800 Speaker 1: to seeing that on our own shores, aren't we. Well 186 00:12:23,320 --> 00:12:27,120 Speaker 1: Luckily that yes, historically that has been the case with 187 00:12:27,280 --> 00:12:30,760 Speaker 1: you know, with a few instances, and you know, and 188 00:12:30,800 --> 00:12:34,280 Speaker 1: again This is not to say that, hey, some nationwide 189 00:12:34,280 --> 00:12:36,920 Speaker 1: insurgencies is gonna kick off tomorrow. You look at these 190 00:12:36,920 --> 00:12:41,600 Speaker 1: groups and actually are small. They're geographically limited two areas 191 00:12:41,640 --> 00:12:43,720 Speaker 1: like Portland and Seattle. So it's not like they're in 192 00:12:44,200 --> 00:12:48,719 Speaker 1: central Nebraska, you know, in any in any large numbers. Um. 193 00:12:48,840 --> 00:12:50,320 Speaker 1: But yeah, so you know, one of the one of 194 00:12:50,320 --> 00:12:53,720 Speaker 1: the hallmarks of low intensity conflict is it's often regional. 195 00:12:53,920 --> 00:12:57,720 Speaker 1: That's often local or regional, and that comes directly from 196 00:12:57,800 --> 00:13:01,080 Speaker 1: the Army's own doctrine. So it's you know, it's kind 197 00:13:01,080 --> 00:13:03,440 Speaker 1: of been keeping with low intensity conflict that these things 198 00:13:03,480 --> 00:13:07,680 Speaker 1: really are regionalized, mainly to two urban environments and you know, 199 00:13:07,720 --> 00:13:12,160 Speaker 1: big metro areas. Okay, we're gonna get more to that 200 00:13:12,240 --> 00:13:14,320 Speaker 1: in a second, but first we have to take a 201 00:13:14,360 --> 00:13:17,360 Speaker 1: short break. Have any of you our listeners out there 202 00:13:17,400 --> 00:13:20,480 Speaker 1: and readers of software dot com and have you ever 203 00:13:20,520 --> 00:13:23,720 Speaker 1: searched for something online that you really didn't want others 204 00:13:23,800 --> 00:13:26,280 Speaker 1: knowing about. I know most of you are probably thinking, 205 00:13:26,760 --> 00:13:30,120 Speaker 1: why don't you just use incognito mode? But you know, 206 00:13:30,320 --> 00:13:33,520 Speaker 1: let me tell you something. 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So now we're back to our our podcast 232 00:15:09,760 --> 00:15:13,400 Speaker 1: here we're talking with Sam Copper. We're talking about some 233 00:15:14,880 --> 00:15:17,800 Speaker 1: interesting and a little bit alarming stuff that's going on 234 00:15:17,880 --> 00:15:21,600 Speaker 1: in the United States right now. Sam, you know where 235 00:15:21,640 --> 00:15:23,640 Speaker 1: you know, you were talking about how some of these 236 00:15:23,680 --> 00:15:30,400 Speaker 1: groups are getting involved and organized and they're regional. How 237 00:15:30,440 --> 00:15:35,600 Speaker 1: can some people, uh, you know, are average American I 238 00:15:35,640 --> 00:15:40,000 Speaker 1: guess you could say, who's not trained like yourself, you know, 239 00:15:40,560 --> 00:15:44,440 Speaker 1: come to recognize and maybe report some of the stuff 240 00:15:44,480 --> 00:15:51,040 Speaker 1: they're seeing what's going on. Well, yeah, I'm a big 241 00:15:51,080 --> 00:15:55,280 Speaker 1: advocate on intelligence collection at all levels. I mean in 242 00:15:55,280 --> 00:15:57,520 Speaker 1: the army, you know, we said every soldier is a sensor, 243 00:15:58,160 --> 00:16:01,520 Speaker 1: and in your community. I I'm very interested in my 244 00:16:01,680 --> 00:16:04,960 Speaker 1: level of preparedness. So every member of my community is 245 00:16:05,000 --> 00:16:11,120 Speaker 1: a sensor. One way that that more people can kind 246 00:16:11,120 --> 00:16:14,320 Speaker 1: of get involved and maintain some situational awareness on this. 247 00:16:14,520 --> 00:16:16,600 Speaker 1: I mean, obviously they can subscribe to what we do. 248 00:16:16,760 --> 00:16:18,840 Speaker 1: We can't cover everything, and we can't you know, we 249 00:16:18,920 --> 00:16:22,280 Speaker 1: can't be in the weeds in every locale So one 250 00:16:22,320 --> 00:16:24,400 Speaker 1: way is to simply just get online or do a 251 00:16:24,440 --> 00:16:27,600 Speaker 1: Google search for some of these groups and you can 252 00:16:27,640 --> 00:16:32,400 Speaker 1: monitor them yourself in the local area. What we specialize 253 00:16:32,440 --> 00:16:35,520 Speaker 1: is putting the puzzle pieces together and kind of explaining 254 00:16:35,520 --> 00:16:38,240 Speaker 1: this so what and also the what's next for some 255 00:16:38,320 --> 00:16:42,160 Speaker 1: of these groups. But that's probably the best way that 256 00:16:42,200 --> 00:16:44,440 Speaker 1: more people can get involved in kind of stay aware 257 00:16:44,760 --> 00:16:48,400 Speaker 1: of what what their local groups are doing. You know, 258 00:16:48,480 --> 00:16:53,240 Speaker 1: and you talked about on your UM on one of 259 00:16:53,240 --> 00:16:57,400 Speaker 1: your podcasts, how there's different levels where you can see 260 00:16:57,440 --> 00:17:02,000 Speaker 1: things from a strategic or tactical level, and uh, maybe 261 00:17:02,040 --> 00:17:05,320 Speaker 1: some of our listeners out there now, can you talk 262 00:17:05,400 --> 00:17:09,919 Speaker 1: them through some of the more tactical level UM, you know, 263 00:17:10,240 --> 00:17:14,080 Speaker 1: indicators that they might see in their communities that could 264 00:17:14,119 --> 00:17:20,440 Speaker 1: give them some pause. Sure. Well, one thing I would 265 00:17:20,520 --> 00:17:26,320 Speaker 1: begin to look at is radical revolutionary political groups or rallies. 266 00:17:27,359 --> 00:17:29,800 Speaker 1: So there's a couple of websites you can go to 267 00:17:29,800 --> 00:17:32,640 Speaker 1: meet up dot com or a lot of times these 268 00:17:32,640 --> 00:17:34,679 Speaker 1: things will be posted on Facebook. And if you just 269 00:17:34,720 --> 00:17:38,960 Speaker 1: look at political rallies or anything like that, UM and 270 00:17:39,119 --> 00:17:43,800 Speaker 1: you start digging into who's organizing it and which organizations, 271 00:17:44,280 --> 00:17:47,680 Speaker 1: which organizations are involved, will give you a little better 272 00:17:47,720 --> 00:17:51,679 Speaker 1: idea about what groups may be in your area. Um, 273 00:17:51,760 --> 00:17:55,040 Speaker 1: but you know, if there are uh, if there are 274 00:17:55,920 --> 00:18:01,240 Speaker 1: revolutionary socialist groups, are radical groups, um. You know, even 275 00:18:01,320 --> 00:18:06,240 Speaker 1: some of these fascist groups have some level of local, um, 276 00:18:06,280 --> 00:18:09,480 Speaker 1: local presence, and sometimes that stuff is on social media. 277 00:18:09,560 --> 00:18:11,719 Speaker 1: So that's I would say, that's a very good starting 278 00:18:11,720 --> 00:18:14,680 Speaker 1: point to get the kind of the tactical level view 279 00:18:14,720 --> 00:18:17,520 Speaker 1: of your area. Now that's not going to give you everything, 280 00:18:18,680 --> 00:18:22,480 Speaker 1: and you know, at a certain level, I actually would 281 00:18:22,520 --> 00:18:27,399 Speaker 1: advise for just for the interests of general preparedness, um, 282 00:18:27,440 --> 00:18:30,000 Speaker 1: you know, to do an area study and include these 283 00:18:30,440 --> 00:18:33,879 Speaker 1: groups and really dig into who is actually in your area, 284 00:18:33,920 --> 00:18:35,640 Speaker 1: because what happens is, you know a lot of times 285 00:18:35,640 --> 00:18:38,440 Speaker 1: people think, well, this is in Portland and Seattle and 286 00:18:38,720 --> 00:18:40,359 Speaker 1: it may be on the other side of their town 287 00:18:40,520 --> 00:18:42,840 Speaker 1: where it maybe you know, the next big city away, 288 00:18:42,880 --> 00:18:47,960 Speaker 1: there will be some large presence. So we we can't. Yeah, 289 00:18:47,960 --> 00:18:50,399 Speaker 1: so we can't. We can't assume that this type of 290 00:18:50,400 --> 00:18:52,639 Speaker 1: stuff is not going on in our area, especially if 291 00:18:52,640 --> 00:18:57,639 Speaker 1: we're not looking forward actively. Okay, Yeah, I know in 292 00:18:57,800 --> 00:19:01,960 Speaker 1: your website you talked you know, uh, suspicious vehicles and 293 00:19:02,000 --> 00:19:05,440 Speaker 1: people that start showing up in your towns and and 294 00:19:05,760 --> 00:19:08,680 Speaker 1: what constitutes soft targets. I know a lot of people 295 00:19:08,720 --> 00:19:12,280 Speaker 1: don't understand when they hear the term soft target, it 296 00:19:12,359 --> 00:19:16,400 Speaker 1: doesn't always necessarily mean that just something that's easily accessible, 297 00:19:16,440 --> 00:19:19,320 Speaker 1: but something that's a very low risk and perhaps a 298 00:19:19,400 --> 00:19:23,520 Speaker 1: high reward type of target. And some of the other 299 00:19:23,560 --> 00:19:27,719 Speaker 1: things you talked about I thought was interesting was you know, 300 00:19:27,800 --> 00:19:31,399 Speaker 1: you start seeing gun stores being robbed in your area, 301 00:19:31,840 --> 00:19:35,920 Speaker 1: that's always uh, some kind of indicator, I'm sure, And 302 00:19:36,600 --> 00:19:39,080 Speaker 1: you know, this is some stuff that we're seeing more 303 00:19:39,080 --> 00:19:44,159 Speaker 1: and more of across the United States. So, um, how 304 00:19:44,359 --> 00:19:48,880 Speaker 1: how active are you guys across the country right now? Well, 305 00:19:49,119 --> 00:19:52,240 Speaker 1: we have seen a we have seen a drop off 306 00:19:52,240 --> 00:19:55,000 Speaker 1: in activity from a lot of these groups because they 307 00:19:55,040 --> 00:20:00,879 Speaker 1: were organizing and planning to have you to to mass 308 00:20:00,920 --> 00:20:04,960 Speaker 1: mobilize and go and put on these protests, and that's 309 00:20:05,040 --> 00:20:06,600 Speaker 1: kind of been taken off the table, and a lot 310 00:20:06,640 --> 00:20:09,760 Speaker 1: of these groups really have I'm gone quiet, but but 311 00:20:09,800 --> 00:20:12,119 Speaker 1: they're not going to disappear, right, I Mean, it's only 312 00:20:12,440 --> 00:20:15,119 Speaker 1: some of these groups. They still they called Biden a 313 00:20:15,160 --> 00:20:18,639 Speaker 1: fascist and they're getting ready to you know, combat the 314 00:20:18,680 --> 00:20:22,760 Speaker 1: next fascist that was elected president the United States. You know, Um, 315 00:20:24,880 --> 00:20:28,560 Speaker 1: and so you know, um, a couple of things. If 316 00:20:28,600 --> 00:20:30,560 Speaker 1: I if I can just go back to that gun 317 00:20:30,600 --> 00:20:34,119 Speaker 1: store robbery example. You know, you look at early you 318 00:20:34,119 --> 00:20:37,760 Speaker 1: look at early stage indicators of of insurgency that's actually 319 00:20:37,760 --> 00:20:42,280 Speaker 1: moving towards armed conflict. And since that didn't happen in 320 00:20:42,440 --> 00:20:50,120 Speaker 1: November at least not yet due to President Trump being reelected, um, 321 00:20:50,160 --> 00:20:53,000 Speaker 1: you know it maybe it may be years off, who knows, 322 00:20:53,000 --> 00:20:55,040 Speaker 1: it could be days or months off until there's a trigger. 323 00:20:55,520 --> 00:20:59,160 Speaker 1: But what what typically happens with these insurgencies is they 324 00:20:59,200 --> 00:21:02,000 Speaker 1: start small, and they don't have a lot of funding, 325 00:21:03,119 --> 00:21:07,600 Speaker 1: and they have material requirements that they can't fund themselves, 326 00:21:08,480 --> 00:21:10,000 Speaker 1: and so what do they do. You know, they go 327 00:21:10,119 --> 00:21:13,840 Speaker 1: knock off a gun store and you know they've insurgencies. 328 00:21:13,880 --> 00:21:16,320 Speaker 1: You know, they've robbed banks and they've you know, hit 329 00:21:16,359 --> 00:21:19,280 Speaker 1: these um you know you talked about soft targets with 330 00:21:19,320 --> 00:21:21,920 Speaker 1: a high reward. You know, they've gone out and they've 331 00:21:21,920 --> 00:21:26,080 Speaker 1: had to acquire the things that they need to sustain 332 00:21:26,240 --> 00:21:29,600 Speaker 1: themselves or to sustain their operations. So that really is 333 00:21:30,000 --> 00:21:32,520 Speaker 1: um you know, even though it doesn't seem likely right 334 00:21:32,520 --> 00:21:36,760 Speaker 1: now in the future that those absolutely would be very 335 00:21:36,800 --> 00:21:42,080 Speaker 1: good indicators of potential or future organized political violence if 336 00:21:42,080 --> 00:21:44,800 Speaker 1: you did start seeing those things happen. You know, I 337 00:21:45,359 --> 00:21:49,960 Speaker 1: saw um one of your online posts you talked about 338 00:21:49,960 --> 00:21:53,600 Speaker 1: setting up a local intelligence network, and I know it's 339 00:21:53,760 --> 00:21:58,000 Speaker 1: on your online course, but can you talk about a 340 00:21:58,040 --> 00:22:01,400 Speaker 1: little bit about this for people who are interested in 341 00:22:01,520 --> 00:22:08,040 Speaker 1: doing this. Yeah, absolutely so. In addition to running Forward Observer, 342 00:22:08,119 --> 00:22:13,560 Speaker 1: I'd also do training courses on intelligence really for preparedness. 343 00:22:13,840 --> 00:22:16,720 Speaker 1: You know, I live in central Texas. We have flooding, 344 00:22:17,359 --> 00:22:21,320 Speaker 1: and people out west have wildfires, and there's all sorts 345 00:22:21,320 --> 00:22:24,800 Speaker 1: of systems disruption. I think we really, I think the 346 00:22:24,800 --> 00:22:28,000 Speaker 1: next decade in this country is gonna be way more difficult. 347 00:22:28,240 --> 00:22:30,000 Speaker 1: The next twenty years are gonna be way more difficult 348 00:22:30,000 --> 00:22:34,840 Speaker 1: than the last twenty years. And so I'm I want 349 00:22:34,840 --> 00:22:38,800 Speaker 1: to encourage everyone to think about the level of preparedness 350 00:22:38,800 --> 00:22:41,200 Speaker 1: and to think about, um, you know, what they would 351 00:22:41,240 --> 00:22:44,440 Speaker 1: do in an emergency situation. And one of the best 352 00:22:44,440 --> 00:22:50,240 Speaker 1: things you can do is to have access to timely relevant, accurate, specific, 353 00:22:50,359 --> 00:22:55,560 Speaker 1: and predictive or actionable intelligence. And one way to get 354 00:22:55,600 --> 00:22:58,720 Speaker 1: started in that is to simply start a neighborhood watch 355 00:22:58,800 --> 00:23:03,119 Speaker 1: or maybe join one. If one thing you can do is, 356 00:23:03,160 --> 00:23:06,199 Speaker 1: you know, get a baseline of what local crime there is, 357 00:23:07,359 --> 00:23:09,560 Speaker 1: and you know who's involved in that kind of crime, 358 00:23:10,119 --> 00:23:13,280 Speaker 1: start a neighborhood watch, work with you know, you can 359 00:23:13,280 --> 00:23:16,280 Speaker 1: bring into a local sheriff's deputy to talk about, Hey, 360 00:23:16,320 --> 00:23:18,440 Speaker 1: here the gangs that operate in your area, and here 361 00:23:18,520 --> 00:23:23,800 Speaker 1: the you know, here's uh the drug trafficking that's that's 362 00:23:23,840 --> 00:23:26,240 Speaker 1: going on or whatever whatever whatever types of crime or 363 00:23:26,280 --> 00:23:28,879 Speaker 1: in your area, and then you can utilize I mean, 364 00:23:28,920 --> 00:23:30,800 Speaker 1: you could really go door to door and look, I'm 365 00:23:30,800 --> 00:23:34,000 Speaker 1: a very ground level kind of prepared in this guy. 366 00:23:34,040 --> 00:23:36,480 Speaker 1: Like I've I've gone to every single one of my neighbors, 367 00:23:36,520 --> 00:23:41,040 Speaker 1: introduced myself, talked to them, traded contact information, got them 368 00:23:41,040 --> 00:23:45,040 Speaker 1: to be involved at least passively involved in a neighborhood watch. 369 00:23:46,800 --> 00:23:49,400 Speaker 1: And you know, that's something that I really would recommend 370 00:23:49,440 --> 00:23:52,000 Speaker 1: a lot of people to do because, um, you know, 371 00:23:52,080 --> 00:23:54,919 Speaker 1: for in the PP, in the preparedness community, a lot 372 00:23:54,920 --> 00:23:57,119 Speaker 1: of people are who are afraid about an MP or 373 00:23:57,200 --> 00:24:01,200 Speaker 1: societal or economic collapse, you know, or nuclear war, I 374 00:24:01,240 --> 00:24:04,359 Speaker 1: don't know, whatever. And the fact of the matter is, 375 00:24:04,400 --> 00:24:07,000 Speaker 1: if you don't know your neighbors and you don't have 376 00:24:07,040 --> 00:24:11,320 Speaker 1: any organization, any kind of network built locally, then you 377 00:24:11,359 --> 00:24:13,960 Speaker 1: may be on your own in a worst case scenario 378 00:24:14,040 --> 00:24:17,359 Speaker 1: if that were to happen. Um, and even if even 379 00:24:17,400 --> 00:24:21,119 Speaker 1: if nothing bad we're going to happen, just having a 380 00:24:21,160 --> 00:24:24,520 Speaker 1: community that you can belong to and notice that, oh, 381 00:24:24,640 --> 00:24:29,080 Speaker 1: you know, um, we've been seeing this vehicle come up 382 00:24:29,080 --> 00:24:31,520 Speaker 1: and down our street. Maybe it's a you know, maybe 383 00:24:31,520 --> 00:24:34,720 Speaker 1: they're doing pre operational surveillance to try to find houses 384 00:24:34,760 --> 00:24:36,720 Speaker 1: to rob or presents to steal because you know, it's 385 00:24:36,800 --> 00:24:40,520 Speaker 1: Christmas time coming up, and you know, say, hey, if 386 00:24:40,560 --> 00:24:43,280 Speaker 1: they can pass that vehicle description onto me, or maybe 387 00:24:43,320 --> 00:24:45,320 Speaker 1: you know, we can pass it onto the police department 388 00:24:45,320 --> 00:24:47,439 Speaker 1: and they say, oh, we've gotten several reports of that vehicle. 389 00:24:48,119 --> 00:24:50,240 Speaker 1: Information makes the world go around, we said in the Army. 390 00:24:50,280 --> 00:24:56,840 Speaker 1: Intelligence drives the fight, and intelligence drives situational awareness and 391 00:24:57,080 --> 00:25:00,239 Speaker 1: decision making as well, and it really informs us of 392 00:25:00,240 --> 00:25:03,760 Speaker 1: our security situation. So I guess my my real message 393 00:25:03,760 --> 00:25:05,879 Speaker 1: is if you don't have intelligence, then you're going to 394 00:25:05,960 --> 00:25:08,840 Speaker 1: be you know, deaf and blind as it were, in 395 00:25:08,920 --> 00:25:12,360 Speaker 1: an emergency or in some type of local conflict scenario, 396 00:25:12,760 --> 00:25:15,640 Speaker 1: which is why we've got to build local intelligence that 397 00:25:15,840 --> 00:25:18,399 Speaker 1: really can start with the neighborhood watch. That really is 398 00:25:18,440 --> 00:25:21,560 Speaker 1: the most effective, most immediate way to begin a local 399 00:25:21,600 --> 00:25:26,880 Speaker 1: intelligence network. Okay, and a couple of other things that 400 00:25:26,920 --> 00:25:30,480 Speaker 1: you that you wrote about. I thought that hits the 401 00:25:30,560 --> 00:25:32,719 Speaker 1: nail on the head for especially for the people who 402 00:25:32,800 --> 00:25:37,040 Speaker 1: aren't experiencing this focus your efforts. And you talked about 403 00:25:37,040 --> 00:25:43,720 Speaker 1: how the sixty model for collecting and and and information 404 00:25:43,760 --> 00:25:49,040 Speaker 1: coming through the news being deliberate and developing people not sources. 405 00:25:49,119 --> 00:25:52,520 Speaker 1: That's the one that I really like because a lot 406 00:25:52,560 --> 00:25:56,960 Speaker 1: of people they don't understand the difference. And uh, can 407 00:25:57,000 --> 00:26:04,400 Speaker 1: you talk our listeners through that? Yeah? Absolutely. Information overload 408 00:26:04,520 --> 00:26:07,959 Speaker 1: is one of the biggest complaints that I see. You know, 409 00:26:08,000 --> 00:26:09,720 Speaker 1: it's gonna to the point where people turn off the 410 00:26:09,760 --> 00:26:12,399 Speaker 1: news and they don't even pay attention. And even in 411 00:26:12,440 --> 00:26:15,120 Speaker 1: the preparedness community, as I go around and work with 412 00:26:15,560 --> 00:26:20,640 Speaker 1: you know, prepper groups or these groups out there, they're 413 00:26:20,680 --> 00:26:24,680 Speaker 1: so concerned on on the national or the strategic level, 414 00:26:24,800 --> 00:26:27,399 Speaker 1: like strategic threats like we're with China or you know, 415 00:26:27,960 --> 00:26:31,000 Speaker 1: Russia or North Korea, whatever. And what I explained to 416 00:26:31,000 --> 00:26:33,760 Speaker 1: people is that during an emergency, what's gonna matter most 417 00:26:33,880 --> 00:26:36,080 Speaker 1: is not what happened, what's happening A thousand or five 418 00:26:36,119 --> 00:26:38,800 Speaker 1: thousand miles away, but what's happening like a hundred or 419 00:26:38,800 --> 00:26:43,960 Speaker 1: five feet away, and so model I say, you know, 420 00:26:44,880 --> 00:26:47,600 Speaker 1: if you do suffer from information overload where you want 421 00:26:47,640 --> 00:26:51,280 Speaker 1: to be really prepared, the solution here is to spend 422 00:26:51,400 --> 00:26:55,360 Speaker 1: six of your time looking at local news and local issues. 423 00:26:56,359 --> 00:26:58,720 Speaker 1: I can't affect what's going on in d C. I 424 00:26:58,760 --> 00:27:01,640 Speaker 1: can affect what's going on in my on my city council, 425 00:27:02,720 --> 00:27:06,000 Speaker 1: especially with the kind of network building and community organizing 426 00:27:06,080 --> 00:27:11,639 Speaker 1: we've been doing here locally. Beyond that, look at the 427 00:27:12,040 --> 00:27:15,960 Speaker 1: county or the state region, and then ten percent look 428 00:27:16,000 --> 00:27:19,000 Speaker 1: at the national level, because there's just you know, I mean, 429 00:27:19,000 --> 00:27:21,160 Speaker 1: you know how the news is. There's so much stuff 430 00:27:21,160 --> 00:27:23,840 Speaker 1: out there, and it's it's burning up the press today 431 00:27:23,840 --> 00:27:25,320 Speaker 1: and in twenty four hours it may as well have 432 00:27:25,359 --> 00:27:28,159 Speaker 1: been twenty four years ago because they've moved on to 433 00:27:28,240 --> 00:27:31,160 Speaker 1: the next point of shock and all or the next 434 00:27:31,320 --> 00:27:34,160 Speaker 1: uh you know, thing to get everyone riled up, when 435 00:27:34,160 --> 00:27:36,400 Speaker 1: in reality, things that really to get to really get 436 00:27:36,480 --> 00:27:40,119 Speaker 1: riled up are you know, raising property taxes or you know, 437 00:27:40,200 --> 00:27:43,480 Speaker 1: whatever other hair brained thing you're local city council or 438 00:27:44,119 --> 00:27:47,879 Speaker 1: or county commission are doing. So six look at the 439 00:27:47,880 --> 00:27:50,720 Speaker 1: local level, look at the county or state or maybe 440 00:27:50,760 --> 00:27:52,879 Speaker 1: regional level, and ten percent look at the national or 441 00:27:52,920 --> 00:27:55,280 Speaker 1: strategic level. Really, at the end of the day, what 442 00:27:55,320 --> 00:27:58,600 Speaker 1: matters is what happens locally, and it doesn't matter, you know, 443 00:27:58,960 --> 00:28:02,119 Speaker 1: it doesn't matter how well you understand or war with China, 444 00:28:02,560 --> 00:28:06,239 Speaker 1: or you know, even a national civil war, some kind 445 00:28:06,280 --> 00:28:09,439 Speaker 1: of domestic conflict. If you don't understand what's going to 446 00:28:09,480 --> 00:28:13,240 Speaker 1: happen locally, then you're really not prepared. You may be 447 00:28:13,280 --> 00:28:16,120 Speaker 1: well informed on a national level, but if you don't 448 00:28:16,160 --> 00:28:18,960 Speaker 1: know what's going on in your own community, uh, you 449 00:28:19,040 --> 00:28:25,760 Speaker 1: really do risk strategic shock. Yeah. And you know, one 450 00:28:25,800 --> 00:28:29,760 Speaker 1: of the interesting things that tend the news a lot lately, 451 00:28:30,640 --> 00:28:34,760 Speaker 1: and I hear it locally because you talk to people 452 00:28:35,560 --> 00:28:38,200 Speaker 1: and everyone says, well, if we go to war with Iran, 453 00:28:38,720 --> 00:28:41,080 Speaker 1: they don't have any kind of military that we need 454 00:28:41,120 --> 00:28:45,040 Speaker 1: to worry about. Uh So, what happens if we go 455 00:28:45,080 --> 00:28:47,280 Speaker 1: to war with Iran? Nothing will happen to us here. 456 00:28:47,920 --> 00:28:51,880 Speaker 1: And that's not really true because I think what a 457 00:28:51,920 --> 00:28:56,160 Speaker 1: lot of people don't understand, and I've seen you touch 458 00:28:56,240 --> 00:28:59,920 Speaker 1: upon this on on your YouTube video, was the fact 459 00:29:00,000 --> 00:29:04,240 Speaker 1: a cyber war has already happened in this country with 460 00:29:04,360 --> 00:29:07,520 Speaker 1: the Iranians. Not saying We're gonna go to war with Iran, 461 00:29:07,680 --> 00:29:11,560 Speaker 1: I'm just using as an excuse. Cyber war can happen. 462 00:29:11,680 --> 00:29:17,120 Speaker 1: It can affect you locally. And you know, of course 463 00:29:17,160 --> 00:29:21,480 Speaker 1: there's always the possibility of proxy groups and terrorists as 464 00:29:22,200 --> 00:29:27,360 Speaker 1: uh incidents in our bigger cities. But um, you know, uh, 465 00:29:27,920 --> 00:29:30,720 Speaker 1: can you fill in our listeners a little bit about 466 00:29:30,760 --> 00:29:34,360 Speaker 1: what the possibility of what some of the cyberg type 467 00:29:34,360 --> 00:29:41,560 Speaker 1: of crimes could influence them in their local communities. Yeah, absolutely, 468 00:29:41,560 --> 00:29:45,680 Speaker 1: you know, Uh, David Kilcolin has the best take on this, 469 00:29:46,400 --> 00:29:52,360 Speaker 1: and he he writes, oh, man, I forget, he's got 470 00:29:52,360 --> 00:29:54,880 Speaker 1: three or four really great books. I forget if it's 471 00:29:54,920 --> 00:29:57,440 Speaker 1: out of the mountains or the acts. Maybe it's in 472 00:29:57,440 --> 00:30:01,640 Speaker 1: the accidental guerrilla Actually, um, he actually writes about this 473 00:30:01,880 --> 00:30:06,320 Speaker 1: paradox is that the United States in terms of conventional 474 00:30:06,360 --> 00:30:13,080 Speaker 1: military has been so strong that we have really encouraged 475 00:30:13,640 --> 00:30:18,240 Speaker 1: our near peer competitors or are smaller nations in the 476 00:30:18,280 --> 00:30:22,040 Speaker 1: access of evil to pursue asymmetric means of war fighting. 477 00:30:22,920 --> 00:30:25,920 Speaker 1: And given you know, if we if we look at Rome, 478 00:30:26,640 --> 00:30:29,240 Speaker 1: you know, Rome had fifteen thousand miles the Roman Empire 479 00:30:29,280 --> 00:30:32,840 Speaker 1: had fifteen thousand miles of paved road and that was 480 00:30:32,920 --> 00:30:36,200 Speaker 1: their strategic strength because as long as they could protect 481 00:30:36,240 --> 00:30:39,240 Speaker 1: those roads, they could protect commerce. And that's how they 482 00:30:39,680 --> 00:30:42,920 Speaker 1: that's how the Roman Empire became so wealthy is through 483 00:30:42,960 --> 00:30:46,680 Speaker 1: trade and commerce. Well, the problem is is Rome got 484 00:30:46,720 --> 00:30:49,920 Speaker 1: to the later stages of empire and heading into its 485 00:30:50,040 --> 00:30:53,520 Speaker 1: collapse phase. Which I'm not trying to rock the boat 486 00:30:53,560 --> 00:30:56,040 Speaker 1: too much, but I actually I'm very open to the 487 00:30:56,080 --> 00:30:59,760 Speaker 1: potential that the US Empire is already in a collapse phase. 488 00:31:00,840 --> 00:31:02,080 Speaker 1: But you look at that and all of a sudden, 489 00:31:02,120 --> 00:31:06,280 Speaker 1: fifteen thousand miles of paved roads becomes a strategic disadvantage 490 00:31:06,560 --> 00:31:09,680 Speaker 1: when you are being invaded by you know what, who 491 00:31:09,720 --> 00:31:14,840 Speaker 1: are they called barbarians in using those roads to invade? Well, 492 00:31:14,880 --> 00:31:17,480 Speaker 1: I look at the United States and the interconnectedness and 493 00:31:17,480 --> 00:31:20,800 Speaker 1: our dependence on the internet in the same in the 494 00:31:20,840 --> 00:31:23,720 Speaker 1: same way. Now, we do have a the world's most 495 00:31:23,800 --> 00:31:30,080 Speaker 1: advanced capabilities, but that does not mean that we are 496 00:31:30,160 --> 00:31:32,400 Speaker 1: not susceptible here. So, yes, if we were to get 497 00:31:32,400 --> 00:31:35,240 Speaker 1: into a war with China or with Iran or North 498 00:31:35,320 --> 00:31:38,800 Speaker 1: Korea or whomever, I think there's a very good chance 499 00:31:39,400 --> 00:31:42,280 Speaker 1: then ordered, Well, I think there's a very good chance 500 00:31:42,360 --> 00:31:46,440 Speaker 1: that that cyberwar and cyber attacks and exploitation will be 501 00:31:46,440 --> 00:31:47,760 Speaker 1: a part of that. I mean, let's be honest, a 502 00:31:47,840 --> 00:31:50,960 Speaker 1: lot of these countries have already conducted or declared cyber 503 00:31:51,000 --> 00:31:54,719 Speaker 1: war against the United States. So what that means for 504 00:31:54,800 --> 00:32:00,960 Speaker 1: US is maybe these countries could disrupt our Internet, disrupt 505 00:32:00,960 --> 00:32:05,520 Speaker 1: our commerce, disrupt our the power, things that can make 506 00:32:05,560 --> 00:32:08,720 Speaker 1: a lot of people's lives very difficult. And you know, 507 00:32:08,720 --> 00:32:12,320 Speaker 1: who knows, um who knows how bad these attacks might be. 508 00:32:12,400 --> 00:32:15,560 Speaker 1: I just want to throw out there, Steve, as you said, Yeah, 509 00:32:15,640 --> 00:32:18,240 Speaker 1: just because we're fighting in some c conflict with some 510 00:32:18,320 --> 00:32:21,280 Speaker 1: foreign country does not mean that they won't bring the 511 00:32:21,320 --> 00:32:24,280 Speaker 1: fight here, and that would include a tax on critical 512 00:32:24,320 --> 00:32:28,640 Speaker 1: infrastructure and you know, using our our commercial roads to 513 00:32:28,760 --> 00:32:34,240 Speaker 1: attack a soft target, which at this point the the 514 00:32:34,320 --> 00:32:38,920 Speaker 1: America would be in terms of cyber conflict. Yeah, I 515 00:32:38,960 --> 00:32:44,520 Speaker 1: think you mentioned there was a how I'm drawing, I 516 00:32:44,560 --> 00:32:46,600 Speaker 1: wrote down my notes and I don't have it in 517 00:32:46,640 --> 00:32:49,120 Speaker 1: front of me. I think you said something that there 518 00:32:49,200 --> 00:32:52,440 Speaker 1: was a cyber attack on I think it was in 519 00:32:52,840 --> 00:32:56,520 Speaker 1: a community in New York about there was Yeah, a 520 00:32:56,640 --> 00:33:01,320 Speaker 1: water system or a damned system. Yeah. This In two 521 00:33:01,320 --> 00:33:07,880 Speaker 1: thousand thirteen, this Iranian backed hacking team gained access to 522 00:33:07,960 --> 00:33:10,880 Speaker 1: a dam in upstate New York, the Bowman Damn. Well, 523 00:33:10,880 --> 00:33:12,800 Speaker 1: it turns out it actually wasn't a damn. It was 524 00:33:12,800 --> 00:33:18,160 Speaker 1: basically like a sluice gate for irrigation. And there investigators 525 00:33:18,200 --> 00:33:20,680 Speaker 1: are trying to figure out why why the Iranians attack 526 00:33:20,880 --> 00:33:23,360 Speaker 1: this particular thing. It's it's an upstate New York, it's 527 00:33:23,360 --> 00:33:26,800 Speaker 1: not a particular strategic value. And they kind of settled 528 00:33:26,840 --> 00:33:29,800 Speaker 1: on two different scenarios. Either a, I think there's a 529 00:33:29,800 --> 00:33:32,440 Speaker 1: Bowman damn in like Arizona or something like that, so 530 00:33:32,600 --> 00:33:35,800 Speaker 1: maybe they meant to attack a different damn by the 531 00:33:35,840 --> 00:33:39,360 Speaker 1: same name um. Or the other thing is they just said, hey, 532 00:33:39,400 --> 00:33:41,280 Speaker 1: this is a kind of a dry run, like what 533 00:33:41,360 --> 00:33:45,000 Speaker 1: would it actually take to hack into critical infrastructure in 534 00:33:45,040 --> 00:33:48,280 Speaker 1: the United States. Well, the FB, the FBI and DHS 535 00:33:48,360 --> 00:33:51,160 Speaker 1: and n S A, you know, came out and I 536 00:33:51,200 --> 00:33:55,680 Speaker 1: think in like or maybe they charged a number of 537 00:33:55,680 --> 00:34:00,440 Speaker 1: individuals Iranians for for overdoing this. And really, to me, 538 00:34:00,520 --> 00:34:03,520 Speaker 1: this is kind of like a proof of concept. We 539 00:34:03,600 --> 00:34:06,120 Speaker 1: know the we know kind of the untold damage that 540 00:34:06,200 --> 00:34:10,000 Speaker 1: could be done in cyber tax against the United States, 541 00:34:11,480 --> 00:34:14,239 Speaker 1: and so yeah, that's that was that one particular thing, 542 00:34:14,400 --> 00:34:17,080 Speaker 1: and not just that, but you know, Iranian back hackers 543 00:34:17,120 --> 00:34:21,759 Speaker 1: they did denial service attacks on banks and UM and 544 00:34:21,840 --> 00:34:25,480 Speaker 1: some other other targets. Yeah, I just remember that one 545 00:34:25,880 --> 00:34:29,640 Speaker 1: specifically because I I pointed to that one because I 546 00:34:29,719 --> 00:34:33,880 Speaker 1: don't remember that reading about that. UM. I think you 547 00:34:33,920 --> 00:34:37,200 Speaker 1: said two thousand and thirteen, so I don't know where 548 00:34:37,239 --> 00:34:39,960 Speaker 1: I was seven years ago, but I don't remember hearing 549 00:34:40,000 --> 00:34:43,799 Speaker 1: about that. So that's something. As soon as I heard 550 00:34:43,840 --> 00:34:46,600 Speaker 1: that on the podcast, I was like, well, I'm gonna 551 00:34:46,640 --> 00:34:49,160 Speaker 1: have to look this one up because I don't remember that. 552 00:34:49,680 --> 00:34:54,000 Speaker 1: But you know, uh, now I'm jumping around a little 553 00:34:54,000 --> 00:34:57,520 Speaker 1: bit because you know, there's so many different things that 554 00:34:57,600 --> 00:35:00,440 Speaker 1: you've written about that I find interest thing, and you 555 00:35:00,520 --> 00:35:05,959 Speaker 1: talked about, you know, there's uh, you know, a possibility 556 00:35:06,000 --> 00:35:09,160 Speaker 1: for an insurgency in this own country, and you talked 557 00:35:09,200 --> 00:35:13,960 Speaker 1: about places like Portland and Seattle and the Irish troubles 558 00:35:14,040 --> 00:35:18,360 Speaker 1: that happened in Ireland and are we ready for a 559 00:35:18,440 --> 00:35:23,120 Speaker 1: counter We didn't do too well in counterinsurgency and Afghanistan, 560 00:35:23,120 --> 00:35:30,240 Speaker 1: are we ready for a possible one in this country? Well? 561 00:35:30,440 --> 00:35:33,840 Speaker 1: I would say no, right, now, but you taught you 562 00:35:33,920 --> 00:35:37,560 Speaker 1: bring up Afghanistan and actually see a parallel here. You know. 563 00:35:37,880 --> 00:35:40,880 Speaker 1: So I spent two years in Afghanistan, and I remember 564 00:35:40,920 --> 00:35:44,520 Speaker 1: being a specialist on my first tour in Afghanistan saying, 565 00:35:46,000 --> 00:35:49,640 Speaker 1: not really understanding how we are actually gonna quote unquote 566 00:35:49,640 --> 00:35:55,200 Speaker 1: win in Afghanistan. In you know, I kept I kept 567 00:35:55,239 --> 00:35:59,120 Speaker 1: seeing this information about green on Blue attacks and the 568 00:35:59,120 --> 00:36:02,719 Speaker 1: Taliban and info traded the A and A and UM 569 00:36:02,760 --> 00:36:07,000 Speaker 1: and the National police, and they were, you know, obviously 570 00:36:07,040 --> 00:36:11,839 Speaker 1: shooting American and Coalition ICE AFT soldiers, UM. And then 571 00:36:12,719 --> 00:36:15,319 Speaker 1: that was part of the problem. The other problem was 572 00:36:17,040 --> 00:36:22,279 Speaker 1: the corruption and the unwillingness or inability of our quote 573 00:36:22,360 --> 00:36:26,360 Speaker 1: unquote security partners in Afghanistan to meet the conditions that 574 00:36:26,400 --> 00:36:30,160 Speaker 1: were required for a US victory for U S counterinsurgency. 575 00:36:30,960 --> 00:36:33,719 Speaker 1: And so, you know, I look at Afghanistan and say, well, yeah, 576 00:36:33,760 --> 00:36:37,200 Speaker 1: a lot of mistakes were made. Um. It was was 577 00:36:37,280 --> 00:36:40,919 Speaker 1: kind of an instrumentable task to begin with, to set 578 00:36:41,000 --> 00:36:45,120 Speaker 1: up a functioning nation state democracy in Afghanistan. But I 579 00:36:45,160 --> 00:36:47,880 Speaker 1: looked at the at the government and the government's ties 580 00:36:47,920 --> 00:36:52,080 Speaker 1: with drug running and the Taliban and all these other problems, 581 00:36:52,880 --> 00:36:56,600 Speaker 1: and it's very difficult to win a counter insurgency when 582 00:36:56,600 --> 00:36:59,319 Speaker 1: you're security partners. Now this doesn't mean all of them, 583 00:36:59,400 --> 00:37:02,520 Speaker 1: but when you're scurity partners, aren't kind of meeting your 584 00:37:02,640 --> 00:37:05,520 Speaker 1: meeting the standard required to achieve victory. Well here's the thing. 585 00:37:05,719 --> 00:37:08,640 Speaker 1: Let's look at Portland. What was going on in Portland 586 00:37:08,719 --> 00:37:11,880 Speaker 1: over the summer. So you have these anarchists groups attacking 587 00:37:11,920 --> 00:37:15,800 Speaker 1: a federal courthouse, and so the Trump administration said, Okay, 588 00:37:15,880 --> 00:37:18,680 Speaker 1: we're gonna deploy bar Tech and US Marshall Service and 589 00:37:18,920 --> 00:37:22,480 Speaker 1: whatever other federal law enforcement to Portland. And and they 590 00:37:22,480 --> 00:37:24,560 Speaker 1: started snatching these dudes up off the street. You know, 591 00:37:24,600 --> 00:37:26,480 Speaker 1: I don't know if you saw the videos, but they 592 00:37:26,480 --> 00:37:29,399 Speaker 1: would literally grab one of these activists who was wanted for, 593 00:37:29,560 --> 00:37:31,720 Speaker 1: you know, fire bombing in the courthouse the night before, 594 00:37:32,440 --> 00:37:36,600 Speaker 1: they put him in a minivan and drive off. And 595 00:37:36,680 --> 00:37:39,920 Speaker 1: what did that do to the citizens of Portland? They 596 00:37:39,960 --> 00:37:43,280 Speaker 1: got very angry. And then you had moms and dad's 597 00:37:43,320 --> 00:37:47,160 Speaker 1: out there standing in between federal law enforcement and these 598 00:37:47,280 --> 00:37:52,480 Speaker 1: violent anarchists basically to protect them, saying, uh, we may 599 00:37:52,520 --> 00:37:54,600 Speaker 1: not love what these anarchists are doing, but we're not 600 00:37:54,600 --> 00:37:57,480 Speaker 1: gonna allow federal law enforcement to come into Portland and 601 00:37:57,560 --> 00:38:03,319 Speaker 1: do this to our Ferrett fellow Portlanders, and that is 602 00:38:03,520 --> 00:38:07,120 Speaker 1: a massive counterinsurgency failure. You know, looking at this just 603 00:38:07,200 --> 00:38:10,120 Speaker 1: from a third party, looking at at what federal law enforcement, 604 00:38:10,719 --> 00:38:13,319 Speaker 1: the consequences of their actions and the impact that they 605 00:38:13,320 --> 00:38:15,840 Speaker 1: had on the citizens of Portland, they they made the 606 00:38:15,880 --> 00:38:21,399 Speaker 1: problem much much worse. And Ted Wheeler, the this Portland mayor, 607 00:38:21,840 --> 00:38:25,440 Speaker 1: and Mike Schmidt, the Portland d A, and the city council, 608 00:38:25,800 --> 00:38:28,479 Speaker 1: they did not want federal law enforcement to come into 609 00:38:28,520 --> 00:38:32,799 Speaker 1: the city and to help put help put down this insurrection. 610 00:38:33,719 --> 00:38:38,000 Speaker 1: And so basically you had I don't want to call 611 00:38:38,040 --> 00:38:41,200 Speaker 1: him indigenous, but you know, you had these You had 612 00:38:41,239 --> 00:38:44,759 Speaker 1: these political figures who would not work with federal law 613 00:38:44,880 --> 00:38:47,840 Speaker 1: enforcement to achieve a counter insurgency victory, just like we 614 00:38:47,880 --> 00:38:51,920 Speaker 1: had in Afghanistan. Lots of problems with politicians over there 615 00:38:51,920 --> 00:38:54,880 Speaker 1: not working with the US to achieve a counter insurgency victory, 616 00:38:56,440 --> 00:39:01,160 Speaker 1: and they're parallels. So no, in a lot of places 617 00:39:01,200 --> 00:39:05,080 Speaker 1: like Portland's, you're not going to achieve a counterinsurgency victory 618 00:39:05,120 --> 00:39:08,800 Speaker 1: unless you have complete total buy in, or unless local 619 00:39:08,840 --> 00:39:12,080 Speaker 1: politicians are leading that effort, or local law enforcement is 620 00:39:12,160 --> 00:39:14,359 Speaker 1: leading that effort, and the politicians in Portland were not 621 00:39:14,440 --> 00:39:16,879 Speaker 1: willing to let that happen, which is why you had 622 00:39:17,520 --> 00:39:20,680 Speaker 1: I mean that stuff's long gone now, but billions I 623 00:39:20,680 --> 00:39:22,400 Speaker 1: don't know how much, but you know, maybe billions of 624 00:39:22,400 --> 00:39:25,719 Speaker 1: dollars worth of damage, and they just let it play out, 625 00:39:25,800 --> 00:39:29,520 Speaker 1: and that was their counter insurgency effort. It appeared, right. 626 00:39:29,600 --> 00:39:33,200 Speaker 1: I remember when all that was unfolding there a couple 627 00:39:33,239 --> 00:39:36,120 Speaker 1: of months ago. It wasn't even a couple of months ago, really, 628 00:39:36,200 --> 00:39:40,440 Speaker 1: but you know, I was watching that, and you know, 629 00:39:40,520 --> 00:39:46,120 Speaker 1: not only did they hate not support the effort to 630 00:39:46,239 --> 00:39:50,240 Speaker 1: put that, you know, the rioting and the looting down, 631 00:39:50,960 --> 00:39:56,040 Speaker 1: they actively worked against it. And um, I just thought 632 00:39:56,080 --> 00:39:59,520 Speaker 1: it made the situation there much much worse than it 633 00:39:59,560 --> 00:40:05,200 Speaker 1: could have been and should have been. Yeah, I mean, 634 00:40:05,200 --> 00:40:08,040 Speaker 1: I don't know who's in charge of of making those decisions, 635 00:40:08,360 --> 00:40:12,080 Speaker 1: either at DHS or d o J or wherever, but 636 00:40:12,440 --> 00:40:15,080 Speaker 1: the strong arm type of thing, you know, that's something 637 00:40:15,120 --> 00:40:19,200 Speaker 1: that there is no no colonel in the army who 638 00:40:19,200 --> 00:40:21,839 Speaker 1: would go, who would have gone to Afghanistan and said, yeah, 639 00:40:21,920 --> 00:40:24,279 Speaker 1: let's do that. That's a really good idea. Let's let's 640 00:40:24,280 --> 00:40:26,520 Speaker 1: piss off all the locals. As we tried to fight 641 00:40:26,520 --> 00:40:30,239 Speaker 1: against the Taliband. You know, so just like they violated 642 00:40:30,280 --> 00:40:33,000 Speaker 1: like basically rule number one of counterinsurgency, which is do 643 00:40:33,120 --> 00:40:36,879 Speaker 1: not make needless enemies. But that's exactly what we see 644 00:40:36,960 --> 00:40:41,680 Speaker 1: we saw federal law enforcement do in Portland. Yeah, that 645 00:40:41,800 --> 00:40:47,000 Speaker 1: was like total failure there on different levels. But it 646 00:40:47,080 --> 00:40:50,799 Speaker 1: was terrible what we saw going on there. And I 647 00:40:50,840 --> 00:40:54,080 Speaker 1: don't know what the answer was there, but it obviously 648 00:40:54,239 --> 00:40:57,360 Speaker 1: wasn't working what we were doing as as a country. 649 00:40:57,400 --> 00:40:59,360 Speaker 1: And I don't know whether it was just because of 650 00:41:00,239 --> 00:41:04,360 Speaker 1: the person in the White House or the fact that 651 00:41:04,360 --> 00:41:08,359 Speaker 1: that the people in the Northwest just have a deep 652 00:41:08,400 --> 00:41:13,120 Speaker 1: seated distrust of federal law enforce, but I don't know, 653 00:41:13,200 --> 00:41:19,640 Speaker 1: but it was I thought it was totally needless. Well 654 00:41:19,719 --> 00:41:22,239 Speaker 1: we go back to kill Colin and petray Us. And 655 00:41:22,280 --> 00:41:24,640 Speaker 1: by the way, I you know, they get some things right. 656 00:41:24,719 --> 00:41:26,880 Speaker 1: I personally think they get some things wrong. But in 657 00:41:26,920 --> 00:41:29,759 Speaker 1: their counter Insurgency Manual they say the media is an 658 00:41:29,760 --> 00:41:33,080 Speaker 1: asset of the enemy. And it just so happens that 659 00:41:33,160 --> 00:41:36,120 Speaker 1: in that specific instance, the media was not doing anything 660 00:41:36,160 --> 00:41:39,799 Speaker 1: to help the situation. The longer it goes on, the 661 00:41:39,840 --> 00:41:42,560 Speaker 1: more eyeballs they had, the more money they made through advertising. 662 00:41:42,560 --> 00:41:47,680 Speaker 1: And I think that also was part of the problem 663 00:41:47,719 --> 00:41:53,879 Speaker 1: because that the media was inflaming the situation m which 664 00:41:54,000 --> 00:41:55,759 Speaker 1: kill Colin and petray Us talk about. I mean, that's 665 00:41:55,760 --> 00:42:01,000 Speaker 1: another undeniable part of counterinsurgency is the information laying information 666 00:42:01,040 --> 00:42:05,200 Speaker 1: space right, and in the media. We look upon the 667 00:42:05,239 --> 00:42:09,200 Speaker 1: media as the enemy and counterinsurgency, but it should be 668 00:42:09,520 --> 00:42:13,480 Speaker 1: an ally and that that's where I think we we lose. 669 00:42:14,560 --> 00:42:18,359 Speaker 1: I think we lose that that part of the fight 670 00:42:18,480 --> 00:42:23,759 Speaker 1: every time. Yeah, I would even I'm gonna make some 671 00:42:23,840 --> 00:42:27,520 Speaker 1: of my friends angry, but I actually think the information 672 00:42:27,680 --> 00:42:31,279 Speaker 1: operations in Afghanistan was not particularly effective, and I really 673 00:42:31,280 --> 00:42:34,800 Speaker 1: wouldn't expect the federal government to get the IO piece 674 00:42:34,840 --> 00:42:39,840 Speaker 1: of this right either. So to go back and answer questions, no, 675 00:42:40,000 --> 00:42:43,200 Speaker 1: I really don't think the FEDS are prepared to fight 676 00:42:43,280 --> 00:42:49,640 Speaker 1: en counterinsurgency domestically, not yet at least. Okay, So, as 677 00:42:49,719 --> 00:42:53,920 Speaker 1: we're starting to wind up here for our podcast today 678 00:42:53,920 --> 00:42:57,759 Speaker 1: with Sam Culper, Sam uh, is there anything else that 679 00:42:57,840 --> 00:43:00,960 Speaker 1: we haven't touched on with your organization and what you 680 00:43:01,080 --> 00:43:04,440 Speaker 1: do and what you teach that we haven't touched on 681 00:43:04,880 --> 00:43:07,520 Speaker 1: up to this point that you'd like to inform our 682 00:43:07,520 --> 00:43:13,240 Speaker 1: readers about. Yeah. Sure, you know, if I could um 683 00:43:13,280 --> 00:43:17,480 Speaker 1: just define low intensity conflicts, so it exists under it 684 00:43:17,520 --> 00:43:20,640 Speaker 1: exists below the threshold of conventional warfare, so we're not 685 00:43:20,640 --> 00:43:24,240 Speaker 1: talking about tanks and bombers, but it is above routine 686 00:43:24,400 --> 00:43:27,720 Speaker 1: and peaceful competition. And I don't think there's anyone alive 687 00:43:27,800 --> 00:43:30,120 Speaker 1: in America today who would say that the United States 688 00:43:30,200 --> 00:43:33,279 Speaker 1: is at peace. There are some who would say that 689 00:43:33,280 --> 00:43:35,400 Speaker 1: we are at war, but we're really not at conventional 690 00:43:35,400 --> 00:43:38,000 Speaker 1: where we're actually at a low intensity conflict. And this 691 00:43:38,080 --> 00:43:42,080 Speaker 1: is kind of this this gray area between hot conflict 692 00:43:42,080 --> 00:43:47,040 Speaker 1: and a cold conflict, and violence or the kinectic part 693 00:43:47,160 --> 00:43:49,880 Speaker 1: of this is actually not the most important part of 694 00:43:49,920 --> 00:43:54,520 Speaker 1: a low intensity conflict. Low intensity conflict is fought among 695 00:43:54,560 --> 00:43:58,840 Speaker 1: the in political warfare and economic warfare, information warfare, diplomatic 696 00:43:58,960 --> 00:44:01,920 Speaker 1: so on and so forth. And let me tell you 697 00:44:02,080 --> 00:44:06,080 Speaker 1: that war is raging. And I think there's a very 698 00:44:06,080 --> 00:44:11,879 Speaker 1: good chance that this decade gets progressively worse in terms 699 00:44:11,960 --> 00:44:15,840 Speaker 1: of the intensity of low intensity conflict. Even though things 700 00:44:15,960 --> 00:44:18,399 Speaker 1: seem fairly peaceful right now, there are number triggers out 701 00:44:18,400 --> 00:44:22,520 Speaker 1: there in the future that that could blow this wide open. 702 00:44:22,840 --> 00:44:26,160 Speaker 1: I do think that the country is uh, you know, 703 00:44:26,239 --> 00:44:30,120 Speaker 1: kind of a powder keg. A lot of people feel 704 00:44:30,160 --> 00:44:32,279 Speaker 1: that way, but we at Ford Observer, we can come 705 00:44:32,280 --> 00:44:33,880 Speaker 1: back and we can actually you know, we look at 706 00:44:33,880 --> 00:44:37,480 Speaker 1: the evidence. We can actually provide that the evidence in 707 00:44:37,520 --> 00:44:41,600 Speaker 1: the data to support these conclusions. Um. And so I 708 00:44:41,600 --> 00:44:43,720 Speaker 1: guess that's, you know, really kind of where we differ 709 00:44:43,800 --> 00:44:47,239 Speaker 1: from a blogger out there who who's telling people that 710 00:44:47,239 --> 00:44:49,360 Speaker 1: there's gonna be a civil war. I mean really, my 711 00:44:49,440 --> 00:44:52,560 Speaker 1: response is that it's probably already started. Like we'll probably 712 00:44:52,560 --> 00:44:56,040 Speaker 1: look back in twenty years and say, is probably where 713 00:44:56,040 --> 00:45:01,640 Speaker 1: this thing started. Okay, well, Sam, we want to thank 714 00:45:01,680 --> 00:45:05,239 Speaker 1: you for joining us today here on software. Uh. We 715 00:45:05,320 --> 00:45:09,040 Speaker 1: really appreciate your time and your service to the government 716 00:45:09,120 --> 00:45:11,160 Speaker 1: and what you're doing right now for the people that 717 00:45:11,200 --> 00:45:16,000 Speaker 1: are out there. Tell our listeners where they can sign up, um, 718 00:45:16,440 --> 00:45:18,640 Speaker 1: to take some of your courses that are out there, 719 00:45:18,680 --> 00:45:22,440 Speaker 1: and where they could find you on the different parts 720 00:45:22,480 --> 00:45:26,440 Speaker 1: of social media. Yeah. Well again, thanks for having me, 721 00:45:26,480 --> 00:45:29,200 Speaker 1: Thanks for giving me the opportunity to talk about this stuff. 722 00:45:29,600 --> 00:45:33,280 Speaker 1: My website is Forward observer dot com. I'll be publishing 723 00:45:33,280 --> 00:45:37,279 Speaker 1: my training schedule for two you're shortly so if you 724 00:45:37,320 --> 00:45:42,080 Speaker 1: get on our our email list, then I'll just blast 725 00:45:42,120 --> 00:45:47,680 Speaker 1: out training schedule and uh and if you want access 726 00:45:47,719 --> 00:45:50,759 Speaker 1: to our daily intelligence reports, we'd love to have you 727 00:45:50,800 --> 00:45:54,560 Speaker 1: as a customer, and that's at forward observer dot com. 728 00:45:54,600 --> 00:45:56,640 Speaker 1: If you want to get software app on your phone, 729 00:45:56,760 --> 00:46:00,160 Speaker 1: download our free mobile app and get easy access to 730 00:46:00,160 --> 00:46:05,040 Speaker 1: our articles, podcasts and gear reviews, all perfectly formatted to 731 00:46:05,120 --> 00:46:08,840 Speaker 1: your device. Please subscribe to Software radio dot com to 732 00:46:08,880 --> 00:46:12,360 Speaker 1: get access to all of our library of e books 733 00:46:12,400 --> 00:46:16,200 Speaker 1: and exclusive team room forms and content available on all 734 00:46:16,239 --> 00:46:20,120 Speaker 1: your Apple and Android devices. We want to thank everyone 735 00:46:20,160 --> 00:46:22,720 Speaker 1: for listening this afternoon. We want to thank our guests 736 00:46:22,719 --> 00:46:27,600 Speaker 1: Sam Culprit for joining us and Forward Observer dot com. Uh. 737 00:46:27,680 --> 00:46:31,200 Speaker 1: Necessarily interesting stuff that he's got out there. He has 738 00:46:31,239 --> 00:46:33,920 Speaker 1: a lot of experience in it. And Sam, it's not 739 00:46:34,040 --> 00:46:37,200 Speaker 1: the most uh comfortable thing for people to talk about 740 00:46:37,320 --> 00:46:40,920 Speaker 1: because we never expect this stuff to be happening in 741 00:46:40,960 --> 00:46:44,440 Speaker 1: our own backyard, but it is. It's happening right with us. 742 00:46:45,040 --> 00:46:47,920 Speaker 1: So thank you for joining us today, Thank you for 743 00:46:48,000 --> 00:46:51,360 Speaker 1: all you do, and we'll be back with another podcast 744 00:46:51,440 --> 00:46:55,000 Speaker 1: real soon. Thanks again, Sam, Yeah, thank you for having 745 00:46:55,040 --> 00:46:55,160 Speaker 1: me