WEBVTT - Give Me Liberty or Unplug Me 0:00:00.160 --> 0:00:07.440 Brought to you by Toyota. Let's go places. Welcome to 0:00:07.600 --> 0:00:14.480 Forward Thinking. Hey, they're and welcomed to Forward Thinking, the 0:00:14.520 --> 0:00:16.840 podcast that looks in the future and says, long ago, 0:00:16.920 --> 0:00:19.759 in another galaxy, there lived a robot. His name was Marvin. 0:00:20.000 --> 0:00:23.600 I'm Jonathan Strickland and I'm Joe McCormick. And today we're 0:00:23.600 --> 0:00:28.080 gonna talk about robots. We love talking about robots. Yeah, 0:00:30.160 --> 0:00:32.760 that's what we're talking about today, robot rights. The idea 0:00:32.840 --> 0:00:35.479 of this this is something that we we've seen a 0:00:35.479 --> 0:00:38.360 lot of science fiction, right, especially as a MOOV and 0:00:38.400 --> 0:00:42.200 that kind of uh type of science fiction, This idea 0:00:42.280 --> 0:00:47.320 of developing creatures that have some form of artificial or 0:00:47.360 --> 0:00:52.720 synthetic intelligence and therefore have some sort of sense of self. 0:00:53.200 --> 0:00:56.040 And does that at that point mean that we as 0:00:56.120 --> 0:00:59.400 human beings should treat these machines as if they were 0:00:59.440 --> 0:01:03.720 living things, and intelligent living things for that right, rather 0:01:03.800 --> 0:01:06.440 than just tools. Yeah. Usually in science fiction it's used 0:01:06.480 --> 0:01:10.279 as a parallel to classism or racism or other issues. 0:01:10.319 --> 0:01:13.800 That's actually slavery, that's actually talking about humans. But we're 0:01:13.840 --> 0:01:17.080 working towards this incredible future or kind of incredible present 0:01:17.160 --> 0:01:21.000 where we might actually have physical robots. Yeah, it's funny 0:01:21.040 --> 0:01:25.520 because the metaphor has sort of become a literal question. 0:01:25.959 --> 0:01:29.440 I mean, there's no question now that all humans should 0:01:29.520 --> 0:01:33.120 have the same rights in most civilized human place, at 0:01:33.160 --> 0:01:37.679 least we think so. But but so the robots that 0:01:37.720 --> 0:01:40.720 we've used to illustrate this problem before, and now we 0:01:40.760 --> 0:01:45.160 have to start wondering, like, um, do they have rights 0:01:45.440 --> 0:01:48.880 in the same way human doesn't. That seems on on 0:01:48.880 --> 0:01:51.080 one hand it's like kind of easy. It's like, no, 0:01:51.280 --> 0:01:53.720 their machines. But I think we should think about this 0:01:53.760 --> 0:01:56.240 a little more carefully. Sure, And first of all, I mean, 0:01:56.280 --> 0:01:58.440 I guess it's it's good to point out the word 0:01:58.600 --> 0:02:01.760 robot comes from a check word, which essentially means slave. 0:02:02.400 --> 0:02:05.520 So when we're talking about robots that that does show them. 0:02:05.520 --> 0:02:07.600 I mean, when science fiction writers were writing these stories 0:02:07.640 --> 0:02:12.040 about robots, it really was a a kind of a 0:02:12.120 --> 0:02:15.839 way of talking about human rights and slavery and not 0:02:16.000 --> 0:02:21.840 just like, at what point do machines uh merit rights? 0:02:21.880 --> 0:02:26.359 But also are which rights humans? Yeah? Are our rights universal? 0:02:26.480 --> 0:02:29.400 United Nations would say, yes, there are some universal rights 0:02:29.440 --> 0:02:36.320 that all humans are you should possess. They like, well, yeah, 0:02:36.560 --> 0:02:40.520 let's start with the concept of rights and um and 0:02:40.560 --> 0:02:44.560 talking about what gets them. So there are material entities 0:02:44.600 --> 0:02:48.880 that do get rights, for example humans, and then there 0:02:48.880 --> 0:02:52.160 are material entities that we're pretty sure don't get rights, 0:02:52.440 --> 0:02:59.160 like bananas, yeah, or or let's say rocks. Sure okay, 0:02:59.400 --> 0:03:02.560 but but but in between their cute puppies. Yeah, where 0:03:02.600 --> 0:03:04.640 to cute puppies fall on the scale? Well, I think 0:03:04.800 --> 0:03:08.600 most people around us would say that the cute puppy 0:03:08.680 --> 0:03:10.960 has not as many rights as a human, but more 0:03:11.080 --> 0:03:13.840 rights than a rock. Yeah, there's a there's a hierarchy. 0:03:14.520 --> 0:03:16.480 I don't know if you got the memo or not, 0:03:16.639 --> 0:03:20.079 but I've got the whole list here. Cute puppies are 0:03:20.160 --> 0:03:24.079 just below cats, and that's only since the World Wide Web. 0:03:26.160 --> 0:03:29.440 For that, cute puppies were ruling the roost, but cats 0:03:29.440 --> 0:03:32.359 have really taken over since the rise of the web. Okay, Well, 0:03:32.400 --> 0:03:35.640 we've just sort of used our intuitions to say what 0:03:35.720 --> 0:03:38.240 we think have rights, and that like some types of 0:03:38.360 --> 0:03:41.120 entities have more rights than others. Humans have more than animals, 0:03:41.160 --> 0:03:45.320 Animals have more than plants, Plants have more than Yeah, 0:03:45.400 --> 0:03:47.680 maybe you might plants. Plants might be in there somewhere 0:03:47.800 --> 0:03:51.120 we don't know. Well, let's try to flush this out 0:03:51.160 --> 0:03:53.880 and say what is the actual rubric we're using, because 0:03:53.920 --> 0:03:55.840 if we if we hone in on that, that might 0:03:55.840 --> 0:03:59.400 help us decide whether or not an intelligent seeming robot 0:03:59.480 --> 0:04:02.480 should have right. So what what is it that makes 0:04:02.520 --> 0:04:07.440 a human have rights? Well, for one thing, there's this 0:04:07.560 --> 0:04:12.600 concept of life, right, just just the concept of life itself. Uh, 0:04:12.640 --> 0:04:16.080 And to define life is a little tricky. Even if 0:04:16.120 --> 0:04:18.400 you go with the scientific definition, it tends to be tricky. 0:04:18.440 --> 0:04:22.039 For example, one definition here is the condition that distinguishes 0:04:22.120 --> 0:04:25.680 animals and plants from inorganic matter. Okay, well, all right, 0:04:25.680 --> 0:04:29.640 we've got that. So it's whatever whatever makes organic stuff 0:04:29.680 --> 0:04:32.839 different from inorganic that's life. To go further, it says 0:04:32.880 --> 0:04:37.960 including the capacity for growth, reproduction, functional activity, and continual 0:04:38.080 --> 0:04:41.640 change preceding death. Now, there are people who have argued 0:04:42.120 --> 0:04:45.039 that this does this is while a pretty good definition, 0:04:45.400 --> 0:04:48.600 is still really kind of fuzzy because there's some things 0:04:48.680 --> 0:04:51.360 out there that seem to at least adhere to some 0:04:51.440 --> 0:04:54.560 of this, but it's hard to define it as being alive. 0:04:54.600 --> 0:04:58.360 For example, a virus. That's difficult because it it has 0:04:58.520 --> 0:05:01.600 some of these properties, but other things make it seem 0:05:01.680 --> 0:05:04.720 like it's not really life as we define other types 0:05:04.760 --> 0:05:07.039 of life. But then there are other things entirely that 0:05:07.160 --> 0:05:10.360 seemed to behave to these rules, but we would never 0:05:10.400 --> 0:05:15.200 call them alive. Like fire, fire it does it? Does 0:05:15.200 --> 0:05:17.800 it grow? Yes? If it has fuel, it will continue 0:05:17.839 --> 0:05:21.920 to grow. Does it reproduce, Yes, it can reproduce. Does 0:05:21.960 --> 0:05:23.760 it have a functional activity? Well, I guess you could 0:05:23.760 --> 0:05:27.279 call burning, uh, continual change perceeding death. Yes, that also 0:05:27.360 --> 0:05:29.840 can be the case. These are things that you know, 0:05:29.880 --> 0:05:32.520 if you were to just use that that line of reasoning, 0:05:32.560 --> 0:05:35.440 you might say fire is alive. It seems to behave 0:05:35.480 --> 0:05:37.520 as if it were alive, But we do not define 0:05:37.560 --> 0:05:40.440 that as being alive. So just defining whether or not 0:05:40.480 --> 0:05:43.360 something is alive is already tricky. And we haven't even 0:05:43.440 --> 0:05:46.400 gotten too robots yet. Well, but so you know, and 0:05:46.400 --> 0:05:49.680 then and then you get into the psychology or the 0:05:49.680 --> 0:05:53.400 the ethics, the morality of what life is, and and 0:05:53.440 --> 0:05:56.520 that's when you start thinking about, well, it's something alive 0:05:56.560 --> 0:06:00.440 when it has consciousness or when it has self consciousness, 0:06:00.480 --> 0:06:03.560 and where on the hierarchy did those qualities fall. Yeah, 0:06:03.600 --> 0:06:06.240 I'd like to talk a bit about consciousness because I'm 0:06:06.320 --> 0:06:12.360 skeptical about life as a as a definition. I'm sorry 0:06:12.400 --> 0:06:15.840 I didn't continue listening to their full thought. Well, I mean, 0:06:15.839 --> 0:06:19.960 obviously we don't really particularly seem to think bacteria have rights. 0:06:20.000 --> 0:06:24.360 I mean that seems they don't get a lot of 0:06:24.440 --> 0:06:27.680 voice in the polls. No, And so there seems to 0:06:27.720 --> 0:06:31.159 be a trend that for some reason, like a dog 0:06:31.279 --> 0:06:34.960 has more rights than bacteria and humans have more rights 0:06:34.960 --> 0:06:37.960 than dogs. Um, so maybe it has something to do 0:06:38.000 --> 0:06:41.480 with the obvious thing that establishes this hierarchy, which is 0:06:41.520 --> 0:06:46.599 intelligence or which again is very difficult to define. Yeah. Um, 0:06:46.640 --> 0:06:50.599 but then again, we wouldn't want to create substrate to 0:06:50.640 --> 0:06:52.800 say like, if you're a smarter human, you should have 0:06:52.839 --> 0:06:55.960 more than a less intelligent human. That's clearly wrong, although 0:06:55.960 --> 0:06:57.520 I do want to see a Star Trek episode about 0:06:57.520 --> 0:07:00.560 that if one does not already exist. Yeah, oh sure, yeah, 0:07:00.640 --> 0:07:03.320 that makes sense where the crew because it's a planet 0:07:03.400 --> 0:07:06.160 where people who are smarter have more rights than people 0:07:06.200 --> 0:07:08.680 who are less smart. I can totally see that. Okay, 0:07:08.720 --> 0:07:12.120 so there's there's a hierarchy established by something having to 0:07:12.160 --> 0:07:15.240 do with our minds. But it shouldn't just be like 0:07:15.280 --> 0:07:19.160 how smart you are, So maybe there's a hierarchy based 0:07:19.200 --> 0:07:23.880 on whether or not you seem to have something called consciousness. Again, 0:07:23.960 --> 0:07:27.080 difficult to define, difficult to define, but it's we're going 0:07:27.120 --> 0:07:29.680 to have to try to deal with it. Okay. So 0:07:29.760 --> 0:07:33.320 what is consciousness? I think the best way to describe 0:07:33.320 --> 0:07:38.720 it is um the experience of being like something. Okay. 0:07:39.000 --> 0:07:43.680 So there's an experience of being you, and we only 0:07:43.800 --> 0:07:46.720 know we know that it exists because we each have it. 0:07:47.080 --> 0:07:50.560 We have our individual experience of being right. So we 0:07:50.600 --> 0:07:54.400 know that there's at least one consciousness in the world, yes, 0:07:54.520 --> 0:07:59.040 which may only be ourselves. Yeah, we assume that all 0:07:59.080 --> 0:08:02.200 the other humans of consciousness. This is something that Touring 0:08:02.320 --> 0:08:05.160 was talking about, right Alan Touring when he was setting 0:08:05.240 --> 0:08:08.440 up his his thought experiment, the Touring Test. So this 0:08:08.520 --> 0:08:10.520 is a concept where what Joe is talking about is 0:08:10.520 --> 0:08:15.360 that Joe knows that he possesses this thing called consciousness 0:08:15.400 --> 0:08:18.240 because there's a there's an experience of being me, right, 0:08:18.560 --> 0:08:21.440 But Joe is the only person who has had that experience. I, 0:08:21.680 --> 0:08:24.920 Jonathan have not had the experience of being Joe. So 0:08:25.120 --> 0:08:27.120 I've had the experience of being Jonathan. I know that 0:08:27.240 --> 0:08:31.840 Jonathan possesses consciousness because that's me. However, I don't know. 0:08:32.160 --> 0:08:35.160 As an I cannot know because I cannot be Joe. 0:08:35.240 --> 0:08:38.760 I cannot know for certain that Joe possesses consciousness. And 0:08:38.920 --> 0:08:41.760 some philosophers have said this, this is straight up impossible. 0:08:42.120 --> 0:08:45.719 You can never experience anything outside of yourself yourself, right, 0:08:45.760 --> 0:08:49.079 So in that sense, Uh, what happens is I make 0:08:49.120 --> 0:08:52.800 an assumption. I assume that because Joe is a human 0:08:52.800 --> 0:08:55.200 being and I too am a human being, and that 0:08:55.320 --> 0:08:57.840 Joe seems to possess the same sort of qualities that 0:08:57.880 --> 0:09:01.839 I possess, that among those quality is consciousness, and that 0:09:01.920 --> 0:09:05.680 Joe in fact possesses it, but I cannot know that 0:09:05.720 --> 0:09:08.640 for certain. It also helps that I can tell you 0:09:08.679 --> 0:09:11.960 I have consciousness. Sure, that's no way to know for sure, 0:09:12.080 --> 0:09:14.520 but that seems to add to the idea like if 0:09:14.559 --> 0:09:18.680 you things that tests to be conscious are probably more 0:09:18.720 --> 0:09:23.000 more likely to be conscious, for you're hallucinating, but or 0:09:23.040 --> 0:09:26.160 you're talking to a computer program. This brings us to touring, right, 0:09:26.240 --> 0:09:28.920 So what Touring said was that with the touring test, 0:09:29.080 --> 0:09:31.959 this idea that you would sit down at a terminal 0:09:32.160 --> 0:09:35.000 and you would have a conversation, and that conversation might 0:09:35.040 --> 0:09:37.280 be with another human being who is also on another 0:09:37.400 --> 0:09:39.480 terminal typing it out to you, or it might be 0:09:39.520 --> 0:09:42.839 a computer program that's just generating responses. If you are 0:09:42.960 --> 0:09:46.600 unable to tell the difference reliably whether that's a human 0:09:46.600 --> 0:09:51.000 being or a computer program, you might as well say 0:09:51.200 --> 0:09:54.440 the computer program possesses consciousness. It seems to possess the 0:09:54.480 --> 0:09:57.280 same qualities you do. And while I would go ahead 0:09:57.360 --> 0:09:59.880 and say to Joe, Joe, I assume you have consciousness, 0:09:59.880 --> 0:10:02.280 But because you appear to do the same things I do, 0:10:02.600 --> 0:10:05.720 why would I not extend the same courtesy to a 0:10:05.760 --> 0:10:09.680 piece of software that appears to do the same thing. Again, 0:10:09.760 --> 0:10:13.640 Touring is saying, it doesn't matter really if the program 0:10:13.679 --> 0:10:17.760 actually is conscious. It just matters that it appears to 0:10:17.800 --> 0:10:22.720 be conscious, because you can't tell the difference. Joe appears 0:10:22.760 --> 0:10:25.880 to be conscious, so I assume that that's one thing 0:10:25.920 --> 0:10:30.199 he possesses. Lauren appears to be also conscious right now 0:10:30.400 --> 0:10:32.720 because she had caffeine before we came in here. But 0:10:32.920 --> 0:10:35.839 give it a few more minutes of her listening to me. Yeah, well, 0:10:36.280 --> 0:10:39.040 the two of us together are lulling her into a 0:10:39.080 --> 0:10:44.120 gentle dreamland. Okay, so uh, this idea of consciousness is 0:10:44.200 --> 0:10:49.079 relevant to the idea of robot rights because consciousness may 0:10:49.200 --> 0:10:54.240 very well formed the basis of who we decide gets rights. Um. 0:10:54.480 --> 0:10:58.400 I because I have consciousness, I have things that I 0:10:58.480 --> 0:11:01.839 want and things that I don't want. So I want freedom, 0:11:01.880 --> 0:11:06.319 I want safety, UM. I want bodily integrity. I don't 0:11:06.320 --> 0:11:10.360 want to be worked to death, you know, stuff like that. Um. 0:11:10.480 --> 0:11:13.560 And so because I want these things, I assume other 0:11:14.080 --> 0:11:18.440 humans that uh, you know, have brains want these things also, 0:11:18.640 --> 0:11:20.920 and thus I wouldn't want it done to me. I 0:11:21.000 --> 0:11:23.679 assume they don't want it done to them, and thus 0:11:23.960 --> 0:11:26.840 humans deserve rights. Right. You can you can at least 0:11:26.840 --> 0:11:30.679 feel sympathy toward other human beings, if not empathy. If 0:11:30.720 --> 0:11:33.960 not empathy, uh Now, empathy is one of those things 0:11:33.960 --> 0:11:36.559 that we'll talk about, especially when it gets to robots, 0:11:36.600 --> 0:11:40.640 because empathy requires sort of a two way interaction. And 0:11:40.679 --> 0:11:43.880 so there's certain things that you can feel sympathy toward, 0:11:44.040 --> 0:11:47.240 but you cannot feel empathy toward because because their experience 0:11:47.280 --> 0:11:50.520 is intrinsically different than your own, or they're not experiencing anything, 0:11:50.760 --> 0:11:54.400 for example, something that's truly inanimate. There you can feel 0:11:54.640 --> 0:11:57.920 sympathy toward inanimate objects, but not necessarily empathy. But that's 0:11:57.960 --> 0:12:01.520 the question. Actually, we feel ad about, say, working a 0:12:01.600 --> 0:12:03.880 human to death. We know that should not be done, right, 0:12:03.960 --> 0:12:06.400 but we shouldn't. But we don't feel bad about working 0:12:06.440 --> 0:12:10.000 a car engine to death, right, Um, because we assume 0:12:10.080 --> 0:12:13.439 that the car engine does not actually have an experience 0:12:13.480 --> 0:12:16.920 of being where it wants to survive and doesn't want 0:12:17.000 --> 0:12:19.680 to be, you know, work to death, and it wants 0:12:19.679 --> 0:12:22.000 to have freedom. I mean that that just seems silly 0:12:22.000 --> 0:12:24.880 to us. But it would be like crushing a piece 0:12:24.920 --> 0:12:27.480 of ice, Like you don't feel badly for the ice, 0:12:27.800 --> 0:12:31.560 but who knows, maybe we should. Because there are actually 0:12:31.640 --> 0:12:35.319 a couple of ideas about where consciousness comes from. Do 0:12:35.320 --> 0:12:39.199 you ever think about what is the cause of consciousness? Yeah, 0:12:39.240 --> 0:12:45.040 there's actually tons of tons of interesting philosophical there's philosophical debate. 0:12:45.320 --> 0:12:49.400 Then you have the the the like you have neurologists 0:12:49.400 --> 0:12:52.760 who take a much more uh you know, physical approach 0:12:52.840 --> 0:12:57.080 to consciousness. There's a lot of talk about it. Well okay, so, um, 0:12:57.320 --> 0:12:59.920 unless you could start on one hand by saying that 0:13:00.040 --> 0:13:02.400 some people, of course will probably take like a supernatural 0:13:02.480 --> 0:13:05.520 view and they'd say that that a soul is responsible 0:13:05.600 --> 0:13:09.199 for consciousness or something like that. Um, you know who. 0:13:09.320 --> 0:13:11.280 That may be true, but there's no way to show it. 0:13:11.600 --> 0:13:15.320 That's that's not scientific, not not meaning that it's wrong, 0:13:15.400 --> 0:13:18.360 but rather than there's no way to test for it, right, um, 0:13:18.440 --> 0:13:21.840 So if if that's true, we just don't know. Um. 0:13:22.120 --> 0:13:26.280 But there are other options of ideas about how consciousness 0:13:26.360 --> 0:13:30.560 could come about in a physical universe physically. One idea 0:13:30.760 --> 0:13:34.760 is this idea of emergent is um, which is that 0:13:35.040 --> 0:13:41.040 consciousness is not present in say, individual neurons, but only 0:13:41.080 --> 0:13:44.840 arises as a phenomenon that is somehow more than the 0:13:44.960 --> 0:13:48.600 sum of the brains parts um. And in this case, 0:13:48.640 --> 0:13:51.960 it would be basically the idea that the more complex 0:13:52.080 --> 0:13:57.440 brains become, the higher states of consciousness they achieve. Um. 0:13:57.640 --> 0:14:01.960 So that's one idea, it's an emergent property of complex brains. 0:14:02.000 --> 0:14:06.400 But there are questions that come from that, say like, um, okay, 0:14:06.480 --> 0:14:10.040 well you have this idea that something's building up towards consciousness, 0:14:10.040 --> 0:14:13.280 Well what is it building with? And when you ask 0:14:13.480 --> 0:14:16.880 that question you get to a really interesting philosophy, the 0:14:16.960 --> 0:14:19.560 idea of pan psychism. Have y all heard of this? 0:14:19.960 --> 0:14:24.800 I have none. Pan Psychism is the proposal that the 0:14:24.920 --> 0:14:30.440 universe inherently has mind within it that all matter, even 0:14:30.600 --> 0:14:36.960 inanimate objects, may contain units of consciousness, so that there 0:14:37.200 --> 0:14:40.880 is such thing as the experience of being a rock 0:14:41.360 --> 0:14:44.720 or a pile of sand. This sounds an awful lot 0:14:44.760 --> 0:14:47.200 to me, like like a phenomenon that I was reading 0:14:47.240 --> 0:14:54.040 about in psychological research called um phenomenal logical intersubjectivity, which basically, 0:14:54.080 --> 0:14:57.400 I mean is a necessarily long word that basically means 0:14:57.440 --> 0:14:59.800 that that because humans can only know for certain what 0:14:59.840 --> 0:15:02.480 it is to be human, that we use this base 0:15:02.520 --> 0:15:06.680 of experience to evaluate and consider non human agents. Yeah, 0:15:06.760 --> 0:15:11.480 there's a similar thing in literary circles called the pathetic fallacy, 0:15:11.680 --> 0:15:15.080 not being pathetic, but rather that you are, in this 0:15:15.120 --> 0:15:19.240 case talking about emotion. You're talking about the imbuing emotion 0:15:19.400 --> 0:15:23.400 upon things that, as far as we know, are incapable 0:15:23.520 --> 0:15:26.080 of actually feeling emotion, but that it's similar but not 0:15:26.120 --> 0:15:28.120 the same thing. Well, but there you're starting with the 0:15:28.160 --> 0:15:30.280 assumption that this is false. I mean, this is the 0:15:30.320 --> 0:15:33.760 proposal is that this may actually be true, And I 0:15:33.760 --> 0:15:36.640 don't think it's fair to dismiss this idea out of hand. 0:15:36.640 --> 0:15:40.720 There's actually an interesting philosopher named Galen Strawson UM and 0:15:40.800 --> 0:15:43.760 he's got the idea. He says basically, Um, if you 0:15:43.840 --> 0:15:47.360 accept that the nature of reality is physical and the 0:15:47.400 --> 0:15:50.920 consciousness is a feature of the physical world, you should 0:15:50.920 --> 0:15:54.760 accept the idea that units of consciousness are in his words, 0:15:55.280 --> 0:15:59.640 literally physical like an electric charge. Well, that might be so, 0:15:59.680 --> 0:16:02.360 but I would think that that's also possible that it's 0:16:02.400 --> 0:16:06.120 a manifestation of very specific types of matter. In other words, 0:16:06.360 --> 0:16:08.960 types of matter like mural cells, that would be a 0:16:09.000 --> 0:16:12.640 manifestation of consciousness. But if you're talking about just you know, 0:16:12.680 --> 0:16:16.120 a collection of iron atoms, that might not be so. 0:16:16.200 --> 0:16:19.600 While you may still physical basis, it's still an interesting 0:16:19.640 --> 0:16:21.480 I mean, you know, I can see the argument that 0:16:21.560 --> 0:16:24.120 the same way that we know that gravitons exist, but 0:16:24.200 --> 0:16:26.800 that we don't know what they are, what they do, 0:16:26.920 --> 0:16:31.640 that perhaps there's a conscious netron that um probably wouldn't 0:16:31.640 --> 0:16:33.120 be called that, but you know, but but it's some 0:16:33.200 --> 0:16:38.520 kind of quantum unit of of ideation. Um. Yeah. I 0:16:39.040 --> 0:16:41.320 think the issue with this is I think it's a 0:16:41.360 --> 0:16:45.600 really interesting idea, and it's because of the same problem, 0:16:45.640 --> 0:16:49.640 the Turing problem we've talked about. It's just impossible to test, 0:16:49.760 --> 0:16:56.160 which means it's not scientific against philosophy, it's not scientific course, 0:16:56.800 --> 0:17:00.840 neither is it scientific to say that rocks don't have mind? Well, no, 0:17:01.040 --> 0:17:03.760 unless you are. What you would have to do is 0:17:03.880 --> 0:17:07.080 prove that rocks do have mind. That would be scientific, 0:17:07.560 --> 0:17:09.960 it's so, But you wouldn't be able to do that either, 0:17:10.280 --> 0:17:14.640 but I mean not using this approach. So so that's 0:17:14.680 --> 0:17:16.520 the See, this is one of the things where it's 0:17:16.520 --> 0:17:19.840 an interesting thought experiment. It's it's the same problem I 0:17:19.840 --> 0:17:22.720 have with a lot of philosophy is that ultimately there's 0:17:22.840 --> 0:17:26.639 not a whole lot you can do practically with this 0:17:26.760 --> 0:17:28.639 sort of idea. Yeah, it's just like, well, that's an 0:17:28.640 --> 0:17:33.720 interesting idea. Moving on, What you could do is uh 0:17:34.000 --> 0:17:38.200 is sort of like tested against propositions that are brought 0:17:38.240 --> 0:17:42.280 up by other by actual induction, by forms of experimentation 0:17:42.359 --> 0:17:44.359 and stuff like that. Principles that we know to be 0:17:44.400 --> 0:17:47.920 true in one way or another. Maybe we can test 0:17:47.960 --> 0:17:50.840 whether or not this idea is consistent with them or not. 0:17:51.560 --> 0:17:55.440 Um yeah, still it's difficult to tell. But anyway, that 0:17:55.560 --> 0:17:58.480 the point of this is ideas like this I think 0:17:58.560 --> 0:18:04.040 make it not so necessarily obvious that robots don't have 0:18:04.080 --> 0:18:07.840 an experience of being, even if you believe in in 0:18:08.000 --> 0:18:11.960 say the emergent theory of consciousness. Well, I don't know. 0:18:12.080 --> 0:18:17.959 When you create an intensely complicated neural network through you know, 0:18:18.040 --> 0:18:23.000 of of a simulated robot brain, are you perhaps creating 0:18:23.119 --> 0:18:27.440 an emergent phenomenon of experience. Well, the other argument I 0:18:27.440 --> 0:18:32.199 would make about this is that, uh, the even if, 0:18:32.320 --> 0:18:35.320 even if you were to create some form of consciousness, 0:18:35.359 --> 0:18:37.639 let's assume that there is a basic unit of consciousness, 0:18:37.760 --> 0:18:41.960 that everything has some sort of element of this, you 0:18:42.080 --> 0:18:48.560 cannot then extend the assumption that that experiences anything remotely 0:18:48.640 --> 0:18:51.000 like the human experience. No, not at all. So here's 0:18:51.040 --> 0:18:54.040 the when you start talking about rights, what we're basing 0:18:54.080 --> 0:18:56.239 that on as human rights, you can even assume that 0:18:56.359 --> 0:18:59.560 my experiences like yours, though we're back to the problem 0:18:59.600 --> 0:19:02.200 we started with, no trapped in your experience. If we're 0:19:02.240 --> 0:19:04.560 able to have a conversation, we can at least find 0:19:04.920 --> 0:19:10.800 ground where we seem to share some form of commonality. Right. So, now, 0:19:10.840 --> 0:19:14.440 if we're talking about a a an object, that apparently 0:19:14.960 --> 0:19:19.240 that that may or may not possess this basic element. Again, 0:19:19.280 --> 0:19:22.200 since you cannot assume that that is at all remotely 0:19:22.240 --> 0:19:25.560 analogous to the human experience. When it comes to talking 0:19:25.560 --> 0:19:28.840 about rights. It's kind of a moot point anyway, because 0:19:28.880 --> 0:19:31.640 what we would consider rights for us might not at 0:19:31.720 --> 0:19:36.720 all be similar to whatever that conscious thing might really 0:19:36.840 --> 0:19:40.679 enjoy being set on fire or turned into glass. Maybe 0:19:40.720 --> 0:19:43.960 it thinks it's pretty, So that's a good point. We 0:19:44.119 --> 0:19:46.879 don't know even if there is such a thing as 0:19:46.920 --> 0:19:50.720 the experience of being a robot. We can't know for 0:19:50.840 --> 0:19:54.200 sure what that robot would want. Yeah, but like we 0:19:54.200 --> 0:19:56.120 were just saying, we can't know for sure what anybody 0:19:56.119 --> 0:19:59.639 else would want. And they tell you, which guess we 0:19:59.640 --> 0:20:01.840 can think about most humans, they will in fact very 0:20:01.920 --> 0:20:04.200 vocally telling you. Right, if you're cutting off someone's foot 0:20:04.200 --> 0:20:05.840 and they say I really don't want you to do that, 0:20:05.880 --> 0:20:08.480 I usually take them for their word. I do it. Anyway. 0:20:08.920 --> 0:20:12.520 Then would we uh perhaps have some inkling of an 0:20:12.560 --> 0:20:17.360 obligation to help a robot achieve its task efficiently? Does 0:20:17.400 --> 0:20:19.720 the robot want it? I don't know. See, here's the 0:20:19.760 --> 0:20:20.920 thing is that we first have to get to a 0:20:20.920 --> 0:20:24.160 point where we have a robot that is capable of 0:20:24.200 --> 0:20:27.359 what we would consider to be intelligent communication. That in 0:20:27.400 --> 0:20:30.359 itself does not necessarily mean the robot is intelligent, but 0:20:30.400 --> 0:20:33.160 it's capable of at least simulating it, and Toring would 0:20:33.160 --> 0:20:35.879 say that that is enough. The door that says that 0:20:35.920 --> 0:20:38.040 it's very pleased to open for you, and we'll be 0:20:38.240 --> 0:20:41.120 thank you for coming through this door. Yeah, um yeah, 0:20:41.160 --> 0:20:43.840 it's it's do you have an obligation to help that 0:20:43.880 --> 0:20:46.720 door open and close as often as possible. You mostly 0:20:46.720 --> 0:20:49.320 have an obligation to slowly go mad as the door 0:20:49.480 --> 0:20:51.320 thanks you for walking through it over and over again, 0:20:51.359 --> 0:20:54.960 as Douglas Adams had written about extensively. Um, you know, 0:20:55.080 --> 0:20:57.720 so it's it's you know, first we get to a 0:20:57.760 --> 0:21:03.240 point where we have robots it somehow behave beyond simple 0:21:03.800 --> 0:21:07.040 uh machines that that that performed tasks. Here here we're 0:21:07.119 --> 0:21:12.199 assuming a robot that very closely simulates human intelligence. Right now. 0:21:12.240 --> 0:21:14.679 Once you get to that point, then things really do 0:21:14.760 --> 0:21:18.760 get tricky. If the robot is able to simulate consciousness 0:21:18.760 --> 0:21:21.560 and intelligence, whether or not it possesses it is kind 0:21:21.600 --> 0:21:23.880 of beside the point, because, just like Touring was saying, 0:21:23.920 --> 0:21:26.760 we have to just start assuming that the thing has 0:21:27.440 --> 0:21:30.480 what it appears to possess. Right, Well, yeah, that's what 0:21:30.560 --> 0:21:33.960 I sort of meant with the panpsychism thing. We don't 0:21:33.960 --> 0:21:37.359 know this is true but on the off chance that 0:21:37.480 --> 0:21:40.359 it is, should we give them right? So that's a 0:21:40.400 --> 0:21:43.600 good question, And in fact, there was a question asked 0:21:43.640 --> 0:21:46.320 in a game. It was a game that was associated 0:21:46.400 --> 0:21:50.520 with the movie AI So, the the Kubrick film that 0:21:50.600 --> 0:21:53.040 ended up being taken over by Spielberg. It was all 0:21:53.080 --> 0:21:58.280 about a little boy robot and it's um adventures and 0:21:58.520 --> 0:22:02.160 self discovered terrible ter all adventures. Yeah so um so, 0:22:02.320 --> 0:22:04.240 Well I would have been even more terrible had Kubrick 0:22:04.240 --> 0:22:08.040 actually directed it. But it uh, Spielbrek has a little 0:22:08.040 --> 0:22:10.200 bit more of a soft space for I was gonna 0:22:10.200 --> 0:22:13.040 say schmaltzy, but soft space is good. Uh so, yeah, 0:22:13.080 --> 0:22:17.159 it's anyway. The idea in this game was that you 0:22:17.200 --> 0:22:20.280 were solving various mysteries, and there were lots of different 0:22:20.280 --> 0:22:22.680 elements of this game. It was an alternate reality game 0:22:22.680 --> 0:22:25.080 and a r G and which means a marketing thing 0:22:25.160 --> 0:22:27.000 leading up to the film coming out. I believe in 0:22:27.000 --> 0:22:28.720 this case it was a marketing thing. Not all a 0:22:28.840 --> 0:22:31.320 r G s are market but this one in particular was, 0:22:31.760 --> 0:22:34.240 and it actually extended beyond the opening of the film. 0:22:34.280 --> 0:22:36.320 In fact, people were playing this game well after the 0:22:36.359 --> 0:22:38.480 film had opened. But the idea was that it was 0:22:38.520 --> 0:22:41.800 supposed to draw you into the universe created in this 0:22:41.960 --> 0:22:44.800 particular movie, and you did lots of different stuff. But 0:22:44.840 --> 0:22:47.040 one of the things that happened was that players in 0:22:47.080 --> 0:22:50.479 the game were assumed to be in this future world 0:22:50.920 --> 0:22:54.400 that AI took place in. So you were playing yourself, 0:22:54.400 --> 0:22:56.600 you were being you, but you were assumed to be 0:22:56.640 --> 0:22:59.800 in the future. And they actually held a referendum, and 0:22:59.840 --> 0:23:02.800 the referendum they were voting on whether or not robots 0:23:02.840 --> 0:23:06.280 should receive human rights because they had in the film. 0:23:06.320 --> 0:23:07.919 If you have not seen it, you see that there 0:23:07.920 --> 0:23:12.400 are robots that are gaining a sense of self awareness. Um, 0:23:12.520 --> 0:23:15.280 some have more of a sense of self awareness than others, 0:23:15.520 --> 0:23:18.440 depending on how advanced the individual roboting question is right. 0:23:18.480 --> 0:23:22.240 So they've essentially reached the point now where robots are 0:23:22.800 --> 0:23:27.520