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Speaker 1: The British were furious over alleged American intelligence leaks about

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Speaker 1: the Manchester bombing, including the suspect's name and pictures of

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Speaker 1: bomb parts. Prime Minister Theresa May said she would raise

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Speaker 1: the issue with President Trump on the sidelines of yesterday's

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Speaker 1: NATO summit in Brussels. I will make clear to President

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Speaker 1: Trump that intelligence that has shared between our law enforcement

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Speaker 1: agencies must remain secure. And after May's complained to Trump,

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Speaker 1: he said the US would investigate the alleged leaks, which

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Speaker 1: were deeply troubling. Our guests are Andrew Kent, professor at

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Speaker 1: Fordham University Law School, and Bradley Moss, a partner at

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Speaker 1: Mark Zade. Andrew, I should point out that these leaks

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Speaker 1: came after Trump himself disclosed sensitive information about Islamic state

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Speaker 1: in a meeting with Russian officials. But will this affect

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Speaker 1: intelligence sharing with the UK? Yeah, I think it's hard

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Speaker 1: to say. I mean, I read pretty carefully the different

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Speaker 1: news accounts of US, and from what I can tell,

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Speaker 1: it's still unclear from whose side, you know, whether it's

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Speaker 1: you know, the American or the US side the leaks came.

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Speaker 1: I mean, it seems Prime Minister May thinks it's from

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Speaker 1: the American side, and and maybe it is. Um but

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Speaker 1: you know, these kinds of leaks are pretty common. You know,

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Speaker 1: the photos published by the New York Times, UH did

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Speaker 1: not you know, I mean, they're crime scene photos, but

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Speaker 1: did not seem to be amazingly sensitive, not not on

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Speaker 1: the on the same order of the kind of thing

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Speaker 1: that President Trump apparently disclosed. So I would be surprised

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Speaker 1: if a you know, decades long, incredibly strong and fruit

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Speaker 1: prole intelligence relationship between the UK and the United States

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Speaker 1: is you know, meaningfully harmed by this. But you know,

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Speaker 1: it certainly doesn't help Bradley, UH Justice Department apparently is

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Speaker 1: going to look into this. What what laws conceivably could

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Speaker 1: have been broken by the leak of this information? Well,

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Speaker 1: by and large, the standard ones we've heard with respect

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Speaker 1: to any leak of classified information, even class and information

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Speaker 1: that's been shared a for UH foreign partner government could

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Speaker 1: conceivably fall under one of various statutory provisions under the

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Speaker 1: Espionage Act, or a couple of different ones with respective

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Speaker 1: misdemeanors for improperly removing classified information or what's called national

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Speaker 1: defense information. So any one of those particular provisions that

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Speaker 1: always get raised with any leak of classie information could

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Speaker 1: be implicated. The question, of course, is who you know,

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Speaker 1: Even assuming that this was a leak from the U

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Speaker 1: S side, what particular agencies or organizations with the US

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Speaker 1: government would have received it, And was it from the

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Speaker 1: intelligence community or was it coming from White House officials.

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Speaker 1: We just don't know yet. Is this information to actually classify?

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Speaker 1: Would you expect that to be the case? From what

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Speaker 1: from what has been described, I am candidly not certain.

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Speaker 1: It sounds like it was likely at least sensitive. Whether

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Speaker 1: or not it met the definition for classified is kind

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Speaker 1: of up in the air, and that's going to be

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Speaker 1: part of the problem is there's very clear statutory provisions

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Speaker 1: in US law for criminalizing people who leak classified information.

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Speaker 1: When it comes to unclassified but sensitive information, it's a

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Speaker 1: lot harder to make a criminal case, if at all.

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Speaker 1: And if that's what that's what we have here. If

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Speaker 1: it's information that's not classified, it's a basis for possibly

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Speaker 1: firing the person who leaked it, But making a criminal

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Speaker 1: case is far more difficult. Andrew, is there a contrast

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Speaker 1: between the US and the UK when it comes to

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Speaker 1: press leaking. We have the first Amendment and the British

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Speaker 1: have the Official Secrets Act, so it seems as if

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Speaker 1: there might be, you know, a disconnect. What you said,

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Speaker 1: Joe is absolutely right. I mean there are kind of

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Speaker 1: cultural and legal differences. But if it's a US employee

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Speaker 1: who uh you know, has a duty uh as part

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Speaker 1: of their job and also under the US law not

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Speaker 1: to disclose class information, then the First Amendment is not

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Speaker 1: going to protect that person. You know, we really have

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Speaker 1: First Amendment kinds of questions here when we talk about

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Speaker 1: news organizations, and then obviously the hard types of questions

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Speaker 1: where you're talking like something like wiki leaks, which might

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Speaker 1: be somewhere between a news organization and a criminal organization.

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Speaker 1: But but a US government official, uh, you can't leak um.

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Speaker 1: Notwithstanding the First amoument. And Bradley, is it since Andrew

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Speaker 1: mentioned news organizations, we only have about thirty seconds, but

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Speaker 1: it's it's clear that the New York Times could not

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Speaker 1: be prosecuted for for publishing this information. Is that correct? Yeah?

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Speaker 1: Not unless the Department of Justice is going to throw

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Speaker 1: away decades of uh institutional president no media organization will

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Speaker 1: be criminally prosecuted for publishing information, even if there was classified.

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Speaker 1: They wouldn't want to risk the First Amendment challenges. Jared

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Speaker 1: Kushner is not just another White House staffer. He's not

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Speaker 1: only the president's son in law, but one of Trump's

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Speaker 1: closest advisers. Now the person in the inner circle who

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Speaker 1: is family is being investigated by the FBI, and it's

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Speaker 1: probe of Russian interference in the presidential election. According to

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Speaker 1: The Washington Post, this means that Kushner is the first

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Speaker 1: current White House official now connected to the investigation. Kushner

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Speaker 1: also admitted omitted mentioning his contacts with the Russians when

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Speaker 1: applying for top security clearance, as did Attorney General Jeff Sessions.

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Speaker 1: We've been talking with Andrew Kent, professor at Fordham University

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Speaker 1: Law School, and Bradley Moss, partner in Mark Zad Brad

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Speaker 1: Kushner is a person of interest, but not a target.

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Speaker 1: Explain the difference and how often a person of interest

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Speaker 1: becomes a target. Sure, so, a person of interest just

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Speaker 1: means there he has final or final he has material information,

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Speaker 1: relevant information and relevant personal knowledge of details that's informative

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Speaker 1: for the purposes of this investigation. What that is is

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Speaker 1: not entirely clear. It seems that at least some of

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Speaker 1: it has to do with financial information. Another part has

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Speaker 1: to do with the data analytics program that the Trump

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Speaker 1: campaign was running, and the concern that appears to be

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Speaker 1: in the FBI that there was some element of collusion

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Speaker 1: in terms of how different Facebook ads and Facebook messages

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Speaker 1: were sent out, in possible inclusion with Russian officials. So

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Speaker 1: that seems to at least be part of where the

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Speaker 1: focus is. It doesn't mean, as you notice it know,

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Speaker 1: as you noted, it doesn't mean that he's going to

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Speaker 1: become a target of the investigation, that he's gonna be indicted.

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Speaker 1: He may never become. So it's not at all uncommon

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Speaker 1: for people who are simply a person of interest to

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Speaker 1: never become anything more than a witness. It most in

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Speaker 1: a you know, subsequent criminal prosecution, they don't necessarily turn

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Speaker 1: into targets. And that may be all that he actually

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Speaker 1: is in the end. With respect to this investigation, Andrew,

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Speaker 1: based on what we know from what's public now, why

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Speaker 1: might investigators be interested, particularly in Jared Kushner. What is

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Speaker 1: it about him? Well, certainly he's a way of finding

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Speaker 1: out what the president knew without directly questioning the president.

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Speaker 1: He's you know, he maybe uh, you know, his closest

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Speaker 1: advisory and certainly is one of the very closest and

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Speaker 1: presumably communicated with his father in law quite frequently. So

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Speaker 1: you know, it's it's a unique level of access into

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Speaker 1: you know, what knowledge UH and President Trump had and

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Speaker 1: what things he said and did. And also, you know,

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Speaker 1: as Brad said, Christners seems to have been uh, you know,

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Speaker 1: potentially involved in a number of things of interest including

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Speaker 1: you know, the potential collusion, potential financial ties between UM,

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Speaker 1: between Trump and UH and in Russian state owned banks.

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Speaker 1: So there's a number of things that seemed to be

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Speaker 1: of interest to the FDI that that christianer was also

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Speaker 1: involved in UM. And so it's natural to talk to

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Speaker 1: him even if even if he weren't, this kind of

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Speaker 1: unique way to look into UM, you know, the knowledge

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Speaker 1: of Trump himself. Brad Jenny Gorlick, one of Chrishner's attorneys,

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Speaker 1: said that he's previously volunteered to share with Congress what

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Speaker 1: he knows about out these meetings, and he'll do the

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Speaker 1: same as these contacted in connection with any other inquiry.

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Speaker 1: That's easy to say. And then if it gets close

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Speaker 1: to to a situation that's tenuous. It's easy to take

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Speaker 1: it back correct. There's nothing that prevents Jared Kushner from

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Speaker 1: withdrawal a withdrawing, but modifying the level of his cooperation,

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Speaker 1: possibly invoking any type of that. I can't think of

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Speaker 1: too many privileges that someone in his position might hold,

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Speaker 1: but trying to invoke any proprietary or corporate style privileges

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Speaker 1: that he would hold over certain information. There's nothing that

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Speaker 1: stops him. And we have no idea in the course

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Speaker 1: of the FBI investigation or the congressional investigations, how he

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Speaker 1: would exactly respond two questions and how much detail he

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Speaker 1: can and would provide. So right now this is a

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Speaker 1: lot of posturing. We'll see as things proceed um what

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Speaker 1: he actually does. Andrew the Post reported that Jared Kushner

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Speaker 1: has had some meetings with the Russian ambassador before inauguration,

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Speaker 1: meetings with a banker whose bank was affected by the

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Speaker 1: sanctions against Russia. UM. There's also this week testimony by

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Speaker 1: the CI Director Pharmacy Director John Brennan, who talked about

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Speaker 1: Russia trying to get people to to act on their behalf. UM.

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Speaker 1: Either he put it either wittingly or unwittingly. UM. Does

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Speaker 1: all that stuff sort of fit together? Is that? Is

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Speaker 1: that potentially what's going on here with this inquiry? Well,

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Speaker 1: there's also reports this week that the U. S Intelligence

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Speaker 1: had intercepted communications where the Russian intelligence was talking about

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Speaker 1: being able to influence Trump through influencing people close to him. Uh.

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Speaker 1: You know, people speculated that I was talking about Michael

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Speaker 1: Flynn or Paul Manafort, but that could also have been

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Speaker 1: you know, Jared Kushner as well. UM. So uh, you

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Speaker 1: know this this might all fit together. You know, there's

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Speaker 1: still an enormous amount we don't know. Um, but you know,

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Speaker 1: Chrishner does seem like he was, you know, central player

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Speaker 1: in the campaign. Um, on those aspects that you know,

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Speaker 1: potentially we're touching Russian involvement. If if that happened. And

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Speaker 1: then as you know, as you said and I mentioned,

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Speaker 1: you know, the financial relationship that you know, his father

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Speaker 1: in law might have with with Russian entities, Krishner could

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Speaker 1: be Um, Krishner could have knowledge of that or even

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Speaker 1: some involvement in that too. So yeah, it might all

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Speaker 1: add up to collusion or to Russia having financial leverage

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Speaker 1: over President Trump, or it might not. Um, you know,

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Speaker 1: I don't I don't think we know, but you know,

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Speaker 1: the f guys obviously interested. And also, let's talk a

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Speaker 1: little bit brad about the security clearance. Kushner omitted mentioning

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Speaker 1: his contacts with the Russians when applying for top security clearance,

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Speaker 1: and so did Attorney General Jeff Sessions, who said that

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Speaker 1: he was told not to buy advisors in the FBI.

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Speaker 1: And then they say, well, we'll correct that now. But

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Speaker 1: what does it show when they don't initially disclose that. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: let's put it very succinctly in terms of recent events.

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Speaker 1: If this were one of my clients, a rank and

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Speaker 1: file person who had made that type of omission, they

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Speaker 1: would have been body slammed by security for having done it. Uh.

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Speaker 1: These are very serious forms. It's very lengthy, it's very

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Speaker 1: time consuming, but it's a very necessary form to hold

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Speaker 1: a security clearance, and you submit it under penalty of perjury.

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Speaker 1: The fact that both Jared Kushner and Attorney General Sessions

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Speaker 1: omitted this information for reasons that, especially with Jared Kushner,

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Speaker 1: I don't still to this day grasp in terms of

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Speaker 1: why he thought he didn't have to report the information

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Speaker 1: on the form. You know what reason he was signing

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Speaker 1: it without submitting that information just is flabbergasting. I don't

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Speaker 1: know if it's arrogance. I don't know if it's just uh,

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Speaker 1: a level of incompetence or what it is here. I

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Speaker 1: don't want to assume bad faith. I don't want to

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Speaker 1: assume this is part of a larger plot. But even

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Speaker 1: if it's inadvertent, it raises questions in it feeds this

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Speaker 1: narrative that there's something more to it. That of all

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Speaker 1: the things to forget and to leave off your form,

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Speaker 1: you leave off the contacts with the Russians, which is

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Speaker 1: what's being investigated by Congress and the FBI. It just

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Speaker 1: beats this ongoing media narrative. It seems to be a

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Speaker 1: lot of body slamming going on. I don't know about

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Speaker 1: that reference. And as a journalist, I don't know if

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Speaker 1: I like being all the talk of body slamming. But

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Speaker 1: we have about thirty seconds. Andrew, do you agree? I do? I.

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Speaker 1: I it's amazing how it's always the Russian stuff that

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Speaker 1: gets omitted and forgotten. You know, whether it's on testimony

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Speaker 1: or on the security clearance forms, there might well be

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Speaker 1: an innocent explanation for it. Uh, it might well, be incompetence.

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Speaker 1: You know, we certainly have seen a whole lot of

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Speaker 1: incompetence and sloppiness with members of this administration so far,

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Speaker 1: but it really does not look good. Well, I want

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Speaker 1: to thank you both for being on Bloomberg Law as always.

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Speaker 1: That's Professor Andrew Kent from Foreign University Law School and

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Speaker 1: Bradley Moss, partner at mark Zaid does it for this

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Speaker 1: edition of Bloomberg Law. Thanks to our technical director Chris

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Speaker 1: Trike coll Me and our producer David Suckerman. Coming up

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Speaker 1: next Bloomberg Markets with Carol Masser and Corey Johnson. I'm

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Speaker 1: June Grossel with Greg Stuhre. Have a great long holiday weekend.

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Speaker 1: This is Bloomberg