WEBVTT - Osterweis’ Wong on Forward-Looking Quality: Inside Active

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<v Speaker 1>Welcome to Inside Active, a podcast about active managers that

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<v Speaker 1>goes beyond soundbites and headlines and looks deeper into their processes,

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<v Speaker 1>challenges and philosophies and security selection. I'm David Cohne, i

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<v Speaker 1>lead mutual fund and active research at Bloomberg Intelligence. Today

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<v Speaker 1>my co host is Michael casper Us, small cap and

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<v Speaker 1>sector strategist at Bloomberg Intelligence. Mike, thanks for joining me today.

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<v Speaker 2>Thank you, David.

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<v Speaker 1>So you wrote an interesting note last week on the

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<v Speaker 1>connection between small cap stocks and M and A. So

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<v Speaker 1>how to merge his and acquisitions affect Russell two thousand performance?

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, Well, first a recap of what happened in twenty

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<v Speaker 2>twenty four, and it was the weakest year we had

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<v Speaker 2>on record going back to about two thousand, with the

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<v Speaker 2>last quarter of twenty twenty four being particularly bad, just

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<v Speaker 2>two deals worth a paltry four point four billion in

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<v Speaker 2>the fourth quarter, But that caped a year where there

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<v Speaker 2>was only about fifty two deals that was worse than

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<v Speaker 2>two thousand and eight sixty one deals and making it

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<v Speaker 2>the worst going back to two thousand. Now you might

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<v Speaker 2>be wondering where did that dip come from. It was

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<v Speaker 2>definitely in financials, they made up just nine point three

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<v Speaker 2>percent of last year's fifty four deals. Typically they average

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<v Speaker 2>around eighteen point three percent or so of deals annually

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<v Speaker 2>going back to again two thousand, So really the big

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<v Speaker 2>departure was in financials only. Energy, though saw more deals

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<v Speaker 2>than its pre pandemic and X Great Financial Crisis average.

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<v Speaker 2>But why does this really matter for small cap stocks?

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<v Speaker 2>At the end of the day, small cap performance and

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<v Speaker 2>the amount of M and A, so the amount of

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<v Speaker 2>targets in the small cap index are pretty closely linked.

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<v Speaker 2>So if you look at calendar year performance of the

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<v Speaker 2>rest of two thousand and deal count and value in

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<v Speaker 2>the correlation between the two Russell two thousand annual performance,

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<v Speaker 2>calendar year performance is point five two correlated with count

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<v Speaker 2>and it's point four correlated to deal value. So a

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<v Speaker 2>pretty significant positive correlation there. Obviously is takeouts to accumulate.

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<v Speaker 2>It drives a premium for some of these small cap

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<v Speaker 2>stocks in some of these sectors. And one of the

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<v Speaker 2>cool things just before I give up on this, one

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<v Speaker 2>of the cool things we did that I want to

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<v Speaker 2>mention is that we tried to look for commonality across

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<v Speaker 2>these takeout targets in the Russell two thousand, going back

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<v Speaker 2>to again two thousand or two thousand and one, and

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<v Speaker 2>what we found the commonality amongst them was most of

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<v Speaker 2>them had positive EBADA for the year prior to the

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<v Speaker 2>deal's announcement. Over sixty percent of all those deals going

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<v Speaker 2>back to two thousand had positive EBADA seventy two percent

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<v Speaker 2>or so. We're cheaper than the index median ev to

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<v Speaker 2>EBADA and about seventy percent had lower net debt to ebadas,

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<v Speaker 2>a lower leverage leverage than the median stock in the

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<v Speaker 2>Russell two thousand. So we did a nice little takeover

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<v Speaker 2>target screen looking at companies in the Russell two thousand today.

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<v Speaker 1>That's great. So if we are talking about small caps,

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<v Speaker 1>I think it's a great time to welcome our guest.

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<v Speaker 1>I'd like to welcome Brian Wong to the podcast. Brian

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<v Speaker 1>is vice president and small cap growth portfolio manager at

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<v Speaker 1>Ostrowis and a manager for the Austrowis Opportunity Fund ticker OSTGX. Brian,

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<v Speaker 1>thanks for joining us today.

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<v Speaker 3>Thanks for having me.

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<v Speaker 1>David, So I'd like to begin by asking you how

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<v Speaker 1>you got your start in the investment business.

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<v Speaker 4>Sure, well, I went to college at Yale. I was

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<v Speaker 4>a political science major, so a great great training for investments,

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<v Speaker 4>of course, and really what I was focused on studying

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<v Speaker 4>in college was the Grand Strategy of Countries. So I

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<v Speaker 4>wrote my senior essay on the Grand Strategy of Dung Dungshaoping,

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<v Speaker 4>who's really China sort of modern leader following Mount Malzaedong

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<v Speaker 4>really opened up the economy there, but still preserved capitalism

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<v Speaker 4>with Chinese characteristics. And when I was graduating from college,

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<v Speaker 4>I got a great opportunity to join a long short

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<v Speaker 4>hedge fund run by Yale history major Dan, who really

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<v Speaker 4>saw how my skill set might translate, and so the

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<v Speaker 4>first book he gave me was Competitive Strategy by Michael Porter.

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<v Speaker 4>So really I went from studying the Grand strategy of

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<v Speaker 4>countries and leaders to companies. That was just a tremendous

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<v Speaker 4>opportunity to learn the craft of investing. The senior analyst

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<v Speaker 4>that the firm was a fellow by the name of

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<v Speaker 4>Sal Khon, who went on to found the con Academy.

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<v Speaker 4>And so I remember just sitting with Sal after work

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<v Speaker 4>many days, seeing him watch him record these videos of

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<v Speaker 4>him tutoring his cousin in math, and really sort of

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<v Speaker 4>grew to appreciate the power of technology, obviously leveraging a

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<v Speaker 4>new model of distribution YouTube to reach a much broader

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<v Speaker 4>audience of millions of people. And the idea of using

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<v Speaker 4>technology as this efficiency driver. You can record something once,

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<v Speaker 4>but obviously the content is forever. And then additionally, I

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<v Speaker 4>think just this idea of scaling by creating value for others.

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<v Speaker 4>You know, dominant companies don't start out that way. Every

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<v Speaker 4>entrepreneur has humble, humble beginnings. UH an idea. You know,

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<v Speaker 4>it requires very hard work.

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<v Speaker 3>So that was a neat experience to see very early

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<v Speaker 3>on in my career.

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<v Speaker 4>And so when Sal left to start kN Academy and

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<v Speaker 4>and Dan retired, I joined the Packard Foundation, which is

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<v Speaker 4>now run by Kim Sargent, a disciple formerly of the

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<v Speaker 4>Yale Endowment, and and there I learned the value of

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<v Speaker 4>long term investing uh and and for the past decade

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<v Speaker 4>I've been at Osterweiss applying sort of what I've learned

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<v Speaker 4>through those three to two former stages of my career.

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<v Speaker 4>First the idea of strategy and competitive advantage, second the

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<v Speaker 4>long term focus, and third this idea of you know,

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<v Speaker 4>how how do these companies start out from from something

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<v Speaker 4>small and scale to become something very significant. So I'm

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<v Speaker 4>very I'm very fascinated by that, and that's what I've

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<v Speaker 4>been applying for the past decade.

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<v Speaker 1>So let's let's kind of dig into the opportunity fund.

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<v Speaker 1>You know, it sounds like you started getting into the philosophy,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, behind the fund strategy. Can you, I guess,

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<v Speaker 1>give us a little bit more about that philosophy that

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<v Speaker 1>you're using, I guess for the investment process of this.

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<v Speaker 4>Yeah, I guess just to take a step back even

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<v Speaker 4>before we kind of talk about the philosophy. I mean,

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<v Speaker 4>why being sort of small caps at all? I think

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<v Speaker 4>it has to do with this, you know, defining characteristic

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<v Speaker 4>of capitalism, right, which is this this what makes America exceptional?

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<v Speaker 3>Right?

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<v Speaker 4>It's innovation and sort of this process of creative destruction

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<v Speaker 4>whereby smaller companies and entrepreneurs come up with newer, more

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<v Speaker 4>innovative ways of doing things, they offer superior value to

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<v Speaker 4>customers and improve lives. So I think, you know, I

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<v Speaker 4>very much believe in that fundamental process. And then if

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<v Speaker 4>we kind of move to active management, right, we firmly

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<v Speaker 4>believe there's there's a value of active in small cap

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<v Speaker 4>And you start with the idea that small cap is inefficient.

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<v Speaker 4>You have a universe of emerging companies with limited analyst coverage.

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<v Speaker 4>So it's certainly an area where active management can add value.

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<v Speaker 4>I think Morgan Stanley did a great study where they

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<v Speaker 4>found the cumulative media and alpha by active managers and

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<v Speaker 4>small cap was nearly sixty percent over the past thirty years. It's,

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<v Speaker 4>you know, very different versus sort of mid MidCap and

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<v Speaker 4>large cap. And then third, similar to private markets, the

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<v Speaker 4>best managers and I'm really talking about sort of the

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<v Speaker 4>top quartile, the top descl can add tremendous value. And

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<v Speaker 4>that's similar to kind of like an institutional investor looking

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<v Speaker 4>at private equity or venture capital. You don't want to

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<v Speaker 4>be in sort of venture capital just for the sake

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<v Speaker 4>of being in venture capital. You really want to be

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<v Speaker 4>in a top quartile type manager. And so those those

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<v Speaker 4>are the things we believe. And if you then layer

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<v Speaker 4>into kind of our strategy, you know, we think we

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<v Speaker 4>have a few key advantages. First, all we do is

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<v Speaker 4>small cap, at least my team of four, we focus

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<v Speaker 4>on this emerging company universe. We happen to be located

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<v Speaker 4>in San Francisco, which obviously gives us a backdoor seat

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<v Speaker 4>to a lot of the innovation, particularly in the tech,

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<v Speaker 4>technology and healthcare sector. Second, our team experience. Again I

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<v Speaker 4>mentioned the four of us as industry specific sector analysts.

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<v Speaker 4>Third and absolute valuation discipline, which I'm sure we'll get

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<v Speaker 4>into later, but every name has to have at least

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<v Speaker 4>one hundred percent upside at the time of our purchase

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<v Speaker 4>over a five year time horizon. We use no more

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<v Speaker 4>than a thirty times pee multiple and our five year

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<v Speaker 4>model estimates. And then finally, fourth, a high conviction portfolio.

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<v Speaker 4>So on average we have about forty names in our portfolios,

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<v Speaker 4>so fairly concentrated. And so what that gives us is

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<v Speaker 4>this portfolio of innovation and growth, but it's also tethered

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<v Speaker 4>to reality and valuations, and we think that's the secret

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<v Speaker 4>sauce to full cycle returns and the alpha that we've

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<v Speaker 4>been able to generate over time.

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<v Speaker 1>So I know quality is an aspect that you're looking for.

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<v Speaker 1>Is there anything that you would you define quality as?

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<v Speaker 1>Any specific characteristics?

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<v Speaker 4>Yeah, I think I think traditional managers would certainly look

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<v Speaker 4>on you know, wide modes, high an uninvested capital, that

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<v Speaker 4>sort of thing. And I think quality has a number

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<v Speaker 4>of different dimensions. As you said, you know, we like

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<v Speaker 4>high return on invested capital businesses just as much as

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<v Speaker 4>everyone else. But I think sometimes the opportunity in this

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<v Speaker 4>emerging company universe is to have a more forward definition

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<v Speaker 4>of quality and sort of, you know it s Gretzky said,

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<v Speaker 4>skating to where the puck is going to be. So

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<v Speaker 4>we're much more forward looking than sort of backward looking.

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<v Speaker 4>So in addition to kind of the playbook of being

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<v Speaker 4>able to buy high return on invested capital businesses when

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<v Speaker 4>they sell off, you know, we want to kind of

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<v Speaker 4>be diving into the mystery of the emerging company universe

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<v Speaker 4>and think about these future, forward looking quality metrics, and so,

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<v Speaker 4>you know, certainly we care about competitive advantage, but I

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<v Speaker 4>think frequently there's an innovation component which we're looking for.

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<v Speaker 4>There's a strong margin expansion component, so we're often focused

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<v Speaker 4>on incremental margin as opposed to just kind of current margin.

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<v Speaker 4>And then we're focused a lot on management, obviously, and

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<v Speaker 4>trying to invest with these entrepreneurial management teams that set

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<v Speaker 4>ambitious objectives but also have a clear plan and track

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<v Speaker 4>record upon which they can execute towards those objectives.

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<v Speaker 2>And you mentioned PES as one of the metrics that

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<v Speaker 2>you use. How do you feel about equity valuations broadly

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<v Speaker 2>and are there any other metrics that you like to

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<v Speaker 2>use for valuing stocks.

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<v Speaker 4>Yeah, our primary valuation metric is long term earnings power,

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<v Speaker 4>and so we have a process we call it this

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<v Speaker 4>anchor point, where we're focused on intrinsic value five years out.

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<v Speaker 4>So we're oftentimes looking, we're trying to understand the unit

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<v Speaker 4>economics of these companies. Everything we do is focused on

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<v Speaker 4>fundamental bottoms up research, and so if you break down

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<v Speaker 4>revenue of any company, right, there's often a volume component

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<v Speaker 4>and a price component. A company can sell a certain

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<v Speaker 4>amount of widgets and charge a certain price per widget,

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<v Speaker 4>and then you layer on the incremental margins. I've on

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<v Speaker 4>the earnings per share target and so upon which we

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<v Speaker 4>applied no more than a thirty times p multiple to

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<v Speaker 4>those five year estimates, and every company to enter the

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<v Speaker 4>portfolio has to have at least one hundred percent upset

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<v Speaker 4>on those on those metrics. So that is the primary

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<v Speaker 4>valuation metric we use. We do look at other relative

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<v Speaker 4>valuation metrics, you know EVD sales, EVD, EBITDA, things like that,

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<v Speaker 4>but the primary metric is really the five year earnings

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<v Speaker 4>power and the intrinsic value of these companies.

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<v Speaker 1>I wanted to do a follow up on you know,

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<v Speaker 1>you were talking about management teams just a few moments ago.

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<v Speaker 1>You know, what are the exact qualities? I know you

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<v Speaker 1>mentioned you know, having ambition and you know having you know,

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<v Speaker 1>good products. Are there any other I guess qualities you

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<v Speaker 1>look for in management teams?

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<v Speaker 3>Yeah?

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<v Speaker 4>Management, I mean it is there's kind of the science

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<v Speaker 4>of investing, and I guess there's the art, right, and

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<v Speaker 4>I think management is much more of an art than

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<v Speaker 4>than a science, uh to to say there's one way

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<v Speaker 4>of managing a companyany Obviously, every company can be very different.

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<v Speaker 4>But I think the best entrepreneurs do tech. If you

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<v Speaker 4>look at just the Magnificent seven for incentra right, I mean,

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<v Speaker 4>the most successful companies were all sort of founder led.

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<v Speaker 4>These these folks who are driven to change the world

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<v Speaker 4>and and and and have been able to scale the

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<v Speaker 4>company's in remarkable ways. I don't I don't think every

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<v Speaker 4>founder has the capability to scale to those levels, obviously,

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<v Speaker 4>but those are the most successful outcomes. But we do,

0:12:30.080 --> 0:12:33.040
<v Speaker 4>we do analyze culture of companies, uh, you know, even

0:12:33.040 --> 0:12:36.000
<v Speaker 4>glassdoor reviews, things like that. We certainly like to take

0:12:36.000 --> 0:12:38.640
<v Speaker 4>advantage of our location, again being in the B area,

0:12:38.760 --> 0:12:43.720
<v Speaker 4>being able to access private companies, venture capitalists, competitors, suppliers,

0:12:44.240 --> 0:12:48.400
<v Speaker 4>kind of the traditional Fisher scuttle butt work, and and

0:12:48.440 --> 0:12:51.240
<v Speaker 4>then ultimately I think somebody once told me the best

0:12:51.240 --> 0:12:55.040
<v Speaker 4>managers do set low expectations.

0:12:54.280 --> 0:12:55.839
<v Speaker 3>And constantly sort of surpass them.

0:12:55.920 --> 0:12:59.120
<v Speaker 4>Right, Not not to say that they're unambitious expectations, but

0:12:59.160 --> 0:13:02.560
<v Speaker 4>if you can consistently kind of outperform relative to the

0:13:02.600 --> 0:13:05.319
<v Speaker 4>expectations you set, that's a very good thing.

0:13:07.360 --> 0:13:10.760
<v Speaker 2>Are there any sectors you currently find particularly compelling? And

0:13:11.440 --> 0:13:13.240
<v Speaker 2>one of the things I've focused on in twenty twenty

0:13:13.240 --> 0:13:15.440
<v Speaker 2>five is the sector rotation that kind of moved away

0:13:15.440 --> 0:13:17.679
<v Speaker 2>from tech, especially in large caps. Do you think that

0:13:17.720 --> 0:13:19.840
<v Speaker 2>could last in twenty twenty five?

0:13:20.600 --> 0:13:21.400
<v Speaker 3>I am hopeful.

0:13:21.600 --> 0:13:24.120
<v Speaker 4>I personally spend a lot of time in the technology sector.

0:13:24.160 --> 0:13:26.560
<v Speaker 4>But you're absolutely correct that when you look at the

0:13:26.640 --> 0:13:29.880
<v Speaker 4>drivers of the s and P five hundred, obviously they're

0:13:29.960 --> 0:13:34.200
<v Speaker 4>very much concentrated in the magnificent seven or eight. One

0:13:34.240 --> 0:13:37.040
<v Speaker 4>of the interesting things about the small cap universes, to

0:13:37.080 --> 0:13:39.120
<v Speaker 4>some extent, we've seen that broadening. So if you look

0:13:39.120 --> 0:13:41.840
<v Speaker 4>at the drivers of the returns in the small cap space.

0:13:42.400 --> 0:13:46.000
<v Speaker 4>It is not solely technology, and certainly for our strategy,

0:13:46.040 --> 0:13:49.680
<v Speaker 4>we've seen great performance in consumer and healthcare and in

0:13:49.679 --> 0:13:52.079
<v Speaker 4>industrials and other sectors. So I think we're already starting

0:13:52.080 --> 0:13:54.520
<v Speaker 4>to see some of that broadening. We haven't seen it

0:13:54.760 --> 0:13:57.160
<v Speaker 4>to the extent in the S and P. Five hundred,

0:13:57.720 --> 0:14:00.160
<v Speaker 4>but I think some of that will depend on, obviously,

0:14:00.200 --> 0:14:05.000
<v Speaker 4>whether technology can maintain its leadership, particularly in AI, and

0:14:05.040 --> 0:14:08.880
<v Speaker 4>whether some of these other sectors can broaden out. Certainly

0:14:09.240 --> 0:14:13.000
<v Speaker 4>with the new administration, that that that there is some

0:14:13.040 --> 0:14:15.240
<v Speaker 4>reason to be supportive of the overall economy.

0:14:16.240 --> 0:14:19.040
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, and it's it's good that you bring up the

0:14:19.080 --> 0:14:19.840
<v Speaker 2>new administration.

0:14:20.080 --> 0:14:20.240
<v Speaker 4>Uh.

0:14:20.400 --> 0:14:23.080
<v Speaker 2>Do you think that any of the election results changed

0:14:23.080 --> 0:14:24.360
<v Speaker 2>any of your investment theses?

0:14:26.440 --> 0:14:27.480
<v Speaker 3>Yeah, yes, and no.

0:14:27.600 --> 0:14:30.320
<v Speaker 4>I mean I think we are much more focused on

0:14:30.400 --> 0:14:35.040
<v Speaker 4>these secular growth themes of technology, healthcare. Uh, you know,

0:14:35.160 --> 0:14:39.000
<v Speaker 4>just just more innovation throughout the economy. Consumer businesses have

0:14:39.280 --> 0:14:42.080
<v Speaker 4>are offering, you know, always offering better value to customers.

0:14:42.120 --> 0:14:45.880
<v Speaker 4>New companies like sweet greens and restaurants along healthier living

0:14:45.920 --> 0:14:49.120
<v Speaker 4>trends or elf and beauty and cosmetics offering sort of

0:14:50.560 --> 0:14:53.600
<v Speaker 4>you know, value at at a good price point. And

0:14:53.680 --> 0:14:56.920
<v Speaker 4>so those those don't tend to be correlated as much,

0:14:57.240 --> 0:15:00.520
<v Speaker 4>uh with sort of administration changes, where you might have

0:15:00.560 --> 0:15:03.640
<v Speaker 4>more cyclical factors of you know, industrials being more in

0:15:03.760 --> 0:15:06.600
<v Speaker 4>or out of favor. But I do think on the margin,

0:15:06.640 --> 0:15:10.880
<v Speaker 4>obviously we're paying attention to tariffs, we're paying attention to

0:15:10.920 --> 0:15:14.480
<v Speaker 4>the drive towards government efficiency. But I think the most

0:15:14.600 --> 0:15:18.320
<v Speaker 4>positive factor with the administration is there does seem to

0:15:18.320 --> 0:15:21.120
<v Speaker 4>be a renewed focus on innovation and technology in general.

0:15:21.560 --> 0:15:23.800
<v Speaker 4>So obviously you have JD. Vance who is formerly a

0:15:23.880 --> 0:15:27.120
<v Speaker 4>venture capitalist. There's reasons to think he might be better

0:15:27.160 --> 0:15:30.200
<v Speaker 4>for little tech as opposed to just big tech, which

0:15:30.200 --> 0:15:33.080
<v Speaker 4>would benefit the small cap space as well as venture capital.

0:15:34.120 --> 0:15:36.240
<v Speaker 4>And you have Elon and and other folks are who

0:15:36.280 --> 0:15:38.880
<v Speaker 4>are driving efficiency and innovation, which I think is good

0:15:38.960 --> 0:15:41.000
<v Speaker 4>good for America and good good for a small cap.

0:15:42.640 --> 0:15:45.080
<v Speaker 2>And I've been really focused on rates, and obviously the

0:15:45.200 --> 0:15:48.200
<v Speaker 2>rate pictures increasingly more up in the air as we

0:15:48.200 --> 0:15:50.240
<v Speaker 2>get into twenty twenty five, but I've been really focused

0:15:50.280 --> 0:15:53.280
<v Speaker 2>on rates as a catalyst for small cap stucks to

0:15:53.360 --> 0:15:54.560
<v Speaker 2>kind of inherrow the gap with the S and P

0:15:54.640 --> 0:15:57.000
<v Speaker 2>five hundred, What do you think the catalysts are for

0:15:57.560 --> 0:15:59.960
<v Speaker 2>you know, maybe a small cap resurgence this year.

0:16:01.960 --> 0:16:02.600
<v Speaker 3>Yeah, I think.

0:16:03.520 --> 0:16:06.200
<v Speaker 4>I think a stabilization in rates is really the key.

0:16:06.280 --> 0:16:10.680
<v Speaker 4>We've never wanted to make explicit bets on rate cuts

0:16:10.720 --> 0:16:13.800
<v Speaker 4>and things like that, although we understand the market does

0:16:13.840 --> 0:16:16.400
<v Speaker 4>that for us and and may have gotten a little

0:16:16.400 --> 0:16:19.520
<v Speaker 4>bit ahead of itself maybe let's say six six months ago,

0:16:19.600 --> 0:16:22.520
<v Speaker 4>But now I think the general consensus will see maybe

0:16:22.560 --> 0:16:27.840
<v Speaker 4>one or zero rate cuts. Again, I think putting putting

0:16:28.440 --> 0:16:31.400
<v Speaker 4>sort of the past five years in context. You know,

0:16:31.560 --> 0:16:33.760
<v Speaker 4>rates on the ten year went from close to zero,

0:16:33.920 --> 0:16:36.480
<v Speaker 4>maybe fifty basis points to four and a half percent,

0:16:37.280 --> 0:16:40.520
<v Speaker 4>and so that was a big headwind for small caps.

0:16:40.520 --> 0:16:42.600
<v Speaker 4>And now I think there's a debate of you know,

0:16:42.640 --> 0:16:45.040
<v Speaker 4>do rates stick down a bit or take up a bit? Again,

0:16:45.240 --> 0:16:47.280
<v Speaker 4>putting putting this all in the context of the past

0:16:47.280 --> 0:16:49.960
<v Speaker 4>five years, I think the most important takeaway is we're

0:16:50.000 --> 0:16:53.000
<v Speaker 4>not nobody's expecting a four or five hundred basis point

0:16:53.040 --> 0:16:55.680
<v Speaker 4>increase in rates, right. We seem to be entering a

0:16:55.680 --> 0:16:59.840
<v Speaker 4>more stabilized period of interest rates broadly, and I think

0:17:00.280 --> 0:17:03.560
<v Speaker 4>along combined with the strong economy, that's going to be

0:17:03.600 --> 0:17:05.960
<v Speaker 4>a very positive thing for small caps.

0:17:06.440 --> 0:17:08.320
<v Speaker 2>And since I talked about it at the beginning of

0:17:08.320 --> 0:17:10.440
<v Speaker 2>the segment, What do you see as the outlook for

0:17:10.560 --> 0:17:13.240
<v Speaker 2>IPO and M and A D see a comeback after

0:17:13.280 --> 0:17:15.600
<v Speaker 2>this really week two year stretch that we've had.

0:17:16.840 --> 0:17:21.239
<v Speaker 4>Certainly so, I think we're already starting to see it.

0:17:21.240 --> 0:17:25.040
<v Speaker 4>We've seen a trickle of technology IPOs, but you're correct

0:17:25.040 --> 0:17:28.440
<v Speaker 4>that following a ro us twenty twenty and twenty twenty one,

0:17:28.520 --> 0:17:32.400
<v Speaker 4>twenty two, twenty three, and twenty four were fairly meager.

0:17:33.160 --> 0:17:34.840
<v Speaker 3>That window is beginning to lift.

0:17:35.040 --> 0:17:39.399
<v Speaker 4>I follow the private technology ecosystem very closely. Supposedly there

0:17:39.400 --> 0:17:43.280
<v Speaker 4>are fifteen hundred private unicorns with valuations of a billion

0:17:43.359 --> 0:17:48.119
<v Speaker 4>or higher, and I think there's been a strike by

0:17:48.160 --> 0:17:53.560
<v Speaker 4>the private markets to really underwrite the lower valuations that

0:17:53.600 --> 0:17:59.120
<v Speaker 4>are necessary in some cases to take those companies public. Obviously,

0:17:59.119 --> 0:18:01.199
<v Speaker 4>many of these companies were funded during a period of

0:18:01.440 --> 0:18:03.600
<v Speaker 4>very low interest rates, and so there's been a disparity

0:18:03.640 --> 0:18:06.960
<v Speaker 4>in terms of private versus public market valuations. I think

0:18:07.040 --> 0:18:13.159
<v Speaker 4>certainly the lower regulatory environment going forward, the certainty of

0:18:13.200 --> 0:18:17.320
<v Speaker 4>the new administration will be positive catalysts for that, and

0:18:17.359 --> 0:18:20.679
<v Speaker 4>I think that's necessary. I think there's been this trend

0:18:20.720 --> 0:18:25.080
<v Speaker 4>of companies staying private for longer. I'm not sure that's

0:18:25.080 --> 0:18:25.679
<v Speaker 4>such such.

0:18:25.560 --> 0:18:26.040
<v Speaker 3>A good thing.

0:18:26.320 --> 0:18:28.440
<v Speaker 4>Uh, And I think I think we'll want to see

0:18:28.880 --> 0:18:31.879
<v Speaker 4>smaller companies come come come public sooner.

0:18:35.080 --> 0:18:38.760
<v Speaker 1>You had mentioned you know the portfolio is pretty concentrated.

0:18:39.440 --> 0:18:43.919
<v Speaker 1>Do you have any I guess things in place to

0:18:44.000 --> 0:18:45.200
<v Speaker 1>manage portfolio risk?

0:18:47.000 --> 0:18:47.680
<v Speaker 3>Yes, I think.

0:18:47.760 --> 0:18:51.000
<v Speaker 4>I think when we look at portfolio risk first and foremost,

0:18:51.040 --> 0:18:54.119
<v Speaker 4>we are we are looking at the the risk of

0:18:54.440 --> 0:18:59.600
<v Speaker 4>losing capital as opposed to to solely volatility. Although you know,

0:19:00.440 --> 0:19:03.440
<v Speaker 4>you can screen our portfolio on sharp ratios and downside

0:19:03.440 --> 0:19:07.840
<v Speaker 4>capture ratios and we happen to look pretty attractive on

0:19:07.920 --> 0:19:09.639
<v Speaker 4>those metrics. I think part of that is due to

0:19:09.680 --> 0:19:16.399
<v Speaker 4>our absolute valuation discipline and our general each company has

0:19:16.400 --> 0:19:18.439
<v Speaker 4>to have at least one hundred percent upside. Again, at

0:19:18.440 --> 0:19:20.040
<v Speaker 4>the time of purchase, we use no more than a

0:19:20.040 --> 0:19:24.840
<v Speaker 4>thirty times pe on those price starting's estimates, and then

0:19:24.880 --> 0:19:27.800
<v Speaker 4>we're generally trimming when the upside falls to fifty percent

0:19:28.760 --> 0:19:31.760
<v Speaker 4>or lower. As opposed to a pure buy and hold manager,

0:19:32.000 --> 0:19:34.800
<v Speaker 4>We're not willing to hold an exceptional company at an

0:19:34.840 --> 0:19:37.760
<v Speaker 4>infinite price, and so we're quite disciplined about that. The

0:19:37.800 --> 0:19:40.560
<v Speaker 4>best companies that stay in the portfolio over multiple years

0:19:40.640 --> 0:19:43.240
<v Speaker 4>have to continuously prove themselves in terms of the upside.

0:19:43.720 --> 0:19:46.360
<v Speaker 4>Otherwise we'll trim and sell the lesser companies as they

0:19:46.400 --> 0:19:50.120
<v Speaker 4>become more fully valued. So our best defense is really

0:19:50.200 --> 0:19:53.879
<v Speaker 4>our knowledge I think of the individual portfolio companies. We

0:19:53.920 --> 0:19:56.200
<v Speaker 4>certainly want to know the key drivers of these companies

0:19:56.680 --> 0:19:59.720
<v Speaker 4>as well or better than anyone else to mitigate the

0:19:59.720 --> 0:20:03.200
<v Speaker 4>constant intration. Though again, we have a five percent max

0:20:03.280 --> 0:20:06.000
<v Speaker 4>position limit, so we're not going to hold companies above

0:20:06.000 --> 0:20:08.320
<v Speaker 4>a five percent weight because we recognize there can be

0:20:08.920 --> 0:20:13.280
<v Speaker 4>additional volatility and risk associated with that. But really it

0:20:13.359 --> 0:20:16.320
<v Speaker 4>is it is our knowledge of these companies and our

0:20:16.359 --> 0:20:17.879
<v Speaker 4>absolute valuation discipline.

0:20:18.080 --> 0:20:20.639
<v Speaker 1>I had one follow up question to that. You mentioned

0:20:20.680 --> 0:20:24.120
<v Speaker 1>trimming companies, and so I'm curious, are there any other

0:20:25.160 --> 0:20:27.919
<v Speaker 1>things you look at? You know, I guess we trigger

0:20:27.960 --> 0:20:31.200
<v Speaker 1>selling the portfolio, not just you know, trimming a company gets.

0:20:31.320 --> 0:20:35.040
<v Speaker 4>Yeah, we sell for one of three reasons, typically one

0:20:35.240 --> 0:20:40.919
<v Speaker 4>the position becomes fully valued, to upgrade to better opportunities,

0:20:41.160 --> 0:20:46.119
<v Speaker 4>or three. I mentioned this anchor points concept we have

0:20:46.280 --> 0:20:49.200
<v Speaker 4>whereby we're really looking out five years into the future

0:20:49.560 --> 0:20:53.000
<v Speaker 4>and trying to anchor it to these estimates of intrinsic.

0:20:52.520 --> 0:20:55.040
<v Speaker 3>Value if those.

0:20:56.359 --> 0:20:59.240
<v Speaker 4>If those companies are failing to meet those objectives over time,

0:20:59.440 --> 0:21:01.760
<v Speaker 4>which does and that's a third reason we sell.

0:21:02.640 --> 0:21:05.720
<v Speaker 2>So I've been following fundamentals for for small caps for

0:21:05.720 --> 0:21:08.240
<v Speaker 2>for some time, and it looks like consensus is very

0:21:08.280 --> 0:21:11.160
<v Speaker 2>weak for the fourth quarter earning season. Are there any

0:21:11.200 --> 0:21:13.840
<v Speaker 2>macro factors you're you're watching that might help turn the

0:21:13.840 --> 0:21:15.120
<v Speaker 2>tide on fundamentals?

0:21:15.680 --> 0:21:18.360
<v Speaker 4>I think interest rates and valuations would be the main

0:21:18.400 --> 0:21:21.879
<v Speaker 4>thing we're focused on, in addition to just company earnings.

0:21:22.560 --> 0:21:25.840
<v Speaker 4>I think, you know, the biggest debate in the market

0:21:25.920 --> 0:21:29.720
<v Speaker 4>right now is technology and AI. I was just at

0:21:30.119 --> 0:21:34.600
<v Speaker 4>a conference the other week, and so I think the

0:21:34.640 --> 0:21:39.040
<v Speaker 4>biggest question in the market right now is you know,

0:21:40.240 --> 0:21:43.000
<v Speaker 4>perhaps AI probably has the most promise of any technology

0:21:43.040 --> 0:21:46.880
<v Speaker 4>we've seen right because it's it's tam unconstrained in terms

0:21:46.880 --> 0:21:49.399
<v Speaker 4>of being able to address labor, labor and services, not

0:21:49.480 --> 0:21:53.920
<v Speaker 4>just tools and software spend. But because of that, it

0:21:54.240 --> 0:21:57.960
<v Speaker 4>can be prone to overhype. And so I think, you know,

0:21:58.000 --> 0:22:00.800
<v Speaker 4>a lot of Fortune one thousand type companies want to

0:22:00.800 --> 0:22:04.560
<v Speaker 4>bet on a technology that's well understood and minimize risk.

0:22:05.200 --> 0:22:09.480
<v Speaker 4>I think with Cloud there was much more, much more

0:22:09.760 --> 0:22:12.639
<v Speaker 4>consensus over the value of cloud, and even then I

0:22:12.640 --> 0:22:16.359
<v Speaker 4>think you saw some companies be resistant for some time.

0:22:17.240 --> 0:22:20.560
<v Speaker 4>So with the risks of hallucinating, you know, I think

0:22:20.600 --> 0:22:23.760
<v Speaker 4>it's hard to see widespread enterprise adoption right now. Certainly

0:22:23.760 --> 0:22:26.440
<v Speaker 4>from a consumer standpoint, it's easier to see adoption there.

0:22:27.200 --> 0:22:30.359
<v Speaker 4>I think another area that folks are wondering about is

0:22:31.160 --> 0:22:35.320
<v Speaker 4>the scaling laws. Right we're quickly exhausting all the data

0:22:35.880 --> 0:22:38.720
<v Speaker 4>upon which we're training these models, and we're using increasingly

0:22:38.760 --> 0:22:42.000
<v Speaker 4>synthetic data and reasoning and trying to see sort of

0:22:42.080 --> 0:22:44.879
<v Speaker 4>how that progresses, as well as well as the return

0:22:44.920 --> 0:22:49.199
<v Speaker 4>on invested capital versus the capex. So these hyperscalers are

0:22:49.200 --> 0:22:53.240
<v Speaker 4>all extremely well funded, the Microsoft's Amazon schools of the world,

0:22:54.200 --> 0:22:57.120
<v Speaker 4>and they can support this capex I think for some time,

0:22:57.160 --> 0:22:59.560
<v Speaker 4>but at a certain point it starts diminishing your free

0:22:59.560 --> 0:23:02.399
<v Speaker 4>cash flow. And so it's striking to me that a

0:23:02.440 --> 0:23:06.080
<v Speaker 4>company like Microsoft is reporting a decline in its free

0:23:06.119 --> 0:23:08.920
<v Speaker 4>cash flow for share this year. I think investors might

0:23:09.000 --> 0:23:12.600
<v Speaker 4>overlook that for a period, but over time, you obviously

0:23:12.680 --> 0:23:14.399
<v Speaker 4>want to see the growth in the free cash flow,

0:23:14.960 --> 0:23:17.280
<v Speaker 4>and so Sequoya put out a good paper I think

0:23:17.359 --> 0:23:21.159
<v Speaker 4>last year on AI's six hundred billion dollar question asking

0:23:21.240 --> 0:23:25.680
<v Speaker 4>whether whether the return on this two hundred billion of Nvidia,

0:23:26.160 --> 0:23:29.439
<v Speaker 4>you know, data data center spend is supported by the

0:23:29.480 --> 0:23:33.240
<v Speaker 4>six hundred billion in revenue software and application revenue, which

0:23:33.280 --> 0:23:35.399
<v Speaker 4>we've yet to seen. So I think that's the biggest

0:23:35.400 --> 0:23:37.480
<v Speaker 4>debate in the market right now. I know that's less

0:23:37.520 --> 0:23:39.840
<v Speaker 4>of a macro factor, but in terms of thinking about

0:23:40.359 --> 0:23:43.960
<v Speaker 4>something I'm watching in terms of secular growth trends, Yeah.

0:23:43.800 --> 0:23:47.320
<v Speaker 2>That's definitely interesting. And did you have any major takeaways

0:23:47.320 --> 0:23:50.040
<v Speaker 2>from the third quarter earning season and is there anything

0:23:50.080 --> 0:23:52.320
<v Speaker 2>you're watching as fourth quarter results start to roll in

0:23:52.359 --> 0:23:53.360
<v Speaker 2>for small cap companies.

0:23:53.520 --> 0:23:57.119
<v Speaker 4>No, I mean, I think it's it's mostly a function

0:23:57.160 --> 0:23:59.440
<v Speaker 4>of what what I just described. I think I think

0:23:59.480 --> 0:24:04.560
<v Speaker 4>we're try to think about the broadening I guess, first

0:24:04.640 --> 0:24:08.280
<v Speaker 4>and foremost what's happening in the technology sector, but second

0:24:08.320 --> 0:24:14.399
<v Speaker 4>also the broadening of the economy, certainly with industrial industrial economy, ism,

0:24:14.880 --> 0:24:17.320
<v Speaker 4>data like that as well. But again, our focus is

0:24:17.359 --> 0:24:20.880
<v Speaker 4>more on secular growth and whether these companies are tracking

0:24:20.960 --> 0:24:24.960
<v Speaker 4>towards these long term anchor points. I think during the

0:24:25.000 --> 0:24:28.200
<v Speaker 4>dot com bubble, Jeff Bezos said it best. I think

0:24:28.200 --> 0:24:31.000
<v Speaker 4>his stock Amazon was down something like eighty ninety percent

0:24:31.040 --> 0:24:35.840
<v Speaker 4>at one point. But he was talking about how by

0:24:35.840 --> 0:24:39.960
<v Speaker 4>any measure, Amazon was stronger than a year ago. Its

0:24:40.000 --> 0:24:42.960
<v Speaker 4>customer account had increased from fourteen million to twenty million,

0:24:43.320 --> 0:24:46.520
<v Speaker 4>its sales had climbed over sixty eight percent, its operating

0:24:46.560 --> 0:24:49.240
<v Speaker 4>loss had narrowed. And so we're trying to think about

0:24:49.920 --> 0:24:53.000
<v Speaker 4>these fundamental metrics in terms of the drivers of unit

0:24:53.040 --> 0:24:56.679
<v Speaker 4>expansion and incremental margins that are creating heavier and heavier

0:24:56.720 --> 0:25:00.440
<v Speaker 4>businesses over time, because in the short term market is

0:25:00.480 --> 0:25:02.200
<v Speaker 4>a voting machine, but in the long term it's a

0:25:02.240 --> 0:25:04.919
<v Speaker 4>weighing machine, and we're trying to invest in these heavier

0:25:04.960 --> 0:25:05.880
<v Speaker 4>companies over time.

0:25:07.160 --> 0:25:12.000
<v Speaker 2>And you mentioned the AI investment maybe not justified by

0:25:12.000 --> 0:25:15.080
<v Speaker 2>the payoff as a risk. Are there any other big

0:25:15.160 --> 0:25:16.840
<v Speaker 2>risks you see the stocks this year?

0:25:18.200 --> 0:25:20.480
<v Speaker 4>Well, certainly, as we touched on that, I think interest

0:25:20.600 --> 0:25:26.880
<v Speaker 4>rates and valuation metrics would be the concern, so that

0:25:26.960 --> 0:25:29.959
<v Speaker 4>those are factors we will be falling. I think the

0:25:30.000 --> 0:25:34.320
<v Speaker 4>market is relatively expensive by traditional metrics. One of the

0:25:34.440 --> 0:25:37.560
<v Speaker 4>encouraging factors on small cap is relative to large cap

0:25:38.080 --> 0:25:43.400
<v Speaker 4>we are undervalued on a relative basis, and certainly small

0:25:43.440 --> 0:25:46.520
<v Speaker 4>caps have underperformed large caps over the past decade. I

0:25:46.520 --> 0:25:50.240
<v Speaker 4>think it's the longest stretch in history. Traditionally, obviously, there's

0:25:50.280 --> 0:25:52.399
<v Speaker 4>been this small cap premium. I think over the past

0:25:52.880 --> 0:25:55.639
<v Speaker 4>ninety seven years, if you invested a dollar in small

0:25:55.680 --> 0:25:57.800
<v Speaker 4>cap versus large cap, you would have ended up with

0:25:58.160 --> 0:26:02.000
<v Speaker 4>over four times your money in small So that hasn't

0:26:02.040 --> 0:26:04.199
<v Speaker 4>been the case for the past decade. There's good reasons

0:26:04.200 --> 0:26:06.840
<v Speaker 4>why that is the case, with the rise of these

0:26:06.840 --> 0:26:11.200
<v Speaker 4>Magnificent seven companies and so forth. But markets trends don't

0:26:11.240 --> 0:26:14.000
<v Speaker 4>tend to last in one direction forever, and we think

0:26:14.040 --> 0:26:17.359
<v Speaker 4>there's a real opportunity for me and reversion here. As

0:26:17.400 --> 0:26:21.320
<v Speaker 4>a small cap has underperformed and the evaluations are relatively cheaper.

0:26:21.800 --> 0:26:26.080
<v Speaker 4>That should bode well as the economy broadens and we

0:26:26.119 --> 0:26:29.919
<v Speaker 4>could see some momentum and small cap and then again, additionally,

0:26:30.040 --> 0:26:32.680
<v Speaker 4>an active manager doesn't have to invest in the whole

0:26:32.720 --> 0:26:34.920
<v Speaker 4>asset class, but we can really invest in the most

0:26:34.960 --> 0:26:38.440
<v Speaker 4>exceptionally well positioned companies within the asset class.

0:26:39.160 --> 0:26:41.520
<v Speaker 1>It would be something to definitely look forward to. But

0:26:41.640 --> 0:26:43.720
<v Speaker 1>before we let you go, we'd love to hear what

0:26:43.760 --> 0:26:46.360
<v Speaker 1>some of your favorite reads are. You know, any financial

0:26:46.720 --> 0:26:48.240
<v Speaker 1>favorite financial books you like?

0:26:48.560 --> 0:26:51.280
<v Speaker 4>Yeah, I began talking a little bit about the Phil

0:26:51.400 --> 0:26:56.119
<v Speaker 4>Fisher scuttle, but type work, you know, attending conferences, industry events,

0:26:56.240 --> 0:26:59.560
<v Speaker 4>expert networks. We mentioned kind of our location here in

0:26:59.600 --> 0:27:03.879
<v Speaker 4>the Bay. I remember one investment we made in a

0:27:03.920 --> 0:27:08.280
<v Speaker 4>software company called Avalara for sales tax collection. Obviously, there's

0:27:08.320 --> 0:27:11.399
<v Speaker 4>only two certain days in life, death and taxes, and

0:27:11.440 --> 0:27:14.480
<v Speaker 4>so I remember going to one of these some of

0:27:14.520 --> 0:27:18.040
<v Speaker 4>these tax tax conferences and hearing from the California Department

0:27:18.119 --> 0:27:21.840
<v Speaker 4>of Tax and Fees that they were expecting additional you know,

0:27:22.160 --> 0:27:24.879
<v Speaker 4>one a half to two billion revenue back in I

0:27:24.880 --> 0:27:27.600
<v Speaker 4>think the twenty eighteen or twenty nineteen time frame, because

0:27:27.640 --> 0:27:31.520
<v Speaker 4>there was a Supreme Court decision called South Dakota versus Wayfair,

0:27:32.480 --> 0:27:36.280
<v Speaker 4>which ruled that it overturned the physical presence requirement where

0:27:36.520 --> 0:27:39.360
<v Speaker 4>if you bought something on Amazon, let's say, from California,

0:27:39.760 --> 0:27:43.200
<v Speaker 4>but it chipped from Texas, Texas couldn't collect state tax

0:27:43.240 --> 0:27:47.040
<v Speaker 4>on that unless the seller had a presence in Texas.

0:27:47.560 --> 0:27:50.200
<v Speaker 3>And so when the Supreme Court court overturned.

0:27:49.760 --> 0:27:53.119
<v Speaker 4>That ruling, there was a huge rush to sort of

0:27:53.200 --> 0:27:56.760
<v Speaker 4>tax a broader jurisdiction. So Avolara was well positioned for

0:27:56.840 --> 0:28:00.199
<v Speaker 4>that trend and so the scuttle butt I mentioned in

0:28:00.280 --> 0:28:02.960
<v Speaker 4>terms of that primary due diligence really is the craft

0:28:03.359 --> 0:28:06.520
<v Speaker 4>of small cap investing, and Phil Fisher very much pioneered

0:28:06.520 --> 0:28:09.919
<v Speaker 4>that with his book Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits. I

0:28:09.920 --> 0:28:13.159
<v Speaker 4>think one of the questions he always asks management teams

0:28:13.240 --> 0:28:15.760
<v Speaker 4>is what are you doing that your competitors aren't doing right,

0:28:16.119 --> 0:28:20.600
<v Speaker 4>because you really have to sustain innovation to drive future

0:28:20.600 --> 0:28:23.760
<v Speaker 4>appreciation in your business. And then the second book, I

0:28:23.800 --> 0:28:28.320
<v Speaker 4>think is a book called Seven Powers by Hamilton Helmer,

0:28:29.000 --> 0:28:32.400
<v Speaker 4>and it's a little bit an extension of Clay Christensen's

0:28:32.440 --> 0:28:35.800
<v Speaker 4>work on the innovator's dilemma, but he has a concept

0:28:35.840 --> 0:28:38.920
<v Speaker 4>called counter positioning which is very very powerful in small

0:28:38.960 --> 0:28:42.640
<v Speaker 4>cap and a classic example I think is Netflix versus Blockbuster.

0:28:43.840 --> 0:28:47.040
<v Speaker 4>So when you look at Blockbuster's business, they were challenged

0:28:47.280 --> 0:28:49.920
<v Speaker 4>in a couple different ways, not only with sort of

0:28:49.920 --> 0:28:53.680
<v Speaker 4>the internet distribution model changing that from brick and mortar,

0:28:54.160 --> 0:28:56.360
<v Speaker 4>but also if you looked back at their business, I

0:28:56.400 --> 0:28:59.640
<v Speaker 4>think a substantial chunk of their income was derived from

0:28:59.680 --> 0:29:02.320
<v Speaker 4>late ease, and so when you had a newer incumbent

0:29:02.400 --> 0:29:07.360
<v Speaker 4>like Netflix rise, they were able to compete in a

0:29:07.360 --> 0:29:10.400
<v Speaker 4>way that Blockbuster was really powerless to sort of respond

0:29:10.440 --> 0:29:13.880
<v Speaker 4>to because to compete they had to not only change

0:29:13.880 --> 0:29:17.840
<v Speaker 4>their business model in terms of the generation from late fees,

0:29:18.400 --> 0:29:20.880
<v Speaker 4>but also the brick and mortar model to Internet. And

0:29:20.920 --> 0:29:24.680
<v Speaker 4>so we like this idea. But whereby new companies can

0:29:24.720 --> 0:29:27.720
<v Speaker 4>counterposition against legacy incumbents.

0:29:27.280 --> 0:29:29.600
<v Speaker 1>That's an interesting point. I guess I never really thought about,

0:29:30.080 --> 0:29:32.360
<v Speaker 1>you know, all those nights, you know, going to Blockbuster

0:29:32.480 --> 0:29:35.320
<v Speaker 1>years ago, the late fees drove so much of their revenue,

0:29:35.360 --> 0:29:38.320
<v Speaker 1>but definitely makes sense. This is great, Brian, thank you

0:29:38.320 --> 0:29:41.480
<v Speaker 1>so much for joining us today. Thank you, Mike, thanks

0:29:41.520 --> 0:29:43.360
<v Speaker 1>again for being my co host today.

0:29:43.600 --> 0:29:44.160
<v Speaker 2>Thank you both.

0:29:44.600 --> 0:29:47.360
<v Speaker 1>Until our next episode, this is David Cohne with Inside

0:29:47.360 --> 0:29:47.560
<v Speaker 1>Out

0:30:00.320 --> 0:30:00.760
<v Speaker 4>Four No.