1
00:00:00,280 --> 00:00:04,720
Speaker 1: From UFOs to psychic powers and government conspiracies. History is

2
00:00:04,840 --> 00:00:09,119
Speaker 1: riddled with unexplained events. You can turn back now or

3
00:00:09,240 --> 00:00:12,200
Speaker 1: learn the stuff they don't want you to know. A

4
00:00:12,280 --> 00:00:13,960
Speaker 1: production of iHeartRadio.

5
00:00:24,200 --> 00:00:26,760
Speaker 2: Hello, welcome back to the show. My name is Matt,

6
00:00:27,040 --> 00:00:27,880
Speaker 2: my name is Noah.

7
00:00:28,120 --> 00:00:30,760
Speaker 3: They call me Ben. We're joined as always with our

8
00:00:30,840 --> 00:00:35,519
Speaker 3: super producer Alexis codename Doc Holliday Jackson. Most importantly, you

9
00:00:36,600 --> 00:00:39,840
Speaker 3: are here and that makes this the stuff they don't

10
00:00:39,960 --> 00:00:44,400
Speaker 3: want you to know now. As you know longtime conspiracy realist.

11
00:00:44,640 --> 00:00:49,159
Speaker 3: Between our weekly episodes, we always like to bring you

12
00:00:49,360 --> 00:00:52,479
Speaker 3: something a little extra, and this is one of our

13
00:00:52,520 --> 00:00:56,680
Speaker 3: favorite parts of the week. You become the stars of

14
00:00:56,840 --> 00:00:59,640
Speaker 3: the show. So if you have ever written to us,

15
00:01:00,160 --> 00:01:03,960
Speaker 3: if you have spoken the right incantations into a reflective

16
00:01:04,000 --> 00:01:06,920
Speaker 3: surface of your choice, or if you know you've given

17
00:01:07,000 --> 00:01:09,319
Speaker 3: us a phone call, tune in. You might be on

18
00:01:09,360 --> 00:01:11,720
Speaker 3: the show and we would love for you to be

19
00:01:11,920 --> 00:01:14,240
Speaker 3: a part of it. I mean, your phone is a

20
00:01:14,280 --> 00:01:17,839
Speaker 3: black mirror in and of itself. You know, it's a weird, reflective,

21
00:01:18,160 --> 00:01:20,880
Speaker 3: ritualistic surface. There we go. You kind of have to

22
00:01:20,880 --> 00:01:22,679
Speaker 3: be the black mirror you want to see in the world.

23
00:01:23,319 --> 00:01:27,000
Speaker 3: So we are going to have a fascinating, I think,

24
00:01:27,080 --> 00:01:32,039
Speaker 3: conversation about following up on an earlier conversation about gene editing.

25
00:01:32,120 --> 00:01:34,679
Speaker 3: That three parent baby thing really struck a chord with

26
00:01:34,720 --> 00:01:38,800
Speaker 3: a lot of us. We are going to talk about

27
00:01:39,760 --> 00:01:41,600
Speaker 3: we don't want to sound like broken records with the

28
00:01:41,600 --> 00:01:43,880
Speaker 3: AI stuff, but we're going to talk about a language

29
00:01:43,959 --> 00:01:48,360
Speaker 3: learning model that is far different from what you have

30
00:01:48,560 --> 00:01:51,320
Speaker 3: been reading about these days. I don't even want to

31
00:01:51,360 --> 00:01:53,080
Speaker 3: say the name because they don't want to spoil it,

32
00:01:53,120 --> 00:01:55,320
Speaker 3: but shout out to you spector thanks for hipping us

33
00:01:55,360 --> 00:01:58,640
Speaker 3: to this one. Before we do any of that, we

34
00:01:58,880 --> 00:02:04,279
Speaker 3: are immensely fortunate to hear from a longtime listener friend

35
00:02:04,320 --> 00:02:09,000
Speaker 3: of the show for novours named Ziggy, who I don't

36
00:02:09,000 --> 00:02:11,480
Speaker 3: know about you, Matt, but this was the first time

37
00:02:12,080 --> 00:02:15,679
Speaker 3: I really learned about this story is and Ziggy wrote

38
00:02:15,720 --> 00:02:17,880
Speaker 3: to us, I think maybe I had seen a headline,

39
00:02:18,000 --> 00:02:22,040
Speaker 3: but it just it gets chilling the deeper you go, right.

40
00:02:22,280 --> 00:02:25,440
Speaker 2: For sure, this is a story that actually showed up

41
00:02:25,480 --> 00:02:28,320
Speaker 2: on my whatever the Apple news thing is. It just

42
00:02:28,400 --> 00:02:31,280
Speaker 2: kind of gives you a quick headline or something. Saw

43
00:02:31,320 --> 00:02:34,160
Speaker 2: this on I think it was on Monday. But Ziggy

44
00:02:34,160 --> 00:02:37,400
Speaker 2: wrote to us on Tuesday as we record this, Ziggy.

45
00:02:37,560 --> 00:02:40,080
Speaker 2: You might remember from back in the day she wrote

46
00:02:40,080 --> 00:02:43,520
Speaker 2: to us about the moth Man and we read one

47
00:02:43,560 --> 00:02:45,520
Speaker 2: of her messages on the air before. I think that

48
00:02:45,600 --> 00:02:48,400
Speaker 2: was you, Nel. Ziggy is back with some information. So

49
00:02:48,880 --> 00:02:52,200
Speaker 2: here's what Ziggy wrote. Hey guys, this past weekend, an

50
00:02:52,240 --> 00:02:56,919
Speaker 2: apartment complex in Davenport, Iowa partially collapsed. There's been a

51
00:02:56,919 --> 00:03:00,000
Speaker 2: big uproar because even though search and rescue hasn't been

52
00:03:00,200 --> 00:03:04,320
Speaker 2: totally complete, the building was set to demolish two days

53
00:03:04,560 --> 00:03:09,680
Speaker 2: after the collapse. That seems unreasonably too soon. Don't inspectors

54
00:03:09,720 --> 00:03:12,320
Speaker 2: go in to find the cause, secure enough of the

55
00:03:12,360 --> 00:03:15,520
Speaker 2: building that residents could have a chance or notice whether

56
00:03:15,560 --> 00:03:19,959
Speaker 2: they can retrieve items. Also, there are still survivors being found.

57
00:03:20,360 --> 00:03:23,240
Speaker 2: A big Facebook campaign has started to find pets as well.

58
00:03:23,560 --> 00:03:26,880
Speaker 2: I believe the demolition for today Tuesday, as Ziggy was

59
00:03:26,919 --> 00:03:29,919
Speaker 2: writing to us, has been put on hold, but haven't

60
00:03:29,960 --> 00:03:32,760
Speaker 2: heard a definitive. Do you guys know why a city

61
00:03:32,800 --> 00:03:36,080
Speaker 2: would want to demolish an active site so quickly. The

62
00:03:36,160 --> 00:03:39,080
Speaker 2: only thing I can think of is chemical exposure built

63
00:03:39,080 --> 00:03:43,960
Speaker 2: in nineteen oh nine, maybe asbestos, maybe lead. I included

64
00:03:43,960 --> 00:03:46,120
Speaker 2: a CNN link below let me know what you think.

65
00:03:46,520 --> 00:03:48,800
Speaker 2: As always, this email can be shared. Thank you for

66
00:03:48,880 --> 00:03:51,480
Speaker 2: letting us know. Ziggy. You can call me Ziggy and

67
00:03:51,520 --> 00:03:54,120
Speaker 2: shout out to all the writers on strike. IATZI is

68
00:03:54,160 --> 00:03:58,560
Speaker 2: behind you, Union strong, best zig Nice.

69
00:03:59,320 --> 00:04:01,200
Speaker 3: Okay, Matt, what's going on here?

70
00:04:01,520 --> 00:04:05,120
Speaker 2: Well, this is a story that is still going on

71
00:04:05,240 --> 00:04:10,080
Speaker 2: right now. There are still things happening there in Davenport, Iowa.

72
00:04:10,520 --> 00:04:12,400
Speaker 2: We can give you just a little bit of the

73
00:04:12,440 --> 00:04:15,160
Speaker 2: details and give you the latest reporting out of the

74
00:04:15,200 --> 00:04:19,320
Speaker 2: local news. Specifically, I pulled up a Channel six NBC

75
00:04:19,560 --> 00:04:23,239
Speaker 2: affiliate and their most recent reporting as of two hours

76
00:04:23,279 --> 00:04:26,920
Speaker 2: before recording this episode. What happened was on Sunday, May

77
00:04:26,960 --> 00:04:30,400
Speaker 2: twenty eighth, an apartment complex, as Ziggy said, located there

78
00:04:30,440 --> 00:04:34,480
Speaker 2: in Davenport, Iowa, specifically at three twenty four Main Street,

79
00:04:34,920 --> 00:04:37,960
Speaker 2: partially collapsed. There's been a ton of reporting on it,

80
00:04:38,040 --> 00:04:40,960
Speaker 2: real time reporting that again, that's why it's really developing

81
00:04:41,040 --> 00:04:44,719
Speaker 2: right now. That shows images of the apartment. There were

82
00:04:45,080 --> 00:04:50,760
Speaker 2: numerous people who actually fell when the apartment complex partially collapsed,

83
00:04:50,760 --> 00:04:54,080
Speaker 2: people who were found in the rubble. There were eight

84
00:04:54,200 --> 00:04:57,600
Speaker 2: people that were recovered. When I last was looking at

85
00:04:57,600 --> 00:05:01,400
Speaker 2: this story, and as Ziggy stated, a woman was pulled

86
00:05:01,480 --> 00:05:06,040
Speaker 2: from the wreckage from the debris there like literally hours

87
00:05:06,520 --> 00:05:09,440
Speaker 2: before the city of Davenport had planned to demolish the

88
00:05:09,640 --> 00:05:11,920
Speaker 2: entire building. And there are still a few people who

89
00:05:11,960 --> 00:05:15,960
Speaker 2: are unaccounted for, at least as my best understanding as

90
00:05:15,960 --> 00:05:17,000
Speaker 2: we're recording right now.

91
00:05:17,600 --> 00:05:22,320
Speaker 3: Yeah, so we're recording on May thirty, first, twenty three,

92
00:05:22,480 --> 00:05:26,000
Speaker 3: And Matt, I found the same stuff that you had said,

93
00:05:26,279 --> 00:05:31,200
Speaker 3: also found Tizig's question. Found something really interesting in the

94
00:05:31,279 --> 00:05:34,039
Speaker 3: quad Cities subreddit. I don't know if you saw this,

95
00:05:34,160 --> 00:05:39,760
Speaker 3: but there's something cartoonishly suspicious with the inspection records. I

96
00:05:39,760 --> 00:05:44,719
Speaker 3: think an inspection occurred just days before the disaster, and

97
00:05:44,960 --> 00:05:50,240
Speaker 3: Trotting Turtles over on the subreddit I mentioned seems to

98
00:05:50,279 --> 00:05:54,359
Speaker 3: have pulled receipts showing that the city of Davenport altered

99
00:05:54,880 --> 00:05:57,200
Speaker 3: the latest inspection record. Did you see that?

100
00:05:57,520 --> 00:06:02,080
Speaker 2: Mm hmm, Yeah, there's some wonkiness going on. There's another

101
00:06:02,200 --> 00:06:05,240
Speaker 2: article I want to cite here. Maybe let's cite this

102
00:06:05,279 --> 00:06:08,200
Speaker 2: one that we'll go back to that local NBC news report.

103
00:06:08,720 --> 00:06:13,200
Speaker 2: There's an Insider article Business Insider you can find titled

104
00:06:13,400 --> 00:06:16,039
Speaker 2: quote tenants who lived in an Iowa building predicted it

105
00:06:16,040 --> 00:06:19,520
Speaker 2: would collapse before it did. Source says, and in here

106
00:06:20,120 --> 00:06:21,880
Speaker 2: it goes over a lot of the stuff you're talking

107
00:06:21,920 --> 00:06:25,240
Speaker 2: about there ben where there were serious plumbing issues within

108
00:06:25,240 --> 00:06:27,920
Speaker 2: the building that were known to tenants. There were ceiling

109
00:06:27,960 --> 00:06:32,159
Speaker 2: collapses that had been occurring in the building, and again

110
00:06:32,200 --> 00:06:34,800
Speaker 2: people who live there just were saying, this place needs

111
00:06:34,800 --> 00:06:38,920
Speaker 2: some serious work or it's going down. You can read

112
00:06:38,960 --> 00:06:42,240
Speaker 2: all about that if you want to. The official statement

113
00:06:42,720 --> 00:06:45,599
Speaker 2: prior to today, the ones that I had read, we're saying

114
00:06:45,880 --> 00:06:49,680
Speaker 2: the reasoning behind demolishing the building asap was because they

115
00:06:49,720 --> 00:06:54,479
Speaker 2: were nervous about possible damage to the surrounding area if

116
00:06:54,520 --> 00:06:57,520
Speaker 2: this building, which they said was going to collapse imminently,

117
00:06:57,839 --> 00:07:02,040
Speaker 2: did in fact collapse, which way it collapsed, and how

118
00:07:02,120 --> 00:07:04,520
Speaker 2: much damage that could occur. But one of the biggest

119
00:07:04,520 --> 00:07:08,919
Speaker 2: things was a natural gas leak at the location of

120
00:07:08,960 --> 00:07:12,840
Speaker 2: the collapse, like an active, serious natural gas leak that

121
00:07:13,280 --> 00:07:17,320
Speaker 2: was ongoing and continuing and inaccessible, which could be a

122
00:07:17,360 --> 00:07:19,080
Speaker 2: reason for collapse, but it could also be a reason

123
00:07:19,120 --> 00:07:22,000
Speaker 2: to not collapse the thing try and I don't know,

124
00:07:22,440 --> 00:07:25,800
Speaker 2: I turned it off some other way. I don't know.

125
00:07:25,920 --> 00:07:27,400
Speaker 2: That just seems super dangerous to me.

126
00:07:27,760 --> 00:07:32,520
Speaker 3: It would depend upon the nature of the gas leak, right,

127
00:07:33,080 --> 00:07:36,840
Speaker 3: the degree of the league. Where is it? You know,

128
00:07:36,960 --> 00:07:39,560
Speaker 3: is it a matter of fixing just one pipe or something.

129
00:07:39,960 --> 00:07:43,680
Speaker 3: It doesn't make sense to clash an entire building for that.

130
00:07:44,400 --> 00:07:48,280
Speaker 3: The idea of controlling the damage of essentially cauterizing the

131
00:07:48,320 --> 00:07:53,920
Speaker 3: womb to prevent more structural infection, which is terrible analogy

132
00:07:55,200 --> 00:07:59,800
Speaker 3: that can make sense in certain ways. Over the years

133
00:08:00,240 --> 00:08:04,040
Speaker 3: in our house stuff worksdays, I remember traveling to watch

134
00:08:04,440 --> 00:08:07,440
Speaker 3: controlled demolitions here in the city of Atlanta, just because

135
00:08:07,440 --> 00:08:09,960
Speaker 3: we thought they looked really cool and we wanted to

136
00:08:10,040 --> 00:08:10,560
Speaker 3: film them.

137
00:08:10,880 --> 00:08:12,720
Speaker 4: That's what I was going to ask about. When you

138
00:08:12,760 --> 00:08:15,200
Speaker 4: look at the front of this building and the part

139
00:08:15,240 --> 00:08:18,520
Speaker 4: that's collapsed, I mean, I'm not trying to be too

140
00:08:18,520 --> 00:08:21,200
Speaker 4: conspiratorial or like, you know nine to eleven was an

141
00:08:21,200 --> 00:08:23,840
Speaker 4: inside job or anything, but like it looks the way

142
00:08:24,680 --> 00:08:28,200
Speaker 4: buildings look when they're sort of collapsed on purpose.

143
00:08:29,160 --> 00:08:31,640
Speaker 2: Yeah, I don't think that's what we're dealing with here.

144
00:08:31,800 --> 00:08:35,240
Speaker 2: Just to I hear what you're saying, I'm just I

145
00:08:35,320 --> 00:08:36,679
Speaker 2: just want to kind of call that a little bit

146
00:08:36,720 --> 00:08:39,320
Speaker 2: because it does appear that there was series damage to

147
00:08:39,400 --> 00:08:42,520
Speaker 2: this building, or there was not damage to the building

148
00:08:42,559 --> 00:08:47,840
Speaker 2: there was deterioration of the building that caused it to

149
00:08:47,880 --> 00:08:49,640
Speaker 2: collapse where it did got it.

150
00:08:49,920 --> 00:08:53,440
Speaker 3: At the very least, it sounds like we can say,

151
00:08:53,559 --> 00:08:56,600
Speaker 3: we can share with you that it seems there's something

152
00:08:56,800 --> 00:09:02,000
Speaker 3: very off with the code inspection. The city of Davenport

153
00:09:02,480 --> 00:09:07,320
Speaker 3: approved this inspection initially, which was by a private party,

154
00:09:07,360 --> 00:09:12,280
Speaker 3: a private inspection outfit, and then after the building collapsed,

155
00:09:12,720 --> 00:09:15,559
Speaker 3: the city went back and changed it from a past

156
00:09:15,679 --> 00:09:19,960
Speaker 3: inspection to a failed inspection. And those are the when

157
00:09:20,000 --> 00:09:22,960
Speaker 3: I say, this person on Reddit pulled the receipts. They

158
00:09:23,040 --> 00:09:27,120
Speaker 3: have what appear to be screenshots of the change of

159
00:09:27,160 --> 00:09:29,439
Speaker 3: the before and after, and that sounds like you and

160
00:09:29,520 --> 00:09:33,960
Speaker 3: I have found a lot of similar things here, but

161
00:09:34,160 --> 00:09:38,440
Speaker 3: we haven't found anything that appears to directly answer the question.

162
00:09:39,120 --> 00:09:44,480
Speaker 3: Ziggy's excellent question about the timing here, right and the

163
00:09:44,559 --> 00:09:48,600
Speaker 3: idea of if they go through the demolition and they

164
00:09:48,679 --> 00:09:52,000
Speaker 3: haven't searched for survivors, or if they go through with

165
00:09:52,040 --> 00:09:54,559
Speaker 3: the demolition there are survivors in there. I think right

166
00:09:54,600 --> 00:09:57,559
Speaker 3: now there are two suspected people surviving.

167
00:09:57,720 --> 00:10:00,679
Speaker 2: I'll give you just some of the official reporting out NBC.

168
00:10:01,160 --> 00:10:05,880
Speaker 2: They're saying yesterday, a Tuesday afternoon search of the apartment

169
00:10:05,880 --> 00:10:09,480
Speaker 2: building didn't find any signs of human activity, that's what

170
00:10:09,520 --> 00:10:13,079
Speaker 2: they're stating. But again, they did find somebody in there,

171
00:10:13,120 --> 00:10:15,079
Speaker 2: like right before they were going to blow the thing up.

172
00:10:15,679 --> 00:10:18,360
Speaker 2: According to the Humane Society of Scott County, this is

173
00:10:18,400 --> 00:10:22,640
Speaker 2: good news. Crews were able to rescue six cats, two snakes,

174
00:10:22,679 --> 00:10:24,640
Speaker 2: and one lizard, So that's nice.

175
00:10:24,880 --> 00:10:28,559
Speaker 3: Yeah, you know, assuming they're all not evil animals.

176
00:10:31,559 --> 00:10:33,079
Speaker 2: Tos.

177
00:10:33,320 --> 00:10:36,480
Speaker 3: I have this lex luthor Iguana in my head. Now,

178
00:10:37,400 --> 00:10:39,680
Speaker 3: we're obviously not making light of this, and we have

179
00:10:39,840 --> 00:10:43,680
Speaker 3: many more questions to answer here. I think we could

180
00:10:43,720 --> 00:10:47,800
Speaker 3: ask for some help from our fellow conspiracy realist in Iowa.

181
00:10:47,920 --> 00:10:51,880
Speaker 3: I will say the huge, huge coveyat that. One of

182
00:10:51,920 --> 00:10:56,240
Speaker 3: the more conspiratorial things I read goes back to the

183
00:10:56,320 --> 00:10:58,760
Speaker 3: ownership of these companies.

184
00:10:58,960 --> 00:11:03,280
Speaker 2: Yeah. According to that NBC report, Andrew Wold, who owns

185
00:11:03,320 --> 00:11:06,880
Speaker 2: the building, was quote cited Tuesday for not maintaining the

186
00:11:06,920 --> 00:11:12,360
Speaker 2: building in a safe and sanitary condition. So there's a citation.

187
00:11:12,720 --> 00:11:15,080
Speaker 2: I guess that's so weird to think that you could

188
00:11:15,160 --> 00:11:19,440
Speaker 2: allow the apartment complex that you own that has a

189
00:11:19,480 --> 00:11:22,760
Speaker 2: ton of families in it, you just get cited if

190
00:11:22,800 --> 00:11:25,240
Speaker 2: you allowed it to collapse. That's nuts.

191
00:11:25,520 --> 00:11:29,160
Speaker 3: So here's another thing I read. It's just tripping my

192
00:11:29,360 --> 00:11:32,360
Speaker 3: Spidey sense. And when you hear what you guys think.

193
00:11:32,960 --> 00:11:36,560
Speaker 3: So this comes to us from Twitter. Someone says, like

194
00:11:36,600 --> 00:11:39,000
Speaker 3: you point out, Matt, the apartment building is owned by

195
00:11:39,040 --> 00:11:44,000
Speaker 3: Andrew Wold Investments. The registered agent for this is a

196
00:11:44,040 --> 00:11:48,200
Speaker 3: guy named Robert H. Gallagher. Gallagher is an attorney at

197
00:11:48,240 --> 00:11:51,880
Speaker 3: a law firm called GMG and he is the father

198
00:11:52,160 --> 00:11:56,840
Speaker 3: of Robert S. Gallagher, the mayor of Bettendorf. For anybody

199
00:11:56,880 --> 00:11:59,719
Speaker 3: outside of Iowa, that might sound confusing, I'm saying, Oh,

200
00:11:59,760 --> 00:12:03,600
Speaker 3: you're talking about a disaster in Davenport. Why are you

201
00:12:03,640 --> 00:12:08,920
Speaker 3: bringing this Bettendorf place into the mix. Bettendorf is so

202
00:12:09,160 --> 00:12:13,160
Speaker 3: close to Davenport from what we understand that it's a conurbation.

203
00:12:13,760 --> 00:12:16,720
Speaker 3: So because of those connections, which are kind of like

204
00:12:16,800 --> 00:12:21,080
Speaker 3: tenuous threads, people are alleging or at the very least

205
00:12:21,080 --> 00:12:26,800
Speaker 3: heavily implying possible corruption. Again, nothing proven, nothing proven, but

206
00:12:26,880 --> 00:12:29,920
Speaker 3: people have started to, you know, put the red strings

207
00:12:30,280 --> 00:12:31,520
Speaker 3: around the pushpins here.

208
00:12:31,760 --> 00:12:34,600
Speaker 2: Would it be like, we need to demolish the building

209
00:12:34,640 --> 00:12:39,400
Speaker 2: as soon as possible to reduce I don't know, to reduce.

210
00:12:39,320 --> 00:12:44,200
Speaker 3: Reduce possible evidence of liability or maybe to produce excuse me,

211
00:12:44,240 --> 00:12:48,280
Speaker 3: to erase the access to some kind of evidence that

212
00:12:48,320 --> 00:12:52,120
Speaker 3: would prove willful negligence or something that could result in

213
00:12:52,280 --> 00:12:54,440
Speaker 3: very expensive settlements. So you thin because of.

214
00:12:54,440 --> 00:12:58,320
Speaker 2: That, because I had read early on that the property

215
00:12:58,520 --> 00:13:02,040
Speaker 2: management company and or the owner this Andrew Rold character

216
00:13:02,400 --> 00:13:08,640
Speaker 2: would possibly be charged with involuntary manslaughter or something to

217
00:13:08,679 --> 00:13:11,439
Speaker 2: that effect if there are in fact deceased people within

218
00:13:11,480 --> 00:13:15,080
Speaker 2: the debris, within the rebel, and that's why the unaccounted

219
00:13:15,080 --> 00:13:19,280
Speaker 2: for people were so important. I don't know. It feels

220
00:13:19,280 --> 00:13:20,960
Speaker 2: like either way you're going to get in big trouble

221
00:13:21,000 --> 00:13:23,840
Speaker 2: because the building you own collapsed and potentially people died.

222
00:13:23,920 --> 00:13:28,040
Speaker 2: So ah right, I don't know, And.

223
00:13:28,040 --> 00:13:31,600
Speaker 3: Of course the most important part there is the safety

224
00:13:31,760 --> 00:13:35,880
Speaker 3: of the people involved. You are innocent. I'm so glad

225
00:13:35,880 --> 00:13:38,560
Speaker 3: that you brought this to us. It's one of those

226
00:13:38,600 --> 00:13:42,840
Speaker 3: stories that could easily just fade into the background. It

227
00:13:42,920 --> 00:13:46,000
Speaker 3: does feel like there's something wonky. I agree with you.

228
00:13:46,120 --> 00:13:48,440
Speaker 3: I just don't know what it could be, you know

229
00:13:48,440 --> 00:13:50,520
Speaker 3: what I mean. We have to be very careful because

230
00:13:50,520 --> 00:13:54,559
Speaker 3: we don't have any currently, we don't have any solid

231
00:13:54,679 --> 00:13:59,960
Speaker 3: proof that would allow us to authoritatively declare it conspire.

232
00:14:00,160 --> 00:14:00,920
Speaker 3: See you foot.

233
00:14:01,160 --> 00:14:04,280
Speaker 2: Correct well with that, we will keep your eyes on this.

234
00:14:04,400 --> 00:14:06,840
Speaker 2: You keep your ears out and we will see you.

235
00:14:07,440 --> 00:14:08,520
Speaker 2: After the break.

236
00:14:14,960 --> 00:14:20,640
Speaker 3: And we have returned, we're going to hear pretty fascinating

237
00:14:20,720 --> 00:14:25,920
Speaker 3: thing from our pal Specter. Spector says the following, Ben,

238
00:14:26,200 --> 00:14:30,600
Speaker 3: Matt and Noel. I recently heard some news about Darkbert,

239
00:14:31,280 --> 00:14:35,960
Speaker 3: not Dilbert. Dark Bert, a chat GPT type AI or

240
00:14:36,360 --> 00:14:40,400
Speaker 3: LLM that is using information from the dark web. I

241
00:14:40,440 --> 00:14:43,200
Speaker 3: have linked to the video down below. I would love

242
00:14:43,240 --> 00:14:46,160
Speaker 3: to hear a conversation about this on the air. You

243
00:14:46,200 --> 00:14:49,120
Speaker 3: have my permission to use this email. My code name

244
00:14:49,160 --> 00:14:53,440
Speaker 3: is Spector. Kudos and thank yous to you Spector for

245
00:14:53,680 --> 00:14:56,520
Speaker 3: letting us use the email, telling us we can and

246
00:14:56,560 --> 00:14:59,840
Speaker 3: giving yourself a cool nickname. Spect says, thanks and cheap

247
00:15:00,120 --> 00:15:04,520
Speaker 3: up the podcast. So this was pretty interesting. This comes

248
00:15:04,560 --> 00:15:09,360
Speaker 3: from some very very smart boffin types over in South Korea.

249
00:15:09,600 --> 00:15:12,760
Speaker 3: We want to shout out these researchers Yung Jin Jin,

250
00:15:13,280 --> 00:15:19,120
Speaker 3: Eugen Jang, John Chi, Cui Jin Wu Chung Young Jay

251
00:15:19,240 --> 00:15:22,520
Speaker 3: Lee Sung Woon Shin. Like a lot of people, a

252
00:15:22,600 --> 00:15:25,560
Speaker 3: real heavy hitters are working on this thing and they

253
00:15:25,640 --> 00:15:29,040
Speaker 3: are based out of the Korea Advanced Institute of Science

254
00:15:29,120 --> 00:15:34,920
Speaker 3: and Technology. Here's what they say about dark bert quote.

255
00:15:34,960 --> 00:15:38,560
Speaker 3: This AI model ventured into the depths of the dark Web,

256
00:15:38,840 --> 00:15:42,520
Speaker 3: an anonymous and concealed part of the Internet, to index

257
00:15:42,640 --> 00:15:47,040
Speaker 3: and gather information from its shadiest domains. A lot. I

258
00:15:47,080 --> 00:15:49,960
Speaker 3: think before we get too far into this, we should

259
00:15:49,960 --> 00:15:52,240
Speaker 3: talk a little bit about the dark Web. We did

260
00:15:52,280 --> 00:15:56,840
Speaker 3: some episodes on it in the Nights of Yours. It's

261
00:15:56,840 --> 00:16:00,360
Speaker 3: funny because I think a lot of us who are

262
00:16:00,400 --> 00:16:05,040
Speaker 3: not the hat wearing type, whether white hat or black hat,

263
00:16:05,600 --> 00:16:07,720
Speaker 3: the type of folks who don't hang out at def

264
00:16:07,760 --> 00:16:10,760
Speaker 3: Con every year bucket hat, bucket hat as well. Why

265
00:16:10,800 --> 00:16:15,840
Speaker 3: not I like it the non hacker, non initiated community.

266
00:16:16,760 --> 00:16:19,640
Speaker 3: Because of the way the dark net is described in

267
00:16:19,720 --> 00:16:22,440
Speaker 3: fear mongering media, and because of the way it's depicted

268
00:16:22,440 --> 00:16:30,080
Speaker 3: in fiction, it seems automatically always associated with just abominable crimes. Right.

269
00:16:30,440 --> 00:16:33,560
Speaker 4: It's just an encrypted version of the Internet, basically, right,

270
00:16:33,720 --> 00:16:35,840
Speaker 4: or I mean, I mean any part of the Internet

271
00:16:35,880 --> 00:16:38,400
Speaker 4: can be encrypted, I imagine, But the idea is that

272
00:16:38,400 --> 00:16:40,520
Speaker 4: it's sort of a sub Internet that can just you

273
00:16:40,560 --> 00:16:42,960
Speaker 4: have to have a certain type of browser to access it.

274
00:16:43,400 --> 00:16:48,000
Speaker 2: Yeah, it's actually much less secure, right, Yeah.

275
00:16:47,960 --> 00:16:52,400
Speaker 3: There's that. It depends. It depends. One person's security is

276
00:16:52,440 --> 00:16:56,360
Speaker 3: another person's opportunity. Really, it all depends on how much

277
00:16:56,400 --> 00:17:00,880
Speaker 3: you trust the people who build the locks. This is

278
00:17:00,920 --> 00:17:03,720
Speaker 3: a really disturbing thought, and I'm sorry that I put

279
00:17:03,760 --> 00:17:06,800
Speaker 3: it on us, but it is true. So yeah, you're

280
00:17:06,800 --> 00:17:10,560
Speaker 3: absolutely right to access these kinds of things. You'll typically

281
00:17:10,600 --> 00:17:16,160
Speaker 3: see somebody using a tore browser right, the Onion router,

282
00:17:16,600 --> 00:17:20,240
Speaker 3: which is also not as secure as some people want

283
00:17:20,280 --> 00:17:23,439
Speaker 3: you to think. Just being completely honest, check out our

284
00:17:23,480 --> 00:17:28,680
Speaker 3: episode on that. The dark web is, like we said,

285
00:17:28,720 --> 00:17:34,080
Speaker 3: it's concealed. It's not something that you would accidentally find.

286
00:17:34,400 --> 00:17:38,920
Speaker 3: Probably the steps you have to take are pretty intentional,

287
00:17:39,560 --> 00:17:43,040
Speaker 3: and it has illicit marketplaces. This was the home of

288
00:17:43,080 --> 00:17:47,000
Speaker 3: the infamous Silk Road before that was shut down. This

289
00:17:47,480 --> 00:17:53,240
Speaker 3: is where you will see people selling batches of personal info, SSNs,

290
00:17:53,440 --> 00:17:57,080
Speaker 3: credit card numbers, et cetera. This is where you will

291
00:17:57,080 --> 00:18:03,159
Speaker 3: see all kinds of skill people in various digital chat rooms.

292
00:18:03,760 --> 00:18:07,800
Speaker 3: Be aware if you, for instance, are trying to do

293
00:18:07,880 --> 00:18:12,480
Speaker 3: something like by psychoactive or designer drugs or legal substances

294
00:18:12,480 --> 00:18:14,639
Speaker 3: that are illegal in your neck of the woods, be

295
00:18:14,760 --> 00:18:18,880
Speaker 3: aware that the authorities are already all over this thing,

296
00:18:19,400 --> 00:18:23,280
Speaker 3: and there are countless cases of people trying to do

297
00:18:23,359 --> 00:18:26,920
Speaker 3: stuff like hire a hit man, which is it's a

298
00:18:27,000 --> 00:18:29,080
Speaker 3: dumb way to try to hire a hitman, just to

299
00:18:29,080 --> 00:18:30,600
Speaker 3: be completely honest.

300
00:18:30,560 --> 00:18:33,640
Speaker 2: And no, no, no no, Hire all your hitmen on

301
00:18:33,720 --> 00:18:36,360
Speaker 2: the dark web, and make sure you click on the

302
00:18:36,440 --> 00:18:39,080
Speaker 2: links that have a picture of a guy with a

303
00:18:39,119 --> 00:18:43,880
Speaker 2: gun who looks real surly, make around glasses. Yeah yeah, yeah,

304
00:18:44,040 --> 00:18:47,040
Speaker 2: always pick that when you're hiring hitmen.

305
00:18:47,400 --> 00:18:50,800
Speaker 3: Yeah, yeah, because you know, the days of putting your

306
00:18:50,800 --> 00:18:56,640
Speaker 3: classified ad and soldier of fortune are long. God, unfortunately, unfortunately,

307
00:18:56,800 --> 00:19:00,840
Speaker 3: oh my god. Whatever. So so, dark Bird is built

308
00:19:00,920 --> 00:19:05,639
Speaker 3: on something called the Roberta architecture, and what they found

309
00:19:05,960 --> 00:19:09,400
Speaker 3: was that they could use variations of the large language

310
00:19:09,440 --> 00:19:16,560
Speaker 3: model approach to combat cybercrime. They're thinking, we can teach

311
00:19:16,600 --> 00:19:18,679
Speaker 3: this thing in a way that is very close to

312
00:19:18,760 --> 00:19:21,200
Speaker 3: fighting fire with fire. I want to give a shout

313
00:19:21,240 --> 00:19:25,240
Speaker 3: out to Guru writing over on Cybersecurity News who has

314
00:19:25,280 --> 00:19:29,320
Speaker 3: a great kind of primer on Darkbert and Darkbert first

315
00:19:29,400 --> 00:19:33,119
Speaker 3: hit academia with a paper written by these researchers called

316
00:19:33,560 --> 00:19:38,399
Speaker 3: Darkbert Illuminating the language Model's exploration of the dark Web,

317
00:19:38,800 --> 00:19:42,600
Speaker 3: and so they integrated, they're souped up AI or LLM

318
00:19:43,400 --> 00:19:47,600
Speaker 3: with the Tor network and made a comprehensive database out

319
00:19:47,680 --> 00:19:52,439
Speaker 3: of it. And so what they're arguing that they're not

320
00:19:52,560 --> 00:19:56,040
Speaker 3: building an evil chat GPT, right, they're not building a

321
00:19:56,119 --> 00:20:00,679
Speaker 3: chat GPT, that says, I don't know, here's I always thinking of,

322
00:20:00,760 --> 00:20:03,399
Speaker 3: you know how chat GPT right now, outside of a

323
00:20:03,400 --> 00:20:09,720
Speaker 3: few very interesting loopholes, will not knowingly aid you or

324
00:20:09,760 --> 00:20:13,439
Speaker 3: advise you in the commission of crimes, can help you

325
00:20:13,480 --> 00:20:18,880
Speaker 3: at that Dave right right exactly. And the initial thought

326
00:20:18,920 --> 00:20:22,800
Speaker 3: I had was, is this the sith lord chat GPT?

327
00:20:23,320 --> 00:20:25,520
Speaker 3: Is this the one that's going I can only help

328
00:20:25,560 --> 00:20:26,600
Speaker 3: you with crimes?

329
00:20:26,880 --> 00:20:28,960
Speaker 4: Well, Ben, I mean, if we're basing it on the

330
00:20:29,040 --> 00:20:33,000
Speaker 4: graphics in this YouTube video that you linked to, it

331
00:20:33,080 --> 00:20:35,800
Speaker 4: sure looks like it. What's that character in the Marvel

332
00:20:35,880 --> 00:20:42,320
Speaker 4: universe robot guy Ultron No, well, the one that was

333
00:20:42,760 --> 00:20:46,680
Speaker 4: before ultron Vision Vision. Yeah, it's like an evil dark

334
00:20:46,760 --> 00:20:49,920
Speaker 4: version of Vision like in these videos. It's like all

335
00:20:50,000 --> 00:20:52,200
Speaker 4: this Like I guess it's probably like you know, stock footage,

336
00:20:52,240 --> 00:20:54,919
Speaker 4: a CG kind of stuff, but it's in this video

337
00:20:55,160 --> 00:20:58,080
Speaker 4: dark Web AI going to take over the world question

338
00:20:58,200 --> 00:21:00,919
Speaker 4: mark Darkbird and its impact on the all of the

339
00:21:00,920 --> 00:21:04,800
Speaker 4: graphics are just like terminator level creepy robot.

340
00:21:04,880 --> 00:21:05,200
Speaker 2: Guys.

341
00:21:05,640 --> 00:21:09,040
Speaker 3: Yeah, this idea, this Skynet idea, which we've been talking

342
00:21:09,080 --> 00:21:12,159
Speaker 3: about pretty frequently on our off air in our off

343
00:21:12,200 --> 00:21:16,160
Speaker 3: air group chats and stuff, this is closer and closer

344
00:21:16,200 --> 00:21:22,359
Speaker 3: to reality. Darkbert is created to be a new security tool.

345
00:21:22,640 --> 00:21:25,760
Speaker 3: That's what they're saying. They're saying, we're sending We're sending

346
00:21:25,800 --> 00:21:28,720
Speaker 3: this poor guy out there into the fire and the

347
00:21:28,800 --> 00:21:32,399
Speaker 3: darkness to fight these things, right, to be one of

348
00:21:32,440 --> 00:21:35,680
Speaker 3: the one of the creatures that holds the door fast

349
00:21:35,840 --> 00:21:39,199
Speaker 3: and closed. I don't know. I do like the idea

350
00:21:39,359 --> 00:21:42,000
Speaker 3: of an evil chat GPT. I do like the idea

351
00:21:42,040 --> 00:21:47,480
Speaker 3: of a ridiculously evil chat GPT based on the current capabilities.

352
00:21:47,520 --> 00:21:50,280
Speaker 3: Like I love the idea of saying, hey, chat GPT,

353
00:21:50,960 --> 00:21:55,360
Speaker 3: can you help me with this long division this long

354
00:21:55,400 --> 00:21:59,479
Speaker 3: division question, and then having the thing respond and go, actually,

355
00:21:59,560 --> 00:22:01,919
Speaker 3: I'm dark Bert, and I can only help you with

356
00:22:01,960 --> 00:22:04,400
Speaker 3: long division if it's part of a crime.

357
00:22:04,359 --> 00:22:07,680
Speaker 4: Yes, most foul.

358
00:22:07,960 --> 00:22:12,480
Speaker 2: Yes, Well what if it's just super sarcastic, like crazy

359
00:22:12,600 --> 00:22:15,840
Speaker 2: sarcastic and tells you how to do things wrong on purpose?

360
00:22:16,280 --> 00:22:18,280
Speaker 4: Is that not evil in and of itself? Though, Matt,

361
00:22:18,400 --> 00:22:20,320
Speaker 4: you know that's its own flavor of evil.

362
00:22:21,000 --> 00:22:24,480
Speaker 3: Just so, okay, So this is very strange because I'm

363
00:22:24,520 --> 00:22:28,200
Speaker 3: looking at this high level stuff. None of us, including

364
00:22:28,359 --> 00:22:31,159
Speaker 3: code Dame Talk, so far as we know, are black

365
00:22:31,200 --> 00:22:35,040
Speaker 3: hat hackers. And we're not the we're not the people

366
00:22:35,119 --> 00:22:39,200
Speaker 3: working for the Puzzle Palace or anything like that, Thank goodness,

367
00:22:39,720 --> 00:22:43,399
Speaker 3: because their life is difficult. We are very interested in

368
00:22:43,440 --> 00:22:47,240
Speaker 3: this because it inevitably trickles down and affects the public.

369
00:22:47,640 --> 00:22:51,960
Speaker 3: So dark Burt is going to be able to, like,

370
00:22:52,320 --> 00:22:54,359
Speaker 3: if everything goes as planned, it's going to be able

371
00:22:54,400 --> 00:23:03,119
Speaker 3: to proactively identify and flag site for ransomware leaks, sites

372
00:23:03,160 --> 00:23:08,000
Speaker 3: for possible developing threats, you know, domestic, foreign, you name it,

373
00:23:08,080 --> 00:23:11,480
Speaker 3: threats in general. And if you read the paper, they

374
00:23:11,480 --> 00:23:16,399
Speaker 3: are thankfully spending some time on the ethical considerations as well,

375
00:23:16,480 --> 00:23:20,680
Speaker 3: and limitations. Their ethical considerations are, how do we treat

376
00:23:20,720 --> 00:23:23,880
Speaker 3: sensitive information? How do we mask that? Right? We don't

377
00:23:23,960 --> 00:23:27,320
Speaker 3: want if we're trying to save hundreds of thousands of

378
00:23:27,359 --> 00:23:29,679
Speaker 3: people from getting their credit cards stolen, we don't want

379
00:23:29,720 --> 00:23:32,800
Speaker 3: to accidentally just hand that information to someone else. Right,

380
00:23:33,200 --> 00:23:37,240
Speaker 3: How do we control for these necessary ethical boundaries. And

381
00:23:37,280 --> 00:23:40,560
Speaker 3: they also say, look, we have limited usage for non

382
00:23:40,680 --> 00:23:44,520
Speaker 3: English task because the dark Web is not all in English.

383
00:23:44,680 --> 00:23:48,080
Speaker 3: It's kind of anglocentric for us to assume that. And then,

384
00:23:48,200 --> 00:23:52,119
Speaker 3: like any other LLM, it depends on the data that

385
00:23:52,200 --> 00:23:54,800
Speaker 3: it gathers, right, the data that it is able to

386
00:23:54,840 --> 00:23:58,760
Speaker 3: compile and study. So I want to ask you, guys,

387
00:23:59,040 --> 00:24:00,640
Speaker 3: do you think this is a good move.

388
00:24:00,840 --> 00:24:03,080
Speaker 4: It's interesting because, I mean, based on what we were

389
00:24:03,080 --> 00:24:06,320
Speaker 4: talking about at the top of this segment, is the

390
00:24:06,440 --> 00:24:09,840
Speaker 4: dark Web still actively being used for these nefarious things

391
00:24:10,200 --> 00:24:13,840
Speaker 4: in how accessible it is to law enforcement? But why

392
00:24:14,280 --> 00:24:16,280
Speaker 4: that's Mike, I mean, I know this is a separate question,

393
00:24:16,359 --> 00:24:19,119
Speaker 4: but like you mentioned, Matt, like go ahead, do it.

394
00:24:19,200 --> 00:24:20,920
Speaker 4: I know you were being tongue in chee because you're like,

395
00:24:20,920 --> 00:24:23,240
Speaker 4: because then you'll get caught. But like, why are people

396
00:24:23,280 --> 00:24:25,600
Speaker 4: still thinking this is like a safe space to conduct

397
00:24:25,640 --> 00:24:28,800
Speaker 4: these kinds of illicit off the books operations.

398
00:24:28,880 --> 00:24:32,840
Speaker 2: Well, often it's crews that go in and just purchase

399
00:24:33,080 --> 00:24:38,680
Speaker 2: already hacked materials, right, so they have a surreptitious way

400
00:24:38,720 --> 00:24:42,120
Speaker 2: to pay for information that's logged, likely.

401
00:24:41,920 --> 00:24:46,080
Speaker 4: With some sort of crypto currency still or as probably.

402
00:24:45,840 --> 00:24:48,399
Speaker 2: I don't know, but someone would find a way that

403
00:24:48,600 --> 00:24:52,840
Speaker 2: is much less traceable to pay for just the materials

404
00:24:52,880 --> 00:24:56,320
Speaker 2: literally for files that just have you know, in names

405
00:24:56,440 --> 00:24:58,720
Speaker 2: and account numbers and birthdays and such.

406
00:24:59,520 --> 00:25:02,200
Speaker 3: And I think you guys know, I believe some of

407
00:25:02,240 --> 00:25:05,760
Speaker 3: the best ways to really understand things are through metaphor

408
00:25:05,840 --> 00:25:09,639
Speaker 3: and simile. So to attempt an answer to that question,

409
00:25:09,840 --> 00:25:12,440
Speaker 3: which is a great question, in similar form, I would

410
00:25:12,480 --> 00:25:17,200
Speaker 3: say we should imagine it as a numbers game. The criminals, right,

411
00:25:17,440 --> 00:25:21,040
Speaker 3: or people attempting to commit crimes, picture them like a

412
00:25:21,080 --> 00:25:25,280
Speaker 3: herd of antelope, and picture law enforcement like an apex predator.

413
00:25:25,680 --> 00:25:28,399
Speaker 3: The apex predator is always outnumbered by the nature of

414
00:25:28,440 --> 00:25:33,520
Speaker 3: its ecosystem, and it cannot get every member of the herd.

415
00:25:33,920 --> 00:25:36,640
Speaker 3: So people are playing the odds and hoping that someone

416
00:25:37,000 --> 00:25:39,440
Speaker 3: will be a little less buttoned up than they are,

417
00:25:39,720 --> 00:25:43,960
Speaker 3: and often they're correct, unless they have done something that

418
00:25:44,080 --> 00:25:47,159
Speaker 3: caught the attention of that lion out there in the

419
00:25:47,160 --> 00:25:49,560
Speaker 3: savannah or what have you. I don't know how much

420
00:25:49,600 --> 00:25:51,840
Speaker 3: scene painting we want to do here.

421
00:25:52,440 --> 00:25:52,840
Speaker 4: I love it.

422
00:25:52,840 --> 00:25:54,479
Speaker 3: It's very very visual.

423
00:25:54,760 --> 00:25:55,760
Speaker 4: You did a great job at.

424
00:25:55,760 --> 00:25:56,639
Speaker 2: Banking Man, Thank you.

425
00:25:56,840 --> 00:26:00,000
Speaker 3: This comparison is maybe at least a little bit useful

426
00:26:00,200 --> 00:26:05,760
Speaker 3: because something like Darkburt or a successor at dark Bert,

427
00:26:06,320 --> 00:26:10,199
Speaker 3: could be at Yeah, it could be an automation of

428
00:26:10,240 --> 00:26:13,320
Speaker 3: the lions, could be an automation of the predators. And

429
00:26:13,400 --> 00:26:15,960
Speaker 3: all of a sudden, you know what if you join

430
00:26:16,480 --> 00:26:20,280
Speaker 3: your herd underground and you find out that there's not

431
00:26:20,400 --> 00:26:24,520
Speaker 3: one lion anymore, there is a lion bought for each

432
00:26:24,600 --> 00:26:27,320
Speaker 3: one of you, and then as it grows more sophisticated,

433
00:26:27,840 --> 00:26:31,440
Speaker 3: it already knows your patterns, It knows where you're going

434
00:26:31,480 --> 00:26:34,320
Speaker 3: to run, it knows when you're going to turn. All

435
00:26:34,359 --> 00:26:37,120
Speaker 3: of a sudden, the equations become much more complicated.

436
00:26:37,200 --> 00:26:40,360
Speaker 4: Well, you're selling me on this thing pretty good, right now, Ben,

437
00:26:40,680 --> 00:26:43,000
Speaker 4: It does kind of sound like a good idea. What's

438
00:26:43,080 --> 00:26:44,360
Speaker 4: the what's the downside?

439
00:26:44,440 --> 00:26:46,439
Speaker 2: I just want to say, it sounds like Vultron to me.

440
00:26:46,960 --> 00:26:48,560
Speaker 2: Underground lions come on.

441
00:26:48,520 --> 00:26:50,920
Speaker 3: Yeah, yeah, yeah, oh god, truly.

442
00:26:51,040 --> 00:26:53,000
Speaker 4: I mean what you're saying is true, and there's all

443
00:26:53,000 --> 00:26:55,159
Speaker 4: this bad stuff going on in the dark Web, and

444
00:26:55,200 --> 00:26:58,600
Speaker 4: this Darkburt thing is is becoming the lion that like

445
00:26:58,760 --> 00:27:01,439
Speaker 4: tracks the bad act you know, I mean not the

446
00:27:01,480 --> 00:27:04,679
Speaker 4: Gazell's are inherently bad actors. But for the purpose similar

447
00:27:06,680 --> 00:27:10,399
Speaker 4: it's good, right, So how how and why is it

448
00:27:10,800 --> 00:27:11,520
Speaker 4: also bad?

449
00:27:11,880 --> 00:27:15,640
Speaker 3: Yeah, it's a great question because it's so we're describing

450
00:27:15,680 --> 00:27:18,920
Speaker 3: the good case, the positive case, the aim of the creators.

451
00:27:19,520 --> 00:27:21,960
Speaker 3: But we have to remember that a lot of the

452
00:27:21,960 --> 00:27:25,080
Speaker 3: people who made huge breakthroughs in physics that were very

453
00:27:25,440 --> 00:27:29,040
Speaker 3: positive for the world, their ideas led directly to the

454
00:27:29,080 --> 00:27:30,920
Speaker 3: creation of nuclear weapons.

455
00:27:31,320 --> 00:27:33,720
Speaker 4: A lot of people that created AI are now coming

456
00:27:33,760 --> 00:27:35,439
Speaker 4: forth and saying I wish I hadn't done.

457
00:27:35,320 --> 00:27:37,880
Speaker 3: That thing, and so oh so what a shout out.

458
00:27:38,080 --> 00:27:40,320
Speaker 3: I think it was our power revel devil sent me

459
00:27:40,440 --> 00:27:43,040
Speaker 3: this this great mema. I'll have to send you guys.

460
00:27:43,040 --> 00:27:46,000
Speaker 3: But it's like, how are those how are those folks

461
00:27:46,000 --> 00:27:50,119
Speaker 3: with those regrets? How are they not like Tim Robinson

462
00:27:50,720 --> 00:27:52,720
Speaker 3: dressed as a hot dog and that I think you

463
00:27:52,760 --> 00:27:55,640
Speaker 3: should leave sketch. We have to figure out who could

464
00:27:55,640 --> 00:27:56,240
Speaker 3: have done this.

465
00:27:57,440 --> 00:27:59,520
Speaker 4: No, but that's the beauty of it, man, And I'm

466
00:27:59,560 --> 00:28:01,600
Speaker 4: sorry I'm forgetting the guy's name. There's one dude in

467
00:28:01,600 --> 00:28:05,959
Speaker 4: particular who like worked for Google and was really responsible

468
00:28:05,960 --> 00:28:07,760
Speaker 4: for a lot of the technology that led to this,

469
00:28:07,960 --> 00:28:11,040
Speaker 4: like like language learning stuff, and now he is openly

470
00:28:11,119 --> 00:28:12,800
Speaker 4: saying I've done a bad thing.

471
00:28:13,080 --> 00:28:16,760
Speaker 3: Oh hinted, Right, you're talking about it. That's Jeffrey Hinted

472
00:28:17,680 --> 00:28:19,000
Speaker 3: Nobel Prize of Computing.

473
00:28:19,200 --> 00:28:22,280
Speaker 4: And now he's coming out and saying what I've done

474
00:28:22,480 --> 00:28:26,000
Speaker 4: is now being repurposed and used in ways that I

475
00:28:26,040 --> 00:28:28,679
Speaker 4: do not approve of. But that's the problem with just

476
00:28:28,720 --> 00:28:31,240
Speaker 4: like nuclear technology or all of this stuff, once it's

477
00:28:31,320 --> 00:28:34,240
Speaker 4: out there, it's not up to you anymore. You know.

478
00:28:34,280 --> 00:28:37,120
Speaker 4: It's the same as the idea of the artist's intent

479
00:28:37,480 --> 00:28:40,040
Speaker 4: is irrelevant. Once the art is out in the world,

480
00:28:40,160 --> 00:28:43,280
Speaker 4: then it's up for interpretation by whomever gets their hands

481
00:28:43,320 --> 00:28:45,280
Speaker 4: on it, you know. And with art it's a lot

482
00:28:45,360 --> 00:28:49,440
Speaker 4: less nefarious. It doesn't usually lead to world annihilating consequences,

483
00:28:49,480 --> 00:28:51,120
Speaker 4: but in this case it can.

484
00:28:51,640 --> 00:28:57,120
Speaker 3: Well. Technology, Again, technology has no morals nor ethical quandaries

485
00:28:57,200 --> 00:28:59,920
Speaker 3: of its own. You know, fire can burn as he's

486
00:29:00,160 --> 00:29:02,240
Speaker 3: a is, It cooks, and it doesn't know the difference

487
00:29:02,280 --> 00:29:05,920
Speaker 3: between what it's burned. Right, So you could argue that

488
00:29:06,160 --> 00:29:09,040
Speaker 3: this kind of technology is at the same crossroads, at

489
00:29:09,040 --> 00:29:12,360
Speaker 3: the same precipice. The bad side of this or the

490
00:29:12,400 --> 00:29:18,320
Speaker 3: negative is, simply put, the human species does not entirely

491
00:29:18,520 --> 00:29:20,120
Speaker 3: know what it's doing with.

492
00:29:20,200 --> 00:29:23,280
Speaker 4: I think, yeah, I think. I mean, in general, really

493
00:29:23,400 --> 00:29:26,680
Speaker 4: large aways been kind of a hold my beer crew

494
00:29:27,080 --> 00:29:30,720
Speaker 4: right over the past, let's know, the spaghetti at the wall,

495
00:29:31,040 --> 00:29:31,680
Speaker 4: you know what I mean.

496
00:29:31,880 --> 00:29:35,600
Speaker 3: Oh, guys, this mushroom didn't kill me. Oh crap, I'll

497
00:29:35,600 --> 00:29:36,640
Speaker 3: try it, you know. Well.

498
00:29:36,720 --> 00:29:38,640
Speaker 2: And I don't know if anybody saw the news about

499
00:29:38,720 --> 00:29:42,120
Speaker 2: Nvidia that's been happening this past week and weekend, but

500
00:29:42,400 --> 00:29:46,200
Speaker 2: uh haha, they basically said, hold my beer, well, we

501
00:29:46,240 --> 00:29:46,680
Speaker 2: got this.

502
00:29:46,880 --> 00:29:49,400
Speaker 4: We're going to be the guys. You know, we've got

503
00:29:50,360 --> 00:29:52,280
Speaker 4: We're ready to be first to market with this, or

504
00:29:52,280 --> 00:29:55,160
Speaker 4: at the very least, we're gonna pivot in a very

505
00:29:55,200 --> 00:29:57,720
Speaker 4: public way. And Matt we talked about this on the

506
00:29:57,760 --> 00:30:02,400
Speaker 4: group text, like the stock price went up in a big.

507
00:30:02,240 --> 00:30:06,440
Speaker 2: Way, right, yeah, because they developed the platforms that future

508
00:30:06,720 --> 00:30:10,240
Speaker 2: emerging AI companies and commerce are going to need. So there.

509
00:30:10,280 --> 00:30:12,320
Speaker 4: Do you know what else in video has done? These

510
00:30:13,200 --> 00:30:17,880
Speaker 4: processor cards that are meant for video for gaming and displays,

511
00:30:18,240 --> 00:30:21,240
Speaker 4: they're always the things that are used for like crypto mining.

512
00:30:21,560 --> 00:30:24,440
Speaker 4: They've always been this thing that's been sort of repurposed

513
00:30:24,440 --> 00:30:27,360
Speaker 4: and used in these other ways. This is almost an

514
00:30:27,400 --> 00:30:29,840
Speaker 4: example of them just owning that and being like, you

515
00:30:29,920 --> 00:30:32,240
Speaker 4: know what, we're going to just be that thing now.

516
00:30:32,720 --> 00:30:34,400
Speaker 4: I don't know. I think it's very interesting.

517
00:30:34,400 --> 00:30:37,280
Speaker 3: If villain you want, then villain, I shall be right.

518
00:30:37,560 --> 00:30:40,680
Speaker 3: But the thing we do have to add here is

519
00:30:40,720 --> 00:30:44,440
Speaker 3: that Jeffrey Hinton had this wonderful interview with the New

520
00:30:44,520 --> 00:30:47,640
Speaker 3: York Times while back, and he said something that stuck

521
00:30:47,680 --> 00:30:49,880
Speaker 3: out with me. This was in March, I think this year.

522
00:30:49,880 --> 00:30:52,560
Speaker 3: He said, I console myself with the normal excuse. If

523
00:30:52,600 --> 00:30:55,920
Speaker 3: I hadn't done it, somebody else would have. It's hard

524
00:30:55,960 --> 00:30:58,200
Speaker 3: to see how you can prevent the bad actors from

525
00:30:58,280 --> 00:31:01,440
Speaker 3: using it for bad things. So to be clear, I

526
00:31:01,440 --> 00:31:06,440
Speaker 3: think the research that the Darkbird folks have created, the

527
00:31:06,480 --> 00:31:11,520
Speaker 3: stuff they've done is necessary, vital, and must be done.

528
00:31:11,760 --> 00:31:14,840
Speaker 3: So I can't say enough good about them. But what

529
00:31:14,920 --> 00:31:17,160
Speaker 3: I can say, and I think we can all agree,

530
00:31:17,920 --> 00:31:21,840
Speaker 3: is that because this is technology, someone else can take

531
00:31:21,880 --> 00:31:25,280
Speaker 3: control of it and do something else with it, and

532
00:31:25,320 --> 00:31:28,480
Speaker 3: we always have to be vigilant about that concern. With

533
00:31:28,600 --> 00:31:31,600
Speaker 3: that in mind, we're gonna pause for a word from

534
00:31:31,600 --> 00:31:34,440
Speaker 3: our sponsor, and we hope you have a good break.

535
00:31:34,440 --> 00:31:36,760
Speaker 3: While you're on the break, just think about it and

536
00:31:36,880 --> 00:31:40,520
Speaker 3: let us know what's what's the best way to hire

537
00:31:40,600 --> 00:31:46,120
Speaker 3: someone these days. Dark web doesn't work, soldiers, fortune smoke

538
00:31:46,200 --> 00:31:49,600
Speaker 3: signal maybe Yeah, well let us know. We'll be back.

539
00:31:56,160 --> 00:31:59,880
Speaker 4: And we're back with one more piece of listener mail

540
00:32:00,160 --> 00:32:04,240
Speaker 4: from you. This one is from you, Brian, and it

541
00:32:04,320 --> 00:32:08,440
Speaker 4: concerns the idea of gene editing. And I'm just gonna

542
00:32:08,440 --> 00:32:09,600
Speaker 4: read the email because it's pretty good.

543
00:32:09,880 --> 00:32:10,160
Speaker 3: Hello.

544
00:32:10,480 --> 00:32:12,400
Speaker 4: I have been binge listening to your shows for the

545
00:32:12,440 --> 00:32:15,080
Speaker 4: past year. This is my first time writing in though.

546
00:32:15,280 --> 00:32:17,959
Speaker 4: I was listening to the discussion about gene editing the

547
00:32:18,000 --> 00:32:21,800
Speaker 4: mitochondrial DNA and it got me thinking it could cause

548
00:32:21,880 --> 00:32:26,200
Speaker 4: a rift in the healthcare industry between health insurance companies

549
00:32:26,560 --> 00:32:30,360
Speaker 4: and big pharma. Health insurance companies will probably be more

550
00:32:30,400 --> 00:32:33,000
Speaker 4: inclined to pay for the gene editing because it would

551
00:32:33,040 --> 00:32:36,960
Speaker 4: save them money for costly treatments later in life. However,

552
00:32:37,000 --> 00:32:39,840
Speaker 4: big pharma would not want this to be cost effective

553
00:32:39,920 --> 00:32:43,280
Speaker 4: because it could eliminate conditions that they make money on

554
00:32:43,440 --> 00:32:47,080
Speaker 4: and therefore lower their profits. They would want the population

555
00:32:47,200 --> 00:32:50,360
Speaker 4: to have these conditions or health defects so that their

556
00:32:50,400 --> 00:32:52,080
Speaker 4: profit margins wouldn't dip.

557
00:32:52,480 --> 00:32:53,360
Speaker 3: Also, it got me.

558
00:32:53,320 --> 00:32:56,920
Speaker 4: Thinking that this could basically stop evolution for the human race. Oh,

559
00:32:57,000 --> 00:32:59,640
Speaker 4: we talked about this all the time, or potentially create

560
00:32:59,680 --> 00:33:03,600
Speaker 4: a new if you started to include DNA from animals to.

561
00:33:03,560 --> 00:33:05,000
Speaker 3: Take on specific traits.

562
00:33:05,240 --> 00:33:07,840
Speaker 4: It got me thinking of a Doctor Who episode entitled

563
00:33:07,840 --> 00:33:10,080
Speaker 4: the Lazarus Effect. I think it might actually be the

564
00:33:10,160 --> 00:33:10,959
Speaker 4: Lazarus Project.

565
00:33:11,160 --> 00:33:11,840
Speaker 2: I googled it.

566
00:33:12,880 --> 00:33:15,040
Speaker 4: This was just a random thought I had. Well listening

567
00:33:15,040 --> 00:33:17,800
Speaker 4: to you guys, love the show. Keep up the fantastic work. Ryan.

568
00:33:18,160 --> 00:33:20,440
Speaker 4: I love that you had this random thought, well listening

569
00:33:20,440 --> 00:33:22,600
Speaker 4: to us, because this is gonna get us going for

570
00:33:22,640 --> 00:33:24,640
Speaker 4: at least fifteen minutes, which is holl on this segment's

571
00:33:24,640 --> 00:33:25,160
Speaker 4: supposed to be.

572
00:33:27,000 --> 00:33:31,360
Speaker 3: It is. It is great. It's something that Ryan, you

573
00:33:31,400 --> 00:33:33,960
Speaker 3: should hang out and grab a drink with us next time.

574
00:33:34,080 --> 00:33:34,520
Speaker 1: This is good.

575
00:33:34,560 --> 00:33:36,479
Speaker 3: It's the same town, this is This is the kind

576
00:33:36,520 --> 00:33:40,240
Speaker 3: of stuff that we inevitably end up talking about. And

577
00:33:40,320 --> 00:33:43,320
Speaker 3: it's because I think these are These are deep, common,

578
00:33:43,480 --> 00:33:47,600
Speaker 3: continuing conversations. They're they're far older than us, and they're

579
00:33:47,600 --> 00:33:50,560
Speaker 3: going to continue long after we're gone in some form.

580
00:33:51,360 --> 00:33:55,440
Speaker 3: You may be interested in reading more about something called

581
00:33:55,560 --> 00:34:01,280
Speaker 3: synthetic morphology. Synthetic morphology is this kind of an emergent

582
00:34:01,440 --> 00:34:04,840
Speaker 3: field that's bending the boundaries between what we could call

583
00:34:05,080 --> 00:34:11,080
Speaker 3: natural and artificial or perhaps manicured life. Ask how and

584
00:34:11,160 --> 00:34:16,520
Speaker 3: how far we can alter the shapes and compositions of

585
00:34:17,040 --> 00:34:21,320
Speaker 3: living matter to your idea of you know, like remember

586
00:34:21,400 --> 00:34:24,880
Speaker 3: back in the PT Barnum days, the Fiji Mermaids, the

587
00:34:24,920 --> 00:34:29,880
Speaker 3: fake taxidermy stuff. Synthetic morphology is kind of possibly a

588
00:34:29,920 --> 00:34:34,200
Speaker 3: real life version of that, but nowhere nearest. Grotesque morphogenesis

589
00:34:34,239 --> 00:34:37,680
Speaker 3: is just the development of a biological form, an organism,

590
00:34:38,120 --> 00:34:42,560
Speaker 3: and the question is how can we engineer living tissue

591
00:34:42,920 --> 00:34:45,680
Speaker 3: to be more useful in this regard.

592
00:34:45,840 --> 00:34:48,919
Speaker 4: And also we talked about vision and thinking, Ben for

593
00:34:48,960 --> 00:34:52,280
Speaker 4: helping me come to that name of the Marvel universe.

594
00:34:52,320 --> 00:34:55,120
Speaker 3: Who has a.

595
00:34:54,200 --> 00:34:58,480
Speaker 4: Speech he makes and I believe it is WandaVision or

596
00:34:58,520 --> 00:35:00,000
Speaker 4: maybe it's one of the movies. I think it's one Division,

597
00:35:00,000 --> 00:35:02,319
Speaker 4: and where he talks about the ship of thesis, the

598
00:35:02,400 --> 00:35:05,840
Speaker 4: idea of like, at what point when a thing, every

599
00:35:05,920 --> 00:35:09,319
Speaker 4: part of it has been replaced, is still the original thing?

600
00:35:09,800 --> 00:35:14,680
Speaker 4: So we're talking about defying evolution through gene editing. So like,

601
00:35:14,760 --> 00:35:16,600
Speaker 4: if we have gotten to a point on a long

602
00:35:16,680 --> 00:35:20,120
Speaker 4: enough timeline that all of us have been gene edited, like,

603
00:35:20,200 --> 00:35:23,000
Speaker 4: are we still human? You know? That's the question I

604
00:35:23,000 --> 00:35:25,359
Speaker 4: think this begs, but it's not the question really even

605
00:35:25,400 --> 00:35:29,520
Speaker 4: that Ryan proposed. We're talking here about something very practical

606
00:35:29,760 --> 00:35:33,480
Speaker 4: or impractical, depending on your opinion about health insurance and

607
00:35:33,520 --> 00:35:37,279
Speaker 4: big pharma. The idea that health insurance companies would be

608
00:35:37,320 --> 00:35:40,120
Speaker 4: all about this and that they would pay for it

609
00:35:40,200 --> 00:35:44,319
Speaker 4: because long term it would save them money because people

610
00:35:44,360 --> 00:35:47,800
Speaker 4: wouldn't be getting cancer anymore, people wouldn't be getting certain

611
00:35:47,840 --> 00:35:51,920
Speaker 4: conditions that they would have to pay for. And big pharma,

612
00:35:51,960 --> 00:35:54,680
Speaker 4: who you know, are spending lots of money in R

613
00:35:54,719 --> 00:35:59,719
Speaker 4: and D developing things like cancer drugs, certain pharmaceutical products

614
00:35:59,760 --> 00:36:05,600
Speaker 4: that treat very intensely debilitating conditions that are afflicting the

615
00:36:05,680 --> 00:36:09,440
Speaker 4: human race, they would not be about this, And I

616
00:36:09,480 --> 00:36:11,040
Speaker 4: would argue, and I think we talked about this a

617
00:36:11,080 --> 00:36:14,840
Speaker 4: little off air, that there is currently kind of a

618
00:36:14,920 --> 00:36:19,120
Speaker 4: bit of a cozy relationship between health care, health insurance,

619
00:36:19,160 --> 00:36:23,400
Speaker 4: and big pharma. It's not one they want to talk about,

620
00:36:23,400 --> 00:36:25,799
Speaker 4: but it feels like it exists. I don't know what

621
00:36:25,880 --> 00:36:28,560
Speaker 4: y'all think, but it seems that way to me. There's

622
00:36:28,600 --> 00:36:31,799
Speaker 4: a balance that is, you know, there's a balance in

623
00:36:31,840 --> 00:36:33,520
Speaker 4: the forest, and they don't want it to kind of

624
00:36:33,520 --> 00:36:36,160
Speaker 4: skew too far one way or the other, because that

625
00:36:36,200 --> 00:36:40,120
Speaker 4: would screw one or both of their business models. So this,

626
00:36:40,920 --> 00:36:45,200
Speaker 4: in theory, could be an interesting shakeup of that relationship.

627
00:36:45,480 --> 00:36:49,000
Speaker 2: Yeah, but it isn't there isn't there. Sorry, I'm maybe

628
00:36:49,040 --> 00:36:51,319
Speaker 2: I'm going back a couple of thoughts there, nol. But

629
00:36:51,520 --> 00:36:54,399
Speaker 2: I think my thinking has changed a little bit when

630
00:36:54,440 --> 00:36:56,200
Speaker 2: it comes to this, And you guys tell me if

631
00:36:56,200 --> 00:37:00,080
Speaker 2: I'm just bonkers, But it does feel like some of

632
00:37:00,160 --> 00:37:04,240
Speaker 2: these huge pharma groups would want to be the one

633
00:37:04,800 --> 00:37:08,960
Speaker 2: that cures pancreatic cancer because if you, you know, think

634
00:37:08,960 --> 00:37:12,759
Speaker 2: about the story that that becomes, right, Oh, we're the

635
00:37:12,760 --> 00:37:17,600
Speaker 2: outfit the cure of cancer. Now we're developing, you know,

636
00:37:17,719 --> 00:37:20,880
Speaker 2: cures for all these other types of cancer, and it

637
00:37:21,040 --> 00:37:23,680
Speaker 2: just becomes like, I don't know, it's a.

638
00:37:23,640 --> 00:37:27,480
Speaker 3: Hell of a byeline, you know, the Yeah, the people

639
00:37:27,480 --> 00:37:28,560
Speaker 3: who saved their life from me.

640
00:37:28,719 --> 00:37:32,840
Speaker 4: But would gene editing be helmed by big pharma is

641
00:37:32,880 --> 00:37:33,600
Speaker 4: the question.

642
00:37:33,680 --> 00:37:38,480
Speaker 3: Ultimately if it's kind of if they're being commodified, they

643
00:37:38,480 --> 00:37:41,040
Speaker 3: would get their fingers in the pie. And that's not

644
00:37:41,239 --> 00:37:44,800
Speaker 3: even that's not even necessarily villainous. Those conflicts of interest

645
00:37:44,880 --> 00:37:49,600
Speaker 3: between privatized healthcare and Big Pharma. They exist because that

646
00:37:50,040 --> 00:37:57,000
Speaker 3: synergy tezus. That synergy uh equates to profits that are

647
00:37:57,080 --> 00:38:00,239
Speaker 3: far greater than they could make individually in either one

648
00:38:00,280 --> 00:38:02,680
Speaker 3: of those business areas. So of course, if they can

649
00:38:02,719 --> 00:38:06,439
Speaker 3: buy it, they will get into it. If they don't,

650
00:38:06,600 --> 00:38:09,640
Speaker 3: then they're going to be the equivalent of people who

651
00:38:10,520 --> 00:38:15,200
Speaker 3: turned down DVDs and said nope, we're a VHS company.

652
00:38:15,560 --> 00:38:18,560
Speaker 4: That's what God forbid laser disc But when we're talking

653
00:38:18,560 --> 00:38:22,080
Speaker 4: about these types of stories the gene editing, this is

654
00:38:22,160 --> 00:38:26,120
Speaker 4: research that's taking place independent of Big Pharma. Big Pharma

655
00:38:26,200 --> 00:38:30,760
Speaker 4: is not currently helming this research. It's research that's happening

656
00:38:30,800 --> 00:38:32,000
Speaker 4: in the academic space.

657
00:38:32,400 --> 00:38:33,680
Speaker 3: Yeah, but they fund it.

658
00:38:33,920 --> 00:38:36,960
Speaker 4: Well, that's my question though in these stories, I haven't

659
00:38:37,000 --> 00:38:41,680
Speaker 4: necessarily seen a name in Big Pharma associated with the

660
00:38:42,440 --> 00:38:44,640
Speaker 4: news that's coming out. And you would think if Big

661
00:38:44,680 --> 00:38:47,279
Speaker 4: Pharma actually had a handle on it, we wouldn't hear

662
00:38:47,320 --> 00:38:49,280
Speaker 4: about it until they were ready to roll it out.

663
00:38:49,160 --> 00:38:51,799
Speaker 3: And sell it to us. I mean, also to Matt's point,

664
00:38:51,960 --> 00:38:56,560
Speaker 3: we've often wrestled with the conspiracy theory that the accusation

665
00:38:56,760 --> 00:39:00,520
Speaker 3: or the allegation that there is a some pash of

666
00:39:00,640 --> 00:39:03,200
Speaker 3: secret miracle trucks and that company.

667
00:39:03,280 --> 00:39:04,080
Speaker 2: Know that's not true.

668
00:39:04,280 --> 00:39:08,040
Speaker 3: Companies like Pfizer or whatever said, yes, we have the

669
00:39:08,120 --> 00:39:13,080
Speaker 3: cure to cancer or to ms or something. We're we're

670
00:39:13,080 --> 00:39:15,200
Speaker 3: holding it back because we need to figure out how

671
00:39:15,200 --> 00:39:17,480
Speaker 3: to make it a lifelong treatment, how to make it

672
00:39:17,520 --> 00:39:20,839
Speaker 3: a service instead of a cure. It doesn't seem that

673
00:39:20,840 --> 00:39:23,920
Speaker 3: that's It doesn't seem that that's necessarily true. And we're

674
00:39:23,960 --> 00:39:26,880
Speaker 3: not accusing these folks at the top of being amazing

675
00:39:27,000 --> 00:39:30,520
Speaker 3: paragons of ethics. We're saying, it seems like they would

676
00:39:30,600 --> 00:39:33,760
Speaker 3: make so much money by releasing it that the money

677
00:39:33,800 --> 00:39:38,000
Speaker 3: would move. The money will always move, and that's that's

678
00:39:38,040 --> 00:39:41,400
Speaker 3: the seismic man. I'm just saying, like the opposite is true.

679
00:39:41,480 --> 00:39:44,080
Speaker 3: Like if they had a cure to the pancreatic cancer thing,

680
00:39:44,400 --> 00:39:46,400
Speaker 3: they had a cure and they knew it worked, they

681
00:39:46,440 --> 00:39:51,239
Speaker 3: would be so so gassed, so stoked to get it

682
00:39:51,280 --> 00:39:54,840
Speaker 3: out that they would ignore dangerous side effects for sure.

683
00:39:54,960 --> 00:39:57,680
Speaker 4: Oh god, they're ignoring dangerous I mean there are these

684
00:39:57,719 --> 00:40:00,239
Speaker 4: like weight loss drugs that are now being like you know,

685
00:40:00,560 --> 00:40:03,800
Speaker 4: there's several, like it's a shot and like a zepic

686
00:40:03,800 --> 00:40:06,360
Speaker 4: I think is one, and there's several and they're obviously

687
00:40:06,440 --> 00:40:08,960
Speaker 4: this is a new space where these big pharma companies

688
00:40:08,960 --> 00:40:11,640
Speaker 4: are competing, like one is by Novo Nordisk, one is

689
00:40:11,640 --> 00:40:14,040
Speaker 4: by one of the other big four or five or however,

690
00:40:14,080 --> 00:40:17,040
Speaker 4: mean they're not that many, and they're actually certain of

691
00:40:17,040 --> 00:40:20,880
Speaker 4: them are being prescribed quote unquote off label, meaning that

692
00:40:20,880 --> 00:40:24,239
Speaker 4: that's not what it's actually four. But if we prescribe

693
00:40:24,239 --> 00:40:27,279
Speaker 4: it off label, it can do wonders. But it's not

694
00:40:27,520 --> 00:40:30,360
Speaker 4: actually FDA approved yet. But if I know how to

695
00:40:30,400 --> 00:40:33,520
Speaker 4: talk to my doctor, I could get him to prescribe

696
00:40:33,520 --> 00:40:35,359
Speaker 4: it to me, and I can also get him just

697
00:40:35,400 --> 00:40:37,640
Speaker 4: to convince my insurance company to pay for it.

698
00:40:38,080 --> 00:40:38,840
Speaker 3: So that that is.

699
00:40:38,880 --> 00:40:42,040
Speaker 4: A modern example of what this is inevitably going to

700
00:40:42,280 --> 00:40:45,400
Speaker 4: maybe become possible septulism.

701
00:40:45,560 --> 00:40:47,720
Speaker 2: No, it'll make your face all tight.

702
00:40:48,200 --> 00:40:50,480
Speaker 4: Oh my, that's a tight face. That's what I've always wanted.

703
00:40:50,800 --> 00:40:53,080
Speaker 3: But discovery of viagara whatever.

704
00:40:53,640 --> 00:40:55,839
Speaker 4: So the question for y'all, though, is is to your

705
00:40:55,880 --> 00:40:58,520
Speaker 4: whole point about even like the conspiracy theory about big

706
00:40:58,560 --> 00:41:01,839
Speaker 4: pharma holding back these cures and all that. So if

707
00:41:01,920 --> 00:41:05,799
Speaker 4: that were the case, we wouldn't be hearing about this

708
00:41:06,400 --> 00:41:10,000
Speaker 4: unless it was in a big pharma press release. The

709
00:41:10,080 --> 00:41:12,240
Speaker 4: fact that we're hearing about it, that it is research

710
00:41:12,280 --> 00:41:16,280
Speaker 4: that exists, means Big Pharma doesn't have their arms around

711
00:41:16,280 --> 00:41:20,440
Speaker 4: this one yet, and they don't control it. They could

712
00:41:20,440 --> 00:41:23,000
Speaker 4: buy it up. We know that they pay for a

713
00:41:23,000 --> 00:41:25,640
Speaker 4: lot of that research. Obviously, that's true, and they're paying

714
00:41:25,680 --> 00:41:29,520
Speaker 4: for research from like every corner of the scientific community.

715
00:41:29,560 --> 00:41:32,800
Speaker 4: I'm sure, but they don't have this on lock.

716
00:41:33,560 --> 00:41:34,320
Speaker 3: I would argue.

717
00:41:34,520 --> 00:41:36,960
Speaker 4: I would argue because of the way we're hearing about it.

718
00:41:37,400 --> 00:41:39,640
Speaker 4: Otherwise they would have done a big rollout.

719
00:41:39,680 --> 00:41:43,040
Speaker 3: And you know what I mean, Maybe I'm wild West. No,

720
00:41:43,400 --> 00:41:45,799
Speaker 3: I think you're correct, because it's kind of like in

721
00:41:45,840 --> 00:41:50,560
Speaker 3: the early days of podcasting, right, just a mic, some

722
00:41:50,600 --> 00:41:54,280
Speaker 3: relatively affordable equipment, and some hot takes, some hot takes,

723
00:41:54,360 --> 00:41:57,239
Speaker 3: hopefully hopefully a vision or a mission of some sort

724
00:41:57,280 --> 00:42:02,239
Speaker 3: that you believe in. I know, I said hopefully. But

725
00:42:02,360 --> 00:42:05,879
Speaker 3: the thing is Big Farmer has started to buy in

726
00:42:05,920 --> 00:42:09,799
Speaker 3: more and more. I think just this year there was

727
00:42:10,560 --> 00:42:14,000
Speaker 3: an accounting of how much money what we would call

728
00:42:14,080 --> 00:42:17,560
Speaker 3: big pharm has put into this particular genre of biotech,

729
00:42:18,080 --> 00:42:21,799
Speaker 3: and in twenty twenty one alone, that number topped to

730
00:42:22,239 --> 00:42:24,920
Speaker 3: twenty two point seven billion dollars.

731
00:42:25,080 --> 00:42:28,000
Speaker 4: Jesus of course, of course.

732
00:42:27,719 --> 00:42:29,920
Speaker 3: It hash twenty twenty one.

733
00:42:30,040 --> 00:42:32,080
Speaker 4: Excuse me, that's insane.

734
00:42:32,200 --> 00:42:36,200
Speaker 3: Still it's twenty two point seven billion dollars, so they

735
00:42:36,239 --> 00:42:38,520
Speaker 3: know what's on the way they are buying in. I

736
00:42:38,520 --> 00:42:40,359
Speaker 3: think the question we had asked when we were talking

737
00:42:40,360 --> 00:42:43,759
Speaker 3: about this earlier too is maybe the most dangerous one.

738
00:42:44,719 --> 00:42:51,279
Speaker 3: What happens when these changes, these mods are heritable, right?

739
00:42:51,760 --> 00:42:55,960
Speaker 3: What happens when what happens when you are born being

740
00:42:56,000 --> 00:42:59,520
Speaker 3: able to see into the ultraviolet spectrum and you know

741
00:42:59,560 --> 00:43:04,480
Speaker 3: you will never have cancer because your great grandfather was

742
00:43:04,600 --> 00:43:06,080
Speaker 3: super rich back in the day.

743
00:43:06,120 --> 00:43:09,399
Speaker 4: It changes the whole model, and I think specifically for

744
00:43:09,440 --> 00:43:12,959
Speaker 4: the health insurance companies. So to Ryan's point, I think

745
00:43:13,120 --> 00:43:16,640
Speaker 4: big pharma is in a much better position health insurance companies.

746
00:43:16,960 --> 00:43:21,200
Speaker 4: They don't make cures, they don't make you know, biotech.

747
00:43:21,320 --> 00:43:25,000
Speaker 4: They just pay for your maladies and charge you a

748
00:43:25,040 --> 00:43:30,279
Speaker 4: premium accordingly. And if the whole spectrum changes, the whole

749
00:43:30,360 --> 00:43:33,160
Speaker 4: landscape of like what it means to be human changes,

750
00:43:33,960 --> 00:43:35,839
Speaker 4: that could It's the way we talk about like, if

751
00:43:36,080 --> 00:43:39,080
Speaker 4: self driving cars actually became, you know, like a real

752
00:43:39,160 --> 00:43:43,080
Speaker 4: going concern, it would change the industry of dui lawyers.

753
00:43:43,120 --> 00:43:45,719
Speaker 4: It would change the industry of you know, all of

754
00:43:45,719 --> 00:43:48,239
Speaker 4: these like dui courts and various things that you have

755
00:43:48,280 --> 00:43:51,400
Speaker 4: to pay for. When you do that, it would be

756
00:43:51,480 --> 00:43:54,400
Speaker 4: a sea change, and we haven't seen that yet happen

757
00:43:54,440 --> 00:43:56,719
Speaker 4: with anything. We're sort of seeing it with AI in

758
00:43:56,800 --> 00:43:59,120
Speaker 4: terms of what we talked about in the episode about

759
00:43:59,719 --> 00:44:02,960
Speaker 4: the way it's being used for potentially debt collection and

760
00:44:03,040 --> 00:44:04,759
Speaker 4: all of the nude things that it's going to be

761
00:44:04,840 --> 00:44:07,360
Speaker 4: used that's going to replace jobs. That's a sea change.

762
00:44:07,480 --> 00:44:12,960
Speaker 4: It makes a pre existing system irrelevant overnight. Just boom,

763
00:44:12,960 --> 00:44:15,839
Speaker 4: it's gone, Like that's what this could do if it

764
00:44:15,920 --> 00:44:17,200
Speaker 4: really became accessible.

765
00:44:17,560 --> 00:44:20,160
Speaker 3: And you know, I'm going to be completely honest, and

766
00:44:20,160 --> 00:44:22,799
Speaker 3: this is just my opinion, so it's not a fact.

767
00:44:22,840 --> 00:44:27,760
Speaker 3: It's not representative of the show. I do think privatized

768
00:44:28,000 --> 00:44:31,360
Speaker 3: healthcare as it stands now is an industry that should

769
00:44:31,400 --> 00:44:35,400
Speaker 3: die because essentially it's a casino's what they're doing is

770
00:44:35,520 --> 00:44:39,959
Speaker 3: you're being forced to gamble with an institution far more

771
00:44:40,000 --> 00:44:43,120
Speaker 3: powerful than you. And the idea is that if you

772
00:44:43,239 --> 00:44:49,120
Speaker 3: quote unquote win, then they will help combat these egregiously

773
00:44:50,000 --> 00:44:56,040
Speaker 3: overpriced medical requirements medical fees that they themselves created. How

774
00:44:56,120 --> 00:44:58,880
Speaker 3: for you entered the casino and so and if you

775
00:44:59,000 --> 00:45:02,280
Speaker 3: lose this, and that's just another thing where they say, sorry,

776
00:45:02,719 --> 00:45:06,080
Speaker 3: you are sentenced to death for the crime of being poor. Well,

777
00:45:06,080 --> 00:45:07,480
Speaker 3: we get to keep your money away.

778
00:45:07,680 --> 00:45:09,440
Speaker 4: Yeah, we get to keep the money that you've paid

779
00:45:09,480 --> 00:45:12,359
Speaker 4: into this system for however many years up until the

780
00:45:12,360 --> 00:45:13,879
Speaker 4: moment you actually needed it.

781
00:45:14,000 --> 00:45:17,240
Speaker 3: And again, it's not a criticism of the people. Private

782
00:45:17,320 --> 00:45:22,160
Speaker 3: healthcare is like one of the top two employers in

783
00:45:22,200 --> 00:45:26,320
Speaker 3: the United States. It is huge, and removing that industry,

784
00:45:26,400 --> 00:45:31,280
Speaker 3: to your point, NOL could have catastrophic economic consequences. We're

785
00:45:31,320 --> 00:45:34,399
Speaker 3: not attacked. We're I'm not attacking the people at all.

786
00:45:34,640 --> 00:45:37,640
Speaker 3: I'm saying the system is dangerous.

787
00:45:37,239 --> 00:45:41,080
Speaker 4: And the folks that you have to make a claim too.

788
00:45:41,560 --> 00:45:43,600
Speaker 4: But again, those like to our point that I just

789
00:45:43,680 --> 00:45:47,759
Speaker 4: mentioned about Chad GBT replacing debt collectors, those people are

790
00:45:47,760 --> 00:45:50,840
Speaker 4: operating off of a script. Those people are basically human

791
00:45:50,960 --> 00:45:55,600
Speaker 4: robots operating at the behest of a much larger organization.

792
00:45:55,360 --> 00:45:58,919
Speaker 3: That they have no say over what the policies are.

793
00:45:59,120 --> 00:46:01,800
Speaker 4: Their job is just a kind of repeat the company line,

794
00:46:02,239 --> 00:46:05,880
Speaker 4: like follow their guidelines that they're given their guardrails, just

795
00:46:05,960 --> 00:46:09,040
Speaker 4: the same ways that a chatbot would. And again I'm

796
00:46:09,080 --> 00:46:12,040
Speaker 4: not dissing the people. This is an entry level job,

797
00:46:12,320 --> 00:46:15,560
Speaker 4: this is a medium level job, depending on where you

798
00:46:15,640 --> 00:46:17,840
Speaker 4: exist within the structure of the company.

799
00:46:18,480 --> 00:46:22,480
Speaker 2: But did you guys hear about the Sackler family's immunity.

800
00:46:22,760 --> 00:46:26,759
Speaker 3: Yeah, yeah, which we totally predicted. And it wasn't a

801
00:46:26,800 --> 00:46:29,879
Speaker 3: tough prediction. It was like, say, oh, the month after

802
00:46:29,960 --> 00:46:35,560
Speaker 3: June is ninety gonna be July unless something crazy happens. Essentially,

803
00:46:35,600 --> 00:46:38,760
Speaker 3: they made a Uncle Sam made a fausty em bargain

804
00:46:38,880 --> 00:46:41,600
Speaker 3: with them, right, they made a devil's deal, and they said,

805
00:46:41,719 --> 00:46:45,280
Speaker 3: provide us an enormous amount, a cartoonish amount of money

806
00:46:45,640 --> 00:46:49,719
Speaker 3: these settlements, and you won't have to face consequences for

807
00:46:49,760 --> 00:46:50,320
Speaker 3: your actions.

808
00:46:50,400 --> 00:46:53,680
Speaker 2: They pay six billion now the Sackler family because they

809
00:46:53,719 --> 00:46:57,960
Speaker 2: own Purdue Pharma, which uh you know oxy cotton. There's

810
00:46:58,000 --> 00:47:00,800
Speaker 2: a afried about it.

811
00:47:00,840 --> 00:47:03,040
Speaker 3: To be clear, this was not a deal that was

812
00:47:03,080 --> 00:47:04,720
Speaker 3: given to most opium dealers.

813
00:47:05,040 --> 00:47:08,200
Speaker 4: Oh never. No, those people are just thrown in prison,

814
00:47:08,440 --> 00:47:10,280
Speaker 4: you know, I mean, or murdered.

815
00:47:11,480 --> 00:47:14,600
Speaker 3: And the Sactlers still have more than enough financial firepower

816
00:47:14,640 --> 00:47:16,120
Speaker 3: to totally blackbag us.

817
00:47:16,200 --> 00:47:21,160
Speaker 4: Well, not to spoil succession, but a big part of

818
00:47:21,200 --> 00:47:24,520
Speaker 4: that television program that I think we all enjoy is

819
00:47:24,560 --> 00:47:28,600
Speaker 4: that for people at that eschelon, there is really no losing.

820
00:47:29,200 --> 00:47:32,600
Speaker 4: Even if you lose philosophically, like you don't get to

821
00:47:32,640 --> 00:47:35,799
Speaker 4: be the big boss anymore or get to keep purveying

822
00:47:35,840 --> 00:47:40,399
Speaker 4: the vision of your forefathers, You're still fine forever, at

823
00:47:40,400 --> 00:47:44,560
Speaker 4: all time. You're good, Like to the tune of billions,

824
00:47:44,719 --> 00:47:49,400
Speaker 4: you're good and there's no consequences. Even these fines, as

825
00:47:49,440 --> 00:47:52,840
Speaker 4: exorbitant as they might seem on paper to people like us,

826
00:47:53,320 --> 00:47:56,439
Speaker 4: to them, it's nothing. They're just sad they can't keep

827
00:47:56,440 --> 00:47:59,400
Speaker 4: doing it. They just wish they could keep doing what

828
00:47:59,480 --> 00:48:02,400
Speaker 4: they were doing before. And that's the biggest punishment for

829
00:48:02,440 --> 00:48:03,240
Speaker 4: them is that they can't.

830
00:48:03,719 --> 00:48:06,400
Speaker 3: Yeah, you're right, Maybe I'm be unfair because you know,

831
00:48:06,600 --> 00:48:09,520
Speaker 3: in the interest in transparency, I haven't I haven't met

832
00:48:09,560 --> 00:48:10,960
Speaker 3: these people personally.

833
00:48:11,200 --> 00:48:11,880
Speaker 4: Doesn't matter.

834
00:48:12,400 --> 00:48:14,680
Speaker 3: I mean, it's just we can see the actions, right,

835
00:48:14,719 --> 00:48:19,160
Speaker 3: we can see the locations, but the again, right, as

836
00:48:19,160 --> 00:48:21,680
Speaker 3: we said, this is something that is a source of

837
00:48:21,840 --> 00:48:27,200
Speaker 3: endless fascination for us. Do check out Synthetic Morphology Scientific American.

838
00:48:27,560 --> 00:48:30,359
Speaker 3: Great article that came out just earlier this month by

839
00:48:30,440 --> 00:48:35,320
Speaker 3: Philip Ball. Synthetic Morphology let scientists create new life forms.

840
00:48:35,680 --> 00:48:37,560
Speaker 3: I can't wait, what would you get? What would you

841
00:48:37,560 --> 00:48:40,719
Speaker 3: guys get? Healthcare and big pharma aside, Like if you

842
00:48:41,120 --> 00:48:43,200
Speaker 3: if you were able to customize your body right now

843
00:48:43,280 --> 00:48:44,800
Speaker 3: and you could get an extra vision, a couple of

844
00:48:44,800 --> 00:48:48,839
Speaker 3: superpowers X ray vision. Gills, Gills, water wheels.

845
00:48:48,960 --> 00:48:50,759
Speaker 2: You're a Gills guy, I'm a Gills boy.

846
00:48:52,040 --> 00:48:53,239
Speaker 3: The water it up?

847
00:48:53,600 --> 00:48:53,799
Speaker 2: Yeah?

848
00:48:55,320 --> 00:48:58,640
Speaker 3: Yeah, Gingo the Orcas, Huh, that's right, that's right.

849
00:48:59,040 --> 00:49:01,320
Speaker 4: We should talk about this. You heard about the Orcas.

850
00:49:01,400 --> 00:49:03,880
Speaker 4: Then they just like they have taught themselves to attack ships.

851
00:49:06,000 --> 00:49:06,919
Speaker 4: That's for next time.

852
00:49:07,000 --> 00:49:12,640
Speaker 3: The Google whale that was clearly a spy humans. The

853
00:49:12,640 --> 00:49:16,000
Speaker 3: Bluegle whale just showed up at the wrong classroom rocking

854
00:49:16,080 --> 00:49:16,560
Speaker 3: a jan.

855
00:49:16,520 --> 00:49:20,840
Speaker 4: Sport Yeah, basically hypercolor parachute pants.

856
00:49:21,040 --> 00:49:22,760
Speaker 2: No, I have to I have to make a confession.

857
00:49:22,800 --> 00:49:25,120
Speaker 2: When you said you were you had a message from

858
00:49:25,200 --> 00:49:28,359
Speaker 2: Ryan for today's episode, I thought you were talking about

859
00:49:28,400 --> 00:49:32,680
Speaker 2: a different Ryan that wrote in to us calling himself

860
00:49:32,800 --> 00:49:34,920
Speaker 2: Knobbyhood and I would have called.

861
00:49:34,840 --> 00:49:36,600
Speaker 4: Him that if that was the line that I was

862
00:49:36,840 --> 00:49:37,319
Speaker 4: referring to.

863
00:49:37,480 --> 00:49:41,120
Speaker 2: Well, the email starts fellas hate you guys, terrible pob

864
00:49:41,200 --> 00:49:43,080
Speaker 2: love you guys.

865
00:49:43,000 --> 00:49:45,080
Speaker 4: Suck and then he goes on to yeah, but then

866
00:49:45,120 --> 00:49:48,840
Speaker 4: in the end, what is the Australian You know.

867
00:49:50,160 --> 00:49:53,160
Speaker 3: He's lived in. Oh, we don't want to give specifics

868
00:49:53,200 --> 00:49:55,440
Speaker 3: because you did Australia for like fifteen years.

869
00:49:55,840 --> 00:49:58,280
Speaker 4: I saw that too, and I was really mad until

870
00:49:58,320 --> 00:50:00,399
Speaker 4: I scanned the rest of the email, real us how

871
00:50:00,400 --> 00:50:02,920
Speaker 4: long it was, and then it wasn't full of missus gathing,

872
00:50:03,400 --> 00:50:07,839
Speaker 4: you know, condemnations of us as human beings.

873
00:50:07,000 --> 00:50:11,560
Speaker 3: Yeah, like that opener that that definitely hooked to be too,

874
00:50:11,760 --> 00:50:14,360
Speaker 3: because I think that's a cool way. That's like a

875
00:50:14,520 --> 00:50:17,080
Speaker 3: very that's kind of how we talk to each other subtypes,

876
00:50:17,200 --> 00:50:20,160
Speaker 3: you know what I mean. So gosh, that was great

877
00:50:20,160 --> 00:50:21,799
Speaker 3: to bring that up. And you know what, thanks to

878
00:50:21,840 --> 00:50:25,200
Speaker 3: all the riots here, you know, thinks absolutely thanks to

879
00:50:25,320 --> 00:50:28,080
Speaker 3: everybody who takes the time to write in we are

880
00:50:28,360 --> 00:50:31,520
Speaker 3: you know, we've obviously got some punchy energy here.

881
00:50:31,640 --> 00:50:31,840
Speaker 1: I have.

882
00:50:32,880 --> 00:50:35,560
Speaker 3: I'm probably one of the worst because I've been running

883
00:50:35,560 --> 00:50:38,799
Speaker 3: my clock kind of long and might have to call

884
00:50:38,840 --> 00:50:41,640
Speaker 3: it at evening. But we have so much cool stuff

885
00:50:41,680 --> 00:50:44,479
Speaker 3: on the way, and you are the most important part

886
00:50:44,520 --> 00:50:47,880
Speaker 3: of it right in. Let us know your responses, let

887
00:50:47,960 --> 00:50:51,160
Speaker 3: us know what episodes we should do in the future.

888
00:50:51,680 --> 00:50:53,440
Speaker 3: We can't wait for you to be a part of

889
00:50:53,600 --> 00:50:57,279
Speaker 3: the show with us. What's what's a spoiler? Is there

890
00:50:57,320 --> 00:50:59,359
Speaker 3: an episode we can tease that we have coming up?

891
00:50:59,400 --> 00:51:01,960
Speaker 3: We talked about ooh, people are going to have opinions

892
00:51:01,960 --> 00:51:06,280
Speaker 3: about tipping and then oh oh and a certain cryptid

893
00:51:06,600 --> 00:51:07,240
Speaker 3: in Ohio.

894
00:51:07,520 --> 00:51:09,960
Speaker 4: Oh, don't even get me started on that one. But

895
00:51:10,160 --> 00:51:12,759
Speaker 4: in the meantime, you can write to us. We are

896
00:51:12,840 --> 00:51:17,240
Speaker 4: conspiracy stuff on YouTube, Facebook and Twitter. Conspiracy Stuff show

897
00:51:17,440 --> 00:51:19,400
Speaker 4: on Instagram and TikTok.

898
00:51:19,560 --> 00:51:24,480
Speaker 2: We have a phone number one eight three three std WYTK.

899
00:51:24,680 --> 00:51:27,839
Speaker 2: Call the number. You've got three minutes. It's a voicemail.

900
00:51:28,120 --> 00:51:30,719
Speaker 2: Give yourself a cool nickname. We don't care what it is.

901
00:51:30,800 --> 00:51:33,600
Speaker 2: We just hope it's not on your driver's license. If

902
00:51:33,600 --> 00:51:35,960
Speaker 2: you have a driver's license. Do tell us if we

903
00:51:36,000 --> 00:51:38,120
Speaker 2: can use your name and message on the air in

904
00:51:38,120 --> 00:51:40,560
Speaker 2: one of these listener mail episodes. If you've got more

905
00:51:40,600 --> 00:51:42,920
Speaker 2: to say, they could fit in that three minutes. Instead,

906
00:51:43,040 --> 00:51:43,880
Speaker 2: send us an email.

907
00:51:44,080 --> 00:52:05,280
Speaker 3: We are conspiracy at iHeartRadio dot com.

908
00:52:05,719 --> 00:52:07,800
Speaker 2: Stuff they don't want you to know is a production

909
00:52:07,920 --> 00:52:12,160
Speaker 2: of iHeartRadio. For more podcasts from iHeartRadio, visit the iHeartRadio

910
00:52:12,200 --> 00:52:15,600
Speaker 2: app Apple podcasts, or wherever you listen to your favorite shows.