WEBVTT - TechStuff Classic: Hacking for Dollars

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<v Speaker 1>Welcome to tech Stuff, a production from iHeartRadio. Hey there,

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<v Speaker 1>and welcome to tech Stuff. I'm your host, Jonathan Strickland.

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<v Speaker 1>I'm an executive producer with iHeartRadio and how the tech area. Y'all,

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<v Speaker 1>it is time for a classic tech Stuff episode. This

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<v Speaker 1>is one where my friend Shannon Morse joined the show.

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<v Speaker 1>Shannon is a really talented communicator of technology. She's a hacker,

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<v Speaker 1>She's fantastic. She's got a ton of content out there online.

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<v Speaker 1>So highly recommend you check out Shannon if you are

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<v Speaker 1>unfamiliar with her work. She's great. And on this episode

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<v Speaker 1>we talked about hacking for dollars, the various ways that

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<v Speaker 1>hackers make money by being you know, hackers, and this

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<v Speaker 1>episode public on Star Wars Day back in twenty sixteen.

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<v Speaker 1>That of course is May the fourth on twenty sixteen.

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<v Speaker 1>Sit back and enjoy. The term hacker is actually a

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<v Speaker 1>very broad term that can apply to a lot of

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<v Speaker 1>different things, and not all of them are that nefarious

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<v Speaker 1>evil infiltrate a system and steal all the corporate secrets

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<v Speaker 1>kind of approach to hacking that Hollywood often presents right

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<v Speaker 1>right exactly. I actually ask this question to a lot

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<v Speaker 1>of people, especially when I first meet them. Since I'm

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<v Speaker 1>so closely affiliated with a lot of the infoset community,

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<v Speaker 1>I want to surround myself with positive people. So you'll

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<v Speaker 1>notice with the hacker definition, you can either get a

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<v Speaker 1>very negative vibe from somebody or a very positive vibe. Oftentimes,

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<v Speaker 1>with the negative vibe, you'll get somebody who says, oh,

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<v Speaker 1>that's the person who stole my credit card data when

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<v Speaker 1>I went to a restaurant the other day. But on

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<v Speaker 1>the positive side, you'll get somebody that says, oh, they're

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<v Speaker 1>the kind of people that will break something apart and

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<v Speaker 1>then put it back together in a way that it

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<v Speaker 1>wasn't supposed to be put back together to make it

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<v Speaker 1>do something cool. And that's a hack in mainstream. So

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<v Speaker 1>that's the way I see it. I see hackers as

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<v Speaker 1>being people who reverse engineer different software, different hardware. It

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<v Speaker 1>could just be a bicycle, for example, and put it

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<v Speaker 1>back together in a way to make it harder, better, faster,

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<v Speaker 1>and stronger. Nice the old daft punk approach. Of course, Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>I agree entirely. The original term hacker was really all

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<v Speaker 1>about people who have almost an insatiable curiosity to learn

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<v Speaker 1>how stuff works. Oddly enough, I share that quality having

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<v Speaker 1>worked at how stuff works for a decade, but yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>to understand how it works and then to make stuff

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<v Speaker 1>do things it wasn't necessarily intended to do. Not for

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<v Speaker 1>nefarious purposes necessarily, although that could clearly be an application,

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<v Speaker 1>but just for curiosity's sake. Can I take these elements

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<v Speaker 1>that are meant to do this one thing and do

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<v Speaker 1>something completely transformative with it, whether it is hardware or software.

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<v Speaker 1>And we've seen some really cool stuff come out of that.

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<v Speaker 1>I mean, I would argue that a lot of the

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<v Speaker 1>things you see in the cosplay world and the steampunk world,

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<v Speaker 1>those are all taking elements of hacking. Maker Fair is

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<v Speaker 1>really just a hacker's paradise when you get down to it,

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<v Speaker 1>especially for hardware hacks. Absolutely, I'm kind of sad I'm

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<v Speaker 1>going to miss maker Fair this year. I haven't been

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<v Speaker 1>to one yet. I've been to a small one here

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<v Speaker 1>in Atlanta, a very modest maker Fair. Everyone there was

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<v Speaker 1>great and passionate and intelligent, but it was, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>a much smaller scale than something you would see in

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<v Speaker 1>the Bay Area. Yeah, but that's the kind of thing

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<v Speaker 1>that hacker means to me. Now that being said, in

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<v Speaker 1>this episode, we're really going to be focusing on sort

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<v Speaker 1>of the computer oriented, really the software side of hacking,

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<v Speaker 1>and a large part of it's going to be on

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<v Speaker 1>the bad guy, the naughty bits, as I call it

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<v Speaker 1>in our notes about simply to talk about what are

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<v Speaker 1>the ways that hackers cause or the malicious hackers cause problems,

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<v Speaker 1>how do they expect to profit from that? And also

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<v Speaker 1>we'll look at ways that hackers who don't follow that path,

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<v Speaker 1>who are looking to help people, not hurt people, how

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<v Speaker 1>do they make a living Because it's one of those

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<v Speaker 1>things where you kind of take it for granted when

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<v Speaker 1>you see the Hollywood depiction of a hacker, the person

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<v Speaker 1>sitting down. Usually they're sitting at a keyboard and for

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<v Speaker 1>some reason, their monitor only is monochromatic green. Yes, that's

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<v Speaker 1>so true. Well, yeah, they're using the old Apple to

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<v Speaker 1>ems terminals are actually written and green oftentimes, but you

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<v Speaker 1>can change the colors to rainbow colors if you choose.

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<v Speaker 1>That is a hack, it's a real life hack. Yeah, yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>And usually you see them sitting down and then they

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<v Speaker 1>cause some sort of mischief, sometimes bordering on sabotage. But

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<v Speaker 1>then you when you think about it outside of the

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<v Speaker 1>context of that scene, you think, Oh, how did they

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<v Speaker 1>expect to profit from this? Yeah, so that's kind of

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<v Speaker 1>what we're looking at. Yeah, because it's always important to

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<v Speaker 1>me to reiterate too that there are always going to

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<v Speaker 1>be two sides of a coin to everything in life.

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<v Speaker 1>Of course, there are going to be bad guys in

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<v Speaker 1>the in the world who do nefarious hacks, but there's

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<v Speaker 1>also a lot of good guys too, And personally, for me,

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<v Speaker 1>the reason why I'm so interested in researching this is

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<v Speaker 1>because it has made me a much more privacy and

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<v Speaker 1>security guarded person. I've gotten a lot better at my

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<v Speaker 1>own protections online, and I feel like if somebody else

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<v Speaker 1>can understand what a hacker does on the bad side

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<v Speaker 1>as well as the good side, they can better protect

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<v Speaker 1>themselves too, And that's what I've always tried to teach people. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>I think all you have to really do is attend

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<v Speaker 1>one def con and really have that driven home. I

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<v Speaker 1>have not yet gone to a def con, mostly because

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<v Speaker 1>I don't know that I could part with my smartphone

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<v Speaker 1>for that long and I certainly wouldn't take it with me.

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<v Speaker 1>Bring a burner phone, you'll be fine. Yeah, that's me Jonathan,

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<v Speaker 1>the guy which carries the burner. It makes sense, I

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<v Speaker 1>mean when you're doing something like that. So for those

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<v Speaker 1>who don't know, Defcon is a large hacker based conference

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<v Speaker 1>largely looking at the realm of information security, and often

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<v Speaker 1>they will you'll have entire presentations dedicated to showing off

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<v Speaker 1>vulnerabilities and security, again not necessarily so that people can

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<v Speaker 1>take advantage of them, but rather to raise awareness and

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<v Speaker 1>to kind of force the hands of the parties that

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<v Speaker 1>are responsible for that software to take action and fix

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<v Speaker 1>a problem. Right like that was what we saw with

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<v Speaker 1>the hack about remotely taking control of a person's vehicle,

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<v Speaker 1>specifically Jeep was really having that issue. Those one of

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<v Speaker 1>those things where the researchers were saying, look, we're bringing

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<v Speaker 1>this to light, not so that we can create an

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<v Speaker 1>era where people are terrified of their vehicles that someone's

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<v Speaker 1>going to take remote control of their car, but rather

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<v Speaker 1>to really drive home the act that the information security

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<v Speaker 1>is now it's important everywhere. It's not just your phone,

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<v Speaker 1>it's not just your computer. As the Internet of Things

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<v Speaker 1>continues to blossom, it's everything. Yes, I agree, And in

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<v Speaker 1>that sense, those researchers were trying to use something the

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<v Speaker 1>old school term is called responsible disclosure where they explain

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<v Speaker 1>some kind of vulnerability that they found to the company

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<v Speaker 1>in hopes that the company will fix this problem before

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<v Speaker 1>it becomes mainstream and before it gets out into the wild.

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<v Speaker 1>In the case of Jeep, I believe, if my memory

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<v Speaker 1>serves me right, that Jeep did not necessarily release a

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<v Speaker 1>patch for this vulnerability. So then the researchers decided to

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<v Speaker 1>go out publicly about the information that they found, and

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<v Speaker 1>then Jeep decided to fix it once everybody else knew

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<v Speaker 1>about it, right, And sometimes that's what it takes. And

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<v Speaker 1>I've had the same discussion offline with a mutual friend

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<v Speaker 1>of ours, Brian Brushwood. Brian is a stage magician. He

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<v Speaker 1>has a show called Scam School. It's all about social engineering.

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<v Speaker 1>One of the things I have talked about with Brian

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<v Speaker 1>is that his show, he often shows how to do

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<v Speaker 1>certain types of scams or tricks, but they're mostly in

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<v Speaker 1>the barbet world, right, Like, not stuff that you would

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<v Speaker 1>do to ruin someone's life, but something that you know

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<v Speaker 1>you might want to you might win a free beer

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<v Speaker 1>that way. Yeah, And he showed off He had an

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<v Speaker 1>episode where he showed off this guy who had was

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<v Speaker 1>demonstrating a well known vulnerability of a popular bike lock

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<v Speaker 1>that has been off the market for a couple of

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<v Speaker 1>years because of this vulnerability. But that particular vulnerability meant

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<v Speaker 1>that you could use a regular plastic pen, remove the

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<v Speaker 1>pen part of the pen, use the casing, and jam

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<v Speaker 1>that into the lock and pop the lock open. Oh

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<v Speaker 1>that's horrible, right, And so people were complaining in the comments,

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<v Speaker 1>they were saying, you're you're, you're publicizing this vulnerability, And

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<v Speaker 1>I said, guess what, the bad guys already know about

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<v Speaker 1>this vulnerability. What they're doing is publicizing it to a

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<v Speaker 1>public that might be still vulnerable to it so that

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<v Speaker 1>they don't fall victim. And that, to me is a

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<v Speaker 1>very important part of hackers across the board. They serve

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<v Speaker 1>very important purpose to alert folks to potential dangers before

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<v Speaker 1>it gets too late. Yeah. Absolutely, And you're those hackers

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<v Speaker 1>are the people that are generally working to make a

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<v Speaker 1>better world for consumers at about a private and secure

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<v Speaker 1>world for consumers. But then, of course, on the other hand,

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<v Speaker 1>are the batties. Yeah, let's talk about some of them.

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<v Speaker 1>So I kind of gave some weird little titles for

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<v Speaker 1>this when I was typing it up, because in the

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<v Speaker 1>middle of the week. I get bored, Shannon. Let's to

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<v Speaker 1>be honest, and so when I was making an outline

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<v Speaker 1>kind of for us to work from, I started coming

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<v Speaker 1>up with goofy subtitles. So this whole section is titled

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<v Speaker 1>the Naughty Bits in our Notes, and the first one

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<v Speaker 1>is malware moolaw as in people who make money through

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<v Speaker 1>the development or distribution of malware. And malware, as I've

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<v Speaker 1>said on this show many times in order to define it,

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<v Speaker 1>it's really software that is intended to do something that

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<v Speaker 1>is ultimately harmful to the person who runs that software

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<v Speaker 1>on their machine. It covers a wide array of different subcategories, like, uh,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, this is the sort of term that we

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<v Speaker 1>normally would have in the old days just called a

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<v Speaker 1>computer virus, But computer virus is a very specific thing,

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<v Speaker 1>and malware covers more stuff than just viruses, also worms

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<v Speaker 1>and all sorts of stuff. Yeah, there's there's malware for

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<v Speaker 1>Java and Flash. If you still have Flash, install it,

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<v Speaker 1>I highly recommend that you uninstall it if you don't

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<v Speaker 1>need it. There's malware for browsers. There's malware for advertisements

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<v Speaker 1>online for sponsors that you'll see like on different websites

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<v Speaker 1>that was a very recent problem that a lot of

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<v Speaker 1>news publications had with yeah, big name news publication, but yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>so that was a big one. But you'll see malware

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<v Speaker 1>all over the place, and luckily we do have anti

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<v Speaker 1>mal where software that we can use to protect our

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<v Speaker 1>computers from it, and we can also block certain ports

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<v Speaker 1>on or routers that can hopefully protect you from MAUER.

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<v Speaker 1>But there's also a lot of cases where Mauer is

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<v Speaker 1>distributed and built so quickly that a lot of those

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<v Speaker 1>anti Mauer software are not updated quick enough. So in

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<v Speaker 1>that case, we need to do the best that we

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<v Speaker 1>can to protect ourselves and keep MAUER from getting out

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<v Speaker 1>from the deep web. Yeah, you know, it used to

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<v Speaker 1>be that you really all you needed to worry about

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<v Speaker 1>was just don't go to the more seedy elements of

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<v Speaker 1>the web, and you were generally all right, right, Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>It's kind of like avoiding a bad neighborhood, Like, yeah, obviously,

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<v Speaker 1>if you don't want to get robbed, there are certain

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<v Speaker 1>neighborhoods that you should probably shouldn't walk around in by

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<v Speaker 1>yourself at night, right, And this is kind of similar

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<v Speaker 1>in that case where you avoid the deep web unless

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<v Speaker 1>you really want to be on somebody's like hit list

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<v Speaker 1>or something like that. Yeah. Yeah, if you suddenly think

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<v Speaker 1>that you want to come across as a big shot,

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<v Speaker 1>look if you're not a big shot, don't do that.

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<v Speaker 1>It's kind of like, kind of like walking up to

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<v Speaker 1>someone who works in a carnival and claiming that you're

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<v Speaker 1>with it and for it. If you don't know what

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<v Speaker 1>that means, you do not say that. Okay, I think

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<v Speaker 1>I just gave terrible advice to an entire population of listeners. Yeah, don't, don't.

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<v Speaker 1>Don't talk to Carney's unless you are one, all right, so,

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<v Speaker 1>uh and I love you Carney's, I love you all So.

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<v Speaker 1>The the thing that we're getting across, though, is that

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<v Speaker 1>today that's not as big a guarantee as it used

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<v Speaker 1>to be. Right like ten years ago, you'd say, look,

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<v Speaker 1>just be careful. Don't download unusual files. Don't don't run

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<v Speaker 1>a file that's linked in your email without checking it

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<v Speaker 1>out first, don't. Don't, you know, be careful opening up

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<v Speaker 1>emails from things that you don't recognize. Be careful with

0:12:47.400 --> 0:12:52.439
<v Speaker 1>PDF files, Be careful with stuff, especially unsolicited stuff that

0:12:52.480 --> 0:12:56.280
<v Speaker 1>has come to you, because that raises the chances that

0:12:56.400 --> 0:12:59.280
<v Speaker 1>something hinky is going on. It doesn't necessarily mean it's

0:12:59.320 --> 0:13:03.840
<v Speaker 1>definitely a problem, but it's potentially a problem, and it's

0:13:03.880 --> 0:13:06.520
<v Speaker 1>better to be safe than sorry. Make sure you have

0:13:06.640 --> 0:13:10.280
<v Speaker 1>good antivirus software on your computer, make sure you have

0:13:10.280 --> 0:13:12.560
<v Speaker 1>a nice strong firewall. All of these kind of things.

0:13:12.559 --> 0:13:17.320
<v Speaker 1>Those used to be pretty good at keeping nine of

0:13:17.360 --> 0:13:20.200
<v Speaker 1>the malware away from you if you were being a

0:13:20.240 --> 0:13:25.440
<v Speaker 1>fairly responsible Netaicin these days, they definitely help. These days,

0:13:25.600 --> 0:13:28.400
<v Speaker 1>these days, the attacks are sometimes getting like in the

0:13:28.400 --> 0:13:32.600
<v Speaker 1>case of the advertisements on news sites. These are attacks

0:13:32.640 --> 0:13:36.079
<v Speaker 1>that are going through avenues that you want at one

0:13:36.120 --> 0:13:39.240
<v Speaker 1>point would have considered perfectly safe. Right, Not that it's

0:13:39.280 --> 0:13:41.640
<v Speaker 1>happening all the time, but the fact that it can

0:13:41.760 --> 0:13:46.280
<v Speaker 1>happen tells you that it requires an extra level of

0:13:46.360 --> 0:13:51.160
<v Speaker 1>vigilance beyond what we used to say was sufficient. Yeah. Absolutely,

0:13:51.320 --> 0:13:53.960
<v Speaker 1>A data collection for a lot of this malware is

0:13:54.040 --> 0:13:59.720
<v Speaker 1>extremely It's high sensitive in the fact that a user's

0:14:00.120 --> 0:14:03.480
<v Speaker 1>data can get so much money on the on the

0:14:03.520 --> 0:14:08.120
<v Speaker 1>deep web, so much money, really, particularly a collection of

0:14:08.240 --> 0:14:10.959
<v Speaker 1>user data, that's where the big money is, right. I

0:14:11.000 --> 0:14:14.080
<v Speaker 1>did an episode once where we tried to break down

0:14:14.120 --> 0:14:18.280
<v Speaker 1>how much is your personal information worth? It? Really bucks? Yeah,

0:14:18.320 --> 0:14:21.520
<v Speaker 1>it really depends. It depends upon what information you're talking about,

0:14:21.520 --> 0:14:25.240
<v Speaker 1>Like how extensive is that profile on a person? But yeah,

0:14:25.280 --> 0:14:27.680
<v Speaker 1>it's not much in the grand scheme of things. Like

0:14:27.720 --> 0:14:30.880
<v Speaker 1>to you, it's worth a lot, right you as a person, Shannon, Right,

0:14:30.960 --> 0:14:33.320
<v Speaker 1>you as a person, that information is worth a lot

0:14:33.400 --> 0:14:36.160
<v Speaker 1>of money to you, Yeah, because it's who you are.

0:14:36.880 --> 0:14:39.920
<v Speaker 1>To someone else, it's worth pennies on the dollar, really

0:14:39.960 --> 0:14:43.640
<v Speaker 1>depending up, depending upon the amount of information. But the

0:14:43.840 --> 0:14:49.040
<v Speaker 1>malware often is giving hackers access to massive amounts of

0:14:49.080 --> 0:14:53.040
<v Speaker 1>info about a huge number of people, and in numbers

0:14:53.400 --> 0:14:56.280
<v Speaker 1>there is more value, and that's where they will sell that.

0:14:56.720 --> 0:15:00.000
<v Speaker 1>Sometimes they sell it to companies that are just interested

0:15:00.160 --> 0:15:03.440
<v Speaker 1>and getting information so that they can do targeted advertising.

0:15:03.880 --> 0:15:07.880
<v Speaker 1>So it might be that the ultimate use of your

0:15:07.920 --> 0:15:11.240
<v Speaker 1>information isn't as bad as it could be. It just

0:15:11.280 --> 0:15:14.320
<v Speaker 1>means you're going to get some ads, but still not

0:15:14.600 --> 0:15:17.000
<v Speaker 1>fun to think about and to think that you know,

0:15:17.080 --> 0:15:19.760
<v Speaker 1>now these companies have access to information about you that

0:15:19.840 --> 0:15:24.560
<v Speaker 1>you probably would rather they not have, particularly in targeted advertising.

0:15:24.840 --> 0:15:28.760
<v Speaker 1>The famous story about target when they started sending ads

0:15:28.800 --> 0:15:31.760
<v Speaker 1>to a young lady that were related to pregnancy yep,

0:15:32.000 --> 0:15:34.800
<v Speaker 1>and then her dad got really really ticked off. About it.

0:15:34.800 --> 0:15:37.720
<v Speaker 1>But it turned out that little girl was pregnant, yeah,

0:15:37.760 --> 0:15:40.920
<v Speaker 1>and that it was because the algorithms had picked up

0:15:41.120 --> 0:15:44.200
<v Speaker 1>through her search habits that she was pregnant based upon

0:15:44.320 --> 0:15:46.800
<v Speaker 1>the search terms she was putting in, and so they

0:15:46.840 --> 0:15:51.080
<v Speaker 1>proactively sent her some coupons for pregnancy related items. The

0:15:51.160 --> 0:15:53.600
<v Speaker 1>dad got very upset. Then the dad ended up apologizing

0:15:53.600 --> 0:15:56.040
<v Speaker 1>to Target, saying that he was unaware at the time

0:15:56.120 --> 0:15:58.800
<v Speaker 1>of the full situation. Well, in that case, it was

0:15:59.240 --> 0:16:03.040
<v Speaker 1>search algorithm, wasn't a hacker who had gained access to

0:16:03.040 --> 0:16:05.600
<v Speaker 1>stuff and then sold it. But there are other cases

0:16:05.640 --> 0:16:08.600
<v Speaker 1>where that does happen, Yeah, where you know, just a

0:16:08.680 --> 0:16:11.560
<v Speaker 1>database of info and a lot of times they will

0:16:11.600 --> 0:16:14.920
<v Speaker 1>release this malware in something that's called an exploit kit.

0:16:15.360 --> 0:16:18.480
<v Speaker 1>So generally, these exploit kits are like a batch of

0:16:18.840 --> 0:16:22.440
<v Speaker 1>similar malware that will work across several different platforms, So

0:16:22.480 --> 0:16:25.440
<v Speaker 1>that whether that's several different types of software like job

0:16:25.480 --> 0:16:28.480
<v Speaker 1>and flash, or several different browsers. It could be several

0:16:28.480 --> 0:16:31.800
<v Speaker 1>different operating systems too, So you might see an exploit

0:16:31.840 --> 0:16:36.200
<v Speaker 1>kit that works on Linux fourteen O four but also

0:16:36.240 --> 0:16:40.960
<v Speaker 1>works on Windows XP up through eight or something like that. Right,

0:16:41.400 --> 0:16:43.560
<v Speaker 1>And what's crazy is that when you start looking at

0:16:44.280 --> 0:16:46.040
<v Speaker 1>I mean, this is one of the things that hackers do, right,

0:16:46.040 --> 0:16:48.520
<v Speaker 1>They'll look at operating systems and what the market penetration

0:16:48.600 --> 0:16:51.200
<v Speaker 1>is for those systems, because that's that shows you where

0:16:51.200 --> 0:16:53.640
<v Speaker 1>your target rich environment is. Right. So if you have

0:16:53.680 --> 0:16:59.720
<v Speaker 1>Windows seven, guess what you are prime target for malware

0:16:59.760 --> 0:17:04.760
<v Speaker 1>because that is by far the largest that has the

0:17:04.800 --> 0:17:07.600
<v Speaker 1>greatest market share of any operating system right now. Ye,

0:17:07.840 --> 0:17:13.919
<v Speaker 1>Windows XP Still it's number three, number three, and it

0:17:14.000 --> 0:17:16.600
<v Speaker 1>has not been supported by wind formed by Microsoft for

0:17:16.680 --> 0:17:21.000
<v Speaker 1>two years. This, by the way, bad thing. If you

0:17:21.040 --> 0:17:23.960
<v Speaker 1>want to be really secure with your your computer information,

0:17:24.000 --> 0:17:25.760
<v Speaker 1>you don't want to be using an operating system that

0:17:25.800 --> 0:17:28.199
<v Speaker 1>no longer gets support from the company that made it,

0:17:29.560 --> 0:17:32.440
<v Speaker 1>because because that means no vulnerabilities will be patched. From

0:17:32.440 --> 0:17:34.439
<v Speaker 1>that moment forward, you're pretty much on your own. You

0:17:34.480 --> 0:17:37.240
<v Speaker 1>have gone into the dark forest, and you forgot to

0:17:37.240 --> 0:17:41.800
<v Speaker 1>bring your flashlight. It's pretty dangerous. One of the things

0:17:41.800 --> 0:17:45.439
<v Speaker 1>that you kind of I think leads in from what

0:17:45.480 --> 0:17:48.280
<v Speaker 1>you were saying before with these exploit kits. One of

0:17:48.320 --> 0:17:52.480
<v Speaker 1>the most terrifying aspects of this type of malware and

0:17:52.480 --> 0:17:54.920
<v Speaker 1>and the fact that that people can use it for

0:17:55.400 --> 0:17:59.760
<v Speaker 1>nefarious purposes and monetary gain. Is that you also have

0:17:59.800 --> 0:18:02.399
<v Speaker 1>a population of people who don't even understand how the

0:18:02.400 --> 0:18:05.880
<v Speaker 1>malware works. They don't even Script kitties is what I'm

0:18:05.880 --> 0:18:09.000
<v Speaker 1>getting at. Script kitties, that's the term we use for

0:18:09.040 --> 0:18:16.000
<v Speaker 1>people who are they're benefiting from the work that hackers

0:18:16.040 --> 0:18:18.399
<v Speaker 1>have done. Hackers are the ones who are actually putting

0:18:18.440 --> 0:18:21.280
<v Speaker 1>together the software. They're the ones who have identified the

0:18:21.320 --> 0:18:25.119
<v Speaker 1>vulnerability and then exploited it in some way. Script kitties

0:18:25.119 --> 0:18:27.600
<v Speaker 1>are the ones who essentially they're given a set of

0:18:27.600 --> 0:18:31.000
<v Speaker 1>skeleton keys, and they didn't make the skeleton keys, they're

0:18:31.000 --> 0:18:35.560
<v Speaker 1>just using them. And it's scary because you don't need

0:18:35.600 --> 0:18:38.480
<v Speaker 1>a level of expertise. You might think, oh, well, I'm

0:18:38.520 --> 0:18:40.760
<v Speaker 1>kind of safe from hackers because how many people are

0:18:40.800 --> 0:18:45.000
<v Speaker 1>actually hackers? How many people really know how this system works. Well,

0:18:45.560 --> 0:18:47.600
<v Speaker 1>you don't have to really know how the system works.

0:18:47.640 --> 0:18:50.719
<v Speaker 1>If you have a tool that exploits a vulnerability, oh absolutely.

0:18:50.760 --> 0:18:53.720
<v Speaker 1>Although I really hate the word script kitty, I will

0:18:53.720 --> 0:18:56.240
<v Speaker 1>put it out there because I feel like if you're

0:18:56.320 --> 0:19:00.560
<v Speaker 1>interested in information security, and if you're interested in becoming

0:19:00.720 --> 0:19:04.680
<v Speaker 1>a good hacker, then you do start somewhere and everybody

0:19:04.760 --> 0:19:06.760
<v Speaker 1>is going to start with the easy tools that are

0:19:06.760 --> 0:19:09.560
<v Speaker 1>out there and that are available for free. For example,

0:19:09.680 --> 0:19:11.960
<v Speaker 1>one thing that I learned how to use a couple

0:19:12.080 --> 0:19:15.120
<v Speaker 1>years back was this tool called wire shark. It easily

0:19:15.200 --> 0:19:18.320
<v Speaker 1>lets you see everything that's happening on your wireless network,

0:19:18.400 --> 0:19:22.560
<v Speaker 1>or you can use it for any computers that are

0:19:21.960 --> 0:19:24.840
<v Speaker 1>on your network, like behind your router, so you can

0:19:24.840 --> 0:19:27.520
<v Speaker 1>see everything that's going on and you don't necessarily have

0:19:27.600 --> 0:19:32.000
<v Speaker 1>to learn or understand what's going on behind it to

0:19:32.080 --> 0:19:35.479
<v Speaker 1>be able to read what's on your screen happening right

0:19:35.520 --> 0:19:38.639
<v Speaker 1>in front of you. I think it's really important though,

0:19:38.720 --> 0:19:43.240
<v Speaker 1>for people who might be called script kitties to look

0:19:43.280 --> 0:19:46.719
<v Speaker 1>at as being beneficial and that they can grow from

0:19:46.800 --> 0:19:50.680
<v Speaker 1>that process. They can start from being a beginner and say, okay,

0:19:50.760 --> 0:19:52.840
<v Speaker 1>well I need to understand the theory. Now I can

0:19:52.880 --> 0:19:55.879
<v Speaker 1>move on from being a script kittie quote unquote to

0:19:56.000 --> 0:19:59.200
<v Speaker 1>becoming somebody who is an expert in some kind of

0:19:59.280 --> 0:20:03.119
<v Speaker 1>information security out there. Yeah. When I think of the

0:20:03.240 --> 0:20:05.879
<v Speaker 1>term script kitty, in my mind, it's a it's a

0:20:05.920 --> 0:20:09.520
<v Speaker 1>subset of the people that typically get labeled as such. Yeah,

0:20:09.640 --> 0:20:12.720
<v Speaker 1>that subset being people who have little to no interest

0:20:12.760 --> 0:20:17.680
<v Speaker 1>in actually learning how to hack or program people who

0:20:17.760 --> 0:20:22.000
<v Speaker 1>want a very very fast track way to gain either

0:20:22.480 --> 0:20:26.080
<v Speaker 1>a reputation by being the person who took down a

0:20:26.160 --> 0:20:30.320
<v Speaker 1>system by whatever means, or by making a whole lot

0:20:30.320 --> 0:20:34.199
<v Speaker 1>of money really fast for relatively little effort. Those are

0:20:34.200 --> 0:20:36.040
<v Speaker 1>the ones I specifically think of when I think of

0:20:36.040 --> 0:20:38.679
<v Speaker 1>script kitty. But you are absolutely right, you have to

0:20:38.720 --> 0:20:41.439
<v Speaker 1>start somewhere if you're interesting it is. I'm kind of

0:20:41.480 --> 0:20:44.240
<v Speaker 1>defensive with that because I was called a script kitty

0:20:44.280 --> 0:20:47.760
<v Speaker 1>when I first started up started off learning about hacking

0:20:47.760 --> 0:20:51.320
<v Speaker 1>and information security. People would be like, Osh, she's just

0:20:51.359 --> 0:20:53.439
<v Speaker 1>a script kitty, and I'd be like, well, I actually

0:20:53.440 --> 0:20:55.159
<v Speaker 1>want to understand the theory. I want to learn how

0:20:55.200 --> 0:20:57.160
<v Speaker 1>to program. I want to learn how right code. I'm

0:20:57.200 --> 0:20:59.879
<v Speaker 1>no longer called that because I have learned how to

0:21:00.280 --> 0:21:02.760
<v Speaker 1>certain kinds of code. I have learned how to program.

0:21:02.800 --> 0:21:05.919
<v Speaker 1>I can make my Arduino do whatever I want. So

0:21:05.960 --> 0:21:09.280
<v Speaker 1>at this point in my stage, I've surpassed that moment

0:21:09.320 --> 0:21:13.000
<v Speaker 1>of being a nube, and I've gone on to learning

0:21:13.040 --> 0:21:17.560
<v Speaker 1>things and being able to understand specific tasks and get

0:21:17.600 --> 0:21:19.159
<v Speaker 1>them to do what I want them to do without

0:21:19.200 --> 0:21:22.760
<v Speaker 1>finding tutorials online. Yeah, so now I make my own tutorials.

0:21:23.000 --> 0:21:26.440
<v Speaker 1>Seeing that's nice because when I started at How Stuff Works,

0:21:26.440 --> 0:21:29.240
<v Speaker 1>they call me that weird bald guy, and today they

0:21:29.320 --> 0:21:32.440
<v Speaker 1>still do. Shannon and I will be back to talk

0:21:32.520 --> 0:21:34.800
<v Speaker 1>more about hacking for dollars in just a moment, but

0:21:34.880 --> 0:21:46.680
<v Speaker 1>first let's take this quick break so that kind of

0:21:46.720 --> 0:21:50.800
<v Speaker 1>covers the malware approach. People can make money through malware,

0:21:50.840 --> 0:21:55.120
<v Speaker 1>either by selling your information, they might do so by

0:21:55.800 --> 0:22:00.320
<v Speaker 1>another method, which kind of leads into this idea of ransomware.

0:22:00.440 --> 0:22:03.199
<v Speaker 1>So this would be malware specific type of malware that

0:22:04.359 --> 0:22:07.280
<v Speaker 1>locks down your machine in some way so that you

0:22:07.320 --> 0:22:09.679
<v Speaker 1>can no longer access it, and then you essentially get

0:22:09.680 --> 0:22:11.520
<v Speaker 1>a message saying, hey, if you want if you want

0:22:11.520 --> 0:22:13.840
<v Speaker 1>your data back, if you want access to your data,

0:22:13.920 --> 0:22:16.359
<v Speaker 1>if you want to be able to do all this stuff,

0:22:16.359 --> 0:22:18.879
<v Speaker 1>and you want our hands out of your business, then

0:22:18.880 --> 0:22:22.600
<v Speaker 1>you've got to pay us some mulah. Yeah. So basically

0:22:22.680 --> 0:22:26.520
<v Speaker 1>what happens with ransomware is it is, just like you said,

0:22:26.520 --> 0:22:29.920
<v Speaker 1>a type of malware that gets distributed in one way,

0:22:29.920 --> 0:22:32.919
<v Speaker 1>shape or form onto somebody's computer and it ends up

0:22:33.040 --> 0:22:35.800
<v Speaker 1>encrypting their data. It could be a whole hard drive,

0:22:35.840 --> 0:22:38.120
<v Speaker 1>it could be a folder of data. It's some kind

0:22:38.160 --> 0:22:40.840
<v Speaker 1>of important data that they have sitting on their computer.

0:22:41.640 --> 0:22:45.760
<v Speaker 1>And in many cases, a thief the hacker will ask

0:22:45.800 --> 0:22:49.320
<v Speaker 1>them in an email or maybe an unencrypted text document

0:22:49.359 --> 0:22:53.119
<v Speaker 1>that's now surreptitiously on their computer out of nowhere, to

0:22:54.000 --> 0:22:56.400
<v Speaker 1>send them a certain amount of bitcoins, and they tell

0:22:56.440 --> 0:22:58.320
<v Speaker 1>them how to set up a bitcoin wallet so that

0:22:58.359 --> 0:23:00.960
<v Speaker 1>they can send the bitcoins to them for them to

0:23:00.960 --> 0:23:04.520
<v Speaker 1>get a pass code to unlock their encrypted data. Now,

0:23:04.520 --> 0:23:07.360
<v Speaker 1>the weird part is they already owned this data. It's

0:23:07.359 --> 0:23:09.440
<v Speaker 1>on their own hard drive. It could be anything from

0:23:09.440 --> 0:23:12.280
<v Speaker 1>like kids photos, it could be tax documents. But in

0:23:12.320 --> 0:23:14.280
<v Speaker 1>any case, it's going to be some kind of important

0:23:14.320 --> 0:23:17.360
<v Speaker 1>information that people don't want to lose because it might

0:23:17.400 --> 0:23:20.600
<v Speaker 1>be years and years of information that's just on that computer.

0:23:21.200 --> 0:23:23.440
<v Speaker 1>So of course people are going to send them bitcoins.

0:23:23.840 --> 0:23:26.240
<v Speaker 1>And I think last I checked, a bitcoin was a

0:23:26.280 --> 0:23:28.320
<v Speaker 1>few hundred bucks, so it ends up being quite a

0:23:28.320 --> 0:23:30.000
<v Speaker 1>bit of money that they have to send to get

0:23:30.000 --> 0:23:33.320
<v Speaker 1>their information unlocked. Yeah, and this is this is the

0:23:33.359 --> 0:23:37.399
<v Speaker 1>type of malware. When we were talking about the advertising

0:23:37.440 --> 0:23:41.040
<v Speaker 1>that was targeting people through massive news sites, if I'm

0:23:41.040 --> 0:23:44.520
<v Speaker 1>not mistaken, it was specifically ransomware. It was the kind

0:23:44.520 --> 0:23:48.679
<v Speaker 1>of stuff that was encrypting users. Yeah. Yeah, so it

0:23:48.720 --> 0:23:52.000
<v Speaker 1>wasn't just malware. It was ransomware that was infecting computers.

0:23:52.040 --> 0:23:53.919
<v Speaker 1>Because malware can do other stuff too, right, it can

0:23:54.119 --> 0:23:59.480
<v Speaker 1>It can create something like a backdoor access Oh yeah, yeah,

0:24:00.119 --> 0:24:02.359
<v Speaker 1>can take control of your machine or just monitor what

0:24:02.400 --> 0:24:04.199
<v Speaker 1>you're doing. Even if they don't want to take control,

0:24:04.560 --> 0:24:06.640
<v Speaker 1>they can put in key loggers so they can see

0:24:06.720 --> 0:24:09.600
<v Speaker 1>what all your passwords are. So you might want to

0:24:09.640 --> 0:24:13.280
<v Speaker 1>think about using things like a really good password manager. Yeah,

0:24:13.840 --> 0:24:18.560
<v Speaker 1>that's what I use and I love mine. Yeah, so

0:24:18.800 --> 0:24:21.640
<v Speaker 1>the things where you don't have to type the password

0:24:21.680 --> 0:24:23.560
<v Speaker 1>in so you don't have to worry about key loggers

0:24:23.600 --> 0:24:26.840
<v Speaker 1>picking up on that kind of stuff. But we'll talk

0:24:26.880 --> 0:24:29.560
<v Speaker 1>more about that in just a second. So one of

0:24:29.560 --> 0:24:31.080
<v Speaker 1>the other ones I wanted to talk about. This one's

0:24:31.119 --> 0:24:34.520
<v Speaker 1>kind of a gray area because this is this I

0:24:34.560 --> 0:24:38.359
<v Speaker 1>titled this section spies like Us, and by this I

0:24:38.480 --> 0:24:43.240
<v Speaker 1>meant state sponsored hackers. People who are hacking on behalf

0:24:43.400 --> 0:24:49.920
<v Speaker 1>of a specific state or nation or government. Sometimes they

0:24:49.960 --> 0:24:54.800
<v Speaker 1>may be doing so not with the what should I say, like,

0:24:54.880 --> 0:24:58.640
<v Speaker 1>not with the express permission of the nation. It may

0:24:58.720 --> 0:25:01.080
<v Speaker 1>turn out that the state says, hey, we didn't tell

0:25:01.119 --> 0:25:03.040
<v Speaker 1>them to do this. They're just doing it because they

0:25:03.160 --> 0:25:06.359
<v Speaker 1>love us so much and they hate and they hate

0:25:06.400 --> 0:25:09.720
<v Speaker 1>you guys. Yea, and that's why they're doing it. Whether

0:25:09.760 --> 0:25:13.000
<v Speaker 1>that's true or not depends upon the situation. I would

0:25:13.080 --> 0:25:16.360
<v Speaker 1>I would think that if I were running a government

0:25:16.400 --> 0:25:19.600
<v Speaker 1>and I had employed a bunch of hackers to infiltrate

0:25:19.880 --> 0:25:23.840
<v Speaker 1>or sabotage another nation's systems, I also would like some

0:25:23.880 --> 0:25:28.159
<v Speaker 1>plausible deniability in there. Hey, I didn't tell him to

0:25:28.160 --> 0:25:30.439
<v Speaker 1>do it. I just said, man, it's kind of like

0:25:30.720 --> 0:25:34.560
<v Speaker 1>there's there's a story that a king of England once

0:25:34.680 --> 0:25:37.280
<v Speaker 1>yelled out, who will rid me of this meddlesome priest?

0:25:37.680 --> 0:25:39.919
<v Speaker 1>And then a couple of nights went off and ridded

0:25:40.000 --> 0:25:43.560
<v Speaker 1>him of that meddlesome priest and it turned out that

0:25:43.600 --> 0:25:46.840
<v Speaker 1>he was he was just mad and just talking out loud.

0:25:47.480 --> 0:25:50.240
<v Speaker 1>And then one of his dearest friends ended up being

0:25:50.280 --> 0:25:52.760
<v Speaker 1>murdered by a couple of nights because they heard the

0:25:52.800 --> 0:25:54.679
<v Speaker 1>guy talking and said, hey, we should get rid of them.

0:25:54.720 --> 0:25:57.840
<v Speaker 1>We'll get rewarded. That's why the States argue, I don't

0:25:57.840 --> 0:25:59.760
<v Speaker 1>know that that's always the case. Also, by the way,

0:26:00.000 --> 0:26:02.120
<v Speaker 1>are you listeners out there who recognize who I'm talking

0:26:02.160 --> 0:26:04.680
<v Speaker 1>about send me an email and prove it because I'm

0:26:04.720 --> 0:26:08.560
<v Speaker 1>a medievalist and I love that stuff. But yeah, this

0:26:08.600 --> 0:26:10.760
<v Speaker 1>is something that we see. You know, you often will

0:26:10.800 --> 0:26:13.080
<v Speaker 1>hear stories about Chinese hackers or Russian hackers. There was

0:26:13.119 --> 0:26:18.960
<v Speaker 1>a story several years ago about how information security experts

0:26:18.960 --> 0:26:23.400
<v Speaker 1>were noticing some artifacts in our power grid system that

0:26:23.440 --> 0:26:28.040
<v Speaker 1>were indicative of people who had infiltrated that system and

0:26:28.160 --> 0:26:30.680
<v Speaker 1>planted some stuff in there so that they could monitor

0:26:30.720 --> 0:26:33.280
<v Speaker 1>things or perhaps even jump back into the power grid

0:26:33.359 --> 0:26:36.520
<v Speaker 1>system should push come to shove in some sort of

0:26:36.560 --> 0:26:39.840
<v Speaker 1>political situation. They had traced it back to either China

0:26:39.960 --> 0:26:43.040
<v Speaker 1>or Russia. It's pretty tricky to actually figure out where

0:26:43.040 --> 0:26:46.600
<v Speaker 1>attacks ultimately originate from, because if you're really good, you

0:26:46.600 --> 0:26:50.400
<v Speaker 1>can cover your tracks pretty well. But the United States

0:26:50.440 --> 0:26:52.880
<v Speaker 1>has done it too. You might have heard about Stuck's Net.

0:26:53.160 --> 0:26:55.879
<v Speaker 1>That was the that was the computer virus that was

0:26:55.920 --> 0:27:01.800
<v Speaker 1>designed to to spin a centrifuge and nuclear facility at

0:27:01.800 --> 0:27:04.640
<v Speaker 1>a speed greater than what it was supposed to spin at.

0:27:05.320 --> 0:27:07.800
<v Speaker 1>And originally I think the hope was that it would

0:27:07.800 --> 0:27:12.800
<v Speaker 1>cause a catastrophic failure and perhaps even destroy the facility.

0:27:13.119 --> 0:27:15.679
<v Speaker 1>As it turned out, it caused a failure, but not

0:27:15.760 --> 0:27:19.760
<v Speaker 1>at that level, but that those are examples of something

0:27:19.760 --> 0:27:24.840
<v Speaker 1>that's technically legal within the country because it's it's endorsed

0:27:24.960 --> 0:27:30.120
<v Speaker 1>or at least permitted by a government, but you don't

0:27:30.160 --> 0:27:33.520
<v Speaker 1>want it out there because it seems pretty darn shady

0:27:33.560 --> 0:27:38.639
<v Speaker 1>to anybody else. Yeah. Yeah, So state sponsored hacks are

0:27:38.920 --> 0:27:43.359
<v Speaker 1>more worrisome to me because they oftentimes have much larger targets.

0:27:43.960 --> 0:27:48.040
<v Speaker 1>For example, they might target a large government facility, like

0:27:48.400 --> 0:27:51.640
<v Speaker 1>I don't know, the Pentagon, So I worry about those

0:27:51.680 --> 0:27:55.560
<v Speaker 1>because those kind of servers have a lot of information

0:27:55.600 --> 0:27:58.680
<v Speaker 1>on the citizens of any sort of country. So many

0:27:58.720 --> 0:28:01.320
<v Speaker 1>time you see these in the news, it's always like, oh, well,

0:28:01.320 --> 0:28:05.040
<v Speaker 1>this this hack was done by Chinese state sponsored hackers,

0:28:05.160 --> 0:28:09.520
<v Speaker 1>or Russian state sponsored hackers, or American state sponsored hackers,

0:28:09.520 --> 0:28:12.879
<v Speaker 1>and these are North Korea would be another big one. Yeah. Yeah,

0:28:12.880 --> 0:28:16.160
<v Speaker 1>So so they are either it might be a Tinama

0:28:16.240 --> 0:28:20.680
<v Speaker 1>hackers that are kind of comprised together in a illegitimate

0:28:20.720 --> 0:28:24.480
<v Speaker 1>company who are hired by a government, or like you say,

0:28:24.520 --> 0:28:29.399
<v Speaker 1>where they may not necessarily have any affiliation quote unquote

0:28:29.400 --> 0:28:33.120
<v Speaker 1>with the government, but the government ends them paying them

0:28:33.160 --> 0:28:37.280
<v Speaker 1>in some way, shape or form for their infiltration because

0:28:37.320 --> 0:28:39.719
<v Speaker 1>it ends up helping the government in some way or another.

0:28:40.400 --> 0:28:43.840
<v Speaker 1>So it's it's a very sticky scenario when you start

0:28:43.880 --> 0:28:47.080
<v Speaker 1>dealing with these state sponsored hackers, because it's it's hard

0:28:47.080 --> 0:28:51.520
<v Speaker 1>to understand, how are we going to, you know, penalize them.

0:28:51.640 --> 0:28:54.200
<v Speaker 1>Who do we penalize? Do we penalize government or the

0:28:54.240 --> 0:28:57.560
<v Speaker 1>hackers themselves? Are both like who was actually involved? It

0:28:57.720 --> 0:28:59.880
<v Speaker 1>might end up being how do we address the un

0:29:00.040 --> 0:29:03.680
<v Speaker 1>d lying situation that led to the employment of hackers

0:29:03.680 --> 0:29:08.600
<v Speaker 1>in the first place, which can get pretty pretty delicate.

0:29:08.920 --> 0:29:12.400
<v Speaker 1>Another great example not too long ago, or at least

0:29:12.440 --> 0:29:15.720
<v Speaker 1>one that may or may not have been involved in

0:29:16.120 --> 0:29:18.040
<v Speaker 1>may or may not have involved a state sponsored hacker

0:29:18.080 --> 0:29:22.200
<v Speaker 1>I'm still somewhat skeptical of that would be the Sony hack.

0:29:22.560 --> 0:29:26.360
<v Speaker 1>Oh yeah, because the Sony hack, the US government essentially

0:29:26.440 --> 0:29:29.360
<v Speaker 1>was pointing fingers to North Korea, saying the hackers must

0:29:29.400 --> 0:29:31.760
<v Speaker 1>have come from North Korea. Look at this IP address,

0:29:31.960 --> 0:29:34.480
<v Speaker 1>which we don't even need to go into detail right now,

0:29:34.800 --> 0:29:37.520
<v Speaker 1>except to say that an IP address does not proof

0:29:37.640 --> 0:29:41.520
<v Speaker 1>make but at any rate, they're pointing over at North

0:29:41.600 --> 0:29:44.080
<v Speaker 1>Korea saying we think the attacks came from there. The

0:29:44.320 --> 0:29:47.400
<v Speaker 1>attack appears to be politically motivated North Korea for its part,

0:29:47.440 --> 0:29:50.080
<v Speaker 1>the government, which, by the way, North Korea not shy

0:29:50.160 --> 0:29:53.280
<v Speaker 1>about taking credit for stuff, but they said, no, no,

0:29:53.400 --> 0:29:56.000
<v Speaker 1>we didn't, we didn't ask for this, but we're totally

0:29:56.000 --> 0:30:00.520
<v Speaker 1>cool with it happening. So you know, it's one of those.

0:30:00.560 --> 0:30:02.920
<v Speaker 1>It's also very muddy because obviously when you're talking about

0:30:02.920 --> 0:30:05.720
<v Speaker 1>things like espionage or sabotage or any of those things,

0:30:06.880 --> 0:30:09.760
<v Speaker 1>you don't you don't come out and talk more about it,

0:30:09.800 --> 0:30:13.000
<v Speaker 1>you don't. That ends up being closed away. Yeah, in fact,

0:30:13.000 --> 0:30:14.800
<v Speaker 1>I should, I should really throw that over to the

0:30:14.800 --> 0:30:16.680
<v Speaker 1>stuff they don't want you to know guys and have

0:30:16.760 --> 0:30:18.240
<v Speaker 1>them do an episode on it, because that would be

0:30:18.240 --> 0:30:22.200
<v Speaker 1>a lot of fun. And then we've got got the

0:30:22.200 --> 0:30:26.640
<v Speaker 1>the traditional at least, I would argue the traditional concept

0:30:26.680 --> 0:30:29.400
<v Speaker 1>of a hacker from the Hollywood perspective. The black hats,

0:30:30.000 --> 0:30:32.640
<v Speaker 1>the ones that they are wearing the hoodies, and they're

0:30:32.640 --> 0:30:34.920
<v Speaker 1>sitting at a keyboard and they're typing really fast on

0:30:34.960 --> 0:30:38.960
<v Speaker 1>a green and black screen over Yes, they got like,

0:30:39.040 --> 0:30:43.760
<v Speaker 1>got some junk food food around them. Yeah, mail, and

0:30:43.800 --> 0:30:46.040
<v Speaker 1>they have a ton of different windows popping up on

0:30:46.080 --> 0:30:48.280
<v Speaker 1>their computer. Really, you're really fast, so you can't make

0:30:48.320 --> 0:30:51.600
<v Speaker 1>out anything that's happening. It's entirely not true. That's not

0:30:51.640 --> 0:30:55.040
<v Speaker 1>how it works. It's actually a somewhat slow process to

0:30:55.120 --> 0:30:59.160
<v Speaker 1>get UM basically, to get reconnaissance and to get into

0:30:59.320 --> 0:31:01.960
<v Speaker 1>any kind of net work. The only things I've done,

0:31:01.960 --> 0:31:05.600
<v Speaker 1>of course, are completely legal. I've had an authorization by

0:31:05.600 --> 0:31:11.240
<v Speaker 1>everybody who I have tested my abilities on. Right. Yeah,

0:31:11.280 --> 0:31:16.040
<v Speaker 1>so black hats. That's That's another awkward definition because it's

0:31:16.080 --> 0:31:18.240
<v Speaker 1>not one that I like to use all the time

0:31:18.280 --> 0:31:22.440
<v Speaker 1>because black hat hacker means that there's it makes hackers

0:31:22.840 --> 0:31:26.040
<v Speaker 1>have more of a negative appeal to a lot of people.

0:31:26.160 --> 0:31:29.160
<v Speaker 1>So I always just call them black hat thieves. Yeah. Now,

0:31:29.240 --> 0:31:32.200
<v Speaker 1>that's a great way of putting it, because typically you'll

0:31:32.240 --> 0:31:35.480
<v Speaker 1>see things like um uh, the idea of infiltrating a

0:31:35.520 --> 0:31:38.120
<v Speaker 1>system in order to steal information, perhaps to sell it

0:31:38.160 --> 0:31:41.320
<v Speaker 1>to someone else, or to hold it against the party

0:31:41.320 --> 0:31:44.400
<v Speaker 1>that you've stolen it from. Um, you know, so it

0:31:44.480 --> 0:31:50.080
<v Speaker 1>might be extortion as opposed to to stealing and selling. Also,

0:31:50.120 --> 0:31:52.400
<v Speaker 1>we should go ahead and point out something else that

0:31:52.440 --> 0:31:55.280
<v Speaker 1>I'll talk about it in a future episode, but I've

0:31:55.320 --> 0:31:58.880
<v Speaker 1>mentioned it in previous ones too. Hackers don't necessarily just

0:31:59.040 --> 0:32:02.120
<v Speaker 1>sit at a keyboard in type and strings of letters

0:32:02.120 --> 0:32:04.520
<v Speaker 1>and numbers. They also do a lot of social engineering

0:32:04.560 --> 0:32:07.280
<v Speaker 1>where or they can do a lot of social engineering

0:32:07.280 --> 0:32:10.360
<v Speaker 1>where they attempt to gain access to systems, either by

0:32:10.440 --> 0:32:14.520
<v Speaker 1>physically gaining access to a system, which makes it way

0:32:14.560 --> 0:32:18.840
<v Speaker 1>easier than remotely doing it, or even easier than that

0:32:18.920 --> 0:32:21.400
<v Speaker 1>manipulating someone who does have access to a system, and

0:32:21.400 --> 0:32:24.760
<v Speaker 1>then you get it that way, and it's surprisingly easy

0:32:24.840 --> 0:32:29.600
<v Speaker 1>to do if employees have not been educated on how

0:32:29.680 --> 0:32:32.440
<v Speaker 1>to spot that and avoid it. Yeah, properly training your

0:32:33.320 --> 0:32:35.959
<v Speaker 1>employees at your place of work is really important when

0:32:36.000 --> 0:32:39.560
<v Speaker 1>it comes to social engineering. And it is incredibly easy

0:32:39.800 --> 0:32:43.800
<v Speaker 1>to do social engineering, especially when you're a female, I

0:32:43.880 --> 0:32:47.040
<v Speaker 1>would imagine. So it turns out also if you are

0:32:47.160 --> 0:32:51.520
<v Speaker 1>dressed as the stereotypical it guy and you are there too. Yeah,

0:32:51.640 --> 0:32:55.800
<v Speaker 1>quote unquote upgrade someone's machine. Really easy to get access

0:32:55.840 --> 0:33:01.520
<v Speaker 1>to that machine. Yeah, people are so eager. Yeah. And obviously,

0:33:01.600 --> 0:33:05.600
<v Speaker 1>like social engineering completely depends upon identifying and then exploiting

0:33:05.680 --> 0:33:11.760
<v Speaker 1>a person's vulnerability and typically speaking like greed lust, those

0:33:11.800 --> 0:33:16.080
<v Speaker 1>are two big ones that are exploitable and that the

0:33:16.120 --> 0:33:18.560
<v Speaker 1>people who are really good at social engineering know that,

0:33:18.720 --> 0:33:21.520
<v Speaker 1>and they're very good at that leveraging that. Just as

0:33:21.560 --> 0:33:25.719
<v Speaker 1>knowing what sort of vulnerabilities typically show up within code

0:33:25.760 --> 0:33:29.320
<v Speaker 1>within programs, you need to know what vulnerabilities show up

0:33:29.360 --> 0:33:33.239
<v Speaker 1>in people. And I also I had a little thing

0:33:33.240 --> 0:33:36.120
<v Speaker 1>on here about botnet masters. Really what in this I

0:33:36.160 --> 0:33:38.160
<v Speaker 1>was thinking about the people who are using malware to

0:33:38.200 --> 0:33:41.160
<v Speaker 1>get that backdoor access to machines, to get to get

0:33:41.160 --> 0:33:45.959
<v Speaker 1>that administrative control over a wide array. Sometimes we call

0:33:46.000 --> 0:33:48.200
<v Speaker 1>it a botnet, sometimes we call it a zombie army

0:33:48.640 --> 0:33:52.720
<v Speaker 1>of user computers, and then utilizing that to do stuff

0:33:52.760 --> 0:33:57.880
<v Speaker 1>like distributed denial of service attacks so our de dos

0:33:57.920 --> 0:34:03.600
<v Speaker 1>attacks where you are directing an army essentially to coordinate

0:34:03.640 --> 0:34:08.200
<v Speaker 1>an attack against an identified target. Sometimes this is done

0:34:08.320 --> 0:34:11.480
<v Speaker 1>just to cause problems. I mean obviously if you've ever

0:34:12.080 --> 0:34:16.680
<v Speaker 1>had issues logging into like a gaming network. Xbox Live

0:34:16.719 --> 0:34:19.880
<v Speaker 1>has had this happen, PlayStation has had this happen, where

0:34:20.280 --> 0:34:23.560
<v Speaker 1>people who are disenchanted with the service for one reason

0:34:23.680 --> 0:34:26.000
<v Speaker 1>or another, or they just want to do it for

0:34:26.040 --> 0:34:31.000
<v Speaker 1>the lulls, specifically around holiday times. That's a big that's

0:34:31.000 --> 0:34:34.040
<v Speaker 1>a big target time to attack something like Xbox Live.

0:34:34.600 --> 0:34:37.520
<v Speaker 1>They'll direct a ton of traffic to break down servers,

0:34:37.560 --> 0:34:40.560
<v Speaker 1>so servers can't respond to legitimate traffic because they're too

0:34:40.560 --> 0:34:45.480
<v Speaker 1>busy responding to a bunch of fake traffic. Essentially, I'm oversimplifying,

0:34:45.480 --> 0:34:47.919
<v Speaker 1>but this is a basic detos attack. It is. It's

0:34:47.920 --> 0:34:49.919
<v Speaker 1>such a mean thing to do to those little kids

0:34:49.960 --> 0:34:52.680
<v Speaker 1>during Christmas time, just turn off their xboxes so that

0:34:52.719 --> 0:34:54.760
<v Speaker 1>they can't log in and they can't play their games,

0:34:54.760 --> 0:34:58.160
<v Speaker 1>so they just go on. Yeah, yeah, I think, break

0:34:58.239 --> 0:35:01.359
<v Speaker 1>my heart. Gosh, it's a move. It's a jerk move.

0:35:01.480 --> 0:35:04.680
<v Speaker 1>Don't do it. Yeah. I love the definition, or I

0:35:04.760 --> 0:35:09.399
<v Speaker 1>love the term zombie for botnets, because that's exactly what

0:35:09.440 --> 0:35:11.920
<v Speaker 1>it is. Where you have a you have a zero,

0:35:12.200 --> 0:35:14.680
<v Speaker 1>a patient zero, and that would be the first computer.

0:35:15.440 --> 0:35:18.319
<v Speaker 1>They end up biting a few more computers, and those

0:35:18.360 --> 0:35:21.320
<v Speaker 1>ones end up getting infected with the same exact infection

0:35:21.360 --> 0:35:24.600
<v Speaker 1>that patient zero had, and then those ones end up

0:35:24.800 --> 0:35:27.640
<v Speaker 1>biting ten each, So you end up with thousands upon

0:35:27.719 --> 0:35:31.160
<v Speaker 1>thousands of these computers that each have the same exact infection,

0:35:31.600 --> 0:35:35.480
<v Speaker 1>and they all end up perpetrating the same exact vulnerability

0:35:35.640 --> 0:35:39.480
<v Speaker 1>on whatever their target might be. Yeah, and then ultimately

0:35:39.960 --> 0:35:42.960
<v Speaker 1>you end up with a situation where Nagan is standing

0:35:43.000 --> 0:35:45.080
<v Speaker 1>there with a baseball bat and you don't know whose

0:35:45.080 --> 0:35:49.399
<v Speaker 1>head he's gonna cave in. I might have taken that

0:35:49.600 --> 0:35:52.719
<v Speaker 1>metaphor a little too far. But one of the things

0:35:52.719 --> 0:35:56.080
<v Speaker 1>that botnet controllers might do, and in fact, this has

0:35:56.120 --> 0:35:59.759
<v Speaker 1>happened on multiple occasions. It's similar to ransomware is they'll

0:35:59.760 --> 0:36:03.440
<v Speaker 1>send a message to an identified target and say, hey,

0:36:04.200 --> 0:36:06.799
<v Speaker 1>we we got your number. We're going to come after you.

0:36:07.040 --> 0:36:10.200
<v Speaker 1>Unless you pay us a certain amount of money, we

0:36:10.239 --> 0:36:15.040
<v Speaker 1>will unleash the dogs of war on your servers and

0:36:15.160 --> 0:36:17.880
<v Speaker 1>you will be unable to do business. And there have

0:36:17.880 --> 0:36:21.200
<v Speaker 1>been cases where businesses have folded to this kind of pressure,

0:36:21.239 --> 0:36:24.240
<v Speaker 1>where they have in fact paid to do this because

0:36:24.760 --> 0:36:30.000
<v Speaker 1>the hospital. Yes, yes, it was. Yeah, I've seen a

0:36:30.000 --> 0:36:38.000
<v Speaker 1>few cases of particularly malicious and odious acts against things

0:36:38.000 --> 0:36:40.960
<v Speaker 1>like hospitals. There was one year when I was participating

0:36:41.760 --> 0:36:45.719
<v Speaker 1>in a charity for children's hospitals and the charity was

0:36:46.000 --> 0:36:50.800
<v Speaker 1>targeted in the middle of the event and for about

0:36:50.920 --> 0:36:55.440
<v Speaker 1>three hours they were offline trying to deal with that. Yeah,

0:36:55.560 --> 0:36:57.920
<v Speaker 1>it's and in that case it wasn't. It wasn't an

0:36:57.960 --> 0:37:00.799
<v Speaker 1>attack in an effort to get money. I don't think.

0:37:00.840 --> 0:37:03.280
<v Speaker 1>I think it was just someone being truly an awful

0:37:03.480 --> 0:37:06.879
<v Speaker 1>human being. But we have seen cases of people trying

0:37:06.880 --> 0:37:09.560
<v Speaker 1>to do this in order to extort money. So you're

0:37:09.600 --> 0:37:14.720
<v Speaker 1>probably noticing some trends here extortion, stealing, you know, holding

0:37:14.719 --> 0:37:18.040
<v Speaker 1>things for a ransom, this idea of making sure that

0:37:18.880 --> 0:37:23.040
<v Speaker 1>people are spending money out of fear or out of

0:37:23.080 --> 0:37:26.480
<v Speaker 1>a need to get back and have access to something

0:37:26.520 --> 0:37:31.480
<v Speaker 1>that belongs to them. These are all terrible, terrible motivations

0:37:31.480 --> 0:37:35.840
<v Speaker 1>to make money, and as such, as such terrible motivations,

0:37:35.880 --> 0:37:37.759
<v Speaker 1>you might think, well, wait a minute, how are they

0:37:37.800 --> 0:37:40.000
<v Speaker 1>actually like, how are they getting paid? How is this

0:37:40.040 --> 0:37:45.000
<v Speaker 1>money transfer happening? Because you would think anything that would

0:37:45.040 --> 0:37:49.600
<v Speaker 1>be traceable would end up being somewhat problematic. You've got

0:37:49.600 --> 0:37:51.800
<v Speaker 1>a trail that leads back to you as a person,

0:37:51.960 --> 0:37:55.480
<v Speaker 1>then pretty soon law enforcement's going to get involved, or

0:37:55.520 --> 0:38:01.960
<v Speaker 1>at least the irs. So how Shannon do hackers? How

0:38:01.960 --> 0:38:04.799
<v Speaker 1>do they get the money? So there's probably some ways

0:38:04.800 --> 0:38:07.720
<v Speaker 1>that I don't even know about yet, but the ones

0:38:07.760 --> 0:38:10.560
<v Speaker 1>that I can think of would be trading of high

0:38:10.640 --> 0:38:14.240
<v Speaker 1>value data. So that's a pretty big one, where say

0:38:14.280 --> 0:38:16.759
<v Speaker 1>a hacker collects a whole bunch of really really high

0:38:16.840 --> 0:38:20.719
<v Speaker 1>value data like your SO security number, your credit card accounts,

0:38:20.800 --> 0:38:24.440
<v Speaker 1>your banking account tons of information and they decide to

0:38:24.480 --> 0:38:26.600
<v Speaker 1>go on to a deep web forum sell it, and

0:38:26.640 --> 0:38:29.880
<v Speaker 1>then or trade it for something else of high value,

0:38:29.920 --> 0:38:33.680
<v Speaker 1>for example, a gift card. They could ask for people

0:38:33.719 --> 0:38:35.759
<v Speaker 1>to give them a ton of gift cards that are,

0:38:35.800 --> 0:38:38.759
<v Speaker 1>like you, twenty five or fifty dollars each, and then

0:38:39.600 --> 0:38:42.920
<v Speaker 1>use those gift cards at a retailer who is easily

0:38:43.320 --> 0:38:46.319
<v Speaker 1>vulnerable to some kind of gift card scam, and in

0:38:46.320 --> 0:38:48.439
<v Speaker 1>that sense they would be able to make some kind

0:38:48.440 --> 0:38:50.720
<v Speaker 1>of money back through those gift cards and that trade

0:38:50.719 --> 0:38:55.160
<v Speaker 1>of that high value data that they stole from whoever

0:38:55.200 --> 0:38:58.799
<v Speaker 1>it might be, whatever company. Another way would be bitcoins.

0:38:59.320 --> 0:39:01.560
<v Speaker 1>Now that's probably the most obvious one, of course, because

0:39:01.600 --> 0:39:04.600
<v Speaker 1>bitcoins are very very hard to track. Yes, they are

0:39:04.719 --> 0:39:07.800
<v Speaker 1>traceable in some circumstances, depending on what kind of wallet

0:39:07.840 --> 0:39:11.520
<v Speaker 1>you use, but in a lot of circumstances, the bitcoins

0:39:11.560 --> 0:39:15.080
<v Speaker 1>will trade wallets so many times that it'll be somewhat

0:39:15.080 --> 0:39:17.560
<v Speaker 1>impossible to find out where it actually came from, where

0:39:17.560 --> 0:39:20.680
<v Speaker 1>it actually started. Yeah, it's kind of interesting because every

0:39:20.719 --> 0:39:24.239
<v Speaker 1>single bitcoin contains with it a record of every transaction,

0:39:24.280 --> 0:39:26.600
<v Speaker 1>but that does not mean that the parties involved are

0:39:26.600 --> 0:39:31.520
<v Speaker 1>actually identifiable. Yeah, exactly. It really is. It's actually data

0:39:31.600 --> 0:39:34.440
<v Speaker 1>that's used in order to allow for the mining of

0:39:34.480 --> 0:39:38.440
<v Speaker 1>further bitcoins. It's a really fascinating process. But one of

0:39:38.480 --> 0:39:41.280
<v Speaker 1>the things that attracts people to bitcoins is this idea

0:39:41.360 --> 0:39:45.360
<v Speaker 1>of being able to spend them anonymously and be able

0:39:45.360 --> 0:39:50.600
<v Speaker 1>to purchase things, whether legal or illegal, without it being

0:39:50.719 --> 0:39:53.640
<v Speaker 1>traced back to that person. You often will hear about

0:39:53.760 --> 0:39:56.480
<v Speaker 1>things like, you know, the old Silk Road, where you

0:39:56.520 --> 0:40:00.440
<v Speaker 1>could purchase all sources of stuff, including illegal drugs or

0:40:00.520 --> 0:40:04.719
<v Speaker 1>other materials, sometimes weapons, that kind of stuff, and you

0:40:04.719 --> 0:40:07.680
<v Speaker 1>could do it through bitcoins, and people felt a high

0:40:07.760 --> 0:40:11.680
<v Speaker 1>level of confidence because it was not a state backed currency.

0:40:12.360 --> 0:40:17.640
<v Speaker 1>It was this independent cryptocurrency that allowed them that freedom

0:40:17.680 --> 0:40:22.000
<v Speaker 1>and had real value because people want the bitcoins. If

0:40:22.040 --> 0:40:25.920
<v Speaker 1>no one wanted the bitcoins, they wouldn't be worth anything, right,

0:40:26.000 --> 0:40:29.440
<v Speaker 1>And bitcoins have actually been pretty steady last time I checked,

0:40:29.520 --> 0:40:34.400
<v Speaker 1>so their value has been pretty decent in late days,

0:40:34.520 --> 0:40:38.399
<v Speaker 1>in recent days, So I completely understand why hacker would

0:40:38.440 --> 0:40:42.120
<v Speaker 1>want to be paid in bitcoins. It makes sense. Yeah. Yeah,

0:40:42.160 --> 0:40:45.160
<v Speaker 1>there's also the old, the old deal of putting the

0:40:45.200 --> 0:40:49.279
<v Speaker 1>money into the washing machine. Right, that's how money laundering works, right, Yes,

0:40:49.760 --> 0:40:52.359
<v Speaker 1>money laundering. So that was something that I learned about

0:40:52.400 --> 0:40:53.880
<v Speaker 1>way back in the day when I worked at a

0:40:53.920 --> 0:40:56.920
<v Speaker 1>bank of all places, which also got me really interested

0:40:56.960 --> 0:41:00.680
<v Speaker 1>in security before I started podcasting. But money laundering, it's

0:41:00.760 --> 0:41:03.120
<v Speaker 1>very easy for somebody to go online, be able to

0:41:03.160 --> 0:41:06.960
<v Speaker 1>sell this high value data, get some bitcoins or it

0:41:07.040 --> 0:41:10.880
<v Speaker 1>might be some other form of currency, and then be

0:41:10.920 --> 0:41:15.200
<v Speaker 1>able to resell that money or be able to trade

0:41:15.200 --> 0:41:17.759
<v Speaker 1>a product to get real money, real cash at one

0:41:17.760 --> 0:41:22.680
<v Speaker 1>point or another. But basically it's it's um exchanging the

0:41:22.800 --> 0:41:26.160
<v Speaker 1>hands that hold that money so many times that again

0:41:26.200 --> 0:41:29.279
<v Speaker 1>it's very hard to trace, yeah, and it's it's hard

0:41:29.320 --> 0:41:32.600
<v Speaker 1>to determine that the original source of that money was

0:41:32.680 --> 0:41:37.239
<v Speaker 1>anything remotely illegal. And then depending on again, if you're

0:41:37.320 --> 0:41:39.960
<v Speaker 1>if you're a state sponsored hacker, you're probably just drawing

0:41:40.000 --> 0:41:44.080
<v Speaker 1>a salary or doing contract work, so you're actually getting paid.

0:41:44.239 --> 0:41:50.160
<v Speaker 1>You get a pay check, yeah, yeah, so you got

0:41:50.160 --> 0:41:53.440
<v Speaker 1>money withdrawn from your paycheck to handle to support the

0:41:53.480 --> 0:41:57.120
<v Speaker 1>government while you are subverting other governments, and then it

0:41:57.160 --> 0:41:59.719
<v Speaker 1>looks completely legitimate. So that's a really easy way for

0:42:00.000 --> 0:42:06.120
<v Speaker 1>somebody to do something that might be very very bad. Yeah,

0:42:06.160 --> 0:42:09.040
<v Speaker 1>because they are they do have to pay the I rs.

0:42:09.120 --> 0:42:11.239
<v Speaker 1>They do get a tax refund every year, they do

0:42:11.360 --> 0:42:14.680
<v Speaker 1>have an employer, so it looks completely normal for them

0:42:14.680 --> 0:42:19.520
<v Speaker 1>to be receiving a paycheck for whatever work this might be. Yeah,

0:42:19.640 --> 0:42:24.880
<v Speaker 1>So the nice thing is there aren't just quote unquote

0:42:24.920 --> 0:42:28.200
<v Speaker 1>bad guys out there doing all this kind of work

0:42:28.200 --> 0:42:32.879
<v Speaker 1>with computers, with a hacking, with discovering vulnerabilities. There are

0:42:32.880 --> 0:42:35.640
<v Speaker 1>plenty of people, as as you mentioned earlier, Shannon, who

0:42:35.680 --> 0:42:39.480
<v Speaker 1>are doing this in order to help others, either to

0:42:39.600 --> 0:42:43.760
<v Speaker 1>make systems more secure or to inform people of how

0:42:43.800 --> 0:42:46.479
<v Speaker 1>these kind of attacks happen so that they can be

0:42:46.480 --> 0:42:49.640
<v Speaker 1>better prepared to defend themselves. So let's talk about some

0:42:49.719 --> 0:42:54.160
<v Speaker 1>of them. Of course, if you have black hat hackers, right,

0:42:54.200 --> 0:42:56.560
<v Speaker 1>you got the bad guys you gotta have, you gotta

0:42:56.600 --> 0:43:01.000
<v Speaker 1>have the white white hat white hack hackers. These these

0:43:01.040 --> 0:43:07.200
<v Speaker 1>are the noble bounty hunter characters of those westerns, the

0:43:07.200 --> 0:43:11.200
<v Speaker 1>ones who you know they've seen things, but deep down

0:43:11.280 --> 0:43:14.960
<v Speaker 1>they have a heart of gold. Well, not all of them,

0:43:15.040 --> 0:43:20.640
<v Speaker 1>but a lot of my friends are considered white hat hackers.

0:43:20.719 --> 0:43:24.280
<v Speaker 1>They're the people who either they work for a company

0:43:24.320 --> 0:43:28.200
<v Speaker 1>that specializes insecurity. So a lot of my friends work

0:43:28.239 --> 0:43:31.760
<v Speaker 1>for these companies who will be contracted with big brands,

0:43:32.360 --> 0:43:34.719
<v Speaker 1>go into their networks and then find out what the

0:43:34.800 --> 0:43:37.839
<v Speaker 1>vulnerabilities are and fix them, or they will give them

0:43:37.840 --> 0:43:39.680
<v Speaker 1>a report and tell them how to fix them fix

0:43:39.719 --> 0:43:42.240
<v Speaker 1>it in the future. They make a lot of money.

0:43:42.520 --> 0:43:44.520
<v Speaker 1>A lot of them don't like it because they have

0:43:45.080 --> 0:43:49.799
<v Speaker 1>specific amounts of vulnerabilities or specific timeframe set that they

0:43:49.840 --> 0:43:52.040
<v Speaker 1>have to get this work done, and a lot of

0:43:52.040 --> 0:43:54.359
<v Speaker 1>times hacking takes a lot of time. It takes a

0:43:54.360 --> 0:43:58.760
<v Speaker 1>lot of information reconnaissance. So a lot of my friends

0:43:58.760 --> 0:44:02.280
<v Speaker 1>don't necessarily appreciate having to be under these time constraints

0:44:02.360 --> 0:44:05.560
<v Speaker 1>with these big brands well, particularly since you figure the

0:44:05.560 --> 0:44:09.200
<v Speaker 1>bad guys aren't under any particular time constraints exactly. So

0:44:09.440 --> 0:44:12.920
<v Speaker 1>the bad guys have tons of time to find these vulnerabilities,

0:44:12.920 --> 0:44:14.839
<v Speaker 1>while the white hacks are under the stress of these

0:44:14.840 --> 0:44:17.000
<v Speaker 1>time constraints to get the work done so that they

0:44:17.000 --> 0:44:20.040
<v Speaker 1>make their bosses happy. In this sense, a lot of

0:44:20.840 --> 0:44:22.600
<v Speaker 1>a lot of people that I know have created their

0:44:22.640 --> 0:44:26.480
<v Speaker 1>own security companies because of this fault in the generic

0:44:26.560 --> 0:44:30.360
<v Speaker 1>nature of having these security companies. So they said, you know,

0:44:30.400 --> 0:44:33.480
<v Speaker 1>I'm tired of having to deal with these constraints that

0:44:33.520 --> 0:44:35.520
<v Speaker 1>my boss has given me. Just going to open my

0:44:35.640 --> 0:44:37.799
<v Speaker 1>own security company, and we're going to do it even

0:44:37.840 --> 0:44:40.440
<v Speaker 1>better because we won't give ourselves those time constraints. We'll

0:44:40.480 --> 0:44:44.040
<v Speaker 1>give us ourselves several months to find all the vulnerabilities

0:44:44.080 --> 0:44:46.720
<v Speaker 1>that we absolutely can and then we'll write a report

0:44:46.760 --> 0:44:49.279
<v Speaker 1>and we'll fix it. And those are the ones that

0:44:49.400 --> 0:44:51.960
<v Speaker 1>I would definitely work with if I had to hire

0:44:52.000 --> 0:44:55.200
<v Speaker 1>a security company. Yeah, because they're the ones who are

0:44:55.239 --> 0:44:58.799
<v Speaker 1>going to use the exact same kind of methodologies, right

0:44:59.040 --> 0:45:01.480
<v Speaker 1>the bad guys are going to use. And if if

0:45:01.520 --> 0:45:05.080
<v Speaker 1>you want to really be secure, you want the people

0:45:05.120 --> 0:45:08.239
<v Speaker 1>to throw everything they can at your system so that

0:45:08.400 --> 0:45:11.239
<v Speaker 1>you can find out are you actually secure? If you're not,

0:45:11.360 --> 0:45:14.120
<v Speaker 1>what do you need to do to address it? If

0:45:14.120 --> 0:45:17.000
<v Speaker 1>you want to see a movie that does a very

0:45:17.520 --> 0:45:21.600
<v Speaker 1>fantasy version of this very idea, there's a nineteen ninety

0:45:21.600 --> 0:45:26.080
<v Speaker 1>two film that I always think back to. Sneakers had

0:45:26.160 --> 0:45:29.200
<v Speaker 1>Robert Redford and Dan Ackroyd, who plays a character named mother.

0:45:30.520 --> 0:45:34.080
<v Speaker 1>Ben Kingsley is in it, a ton of folks, River

0:45:34.160 --> 0:45:37.960
<v Speaker 1>Phoenix was in it, and it's a It's a movie

0:45:38.000 --> 0:45:42.799
<v Speaker 1>about a group of kind of almost like outcasts who

0:45:42.960 --> 0:45:46.080
<v Speaker 1>have grouped together to form a company that they specifically

0:45:46.120 --> 0:45:49.439
<v Speaker 1>do this. They try to infiltrate a company in order

0:45:49.480 --> 0:45:54.200
<v Speaker 1>to test its security, not to exploit it, but rather

0:45:54.320 --> 0:45:57.560
<v Speaker 1>to tell the company, hey, here's how we got in,

0:45:57.640 --> 0:45:59.759
<v Speaker 1>here's how someone else could get in, so you need

0:45:59.800 --> 0:46:02.879
<v Speaker 1>to plug this vulnerability that kind of thing. And then

0:46:02.880 --> 0:46:05.359
<v Speaker 1>of course they get involved in all sorts of shenanigans.

0:46:05.719 --> 0:46:08.520
<v Speaker 1>And in case you are interested in the methodology, I

0:46:08.560 --> 0:46:11.920
<v Speaker 1>actually find it very very interesting how they get their

0:46:11.960 --> 0:46:15.120
<v Speaker 1>work done, because of course they have to go through

0:46:15.239 --> 0:46:18.120
<v Speaker 1>the tennis match of back and forth with a brand

0:46:18.160 --> 0:46:21.680
<v Speaker 1>name company, whatever it might be. So they'll have to

0:46:21.719 --> 0:46:24.239
<v Speaker 1>get a purchase order, they'll do a little bit of

0:46:24.280 --> 0:46:26.640
<v Speaker 1>negotiation for an amount that they'll do the work for,

0:46:27.120 --> 0:46:29.480
<v Speaker 1>and then they'll go in and they'll gather information on

0:46:29.520 --> 0:46:33.040
<v Speaker 1>the network, and they'll capture traffic, and they'll try to

0:46:33.080 --> 0:46:35.760
<v Speaker 1>find any kind of vulnerabilities that are on that network,

0:46:36.400 --> 0:46:39.319
<v Speaker 1>even with the people too. For example, they could use

0:46:39.360 --> 0:46:44.120
<v Speaker 1>social engineering to get into the server rack physically, or

0:46:44.160 --> 0:46:47.520
<v Speaker 1>they could get into a network that doesn't necessarily have

0:46:47.600 --> 0:46:51.440
<v Speaker 1>a very good password on it. They could email clients

0:46:51.480 --> 0:46:54.000
<v Speaker 1>that work there, that are employed at the brand name

0:46:54.040 --> 0:46:58.200
<v Speaker 1>company with I don't know malware written PDFs for example,

0:46:59.000 --> 0:47:01.040
<v Speaker 1>and they can use why list attacks. They could do

0:47:01.120 --> 0:47:03.480
<v Speaker 1>war driving from the parking lot if they wanted to.

0:47:04.000 --> 0:47:06.879
<v Speaker 1>And then what they'll do is write a very very

0:47:06.880 --> 0:47:10.040
<v Speaker 1>long report so that the brand name company can see

0:47:10.120 --> 0:47:12.759
<v Speaker 1>exactly what happens on their network and exactly what they

0:47:12.760 --> 0:47:16.560
<v Speaker 1>were able to do from whatever back door they were

0:47:16.560 --> 0:47:20.520
<v Speaker 1>able to get into. It's really interesting how well they're

0:47:20.520 --> 0:47:24.960
<v Speaker 1>able to put everything together in turn hopefully save this

0:47:25.000 --> 0:47:27.720
<v Speaker 1>company in the long run thousands and thousands of dollars.

0:47:28.920 --> 0:47:30.759
<v Speaker 1>We will be back to talk a little bit more

0:47:30.800 --> 0:47:34.719
<v Speaker 1>about hacking for that cold hard cash after we take

0:47:34.880 --> 0:47:48.920
<v Speaker 1>another quick break. Security has always been a tick talk approach, Right,

0:47:48.960 --> 0:47:51.360
<v Speaker 1>You've got the tick, which is where someone has identified

0:47:51.440 --> 0:47:54.400
<v Speaker 1>a way of exploiting a system, and then the talk

0:47:54.600 --> 0:47:58.359
<v Speaker 1>is where you find a way to correct that vulnerability.

0:47:58.760 --> 0:48:01.319
<v Speaker 1>The tick is the next time someone's found of vulnerability,

0:48:02.000 --> 0:48:05.200
<v Speaker 1>you're always going to have that, right unless someone somehow

0:48:05.680 --> 0:48:09.359
<v Speaker 1>designs the absolute perfect system, which as far as we know,

0:48:09.640 --> 0:48:13.759
<v Speaker 1>is an impossibility. Yeah. Yeah, because for one thing, if

0:48:13.800 --> 0:48:17.080
<v Speaker 1>people are involved, there's no such thing as a perfect system. Yeah,

0:48:17.320 --> 0:48:19.879
<v Speaker 1>it's always a battle, and I love my video game,

0:48:19.920 --> 0:48:24.240
<v Speaker 1>so I love a battle. But yeah, it also drives

0:48:24.280 --> 0:48:27.200
<v Speaker 1>other other industries though, because we'll see things like the

0:48:27.400 --> 0:48:31.960
<v Speaker 1>artificial intelligence industry improve as a result of this security

0:48:32.000 --> 0:48:36.160
<v Speaker 1>battle between hackers and the infosec experts who are trying

0:48:36.200 --> 0:48:39.960
<v Speaker 1>to make sure to their protecting systems. And as a result,

0:48:40.040 --> 0:48:42.480
<v Speaker 1>we're getting information that can be used in other areas,

0:48:43.120 --> 0:48:46.719
<v Speaker 1>which is phenomenal. Like I remember, here's the simple one.

0:48:46.760 --> 0:48:49.680
<v Speaker 1>It's as far as security goes, This is as low

0:48:49.800 --> 0:48:53.080
<v Speaker 1>level as it gets. But the capture system. So when

0:48:53.200 --> 0:48:57.400
<v Speaker 1>capture was implemented, even the people who were writing capture

0:48:57.480 --> 0:48:59.799
<v Speaker 1>at the time, we're not really thinking of it as

0:49:00.000 --> 0:49:03.279
<v Speaker 1>being some sort of full proof security system to make

0:49:03.320 --> 0:49:06.400
<v Speaker 1>sure that bots don't get into a system, right. They

0:49:06.440 --> 0:49:10.400
<v Speaker 1>weren't thinking, oh, now only human beings can get access.

0:49:10.520 --> 0:49:12.280
<v Speaker 1>And if you don't know what a capture is, anytime

0:49:12.360 --> 0:49:14.160
<v Speaker 1>you get you're filling out a thing and you get

0:49:14.200 --> 0:49:18.120
<v Speaker 1>a little picture of something and it says tell you

0:49:18.280 --> 0:49:20.600
<v Speaker 1>write down the word or numbers that are in this picture,

0:49:20.719 --> 0:49:23.719
<v Speaker 1>or even to a point of identify the pictures in

0:49:23.800 --> 0:49:27.279
<v Speaker 1>this sequence that have this particular feature, like identify all

0:49:27.320 --> 0:49:29.080
<v Speaker 1>the pictures that have a lake in it or something

0:49:29.160 --> 0:49:32.320
<v Speaker 1>like that. That's simply that's simply a version of capture.

0:49:33.600 --> 0:49:35.560
<v Speaker 1>The people who made it, they actually said, our goal

0:49:35.800 --> 0:49:38.640
<v Speaker 1>was really to help push artificial intelligence, because we created

0:49:38.680 --> 0:49:42.839
<v Speaker 1>a system where programmers or hackers had to start coming

0:49:42.960 --> 0:49:47.240
<v Speaker 1>up with computer programs that could identify the same things

0:49:47.320 --> 0:49:50.759
<v Speaker 1>that we humans can identify. And in turn, that means

0:49:50.880 --> 0:49:55.200
<v Speaker 1>now we've got software that pushes forward artificial intelligence. Now, granted,

0:49:55.239 --> 0:49:58.080
<v Speaker 1>that also means you have to improve the system you

0:49:58.160 --> 0:50:00.399
<v Speaker 1>had designed to keep bots out in the first place.

0:50:00.680 --> 0:50:03.040
<v Speaker 1>So again it goes to that TikTok, But there's an

0:50:03.080 --> 0:50:07.680
<v Speaker 1>added benefit beyond someone being able to to automatically access

0:50:07.760 --> 0:50:10.919
<v Speaker 1>systems and build, you know, dozens and dozens of fake

0:50:11.040 --> 0:50:14.120
<v Speaker 1>profiles on Facebook or whatever it might be, whatever that

0:50:14.239 --> 0:50:17.279
<v Speaker 1>might be. Yeah, yeah, And and keep in mind, like

0:50:17.480 --> 0:50:20.280
<v Speaker 1>like we've been saying here, I mean, any any systems

0:50:20.400 --> 0:50:23.360
<v Speaker 1>security is only as strong as its weakest link. That

0:50:23.480 --> 0:50:27.960
<v Speaker 1>weakest link is pretty much always people. That's the big one, right.

0:50:28.120 --> 0:50:30.720
<v Speaker 1>But I mean, I've I've read stories about a hacker

0:50:31.120 --> 0:50:34.760
<v Speaker 1>gaining access to a system because there was an overall

0:50:34.840 --> 0:50:38.280
<v Speaker 1>security system that was really robust for the main company,

0:50:38.840 --> 0:50:41.360
<v Speaker 1>but then they had a little branch office, and the

0:50:41.440 --> 0:50:44.200
<v Speaker 1>branch office didn't have that crazy amount of security but

0:50:44.719 --> 0:50:47.719
<v Speaker 1>was still on the same network. I think I read

0:50:47.760 --> 0:50:50.480
<v Speaker 1>about that story too, So I mean, these are these

0:50:50.520 --> 0:50:53.120
<v Speaker 1>are things like if you identify a potential point of

0:50:53.200 --> 0:50:57.520
<v Speaker 1>weakness that's now suddenly the you know it's it's like

0:50:57.680 --> 0:51:00.759
<v Speaker 1>a bank vault. If the bank vault hasn't enormous door

0:51:00.840 --> 0:51:03.719
<v Speaker 1>with huge locks on it that you have to get through. Oh,

0:51:03.800 --> 0:51:06.279
<v Speaker 1>but it also has a backdoor. Just for convenience sake,

0:51:06.520 --> 0:51:10.440
<v Speaker 1>You're going to aim for the backdoor. But there are

0:51:10.480 --> 0:51:14.719
<v Speaker 1>other ways that hackers can make a legitimate living that

0:51:14.880 --> 0:51:19.399
<v Speaker 1>don't even involve testing security systems. It might involve education. Yeah,

0:51:19.560 --> 0:51:23.080
<v Speaker 1>absolutely so education is I guess what you would say,

0:51:23.160 --> 0:51:25.920
<v Speaker 1>I fall into that kind of category. And while I

0:51:26.239 --> 0:51:28.920
<v Speaker 1>don't necessarily like to call myself a hacker because I

0:51:29.160 --> 0:51:31.399
<v Speaker 1>know so many experts in the field who are much

0:51:31.440 --> 0:51:35.400
<v Speaker 1>more knowledgeable than I am, I'm quite a intermediate, i

0:51:35.480 --> 0:51:39.319
<v Speaker 1>would say. But I love to teach, and I love

0:51:39.360 --> 0:51:42.800
<v Speaker 1>to give tutorials online, so I give tutorials on YouTube.

0:51:43.360 --> 0:51:45.239
<v Speaker 1>But I also know a lot of people who have

0:51:45.520 --> 0:51:49.479
<v Speaker 1>either written books about hacking, and they could do either

0:51:49.640 --> 0:51:53.000
<v Speaker 1>specifics about penetration testing, or they get to make it

0:51:53.080 --> 0:51:57.000
<v Speaker 1>a very very wide based book where they explain everything

0:51:57.120 --> 0:51:59.080
<v Speaker 1>that you would have to do as a penetration tester,

0:51:59.239 --> 0:52:01.560
<v Speaker 1>and a penetration tester is basically one of those guys

0:52:01.640 --> 0:52:04.360
<v Speaker 1>that would go into a company and find all the

0:52:04.400 --> 0:52:08.800
<v Speaker 1>vulnerabilities and report on it. You would also have companies

0:52:08.880 --> 0:52:12.800
<v Speaker 1>that administer certifications, so a lot of I'm sure a

0:52:12.880 --> 0:52:16.800
<v Speaker 1>lot of your listeners probably know that you have to

0:52:16.880 --> 0:52:21.000
<v Speaker 1>get certifications to get a lot to get into a

0:52:21.080 --> 0:52:24.239
<v Speaker 1>lot of the fields with computer security and even just

0:52:24.560 --> 0:52:27.880
<v Speaker 1>you know, computer networking too. There's a lot of searts

0:52:27.920 --> 0:52:30.120
<v Speaker 1>for those and they're very, very expensive. So a lot

0:52:30.160 --> 0:52:34.200
<v Speaker 1>of companies just administer their certifications or they'll will have

0:52:34.360 --> 0:52:36.680
<v Speaker 1>you take classes for a period of time until you

0:52:36.719 --> 0:52:39.839
<v Speaker 1>actually take the test and get certified. But that ends

0:52:39.880 --> 0:52:41.359
<v Speaker 1>up being a really good thing to put on your

0:52:41.400 --> 0:52:44.640
<v Speaker 1>resume for a lot of companies whenever you do intend

0:52:44.719 --> 0:52:49.320
<v Speaker 1>to get a job in network security. And then lastly,

0:52:49.400 --> 0:52:53.000
<v Speaker 1>we have the publishers. So that's the YouTubers, that's the

0:52:53.080 --> 0:52:57.160
<v Speaker 1>people that made podcasts, That's the people that might be

0:52:58.040 --> 0:53:01.840
<v Speaker 1>creating other forms of entertaining mint that not only educate

0:53:01.920 --> 0:53:04.960
<v Speaker 1>but also entertain their users and their listeners so that

0:53:05.120 --> 0:53:09.239
<v Speaker 1>they get excited about being a part of information security.

0:53:09.920 --> 0:53:11.759
<v Speaker 1>And that's what I like to do. I like to

0:53:12.160 --> 0:53:14.480
<v Speaker 1>teach people in a way that makes it exciting. So

0:53:14.600 --> 0:53:16.640
<v Speaker 1>I do a lot of hands on stuff. I make,

0:53:16.800 --> 0:53:19.080
<v Speaker 1>I make jokes, and I explain things in a very

0:53:19.200 --> 0:53:24.640
<v Speaker 1>natural light and it helps. It helps, again foster that

0:53:24.800 --> 0:53:28.120
<v Speaker 1>desire to learn how things work. Yeah, right, that does

0:53:28.880 --> 0:53:31.359
<v Speaker 1>so again that that same fascination, Like if you were

0:53:31.400 --> 0:53:33.880
<v Speaker 1>ever a kid that took apart a watch or a

0:53:34.040 --> 0:53:37.120
<v Speaker 1>radio or some other piece of equipment, because you really

0:53:37.160 --> 0:53:40.279
<v Speaker 1>want to know what's the magic that makes this thing

0:53:40.480 --> 0:53:44.680
<v Speaker 1>do what it does. Hackers have that, I mean, that's

0:53:44.760 --> 0:53:47.960
<v Speaker 1>the that's that's the defining quality in my mind of

0:53:48.000 --> 0:53:51.440
<v Speaker 1>a hacker is ultimately it's someone who is fascinated with

0:53:51.560 --> 0:53:55.759
<v Speaker 1>the way something works. We've largely been focusing on software,

0:53:56.080 --> 0:53:59.799
<v Speaker 1>but that is just as legitimate as any hardware hack.

0:54:00.280 --> 0:54:02.680
<v Speaker 1>It's the idea of how does this It might not

0:54:02.800 --> 0:54:04.800
<v Speaker 1>even just be the software, It might be a full system,

0:54:04.920 --> 0:54:07.480
<v Speaker 1>like how does this system work? What are all the

0:54:07.560 --> 0:54:11.680
<v Speaker 1>interlocking parts? How do they communicate with each other? I

0:54:11.840 --> 0:54:14.680
<v Speaker 1>just had a random memory from when I was younger

0:54:14.719 --> 0:54:17.720
<v Speaker 1>and in school, I took apart my first iPod because

0:54:17.760 --> 0:54:19.239
<v Speaker 1>I had no clue how it worked, and I was

0:54:19.360 --> 0:54:22.560
<v Speaker 1>very curious about what the interior of it was. Yeah,

0:54:22.640 --> 0:54:24.960
<v Speaker 1>so I just I took it apart. I could have

0:54:25.040 --> 0:54:27.960
<v Speaker 1>put it back together, So I was not hacker in

0:54:28.040 --> 0:54:33.600
<v Speaker 1>any sense. For an article I was writing, we got

0:54:33.760 --> 0:54:40.920
<v Speaker 1>a first edition Launch Day Nintendo three DS, and it

0:54:41.040 --> 0:54:43.680
<v Speaker 1>was my job to disassemble it and take photos of

0:54:43.840 --> 0:54:47.080
<v Speaker 1>all the pieces. So first I took a picture of

0:54:47.200 --> 0:54:52.279
<v Speaker 1>it whole and shared it online on Twitter and said

0:54:52.320 --> 0:54:54.879
<v Speaker 1>look what I have, and everyone got excited. And then

0:54:55.280 --> 0:54:57.080
<v Speaker 1>by the end of it, I had a little had

0:54:57.080 --> 0:55:00.600
<v Speaker 1>a little black cauldron at my desk that was leftover

0:55:00.719 --> 0:55:03.160
<v Speaker 1>from a Halloween thing. And then I put all the

0:55:03.239 --> 0:55:05.600
<v Speaker 1>different pieces because there was no way this thing was

0:55:05.640 --> 0:55:08.000
<v Speaker 1>going back together after I took it apart. For one thing,

0:55:08.120 --> 0:55:11.360
<v Speaker 1>Nintendo is pretty careful about sealing stuff in such a

0:55:11.400 --> 0:55:14.480
<v Speaker 1>way that it's not meant to come apart, so so

0:55:14.600 --> 0:55:16.040
<v Speaker 1>you have to have it was a little force in

0:55:16.160 --> 0:55:18.279
<v Speaker 1>some cases in order to get to stuff. And then

0:55:18.320 --> 0:55:19.960
<v Speaker 1>I showed a picture. I'm like, I'm like, look what

0:55:20.120 --> 0:55:25.439
<v Speaker 1>I did to the thing. The entire internet cry. Yeah,

0:55:25.719 --> 0:55:28.920
<v Speaker 1>although ultimately I think the three DS most people were like,

0:55:29.000 --> 0:55:32.719
<v Speaker 1>oh whatever, But at the time when it was brand new,

0:55:32.800 --> 0:55:35.600
<v Speaker 1>people were freaking out. And of course there's there's also

0:55:35.719 --> 0:55:38.480
<v Speaker 1>another role for hackers out there. It may not be

0:55:38.600 --> 0:55:42.160
<v Speaker 1>a steady gig, but we are seeing more and more

0:55:42.680 --> 0:55:46.840
<v Speaker 1>of the Hollywood productions out there actually talk with people

0:55:46.960 --> 0:55:50.040
<v Speaker 1>in the industry so that the depictions that we're getting

0:55:50.239 --> 0:55:54.160
<v Speaker 1>are more accurately reflecting what really happens. Mister Robot is

0:55:54.239 --> 0:55:58.600
<v Speaker 1>probably the example that immediately leaps to my mind, and

0:55:58.760 --> 0:56:01.600
<v Speaker 1>that it's it's a show. It tries very hard to

0:56:01.760 --> 0:56:04.960
<v Speaker 1>take a more realistic approach to the world of hacking,

0:56:05.080 --> 0:56:08.759
<v Speaker 1>as opposed to you type in three passwords, the third

0:56:08.800 --> 0:56:11.640
<v Speaker 1>one gets you in, and then you're navigating through a

0:56:11.880 --> 0:56:15.080
<v Speaker 1>vector graphics three D dungeon and you encounter a skull

0:56:15.160 --> 0:56:18.920
<v Speaker 1>and cross bones. That's not how hacking works. Sounds like

0:56:19.000 --> 0:56:23.160
<v Speaker 1>you were talking about hackers hack the planet. I might

0:56:23.280 --> 0:56:26.600
<v Speaker 1>have been. I mentioned too with education, Just to bring

0:56:26.680 --> 0:56:29.040
<v Speaker 1>it back a bit, professors, I didn't leave you guys out.

0:56:29.080 --> 0:56:32.080
<v Speaker 1>I'm sorry. I love you guys. You are the reason

0:56:32.120 --> 0:56:33.920
<v Speaker 1>why I'm here now. If I didn't take my computer

0:56:34.040 --> 0:56:36.680
<v Speaker 1>courses in college with my professors, I would not be

0:56:36.800 --> 0:56:39.480
<v Speaker 1>doing what I'm doing now. So professors are like at

0:56:39.520 --> 0:56:42.040
<v Speaker 1>the top of that educational list because oh sure, and

0:56:42.120 --> 0:56:44.120
<v Speaker 1>you can take a lot of computer security courses in

0:56:44.239 --> 0:56:47.480
<v Speaker 1>college and sometimes in high schools if you're lucky. But yeah,

0:56:47.560 --> 0:56:52.319
<v Speaker 1>technical assistance. So technical assistance are people that will come

0:56:52.360 --> 0:56:55.360
<v Speaker 1>on board with a Hollywood movie or a TV show

0:56:55.520 --> 0:56:58.320
<v Speaker 1>or what have you, and they will explain to the

0:56:58.400 --> 0:57:03.400
<v Speaker 1>network how the hacking actually happens. So I know a

0:57:03.520 --> 0:57:07.880
<v Speaker 1>few they will. They'll come to some of their hacker

0:57:07.960 --> 0:57:10.000
<v Speaker 1>friends or they will be a hacker themselves and they

0:57:10.040 --> 0:57:13.560
<v Speaker 1>will say, Okay, in this season, I know that they

0:57:13.680 --> 0:57:16.200
<v Speaker 1>want to do X, Y and Z on camera, and

0:57:16.360 --> 0:57:18.720
<v Speaker 1>I need to make it look legitimate, so they will

0:57:18.760 --> 0:57:20.720
<v Speaker 1>come up with the script. They will come up with

0:57:20.880 --> 0:57:24.560
<v Speaker 1>the hack and the actual keyboard commands that the actor

0:57:24.720 --> 0:57:28.040
<v Speaker 1>has to type in on camera so that they are

0:57:28.200 --> 0:57:32.080
<v Speaker 1>actually doing legitimate hacks. So that way, they're not only

0:57:32.760 --> 0:57:35.680
<v Speaker 1>making it look cool for a wider audience because an

0:57:35.680 --> 0:57:38.520
<v Speaker 1>audience is actually going to see how a hack works,

0:57:38.600 --> 0:57:42.880
<v Speaker 1>but they're also getting that credibility with the infoset community too.

0:57:43.360 --> 0:57:46.400
<v Speaker 1>So mister Robot is huge with the infoset community because

0:57:46.600 --> 0:57:49.800
<v Speaker 1>it is legitimate. Like I've watched several of those episodes,

0:57:49.800 --> 0:57:51.440
<v Speaker 1>and I've seen a lot of the hacks that they do.

0:57:51.880 --> 0:57:54.000
<v Speaker 1>They've even used some of our hack fi products on

0:57:54.080 --> 0:57:58.080
<v Speaker 1>the show, and they're actually using legit hacks, And it

0:57:58.280 --> 0:58:00.280
<v Speaker 1>is so much fun to see it ont be and

0:58:00.360 --> 0:58:02.520
<v Speaker 1>see them get so many good reviews from a wider

0:58:02.560 --> 0:58:06.120
<v Speaker 1>consumer audience, because it makes me feel like many more

0:58:06.160 --> 0:58:08.800
<v Speaker 1>people are getting interested in info sex because they see

0:58:08.800 --> 0:58:10.880
<v Speaker 1>what's happening on camera and they see that this is

0:58:10.920 --> 0:58:13.560
<v Speaker 1>actually how you do it. Yeah, it's nice to see

0:58:13.600 --> 0:58:20.320
<v Speaker 1>it go beyond the niche that I would argue info

0:58:20.400 --> 0:58:24.480
<v Speaker 1>SEC and hacking has largely inhabited for the past three decades.

0:58:24.600 --> 0:58:27.520
<v Speaker 1>Right the people who had been interested when it's first started,

0:58:27.560 --> 0:58:31.440
<v Speaker 1>it was essentially your hobbyists, and often those hobbyists were

0:58:31.840 --> 0:58:36.160
<v Speaker 1>isolated individuals. You got to the phone freaking days where

0:58:36.200 --> 0:58:39.720
<v Speaker 1>there was a little bit of a small subculture of

0:58:39.800 --> 0:58:43.080
<v Speaker 1>people who were interested in hacking the telephone system using

0:58:43.160 --> 0:58:46.320
<v Speaker 1>all sorts of stuff, including a whistle from Captain Crunch.

0:58:47.600 --> 0:58:50.880
<v Speaker 1>You had the early hack days where people were just

0:58:51.000 --> 0:58:53.680
<v Speaker 1>trying to create interesting programs for their computers or to

0:58:53.760 --> 0:58:56.000
<v Speaker 1>see how some of the programs that were coming out,

0:58:56.080 --> 0:59:00.840
<v Speaker 1>how did those work? But it was largely a tiny

0:59:00.960 --> 0:59:04.600
<v Speaker 1>slice of the folks who were even aware of personal computers,

0:59:04.720 --> 0:59:07.800
<v Speaker 1>and even that group was still a tiny slice of

0:59:07.880 --> 0:59:12.520
<v Speaker 1>the overall population. We're seeing that tiny slice grow over time,

0:59:13.000 --> 0:59:16.200
<v Speaker 1>and largely because so many of us are so dependent

0:59:16.320 --> 0:59:19.680
<v Speaker 1>upon computers these days that it benefits us to have

0:59:19.720 --> 0:59:22.960
<v Speaker 1>an awareness to make sure that we remain safe, but

0:59:23.160 --> 0:59:26.600
<v Speaker 1>also because of things like mister Robot showing how this

0:59:26.800 --> 0:59:31.560
<v Speaker 1>works and sparking the imagination of people who perhaps before

0:59:31.640 --> 0:59:34.400
<v Speaker 1>they saw that, never thought, yeah, it's kind of cool.

0:59:34.520 --> 0:59:37.120
<v Speaker 1>I would love to be able to manipulate code in

0:59:37.240 --> 0:59:39.600
<v Speaker 1>such a way that I could do something new or

0:59:39.800 --> 0:59:44.439
<v Speaker 1>unexpected or help people. And it's really encouraging to see

0:59:44.520 --> 0:59:47.840
<v Speaker 1>that kind of thing happen right now. I kind of

0:59:47.880 --> 0:59:49.720
<v Speaker 1>wish it had happened ten years ago, but I love

0:59:49.760 --> 0:59:52.600
<v Speaker 1>seeing it happen now same. I actually feel like there

0:59:52.720 --> 0:59:55.760
<v Speaker 1>was a little bit of negativity in the aspect that

0:59:56.560 --> 1:00:00.320
<v Speaker 1>we used to have all these really fancy graphics happening

1:00:00.640 --> 1:00:03.240
<v Speaker 1>in these Hollywood movies and these TV shows, and now

1:00:03.360 --> 1:00:06.640
<v Speaker 1>they're actually seeing the reality that is hacking, and it

1:00:06.880 --> 1:00:10.800
<v Speaker 1>is not super colorful. It's not super quick, fast paced

1:00:10.840 --> 1:00:13.440
<v Speaker 1>and exciting, like it looks like it is on those

1:00:13.520 --> 1:00:17.160
<v Speaker 1>old school shows, So I'm hoping that now that they're

1:00:17.200 --> 1:00:20.800
<v Speaker 1>actually seeing it, people will try it too. Like if

1:00:20.840 --> 1:00:24.400
<v Speaker 1>they seem the main actor on Mister Robot do a

1:00:24.480 --> 1:00:28.360
<v Speaker 1>specific command line option, they'll go to their computer and

1:00:28.440 --> 1:00:30.720
<v Speaker 1>try it themselves and see that it actually does work,

1:00:30.800 --> 1:00:32.360
<v Speaker 1>and then they'll be like, oh, I really want to

1:00:32.400 --> 1:00:34.480
<v Speaker 1>try some new stuff too, so they'll start googling it

1:00:34.520 --> 1:00:36.600
<v Speaker 1>and see what else they can find out. That's the

1:00:36.720 --> 1:00:39.640
<v Speaker 1>kind of inspiration that I wish happened thirty years ago,

1:00:39.920 --> 1:00:43.640
<v Speaker 1>and it didn't, So I want to see more of

1:00:43.720 --> 1:00:46.800
<v Speaker 1>that now, and I'm really happy that, for example, mister

1:00:46.920 --> 1:00:49.640
<v Speaker 1>Robot has done a great job with it. Yeah it's

1:00:49.680 --> 1:00:55.280
<v Speaker 1>it's and you not to poop all over Hollywood, because

1:00:55.480 --> 1:01:01.000
<v Speaker 1>I do lovesm hollywoods, but but it is to understand

1:01:01.360 --> 1:01:03.080
<v Speaker 1>where they were coming from. They were trying to find

1:01:03.120 --> 1:01:09.120
<v Speaker 1>a way to create an exciting visual depiction of something

1:01:09.320 --> 1:01:14.040
<v Speaker 1>that doesn't necessarily necessarily lend itself to that in order

1:01:14.760 --> 1:01:17.480
<v Speaker 1>to create a dramatic effect. So I get it. It's

1:01:17.760 --> 1:01:21.800
<v Speaker 1>very similar to the way Hollywood portrayed virtual reality back

1:01:21.800 --> 1:01:25.800
<v Speaker 1>in the nineties, way before virtual reality was ready for

1:01:25.960 --> 1:01:30.480
<v Speaker 1>public consumption and it's what largely killed VR for a

1:01:30.680 --> 1:01:34.800
<v Speaker 1>decade before the various video game systems started to make

1:01:34.840 --> 1:01:37.720
<v Speaker 1>the components cheap enough for people to play in that

1:01:37.840 --> 1:01:40.320
<v Speaker 1>space again, and now we're on the verge of another

1:01:40.440 --> 1:01:43.960
<v Speaker 1>VR revolution. The same sort of thing is true of hacking, Like,

1:01:44.040 --> 1:01:47.880
<v Speaker 1>how do you show hacking in a way that gets

1:01:47.920 --> 1:01:50.680
<v Speaker 1>across what is happening to an audience and makes it interesting.

1:01:50.880 --> 1:01:53.400
<v Speaker 1>I think largely you have to do that through really

1:01:53.440 --> 1:01:55.680
<v Speaker 1>good writing of your characters. And once you do that,

1:01:56.440 --> 1:01:59.680
<v Speaker 1>then everything else follows. I think if you can show

1:02:00.080 --> 1:02:02.880
<v Speaker 1>that the characters in a movie or in a TV

1:02:03.040 --> 1:02:06.360
<v Speaker 1>show are actually real people that have real relationships, they

1:02:06.440 --> 1:02:09.000
<v Speaker 1>have real jobs and real lives, and they have hobbies

1:02:09.480 --> 1:02:13.360
<v Speaker 1>outside of just hacking, you can really you can start

1:02:13.400 --> 1:02:16.960
<v Speaker 1>to relate to that character in a very real sense

1:02:17.080 --> 1:02:19.440
<v Speaker 1>in the fact that, hey, they are humans too, because

1:02:19.560 --> 1:02:23.760
<v Speaker 1>here's our people too. That was actually a documentary nice. Yeah,

1:02:23.840 --> 1:02:27.000
<v Speaker 1>because again, when when you're when you're thinking about it

1:02:27.040 --> 1:02:29.959
<v Speaker 1>in the abstract, you're really it becomes that us versus

1:02:30.080 --> 1:02:34.520
<v Speaker 1>them mentality, where by its very nature it's dehumanizing. But

1:02:34.680 --> 1:02:38.360
<v Speaker 1>that's probably a topic for a show that's not about technology.

1:02:38.480 --> 1:02:42.040
<v Speaker 1>So I will just leave it be. Shannon Morse, thank

1:02:42.120 --> 1:02:45.960
<v Speaker 1>you so much for joining me today. Please let everyone

1:02:46.040 --> 1:02:50.080
<v Speaker 1>know where they can find all of your stuff. Jonathan Strickland,

1:02:50.240 --> 1:02:54.360
<v Speaker 1>thank you. So yeah, it was a little it was

1:02:54.400 --> 1:02:57.640
<v Speaker 1>a little curt it was a little laden. Yeah. Yeah,

1:02:57.680 --> 1:03:01.120
<v Speaker 1>I've been watching Startrek lately. Way wait too much starts Trek,

1:03:01.200 --> 1:03:04.800
<v Speaker 1>So you can find me. The most direct path is

1:03:04.960 --> 1:03:09.120
<v Speaker 1>on Twitter. I'm at snubs and that's snubs and then

1:03:09.240 --> 1:03:12.760
<v Speaker 1>my shows, specifically Our tech Thing over at tek thing

1:03:12.840 --> 1:03:17.040
<v Speaker 1>dot com and Hack five over at HK five dot org.

1:03:18.000 --> 1:03:20.720
<v Speaker 1>Well that wraps up this classic episode of tech Stuff.

1:03:21.040 --> 1:03:23.960
<v Speaker 1>Hope you enjoyed it. It was great having Shannon on

1:03:24.000 --> 1:03:26.280
<v Speaker 1>the show. I've had her on a few times over

1:03:26.360 --> 1:03:28.360
<v Speaker 1>the years, and I would actually I would love to

1:03:28.400 --> 1:03:31.440
<v Speaker 1>have her on again. There's always an open invitation to Shannon.

1:03:31.800 --> 1:03:34.080
<v Speaker 1>She is a very busy woman. She's got a lot

1:03:34.200 --> 1:03:38.040
<v Speaker 1>going on. So if I can find a time to

1:03:38.240 --> 1:03:40.320
<v Speaker 1>schedule her so that we can have her on and

1:03:40.400 --> 1:03:44.200
<v Speaker 1>share her expertise, that would be wonderful because she's got

1:03:44.760 --> 1:03:48.360
<v Speaker 1>a deep and practical knowledge in fields where I just

1:03:48.560 --> 1:03:51.720
<v Speaker 1>have kind of a general awareness. So she's always great

1:03:51.800 --> 1:03:54.040
<v Speaker 1>to have on the show. If you have suggestions for

1:03:54.120 --> 1:03:56.440
<v Speaker 1>topics I should cover in future episodes of tech Stuff,

1:03:56.520 --> 1:03:58.400
<v Speaker 1>Please reach out to me and let me know what

1:03:58.520 --> 1:04:00.560
<v Speaker 1>those are. One way to do that at is to

1:04:00.720 --> 1:04:03.760
<v Speaker 1>download the iHeartRadio app. It's free to download, it's free

1:04:03.800 --> 1:04:06.280
<v Speaker 1>to use. He can navigate over to the tech Stuff

1:04:06.320 --> 1:04:08.960
<v Speaker 1>part by just putting tech Stuff into that little search bar.

1:04:09.440 --> 1:04:11.240
<v Speaker 1>It'll take you to the podcast page and you'll see

1:04:11.240 --> 1:04:14.760
<v Speaker 1>a little microphone icon. If you click on that microphone icon,

1:04:14.840 --> 1:04:16.760
<v Speaker 1>you can leave me a voice message up to thirty

1:04:16.800 --> 1:04:18.520
<v Speaker 1>seconds in length and let me know what you would

1:04:18.560 --> 1:04:21.160
<v Speaker 1>like to hear in the future, or if you prefer,

1:04:21.240 --> 1:04:23.200
<v Speaker 1>you can go on over to Twitter and send me

1:04:23.400 --> 1:04:27.120
<v Speaker 1>a tweet. The handle for the show is tech Stuff

1:04:27.560 --> 1:04:38.000
<v Speaker 1>HSWU and I'll talk to you again really soon. Tech

1:04:38.040 --> 1:04:42.439
<v Speaker 1>Stuff is an iHeartRadio production. For more podcasts from iHeartRadio,

1:04:42.800 --> 1:04:46.479
<v Speaker 1>visit the iHeartRadio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen

1:04:46.520 --> 1:04:47.600
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