WEBVTT - Tech News: India Cracks Down on Twitter 0:00:04.400 --> 0:00:07.800 Welcome to tech Stuff, a production from I Heart Radio. 0:00:12.119 --> 0:00:14.960 Hey there, and welcome to tech Stuff. I'm your host, 0:00:15.160 --> 0:00:19.200 Jonathan Strickland. I'm an executive producer with I Heart Radio 0:00:19.280 --> 0:00:22.279 and I love all things tech, and it is time 0:00:22.360 --> 0:00:27.080 for the tech news for Tuesday, July six, twenty one. 0:00:27.560 --> 0:00:31.880 Let's get to it. An infosec researcher who goes by 0:00:31.880 --> 0:00:35.720 the handle dr web Anti Virus. I love that handle, 0:00:36.159 --> 0:00:40.559 posted a list of ten apps that are were found 0:00:40.640 --> 0:00:43.400 in the Google Play Store that are host to a 0:00:43.479 --> 0:00:46.920 trojan horse type of malware. This is a kind of 0:00:46.960 --> 0:00:49.680 malware that acts as a carrier for some sort of 0:00:49.880 --> 0:00:52.519 malicious payload. So you can think of it as kind 0:00:52.520 --> 0:00:56.080 of the gel cap that contains something really nasty inside 0:00:56.080 --> 0:00:59.680 it and just slips into a system. What specifically goes 0:00:59.720 --> 0:01:03.080 into a trojan can vary, but in this case, the 0:01:03.120 --> 0:01:07.280 malware's purpose is to scrape Facebook log and credentials off 0:01:07.400 --> 0:01:11.080 of phones. So lots of apps have options that allow 0:01:11.200 --> 0:01:15.240 users to link that app to a Facebook account, often 0:01:15.319 --> 0:01:19.480 with dubious benefits to the user for doing so. It's 0:01:19.480 --> 0:01:22.560 a pretty common practice and some users don't even think 0:01:22.600 --> 0:01:26.480 twice about it. They just click right through. In this case, 0:01:26.640 --> 0:01:29.119 doing that opens up the chance for someone to gain 0:01:29.240 --> 0:01:32.679 your login and password to Facebook, which is also why 0:01:32.720 --> 0:01:36.080 it's always a good idea to enable two factor authentication 0:01:36.520 --> 0:01:38.920 on any services that offer it. It's a bit of 0:01:38.959 --> 0:01:42.720 a hassle, but it can save you some real heartache 0:01:42.720 --> 0:01:46.640 in the long run. The ten apps include p I 0:01:46.720 --> 0:01:54.320 P Photo or PIP Photo Processing, Photo, Rubbish Cleaner, Horoscope, 0:01:54.440 --> 0:02:00.240 Daily In, Well Fitness, app Lock, Keep block It, Mass Sir, 0:02:00.840 --> 0:02:06.200 Horoscope Pie, and app lock Manager. Google has removed all 0:02:06.280 --> 0:02:09.839 ten apps from the app store, but people have downloaded 0:02:09.960 --> 0:02:13.440 these apps at least six million times collectively. Across all 0:02:13.480 --> 0:02:16.960 the apps, the apps gave no indication that they were malicious. 0:02:16.960 --> 0:02:20.000 All of them actually did what it was they claimed 0:02:20.000 --> 0:02:23.239 to do. They just went above and beyond and harvested 0:02:23.360 --> 0:02:25.880 Facebook data to on top of that, so if you 0:02:26.040 --> 0:02:28.680 use Android devices, it's a good idea to check to 0:02:28.720 --> 0:02:31.880 make sure you didn't download and install any of those apps. 0:02:32.080 --> 0:02:34.680 It's also a good idea to change your Facebook password 0:02:34.919 --> 0:02:39.560 and to activate two factor authentication. It's time for another 0:02:39.639 --> 0:02:44.520 cryptocurrency story. This time the King of Bitcoin is in 0:02:44.680 --> 0:02:48.040 legal trouble. I should add this is a self proclaimed 0:02:48.160 --> 0:02:51.360 King of Bitcoin, Bitcoin is not now, nor has it 0:02:51.400 --> 0:02:56.320 ever been, an actual monarchy. This guy's name is Claudio Livera, 0:02:56.440 --> 0:02:59.959 and allegedly he embezzled a lot of money from investor 0:03:00.080 --> 0:03:02.880 ers who are looking to get into cryptocurrency and buy 0:03:02.960 --> 0:03:05.720 a lot of money. I'm talking somewhere in the neighborhood 0:03:05.760 --> 0:03:11.360 of three hundred million dollars. Yelza. Olivera is the president 0:03:11.360 --> 0:03:15.320 of a company called the Bitcoin Banko Group, and a 0:03:15.360 --> 0:03:18.240 few years ago, in twenty nineteen, the group was in 0:03:18.280 --> 0:03:21.959 financial trouble. The company reported that after balancing its books, 0:03:22.240 --> 0:03:25.880 it came up with a shortfall of seven thousand bitcoins 0:03:25.960 --> 0:03:28.840 or so. So, in other words, seven thousand bitcoins just 0:03:29.360 --> 0:03:32.840 seemed to up and vanish. Now that could actually happen, 0:03:33.160 --> 0:03:35.760 of course. I mean if the company were to store 0:03:36.120 --> 0:03:39.320 the bitcoins in a digital wallet that in turn was 0:03:39.440 --> 0:03:42.800 on you know, some specific device, and then the company 0:03:42.880 --> 0:03:46.120 lost access to that device, like maybe they sold it 0:03:46.200 --> 0:03:48.480 or threw it out or something, well, that money would 0:03:48.520 --> 0:03:51.240 also be lost. It would be on that physical hardware. 0:03:51.280 --> 0:03:53.480 At least the record of it that allows you to 0:03:53.800 --> 0:03:57.520 use that money would be on that physical hardware. This 0:03:57.560 --> 0:04:01.560 is equivalent to stuffing a physic sical like combination lock 0:04:01.720 --> 0:04:05.320 safe full of cash and then throwing that safe into 0:04:05.360 --> 0:04:09.120 the ocean at any rate. The company then applied for 0:04:09.200 --> 0:04:12.240 permission from the Brazilian government to go through a process 0:04:12.280 --> 0:04:15.720 that would allow the company to reorganize its finances in 0:04:15.800 --> 0:04:18.880 order to you know, payoff creditors and and to not 0:04:19.000 --> 0:04:22.440 go bankrupt, and the government agreed to this. But then 0:04:23.200 --> 0:04:27.120 the Brazilian government noted that a year on into this process, 0:04:27.680 --> 0:04:30.440 the company didn't seem to actually be following the court 0:04:30.520 --> 0:04:35.000 prescribed process of reorganization. It wasn't doing what it was 0:04:35.000 --> 0:04:37.520 supposed to do by court mandate. And that's when the 0:04:37.520 --> 0:04:42.080 Brazilian government formed an investigation into Olivera, which ultimately concluded 0:04:42.120 --> 0:04:44.920 that he had been skimming money from investors for himself, 0:04:45.000 --> 0:04:48.400 and furthermore that he appeared to have had a history 0:04:48.440 --> 0:04:51.840 of doing this in other places, including the United States. 0:04:51.839 --> 0:04:57.279 Olivera is now in police custody in Brazil. Last Friday, 0:04:57.360 --> 0:05:00.840 we learned that a networking company called Kause, which makes 0:05:00.920 --> 0:05:04.479 products designed to help I T professionals maintain a minister 0:05:04.920 --> 0:05:08.479 network systems and I T infrastructure, got hit with a 0:05:08.640 --> 0:05:12.720 ransomware attack. Lots of companies rely on cause A products, 0:05:12.760 --> 0:05:16.120 and according to the company, anywhere from eight hundred to 0:05:16.279 --> 0:05:21.120 fifteen hundred customers may be affected by this UH and 0:05:21.160 --> 0:05:23.440 it's actually kind of a cascading effects. So because A 0:05:23.880 --> 0:05:27.320 gets targeted, right, they are the company that provides the 0:05:27.400 --> 0:05:32.000 services overall. But in that process of targeting the company, 0:05:32.040 --> 0:05:35.000 the hackers were able to breach data on about fifty 0:05:35.240 --> 0:05:38.640 of cause As direct customers. But those fifty customers in 0:05:38.760 --> 0:05:44.120 turn provide services to smaller companies, so we start to 0:05:44.160 --> 0:05:46.600 see the effects ripple outward. That's where we get to 0:05:46.640 --> 0:05:49.719 that range of eight d to fifteen hundred affected companies. 0:05:50.040 --> 0:05:52.840 The affected companies are essentially locked out of their cloud 0:05:52.920 --> 0:05:57.960 based systems. Hacker group called REvil m R e v 0:05:58.160 --> 0:06:01.360 I L has claimed response ability and has demanded a 0:06:01.440 --> 0:06:05.599 ransom of seventy million dollars in Bitcoin in order to 0:06:05.680 --> 0:06:09.720 release the hold they have on that system to decrypt it. Essentially, 0:06:10.080 --> 0:06:12.720 that's the most that any hacker group has ever demanded 0:06:12.760 --> 0:06:15.680 as a ransom so far. The previous record holder was 0:06:15.839 --> 0:06:19.040 um let's see here, oh you know what, still Rebuild. 0:06:19.680 --> 0:06:23.560 They demanded fifty million dollars from Aser earlier this year. 0:06:24.520 --> 0:06:28.880 A spokesperson for CAZA has declined to comment on paying 0:06:29.040 --> 0:06:32.560 ransoms to terrorists, And just as a reminder, you know, 0:06:32.680 --> 0:06:35.880 paying ransomware is not a great idea. It does not 0:06:36.080 --> 0:06:39.320 guarantee that you're actually going to regain control of your systems, 0:06:39.400 --> 0:06:42.160 and paying off the ransom sends the message that this 0:06:42.360 --> 0:06:45.600 is an effective and profitable type of crime, and that 0:06:45.640 --> 0:06:49.719 guarantees that you'll have more attacks in the future. Some 0:06:49.800 --> 0:06:53.200 companies likely make the choice to pay off the ransom 0:06:53.320 --> 0:06:56.320 because they happen to have some form of cyber insurance 0:06:56.400 --> 0:06:59.520 against that kind of thing, and I guess that makes 0:06:59.560 --> 0:07:01.760 sense from the company's perspective. I mean, if you can 0:07:01.760 --> 0:07:06.120 pay off a ransom and get control of your systems 0:07:06.160 --> 0:07:08.920 back and you get reimbursed for the money you spent 0:07:09.000 --> 0:07:12.119 because you're insured, you kind of made it all someone 0:07:12.160 --> 0:07:16.640 else's problem, right. Insurance companies are starting to see that 0:07:16.760 --> 0:07:19.960 problem manifest now, which I imagine means we're going to 0:07:20.080 --> 0:07:23.720 see some big changes in that kind of insurance moving forward. Anyway, 0:07:24.000 --> 0:07:28.120 INFOSEC researchers believe that revel is based out of Russia 0:07:28.320 --> 0:07:31.040 or possibly Eastern Europe, and we're seeing this a lot 0:07:31.080 --> 0:07:33.640 with a lot of criminal groups in Russia in particular 0:07:33.680 --> 0:07:36.080 picking up the pace. There's a general belief that the 0:07:36.160 --> 0:07:39.880 Russian government allows these criminal groups to operate. Maybe they 0:07:39.920 --> 0:07:44.760 even subcontract with these criminal organizations in order to target 0:07:44.880 --> 0:07:49.040 specific political enemies. That's an allegation that the Russian government 0:07:49.080 --> 0:07:53.120 itself denies. But generally speaking, if you're developing software and 0:07:53.240 --> 0:07:57.080 you're in Russia, you're pretty much confined to the Russian market, 0:07:57.280 --> 0:08:00.800 and hacking becomes a more viable means of making money. 0:08:00.960 --> 0:08:04.960 So um, yeah, I can't say for certain that the 0:08:05.040 --> 0:08:11.320 Russian government condones or actively supports these hacking uh activities, 0:08:11.760 --> 0:08:17.440 but the government does seem to be reticent in pursuing 0:08:17.640 --> 0:08:22.120 legal action against these hacker organizations. Let's put it that way. 0:08:22.240 --> 0:08:24.880 At best, it appears they're looking the other way, and 0:08:24.920 --> 0:08:28.800 at worst they're in cahoots. In addition to that, I 0:08:28.840 --> 0:08:32.199 also want to mention that the company because has said 0:08:32.280 --> 0:08:37.720 it is working to get the services restored today July six. 0:08:39.320 --> 0:08:41.480 By the time you listen to this, that may have 0:08:41.679 --> 0:08:47.040 already happened. Moving on, in India, Twitter is facing a 0:08:47.160 --> 0:08:51.760 very tough situation. The Indian government has ruled that Twitter 0:08:51.880 --> 0:08:56.120 has not been compliant with content regulation within the country, 0:08:56.160 --> 0:09:00.520 and as a result, will not enjoy liability protection against 0:09:00.640 --> 0:09:04.079 stuff that people post on Twitter. While in India, the 0:09:04.160 --> 0:09:06.960 law states that Twitter is to remove posts quickly in 0:09:07.000 --> 0:09:10.880 response to legal requests from you know, law enforcement, and 0:09:10.960 --> 0:09:14.000 that the company is also supposed to share details about 0:09:14.040 --> 0:09:17.680 the owner of accounts that post offending messages. So, in 0:09:17.679 --> 0:09:21.360 other words, if someone posts something that is in violation 0:09:21.440 --> 0:09:24.520 of these rules in India, then Twitter is supposed to 0:09:24.559 --> 0:09:28.640 give up information about that person to Indian law enforcement. 0:09:29.360 --> 0:09:33.640 Twitter was also to hire a compliance officer to ensure 0:09:33.679 --> 0:09:37.960 that the company would follow India's national policies. Also supposed 0:09:38.000 --> 0:09:41.240 to hire a grievance officer in charge of reviewing allegations 0:09:41.559 --> 0:09:44.640 and a contact person who would respond to law enforcement 0:09:44.679 --> 0:09:47.920 messages as soon as possible. And according to the government, 0:09:48.120 --> 0:09:52.520 law enforcement received a complaint from an unknown or unnamed 0:09:52.520 --> 0:09:55.520 Twitter user that said that they were the victims of 0:09:55.559 --> 0:09:59.480 malicious messages that were posted on Twitter that violated these 0:09:59.559 --> 0:10:02.320 rules that I've mentioned, and that the company had not 0:10:02.400 --> 0:10:06.440 yet hired the officers that I mentioned earlier. This follows 0:10:06.440 --> 0:10:08.800 on the heels of some really big stories in India 0:10:08.880 --> 0:10:12.240 involving social media, including the government's attempts to suppress a 0:10:12.320 --> 0:10:17.439 farmers protest within India, and also Twitter had labeled some 0:10:17.520 --> 0:10:22.520 messages from Indian officials as being manipulated media, which caused 0:10:22.520 --> 0:10:26.200 a big mess in India. Here in the United States, 0:10:26.440 --> 0:10:30.599 social networking sites enjoy legal protection thanks to Section to thirty, 0:10:30.640 --> 0:10:33.880 which says that platforms are not accountable for the stuff 0:10:33.920 --> 0:10:37.480 that their users post to those platforms. But officials in 0:10:37.559 --> 0:10:40.280 India point out that it is unreasonable for a company 0:10:40.320 --> 0:10:44.600 to expect American laws and American legal protection while they're 0:10:44.640 --> 0:10:48.319 operating in a totally different country. It is too early 0:10:48.400 --> 0:10:51.200 to say how all this is going to play out 0:10:51.360 --> 0:10:54.199 and whether or not Twitter executives will eventually have to 0:10:54.679 --> 0:10:58.360 stand charge for content posted on Twitter in India, content 0:10:58.440 --> 0:11:02.040 posted by you know, other people. But I expect we're 0:11:02.040 --> 0:11:04.360 gonna see some pretty big stories come out of all this, 0:11:04.559 --> 0:11:07.160 and not just with Twitter, but with any social networking 0:11:07.200 --> 0:11:11.360 site that is operating within India, an enormous market. It's 0:11:11.360 --> 0:11:15.040 not like these companies want to just pull out of India. However, 0:11:15.960 --> 0:11:18.640 there is a place where they are threatening to do 0:11:18.840 --> 0:11:22.520 just that, just not in India. So, speaking of American 0:11:22.559 --> 0:11:26.120 social networks facing big decisions and overseas markets, let's talk 0:11:26.120 --> 0:11:29.920 about Hong Kong. The local government there plans to enact 0:11:29.960 --> 0:11:33.560 some new rules that would change data protection laws within 0:11:33.720 --> 0:11:36.240 the city of Hong Kong, and the goal is to 0:11:36.280 --> 0:11:40.440 fight doxing. Now, that's the practice of a person sharing 0:11:40.600 --> 0:11:45.640 some other person's personal information without their consent, UH, typically 0:11:45.840 --> 0:11:51.680 for malicious purposes, like to either encourage harassment or worse. So, 0:11:51.800 --> 0:11:55.280 for example, if I were to share Ben Boland's home 0:11:55.360 --> 0:11:59.880 address on this program, that would be doxing, and I 0:12:00.000 --> 0:12:02.280 suspect that's why Ben always forces me to wear a 0:12:02.280 --> 0:12:05.160 blindfold and sit in a card that then randomly drives 0:12:05.160 --> 0:12:07.320 around the city for two hours before I can never 0:12:07.400 --> 0:12:11.520 visit him anyway, Hong Kong's rules would set finds of 0:12:11.760 --> 0:12:17.600 nearly dollars per incident plus up to five years imprisonment. 0:12:18.080 --> 0:12:20.559 And apparently, as the rules are written, they could apply 0:12:20.679 --> 0:12:24.959 to platforms that includes companies like Facebook, Twitter, and Google, 0:12:25.800 --> 0:12:28.440 so not just the people posting to them, but the 0:12:28.440 --> 0:12:31.920 platforms that carry the messages as well. The company's sent 0:12:32.080 --> 0:12:35.439 a letter back in June that just became public this week, 0:12:35.679 --> 0:12:38.440 and that letter warns Hong Kong officials that if the 0:12:38.520 --> 0:12:41.880 rules are going to go into practice, these companies will 0:12:41.920 --> 0:12:45.520 have no choice but to stop providing services within Hong Kong. 0:12:46.040 --> 0:12:50.920 So it's kind of an ultimatum. Dots ng is a 0:12:51.000 --> 0:12:55.160 truly abhorrent practice. But just to be clear and to 0:12:55.200 --> 0:12:58.840 get the full context of this, these rules seem to 0:12:58.880 --> 0:13:02.400 stem not from the way that private citizens have been 0:13:02.400 --> 0:13:06.360 affected in Hong Kong, but that rather, during the anti 0:13:06.440 --> 0:13:10.840 government protests in Hong Kong back in twenty nineteen, some 0:13:11.000 --> 0:13:15.480 people were sharing private information about several police officers that 0:13:15.640 --> 0:13:19.160 ended up making the rounds online. Now, again, this is 0:13:19.200 --> 0:13:23.000 a terrible practice, like you know, it's it's it's not 0:13:23.080 --> 0:13:25.880 good no matter which side is using this, and many 0:13:25.920 --> 0:13:29.400 of those police officers ended up facing targeted harassment and worse, 0:13:29.840 --> 0:13:33.040 including you know, their families. But I just wanted to 0:13:33.080 --> 0:13:36.200 give context that the rules don't seem to be in 0:13:36.280 --> 0:13:40.960 response to, you know, citizen concerns. It seems to be 0:13:41.080 --> 0:13:43.680 more of a response to try and clamp down on 0:13:43.800 --> 0:13:47.840 citizens and as a response to civilian challenges to the 0:13:47.840 --> 0:13:51.360 government's activities. So in other words, I guess the the 0:13:51.400 --> 0:13:54.680 short way of saying all that is people are way 0:13:54.720 --> 0:13:59.040 more complicated than technology ever will be. We have a 0:13:59.080 --> 0:14:02.080 couple more stories to get through. But before I do that, 0:14:02.400 --> 0:14:14.920 let's take a quick break. Okay, we're back so over 0:14:15.080 --> 0:14:18.720 in the United Kingdom, there is a semiconductor company called 0:14:18.880 --> 0:14:23.440 Newport Wafer Fab or n WF, and it has a 0:14:23.480 --> 0:14:27.280 new owner. That owner is next spire A That is 0:14:27.320 --> 0:14:31.080 a company that is based in the Netherlands. However, that 0:14:31.160 --> 0:14:35.120 company has its own parent company, because things always get 0:14:35.120 --> 0:14:39.040 more complicated, and that parent company is a Chinese firm 0:14:39.160 --> 0:14:44.840 called Wingtech Group. NWF is the UK's largest silicon chip 0:14:44.920 --> 0:14:49.240 manufacturing company. The UK government might actually look into these 0:14:49.280 --> 0:14:52.720 things a little more closely because the UK passed a 0:14:52.800 --> 0:14:57.640 law that's called the National Security and Investment Act specifically 0:14:57.920 --> 0:15:03.760 to review all acquisitions that could affect national security. In general, 0:15:03.840 --> 0:15:07.080 the UK government views the practice of a foreign company 0:15:07.200 --> 0:15:10.720 coming in to purchase big UK companies as being a 0:15:10.760 --> 0:15:14.600 bit risky. But so far there's been no official resistance 0:15:14.680 --> 0:15:21.240 to this acquisition. Resistance. That's an electricity pun about silicon chips, 0:15:21.240 --> 0:15:24.360 and I didn't even mean to make that. So we'll 0:15:24.400 --> 0:15:27.520 have to see if the UK government allows this to 0:15:27.520 --> 0:15:30.640 move forward with no further comment. It is a little weird. 0:15:30.920 --> 0:15:33.960 I mean, I find the way the UK government handles 0:15:34.000 --> 0:15:37.000 things to be odd anyway. Now, I look at things 0:15:37.040 --> 0:15:42.080 like Brexit, which seems to indicate that England or Britain, 0:15:42.160 --> 0:15:44.800 rather the United Kingdom wants to stand on its own 0:15:44.840 --> 0:15:47.880 and not be part of a larger collective. And yet 0:15:48.520 --> 0:15:52.560 isn't necessarily blinking an eye when large foreign companies come 0:15:52.600 --> 0:15:56.520 in and acquire major companies within the UK. Just seems 0:15:56.520 --> 0:15:58.800 to be a disconnect, is all I'm saying, Just trying 0:15:58.800 --> 0:16:03.040 to understand it. Also in acquisition news, we've got some 0:16:03.240 --> 0:16:06.440 about Bugatti, which is a company that's known for its 0:16:06.480 --> 0:16:12.280 outrageously expensive supercars that very wealthy folks drive at very 0:16:12.360 --> 0:16:16.080 fast speeds. The company of Bugatti started more than a 0:16:16.160 --> 0:16:18.960 century ago, and I covered a bit about it in 0:16:19.040 --> 0:16:23.000 my episodes about the history of Volkswagen. The original run 0:16:23.000 --> 0:16:27.560 of Bugatti ended around the nineteen fifties nineteen sixties. It 0:16:27.640 --> 0:16:31.000 followed the death of its founder, A Torre Bugatti. His 0:16:31.080 --> 0:16:33.880 son had passed away a few years earlier before he died, 0:16:34.520 --> 0:16:38.520 and it essentially kind of faded from memory. And in 0:16:38.640 --> 0:16:43.960 nineteen seven a an investor, a man named Roman rt Oli, 0:16:44.160 --> 0:16:48.160 purchased the rights to the brand name Bugatti, so he 0:16:48.200 --> 0:16:50.320 was able to bring Bugatti back from you know, like 0:16:50.360 --> 0:16:54.920 the Junkyard of history. Volkswagen would then later purchase those 0:16:55.040 --> 0:16:59.720 rights and launched Bugatti Automobiles in ninet So while the 0:16:59.800 --> 0:17:03.480 name Bugatti has been in the automotive world since you know, 0:17:03.800 --> 0:17:08.400 nine nine, you could argue that the Bugatti automobile line 0:17:08.400 --> 0:17:11.560 has had sort of three distinct phases. Had the original 0:17:11.640 --> 0:17:15.560 run with the founder, the run under Artioli when he 0:17:15.840 --> 0:17:19.760 bought the branding, and then the Volkswagen run. Now an 0:17:19.760 --> 0:17:24.280 electric vehicle startup called Ramack has acquired a majority stake 0:17:24.400 --> 0:17:29.280 in Bugatti from Volkswagen Mate Ramak or perhaps Mate Ramak 0:17:29.480 --> 0:17:31.520 I honestly don't know how to say his name anyway. 0:17:31.520 --> 0:17:35.200 The founder of Ramak will lead the new organization, which 0:17:35.200 --> 0:17:39.200 will fittingly be called Bugatti Ramak. The deal was an 0:17:39.240 --> 0:17:42.320 all stock deal, and according to Raemak, the Bugotti and 0:17:42.400 --> 0:17:46.440 Rhemack departments will still operate separately as distinct brands. They're 0:17:46.480 --> 0:17:49.960 not going to be merged together. The Bugatti Raemack company 0:17:50.240 --> 0:17:53.480 will guide both brands. Essentially, it will make the decisions 0:17:53.520 --> 0:17:56.280 for each brand, but each brand will remain its own thing. 0:17:56.960 --> 0:17:59.840 The plan is to introduce an electric vehicle version of 0:18:00.040 --> 0:18:03.400 Bugatti by the end of the decade, along with some 0:18:03.520 --> 0:18:08.720 hybrid models. Users of Audacity have noticed some changes since 0:18:08.760 --> 0:18:12.080 the company mus Group acquired the open source app earlier 0:18:12.119 --> 0:18:15.680 this year. Audacity is a free to download and free 0:18:15.720 --> 0:18:19.720 to use audio recording and editing app. Uh And in fact, 0:18:19.800 --> 0:18:21.920 it's what I used to record tech stuff when I'm 0:18:21.960 --> 0:18:25.680 working from home, like today, I'm using Audacity. At work, 0:18:25.880 --> 0:18:30.000 we use Adobe Audition in case you're curious. Audacity is 0:18:30.080 --> 0:18:33.679 popular because one it's free and to it has a 0:18:33.720 --> 0:18:37.320 fairly extensive set of features, features that I hardly use 0:18:37.440 --> 0:18:40.520 because there are a lot of them, but understanding what 0:18:40.560 --> 0:18:42.800 each one does takes a little bit of digging, so 0:18:42.880 --> 0:18:46.479 I've only kind of dipped my toe in like maybe 0:18:46.520 --> 0:18:49.480 two percent of the features that are available on Audacity. 0:18:49.800 --> 0:18:53.159 The latest version of Audacity, however, includes changes to the 0:18:53.200 --> 0:18:56.560 apps privacy policy, and those changes mentioned that the app 0:18:56.560 --> 0:19:01.040 will collect quote data necessary for law enforcement, IT, litigation 0:19:01.200 --> 0:19:08.760 and authorities requests if any end quote, which huh, yikes. 0:19:08.560 --> 0:19:10.919 This is a piece of software that you use to 0:19:10.960 --> 0:19:14.920 record audio and then edit that audio. You probably wouldn't 0:19:14.960 --> 0:19:18.840 think of it as also passing information on to some 0:19:18.920 --> 0:19:23.439 other entity, right, but apparently that's the case. These changes 0:19:23.480 --> 0:19:28.080 prompted some folks to refer to Audacity as spyware, and 0:19:28.160 --> 0:19:30.879 there's some indication that we might see a fork in 0:19:30.960 --> 0:19:35.480 Audacity as open source developers go back to earlier versions, 0:19:35.680 --> 0:19:39.919 pre muse group acquisition of Audacity and continue developing the 0:19:39.960 --> 0:19:43.640 software through the open source approach. And in case you're 0:19:43.680 --> 0:19:47.159 not familiar with open source, the idea is that you 0:19:47.280 --> 0:19:51.200 make code readily available so that people can see exactly 0:19:51.240 --> 0:19:54.400 how something is coded, and they can then take that 0:19:54.600 --> 0:19:57.920 and depending upon the licensing agreement you set up, they 0:19:57.960 --> 0:20:00.639 can take that code and build it in to something 0:20:00.720 --> 0:20:03.359 of their own. Maybe they make their own version of 0:20:03.400 --> 0:20:08.760 the thing that code stands for, and they can then, 0:20:09.000 --> 0:20:12.840 depending on the license agreement, market that themselves. This all 0:20:12.840 --> 0:20:17.399 depends on how the open code licensing is approached. There 0:20:17.400 --> 0:20:18.880 are a lot of different ways of doing that. I've 0:20:18.920 --> 0:20:22.240 covered that on previous episodes. But the big benefit of 0:20:22.320 --> 0:20:25.919 open source is that you have it open to the 0:20:26.080 --> 0:20:30.480 entire world of developers, as opposed to say, an internal 0:20:30.560 --> 0:20:33.440 group working on a project. And when you open it 0:20:33.520 --> 0:20:37.639 up to everyone, well, by nature, you end up getting 0:20:37.880 --> 0:20:40.800 the best ideas. It may take some time for them 0:20:40.800 --> 0:20:43.560 to all kind of rise to the top. But you're 0:20:43.560 --> 0:20:47.640 going to benefit from the experience of the collective. So 0:20:47.960 --> 0:20:53.199 it's a very effective way of creating powerful applications, but 0:20:53.480 --> 0:20:57.280 it does come with this sort of limitation on how 0:20:57.359 --> 0:21:01.320 you monetize it, or at least there are other factors 0:21:01.320 --> 0:21:05.840 you have to take into consideration. Moving on, Atari, a 0:21:05.920 --> 0:21:09.399 company that lays claim to an historic name in video 0:21:09.440 --> 0:21:12.640 game culture is making a change. Now, before I get 0:21:12.680 --> 0:21:15.479 into this, I should mention that the Atari of today 0:21:15.880 --> 0:21:19.000 is not the same company as the Atari that was 0:21:19.080 --> 0:21:21.680 part of the initial video game console boom of the 0:21:21.760 --> 0:21:25.560 late seventies and early eighties. That version of Atari pretty 0:21:25.640 --> 0:21:30.280 much doesn't exist anymore. Some of its intellectual property exists, 0:21:30.800 --> 0:21:34.760 but but you could think of the current Atari as being, 0:21:35.400 --> 0:21:40.240 you know, a reincarnation maybe. So the Attari of today 0:21:40.320 --> 0:21:43.160 is trying to really establish itself in the modern gaming 0:21:43.280 --> 0:21:46.280 sphere and announced that it's going to transition away from 0:21:46.280 --> 0:21:49.919 developing free to play mobile games, which is an incredibly 0:21:49.960 --> 0:21:53.919 competitive field, to focus more on making games for consoles 0:21:54.040 --> 0:21:57.760 and the PC. These plans would potentially include developing new 0:21:57.840 --> 0:22:03.199 games for the Atari VCS console, which was finally released 0:22:03.240 --> 0:22:07.000 after multiple delays. This is a console that has a 0:22:07.320 --> 0:22:11.119 throwback retro look to it. It plays classic Atari twenty 0:22:11.119 --> 0:22:14.560 six games, among other things like it technically can play 0:22:14.640 --> 0:22:17.160 lots of other stuff, but it was designed to kind 0:22:17.160 --> 0:22:21.760 of dip into that nostalgia for gamers who are, you know, 0:22:21.880 --> 0:22:25.119 my age or older. No word yet on how the 0:22:25.119 --> 0:22:28.560 company is handling the planned opening of its string of 0:22:28.560 --> 0:22:31.000 Attari hotels that we heard about a couple of years ago. 0:22:31.880 --> 0:22:34.200 I actually wonder if that project is still on track 0:22:34.320 --> 0:22:37.560 or not. The first of those hotels is supposed to 0:22:37.600 --> 0:22:40.520 open in Las Vegas next year, and I know that 0:22:40.560 --> 0:22:42.840 if I ever do return to c e S, I'm 0:22:42.840 --> 0:22:44.520 going to have to try and book a room in 0:22:44.560 --> 0:22:49.800 that hotel, assuming you know that it exists. And finally, 0:22:50.160 --> 0:22:54.000 has this ever happened to you? You find yourself in 0:22:54.040 --> 0:22:57.479 a tedious situation, so you reach over and pick up 0:22:57.480 --> 0:23:01.040 your phone for a distraction. Maybe you're standing in a 0:23:01.080 --> 0:23:03.000 line and you just want something to take your mind 0:23:03.040 --> 0:23:06.240 off the fact that you're five people back from being 0:23:06.240 --> 0:23:09.640 able to order your coffee. Maybe you're watching a TV 0:23:09.760 --> 0:23:13.160 show and it's just gone to commercial. Maybe you're listening 0:23:13.200 --> 0:23:15.679 to a podcast and the bald guy is just droning 0:23:15.720 --> 0:23:19.520 on about stuff, or maybe you're part of a government 0:23:19.600 --> 0:23:23.080 body hosting a debate about matters that could potentially affect 0:23:23.480 --> 0:23:28.320 thousands of people's lives. That last one is a kicker, right, Like, 0:23:28.400 --> 0:23:31.480 I mean, there's this general feeling that if you're at 0:23:31.520 --> 0:23:36.040 an important debate, for example, let's say you are a 0:23:36.160 --> 0:23:40.160 US politician in Congress, maybe you should be paying attention 0:23:40.240 --> 0:23:44.080 to the proceedings, as at least theoretically, the outcome of 0:23:44.160 --> 0:23:47.560 them stands to impact countless people, many of whom you 0:23:47.640 --> 0:23:52.680 might actually represent. And yet politicians, like everyone else, you 0:23:52.920 --> 0:23:56.160 can get a bit bored and occasionally they will look 0:23:56.200 --> 0:24:01.120 to their phones for distractions. But the question how occasionally, 0:24:01.200 --> 0:24:05.480 like how much or how little attention are the politicians 0:24:05.560 --> 0:24:09.920 actually paying when it comes to, you know, running a government. 0:24:10.440 --> 0:24:15.440 So an AI that's being called Drees Deporter is scrying 0:24:15.480 --> 0:24:19.880 through video of televised political debates in Belgium. It's doing 0:24:19.920 --> 0:24:23.439 that to see how frequently people are looking at their phones. 0:24:24.400 --> 0:24:27.439 So the AI is looking at signs that politicians are 0:24:27.440 --> 0:24:30.119 looking down at their phones, are actively typing on their 0:24:30.160 --> 0:24:33.320 phones rather than paying attention to the proceedings at hand. 0:24:33.760 --> 0:24:38.399 Then the AI takes screenshots of moments that determines count 0:24:38.480 --> 0:24:41.800 as you know, politicians being distracted. Uh, and it even 0:24:41.920 --> 0:24:45.360 highlights the region showing the phone in the hands of 0:24:45.400 --> 0:24:49.480 that politician then posts those images to Twitter. So it's 0:24:49.800 --> 0:24:54.199 it's essentially public shaming. It's it's saying, hey, you are 0:24:54.240 --> 0:24:57.119 elected to do a job. That job might be boring, 0:24:57.440 --> 0:25:01.320 but it's still important and you are entrusted to do 0:25:01.359 --> 0:25:04.840 that job, so get off you gosh darn phone. Now. 0:25:05.400 --> 0:25:08.639 I'm the first to say this does not sound entirely 0:25:08.720 --> 0:25:11.639 fair to me, because we don't actually know why the 0:25:11.680 --> 0:25:15.000 politicians are looking at their phones at any given time. 0:25:15.359 --> 0:25:18.520 There could be cases where there is a legitimate reason 0:25:18.720 --> 0:25:21.720 that isn't related to just you know, checking out from 0:25:21.760 --> 0:25:25.560 whatever political discussion is going on at the moment. Still, 0:25:25.880 --> 0:25:29.000 I thought it was a fairly funny story to end 0:25:29.160 --> 0:25:33.199