WEBVTT - Killer Robots and the Future of War

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<v Speaker 1>Pushkin. You're listening to Brave New Planet, a podcast about

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<v Speaker 1>amazing new technologies that could dramatically improve our world. Or

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<v Speaker 1>if we don't make wise choices, could leave us a

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<v Speaker 1>lot worse off. Utopia or dystopia. It's up to us.

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<v Speaker 1>On September twenty sixth, nineteen eighty three, the world almost

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<v Speaker 1>came to an end. Just three weeks earlier, the Soviet

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<v Speaker 1>Union had shot down Korean Airlines Flight Double O seven,

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<v Speaker 1>a passenger plane with two hundred and sixty nine people aboard.

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<v Speaker 1>I'm coming before you tonight about the Korean Airline massacre.

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<v Speaker 1>President Ronald Reagan addressed the nation the attack by the

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<v Speaker 1>Soviet Union against two hundred and sixty nine innocent men, women,

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<v Speaker 1>and children aboard an unarmed Korean passenger plane. This crime

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<v Speaker 1>against humanity must never be forgotten here or throughout the world.

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<v Speaker 1>Cold War tensions escalated, with the two nuclear powers on

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<v Speaker 1>high alert. World War three felt frighteningly possible. Then, on

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<v Speaker 1>September twenty sixth, in a command center outside of Moscow,

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<v Speaker 1>an alarm sounded. The Soviet Union's early warning system reported

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<v Speaker 1>the launch of multiple intercontinental ballistic missiles from bases in

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<v Speaker 1>the United states. Statislav Petrov, a forty four year old

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<v Speaker 1>member of the Soviet Air Defense Forces, was the duty

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<v Speaker 1>officer that night. His role was to alert Moscow that

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<v Speaker 1>an attack was under way, likely triggering Soviet nuclear retaliation

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<v Speaker 1>and all out war. Petrov spoke with BBC News in

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<v Speaker 1>twenty thirteen. The sirens sounded very loudly, and I just

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<v Speaker 1>sat there for a few seconds, staring at the screen

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<v Speaker 1>with the word launch displayed in bold red letters. A

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<v Speaker 1>minute later, the siren went off again. The second missile

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<v Speaker 1>was launched, then the third, and the fourth, and the fifth.

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<v Speaker 1>The computers changed their alerts from launch to missile strike.

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<v Speaker 1>Petrov's instructions were clear, report the attack on the motherland,

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<v Speaker 1>but something didn't make sense. If the US were attacking,

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<v Speaker 1>why only five missiles rather than an entire fleet? And

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<v Speaker 1>then I made my decision. I would not trust the computer.

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<v Speaker 1>I picked up the telephone handset, spoke to my superiors

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<v Speaker 1>and reported that the alarm was false. But I myself

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<v Speaker 1>was not sure. Until the very last moment. I knew

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<v Speaker 1>perfectly well that nobody would be able to correct my

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<v Speaker 1>mistake if I had made one. Petrov, of course, was right.

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<v Speaker 1>The false alarm was later found to be the result

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<v Speaker 1>of a rare and unanticipated coincidence sunlight glinting off high

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<v Speaker 1>altitude clouds over North Dakota at just the right angle

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<v Speaker 1>to fool the Soviet satellites. Statislav Petrov's story comes up

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<v Speaker 1>again and again in discussions of how far we should

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<v Speaker 1>go and turning over important decisions, especially life and death decisions,

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<v Speaker 1>to artificial intelligence. It's not an easy call. Think about

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<v Speaker 1>the split second decisions and avoiding a highway collision. Who

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<v Speaker 1>will ultimately do better a tire driver or a self

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<v Speaker 1>driving car? Nowhere is the question more fraught than on

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<v Speaker 1>the battlefield. As technology evolves, should weapons systems be given

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<v Speaker 1>the power to make life and death decisions? Or do

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<v Speaker 1>we need to ensure there's always a human a Stanislav

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<v Speaker 1>Petrov in the loop. Some people, including winners of the

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<v Speaker 1>Nobel Peace Prize, say that weapons should never be allowed

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<v Speaker 1>to make their own decisions about who or what to attack.

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<v Speaker 1>They're calling for a ban on what they call killer robots.

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<v Speaker 1>Others think that idea is well meaning but naive. Today's

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<v Speaker 1>big question lethal autonomous weapons. Should they ever be allowed?

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<v Speaker 1>If so, when, if not, can we stop them? My

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<v Speaker 1>name is Eric Lander. I'm a scientist who works on

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<v Speaker 1>ways to improve human health. I helped lead the Human

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<v Speaker 1>Genome Project, and today I lead the Broad Institute of

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<v Speaker 1>and Harvard. In the twenty first century, powerful technologies have

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<v Speaker 1>been appearing at a breathtaking pace, related to the Internet,

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<v Speaker 1>artificial intelligence, genetic engineering, and more. They have amazing potential upsides,

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<v Speaker 1>but we can't ignore the risks that come with them.

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<v Speaker 1>The decisions aren't just up to scientists or politicians, whether

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<v Speaker 1>we like it or not, we all of us are

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<v Speaker 1>the stewards of a brave New Planet. This generation's choices

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<v Speaker 1>will shape the future as never before. Coming up on

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<v Speaker 1>today's episode of Brave New Planet fully autonomous lethal weapons

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<v Speaker 1>or killer robots, we hear from a fighter pilot about

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<v Speaker 1>why it might make sense to have machines in charge

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<v Speaker 1>of some major battlefield decisions. I know people who have

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<v Speaker 1>killed civilians, and in all cases where people made mistakes,

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<v Speaker 1>it was just too much information. Things were happening too fast.

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<v Speaker 1>I speak with one of the world's leading robo ethesis.

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<v Speaker 1>Robots will make mistakes too, but hopefully, if done correctly,

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<v Speaker 1>they will make far far less mistakes than human beings.

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<v Speaker 1>We'll hear about some of the possible consequences of autonomous weapons.

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<v Speaker 1>Algorithms interacting at machine speed faster than humans couldn't respond

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<v Speaker 1>might result in accidents, and that's something like a flash war.

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<v Speaker 1>I'll speak with a leader from Human Rights Watch. The

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<v Speaker 1>campaign to stop Killer Robots is seeking new international lure

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<v Speaker 1>in the form of a new treaty. And we'll talk

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<v Speaker 1>with former Secretary of Defense Ash Carter. Because I'm the

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<v Speaker 1>guy who asked to go out the next morning after

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<v Speaker 1>some women and children have been accidentally killed. As suppose

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<v Speaker 1>I go out there, Eric and I say, oh, I

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<v Speaker 1>don't know how it happened. The machine did it. I

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<v Speaker 1>would be crucified. I should be crucified. So stay with us.

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<v Speaker 1>Chapter one, Stanley the self driving Car. Not long after

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<v Speaker 1>the first general purpose computers were invented in the nineteen forties,

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<v Speaker 1>some people began to dream about fully autonomous robots, machines

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<v Speaker 1>that used their electronic brains to navigate the world, make decisions,

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<v Speaker 1>and take actions. Not surprisingly, some of those dreamers were

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<v Speaker 1>in the US Department of Defense, specifically the Defense Advanced

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<v Speaker 1>Research Projects Agency or DARPA, the visionary unit behind the

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<v Speaker 1>creation of the Internet. They saw a lot of potential

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<v Speaker 1>for automating battlefields, but they knew it might take decades.

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<v Speaker 1>In the nineteen sixties, DARPA funded the Stanford Research inst

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<v Speaker 1>to build Shaky the Robots, a machine that used cameras

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<v Speaker 1>to move about a laboratory. In the nineteen eight ease,

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<v Speaker 1>it supported universities to create vehicles that could follow lanes

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<v Speaker 1>on a road. By the early two thousands, DARPA decided

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<v Speaker 1>that computers had reached the point that fully autonomous vehicles

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<v Speaker 1>able to navigate the real world might finally be feasible.

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<v Speaker 1>To find out, DARPA decided to launch a race. I

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<v Speaker 1>talked to someone who knew a lot about it. My

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<v Speaker 1>name is Sebastian Thrun. I mean the smartest person on

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<v Speaker 1>the planet and the best looking. That's kidding. Sebastian Thrun

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<v Speaker 1>gained recognition when his autonomous car, a modified Volkswagon with

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<v Speaker 1>a computer in the trunk and sensors on the roof,

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<v Speaker 1>was the first to win the DARPA Grand Challenge. A

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<v Speaker 1>dun Challenge was his momentous government sponsors robot raises epic RaSE,

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<v Speaker 1>can you bid a robot that can navigate one hundred

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<v Speaker 1>and thirty punishing miles through the Mohabi Desert and the

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<v Speaker 1>best robot like seven miles and then literally end up

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<v Speaker 1>in many many mini researchers had concluded can't be done.

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<v Speaker 1>In fact, many of my colleagues told me I'm going

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<v Speaker 1>to waste my time and my name if I engaged

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<v Speaker 1>in this kind of super hard race. And that made

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<v Speaker 1>you more interested in doing it, of course, and so

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<v Speaker 1>you built Stanley. Yeah, So my students built Stanley and

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<v Speaker 1>started as a class And Stanford students are great. If

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<v Speaker 1>you tell them go to the moon in two months,

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<v Speaker 1>they're going to go to the moon. So then two

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<v Speaker 1>thousand or five, the actual government sponsored race, how did

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<v Speaker 1>Stanley do. We came in first, so we are focused

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<v Speaker 1>insanely strongly on software and specifically on machine learning, and

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<v Speaker 1>that differentiated as from pretty much every other team that

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<v Speaker 1>focused on hardware. But the way I look at this

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<v Speaker 1>is there were five teams that finished this ruling race

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<v Speaker 1>within one year, and it's the community of the people

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<v Speaker 1>that build all these machines that really won. So nobody

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<v Speaker 1>made it a mile in the first race, and five

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<v Speaker 1>different teams made it more than one hundred and thirty

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<v Speaker 1>miles through the desert, just a year later, Yeah, that's

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<v Speaker 1>kind of amazing to me. That just showed how fast

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<v Speaker 1>this technology can possibly evolve. And what's happened since then?

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<v Speaker 1>I worked at Google for a vile and eventually this guy,

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<v Speaker 1>Larry Page came to me and says, hey, Sebastian, I

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<v Speaker 1>thought about this long and heart. We should build a

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<v Speaker 1>self driving car they can drive on all streets in

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<v Speaker 1>the world. And with my entire authority, I said that

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<v Speaker 1>cannot be done. We just had driven a desert raised

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<v Speaker 1>there was never pedestrians and bicycles and all the other

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<v Speaker 1>people that we could kill in the environment. And for me,

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<v Speaker 1>just the sheer imagination we would drive a self driving

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<v Speaker 1>car to San Francisco sounded always like a crime. So

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<v Speaker 1>you told Larry Page, one of the two co founders

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<v Speaker 1>of Google, that the idea of building a self driving

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<v Speaker 1>car that could navigate anywhere was just not Yeah, feelous.

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<v Speaker 1>Later came back and said, he Sebastian, look, I trust you,

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<v Speaker 1>you're the expert, but I want to explain Eric Schmidt,

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<v Speaker 1>then the Google CEO, and it's my co founder, surgery brain,

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<v Speaker 1>why it can be done. Can you give me the

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<v Speaker 1>technical reason? So I went home in agony, thinking about

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<v Speaker 1>what is the technical reason why it can be done?

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<v Speaker 1>And I got back the next day and I said, so,

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<v Speaker 1>what is it? And I said, I can't think of

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<v Speaker 1>any and Lomi Hoold. Eighteen months later, roughly ten engineers

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<v Speaker 1>we drove pretty much every street in California. Today, autonomous

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<v Speaker 1>technology is changing the transportation industry. About ten percent of

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<v Speaker 1>cars sold in the US are already capable of at

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<v Speaker 1>least partly guiding themselves down the highway. In twenty eighteen,

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<v Speaker 1>Google's self driving car company Weymo launched a self driving

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<v Speaker 1>taxi service in Phoenix, Arizona, initially with human backup drivers

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<v Speaker 1>behind every wheel, but now sometimes even without. I asked

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<v Speaker 1>Sebastian why he thinks this matters. We lose more than

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<v Speaker 1>a million people in traffic accidents every year, almost exclusively

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<v Speaker 1>to us not pay attention. When it was eighteen, my

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<v Speaker 1>best friend died in a traffic accident and it was

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<v Speaker 1>a split second poor decision from his friend who was

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<v Speaker 1>driving in who also died. To me, this is just unacceptable.

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<v Speaker 1>Beyond safety, Sebastian sees many other advantages for autonomy. During

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<v Speaker 1>a commute, you can do something else that means you're

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<v Speaker 1>probably willing to commute further distances. You could sleep, or

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<v Speaker 1>watch the movie, or do email. And then eventually people

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<v Speaker 1>can use cars that today can't operate them blind people,

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<v Speaker 1>old people, children, babies. I mean, there's an entire spectrum

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<v Speaker 1>of people that are kindly excluded. They would now be

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<v Speaker 1>able to be mobile. Chapter two the Tomahawk so darpest

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<v Speaker 1>efforts over the decades helped give rise to the modern

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<v Speaker 1>self driving car industry, which promises to make transportations safer,

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<v Speaker 1>more efficient, and more accessible. But the agencies primary motivation

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<v Speaker 1>was to bring autonomy to a different challenge, the battlefield.

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<v Speaker 1>I traveled to Chapel Hill, North Carolina, to meet with

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<v Speaker 1>someone who spends a lot of time thinking about the

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<v Speaker 1>consequences of autonomous technology. We both serve on a civilian

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<v Speaker 1>advisory board for the Defense Department. My name is Missy Cummings.

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<v Speaker 1>I'm a professor of electrical and computer engineering at Duke University,

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<v Speaker 1>and I think one of the things that people find

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<v Speaker 1>most interesting about me is that I was one of

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<v Speaker 1>the US military's first female fighter pilots in the Navy.

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<v Speaker 1>Did you always want to be a fighter pilot? So

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<v Speaker 1>when I was growing up, I did not know that

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<v Speaker 1>women could be pilots, and indeed, when I was growing up,

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<v Speaker 1>women could it be pilots. And it wasn't until the

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<v Speaker 1>late seventies that women actually became pilots in the military.

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<v Speaker 1>So I went to college. In nineteen eighty four, I

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<v Speaker 1>was at the Naval Academy, and then of course, in

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<v Speaker 1>nineteen eighty six Top Gun came out, and then I

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<v Speaker 1>know who doesn't want to be a pilot After you

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<v Speaker 1>see the movie Top Gun. Missy is tremendously proud of

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<v Speaker 1>the eleven years she spent in the Navy, but she

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<v Speaker 1>also acknowledges the challenges of being part of that first

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<v Speaker 1>generation of woman fighter pilots. It's no secret that the

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<v Speaker 1>reason I left the military was because of the hostile

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<v Speaker 1>attitude towards women. None of the women in that first

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<v Speaker 1>group stayed in to make it a career. The guys

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<v Speaker 1>were very angry that we were there, and I decided

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<v Speaker 1>to leave when they started sabotaging my flight gear. I

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<v Speaker 1>just thought, this is too much. If something really bad happened,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, I would die. When Missy Cummings left the Navy,

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<v Speaker 1>she decided to pursue a PhD in Human Machine interaction.

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<v Speaker 1>In my last three years flying IF eighteens, there were

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<v Speaker 1>about thirty six people I knew that died, about one

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<v Speaker 1>person a month. They were all training accidents. It just

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<v Speaker 1>really struck me how many people were dying because the

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<v Speaker 1>design of the airplane just did not go with the

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<v Speaker 1>human tendencies. And so I decided to go back to

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<v Speaker 1>school to find out what can be done about that.

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<v Speaker 1>So I went to finish my PhD at the University

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<v Speaker 1>of Virginia, and then I spent the next ten years

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<v Speaker 1>at MT learning my craft. The person I am today

0:15:30.730 --> 0:15:34.370
<v Speaker 1>is half because of the Navy and half because of MIGHT. Today,

0:15:34.570 --> 0:15:38.050
<v Speaker 1>Missy is a Duke University where she runs the Humans

0:15:38.050 --> 0:15:42.250
<v Speaker 1>an Autonomy Lab, or for short HOW. It's a nod

0:15:42.290 --> 0:15:46.290
<v Speaker 1>to the sentient computer that goes rogue in Stanley Kubrick's

0:15:46.330 --> 0:15:50.410
<v Speaker 1>film two thousand and one, A Space Odyssey. This mission

0:15:50.530 --> 0:15:53.330
<v Speaker 1>is too important for me to allow you to jeopardize it.

0:15:55.130 --> 0:15:58.450
<v Speaker 1>I don't know what you're talking about. How. I know

0:15:58.530 --> 0:16:01.650
<v Speaker 1>that you and Frank were planning to disconnect me, and

0:16:01.730 --> 0:16:05.570
<v Speaker 1>I'm afraid that's something I cannot allow to happen. And

0:16:05.650 --> 0:16:10.450
<v Speaker 1>so I intentionally named my lab how so that we

0:16:10.450 --> 0:16:13.330
<v Speaker 1>were there to stop that from happening. Right, I had

0:16:13.370 --> 0:16:17.290
<v Speaker 1>seen many friends die, not because the robot became sentient,

0:16:17.450 --> 0:16:21.530
<v Speaker 1>in fact, because the designers of the automation really had

0:16:21.610 --> 0:16:24.610
<v Speaker 1>no clue how people would or would not use this technology.

0:16:25.410 --> 0:16:30.570
<v Speaker 1>It is my life's mission statement to develop human collaborative

0:16:30.610 --> 0:16:34.090
<v Speaker 1>computer systems that work with each other to achieve something

0:16:34.130 --> 0:16:37.370
<v Speaker 1>greater than either would alone. The Humans and Autonomy Lab

0:16:37.450 --> 0:16:42.450
<v Speaker 1>works on the interactions between humans and machines across many fields,

0:16:43.050 --> 0:16:46.930
<v Speaker 1>but given her background, Missy's thought a lot about how

0:16:46.970 --> 0:16:51.850
<v Speaker 1>technology has changed the relationship between humans and their weapons.

0:16:52.250 --> 0:16:56.490
<v Speaker 1>There's a long history of us distancing ourselves from our actions.

0:16:57.330 --> 0:17:00.090
<v Speaker 1>We want to shoot somebody, we wanted to shoot them

0:17:00.090 --> 0:17:03.090
<v Speaker 1>with bows and arrows. We wanted to drop bombs from

0:17:03.130 --> 0:17:05.970
<v Speaker 1>five miles over a target. We want cruise muscles that

0:17:06.010 --> 0:17:09.050
<v Speaker 1>can kill you from another country. Right, it is human

0:17:09.290 --> 0:17:14.250
<v Speaker 1>nature to back that distance up, Missy season inherent tension.

0:17:15.050 --> 0:17:19.810
<v Speaker 1>On one hand, technology distances ourselves from killing. On the

0:17:19.810 --> 0:17:23.370
<v Speaker 1>other hand, technology is letting us design weapons that are

0:17:23.410 --> 0:17:28.410
<v Speaker 1>more accurate and less indiscriminate in their killing. Missy rotor

0:17:28.530 --> 0:17:32.530
<v Speaker 1>PhD thesis about the Tomahawk missile, an early precursor of

0:17:32.610 --> 0:17:37.130
<v Speaker 1>the autonomous weapons systems being developed today. The Tomahawk missile

0:17:37.210 --> 0:17:41.250
<v Speaker 1>has these stored maps in its brain, and as its

0:17:41.250 --> 0:17:44.250
<v Speaker 1>skimming along the nap of the Earth, it compares the

0:17:44.290 --> 0:17:46.930
<v Speaker 1>pictures that it's taking with its pictures and its database

0:17:47.330 --> 0:17:50.530
<v Speaker 1>to decide how to get to its target. This Tomahawk

0:17:50.610 --> 0:17:52.450
<v Speaker 1>was kind of a set it and forget it kind

0:17:52.450 --> 0:17:55.290
<v Speaker 1>of thing. Once you launched it, it would follow its

0:17:55.290 --> 0:17:57.850
<v Speaker 1>map to the right place and there was nobody looking

0:17:57.890 --> 0:18:02.370
<v Speaker 1>over its shoulders. Well, so the Tomahawk missile that we

0:18:02.410 --> 0:18:04.610
<v Speaker 1>saw in the Gulf War, that was a fire and

0:18:04.650 --> 0:18:08.730
<v Speaker 1>forget missile that a target would be programmed into the

0:18:09.290 --> 0:18:11.210
<v Speaker 1>sole and then it would be fired and that's where

0:18:11.210 --> 0:18:15.810
<v Speaker 1>it would go. Later, around two thousand, two thousand and three,

0:18:16.690 --> 0:18:20.010
<v Speaker 1>then GPS technology was coming online, and that's when we

0:18:20.050 --> 0:18:22.610
<v Speaker 1>got the tactical Tomahawk, which had the ability to be

0:18:22.690 --> 0:18:27.090
<v Speaker 1>redirected in flight. That success with GPS and the Tomahawk

0:18:27.170 --> 0:18:31.970
<v Speaker 1>opened the military's eyes to the ability to use them

0:18:32.010 --> 0:18:36.330
<v Speaker 1>in drones. Today's precision guided weapons are far more accurate

0:18:36.370 --> 0:18:39.970
<v Speaker 1>than the widespread aerial bombing that occurred on all sides

0:18:39.970 --> 0:18:44.450
<v Speaker 1>in World War Two, where some cities were almost entirely leveled,

0:18:44.810 --> 0:18:49.210
<v Speaker 1>resulting in huge numbers of civilian casualties. In the Gulf War,

0:18:49.650 --> 0:18:56.170
<v Speaker 1>Tomahawk missile attacks came to be called surgical strikes. I

0:18:56.250 --> 0:19:02.330
<v Speaker 1>know people who have killed civilians, and I know people

0:19:02.370 --> 0:19:05.330
<v Speaker 1>who have killed friendlies. They have dropped bombs on our

0:19:05.330 --> 0:19:10.530
<v Speaker 1>own forces and killed our own people. And in all

0:19:10.610 --> 0:19:15.170
<v Speaker 1>cases where people made mistakes, it was just too much information.

0:19:15.410 --> 0:19:18.730
<v Speaker 1>Things were happening too fast. You've seen some pictures that

0:19:18.770 --> 0:19:21.130
<v Speaker 1>you've got in a brief hours ago, and you're supposed

0:19:21.170 --> 0:19:24.330
<v Speaker 1>to know that what you're seeing now through this grainy

0:19:24.410 --> 0:19:27.210
<v Speaker 1>image thirty five thousand feet over a target is the

0:19:27.250 --> 0:19:30.490
<v Speaker 1>same image that you're being asked to bob. The Tomahawk

0:19:30.970 --> 0:19:35.610
<v Speaker 1>never missed its target. It never made a mistake unless

0:19:35.610 --> 0:19:39.250
<v Speaker 1>it was programmed as a mistake. And that's old autonomy,

0:19:39.370 --> 0:19:46.530
<v Speaker 1>and it's only gotten better over time. Chapter three, Kicking

0:19:46.610 --> 0:19:52.730
<v Speaker 1>down Doors. The Tomahawk was just a baby step toward automation.

0:19:53.250 --> 0:19:56.130
<v Speaker 1>With the ability to read maps, it could correct its course,

0:19:56.650 --> 0:20:00.570
<v Speaker 1>but it couldn't make sophisticated decisions. But what happens when

0:20:00.610 --> 0:20:04.410
<v Speaker 1>you start adding modern artificial intelligence? So where do you

0:20:04.410 --> 0:20:08.010
<v Speaker 1>see autonomous weapons going? If you could kind of map

0:20:08.050 --> 0:20:09.930
<v Speaker 1>out where are we today and where do you think

0:20:10.010 --> 0:20:13.570
<v Speaker 1>we'll be ten twenty years from now. So, in terms

0:20:13.610 --> 0:20:18.130
<v Speaker 1>of autonomy and weapons, by today's standards, the Tomahawk missile

0:20:18.250 --> 0:20:20.090
<v Speaker 1>is still one of the best ones that we have,

0:20:20.330 --> 0:20:23.490
<v Speaker 1>and it's also still one of the most advanced. Certainly,

0:20:23.530 --> 0:20:26.170
<v Speaker 1>there are research arms of the military who are trying

0:20:26.290 --> 0:20:31.370
<v Speaker 1>very hard to come up with new forms of autonomy.

0:20:31.930 --> 0:20:35.010
<v Speaker 1>There was the Predicts that came out of Lincoln Lab,

0:20:35.050 --> 0:20:39.690
<v Speaker 1>and this was basically a swarm of really tiny UAVs

0:20:39.690 --> 0:20:45.450
<v Speaker 1>that could coordinate together. A ua V, an unmanned aerial

0:20:45.570 --> 0:20:50.490
<v Speaker 1>vehicle is military speak for a drone. The Predicts the

0:20:50.730 --> 0:20:54.090
<v Speaker 1>drones that Missy was referring to. They were commissioned by

0:20:54.090 --> 0:20:57.210
<v Speaker 1>the Strategic Capabilities Office of the US Department of Defense.

0:20:57.810 --> 0:21:00.810
<v Speaker 1>These tiny flying robots are able to communicate with each

0:21:00.850 --> 0:21:04.250
<v Speaker 1>other and make split second decisions about how to move

0:21:04.250 --> 0:21:07.130
<v Speaker 1>as a group. Many researchers, have you been using bio

0:21:07.250 --> 0:21:12.210
<v Speaker 1>inspired methods? Be right? So bees have local and global intelligence.

0:21:12.530 --> 0:21:15.370
<v Speaker 1>Like a group of bees, these drones are called a

0:21:15.450 --> 0:21:20.650
<v Speaker 1>swarm collective intelligence on a shared mission. A human can

0:21:20.690 --> 0:21:24.250
<v Speaker 1>make the big picture decision and the swarm of microdrones

0:21:24.290 --> 0:21:27.450
<v Speaker 1>can then collectively decide on the most efficient way to

0:21:27.530 --> 0:21:30.810
<v Speaker 1>carry out the order in the moment. I wanted to

0:21:30.850 --> 0:21:35.370
<v Speaker 1>know why exactly this technology is necessary, so I went

0:21:35.410 --> 0:21:38.450
<v Speaker 1>to speak to someone who I was pretty sure would know.

0:21:38.890 --> 0:21:43.010
<v Speaker 1>I'm Ash Carter. Most people will probably have heard my

0:21:43.090 --> 0:21:48.250
<v Speaker 1>name as the Secretary of Defense who proceeded Gimatus. You

0:21:48.290 --> 0:21:50.610
<v Speaker 1>will know me in part from the fact that we

0:21:50.730 --> 0:21:53.210
<v Speaker 1>knew one another way back in Oxford when we were

0:21:53.250 --> 0:21:55.890
<v Speaker 1>both young scientists, and I guess agents start there. I'm

0:21:55.930 --> 0:21:58.530
<v Speaker 1>a physicist. When you were doing your PhD in physics,

0:21:58.570 --> 0:22:01.450
<v Speaker 1>I was doing my PhD in mathematics at Oxford. What

0:22:01.610 --> 0:22:06.170
<v Speaker 1>was your thesis on? It was on quantum chrominynamics. That

0:22:06.330 --> 0:22:09.810
<v Speaker 1>was the theory of quarks and gluons. And how in

0:22:09.850 --> 0:22:14.330
<v Speaker 1>the world is somebody who's an expert in quantum chromodynamics

0:22:14.450 --> 0:22:18.730
<v Speaker 1>become the Secretary of Defense. It's an interesting story. The

0:22:18.970 --> 0:22:24.610
<v Speaker 1>people who were the seniors in my field of physics,

0:22:25.010 --> 0:22:28.250
<v Speaker 1>the mentors, so to speak, were all members of the

0:22:28.330 --> 0:22:33.890
<v Speaker 1>Manhattan Project generation. They had built the bomb during World

0:22:33.930 --> 0:22:38.330
<v Speaker 1>War Two, and they were proud of what they'd done

0:22:38.890 --> 0:22:42.530
<v Speaker 1>because they believed that it had ended the war with

0:22:42.650 --> 0:22:45.970
<v Speaker 1>fewer casualties than otherwise there would have been in a

0:22:46.010 --> 0:22:49.130
<v Speaker 1>full scale of invasion of Japan, and also that it

0:22:49.170 --> 0:22:51.170
<v Speaker 1>had kept the peace through the Cold War, so they

0:22:51.170 --> 0:22:53.610
<v Speaker 1>were proud of it. However, they knew there was a

0:22:53.690 --> 0:22:57.570
<v Speaker 1>dark side, and they conveyed to me that it was

0:22:58.170 --> 0:23:03.810
<v Speaker 1>my responsibility as a scientist to be involved in these matters.

0:23:04.450 --> 0:23:08.690
<v Speaker 1>And the technology doesn't determine what the balance of good

0:23:08.690 --> 0:23:12.330
<v Speaker 1>and bad is. We human beings do. That was the lesson,

0:23:12.730 --> 0:23:16.130
<v Speaker 1>and so that's what got me started, and then my

0:23:16.250 --> 0:23:19.250
<v Speaker 1>very first Pentagon job, which was in nineteen eighty one,

0:23:19.570 --> 0:23:22.330
<v Speaker 1>right through until the last time I walked out of

0:23:22.370 --> 0:23:27.010
<v Speaker 1>the Pentagon of Sectary Defense, which was January of twenty seventeen. Now,

0:23:27.330 --> 0:23:32.330
<v Speaker 1>when you were secretary, there was a Strategic Capabilities Office

0:23:32.650 --> 0:23:38.330
<v Speaker 1>that it's been publicly reported, was experimenting with using drones

0:23:38.890 --> 0:23:43.410
<v Speaker 1>to make swarms of drones that could do things, communicate

0:23:43.450 --> 0:23:46.890
<v Speaker 1>with each other, make formations. Why would you want such things?

0:23:46.890 --> 0:23:49.210
<v Speaker 1>So it's a good question. Here's what you do with

0:23:49.250 --> 0:23:52.130
<v Speaker 1>the drone like that, You put a jammer on it,

0:23:52.210 --> 0:23:56.210
<v Speaker 1>a little radio beacon, and you fly it right into

0:23:56.250 --> 0:24:01.450
<v Speaker 1>the eye of a enemy radar. So all that radar

0:24:01.570 --> 0:24:06.130
<v Speaker 1>c's is the energy emitted by that little drone, and

0:24:06.170 --> 0:24:10.730
<v Speaker 1>it's essentially dazzled or blinded. If there's one big drone,

0:24:11.330 --> 0:24:14.770
<v Speaker 1>that radar is precious enough that the defenders going to

0:24:14.850 --> 0:24:18.250
<v Speaker 1>shoot that drone down. But if you have so many

0:24:18.290 --> 0:24:21.690
<v Speaker 1>out there, the enemy can't afford to shoot them all down.

0:24:22.450 --> 0:24:26.530
<v Speaker 1>And since they are flying right up to the radar,

0:24:26.850 --> 0:24:29.770
<v Speaker 1>they don't have to be very powerful. So there's an

0:24:29.770 --> 0:24:34.810
<v Speaker 1>application where lots of little drones can have the effect

0:24:34.970 --> 0:24:39.250
<v Speaker 1>of nullifying enemy radar. That's a pretty big deal for

0:24:39.290 --> 0:24:42.810
<v Speaker 1>a few little, little microdrones. To learn more, I went

0:24:42.890 --> 0:24:45.610
<v Speaker 1>to speak with Paul Shari. Paul's the director of the

0:24:45.610 --> 0:24:49.250
<v Speaker 1>Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a

0:24:49.290 --> 0:24:52.850
<v Speaker 1>New American Security. Before that, he worked for Ash Carter

0:24:52.930 --> 0:24:57.290
<v Speaker 1>at the Pentagon studying autonomous weapons and a recently authored

0:24:57.290 --> 0:25:01.570
<v Speaker 1>a book called Army of None, Autonomous Weapons and the

0:25:01.650 --> 0:25:05.810
<v Speaker 1>Future of War. Paul's interest in autonomous weapons began when

0:25:05.810 --> 0:25:09.610
<v Speaker 1>he served in the Army. I enlisted in the Army

0:25:09.850 --> 0:25:12.850
<v Speaker 1>to become an Army ranger. That was June of two

0:25:12.850 --> 0:25:15.850
<v Speaker 1>thousand and one, did a number of tours overseas and

0:25:15.970 --> 0:25:19.410
<v Speaker 1>the wars and a rock Afghanistan. So I'll say one

0:25:19.450 --> 0:25:22.450
<v Speaker 1>moment that stuck out for me where I really sort

0:25:22.450 --> 0:25:24.490
<v Speaker 1>of the light bulb went on about the power of

0:25:24.650 --> 0:25:28.370
<v Speaker 1>robotics in warfare. I was in a rock in two

0:25:28.410 --> 0:25:31.690
<v Speaker 1>thousand and seven. We were on a patrol, driving along

0:25:31.730 --> 0:25:35.410
<v Speaker 1>in a Striker armored vehicle. Came across an ID improvised

0:25:35.450 --> 0:25:38.730
<v Speaker 1>explosive device makeshift road type bomb, and so we called

0:25:38.810 --> 0:25:41.810
<v Speaker 1>up bomb disposal folks. So they show up and I'm

0:25:41.850 --> 0:25:44.730
<v Speaker 1>expecting the bomb tech to come out in that big

0:25:44.770 --> 0:25:46.450
<v Speaker 1>bomb suit that you might have seen in the movie

0:25:46.450 --> 0:25:50.130
<v Speaker 1>The hurt Locker, for example, and instead out rolls out

0:25:50.290 --> 0:25:53.730
<v Speaker 1>a little robot and I kind of went, oh, that

0:25:53.770 --> 0:25:56.930
<v Speaker 1>makes a lot of sense. Have the robot diffused the bomb. Well,

0:25:56.930 --> 0:25:58.370
<v Speaker 1>it turns out there's a lot of things in war

0:25:58.410 --> 0:26:01.210
<v Speaker 1>that are super dangerous where it makes sense to have

0:26:01.330 --> 0:26:04.570
<v Speaker 1>robots out on the front lines, getting people better stand

0:26:04.610 --> 0:26:08.010
<v Speaker 1>off a little bit more separation from potential threats. The

0:26:08.090 --> 0:26:11.850
<v Speaker 1>bomb diffusing robe are still remote controlled by a technician,

0:26:12.330 --> 0:26:15.010
<v Speaker 1>but ashe Carter wants to take the idea of robots

0:26:15.010 --> 0:26:18.530
<v Speaker 1>doing the most dangerous work a step further somewhere in

0:26:18.570 --> 0:26:21.690
<v Speaker 1>the future. But I'm certain will occur. Is I think

0:26:21.730 --> 0:26:25.250
<v Speaker 1>there will be robots who will be part of infantry

0:26:25.290 --> 0:26:28.410
<v Speaker 1>squads and that will do some of the most dangerous

0:26:28.530 --> 0:26:32.770
<v Speaker 1>jobs in an infantry squad, like kicking down the door

0:26:32.850 --> 0:26:35.090
<v Speaker 1>of a building and being the first one to run

0:26:35.170 --> 0:26:39.610
<v Speaker 1>in and clear the building of terrorists or whatever. That's

0:26:39.610 --> 0:26:42.890
<v Speaker 1>a job that doesn't sound like something I would like

0:26:43.050 --> 0:26:46.050
<v Speaker 1>to have a young American man or woman doing if

0:26:46.090 --> 0:26:53.130
<v Speaker 1>I could replace them with a robot. Chapter four Harpies,

0:26:55.330 --> 0:26:58.690
<v Speaker 1>Paul Shari gave me an overview of the sophisticated unmanned

0:26:58.730 --> 0:27:01.810
<v Speaker 1>systems currently used by militaries. So I think it's worth

0:27:01.850 --> 0:27:07.690
<v Speaker 1>separate running out the value of robotics versus autonomy removing

0:27:07.690 --> 0:27:11.970
<v Speaker 1>a person from decision making. So what's so special about autonomy.

0:27:12.210 --> 0:27:16.650
<v Speaker 1>The advantages there are really about speed. Machines can make

0:27:16.690 --> 0:27:20.970
<v Speaker 1>decisions faster than humans. That's why automatic breaking and automobiles

0:27:21.050 --> 0:27:23.810
<v Speaker 1>is valuable. But you could have much faster reflexes than

0:27:23.850 --> 0:27:28.650
<v Speaker 1>a person might had. Pul separates the technology into three baskets. First,

0:27:29.010 --> 0:27:33.690
<v Speaker 1>semi autonomous weapons. Semi autonomous weapons that are widely used

0:27:33.690 --> 0:27:36.770
<v Speaker 1>around the globe today, where automation is used to maybe

0:27:36.770 --> 0:27:40.930
<v Speaker 1>help identify targets, but humans are in the final decision

0:27:41.010 --> 0:27:46.250
<v Speaker 1>about which targets to attack. Second, there are supervised autonomous weapons.

0:27:46.610 --> 0:27:50.570
<v Speaker 1>There are automatic modes that can be activated on air

0:27:50.610 --> 0:27:54.610
<v Speaker 1>and missile defense systems that allow these computers to defend

0:27:54.810 --> 0:27:58.410
<v Speaker 1>the ship or ground vehicle or land base all on

0:27:58.450 --> 0:28:02.210
<v Speaker 1>its own against these incoming threats. But humans supervise these

0:28:02.250 --> 0:28:07.010
<v Speaker 1>systems in real time. They could, at least in theory, intervene. Finally,

0:28:07.250 --> 0:28:11.930
<v Speaker 1>there are fully autonomous weapon There are a few isolated

0:28:11.970 --> 0:28:15.770
<v Speaker 1>examples of what you might consider fully autonomous weapons where

0:28:15.810 --> 0:28:18.970
<v Speaker 1>there's no human oversight and they're using an offensive capacity.

0:28:19.450 --> 0:28:22.130
<v Speaker 1>The clearest today that's an operation is the Israeli Harpy

0:28:22.210 --> 0:28:26.530
<v Speaker 1>drone that can load over a wide area after about

0:28:26.530 --> 0:28:28.490
<v Speaker 1>two and a half hours at a time to search

0:28:28.490 --> 0:28:31.570
<v Speaker 1>for enemy radars, and then when it finds one, it

0:28:31.610 --> 0:28:35.090
<v Speaker 1>can attack it all on its own without any further

0:28:35.170 --> 0:28:38.970
<v Speaker 1>human approval. Once it's launched, that decision about which particular

0:28:38.970 --> 0:28:42.170
<v Speaker 1>target to attack that's delegated to the machine. It's been

0:28:42.210 --> 0:28:47.370
<v Speaker 1>sold to a handful of countries Turkey, India, China, South Korea.

0:28:47.530 --> 0:28:50.530
<v Speaker 1>I asked Missy if she saw advantages to having autonomy

0:28:50.570 --> 0:28:54.730
<v Speaker 1>built into lethal weapons. While she had reservations, she pointed

0:28:54.770 --> 0:28:58.810
<v Speaker 1>out that in some circumstances it could prevent tragedies. A

0:28:58.970 --> 0:29:02.610
<v Speaker 1>human has something called the neuromuscular lag in them. It's

0:29:02.610 --> 0:29:05.210
<v Speaker 1>about a half second delay. So you see something, you

0:29:05.250 --> 0:29:10.570
<v Speaker 1>can execute an action a half second later. So let's

0:29:10.610 --> 0:29:14.650
<v Speaker 1>say that that guided weapon fired by a human is

0:29:14.690 --> 0:29:17.650
<v Speaker 1>going into a building, and then right before it gets

0:29:17.650 --> 0:29:21.050
<v Speaker 1>to the building, at a half second, the door opens

0:29:21.090 --> 0:29:24.370
<v Speaker 1>and a child walks out. It's too late. That child

0:29:24.490 --> 0:29:29.010
<v Speaker 1>is dead. But a lethal autonomous weapon who had a

0:29:29.050 --> 0:29:34.850
<v Speaker 1>good enough perception system could immediately detect that and immediately

0:29:34.890 --> 0:29:38.730
<v Speaker 1>guide itself to a safe place to explode. That is

0:29:38.770 --> 0:29:48.850
<v Speaker 1>a possibility in the future. Chapter five bounded morality. Some

0:29:48.890 --> 0:29:53.130
<v Speaker 1>people think, and this point is controversial, that robots might

0:29:53.130 --> 0:29:57.050
<v Speaker 1>turn out to be more humane than humans. The history

0:29:57.050 --> 0:30:01.290
<v Speaker 1>of warfare has enough examples of atrocities committed by soldiers

0:30:01.330 --> 0:30:04.330
<v Speaker 1>on all sides. For example, in the middle of the

0:30:04.410 --> 0:30:08.050
<v Speaker 1>Vietnam War in March nineteen sixty eight, a company of

0:30:08.050 --> 0:30:11.970
<v Speaker 1>American soldiers attack the village in South Vietnam, killing and

0:30:12.130 --> 0:30:17.610
<v Speaker 1>estimated five hundred and four unarmed Vietnamese men, women, and children,

0:30:18.170 --> 0:30:22.490
<v Speaker 1>all noncombatants. The horrific event became known as the Melai

0:30:22.650 --> 0:30:27.850
<v Speaker 1>massacre in nineteen sixty nine. Journalist Mike Wallace of Sixty

0:30:27.890 --> 0:30:31.730
<v Speaker 1>Minutes sat down with Private Paul Medloe, one of the

0:30:31.810 --> 0:30:34.650
<v Speaker 1>soldiers involved in the massacre. Well, I'm might a kill

0:30:34.690 --> 0:30:38.850
<v Speaker 1>about ten or fifteen of them men, women, and children

0:30:38.810 --> 0:30:47.730
<v Speaker 1>and babies and babies. You're married, right, children too? How

0:30:47.730 --> 0:30:52.530
<v Speaker 1>can a father of two young children shoot babies? I

0:30:52.530 --> 0:30:55.370
<v Speaker 1>don't know when to sworn in things. Of course, the

0:30:55.450 --> 0:30:58.890
<v Speaker 1>vast majority of soldiers do not behave this way. But

0:30:59.050 --> 0:31:02.570
<v Speaker 1>humans can be thoughtlessly violent. They can act out of anger,

0:31:02.690 --> 0:31:07.250
<v Speaker 1>out of fear, they can seek revenge, they can murder senselessly.

0:31:07.970 --> 0:31:11.810
<v Speaker 1>Can robots do better? After all, robots don't get angry,

0:31:11.850 --> 0:31:15.650
<v Speaker 1>They're not impulsive. I spoke with someone who thinks that

0:31:16.010 --> 0:31:20.090
<v Speaker 1>lethal autonomous weapons could ultimately be more humane. My name

0:31:20.170 --> 0:31:23.450
<v Speaker 1>is Ronald Arkin. I'm a regents professor at the Georgia

0:31:23.490 --> 0:31:27.530
<v Speaker 1>Institute of Technology in Atlanta, Georgia. I am a roboticist

0:31:27.610 --> 0:31:31.290
<v Speaker 1>for close to thirty five years. I've been in robot

0:31:31.330 --> 0:31:34.490
<v Speaker 1>ethics for maybe the past fifteen. Ron wanted to make

0:31:34.530 --> 0:31:37.090
<v Speaker 1>it clear that he doesn't think these robots are perfect,

0:31:37.810 --> 0:31:40.890
<v Speaker 1>but they could be better than our current option. I

0:31:40.930 --> 0:31:45.050
<v Speaker 1>am absolutely not pro lethal autonomous weapons systems because I'm

0:31:45.050 --> 0:31:48.690
<v Speaker 1>not pro lethal weapons of any sort. I am against

0:31:48.810 --> 0:31:51.970
<v Speaker 1>killing in all of its manifold forms. But the problem

0:31:52.130 --> 0:31:56.130
<v Speaker 1>is that humanity persist in entering into warfare. As such,

0:31:56.210 --> 0:31:59.450
<v Speaker 1>we must better protect the innocent in the battlespace, far

0:31:59.570 --> 0:32:03.010
<v Speaker 1>better than we currently do. So Ron thinks that lethal

0:32:03.050 --> 0:32:07.010
<v Speaker 1>autonomous weapons could prevent some of the unnecessary violence that

0:32:07.090 --> 0:32:11.530
<v Speaker 1>occurs in war. Human being don't do well in warfare

0:32:11.570 --> 0:32:15.050
<v Speaker 1>in general, and that's why there's so much room for improvement.

0:32:15.450 --> 0:32:19.970
<v Speaker 1>There's unnamed fire, there's mistakes, there's carelessness, and in the

0:32:20.010 --> 0:32:24.250
<v Speaker 1>worst case, there's the commission of atrocities, and unfortunately, all

0:32:24.290 --> 0:32:28.450
<v Speaker 1>those things lead to the depths of noncombatants. And robots

0:32:28.490 --> 0:32:31.010
<v Speaker 1>will make mistakes too. They probably will make different kinds

0:32:31.010 --> 0:32:34.250
<v Speaker 1>of mistakes, but hopefully, if done correctly, they will make

0:32:34.290 --> 0:32:37.570
<v Speaker 1>far far less mistakes than human beings do in certain

0:32:37.650 --> 0:32:40.930
<v Speaker 1>narrow circumstances where human beings are prone to those errors.

0:32:41.130 --> 0:32:45.810
<v Speaker 1>So how old the robots follow these international humanitarian standards?

0:32:46.450 --> 0:32:50.130
<v Speaker 1>The way in which we explored initially is looking at

0:32:50.170 --> 0:32:53.370
<v Speaker 1>something referred to as bounded morality, which means we look

0:32:53.370 --> 0:32:56.770
<v Speaker 1>at very narrow situations. You are not allowed to drop

0:32:56.850 --> 0:33:02.050
<v Speaker 1>bombs on schools, on hospitals, mosques, or churches. So the

0:33:02.130 --> 0:33:05.490
<v Speaker 1>point is, if you know the geographic location of those,

0:33:05.930 --> 0:33:10.090
<v Speaker 1>you can demarcate those on a map, use GPS, and

0:33:10.210 --> 0:33:13.410
<v Speaker 1>you can prevent someone from pulling a trigger. But keep

0:33:13.450 --> 0:33:16.050
<v Speaker 1>in mind these systems are not only going to decide

0:33:16.050 --> 0:33:18.850
<v Speaker 1>when to engage it, but also when not to engage

0:33:18.930 --> 0:33:22.210
<v Speaker 1>a target. They can be more conservative. I believe the

0:33:22.250 --> 0:33:26.410
<v Speaker 1>potential exists to reduce noncombatant casualties and collateral damage in

0:33:26.450 --> 0:33:28.610
<v Speaker 1>almost all of its forms over what we currently have,

0:33:32.930 --> 0:33:36.770
<v Speaker 1>so autonomous weapons might operate more efficiently, reduce risk to

0:33:36.770 --> 0:33:41.810
<v Speaker 1>one's own troops, operate faster than the enemy, decreased civilian casualties,

0:33:42.090 --> 0:33:51.570
<v Speaker 1>and perhaps avoid atrocities. What could possibly go wrong? Chapter six?

0:33:51.930 --> 0:33:57.130
<v Speaker 1>What could possibly go wrong? Autonomous systems can do some

0:33:57.170 --> 0:34:01.530
<v Speaker 1>pretty remarkable things these days, but of course, robots just

0:34:01.650 --> 0:34:04.690
<v Speaker 1>do what their computer code tells them to do. The

0:34:04.770 --> 0:34:08.330
<v Speaker 1>computer code is written by humans, or, in the case

0:34:08.330 --> 0:34:14.010
<v Speaker 1>of modern artificial intelligence, automatically inferred from training data. What

0:34:14.170 --> 0:34:17.250
<v Speaker 1>happens if a robot encounters a situation that the human

0:34:17.570 --> 0:34:22.730
<v Speaker 1>where the training data didn't anticipate, well, things could go

0:34:22.850 --> 0:34:27.290
<v Speaker 1>wrong in a hurry. One of the concerns with autonomous

0:34:27.330 --> 0:34:30.810
<v Speaker 1>weapons is that they might malfunction in a way that

0:34:31.010 --> 0:34:36.130
<v Speaker 1>leads them to begin erroneously engaging targets. Robots run amock,

0:34:36.490 --> 0:34:41.090
<v Speaker 1>and this is particularly a risk for weapons that could

0:34:41.130 --> 0:34:45.450
<v Speaker 1>target on their own. Now, this builds on a flaw

0:34:45.610 --> 0:34:49.650
<v Speaker 1>and known malfunction of machine guns today called a runaway gun.

0:34:50.250 --> 0:34:53.490
<v Speaker 1>A machine gun begins firing for one reason another and

0:34:53.570 --> 0:34:56.610
<v Speaker 1>because of the nature of a machine gun where one

0:34:56.610 --> 0:35:00.290
<v Speaker 1>bullets firing cycles the automation and brings in an ex bullet.

0:35:00.730 --> 0:35:03.370
<v Speaker 1>Once it starts firing, human doesn't have to do it,

0:35:03.490 --> 0:35:06.010
<v Speaker 1>and it will continue firing bullets. The same sort of

0:35:06.050 --> 0:35:11.090
<v Speaker 1>runaway behavior can result from small in computer code, and

0:35:11.210 --> 0:35:16.450
<v Speaker 1>the problems only multiply when autonomous systems interact at high speed.

0:35:17.530 --> 0:35:21.210
<v Speaker 1>Paul Shara points to Wall Street as a harbinger of

0:35:21.250 --> 0:35:23.610
<v Speaker 1>what can go wrong, and we end up some places

0:35:23.650 --> 0:35:26.930
<v Speaker 1>like where we are in stock trading today, where many

0:35:26.970 --> 0:35:30.530
<v Speaker 1>of the decisions are highly automated, and we get things

0:35:30.530 --> 0:35:35.050
<v Speaker 1>like flash crashes. What the pack is going on down here?

0:35:35.650 --> 0:35:38.330
<v Speaker 1>I don't know. There is fear. This is capitulation. Really.

0:35:39.650 --> 0:35:43.850
<v Speaker 1>In May twenty ten, computer algorithms drove the Dow Jones

0:35:44.290 --> 0:35:48.250
<v Speaker 1>down by nearly one thousand points in thirteen minutes, the

0:35:48.290 --> 0:35:51.650
<v Speaker 1>steepest drop it had ever seen in a day. The

0:35:51.730 --> 0:35:57.210
<v Speaker 1>concern is that a world where militaries have these algorithms

0:35:57.250 --> 0:36:02.210
<v Speaker 1>interacting at machine speed, faster than humans can respond, might

0:36:02.330 --> 0:36:05.610
<v Speaker 1>result in accidents. And that's something like a flash war.

0:36:06.170 --> 0:36:08.370
<v Speaker 1>By a flash war, you mean this thing just cycling

0:36:08.410 --> 0:36:12.050
<v Speaker 1>out of control somehow, right, But the algorithms are merely

0:36:12.090 --> 0:36:15.970
<v Speaker 1>following their programming, and they escalate a conflict into a

0:36:16.130 --> 0:36:19.330
<v Speaker 1>new area of warfare, a new level of violence, in

0:36:19.370 --> 0:36:22.410
<v Speaker 1>a way that might make it harder for humans to

0:36:22.490 --> 0:36:25.770
<v Speaker 1>then dial things back and bring things back under control.

0:36:26.010 --> 0:36:28.890
<v Speaker 1>The system only knows what it's been programmed or been

0:36:28.930 --> 0:36:32.330
<v Speaker 1>trained to know. The human can bring together all of

0:36:32.370 --> 0:36:36.130
<v Speaker 1>these other pieces of information about context, and human can

0:36:36.250 --> 0:36:39.650
<v Speaker 1>understand what's at stake. So there's no Stanislav Petrov on

0:36:39.690 --> 0:36:43.210
<v Speaker 1>the loop. That's the fear, right, is that if there's

0:36:43.290 --> 0:36:47.610
<v Speaker 1>no Petrov there to say no, what might the machines

0:36:47.650 --> 0:36:57.090
<v Speaker 1>do on their own? Chapter seven, slaughter Bots. The history

0:36:57.090 --> 0:37:01.090
<v Speaker 1>of weapons technology includes well intentioned efforts to reduce violence

0:37:01.130 --> 0:37:05.090
<v Speaker 1>and suffering that end up backfiring. I tell in the

0:37:05.170 --> 0:37:08.210
<v Speaker 1>book the story of the Gatling Gun, which was invented

0:37:08.210 --> 0:37:11.170
<v Speaker 1>by Richard Gatling during the American Civil War, and he

0:37:11.210 --> 0:37:14.570
<v Speaker 1>was motivated to invent this weapon, which was a forerunner

0:37:14.570 --> 0:37:18.410
<v Speaker 1>of the machine gun, as an effort to reduce soldiers

0:37:18.490 --> 0:37:20.490
<v Speaker 1>deaths and more. He saw all of these soldiers coming

0:37:20.530 --> 0:37:23.090
<v Speaker 1>back maimed and injured from the Civil War, and he said,

0:37:23.090 --> 0:37:25.970
<v Speaker 1>would it be great if we needed fewer people to fight?

0:37:26.610 --> 0:37:30.210
<v Speaker 1>So we invented a machine that could allow four people

0:37:30.370 --> 0:37:32.730
<v Speaker 1>to deliver the same lethal effects in the battlefield as

0:37:32.730 --> 0:37:35.570
<v Speaker 1>a hundred. Now, the effect of this wasn't actually to

0:37:35.610 --> 0:37:38.050
<v Speaker 1>reduce the number of people fighting, and we got to

0:37:38.090 --> 0:37:42.130
<v Speaker 1>World War One, we saw massive devastation and a whole

0:37:42.210 --> 0:37:45.610
<v Speaker 1>generation of young men in Europe killed because of this technology.

0:37:46.090 --> 0:37:48.930
<v Speaker 1>And so I think that's a good cautionary tale as well,

0:37:49.450 --> 0:37:52.490
<v Speaker 1>that sometimes the way the technology evolves and how it's

0:37:52.610 --> 0:37:55.690
<v Speaker 1>used may not always be how we'd like it to

0:37:55.690 --> 0:37:59.330
<v Speaker 1>be used. And even if regular armies can keep autonomous

0:37:59.330 --> 0:38:03.690
<v Speaker 1>weapons within the confines of international humanitarian law, what about

0:38:03.810 --> 0:38:08.930
<v Speaker 1>rogue actors? Remember those autonomous swarms we discussed with Ash Carter,

0:38:09.370 --> 0:38:12.730
<v Speaker 1>those tiny drones that work together to block enemy radar.

0:38:13.250 --> 0:38:17.050
<v Speaker 1>What happens if the technology spreads beyond armies? What if

0:38:17.090 --> 0:38:20.450
<v Speaker 1>a terrorist adds a gun or an explosive and maybe

0:38:20.530 --> 0:38:26.210
<v Speaker 1>facial recognition technology to those little flying bots. In twenty seventeen,

0:38:26.450 --> 0:38:29.970
<v Speaker 1>Berkeley professors Stuart Russell and the Future of Life Institute

0:38:30.290 --> 0:38:33.650
<v Speaker 1>made a mock documentary called slaughter Bots, is part of

0:38:33.690 --> 0:38:38.410
<v Speaker 1>their campaign against fully autonomous lethal drones. The nation is

0:38:38.450 --> 0:38:42.210
<v Speaker 1>still recovering from yesterday's incident, which officials are describing as

0:38:42.250 --> 0:38:45.850
<v Speaker 1>some kind of automated attack which killed eleven US senators

0:38:45.890 --> 0:38:48.610
<v Speaker 1>at the Capitol Building. They flew in from every rare,

0:38:48.650 --> 0:38:51.290
<v Speaker 1>but attack just one side of the aisle. It was

0:38:51.770 --> 0:38:56.770
<v Speaker 1>people were spreading. Unlike nuclear weapons, which are difficult to build,

0:38:57.130 --> 0:38:59.410
<v Speaker 1>you know, it's not easy to obtain or work with

0:38:59.490 --> 0:39:03.850
<v Speaker 1>weapons grade uranium, the technology to create and modify autonomous

0:39:03.890 --> 0:39:06.650
<v Speaker 1>drones is getting more and more accessible. All of the

0:39:06.690 --> 0:39:11.290
<v Speaker 1>technology you need from the automation standpoint either exists in

0:39:11.330 --> 0:39:15.490
<v Speaker 1>the vehicle already or you can download from GitHub. I

0:39:15.610 --> 0:39:18.890
<v Speaker 1>asked former Secretary of Defense As Carter, if the US

0:39:19.010 --> 0:39:22.490
<v Speaker 1>government is concerned about this sort of attack, you're right

0:39:22.570 --> 0:39:25.570
<v Speaker 1>to worry about drones and Chris. It only takes a

0:39:25.690 --> 0:39:29.770
<v Speaker 1>depraved person who can go to a store and buy

0:39:30.290 --> 0:39:34.010
<v Speaker 1>a drone to at least scare people and quite possibly

0:39:34.050 --> 0:39:38.010
<v Speaker 1>threaten people hanging a gun off of it or putting

0:39:38.050 --> 0:39:41.090
<v Speaker 1>a bomb of some kind on it, and then suddenly

0:39:41.130 --> 0:39:43.610
<v Speaker 1>people don't feel safe going to the super Bowl or

0:39:43.770 --> 0:39:48.610
<v Speaker 1>landing at the municipal airport. And we can't have that.

0:39:48.890 --> 0:39:51.410
<v Speaker 1>I mean it, certainly. As your former secretary of Defense,

0:39:51.610 --> 0:39:53.410
<v Speaker 1>my job was to make sure that we didn't put

0:39:53.490 --> 0:39:55.930
<v Speaker 1>up with that kind of stuff. I'm supposed to protect

0:39:56.370 --> 0:40:00.010
<v Speaker 1>our people, and so how do I protect people against drones?

0:40:00.450 --> 0:40:03.890
<v Speaker 1>In general? They can be shot down, but they can

0:40:03.930 --> 0:40:07.530
<v Speaker 1>put more drones up than it I can conceivably shoot at.

0:40:08.410 --> 0:40:11.090
<v Speaker 1>Not to mention, shooting at things in a Super Bowl

0:40:11.210 --> 0:40:15.370
<v Speaker 1>stadium is an inherently dangerous solution to this problem. And

0:40:15.570 --> 0:40:18.290
<v Speaker 1>so there's a more subtle way of dealing with drones.

0:40:19.050 --> 0:40:24.250
<v Speaker 1>I will either jam or take over the radio link,

0:40:24.650 --> 0:40:27.050
<v Speaker 1>and then you just tell it to fly away and

0:40:27.450 --> 0:40:31.410
<v Speaker 1>go off into the countryside somewhere and crash into a field.

0:40:31.690 --> 0:40:35.210
<v Speaker 1>All right, So help me out if I have enough autonomy,

0:40:35.770 --> 0:40:39.170
<v Speaker 1>couldn't I have drones without radio links that just get

0:40:39.170 --> 0:40:42.490
<v Speaker 1>their assignment and go off and do things. Yes, and

0:40:42.530 --> 0:40:46.010
<v Speaker 1>then your mind as a defender goes to something else.

0:40:46.450 --> 0:40:49.210
<v Speaker 1>Now that they've got their idea of what they're looking

0:40:49.210 --> 0:40:52.890
<v Speaker 1>for a set in their electronic mind. Let me change

0:40:52.890 --> 0:40:55.370
<v Speaker 1>what I look like, Let me change what the stadium

0:40:55.410 --> 0:40:58.170
<v Speaker 1>looks like to it, let me change what the target

0:40:58.250 --> 0:41:00.290
<v Speaker 1>looks like. And for the Super Bowl, what do I

0:41:00.290 --> 0:41:04.010
<v Speaker 1>do about that? Well, once I know I'm being looked at,

0:41:04.370 --> 0:41:09.730
<v Speaker 1>I have the opponent in a box. A few people

0:41:09.810 --> 0:41:14.210
<v Speaker 1>know how easy facial recognition is to fool. Because I

0:41:14.210 --> 0:41:18.730
<v Speaker 1>can wear the right kind of goggles. Are stick ping

0:41:18.770 --> 0:41:25.050
<v Speaker 1>pong balls in my cheeks? There's always a stratagem memo toself.

0:41:25.690 --> 0:41:28.250
<v Speaker 1>Next time I go to Gillette Stadium for a Patriots game,

0:41:28.690 --> 0:41:38.530
<v Speaker 1>bring ping pong balls? Really? Chapter eight, The Moral Buffer.

0:41:39.650 --> 0:41:42.130
<v Speaker 1>So we have to worry about whether lethal autonomous weapons

0:41:42.210 --> 0:41:44.730
<v Speaker 1>might run them up or fall into the wrong hands.

0:41:45.650 --> 0:41:49.570
<v Speaker 1>But there may be an even deeper question. Could fully

0:41:49.610 --> 0:41:53.690
<v Speaker 1>autonomous lethal weapons change the way we think about war?

0:41:54.450 --> 0:41:57.130
<v Speaker 1>I brought this up with Army of non author Paul Shari.

0:41:57.410 --> 0:42:00.130
<v Speaker 1>So one of the concerns about autonomous weapons is that

0:42:00.170 --> 0:42:04.050
<v Speaker 1>it might lead to a breakdown in human more responsibility

0:42:04.050 --> 0:42:08.250
<v Speaker 1>for killing and war. If the weapons themselves are choosing targets,

0:42:08.610 --> 0:42:10.890
<v Speaker 1>the people no longer feel like they're the ones doing

0:42:10.890 --> 0:42:14.610
<v Speaker 1>the killing. Now, on the plus side of things, that

0:42:14.690 --> 0:42:17.810
<v Speaker 1>might mean to less post traumatic stress in war. These

0:42:17.810 --> 0:42:22.370
<v Speaker 1>things have real burdens that weigh on people, but some

0:42:22.570 --> 0:42:26.090
<v Speaker 1>argue that the burden of killing should be a requirement

0:42:26.210 --> 0:42:30.650
<v Speaker 1>of war. It's worth also asking if nobody slept uneasy

0:42:30.690 --> 0:42:33.770
<v Speaker 1>at night, what does that look like? Would there be

0:42:33.890 --> 0:42:36.730
<v Speaker 1>less restraint in war and more killing as a result.

0:42:37.410 --> 0:42:40.930
<v Speaker 1>Missy Cummings, the former fighter pilot and current Duke professor,

0:42:41.250 --> 0:42:43.970
<v Speaker 1>wrote an influential paper in two thousand and four about

0:42:44.010 --> 0:42:48.050
<v Speaker 1>how increasing the gap between a person and their actions

0:42:48.250 --> 0:42:55.410
<v Speaker 1>creates what she called a moral buffer. People ease the

0:42:55.450 --> 0:43:03.650
<v Speaker 1>psychological and emotional pain of warfare by basically superficially layering

0:43:03.650 --> 0:43:06.770
<v Speaker 1>in these other technologies to kind of make them lose

0:43:06.810 --> 0:43:08.930
<v Speaker 1>track of what they're doing. And this is actually something

0:43:08.930 --> 0:43:12.410
<v Speaker 1>that I do think it's a problem for lethal autonomous weapons.

0:43:12.450 --> 0:43:15.170
<v Speaker 1>If we send a weapon and we'd tell it to

0:43:15.250 --> 0:43:19.690
<v Speaker 1>kill one person and it kills the wrong person, then

0:43:19.770 --> 0:43:22.730
<v Speaker 1>it's very likely that people will push off their sense

0:43:22.770 --> 0:43:27.890
<v Speaker 1>of responsibility and accountability onto the autonomous agent because they say, well,

0:43:27.930 --> 0:43:30.530
<v Speaker 1>it's not my fault, it was the autonomous agent's fault.

0:43:30.970 --> 0:43:33.970
<v Speaker 1>On the other hand, Paul Scharide tells a story about

0:43:34.010 --> 0:43:38.130
<v Speaker 1>how when there's no buffer, humans rely on an implicit

0:43:38.250 --> 0:43:41.530
<v Speaker 1>sense of morality that might be hard to explain to

0:43:41.610 --> 0:43:44.770
<v Speaker 1>a robot. There was an incident early in the war

0:43:44.850 --> 0:43:46.970
<v Speaker 1>where I was part of an army ranger sniper team

0:43:47.450 --> 0:43:51.210
<v Speaker 1>up on the Afghanistan Pakistan border and we were watching

0:43:51.250 --> 0:43:56.050
<v Speaker 1>for Taliban fighters infiltrating across the border, and when dawn came,

0:43:56.290 --> 0:43:58.410
<v Speaker 1>we weren't nearly as concealed as we had hoped to be,

0:43:59.130 --> 0:44:02.450
<v Speaker 1>and very quickly a farmer came out to relieve himself

0:44:02.450 --> 0:44:04.690
<v Speaker 1>in the fields and saw us, and we knew that

0:44:04.730 --> 0:44:08.290
<v Speaker 1>we were compromised. What I did not expect was what

0:44:08.330 --> 0:44:10.530
<v Speaker 1>they did next, which was I sent a little girl

0:44:10.570 --> 0:44:13.450
<v Speaker 1>to scout at our position. She was maybe five or six,

0:44:14.250 --> 0:44:18.130
<v Speaker 1>She was not particularly sneaky. She stared directly at us

0:44:18.650 --> 0:44:20.930
<v Speaker 1>and we heard the chirping of what we later realized

0:44:21.010 --> 0:44:22.930
<v Speaker 1>was probably a radio that you had on her, and

0:44:23.010 --> 0:44:26.170
<v Speaker 1>she was reporting back information about us, and then she

0:44:26.330 --> 0:44:29.130
<v Speaker 1>left it. Not long after, some fighters did come and

0:44:29.170 --> 0:44:31.890
<v Speaker 1>then The gun fight that ensued brought out the whole valley,

0:44:31.930 --> 0:44:34.050
<v Speaker 1>so we had to leave. But later that day we

0:44:33.930 --> 0:44:37.210
<v Speaker 1>were talking about how it would treat a situation like that.

0:44:37.650 --> 0:44:40.210
<v Speaker 1>Something that just didn't come up in conversation was the

0:44:40.210 --> 0:44:43.170
<v Speaker 1>idea of shooting this little girl. Now, what's interesting is

0:44:43.170 --> 0:44:46.170
<v Speaker 1>that under the laws of war, that would have been legal.

0:44:47.210 --> 0:44:49.810
<v Speaker 1>The laws of war don't set an age for combatants.

0:44:50.410 --> 0:44:52.810
<v Speaker 1>Your status as a combatant just based on your actions,

0:44:53.410 --> 0:44:57.170
<v Speaker 1>and by scouting for the enemy, she was directly participating

0:44:57.170 --> 0:45:00.890
<v Speaker 1>on hostilities. If you had a robot that was programmed

0:45:00.890 --> 0:45:03.570
<v Speaker 1>to perfectly comply with the laws of war, it would

0:45:03.610 --> 0:45:07.450
<v Speaker 1>have shot this little girl. There are sometimes very difficult

0:45:07.450 --> 0:45:09.810
<v Speaker 1>decisions that are forced on people in but I don't

0:45:09.810 --> 0:45:12.090
<v Speaker 1>think this was one of them. But I think it's

0:45:12.090 --> 0:45:14.010
<v Speaker 1>worth asking how would a robot know the difference between

0:45:14.010 --> 0:45:17.330
<v Speaker 1>what's legal and what's right, and how would you even

0:45:17.330 --> 0:45:23.970
<v Speaker 1>begin to prehend that into a machine. Chapter nine, The

0:45:24.090 --> 0:45:30.650
<v Speaker 1>Campaign to stop killer robots. The most fundamental moral objection

0:45:30.730 --> 0:45:35.450
<v Speaker 1>to fully autonomous lethal weapons comes down to this, As

0:45:35.450 --> 0:45:39.250
<v Speaker 1>a matter of human dignity, only a human should be

0:45:39.290 --> 0:45:42.450
<v Speaker 1>able to make the decision to kill another human. Some

0:45:42.490 --> 0:45:47.050
<v Speaker 1>things are just morally wrong, regardless of the outcome, regardless

0:45:47.090 --> 0:45:49.970
<v Speaker 1>of whether or not you know, torturing one person saves

0:45:50.370 --> 0:45:55.490
<v Speaker 1>a thousand, its torture is wrong. Slavery is wrong. And

0:45:55.850 --> 0:45:58.410
<v Speaker 1>from this point of view, one might say, well, look,

0:45:58.490 --> 0:46:01.290
<v Speaker 1>it's wrong to let a machine decide whom to kill.

0:46:01.770 --> 0:46:04.290
<v Speaker 1>Humans have to make that decision. Some people have been

0:46:04.290 --> 0:46:09.170
<v Speaker 1>working hard to turn this moral view into binding international law.

0:46:09.450 --> 0:46:12.690
<v Speaker 1>So my name is Mary Warem. I'm the advocacy director

0:46:12.730 --> 0:46:15.970
<v Speaker 1>of the Arms division of Human Rights Watch. I also

0:46:16.090 --> 0:46:20.450
<v Speaker 1>coordinate this coalition of groups called the Campaign to Stop

0:46:20.530 --> 0:46:23.770
<v Speaker 1>Killer Robots, and that's a coalition of one hundred and

0:46:23.850 --> 0:46:28.770
<v Speaker 1>twelve non governmental organizations in about fifty six countries that

0:46:28.930 --> 0:46:32.130
<v Speaker 1>is working towards a single goal, which is to create

0:46:32.370 --> 0:46:37.570
<v Speaker 1>a prohibition on fully autonomous weapons. The campaign's argument is

0:46:37.650 --> 0:46:41.290
<v Speaker 1>rooted in the Geneva Conventions, a set of treaties that

0:46:41.450 --> 0:46:46.690
<v Speaker 1>establish humanitarian standards for the conduct of war. There's the

0:46:46.690 --> 0:46:51.090
<v Speaker 1>principle of distinction, which says that armed forces must recognize

0:46:51.130 --> 0:46:54.770
<v Speaker 1>civilians and may not target them. And there's the principle

0:46:54.890 --> 0:46:59.690
<v Speaker 1>of proportionality, which says that incidental civilian deaths can't be

0:46:59.850 --> 0:47:05.730
<v Speaker 1>disproportionate to an attack direct military advantage. The campaign says

0:47:05.890 --> 0:47:10.410
<v Speaker 1>killer robots fail these tests. First, they can't distinguish between

0:47:10.450 --> 0:47:15.450
<v Speaker 1>combatants and noncombatants or tell when an enemy is surrendering. Second,

0:47:15.530 --> 0:47:21.450
<v Speaker 1>they say, deciding whether civilian deaths are disproportionate inherently requires

0:47:21.530 --> 0:47:25.570
<v Speaker 1>human judgment. For these reasons and others, the campaign says,

0:47:26.050 --> 0:47:31.770
<v Speaker 1>fully autonomous lethal weapons should be banned. Getting an international

0:47:31.890 --> 0:47:36.010
<v Speaker 1>treaty to ban fully autonomous lethal weapons might seem like

0:47:36.050 --> 0:47:40.490
<v Speaker 1>a total pipe dream, except for one thing. Mary warm

0:47:40.530 --> 0:47:44.370
<v Speaker 1>In her colleagues already pulled it off for another class

0:47:44.410 --> 0:47:48.770
<v Speaker 1>of weapons, land mines. The signing of this historic treaty

0:47:48.930 --> 0:47:52.250
<v Speaker 1>at the very end of the century is this generation's

0:47:52.330 --> 0:47:56.810
<v Speaker 1>pledge to the future. The International Campaign to Ban Landmines

0:47:57.090 --> 0:48:00.530
<v Speaker 1>and its founder, Jody Williams, received the Nobel Peace Prize

0:48:00.570 --> 0:48:03.370
<v Speaker 1>in nineteen ninety seven for their work leading to the

0:48:03.410 --> 0:48:08.090
<v Speaker 1>Ottawa Convention, which banned the use, production, sale, and stockpiling

0:48:08.330 --> 0:48:11.810
<v Speaker 1>of an anti personnel mines. While one hundred and sixty

0:48:11.890 --> 0:48:15.370
<v Speaker 1>four nations joined the treaty, some of the world's major

0:48:15.490 --> 0:48:20.010
<v Speaker 1>military powers never signed it, including the United States, China,

0:48:20.130 --> 0:48:25.210
<v Speaker 1>and Russia. Still, the treaty has worked and even influence

0:48:25.290 --> 0:48:28.330
<v Speaker 1>the holdouts. So the United States did not join, but

0:48:28.370 --> 0:48:32.010
<v Speaker 1>it went on to I think prioritize clearance of anti

0:48:32.010 --> 0:48:35.890
<v Speaker 1>personnel land mines and remains the biggest donor to clearing

0:48:36.290 --> 0:48:40.010
<v Speaker 1>landlines an unexploded ordinance around the world. And then under

0:48:40.010 --> 0:48:44.330
<v Speaker 1>the Obama administration, the US committed not to use anti

0:48:44.330 --> 0:48:47.650
<v Speaker 1>personnel land mines anywhere in the world other than to

0:48:47.770 --> 0:48:51.890
<v Speaker 1>keep the option open for the Korean peninsula. So slowly,

0:48:52.010 --> 0:48:56.090
<v Speaker 1>over time countries do I think come in line. One

0:48:56.170 --> 0:49:00.290
<v Speaker 1>major difference between banning land mines and banning fully autonomous

0:49:00.370 --> 0:49:04.250
<v Speaker 1>lethal weapons is, well, it's pretty clear what a land

0:49:04.250 --> 0:49:08.570
<v Speaker 1>mine is, but a fully autonomous lethal weapon that's not

0:49:08.650 --> 0:49:12.650
<v Speaker 1>quite as obvious. Six years of discussion at the United

0:49:12.730 --> 0:49:16.650
<v Speaker 1>Nations have yet to produce a crisp definition. Trying to

0:49:16.690 --> 0:49:20.570
<v Speaker 1>define autonomy is also a very challenging task, and this

0:49:20.650 --> 0:49:24.370
<v Speaker 1>is why we focus on the need for meaningful human control.

0:49:25.130 --> 0:49:29.530
<v Speaker 1>So what exactly is meaningful human control? The ability for

0:49:29.570 --> 0:49:32.970
<v Speaker 1>the human operator and the weapon system to communicate the

0:49:32.970 --> 0:49:36.410
<v Speaker 1>ability for the human to intervene in the detection, selection

0:49:36.450 --> 0:49:39.850
<v Speaker 1>and engagement of targets if necessary to cancel the operation.

0:49:40.530 --> 0:49:45.330
<v Speaker 1>Not surprisingly, international talks about the proposed ban are complicated.

0:49:45.610 --> 0:49:48.170
<v Speaker 1>I will say that a majority of the countries who

0:49:48.250 --> 0:49:52.010
<v Speaker 1>have been talking about killer robots have called for illegally

0:49:52.050 --> 0:49:55.690
<v Speaker 1>binding instruments and international treaty. You've got the countries who

0:49:55.690 --> 0:49:59.690
<v Speaker 1>want to be helpful, like France who was proposing working groups,

0:50:00.170 --> 0:50:05.450
<v Speaker 1>Germany who's proposed political declarations on the importance of human control.

0:50:05.970 --> 0:50:08.970
<v Speaker 1>There's a lot of proposals, I think from Australia about

0:50:09.170 --> 0:50:13.650
<v Speaker 1>legal reviews of weapons. Those efforts are being rebuffed by

0:50:13.690 --> 0:50:17.410
<v Speaker 1>a smaller handful of what we call militarily powerful countries

0:50:17.730 --> 0:50:21.010
<v Speaker 1>who don't want to see new international law. The United

0:50:21.050 --> 0:50:24.010
<v Speaker 1>States and Russia have probably been amongst the most problematic

0:50:24.330 --> 0:50:28.530
<v Speaker 1>on dismissing the calls for any form of regulation. As

0:50:28.570 --> 0:50:31.530
<v Speaker 1>with the landlines, Mary Wareham sees a path forward even

0:50:31.570 --> 0:50:34.650
<v Speaker 1>if the major military powers don't join at first. We

0:50:34.730 --> 0:50:38.290
<v Speaker 1>cannot stop every potential use. What we want to do, though,

0:50:38.410 --> 0:50:42.210
<v Speaker 1>is stigmatized, so that everybody understands that even if you

0:50:42.210 --> 0:50:46.130
<v Speaker 1>could do it, it's not right and you shouldn't. Part

0:50:46.130 --> 0:50:49.010
<v Speaker 1>of the campaign strategy is to get other groups on board,

0:50:49.570 --> 0:50:52.970
<v Speaker 1>and they're making some progress. I think a big move

0:50:53.170 --> 0:50:56.330
<v Speaker 1>in our favor came in November when the United Nations

0:50:56.370 --> 0:51:00.170
<v Speaker 1>Secretary General Antonio Guterres, he made a speech in which

0:51:00.170 --> 0:51:03.010
<v Speaker 1>he called for them to be banned under international law.

0:51:03.330 --> 0:51:11.130
<v Speaker 1>Machine the power and the dispression to take human lives

0:51:11.170 --> 0:51:16.770
<v Speaker 1>are politically and acceptable, are morally impartment and should be

0:51:16.810 --> 0:51:25.450
<v Speaker 1>banned by international law. Artificial intelligence researchers have also been

0:51:25.490 --> 0:51:30.890
<v Speaker 1>expressing concern. Since twenty fifteen, more than forty five hundred

0:51:30.970 --> 0:51:35.170
<v Speaker 1>AI and robotics researchers have signed an open letter calling

0:51:35.210 --> 0:51:41.010
<v Speaker 1>for a ban on offensive autonomous weapons beyond meaningful human control.

0:51:41.530 --> 0:51:46.450
<v Speaker 1>The signers included Elon Musk, Stephen Hawking, and Demis Assabas,

0:51:46.530 --> 0:51:50.090
<v Speaker 1>the CEO of Google's Deep Mind. An excerpt from the

0:51:50.210 --> 0:51:55.290
<v Speaker 1>letter quote, if any major military power pushes ahead with

0:51:55.410 --> 0:52:00.730
<v Speaker 1>AI weapon development, a global arms race is virtually inevitable,

0:52:01.330 --> 0:52:06.130
<v Speaker 1>and the endpoint of this technological trajectory is obvious. Autonomous

0:52:06.170 --> 0:52:14.690
<v Speaker 1>weapons will become the Khalishnikov's Tomorrow Chapter ten. To ban

0:52:14.930 --> 0:52:19.570
<v Speaker 1>or not to ban? Not Everyone, however, favors the idea

0:52:19.610 --> 0:52:24.410
<v Speaker 1>of an international treaty banning all lethal autonomous weapons. In fact,

0:52:24.890 --> 0:52:28.090
<v Speaker 1>everyone else I spoke to for this episode, Ron Arkin,

0:52:28.290 --> 0:52:33.450
<v Speaker 1>Missy Cummings, Paul Shari, and Ash Carter oppose it, interestingly,

0:52:33.490 --> 0:52:37.650
<v Speaker 1>though each had a different reason and a different alternative solution.

0:52:38.530 --> 0:52:42.130
<v Speaker 1>Robo ethicist Ron Arkin thinks we'd be missing a chance

0:52:42.170 --> 0:52:46.370
<v Speaker 1>to make wars safer. Technology can, must, and should be

0:52:46.490 --> 0:52:50.450
<v Speaker 1>used to reduce noncombatant casualties. And if it's not going

0:52:50.490 --> 0:52:53.490
<v Speaker 1>to be this, you tell me what you are going

0:52:53.530 --> 0:52:57.010
<v Speaker 1>to do to address that horrible problem that exists in

0:52:57.010 --> 0:52:59.330
<v Speaker 1>the world right now, with all these innocence being slaughtered

0:52:59.330 --> 0:53:02.810
<v Speaker 1>in the battlespace. Something needs to be done, and to me,

0:53:03.130 --> 0:53:07.330
<v Speaker 1>this is one possible way. Paul Shari thinks a comprehensive

0:53:07.410 --> 0:53:11.090
<v Speaker 1>ban is just not practical. Instead, he thinks we should

0:53:11.090 --> 0:53:15.770
<v Speaker 1>focus on banning lethal autonomous weapons that specifically target people.

0:53:16.330 --> 0:53:20.770
<v Speaker 1>That is, anti personnel weapons. In fact, the Landmine Treaty

0:53:20.810 --> 0:53:25.170
<v Speaker 1>bans anti personnel land mines, but not say, anti tank

0:53:25.730 --> 0:53:29.050
<v Speaker 1>land mines. One of the challenging things about anti personnel

0:53:29.090 --> 0:53:32.770
<v Speaker 1>weapons is that you can't stop being a person if

0:53:32.770 --> 0:53:35.130
<v Speaker 1>you wan't avoid being targeted. So if you have a

0:53:35.170 --> 0:53:37.530
<v Speaker 1>weapon that's targeting tanks, you can come out of a

0:53:37.570 --> 0:53:40.130
<v Speaker 1>tank and run away. I mean, that's a good way

0:53:40.210 --> 0:53:44.650
<v Speaker 1>to effectively surrender and render yourself life of combat. If

0:53:44.650 --> 0:53:48.210
<v Speaker 1>it's even targeting, say handheld weapons. You could set down

0:53:48.250 --> 0:53:49.930
<v Speaker 1>your weapon and run away from it. So do you

0:53:49.970 --> 0:53:53.730
<v Speaker 1>think that'd be practical to actually get either a treaty

0:53:53.890 --> 0:53:58.930
<v Speaker 1>or at least an understanding that countries should forswear anti

0:53:58.930 --> 0:54:03.210
<v Speaker 1>personnel lethal autonomous weapons. I think it's easier for me

0:54:03.250 --> 0:54:06.690
<v Speaker 1>to envision how you might get to actual restraint. You

0:54:06.690 --> 0:54:08.730
<v Speaker 1>need to make sure that the weapon that countries are

0:54:08.730 --> 0:54:11.650
<v Speaker 1>giving up it's not so valuable that they can't still

0:54:11.690 --> 0:54:15.050
<v Speaker 1>defeat those you might be willing to cheat. And I

0:54:15.090 --> 0:54:18.970
<v Speaker 1>think it's really an open question how valuable autonomous weapons are.

0:54:19.570 --> 0:54:22.170
<v Speaker 1>But my suspicion is that they are not as valuable

0:54:22.250 --> 0:54:26.930
<v Speaker 1>or necessary in an anti personnel context. Former fighter pilot

0:54:26.930 --> 0:54:30.610
<v Speaker 1>and Duke professor Missy Cummings thinks it's just not feasible

0:54:30.650 --> 0:54:36.490
<v Speaker 1>to ban lethal autonomous weapons. Look, you can't ban people

0:54:36.730 --> 0:54:42.250
<v Speaker 1>developing computer code. It's not a productive conversation to start

0:54:42.330 --> 0:54:46.370
<v Speaker 1>asking for bands on technology that are almost as common

0:54:46.410 --> 0:54:49.530
<v Speaker 1>as the air we breathe. Right, So we are not

0:54:49.610 --> 0:54:52.970
<v Speaker 1>in the world of banning nuclear technologies. And because it's

0:54:52.970 --> 0:54:55.370
<v Speaker 1>a different world, we need to come up with new ideas.

0:54:56.290 --> 0:54:59.370
<v Speaker 1>What we really need is that we make sure that

0:54:59.450 --> 0:55:03.730
<v Speaker 1>we certify these technologies in advance. How do you actually

0:55:03.810 --> 0:55:06.890
<v Speaker 1>do the test certify that the weapon does at least

0:55:06.890 --> 0:55:09.290
<v Speaker 1>as well as a human. That's actually a big problem

0:55:09.330 --> 0:55:12.930
<v Speaker 1>because no one on the planet, not the Department of Defense,

0:55:13.290 --> 0:55:17.930
<v Speaker 1>not Google, not Uber, not any driverless car company understands

0:55:17.970 --> 0:55:22.690
<v Speaker 1>how to certify autonomous technologies. So four driverless cars can

0:55:22.690 --> 0:55:26.970
<v Speaker 1>come to an intersection and they will never prosecute that

0:55:27.050 --> 0:55:30.730
<v Speaker 1>intersection the same way a sun angle can change the

0:55:30.770 --> 0:55:33.730
<v Speaker 1>way that these things think. We need to come up

0:55:33.810 --> 0:55:36.370
<v Speaker 1>with some out of the box thinking about how to

0:55:36.370 --> 0:55:39.050
<v Speaker 1>test these systems to make sure that they're seeing the world.

0:55:39.090 --> 0:55:42.210
<v Speaker 1>And I'm doing that in air quotes in a way

0:55:42.250 --> 0:55:45.290
<v Speaker 1>that we are expecting them to see the world. And

0:55:45.330 --> 0:55:48.170
<v Speaker 1>this is why we need a national agenda to understand

0:55:48.730 --> 0:55:52.330
<v Speaker 1>how to do testing to get to a place that

0:55:52.410 --> 0:55:55.730
<v Speaker 1>we feel comfortable with the results those you are successful

0:55:55.770 --> 0:55:59.290
<v Speaker 1>and you get the Pentagon and the driverless car folks

0:55:59.370 --> 0:56:03.370
<v Speaker 1>to actually do real world testing, what about rest to world?

0:56:03.770 --> 0:56:07.450
<v Speaker 1>What's going to happen? So one of the problems that

0:56:07.490 --> 0:56:12.690
<v Speaker 1>we see in all technology development is that the rest

0:56:12.730 --> 0:56:17.890
<v Speaker 1>of the world doesn't agree with our standards. It is

0:56:17.970 --> 0:56:22.210
<v Speaker 1>going to be a problem going forward, So we certainly

0:56:22.250 --> 0:56:28.810
<v Speaker 1>should not circumvent testing because other countries are circumventing testing. Finally,

0:56:29.010 --> 0:56:32.890
<v Speaker 1>there's former Secretary of Defense Ash Carter Back in twenty twelve,

0:56:33.250 --> 0:56:35.490
<v Speaker 1>ashe was one of the few people who were thinking

0:56:35.570 --> 0:56:39.210
<v Speaker 1>about the consequences of autonomous technology. At the time, he

0:56:39.290 --> 0:56:42.010
<v Speaker 1>was the third ranking official in the Pentagon in charge

0:56:42.010 --> 0:56:45.730
<v Speaker 1>of weapons and technology. He decided to draft a policy,

0:56:46.090 --> 0:56:50.010
<v Speaker 1>which the Department of Defense adopted. It was issued as

0:56:50.050 --> 0:56:54.890
<v Speaker 1>Directive three thousand point zero nine Autonomy in Weapons Systems.

0:56:55.370 --> 0:56:59.610
<v Speaker 1>So I wrote this directive that said, in essence, there

0:56:59.610 --> 0:57:04.210
<v Speaker 1>will always be a human being involved in the decision

0:57:04.290 --> 0:57:08.530
<v Speaker 1>making when it comes to lethal force in the military

0:57:08.530 --> 0:57:10.770
<v Speaker 1>of the United States of America. I'm not going to

0:57:10.850 --> 0:57:15.130
<v Speaker 1>accept autonomous weapons in a literal sense because I'm the

0:57:15.130 --> 0:57:17.010
<v Speaker 1>guy who has to go out the next morning after

0:57:17.050 --> 0:57:20.610
<v Speaker 1>some women and children have been accidentally killed and explain

0:57:20.690 --> 0:57:23.890
<v Speaker 1>it to a press conference or a foreign government or

0:57:23.930 --> 0:57:27.490
<v Speaker 1>a widow. And as suppose I go out there, Eric

0:57:27.570 --> 0:57:30.730
<v Speaker 1>and I say, oh, I don't know how it happened,

0:57:30.730 --> 0:57:34.010
<v Speaker 1>the machine, did it? Are you going to allow your

0:57:34.250 --> 0:57:38.570
<v Speaker 1>Secretary of Defense to walk out and give that kind

0:57:38.610 --> 0:57:42.850
<v Speaker 1>of excuse. No way I would be crucified. I should

0:57:42.890 --> 0:57:45.690
<v Speaker 1>be crucified for giving a press conference like that, And

0:57:45.850 --> 0:57:49.610
<v Speaker 1>I didn't think any future Secretary Defense should ever be

0:57:49.730 --> 0:57:52.410
<v Speaker 1>in that position, or allow him or herself to be

0:57:52.450 --> 0:57:55.170
<v Speaker 1>in that position. That's why I wrote the directive, Because,

0:57:55.250 --> 0:57:58.730
<v Speaker 1>ashe wrote the directive that currently prevents US forces from

0:57:58.770 --> 0:58:02.290
<v Speaker 1>deploying fully autonomous lethal weapons, I was curious to know

0:58:02.370 --> 0:58:06.130
<v Speaker 1>what he thought about an international ban. I think it's

0:58:06.530 --> 0:58:08.930
<v Speaker 1>reasonable to think about a national ban, and we have

0:58:09.330 --> 0:58:12.090
<v Speaker 1>and we have one. Do I think it's reasonable that

0:58:12.170 --> 0:58:14.650
<v Speaker 1>I get everybody else to sign up to that. I

0:58:14.810 --> 0:58:18.170
<v Speaker 1>don't because I think that people will say they'll sign

0:58:18.250 --> 0:58:21.210
<v Speaker 1>up and then not do it. In general, I don't

0:58:21.250 --> 0:58:27.810
<v Speaker 1>like fakeery in serious matters, and that's too easy to fake.

0:58:28.650 --> 0:58:31.650
<v Speaker 1>That is the fake meaning to fake that they have

0:58:31.810 --> 0:58:36.410
<v Speaker 1>forsworn those weapons, and then we find out that they haven't,

0:58:37.130 --> 0:58:40.130
<v Speaker 1>and so it turns out they're doing it, and they're

0:58:40.210 --> 0:58:42.610
<v Speaker 1>lying about doing it or hiding that they're doing it.

0:58:42.730 --> 0:58:45.770
<v Speaker 1>We've run into that all the time. I remember the

0:58:45.770 --> 0:58:49.690
<v Speaker 1>Soviet Union said it signed the Biological Weapons Convention. They

0:58:49.810 --> 0:58:53.010
<v Speaker 1>ran a very large biological warfare bird. They just said

0:58:53.050 --> 0:58:56.650
<v Speaker 1>they didn't all right, but take the situation. Now, what

0:58:56.730 --> 0:59:00.170
<v Speaker 1>would be the harm of the US signing up to

0:59:00.210 --> 0:59:04.850
<v Speaker 1>such a thing, at least building the moral approbrium around

0:59:05.290 --> 0:59:08.210
<v Speaker 1>lethal autonomous weapons, because you're building something else at the

0:59:08.250 --> 0:59:12.250
<v Speaker 1>same time, which it's an illusion of safety for other people.

0:59:12.490 --> 0:59:16.010
<v Speaker 1>You're conspiring in a circumstance in which they are lied

0:59:16.130 --> 0:59:21.450
<v Speaker 1>to about their own safety, and I feel very uncomfortable

0:59:21.570 --> 0:59:25.210
<v Speaker 1>doing that. Paul Shari sums up the challenge as well.

0:59:25.610 --> 0:59:29.410
<v Speaker 1>Countries are widely divergent interviews on things like a treaty,

0:59:29.450 --> 0:59:32.290
<v Speaker 1>but there's also been some early agreement that at some

0:59:32.410 --> 0:59:36.370
<v Speaker 1>level we need humans involved in these kinds of decisions.

0:59:37.170 --> 0:59:39.490
<v Speaker 1>What's not clear is at what level is that the

0:59:39.610 --> 0:59:44.370
<v Speaker 1>level of prisiople choosing every single target, people deciding at

0:59:44.370 --> 0:59:46.970
<v Speaker 1>a higher level what kinds of targets are to be attacked.

0:59:47.410 --> 0:59:50.570
<v Speaker 1>How far are we comfortable removing humans from these decisions.

0:59:51.690 --> 0:59:54.650
<v Speaker 1>If we had all the technology in the world, what

0:59:54.690 --> 0:59:56.690
<v Speaker 1>decisions would we want humans to make it more? And

0:59:56.810 --> 1:00:00.810
<v Speaker 1>why what decisions in the world require uniquely human judgment

1:00:01.410 --> 1:00:04.330
<v Speaker 1>and why is that? And I think if we can

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<v Speaker 1>answer that question, will be in a much better place

1:00:07.050 --> 1:00:17.770
<v Speaker 1>to crapple with the challenge of a hotness weapons going forward. Conclusion,

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<v Speaker 1>choose your planet, So there you haven't fully autonomous lethal weapons.

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<v Speaker 1>They might keep our soldiers safer, minimize casualties, and protect civilians,

1:00:31.410 --> 1:00:35.490
<v Speaker 1>but delegating more decision making to machines might have big

1:00:35.610 --> 1:00:41.010
<v Speaker 1>risks in unanticipated situations. They might make bad decisions that

1:00:41.090 --> 1:00:45.130
<v Speaker 1>could spiral out of control with no Stanislav Petrov in

1:00:45.130 --> 1:00:49.250
<v Speaker 1>the loop. They might even lead to flash wars. The

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<v Speaker 1>technology might also fall into the hands of dictators and terrorists,

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<v Speaker 1>and it might change us as well by increasing the

1:00:57.970 --> 1:01:01.970
<v Speaker 1>moral buffer between us and our actions. But as war

1:01:02.090 --> 1:01:06.090
<v Speaker 1>gets faster and more complex, will it really be practical

1:01:06.170 --> 1:01:10.090
<v Speaker 1>to keep humans involved in decisions? Is it time to

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<v Speaker 1>draw a line? Should we press for an international treaty

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<v Speaker 1>to completely ban what some call killer robots? What about

1:01:18.370 --> 1:01:22.690
<v Speaker 1>a limited ban or just a national ban in the US?

1:01:23.010 --> 1:01:26.930
<v Speaker 1>Or would all this be naive? Would nations ever believe

1:01:27.010 --> 1:01:30.970
<v Speaker 1>each other's promises. It's hard to know, but the right

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<v Speaker 1>time to decide about fully autonomous lethal weapons is probably now,

1:01:35.450 --> 1:01:39.530
<v Speaker 1>before we've gone too far down the path. The question

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<v Speaker 1>is what can you do a lot? It turns out

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<v Speaker 1>you don't have to be an expert, and you don't

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<v Speaker 1>have to do it alone. When enough people get engaged,

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<v Speaker 1>we make wise choices. Invite friends over virtually for now

1:01:55.330 --> 1:01:58.570
<v Speaker 1>in person what it's safe for dinner and debate about

1:01:58.570 --> 1:02:02.050
<v Speaker 1>what we should do. Or organize a conversation for a

1:02:02.090 --> 1:02:04.770
<v Speaker 1>book club or a faith group or a campus event.

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<v Speaker 1>Talk to people with firsthand experience, those who have served

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<v Speaker 1>in the military or been refugees from war. And don't

1:02:13.290 --> 1:02:16.930
<v Speaker 1>forget to email your elected representatives to ask what they think.

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<v Speaker 1>That's how questions get on the national radar. You can

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<v Speaker 1>find lots of resources and ideas at our website Brave

1:02:24.970 --> 1:02:29.050
<v Speaker 1>New Planet dot org. It's time to choose our planet.

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<v Speaker 1>The future is up to us. ED don't want a

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<v Speaker 1>truly autonomous car. I don't want to come to garage

1:02:44.090 --> 1:02:46.930
<v Speaker 1>and the concess. I've fallen in love with the motorcycle

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<v Speaker 1>and I won't drive you today because I'm autonomous. Brave

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<v Speaker 1>New Planet is a co production of the Broad Institute

1:02:57.810 --> 1:03:00.930
<v Speaker 1>of MT and Harvard Pushkin Industries in the Boston Globe,

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<v Speaker 1>with support from the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation. Our show

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<v Speaker 1>is produced by Rebecca Lee Douglas with Mary Doo theme

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<v Speaker 1>song composed by Ned Porter Mastering and sound designed by

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<v Speaker 1>James Garver, fact checking by Joseph Fridman and a stitt

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<v Speaker 1>An enchant. Special thanks to Christine Heenan and Rachel Roberts

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<v Speaker 1>at Clarendon Communications, to Lee McGuire, Kristen Zarelli and Justine

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<v Speaker 1>Levin Allerhans at the Broad, to Milobelle and Heather Faine

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<v Speaker 1>at Pushkin, and to Eliah Edie Brode who made the

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<v Speaker 1>Broad Institute possible. This is brave new planet. I'm Eric Lander.