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Speaker 1: From UFOs to psychic powers and government conspiracies. History is

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Speaker 1: riddled with unexplained events. You can turn back now or

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Speaker 1: learn the stuff they don't want you to know. A

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Speaker 1: production of My Heart Radio. Hello, welcome back to the show.

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Speaker 1: My name is Matt, my name is Nol and they

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Speaker 1: called me Ben. We're joined as always with our super producer,

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Speaker 1: Mr Matt Frederick. Most importantly, you are you. You are here,

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Speaker 1: and that makes this the stuff they don't want you

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Speaker 1: to know. So this is a follow up episode, folks,

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Speaker 1: we did uh we previously looked at the absolute messy

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Speaker 1: Bollos spaghetti that is federal classification, How it got there,

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Speaker 1: why no one really wants to fix it now, just

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Speaker 1: because you know it's like legacy code. It's so precarious,

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Speaker 1: and I I cursed a lot in that episode, just

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Speaker 1: because you know it's uh in in saying how how

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Speaker 1: strange the situation is. That would be a fun experiment.

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Speaker 1: Give one person uh Ubert clearance to be able to

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Speaker 1: see everything right, and then they get to go through

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Speaker 1: everything that's ever ever been classified top secret down and

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Speaker 1: just like go through it and what is necessary and

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Speaker 1: what is not? Make do it? Maybe Jagger right he

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Speaker 1: probably got pretty close and used it, used it for

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Speaker 1: nefarious ends. Yes, Jagger Hoover was basically running the FBI

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Speaker 1: like a mob. That sounds like a monkey's park on

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Speaker 1: a scenario the two because like you'd find out so

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Speaker 1: much it would break your brain and then you would

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Speaker 1: just like you know, go postal in some very profound

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Speaker 1: and alarming way. Well, I mean, we could let Charlie

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Speaker 1: do it. Charlie Day would do it, or you know

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Speaker 1: what's Jared Kushner up to right now? Oh? Boy? Yeah,

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Speaker 1: that's a that's a billion dollar question, isn't it. Uh.

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Speaker 1: This follow up answers some of the questions that we

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Speaker 1: left off with. In federal Classification. We didn't get to

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Speaker 1: the part about security clearances. We talked about how things

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Speaker 1: are secret and why the concept of secrecy is so slippy.

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Speaker 1: We also learned a lot about Dagastani weddings, which was

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Speaker 1: apparently top secret or classified. Uh. But today we're gonna

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Speaker 1: look at how people actually get official access to this information.

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Speaker 1: So here are the facts. First thing, first, what what

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Speaker 1: is a security clearance like in real life? Well, here

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Speaker 1: in the United States, and security clearance is the official

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Speaker 1: um designation given to an individual UH in terms of

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Speaker 1: their level of access to varying types of classified information

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Speaker 1: within differing parts of the government. It allows them to

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Speaker 1: kind of, you know, it's silos information to different individuals

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Speaker 1: who qualify UH for these various security so it's very hierarchical.

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Speaker 1: In other words, access at one level UM gives you

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Speaker 1: access to the information at lower levels, but not you know,

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Speaker 1: the other way around. Yeah, so if you if you

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Speaker 1: get a secret clearance, then you odds are you're going

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Speaker 1: to have access to stuff that's less sensitive like classified

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Speaker 1: stuff as well. But if you just have a UM,

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Speaker 1: if you just have a number of clearances that are

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Speaker 1: like public trust clearance or just regular classified, then no,

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Speaker 1: you're not in the room where they talk about top

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Speaker 1: secret stuff. And the weirdest thing is, you know, a

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Speaker 1: lot of if you're going back to your idea the

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Speaker 1: one guy, the one guy or the one person, I

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Speaker 1: think what would surprise them the most be Yeah, there's

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Speaker 1: some horrific, frightening stuff, but a lot of it probably

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Speaker 1: doesn't matter to the average person, you know what I mean.

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Speaker 1: It's like, oh, we we have a line on you know,

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Speaker 1: the chocolate futures in insert company here. Most people aren't

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Speaker 1: gonna care, right, aren't going to be able to capitalize

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Speaker 1: on that, But they might come in handy for the

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Speaker 1: next coup though, just say yeah, yeah, the next the

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Speaker 1: chocolate coup. They'll call it, uh, this chocolate cous It

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Speaker 1: would be great. Yeah, it's chocolate coup already a thing

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Speaker 1: someone have that. I don't think so, I think it's

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Speaker 1: just chocolate range chocolate. Yeah, yeah, okay, no, chocolate coup

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Speaker 1: totally different. So so we have to remember, like, no,

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Speaker 1: you're correct. We have to also remember that secret clearance

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Speaker 1: for one agency or again fiefdom, does not necessarily mean

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Speaker 1: you have access to information other agencies consider secret. On paper,

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Speaker 1: they're supposed to the credit transfer of background check is

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Speaker 1: supposed to work, but that's not always the case, especially

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Speaker 1: when you get to the really sticky stuff. So how

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Speaker 1: do you get a security clearance? You have to be vetted.

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Speaker 1: There's a background investigation. Shout out to anybody who's had

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Speaker 1: one of those. They go pretty deep depending on your

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Speaker 1: level of clearance. Well, and you could think about this

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Speaker 1: too in maybe more of a workplace kind of situation.

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Speaker 1: Let's not connect to the government, like let's say somebody

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Speaker 1: works for a nuclear power plant, you know, it's that

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Speaker 1: you don't you don't have access to certain areas unless

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Speaker 1: you get clearance. And those clearances, because you're working with

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Speaker 1: potentially dangerous materials, do require significant background checks and regular

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Speaker 1: drug tests and all of that kind of stuff. So

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Speaker 1: there's there's some cross over there, but it's probably not

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Speaker 1: like something you've experienced unless you have had work in

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Speaker 1: one of those really dangerous, you know, situations right where

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Speaker 1: you're handling materials. The background checks I've had probably have

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Speaker 1: never gotten close to the level that you'd get if

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Speaker 1: you were going for a clearance, no question. I mean,

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Speaker 1: I think maybe all of us at some point had

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Speaker 1: to just get like a right to work background check,

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Speaker 1: you know, or had to present some sort of citizenship

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Speaker 1: documents or whatever just to satisfy certain legal criterias for corporations.

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Speaker 1: But it's probably about the extent of it for me. Man,

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Speaker 1: My understand is, you you need like this is like

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Speaker 1: talking to your friends and loved ones and like a

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Speaker 1: physical human being hanging out and going, hey, so what

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Speaker 1: do you know about this Noel Brown character? Right? You've

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Speaker 1: seen it in fiction, and it's actually not too far away.

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Speaker 1: In some cases, Uh, they might you might let's say,

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Speaker 1: I might get a call from someone who says, we're, uh,

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Speaker 1: we're evaluating nod friend of yours, Matthew Frederick, and uh,

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Speaker 1: just like to ask you some questions. We understand that

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Speaker 1: he played in a in a musical outfit called Lions

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Speaker 1: and Scissors. Is that correct to your knowledge? And they

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Speaker 1: were good. They not slap, I mean a little the fiction.

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Speaker 1: They're like, there's something interesting here because he's a co

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Speaker 1: writer on you know, track seven. Uh, and just like

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Speaker 1: to read these lyrics and get gone confirmed whether or

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Speaker 1: not he was involved ideologically with the message of this song.

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Speaker 1: Usually it's not. He was just but but they will

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Speaker 1: look into you know, your foreign contacts. They will, we'll

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Speaker 1: we'll get into all the stuff they'll look into. Uh.

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Speaker 1: And the drummer is the most important party. When people

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Speaker 1: say just the drummer, frontmen need to deal with that.

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Speaker 1: The drummer is the most important part. Oh, you frontmen

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Speaker 1: out there, stop front but your ego and check so

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Speaker 1: uh while all that's happening. And yes, the last you know,

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Speaker 1: maybe your college professors, maybe even down to your grade

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Speaker 1: school folks. Uh, they'll check every address you lived at

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Speaker 1: and if you spend time in another country, if you

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Speaker 1: have a dual passport, forget about it. Honestly, for some

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Speaker 1: of this stuff, you just you can't be trusted, even

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Speaker 1: if your record spotless. But you you also have to

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Speaker 1: sign really serious n d A s uh. This one

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Speaker 1: is called s F three one two because governments love

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Speaker 1: doing this. It's a standard form, but that's what s

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Speaker 1: F stands for. It applies to any employee of the

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Speaker 1: government or someone who contracts out, and a lot of

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Speaker 1: private citizens, a lot of civilians contractors do have clearances

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Speaker 1: they have to. But then it gets this other thing.

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Speaker 1: There has to be a proven reason that you need

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Speaker 1: to know this. You need to know about this Dagastani wedding,

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Speaker 1: you need to know about nuclear um nuclear enrichment technology.

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Speaker 1: So they have to say, here's why you do this.

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Speaker 1: Sometimes it's a formality. That might be the easiest part

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Speaker 1: because there's a lot of information that gets technically classified.

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Speaker 1: But if you're already in a secure network because of

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Speaker 1: your job, or you're going to a lot of meetings

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Speaker 1: because of your job, you're probably gonna hear about it,

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Speaker 1: you know what I mean. So sometimes the need to

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Speaker 1: know is we just feel like this person is naturally

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Speaker 1: going to run into this, So let's make it has

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Speaker 1: down to one off of these clearances. Uh. But then

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Speaker 1: you know, the stuff I think a lot of us

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Speaker 1: think of from the outside looking in is special access programs,

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Speaker 1: compartmentalized intelligence. This stuff did not happen kind of things,

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Speaker 1: black bag ops. You know, how do we get that

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Speaker 1: cocaine over the border into Los Angeles? That's that's that

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Speaker 1: didn't happen. Right officially, that's what the courts will tell you.

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Speaker 1: But I don't know, like how far how far should

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Speaker 1: you go for security clearance? Just the idea spooks some

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Speaker 1: people out, honestly. You know, they've got polygraphs sometimes even

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Speaker 1: though that's not solid science. Uh, in a lot of ways, right,

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Speaker 1: like how like you said, in all the deepest background check, Um,

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Speaker 1: they might have it at jobs like some n d A,

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Speaker 1: some basic prove you have a Social Security number in

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Speaker 1: the US birth certificate stuff. But it can go deeper

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Speaker 1: when you get a mortgage right or alone. Right, mortgages

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Speaker 1: are tough. They're like checking on your toe a nailing. Well,

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Speaker 1: not not to get too too personal, but like you know, recently, uh,

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Speaker 1: Matt and I both recently had to get a mortgage,

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Speaker 1: and um day before you know, my closing, all of

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Speaker 1: a sudden, there's this like five alarm kind of situation

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Speaker 1: where they're missing these uh details about my previous rental history.

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Speaker 1: And it's because I'm still renting the place and it

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Speaker 1: hasn't been exactly two years to the day, but it

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Speaker 1: will have been by the time my my lease is up.

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Speaker 1: And even though the lease says it's you know, for

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Speaker 1: this period through this period, the fact that I haven't

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Speaker 1: actually paid it doesn't match up to a payment that

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Speaker 1: I haven't made yet. So all of a sudden, they're like,

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Speaker 1: you gotta make the payment now, and I'm like, okay,

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Speaker 1: but I I do. I read through this property management

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Speaker 1: company and I don't even know how to go about

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Speaker 1: doing that comes out and it's like after hours on

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Speaker 1: the weekend, you know, and it was just, oh my god.

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Speaker 1: It was bonkers. And depending on the type of loan

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Speaker 1: you're getting to, you're going to have to do more

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Speaker 1: and more and more stringent kind of like submit yourself

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Speaker 1: to more stringent background checks and and very specific situations. Sorry,

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Speaker 1: I just just triggered me because that was like I

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Speaker 1: thought I was gonna lose it. And I literally thought

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Speaker 1: I was gonna lose my mind. No, we I get it.

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Speaker 1: I think we've all been through some kind of weird

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Speaker 1: situation like that, right, I really quickly, I want to

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Speaker 1: bring up Secret Service and I think we've talked about

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Speaker 1: this before quickly in the past been and I just

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Speaker 1: super fast. Um, I knew a guy who went into

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Speaker 1: UH to become a Secret Service agent and what he

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Speaker 1: had to go through to get that position and to

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Speaker 1: get cleared for that, Like the process was so nuts.

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Speaker 1: He had to prove that he has never ever once

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Speaker 1: smoked cannabis, Like he had to prove something that he's

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Speaker 1: never Yeah, because I guess they're worried about his potential

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Speaker 1: mind state because of that drug. Like that just that

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Speaker 1: that confused me to no end. Yeah, But I mean

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Speaker 1: that's an it's also an achronistic in archaic in some ways,

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Speaker 1: right that that law has not caught up with recent science,

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Speaker 1: That law is not caught up with other laws that

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Speaker 1: decriminalize or legalized cannabis in a federal level law to

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Speaker 1: that degree is probably on the way. But that's also

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Speaker 1: another reason why a lot of US cyber outfits are

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Speaker 1: in are having a tough time because it seems like

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Speaker 1: I'm quoting an anonymous source here. It seems like all

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Speaker 1: the good hackers get high and then like and that's

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Speaker 1: that's a deal breaker for a lot of clearances. So

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Speaker 1: they're gonna have to address that at some point. Um,

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Speaker 1: here's another thing. If you live in the US or

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Speaker 1: if you follow US politics, you've heard you've heard the

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Speaker 1: recent hubble ub uh. Security clearances and classification got in

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Speaker 1: the news in a big way not too long ago.

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Speaker 1: So we're gonna just clear the air here once and

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Speaker 1: for all. Yes, the President of the United States, the bodus,

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Speaker 1: whomever that may be, does have the ability to declassify

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Speaker 1: previously classified information. But it's not like just yelling base

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Speaker 1: in a game of tag. You have to do stuff.

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Speaker 1: There is a detailed process. You can't just you know,

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Speaker 1: snap your fingers and make it so well, he can't

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Speaker 1: do it with his mind. Man. Well, that was in

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Speaker 1: the news recently for President Donald Trump. I believe it

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Speaker 1: came out that he made a statement that he believed

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Speaker 1: he could just decide what to take by thinking about it. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: so that's and that's why all these arms of the

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Speaker 1: US government are freaking out now because make no mistake.

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Speaker 1: If you had that kind of there's not malevolence, let's

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Speaker 1: call it negligence. If you had that kind of negligence

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Speaker 1: as a government employee, you'd be fired. You you'd be

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Speaker 1: fired and sent to jail most likely with that. With that,

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Speaker 1: just because of the weight he's carried. Think of it

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Speaker 1: like drugs, right, information is like a drug. And he

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Speaker 1: was moving weight. Uh, and he was moving weight the

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Speaker 1: wrong way. So yes, However, a president does have the ability,

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Speaker 1: through some pretty detailed processes, to declassify some previously classified stuff.

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Speaker 1: So why won't they tell us about the aliens? Moving on?

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Speaker 1: Moving on? Man, I could take all the classified documents

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Speaker 1: I want and Adidas can't drop me right the scope,

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Speaker 1: I have a sneaker deal. I wonder what kind of

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Speaker 1: sneakers they would be. And he's got a big red

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Speaker 1: tie deal. Um over long, I thought it was the

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Speaker 1: same tie. But yes, no, no, it's it's true. U. Still,

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Speaker 1: the thing is that if they can't declassify it without

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Speaker 1: going through this process, if you are the president, you

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Speaker 1: do get some loopholes. You can get access to any

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Speaker 1: of the information you request, like a lot of it. Uh,

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Speaker 1: even if you would ordinarily not be able to get

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Speaker 1: a security clearance if you weren't president. So if you're

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Speaker 1: a president who says, yeah, I smoked weed and I inhaled,

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Speaker 1: like former President Barack Obama, you know that knocks you

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Speaker 1: out of the running for so like he couldn't be

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Speaker 1: on his own secret Service detail. But because he's the president,

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Speaker 1: you know, you circumvent that. So that's right, because you're

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Speaker 1: a duly elected president, all of that stuff goes by

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Speaker 1: the wayside, correct, Like you just have carte blotch. You

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Speaker 1: have access to all the things, a lot of them.

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Speaker 1: There's also the ideal plausible deniability because there's some stuff

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Speaker 1: you have to even if you have the vibe, you

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Speaker 1: have to not know about it. Uh, in case I'm

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Speaker 1: gonna start sniffing around or you get caught out. I

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Speaker 1: would imagine they would recommend that you not look at this.

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Speaker 1: But couldn't you also just say, na, screw that, show

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Speaker 1: me the goods you quite plausibly? Yeah, And you know

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Speaker 1: it's still the weird thing is it feels like there's

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Speaker 1: a lot of precedent there, But we have to remember

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Speaker 1: there haven't been a lot of US presidents. It's a

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Speaker 1: young country, so there's always there. There may well be

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Speaker 1: a plot twist on the way. And you know, but

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Speaker 1: until relatively recently, we seem to have had a tradition

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Speaker 1: of kind of following the rules and and and and

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Speaker 1: adhering to these kind of recommended uh standardizations. Right, yeah,

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Speaker 1: well people try. You know, the US is still in

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Speaker 1: the experiment phase as a country. Uh. Look, we know

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Speaker 1: that just like classification, a bunch of agencies can make

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Speaker 1: something secret or top secret, a bunch of agencies can

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Speaker 1: also clear people two do their stuff right to be

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Speaker 1: read on read into these programs. Right now, I think

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Speaker 1: the d D issues the majority of all clearances. If

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Speaker 1: you take all of their employees because they're huge, the Pentagons,

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Speaker 1: like the world world's biggest office building, and then you

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Speaker 1: take all the people who contract out, then about that

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Speaker 1: is going to be the D O T. But you know,

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Speaker 1: D O, E, C, I, A, all the all the

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Speaker 1: alphabet soup guys, they all have clearances and they're generally

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Speaker 1: something just hit, yeah, something just hit uh ben FBI

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Speaker 1: C I A A T F K K K K

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Speaker 1: K R S C and C B S wait I

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Speaker 1: R S NBC T N T. I was just I

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Speaker 1: was thinking up FBI, A, T F KKK I R, S, NBC, CBS,

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Speaker 1: T N T telling LIZE. Yeah, okay, okay, sorry, shout

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Speaker 1: out dead press. Yeah, that's that's the third verse and

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Speaker 1: a dead press. It's just that chance. It's pretty pretty sick.

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Speaker 1: Um dead press would not get security clearances. They say,

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Speaker 1: this is a big fan of him one and stick Man.

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Speaker 1: Uh No, they would not get clearances. Um, but if

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Speaker 1: you are a person gets clearances, they're like five types

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Speaker 1: you can get and they're they're a little bit snoozy

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Speaker 1: until you get to the end, but it's important to

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Speaker 1: know them. Let's hit you with it. Controlled unclassified. We

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Speaker 1: talked about that in the last episode, hopping over to

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Speaker 1: episode one in this series to learn about that one.

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Speaker 1: We got a public trust position. Now that's interesting, that's

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Speaker 1: that's I don't understand that one. Yeah, it's a weird one.

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Speaker 1: And so so like you are, you are not getting

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Speaker 1: a security clearance. It's not the same as being read

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Speaker 1: onto confidential stuff. But you're the nature of your job

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Speaker 1: whatever that might be, requires access to certain sensitive information,

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Speaker 1: so it can't be necessarily classified. But it is something

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Speaker 1: that could be weaponized. It's something that could be dangerous,

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Speaker 1: So you might you might be in a public trust

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Speaker 1: position if you work with certain levels of infrastructure or utilities. Right,

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Speaker 1: I know how I know how to hack the water

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Speaker 1: treatment facility, says someone work, right, so that I can

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Speaker 1: make it work? Well, WHOA what the guns out? So

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Speaker 1: we can make it work? Guys. So that's one that

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Speaker 1: I think is new to a lot of us. Those

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Speaker 1: can be considered moderate risk or high risk in the

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Speaker 1: U s pt P. That's another man. Okay, Next, you've

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Speaker 1: got confidential, that's you know, something we've all heard about.

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Speaker 1: That's like, that's like your low tier super controlled information. Right.

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Speaker 1: Then you got secret that's above that. Gotta you gotta

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Speaker 1: have another level to reach out one. Then top secret

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Speaker 1: and you know that's of course the one that's the

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Speaker 1: most exciting usually, but it's not really the most exciting

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Speaker 1: stuff is compartmented. Oh yeah, don't let don't let that

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Speaker 1: incredibly boring name fool you. It's not a bento box.

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Speaker 1: It's uh, the absolutely, it's not eligible, it's the absolute

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Speaker 1: top secret, creme de la creme of no one can know.

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Speaker 1: It's called sensitive compartmented information. And this is where all

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Speaker 1: the badgers, this is the bag where all the all

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Speaker 1: the interesting badgers are. You know, we're talking about signals

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Speaker 1: intelligence measures and signature intelligence mass and we're talking about

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Speaker 1: um the US Navy control systems, the Helm of Power here,

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Speaker 1: electronic surveillance programs like Stellar Wind, which was another thing

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Speaker 1: people were it's supposed to know about, and those have

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Speaker 1: the Really, here's a question I want to put to you, guys.

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Speaker 1: By the time you get to compartmented information access, aren't

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Speaker 1: you already pretty vetted? Like I would think, because this

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Speaker 1: is only case by case stuff. If you are read

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Speaker 1: onto some red into some aspect of Stellar Wind, then

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Speaker 1: you are not automatically read into any other hypothetical s

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Speaker 1: c I thing like you know, if they've been secretly

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Speaker 1: hunting Bigfoot or sixty years and there's a crack team

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Speaker 1: of neo Neanderthals who are participating in that search, you're

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Speaker 1: not going to know about it unless you get read

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Speaker 1: into that program. I was, Stellar Wind is a huge

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Speaker 1: surveillance thing. Everyone should be mad about it. Yeah that,

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Speaker 1: I mean that was was Stellar Wind before Snowdon or

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Speaker 1: was that a part of Snowden. That's the only thing

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Speaker 1: I can't remember because I know that's what I learned

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Speaker 1: about what Yes Nowdon talked about. I think Wired released

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Speaker 1: that when Wired and Washington Post in the Guardian, we're

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Speaker 1: able to do as this huge data mining operation very

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Speaker 1: illegal as in the wake of nine eleven that's when

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Speaker 1: it happened, and a lot of people who had top

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Speaker 1: secret security clearance wouldn't know about it, and a lot

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Speaker 1: of people who could have raised a flag in the

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Speaker 1: halls of government weren't told about it because you can

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Speaker 1: weaponize classification. There's an incredible whistle blower. I remember seeing

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Speaker 1: videos of him talking about this, and it's like I've

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Speaker 1: been trying to get tell people about this. William Binny

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Speaker 1: b I n n E. Yu say he was an

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Speaker 1: n s A agent who became a whistle blower and

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Speaker 1: talked about Stellar Wind and was not promoted afterwards. To

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Speaker 1: put it likely, so to get access to this, let's

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Speaker 1: take Benny as an example, he had to successfully go

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Speaker 1: through what's called a single scope background investigation. This is

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Speaker 1: the high level one they talk about. They check every

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Speaker 1: job you've ever had, whether you told them about it

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Speaker 1: or not. Education, any affiliations or organizations you've been kicking

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Speaker 1: it with, UH, any local law enforcement stuff, about every

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Speaker 1: place you have lived, worked, traveled, or attended school. Uh.

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Speaker 1: They'll also interview people who you personally and professionally. They'll

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Speaker 1: run your credit. Uh, they'll look if you've got a

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Speaker 1: spouse or someone who lives with you, whether that's a

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Speaker 1: roommate or a romantic partner. They're getting the business to

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Speaker 1: Everyone gets touched. And the reason everyone gets touched, as

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Speaker 1: paranoid as it sounds, is because in the era of

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Speaker 1: the Cold War, a lot of like deep cover folks

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Speaker 1: were able to successfully fool the system. So it's a

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Speaker 1: real thing. Even when it seems silly. Uh, it is dangerous.

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Speaker 1: And if at any point you refuse to us close

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Speaker 1: something or you accidentally don't disclose it, the rule is

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Speaker 1: you're automatically disqualified. That's the rule. So no scrups. You're

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Speaker 1: doing this cross word in pen and you can't get

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Speaker 1: an answer wrong. And in the end, it's like, how

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Speaker 1: how often do you still say the pledge of allegiance

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Speaker 1: to yourself in your mind? Because really it's what it's about,

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Speaker 1: right allegiance to the United States. If it's that, if

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Speaker 1: that's the government you're trying to get into. Yeah, so

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Speaker 1: let's think of it in terms of without getting too

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Speaker 1: in the weeds when you get to the crazy stuff, right,

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Speaker 1: So without getting too in the weeds, investigators are looking

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Speaker 1: for exactly the kind of stuff you would think about.

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Speaker 1: They want to see whether someone has lots of debt

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Speaker 1: that means they're easier to manipulate. Right, there's a financial motive.

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Speaker 1: They want to see if someone has a personal relationship

402
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Speaker 1: with sketchy characters. You know, how tight are you with

403
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Speaker 1: the ruling body of Saudi Arabia? Right, it's spent a

404
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Speaker 1: lot of time and you're in Yeah, okay, Sun be

405
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Speaker 1: a terrible example. Let's say mean mar or China would

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Speaker 1: be a spooky winner Russia something like that. Uh, if

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Speaker 1: you have a standing record, that's an interesting one of

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Speaker 1: immoral behavior, like moral turpitude. If you've ever heard that

409
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Speaker 1: phrase trying to pass customs. Uh. This can be sticky

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Speaker 1: and subjective because a lot of people say smoking wheat

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Speaker 1: in college or having an edible at a God Speed

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Speaker 1: to Black Emperor show when you're in your you know, twenties,

413
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Speaker 1: doesn't this is the best thing, the best of all

414
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Speaker 1: possible worlds, everything everywhere, all at once level cool. But

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Speaker 1: that would be regarded in some situations as immoral, you

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Speaker 1: might be able to mitigate it, but it'd be really tough.

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Speaker 1: Other things like d u I s. Of course, if

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Speaker 1: you have a bunch of if you've been busted with

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Speaker 1: a bunch of cocaine and you weren't working off the

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Speaker 1: books for an intelligence agency, and that's that's a problem. Um.

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Speaker 1: And one really messy thing about that one in particular

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Speaker 1: is you know, back in the day when the government

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Speaker 1: even more openly persecuted lgbt Q people, evidence of same

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Speaker 1: sex relationships or being being non heterosexual could also be

425
00:26:23,359 --> 00:26:26,960
Speaker 1: seen as even making you even more of a weak

426
00:26:27,040 --> 00:26:31,200
Speaker 1: link than having a lot of debt, because you might

427
00:26:31,280 --> 00:26:34,720
Speaker 1: be manipulated. That was how their their logic went. We're

428
00:26:34,760 --> 00:26:36,760
Speaker 1: not saying that. So that's what I mean when sticky,

429
00:26:36,760 --> 00:26:40,720
Speaker 1: it's subjective what is immoral? But also like the don't

430
00:26:40,840 --> 00:26:44,439
Speaker 1: people with families fall into that category? You know, if

431
00:26:44,480 --> 00:26:47,119
Speaker 1: you have loved ones or anyone that could be kidnapped

432
00:26:47,200 --> 00:26:50,720
Speaker 1: or threatened in order to get some information from you.

433
00:26:50,800 --> 00:26:52,359
Speaker 1: Isn't that sort of what we always see in like

434
00:26:52,800 --> 00:26:55,560
Speaker 1: action movies that just by you know, we we have

435
00:26:55,640 --> 00:26:58,119
Speaker 1: we have these like Lone Wolf characters have decided to

436
00:26:58,400 --> 00:27:01,800
Speaker 1: rid themselves off any attachment. It's because everyone they love,

437
00:27:01,880 --> 00:27:05,000
Speaker 1: they've ever loved, was hurt because of them. You know.

438
00:27:05,119 --> 00:27:07,880
Speaker 1: I just it seems like there are other ways outside

439
00:27:07,880 --> 00:27:11,320
Speaker 1: of this this moral turpitude kind of like path to

440
00:27:11,800 --> 00:27:14,960
Speaker 1: manipulate people. Yeah, there's always a way to get in.

441
00:27:15,040 --> 00:27:18,159
Speaker 1: There's a chink in every armor obviously, right. But uh,

442
00:27:18,640 --> 00:27:20,840
Speaker 1: but with the basically is how easy can we make

443
00:27:20,880 --> 00:27:23,360
Speaker 1: a p tape of this person? Right? Right? Right? Can

444
00:27:23,400 --> 00:27:28,520
Speaker 1: they get honey potted? So this, Uh, I've heard before,

445
00:27:28,600 --> 00:27:30,160
Speaker 1: and this is kind of off the record, but I've

446
00:27:30,200 --> 00:27:34,119
Speaker 1: heard before people saying that they like folks who have

447
00:27:34,200 --> 00:27:37,880
Speaker 1: an established family. They like you know, as long as

448
00:27:37,920 --> 00:27:43,959
Speaker 1: your family is also US based and you're children aren't

449
00:27:45,240 --> 00:27:50,120
Speaker 1: openly working as mercenaries, then uh, they like it because

450
00:27:50,200 --> 00:27:54,600
Speaker 1: it gives you, um, at least an appearance a higher

451
00:27:54,640 --> 00:27:59,040
Speaker 1: likelihood of stability. You have stuff on the line, you know. Um,

452
00:27:59,160 --> 00:28:01,480
Speaker 1: So it can it can go different ways, obviously, Yeah,

453
00:28:01,560 --> 00:28:07,200
Speaker 1: no criminal background, that's a big one. Uh. Sometimes people

454
00:28:07,240 --> 00:28:09,920
Speaker 1: get around it and then it goes the most subjective

455
00:28:09,960 --> 00:28:14,159
Speaker 1: thing that that you have mentioned, that sense of loyalty.

456
00:28:14,520 --> 00:28:18,280
Speaker 1: How do you prove that? How do you measure that flag?

457
00:28:18,440 --> 00:28:22,520
Speaker 1: Outside your house on a pole U flag on your

458
00:28:22,600 --> 00:28:26,160
Speaker 1: vehicle somewhere, either a sticker or like a lapel pit.

459
00:28:27,800 --> 00:28:31,000
Speaker 1: You have to own a bald eagle or no someone

460
00:28:31,040 --> 00:28:37,200
Speaker 1: for every meal pledge of allegiance before every meal, Um,

461
00:28:37,280 --> 00:28:39,800
Speaker 1: you have to have gone to the Stone Mountain laser

462
00:28:39,880 --> 00:28:44,120
Speaker 1: show at least twice. You remember that one? Oh yeah,

463
00:28:44,360 --> 00:28:49,160
Speaker 1: oh yeah, it's not been that long. I remember it was.

464
00:28:49,440 --> 00:28:52,080
Speaker 1: It's one of those things that seems normal when you're

465
00:28:52,120 --> 00:28:54,360
Speaker 1: a kid, and looking back, I'm like, wow, that's kind

466
00:28:54,360 --> 00:28:59,080
Speaker 1: of indoctrination, isn't it. Yeah, Stillmoult lasers show, folks, I

467
00:28:59,080 --> 00:29:00,600
Speaker 1: don't know if they still do it. Check it out.

468
00:29:01,040 --> 00:29:03,880
Speaker 1: So it's obvious white people have this right. Most people

469
00:29:03,920 --> 00:29:08,680
Speaker 1: who have security clearances aren't James Bond level wet work dudes.

470
00:29:09,440 --> 00:29:12,120
Speaker 1: They just need the info to do their job. You

471
00:29:12,160 --> 00:29:15,840
Speaker 1: are a janitorial staff at the Pentagon, then you probably

472
00:29:15,880 --> 00:29:20,280
Speaker 1: have a security clearance just because you probably don't have

473
00:29:20,560 --> 00:29:24,200
Speaker 1: You know, you're probably not read on two compartmented intelligence

474
00:29:24,280 --> 00:29:29,080
Speaker 1: or compartmentalized, but you are. They definitely looked into you.

475
00:29:29,840 --> 00:29:32,040
Speaker 1: Didn't just like give you the job on a handshaken

476
00:29:32,080 --> 00:29:35,120
Speaker 1: a vibe. Do you think instead of trash cans at

477
00:29:35,160 --> 00:29:37,880
Speaker 1: a secured facility like that. They have just paper shredders

478
00:29:37,920 --> 00:29:40,920
Speaker 1: everywhere instead like everybody has a paper shudder at their

479
00:29:40,920 --> 00:29:45,000
Speaker 1: desk or an incinerator. They actually have they have a

480
00:29:45,080 --> 00:29:48,400
Speaker 1: specific measure than they used to have, this specific measure

481
00:29:48,520 --> 00:29:52,840
Speaker 1: for the level of shredding, Like you couldn't have just

482
00:29:52,960 --> 00:29:55,520
Speaker 1: your you know, your office depo are best buy shredder

483
00:29:56,000 --> 00:29:59,600
Speaker 1: had to They didn't want people taping the strips together,

484
00:30:00,160 --> 00:30:03,720
Speaker 1: is what what they meant? Um, Yeah, that's a good question.

485
00:30:03,720 --> 00:30:06,560
Speaker 1: There was a rumor for a long time that you know,

486
00:30:06,600 --> 00:30:09,640
Speaker 1: there's a food court in the Pentagon or there was, Um,

487
00:30:09,640 --> 00:30:12,600
Speaker 1: it's probably still there. And for a long time I

488
00:30:12,640 --> 00:30:14,880
Speaker 1: had heard that even the folks were working at the

489
00:30:14,920 --> 00:30:18,760
Speaker 1: subway had to have a background check. And at that point,

490
00:30:20,360 --> 00:30:22,800
Speaker 1: I feel like I would think it was too much trouble,

491
00:30:23,360 --> 00:30:25,440
Speaker 1: you know what I mean, Like I'm and that's not

492
00:30:25,480 --> 00:30:27,600
Speaker 1: a ding on subway at all, But I would just

493
00:30:27,640 --> 00:30:30,080
Speaker 1: say I'm going through a lot. You know, this is

494
00:30:30,720 --> 00:30:32,440
Speaker 1: we're in an area in the world where they're like

495
00:30:32,480 --> 00:30:36,320
Speaker 1: twenty other subways down the street. Yeah. Can you imagine

496
00:30:36,360 --> 00:30:38,640
Speaker 1: just getting into work every day to have to do

497
00:30:38,720 --> 00:30:42,520
Speaker 1: prepped like to to make that tuna say, I which

498
00:30:42,600 --> 00:30:45,320
Speaker 1: you I bet that people were cool though you know

499
00:30:45,400 --> 00:30:47,240
Speaker 1: you're all you always gotta be nice in person. Makes

500
00:30:47,240 --> 00:30:50,640
Speaker 1: your food so right right now, It's so difficult to

501
00:30:50,680 --> 00:30:54,600
Speaker 1: guess how many people have a security clearance, but back

502
00:30:54,600 --> 00:30:58,280
Speaker 1: in the Washington Post put the number at about five

503
00:30:58,320 --> 00:31:02,680
Speaker 1: point one million. Again, how many people can know about

504
00:31:02,760 --> 00:31:06,440
Speaker 1: something before it no longer becomes secret. Five point one

505
00:31:06,440 --> 00:31:09,440
Speaker 1: million Americans some sort of security clearance for sense of

506
00:31:09,520 --> 00:31:13,560
Speaker 1: scale that is higher than the population of Norway. It's

507
00:31:13,600 --> 00:31:16,800
Speaker 1: like we told a group of people as big as

508
00:31:16,800 --> 00:31:21,760
Speaker 1: the population of Norway. Yeah, but that's why the compartment

509
00:31:21,880 --> 00:31:25,200
Speaker 1: and stuff is so much more interesting because there are

510
00:31:25,200 --> 00:31:28,400
Speaker 1: so many fewer people that have that kind of clearance.

511
00:31:28,800 --> 00:31:33,240
Speaker 1: Quick correction, So we checked these facts. I'm sorry, Matt, No,

512
00:31:33,600 --> 00:31:38,320
Speaker 1: I just remembered as of the population, Norway's five point

513
00:31:38,440 --> 00:31:43,000
Speaker 1: four zero eight million people, so they went up. Norwegians.

514
00:31:43,640 --> 00:31:47,240
Speaker 1: Please don't send the angry email. We checked. Uh, And

515
00:31:47,320 --> 00:31:51,360
Speaker 1: this is a lot of secrets. So the question is

516
00:31:51,880 --> 00:31:54,760
Speaker 1: what could go wrong? It turns out a great deal

517
00:31:55,160 --> 00:32:04,440
Speaker 1: and pause for word from our sponsors. Here's where it

518
00:32:04,520 --> 00:32:10,840
Speaker 1: gets crazy. Okay, No, Matt, how seriously how many people

519
00:32:10,920 --> 00:32:13,400
Speaker 1: can know something before we just throw up our heads

520
00:32:13,400 --> 00:32:15,600
Speaker 1: and say it's not a secret anymore. Those are what

521
00:32:15,640 --> 00:32:21,920
Speaker 1: they call open secrets, right, like Israel's nuclear program, right right, Yeah,

522
00:32:21,960 --> 00:32:23,560
Speaker 1: but I don't know it's it's is it more of

523
00:32:23,600 --> 00:32:26,320
Speaker 1: a is it more of an issue or a question

524
00:32:26,360 --> 00:32:31,120
Speaker 1: of decorum at that point, you know, where it's like, yeah, okay,

525
00:32:31,240 --> 00:32:32,840
Speaker 1: the cats out of the bag, But we don't want

526
00:32:32,840 --> 00:32:36,400
Speaker 1: to claim responsibility for letting the cat and or badgers

527
00:32:36,400 --> 00:32:38,680
Speaker 1: out of the bag. So we're gonna keep it classified

528
00:32:38,760 --> 00:32:41,640
Speaker 1: like that even though we know, because you know, it

529
00:32:41,720 --> 00:32:44,680
Speaker 1: behooves us for more people not to know. And if

530
00:32:44,720 --> 00:32:47,720
Speaker 1: something is an open secret, that also it still has

531
00:32:47,840 --> 00:32:54,080
Speaker 1: the air of around it. M hmm. Well, let's let's

532
00:32:54,080 --> 00:32:56,560
Speaker 1: talk about how weird these numbers are. So before the break,

533
00:32:56,560 --> 00:33:00,600
Speaker 1: we talked about five point one million Americans to have

534
00:33:00,720 --> 00:33:04,920
Speaker 1: some sort of security clearance. That number came from according

535
00:33:04,960 --> 00:33:09,680
Speaker 1: to the Washington Post. But this year CNN put out

536
00:33:09,680 --> 00:33:13,120
Speaker 1: an article written by Zachary B. Wolfe found that the

537
00:33:13,160 --> 00:33:18,440
Speaker 1: Director of National Intelligence twenty seventeen security clearance Determinations. Wow,

538
00:33:18,480 --> 00:33:21,720
Speaker 1: that's a lot listed more than two point eight million

539
00:33:21,800 --> 00:33:28,800
Speaker 1: people as having clearance as of that October, so like October. Um, yeah,

540
00:33:29,000 --> 00:33:33,320
Speaker 1: that's an interesting one. So are they talking about government

541
00:33:33,400 --> 00:33:37,680
Speaker 1: employees only, right, or the because that seems like a

542
00:33:37,760 --> 00:33:41,320
Speaker 1: heck of a drop from five million. Uh, you know

543
00:33:41,520 --> 00:33:44,320
Speaker 1: most of those again one point six have confidential or

544
00:33:44,320 --> 00:33:46,920
Speaker 1: secret information access and then one point to have the

545
00:33:46,960 --> 00:33:51,840
Speaker 1: top secret rating. But one point two million with top secret. Yeah,

546
00:33:52,160 --> 00:33:54,040
Speaker 1: a lot of secrets, a lot of a lot of

547
00:33:54,360 --> 00:33:59,040
Speaker 1: top secrets. But uh, but yeah, it's it's weird. There

548
00:33:59,080 --> 00:34:02,080
Speaker 1: are other people like said who have security clearance but

549
00:34:02,120 --> 00:34:07,360
Speaker 1: they don't currently have access to information. Private contractors clearances.

550
00:34:07,360 --> 00:34:10,360
Speaker 1: It's crazy they have to. And now in recent years

551
00:34:10,400 --> 00:34:14,640
Speaker 1: the idea of that, even the very important but often

552
00:34:14,960 --> 00:34:19,160
Speaker 1: snooze festi process of getting a security clearance has become

553
00:34:19,200 --> 00:34:24,320
Speaker 1: controversial politically charged. Uh. Two of the biggest issues, of course,

554
00:34:24,600 --> 00:34:31,520
Speaker 1: include when politics gets inserted into the into the clearance

555
00:34:31,560 --> 00:34:34,960
Speaker 1: game political impointees, I'm not saying this. It's not like

556
00:34:35,120 --> 00:34:38,960
Speaker 1: you know in the sixties, are you now or have

557
00:34:39,040 --> 00:34:41,520
Speaker 1: you ever been a member of the Communist Party. It's

558
00:34:41,560 --> 00:34:45,759
Speaker 1: like a bunch of people in in intelligence saying no,

559
00:34:46,120 --> 00:34:48,399
Speaker 1: not this guy, don't give it to him. And then

560
00:34:49,000 --> 00:34:51,800
Speaker 1: someone with a lot of political capital, using their juice

561
00:34:52,320 --> 00:34:54,799
Speaker 1: to say I don't care, you know what I mean.

562
00:34:55,560 --> 00:34:58,080
Speaker 1: And that's what happened with Trump and his son in law.

563
00:34:58,360 --> 00:35:00,239
Speaker 1: I see what you're saying. You're saying that like purity

564
00:35:00,280 --> 00:35:03,279
Speaker 1: clearances can kind of be rammed through with a little

565
00:35:03,360 --> 00:35:07,760
Speaker 1: grease from the right person. Yeah, and that's the problem

566
00:35:08,040 --> 00:35:11,000
Speaker 1: that they shouldn't I mean, yeah, right, yes, agreed, agreed,

567
00:35:11,040 --> 00:35:14,000
Speaker 1: I agreed. Yeah, I mean, let's let's talk about it. Then,

568
00:35:14,040 --> 00:35:20,040
Speaker 1: you guys, remember right with this wash the administration of

569
00:35:20,080 --> 00:35:23,839
Speaker 1: them President Trump, um, And we're using this one because

570
00:35:23,840 --> 00:35:26,520
Speaker 1: it's just the best, most recent example. And he gotten

571
00:35:26,520 --> 00:35:29,600
Speaker 1: a lot of hot water in the press and with

572
00:35:30,520 --> 00:35:35,279
Speaker 1: the intelligence community because he did two things that don't

573
00:35:35,280 --> 00:35:37,799
Speaker 1: make a lot of sense in a meritocracy or in

574
00:35:37,800 --> 00:35:41,759
Speaker 1: a competent security environment. One, he gave his son in

575
00:35:41,840 --> 00:35:47,120
Speaker 1: law a job right as like senior advisor. And this

576
00:35:47,239 --> 00:35:50,839
Speaker 1: was a political appointee position, which means it's really up

577
00:35:50,880 --> 00:35:54,000
Speaker 1: to hint, it's up to the president. It's the president's staff.

578
00:35:54,040 --> 00:35:57,439
Speaker 1: You can't say, I mean, you could say you don't

579
00:35:57,480 --> 00:36:00,719
Speaker 1: like someone, but that you don't have any influence on

580
00:36:00,760 --> 00:36:03,160
Speaker 1: whether or not they can get hired. Well, multiple high

581
00:36:03,239 --> 00:36:07,239
Speaker 1: level people did say that they they did. They did

582
00:36:07,680 --> 00:36:10,440
Speaker 1: because he not only hired Jared Koshner, his son in law,

583
00:36:10,480 --> 00:36:14,040
Speaker 1: but he gave him top secret clearance. Right. Yeah. Uh,

584
00:36:14,200 --> 00:36:19,080
Speaker 1: multiple agencies said back in like eighteen, they said, this

585
00:36:19,120 --> 00:36:23,839
Speaker 1: guy has a lot of conflicts of interest. Mr President. Uh,

586
00:36:24,440 --> 00:36:27,719
Speaker 1: we're just saying that if we were, if we were

587
00:36:27,719 --> 00:36:31,160
Speaker 1: doing the background check, she would check a lot of boxes.

588
00:36:31,239 --> 00:36:34,719
Speaker 1: That meant he could never work at this level. Bad

589
00:36:34,760 --> 00:36:38,439
Speaker 1: boxes bad But he had checking bad boxes. Yeah, because

590
00:36:38,440 --> 00:36:40,600
Speaker 1: I mean also, the question too becomes like why and

591
00:36:40,640 --> 00:36:43,759
Speaker 1: to what ends? Because you know, we're not and this

592
00:36:43,800 --> 00:36:44,960
Speaker 1: isn't what we do in the show. We're not trying

593
00:36:45,000 --> 00:36:47,960
Speaker 1: to smear anybody politically or anything. But there there there

594
00:36:48,080 --> 00:36:50,959
Speaker 1: was a sense I think among some you know, even

595
00:36:51,080 --> 00:36:54,880
Speaker 1: down to why did Trump take home those classified documents

596
00:36:55,040 --> 00:36:58,080
Speaker 1: and not give them up when asked that perhaps he

597
00:36:58,160 --> 00:37:04,560
Speaker 1: was priming uh, some of these close personal um confidants, uh,

598
00:37:04,600 --> 00:37:08,279
Speaker 1: to be able to access information and kind of hold

599
00:37:08,320 --> 00:37:11,640
Speaker 1: it over certain individuals. Yeah. And when you're dealing with

600
00:37:11,680 --> 00:37:15,080
Speaker 1: stuff that the Kushner family really was dealing with at

601
00:37:15,120 --> 00:37:20,200
Speaker 1: that time, you could you could be compromised in various ways.

602
00:37:20,520 --> 00:37:22,920
Speaker 1: One of the biggest ones been was this six million

603
00:37:22,960 --> 00:37:30,839
Speaker 1: dollar like real estate thing, Manhattan real estate deal American dream. Uh.

604
00:37:30,880 --> 00:37:37,000
Speaker 1: The Kushner family owned this pretty nice tower in Manhattan,

605
00:37:37,600 --> 00:37:41,000
Speaker 1: but they were hemorrhaging money on it. They were having

606
00:37:41,040 --> 00:37:44,399
Speaker 1: trouble with the deal. And again, to be fair, real

607
00:37:44,520 --> 00:37:48,640
Speaker 1: estate can be a risky business, right, So no one's

608
00:37:48,640 --> 00:37:51,759
Speaker 1: saying this was necessarily a scam, but it was seen

609
00:37:51,800 --> 00:37:54,640
Speaker 1: as a conflict of interest when it came out that

610
00:37:54,920 --> 00:38:00,680
Speaker 1: Uh Kushner and the Kushner companies were actively courting foreign

611
00:38:00,840 --> 00:38:04,319
Speaker 1: investors to help with the cash. That's something that is,

612
00:38:04,520 --> 00:38:07,920
Speaker 1: you know, not uncommon in the world of real estate,

613
00:38:08,040 --> 00:38:11,799
Speaker 1: but in the world of dealing with government secrets. You

614
00:38:11,920 --> 00:38:16,440
Speaker 1: don't want people who need money from foreign powers. It's

615
00:38:16,480 --> 00:38:18,840
Speaker 1: just like day one stuff. Yeah. And not only that,

616
00:38:18,960 --> 00:38:21,880
Speaker 1: they I think there was something about them they like

617
00:38:21,960 --> 00:38:24,919
Speaker 1: met with White House officials, the family did, and then

618
00:38:25,080 --> 00:38:28,120
Speaker 1: when they came away, I think the City Group and

619
00:38:28,200 --> 00:38:30,960
Speaker 1: maybe one other outfit like lent them a ton of

620
00:38:31,000 --> 00:38:35,239
Speaker 1: money after, you know. And and that's not necessarily that bit,

621
00:38:35,680 --> 00:38:37,680
Speaker 1: but it is kind of weird that they met with

622
00:38:37,680 --> 00:38:41,279
Speaker 1: White House officials to Greece some wheels there m h.

623
00:38:41,760 --> 00:38:44,480
Speaker 1: And then of course, Charlie dat and start drawing some

624
00:38:44,520 --> 00:38:49,400
Speaker 1: red strings between uh, that meeting and those loans Apollo

625
00:38:49,400 --> 00:38:52,560
Speaker 1: Global Management and City Group. Uh and and then just

626
00:38:52,640 --> 00:38:58,960
Speaker 1: connect the thoughts out to let's say, favorable financial policies

627
00:38:59,280 --> 00:39:01,680
Speaker 1: that might come up out you know, little stuff too,

628
00:39:01,719 --> 00:39:05,160
Speaker 1: maybe that the average person wouldn't notice because you don't

629
00:39:05,760 --> 00:39:09,759
Speaker 1: touch that rarefied air. Right. Uh So those are two

630
00:39:10,000 --> 00:39:13,840
Speaker 1: Those are two issues that people had, And the Washington

631
00:39:13,880 --> 00:39:18,440
Speaker 1: Post said that they had on record confirmed that foreign

632
00:39:18,520 --> 00:39:24,840
Speaker 1: officials were already having water cooler talk with themselves, going hey, okay,

633
00:39:24,840 --> 00:39:26,799
Speaker 1: so we got this guy over a barrel, how do

634
00:39:26,840 --> 00:39:29,840
Speaker 1: we leverage him? How can we turn this to our advantage?

635
00:39:29,840 --> 00:39:32,799
Speaker 1: You know, let's not say blackmail, but you know, how

636
00:39:32,800 --> 00:39:34,560
Speaker 1: do we how do we get to the kind of

637
00:39:34,560 --> 00:39:40,400
Speaker 1: a win win now that he's financially weak. That's exactly

638
00:39:40,400 --> 00:39:43,640
Speaker 1: what security clearance is supposed to figure out first. So

639
00:39:44,120 --> 00:39:46,600
Speaker 1: this doesn't even talk about Russia. We don't even we can't.

640
00:39:46,600 --> 00:39:48,560
Speaker 1: We don't have time to talk about Christian and Russia.

641
00:39:49,000 --> 00:39:52,279
Speaker 1: There's an episode for another day. I don't know, well

642
00:39:52,560 --> 00:39:55,560
Speaker 1: the big deal there. We can just say this, we

643
00:39:55,680 --> 00:40:00,720
Speaker 1: know that Kushner met with foreign officials with out letting

644
00:40:00,880 --> 00:40:04,359
Speaker 1: the groups know, they're supposed to know when someone at

645
00:40:04,360 --> 00:40:07,799
Speaker 1: that level is meeting with foreign officials, right, yeah, that's

646
00:40:07,840 --> 00:40:10,960
Speaker 1: the other thing. If you are meeting, so if you're

647
00:40:11,000 --> 00:40:17,440
Speaker 1: meeting as a representative of US policy, right, this is

648
00:40:17,480 --> 00:40:22,200
Speaker 1: not your college friend or whatever. You are meeting with

649
00:40:22,280 --> 00:40:27,239
Speaker 1: someone and you're saying, Hey, quid pro quo because I

650
00:40:27,280 --> 00:40:29,920
Speaker 1: can get some stuff done. I know just what you like.

651
00:40:30,280 --> 00:40:33,080
Speaker 1: You know what I like. I like favors to you

652
00:40:33,120 --> 00:40:35,399
Speaker 1: know what I mean, that kind of thing that's your

653
00:40:35,640 --> 00:40:39,520
Speaker 1: You are supposed to tell the National Security Council, like, hey,

654
00:40:39,640 --> 00:40:42,879
Speaker 1: I'm going out on the geopolitical town, might be out late,

655
00:40:43,120 --> 00:40:45,920
Speaker 1: might get in some trouble, don't wait up, uh, in

656
00:40:45,960 --> 00:40:48,200
Speaker 1: which case they would say, what the hell is wrong

657
00:40:48,239 --> 00:40:51,880
Speaker 1: with you? Right? Yeah, please please stay inside, Mr Koshner.

658
00:40:52,040 --> 00:40:55,200
Speaker 1: So how did he get a clearance? Then that's the question. Well,

659
00:40:55,280 --> 00:40:58,400
Speaker 1: I think you know, we've been tipping our hand a

660
00:40:58,440 --> 00:41:01,360
Speaker 1: little bit at that the present it in his in

661
00:41:01,440 --> 00:41:05,719
Speaker 1: his wisdom, or in in the power that the companies

662
00:41:05,760 --> 00:41:09,000
Speaker 1: that position was able to ram it through. He insisted.

663
00:41:09,080 --> 00:41:14,279
Speaker 1: He ordered it to be done, despite advisors, uh you know,

664
00:41:14,880 --> 00:41:17,280
Speaker 1: advising him to the contrary, and you know, it really

665
00:41:17,320 --> 00:41:20,120
Speaker 1: makes me think about you know, one of the first

666
00:41:20,120 --> 00:41:23,040
Speaker 1: things they teach you in like high school Civics class, uh,

667
00:41:23,080 --> 00:41:25,200
Speaker 1: for whatever reason, whether it's like to make you feel

668
00:41:25,280 --> 00:41:28,840
Speaker 1: better about this weird experiment called, you know, democracy that

669
00:41:28,880 --> 00:41:31,600
Speaker 1: we have is this idea of checks and balances. And

670
00:41:31,840 --> 00:41:35,200
Speaker 1: I know that's more about lawmaking, but at the end

671
00:41:35,200 --> 00:41:37,719
Speaker 1: of the day, when you have a president who is

672
00:41:37,880 --> 00:41:40,440
Speaker 1: gonna throw all tradition by the wayside, is going to

673
00:41:40,560 --> 00:41:44,160
Speaker 1: throw all kind of you know, pre established precedents and

674
00:41:44,160 --> 00:41:49,080
Speaker 1: and uh, decorum out the window, checks and balances kind

675
00:41:49,080 --> 00:41:51,000
Speaker 1: of go out the window too. I mean, you literally

676
00:41:51,000 --> 00:41:53,960
Speaker 1: have someone that is is able to order someone like

677
00:41:54,000 --> 00:41:58,000
Speaker 1: a king to to do a thing that everyone you

678
00:41:58,000 --> 00:42:00,640
Speaker 1: know who has more experience probably knows to be not

679
00:42:00,719 --> 00:42:05,000
Speaker 1: a good idea. That kind of absolute power is Uh,

680
00:42:06,320 --> 00:42:09,080
Speaker 1: here's a corrupting force, right and dangerous. That's how he

681
00:42:09,160 --> 00:42:13,720
Speaker 1: checks and balances are so important regardless of where uh

682
00:42:13,920 --> 00:42:17,520
Speaker 1: people might find themselves as individuals on the political spectrum. Right,

683
00:42:18,000 --> 00:42:21,879
Speaker 1: and the president over rides all these concerns. His White

684
00:42:21,960 --> 00:42:24,839
Speaker 1: House counsel says, don't do it. The White House Chief

685
00:42:24,840 --> 00:42:27,640
Speaker 1: of Staff is like, bro, don't do it, sleep it off,

686
00:42:27,680 --> 00:42:30,080
Speaker 1: you know what I mean, wake up and and and

687
00:42:30,320 --> 00:42:33,440
Speaker 1: have a look around. Uh In at the dawn of

688
00:42:33,440 --> 00:42:36,879
Speaker 1: a bright new day. And the day after, White House

689
00:42:36,920 --> 00:42:40,520
Speaker 1: Council Don McGann says, I'm going on record, you just

690
00:42:40,560 --> 00:42:43,720
Speaker 1: can't do it. There's too many conflicts of interest. Trump

691
00:42:43,760 --> 00:42:46,560
Speaker 1: does just what you described, nol Uh. Then President Trump

692
00:42:46,600 --> 00:42:50,719
Speaker 1: says this he forces it through this clearance, and that

693
00:42:50,760 --> 00:42:53,239
Speaker 1: meant that he ordered his son in law. Again, there's

694
00:42:53,239 --> 00:42:57,320
Speaker 1: a familial relationship to get access to top secret information

695
00:42:58,000 --> 00:43:02,600
Speaker 1: over the objections of prety much everybody who had actually

696
00:43:02,600 --> 00:43:06,600
Speaker 1: worked in this space. Not a good look. You know,

697
00:43:06,920 --> 00:43:10,040
Speaker 1: Like you're you Let's say you own the fire station

698
00:43:10,719 --> 00:43:14,080
Speaker 1: and you say, all right, I want my cousin Ernie

699
00:43:14,400 --> 00:43:17,560
Speaker 1: to be the chief firefighter. And they're like, oh, well,

700
00:43:17,680 --> 00:43:22,360
Speaker 1: has Ernie ever put out a fire or fontifier? It's like, well,

701
00:43:22,920 --> 00:43:25,960
Speaker 1: not so much put out, but he loves fire. He's

702
00:43:26,000 --> 00:43:30,280
Speaker 1: the man for the job. And they can't do anything

703
00:43:30,480 --> 00:43:33,240
Speaker 1: because you own the firehouse. It's not a perfect example

704
00:43:33,680 --> 00:43:40,279
Speaker 1: firehouse subs. Uh So this is this is problematic, you know,

705
00:43:40,440 --> 00:43:44,960
Speaker 1: And I guess if we're being fair, you have to say,

706
00:43:45,120 --> 00:43:48,200
Speaker 1: if he's let's leave the nepotism to one side. If

707
00:43:48,280 --> 00:43:50,759
Speaker 1: you are the senior advisor to the President of the

708
00:43:50,880 --> 00:43:54,680
Speaker 1: United States, it's it's functionally impossible to do that job

709
00:43:54,760 --> 00:43:56,880
Speaker 1: without a clearance, right, Like, I've never done it, But

710
00:43:56,920 --> 00:43:59,720
Speaker 1: I assume you run into a lot of classified stuff.

711
00:44:00,040 --> 00:44:02,759
Speaker 1: How are you going to advise the president on classified

712
00:44:02,800 --> 00:44:05,880
Speaker 1: stuff if you're not read in? Yeah, that's a good point.

713
00:44:06,520 --> 00:44:09,239
Speaker 1: Do you just go off vibes? Well, I can't really

714
00:44:09,280 --> 00:44:13,360
Speaker 1: make out most of this black highlighter, but Mr President,

715
00:44:13,400 --> 00:44:16,600
Speaker 1: I would recommend also remember how he said earlier that

716
00:44:16,760 --> 00:44:19,160
Speaker 1: someone accidentally leaves something out there. Clearance can be declined

717
00:44:19,239 --> 00:44:22,440
Speaker 1: or revoked. If they can prove you intentionally decided to

718
00:44:22,520 --> 00:44:25,800
Speaker 1: leave stuff out, you might be on the way to prison.

719
00:44:26,920 --> 00:44:31,120
Speaker 1: Pushner did that, or his legal team did, and his

720
00:44:31,239 --> 00:44:35,160
Speaker 1: team said the omissions weren't oversight. And here's their explanation.

721
00:44:35,239 --> 00:44:37,600
Speaker 1: This is true. This is on record. We can quote

722
00:44:37,880 --> 00:44:41,400
Speaker 1: chapter and verse from the Independent here by Rachel Revez,

723
00:44:42,000 --> 00:44:44,799
Speaker 1: his lawyer said, one of the staff members accidentally hit

724
00:44:44,840 --> 00:44:52,280
Speaker 1: the send button too early. That's what happened. Really, Oh man,

725
00:44:52,680 --> 00:44:55,640
Speaker 1: you guys ever had a moment like that where you

726
00:44:55,840 --> 00:44:58,120
Speaker 1: wish you could undersend something or you had an email

727
00:44:58,160 --> 00:45:01,759
Speaker 1: address one letter wrong, or you accidentally had an attachment

728
00:45:01,800 --> 00:45:04,840
Speaker 1: that wasn't right, or you know, a thread that contained

729
00:45:04,880 --> 00:45:07,080
Speaker 1: information that you shouldn't be sending to this person. I've

730
00:45:07,120 --> 00:45:11,560
Speaker 1: done with my phone multiple times, hitting you know, until

731
00:45:11,560 --> 00:45:15,000
Speaker 1: I go down the next thing and it just goes go, Well,

732
00:45:15,800 --> 00:45:19,359
Speaker 1: I had this weird auto tat feelings I'm getting yeah, yeah, yeah,

733
00:45:19,640 --> 00:45:23,640
Speaker 1: especially to pay on the email process. You're using your platform,

734
00:45:23,680 --> 00:45:26,360
Speaker 1: you're using because someone let you unsend things, or you

735
00:45:26,360 --> 00:45:28,480
Speaker 1: can get an extension that does it, and other ones

736
00:45:28,680 --> 00:45:33,000
Speaker 1: are like a gotcha. Here's the thing though, when even

737
00:45:33,160 --> 00:45:35,120
Speaker 1: I don't know how it works on every platform, but

738
00:45:35,400 --> 00:45:38,600
Speaker 1: on outlook, if you unsend something, which you can within

739
00:45:38,640 --> 00:45:41,160
Speaker 1: a certain period of time, it will still have a

740
00:45:41,200 --> 00:45:44,759
Speaker 1: remnant of like sober and so unsent an email tea,

741
00:45:46,000 --> 00:45:48,960
Speaker 1: It's like, what was that about? Man? You know, I

742
00:45:49,080 --> 00:45:51,799
Speaker 1: want to know what did you do? I've seen that.

743
00:45:51,960 --> 00:45:54,960
Speaker 1: But usually um, like if that happened between us, and

744
00:45:55,040 --> 00:45:57,720
Speaker 1: most of the folks who work with might just text

745
00:45:57,760 --> 00:46:01,640
Speaker 1: of them like what's it going on on? But but

746
00:46:01,840 --> 00:46:05,400
Speaker 1: in this situation, in this deep water, that feels like

747
00:46:05,440 --> 00:46:10,200
Speaker 1: a weird um narrative, right, not saying it's not true.

748
00:46:10,360 --> 00:46:14,400
Speaker 1: It just feels, especially people who are already distrustful of Kushner,

749
00:46:14,520 --> 00:46:17,440
Speaker 1: it feels like it's just even fishier, right, fishier than

750
00:46:17,440 --> 00:46:21,240
Speaker 1: an aquarium. This guy, they're saying. But at this point

751
00:46:21,560 --> 00:46:23,920
Speaker 1: we've got to say, we're kind of yeah, we're singing

752
00:46:24,000 --> 00:46:28,080
Speaker 1: amount because again, this is a great recent example of

753
00:46:28,120 --> 00:46:31,200
Speaker 1: how this stuff can go wrong. There's a whole laborntine

754
00:46:31,360 --> 00:46:35,239
Speaker 1: system meant to stop people with conflicts of interest from

755
00:46:35,280 --> 00:46:39,480
Speaker 1: getting through right to the beating heart of American secrecy.

756
00:46:40,520 --> 00:46:43,799
Speaker 1: But Pushner is not the only example. It's a matter

757
00:46:43,840 --> 00:46:46,160
Speaker 1: of fact, I say, maybe we pause for word from

758
00:46:46,160 --> 00:46:50,000
Speaker 1: our sponsors and zoom out a little and look at

759
00:46:50,040 --> 00:47:01,920
Speaker 1: the rest of the playing field. We're back, okay, we

760
00:47:01,920 --> 00:47:03,799
Speaker 1: we are kind of we were kind of dunking on

761
00:47:03,880 --> 00:47:08,319
Speaker 1: Jered Kushner. But uh, that's not the only problem. There's

762
00:47:08,360 --> 00:47:11,640
Speaker 1: been going on for more than a decade. There's a

763
00:47:11,719 --> 00:47:15,160
Speaker 1: lot of corruption in the system. It's like reading about this,

764
00:47:16,360 --> 00:47:19,240
Speaker 1: fellow listeners will make you wonder, what if you already

765
00:47:19,239 --> 00:47:21,879
Speaker 1: have a security clearance and just don't know. In two

766
00:47:21,880 --> 00:47:26,680
Speaker 1: thousand thirteen, UM the news organization Politico found that UH

767
00:47:27,000 --> 00:47:29,160
Speaker 1: found the following was gonna quote from because it's very

768
00:47:29,280 --> 00:47:34,399
Speaker 1: excellent reporting. Um quote. The process of conducting background checks

769
00:47:34,400 --> 00:47:38,960
Speaker 1: for national security clearances is riddled with extensive fraud that

770
00:47:39,080 --> 00:47:44,200
Speaker 1: can't be adequately combating, sort of like how history is

771
00:47:44,239 --> 00:47:48,560
Speaker 1: riddled with unexplained events. This h these this processes are

772
00:47:48,640 --> 00:47:52,600
Speaker 1: riddled with extensive fraud and can't be adequately combative. Yeah,

773
00:47:52,800 --> 00:47:56,399
Speaker 1: that's right, I think the again not picking on Trump here,

774
00:47:56,440 --> 00:48:01,239
Speaker 1: but that example is a perfect example of it of

775
00:48:01,400 --> 00:48:03,920
Speaker 1: not being able to do anything about it. So this

776
00:48:04,120 --> 00:48:07,520
Speaker 1: there was a lot of soul searching that happened after

777
00:48:07,640 --> 00:48:12,160
Speaker 1: these uh, incredibly sensitive leaks and whistleblowers. You know, like

778
00:48:12,560 --> 00:48:15,520
Speaker 1: Edward Snowden comes out now living in Russia, he got

779
00:48:15,560 --> 00:48:17,839
Speaker 1: a security clearance and it allowed him to leak all

780
00:48:17,880 --> 00:48:22,880
Speaker 1: this in food to the public. So people started investigating

781
00:48:23,600 --> 00:48:27,920
Speaker 1: their own clearance process and what they found was really frightening.

782
00:48:28,040 --> 00:48:29,319
Speaker 1: Is where we have to go to a guy named

783
00:48:29,360 --> 00:48:34,720
Speaker 1: Inspector General Patrick McFarlane and McFarland found that sixteen hundred

784
00:48:34,800 --> 00:48:40,200
Speaker 1: different background check reports were fabricated by guess what, one

785
00:48:40,480 --> 00:48:44,839
Speaker 1: employee who was herself hired on a faulty background check.

786
00:48:45,000 --> 00:48:47,680
Speaker 1: This is like that that one lab in lab Tech

787
00:48:47,719 --> 00:48:51,920
Speaker 1: who was doing all the U bad DNA test right, yeah,

788
00:48:52,080 --> 00:48:56,200
Speaker 1: or it reminds me of um. One of the morticians

789
00:48:56,200 --> 00:48:57,719
Speaker 1: are one of the people that were supposed to be

790
00:48:58,320 --> 00:49:01,759
Speaker 1: disposing of bodies in one way, but they were just

791
00:49:01,800 --> 00:49:03,560
Speaker 1: piling them up in the back because they didn't have

792
00:49:03,600 --> 00:49:05,399
Speaker 1: to spend any more money and they were making tons

793
00:49:05,400 --> 00:49:11,719
Speaker 1: of money Georgia. Yeah. Despicable. Despicable. So somebody was just going, uh,

794
00:49:11,840 --> 00:49:16,239
Speaker 1: fiddle d D. I'm sure that's fine. I spoke to

795
00:49:16,600 --> 00:49:23,080
Speaker 1: their employer and it was great. I didn't have time

796
00:49:23,120 --> 00:49:25,440
Speaker 1: to pull their financials, but I did make my quota

797
00:49:25,520 --> 00:49:28,680
Speaker 1: of X number of checks right over y period of time.

798
00:49:28,760 --> 00:49:32,040
Speaker 1: It might have been something like that. Uh. And the

799
00:49:32,080 --> 00:49:36,520
Speaker 1: weird thing is that employee who made up more than

800
00:49:37,520 --> 00:49:42,560
Speaker 1: background checks was herself hired on a screwed up background check.

801
00:49:42,880 --> 00:49:48,600
Speaker 1: The system is compromised. I'm telling you, Yeah, that's a problem.

802
00:49:48,680 --> 00:49:51,040
Speaker 1: That's a problem, you guys. I always I always think

803
00:49:51,040 --> 00:49:53,600
Speaker 1: about Edward Snowden and how like, you know, it's like

804
00:49:53,920 --> 00:49:56,880
Speaker 1: this guy got a background check to leak all this stuff,

805
00:49:57,360 --> 00:50:00,080
Speaker 1: But wasn't it more like he had a crisis of

806
00:50:00,120 --> 00:50:03,200
Speaker 1: conscience and he was like I gotta I gotta leak

807
00:50:03,280 --> 00:50:06,400
Speaker 1: this stuff. I thought that's how the thing went. I

808
00:50:06,280 --> 00:50:08,680
Speaker 1: imagine that that kind of thing could happen, and that's

809
00:50:08,719 --> 00:50:13,439
Speaker 1: way more dangerous. So, like, these background checks are meant

810
00:50:13,480 --> 00:50:17,279
Speaker 1: to prevent hiring someone who may at some point have

811
00:50:17,360 --> 00:50:20,799
Speaker 1: a crisis of conscience and want to leak information. Right

812
00:50:22,200 --> 00:50:26,120
Speaker 1: to have that lifelong loyalty, Right, even if you don't

813
00:50:26,520 --> 00:50:30,640
Speaker 1: always agree with everything your government does, you're going to

814
00:50:31,360 --> 00:50:34,279
Speaker 1: honor the agreement that you made right the charge you

815
00:50:34,320 --> 00:50:39,680
Speaker 1: took on. So these classifications, like a background investigation might

816
00:50:39,719 --> 00:50:43,839
Speaker 1: not be considered current. You get reinvestigated for the top

817
00:50:43,960 --> 00:50:47,279
Speaker 1: levels of stuff on a rotating basis, I think. But

818
00:50:49,000 --> 00:50:51,520
Speaker 1: mainly the idea is that you are meant to hold

819
00:50:51,560 --> 00:50:54,439
Speaker 1: those secrets for the rest of your waking days, right

820
00:50:54,520 --> 00:50:57,359
Speaker 1: even after you've gone through the debrief process, even after

821
00:50:57,400 --> 00:51:00,960
Speaker 1: you've been retired for twenty five years turned into a

822
00:51:01,040 --> 00:51:06,120
Speaker 1: weird robot somehow. Have you talked about the consequences for

823
00:51:06,120 --> 00:51:09,760
Speaker 1: for breaking one of these clearances? I mean, it varies,

824
00:51:09,800 --> 00:51:11,160
Speaker 1: I'm sure, and I know that's kind of what we're

825
00:51:11,160 --> 00:51:14,640
Speaker 1: talking about. You know, when you leak classified information, But

826
00:51:15,200 --> 00:51:18,400
Speaker 1: is there are there worst penalties associated with like breaking

827
00:51:18,400 --> 00:51:21,320
Speaker 1: that confidence when you've been obviously your clearance will be revoked.

828
00:51:21,360 --> 00:51:24,640
Speaker 1: But uh, is there like some sort of standard kind

829
00:51:24,680 --> 00:51:28,920
Speaker 1: of table of consequences that we can see. Yeah, well

830
00:51:28,920 --> 00:51:33,040
Speaker 1: they're not guaranteed to uh last forever, but you can

831
00:51:33,080 --> 00:51:40,360
Speaker 1: do stuff that will make your clearance automatically revoked. Right. Um,

832
00:51:40,440 --> 00:51:43,600
Speaker 1: and then if you and everybody is supposed to report

833
00:51:43,680 --> 00:51:48,040
Speaker 1: you like you're watching each other. Right, So there's there's

834
00:51:48,040 --> 00:51:50,000
Speaker 1: a lot of stuff that could be an accident to

835
00:51:50,600 --> 00:51:55,759
Speaker 1: you know, somebody's going home, right, they leave a facility

836
00:51:55,960 --> 00:51:58,959
Speaker 1: and they've got a briefcase with them, and they legitimately

837
00:51:59,040 --> 00:52:02,000
Speaker 1: just forgot that one of the things in that briefcase

838
00:52:02,040 --> 00:52:04,799
Speaker 1: was supposed to be under lock and key in a

839
00:52:04,920 --> 00:52:08,880
Speaker 1: secured area, right. Or you know, here's another one that's

840
00:52:08,920 --> 00:52:11,440
Speaker 1: a weird one. What if you're just you're on a

841
00:52:11,440 --> 00:52:14,200
Speaker 1: base somewhere, you're walking around. You see a piece of

842
00:52:14,239 --> 00:52:16,920
Speaker 1: paper just laying on the ground in the hallway. Human

843
00:52:17,000 --> 00:52:20,480
Speaker 1: error happens. Do you pick it up? Are you do

844
00:52:20,640 --> 00:52:24,680
Speaker 1: you have the classification to read it? Where where do

845
00:52:24,719 --> 00:52:29,160
Speaker 1: you take it? It's a it's like it's it's like

846
00:52:29,200 --> 00:52:32,520
Speaker 1: the emails I Heart sends us the fake phishing emails

847
00:52:32,520 --> 00:52:34,440
Speaker 1: that trying to trick out the emails. I don't think

848
00:52:34,480 --> 00:52:37,960
Speaker 1: people know about this. Our company all the time sends

849
00:52:38,080 --> 00:52:42,600
Speaker 1: us emails that are phishing attempts, but and they're meant

850
00:52:42,640 --> 00:52:46,400
Speaker 1: to resemble I heart official communications but be just a

851
00:52:46,400 --> 00:52:48,600
Speaker 1: little off. They're trying to train us to be able

852
00:52:48,640 --> 00:52:52,400
Speaker 1: to see phishing attempts. But it's they get us, they don't.

853
00:52:52,440 --> 00:52:54,160
Speaker 1: I don't know. I don't think they've gotten me yet,

854
00:52:54,520 --> 00:52:56,919
Speaker 1: but you never know, and then all of a sudden

855
00:52:56,920 --> 00:53:00,919
Speaker 1: you'll get another email that's like, did we get you

856
00:53:01,480 --> 00:53:05,320
Speaker 1: for it? I gotta say, though, UM, I have actually

857
00:53:05,960 --> 00:53:10,320
Speaker 1: avoided being scammed recently because of things that I learned

858
00:53:10,360 --> 00:53:13,080
Speaker 1: to look for because of those little got you uh

859
00:53:13,400 --> 00:53:16,319
Speaker 1: moments courtesy of our company. I was trying to sell

860
00:53:16,360 --> 00:53:20,120
Speaker 1: some stuff on Facebook Marketplace and there was this like

861
00:53:20,640 --> 00:53:25,200
Speaker 1: Zel scam that UM. I almost fell for it one time.

862
00:53:25,239 --> 00:53:26,960
Speaker 1: And what ultimately it led me to not fall for

863
00:53:27,000 --> 00:53:30,440
Speaker 1: it was remembering to look at the U R L

864
00:53:30,640 --> 00:53:34,160
Speaker 1: of the email that it was coming from. Uh. It

865
00:53:34,280 --> 00:53:39,360
Speaker 1: was payments Zel payments one five, six, seven three to

866
00:53:39,560 --> 00:53:43,560
Speaker 1: one at gmail dot com. Oh super legit. Yeah, So

867
00:53:44,239 --> 00:53:46,240
Speaker 1: I feel you, Matt and I've always felt a little

868
00:53:46,920 --> 00:53:49,040
Speaker 1: a little screwed with about those two, but it this

869
00:53:49,120 --> 00:53:51,120
Speaker 1: did kind of and then I and then it kept happening.

870
00:53:51,200 --> 00:53:53,000
Speaker 1: I was telling someone on Facebook marketplace, and then I

871
00:53:53,080 --> 00:53:55,840
Speaker 1: kept having like the same type of scams come up,

872
00:53:55,880 --> 00:53:59,040
Speaker 1: and I was just like, ha, got you. Well, uh,

873
00:53:59,239 --> 00:54:02,040
Speaker 1: you know that's that's good to hear that it has

874
00:54:02,080 --> 00:54:05,920
Speaker 1: had some use in uh, some impact, because otherwise it

875
00:54:06,000 --> 00:54:08,480
Speaker 1: just feels like such a weird flex to me. I

876
00:54:08,560 --> 00:54:12,440
Speaker 1: think I'm reading this email and I I would like

877
00:54:12,520 --> 00:54:17,359
Speaker 1: to say I never get caught. Um. There was one

878
00:54:17,440 --> 00:54:19,200
Speaker 1: that had me on a bit of a snipe hunt.

879
00:54:19,400 --> 00:54:22,280
Speaker 1: It was something about vacation time, and so I didn't

880
00:54:22,280 --> 00:54:25,080
Speaker 1: click on anything. I just went into the place where

881
00:54:25,080 --> 00:54:29,640
Speaker 1: I figure out vacation time and I my real response,

882
00:54:29,960 --> 00:54:33,880
Speaker 1: like my genuine response, was do I take vacations? When's

883
00:54:33,920 --> 00:54:37,120
Speaker 1: the last time I did? That? Is that you ever

884
00:54:37,200 --> 00:54:40,120
Speaker 1: logged a vacation day? Ever? Did this come from? Did

885
00:54:40,200 --> 00:54:44,360
Speaker 1: this come from the top angrily texting? But the moral

886
00:54:44,360 --> 00:54:46,879
Speaker 1: of the story is every floor paper you find out

887
00:54:46,880 --> 00:54:49,319
Speaker 1: the Pentagon is a trap. So do not pick the

888
00:54:49,360 --> 00:54:52,520
Speaker 1: world of the stories. Everything is a trap. Life is

889
00:54:52,600 --> 00:54:57,239
Speaker 1: one big escape room, a bar and our own We're

890
00:54:57,239 --> 00:54:59,839
Speaker 1: all the admiral act bars of our own story. This

891
00:55:00,040 --> 00:55:02,879
Speaker 1: of the party where no one gets out alive. Um

892
00:55:03,160 --> 00:55:04,799
Speaker 1: took it in a weird direction at the end, but

893
00:55:04,840 --> 00:55:08,040
Speaker 1: I like, I like what we're building. So they also

894
00:55:08,160 --> 00:55:14,799
Speaker 1: found this investigation. They also found that people who were

895
00:55:14,840 --> 00:55:20,600
Speaker 1: suspected of fraud couldn't get suspended. And it's so weird

896
00:55:20,840 --> 00:55:26,120
Speaker 1: because one individual got a job doing background checks for

897
00:55:26,200 --> 00:55:32,080
Speaker 1: a federal agency while they were facing appending criminal case

898
00:55:32,719 --> 00:55:36,480
Speaker 1: for falsifying background checks at another place. It's like, it's

899
00:55:36,480 --> 00:55:41,080
Speaker 1: like a big banker who's done some financial crimes gets

900
00:55:41,080 --> 00:55:46,280
Speaker 1: consulted on huge bailouts because they know the system the best.

901
00:55:46,760 --> 00:55:48,120
Speaker 1: You know, we need to do, guys, we need to

902
00:55:48,120 --> 00:55:51,400
Speaker 1: automate this thing with an algorithm and an AI and

903
00:55:51,440 --> 00:55:54,359
Speaker 1: it does all the human background checks. It's the only

904
00:55:54,360 --> 00:55:56,000
Speaker 1: way we're ever going to be able to trust a

905
00:55:56,040 --> 00:55:59,000
Speaker 1: background check again, is if a computer. Right, Well, we're

906
00:55:59,040 --> 00:56:01,839
Speaker 1: already this, you know. Honestly, that's my favorite. That's one

907
00:56:01,840 --> 00:56:05,600
Speaker 1: of my favorite background checks. Click on all the traffic lights,

908
00:56:05,880 --> 00:56:08,200
Speaker 1: click on all the stop sides. You know what I mean,

909
00:56:08,320 --> 00:56:11,719
Speaker 1: proof you're not a robot. I feel so validated when

910
00:56:11,719 --> 00:56:15,440
Speaker 1: that happens. I'm like, still got it. I love walking

911
00:56:16,280 --> 00:56:20,560
Speaker 1: on the leg and breathing with the lung, you know

912
00:56:20,600 --> 00:56:25,920
Speaker 1: what I mean, just the one. I'm being serious though,

913
00:56:25,960 --> 00:56:29,080
Speaker 1: I'm imagining a system that's like this human is not

914
00:56:29,200 --> 00:56:34,640
Speaker 1: fit to serve our government machine. Like, oh what what

915
00:56:35,120 --> 00:56:39,880
Speaker 1: we have obtained second hand cellular phone footage of Derek

916
00:56:40,000 --> 00:56:45,160
Speaker 1: Smith in college hitting a bong and commenting on the

917
00:56:45,200 --> 00:56:51,120
Speaker 1: colors of music. I mean, that's clo disqualified. Uh he

918
00:56:51,280 --> 00:56:54,279
Speaker 1: will not work at the Pentagon Subway. I don't know

919
00:56:54,320 --> 00:56:55,640
Speaker 1: if they still have this suthing. So then it has

920
00:56:55,719 --> 00:57:00,120
Speaker 1: to start manufacturing, you know, automatons to do the as

921
00:57:00,239 --> 00:57:03,200
Speaker 1: jobs and then to do the government jobs. It's going

922
00:57:03,320 --> 00:57:06,080
Speaker 1: to hit the balld. You talk about music both both.

923
00:57:07,200 --> 00:57:09,839
Speaker 1: Let's phase out the human part entirely. Let's just have

924
00:57:09,960 --> 00:57:13,239
Speaker 1: let's also have miscreant robots. Uh So, look, you can

925
00:57:13,280 --> 00:57:16,520
Speaker 1: see there are some problems with this. They go across administrations.

926
00:57:17,480 --> 00:57:20,480
Speaker 1: Part of it is due to the enormity and the

927
00:57:20,560 --> 00:57:24,480
Speaker 1: necessity of bureaucracy, right, And that's why this kind of

928
00:57:24,480 --> 00:57:27,200
Speaker 1: stuff is easy to not pay attention to. But there

929
00:57:27,240 --> 00:57:31,680
Speaker 1: are tons of people, literal tons of people who are

930
00:57:32,400 --> 00:57:35,720
Speaker 1: working in this field, and they're doing they're not really

931
00:57:35,760 --> 00:57:38,360
Speaker 1: doing it for the money. They're doing it because they're

932
00:57:38,360 --> 00:57:41,400
Speaker 1: good at it, and they're doing it because the security

933
00:57:41,440 --> 00:57:44,240
Speaker 1: of the country is important. This goes the same for

934
00:57:44,280 --> 00:57:49,280
Speaker 1: any other country, by the way, United Kingdom, China, you

935
00:57:49,400 --> 00:57:52,480
Speaker 1: name it. The systems are different, but they're ultimately designed

936
00:57:52,520 --> 00:57:56,800
Speaker 1: to do the same thing. Uh. And I was wondering

937
00:57:57,320 --> 00:58:00,479
Speaker 1: maybe we end on finally talking a little bit about

938
00:58:00,520 --> 00:58:04,280
Speaker 1: Q clearance. Not the awesome show by our pal Jake Hanrahan,

939
00:58:04,400 --> 00:58:07,480
Speaker 1: but shout out to you, Jake, Q clearance. That's what

940
00:58:07,520 --> 00:58:09,400
Speaker 1: the you know, the Q and on entity was like,

941
00:58:09,440 --> 00:58:12,280
Speaker 1: I don't know what's going on. I got Q clearance. Now,

942
00:58:12,280 --> 00:58:15,280
Speaker 1: Ben Minders saying is that Q clearance is just a

943
00:58:15,280 --> 00:58:19,480
Speaker 1: way to designate or a shorthand for top secret clearance.

944
00:58:19,600 --> 00:58:22,000
Speaker 1: Is that right or wrong? Yeah? Yeah, you're on base.

945
00:58:22,120 --> 00:58:25,600
Speaker 1: It's um it's the Department of Energy clearance that is

946
00:58:26,200 --> 00:58:34,000
Speaker 1: analogous the top secret clearance, got it, okay, Department of Energy. Yeah,

947
00:58:34,200 --> 00:58:38,840
Speaker 1: nuclear weapons. But they just wanted to be different, right. Uh.

948
00:58:39,040 --> 00:58:44,800
Speaker 1: This Q clearance is uh is something you've probably heard

949
00:58:44,800 --> 00:58:47,040
Speaker 1: of if you're if you have read about Q and

950
00:58:47,160 --> 00:58:51,360
Speaker 1: on at all, Um and you can get in the weeds.

951
00:58:51,480 --> 00:58:53,880
Speaker 1: You know, it's not a huge secret how it works

952
00:58:53,960 --> 00:58:56,360
Speaker 1: or what it is, because you know, it's got a

953
00:58:56,360 --> 00:58:59,760
Speaker 1: Wikipedia page. Check it out. But in pop culture and

954
00:58:59,800 --> 00:59:05,000
Speaker 1: the world of online colts, this thing attained legendary mythological status. Uh.

955
00:59:05,080 --> 00:59:07,720
Speaker 1: And it dates back to six A guy named Peter

956
00:59:07,840 --> 00:59:12,040
Speaker 1: Benchlet writes this novel called Q Clearance, and it's a

957
00:59:12,080 --> 00:59:17,720
Speaker 1: satirical novel. It's a comedy about how weird the government is. Uh.

958
00:59:17,800 --> 00:59:20,560
Speaker 1: And then of course we all know what happened. Then

959
00:59:20,920 --> 00:59:24,080
Speaker 1: that's when Q came along and started posting on four

960
00:59:24,160 --> 00:59:26,959
Speaker 1: Chan and eight chan and given all kinds of top

961
00:59:27,000 --> 00:59:30,240
Speaker 1: secrets about the storm because it was coming. Yeah, it

962
00:59:30,320 --> 00:59:32,760
Speaker 1: may it may have come and gone. We're not quite

963
00:59:32,760 --> 00:59:35,720
Speaker 1: sure it might still be coming. Um, although you know,

964
00:59:35,880 --> 00:59:38,920
Speaker 1: Q and on kind of coverage in the larger media

965
00:59:39,000 --> 00:59:41,840
Speaker 1: does seem to have waned a good bit. I imagine

966
00:59:41,840 --> 00:59:44,000
Speaker 1: that there are communities and pockets on the Internet that

967
00:59:44,000 --> 00:59:46,240
Speaker 1: are still pretty active in this stuff. Right, Oh yeah,

968
00:59:46,280 --> 00:59:49,920
Speaker 1: I bet you're right. I mean, so Q not Q Clearance,

969
00:59:49,920 --> 00:59:56,720
Speaker 1: but Q online claimed to have tremendous closeness with the

970
00:59:56,840 --> 01:00:02,000
Speaker 1: Trump administration and the inner circle of that administration. But

971
01:00:02,120 --> 01:00:04,920
Speaker 1: this was later proven probably to be false because a

972
01:00:04,920 --> 01:00:07,200
Speaker 1: lot of the so called predictions simply didn't come to

973
01:00:07,240 --> 01:00:11,200
Speaker 1: pass um and it became almost a surrealist game at

974
01:00:11,200 --> 01:00:13,240
Speaker 1: a time. You know, people were treating it as it

975
01:00:13,320 --> 01:00:17,520
Speaker 1: choose your own adventure version of conspiracy theory. And you know,

976
01:00:17,600 --> 01:00:23,000
Speaker 1: it was probably hilarious to the ninety two thousands something

977
01:00:23,040 --> 01:00:26,200
Speaker 1: people who have a real life QUE clearance. They're probably thinking,

978
01:00:26,280 --> 01:00:28,560
Speaker 1: I wish my job was that cool, you know, I

979
01:00:28,600 --> 01:00:33,200
Speaker 1: wish my job is that cue. But but this is

980
01:00:33,240 --> 01:00:36,720
Speaker 1: the problem. It's true, clearances are getting falsify. Uh, they're

981
01:00:36,760 --> 01:00:39,680
Speaker 1: being given out despite serious problems with the people who

982
01:00:39,680 --> 01:00:42,840
Speaker 1: are being cleared. And that spells danger for the United States.

983
01:00:42,920 --> 01:00:45,800
Speaker 1: Given that the United States is a powerful and dangerous country.

984
01:00:46,080 --> 01:00:51,160
Speaker 1: That spells danger for every person on earth. No hyperbole. So, uh,

985
01:00:51,480 --> 01:00:54,439
Speaker 1: what's to be done? I think we have to ask

986
01:00:54,480 --> 01:00:59,280
Speaker 1: our fellow listeners, Um, folks, let us can you solve it?

987
01:00:59,360 --> 01:01:02,040
Speaker 1: Can you solve it for us? Should just one person

988
01:01:02,080 --> 01:01:09,520
Speaker 1: be in charge of clearing everybody? That's it? Everything clear everyone?

989
01:01:09,720 --> 01:01:13,600
Speaker 1: Just one person gets in there, they know everything, they

990
01:01:13,760 --> 01:01:17,080
Speaker 1: clear everyone, then we all know all the secrets that

991
01:01:17,200 --> 01:01:19,080
Speaker 1: we'd all know too much, and then we'd all be

992
01:01:19,160 --> 01:01:23,080
Speaker 1: driving around and see, that's my thing. I've said it before,

993
01:01:23,120 --> 01:01:26,680
Speaker 1: I'll say it again. Secret secrets are no fun. Secret

994
01:01:26,760 --> 01:01:30,560
Speaker 1: secrets hurt someone. Um, we could if we could just

995
01:01:30,560 --> 01:01:33,880
Speaker 1: take that approach, you know, maybe we'd all be happier.

996
01:01:33,920 --> 01:01:36,920
Speaker 1: And I think it's just magically morph into a utopian

997
01:01:37,000 --> 01:01:40,680
Speaker 1: kind of situation. I'm not checking this so I I'm

998
01:01:40,720 --> 01:01:42,920
Speaker 1: just trying to figure it out off the top of

999
01:01:42,920 --> 01:01:47,080
Speaker 1: my head. If there are okay, we just take the

1000
01:01:47,160 --> 01:01:50,800
Speaker 1: number of days in a year, right, we divide five

1001
01:01:50,800 --> 01:01:53,960
Speaker 1: point one million by the number of days and year.

1002
01:01:54,480 --> 01:01:57,880
Speaker 1: Then that person, if they didn't take vacations, would have

1003
01:01:57,960 --> 01:02:02,800
Speaker 1: to clear four teen thousand, no, thirteen something thousand people

1004
01:02:02,840 --> 01:02:07,400
Speaker 1: a day perfect he's done light work. Well, I mean

1005
01:02:08,360 --> 01:02:10,400
Speaker 1: Meta is about to be you know, well, I don't

1006
01:02:10,400 --> 01:02:13,440
Speaker 1: know Meta there. Maybe they'll be fine, but you know,

1007
01:02:13,480 --> 01:02:15,520
Speaker 1: if something goes real wrong with Meta, we could just

1008
01:02:15,520 --> 01:02:18,280
Speaker 1: put all their stuff, all their AI and all their

1009
01:02:18,400 --> 01:02:22,400
Speaker 1: whatever they're working on. Just put it ton of companies

1010
01:02:22,440 --> 01:02:24,600
Speaker 1: who want a piece of that pipe. Because the government

1011
01:02:24,680 --> 01:02:29,520
Speaker 1: sustains the cost for these investigations regardless of how it

1012
01:02:29,560 --> 01:02:32,200
Speaker 1: works out. And folks, we know it's a very high level. Look,

1013
01:02:32,960 --> 01:02:36,479
Speaker 1: we are not active in that in that sphere, but

1014
01:02:36,600 --> 01:02:40,400
Speaker 1: we are fascinating. We think that the average member of

1015
01:02:40,440 --> 01:02:42,840
Speaker 1: the public should know more about this and about the

1016
01:02:42,880 --> 01:02:46,040
Speaker 1: problems with the current system, so let us know how

1017
01:02:46,080 --> 01:02:48,280
Speaker 1: it can be fixed. If you got any funny war

1018
01:02:48,400 --> 01:02:52,360
Speaker 1: stories that you're comfortable sharing about background investigations and how

1019
01:02:52,400 --> 01:02:54,280
Speaker 1: they did or did not go the way you thought,

1020
01:02:54,720 --> 01:02:56,240
Speaker 1: we can't wait to hear it. We try to be

1021
01:02:56,280 --> 01:02:59,480
Speaker 1: easy to find online. Correct. You can find this on Twitter.

1022
01:02:59,800 --> 01:03:02,160
Speaker 1: You and find us on Facebook, and you can find

1023
01:03:02,200 --> 01:03:04,400
Speaker 1: us on YouTube with a handle conspiracy stuff. We also

1024
01:03:04,440 --> 01:03:06,520
Speaker 1: have a telephone number you can reach us at. Yes,

1025
01:03:06,560 --> 01:03:09,840
Speaker 1: the number is one eight three three st d w

1026
01:03:10,280 --> 01:03:13,400
Speaker 1: y t K. It's a voicemail system. You've got three minutes.

1027
01:03:13,720 --> 01:03:16,360
Speaker 1: Give yourself a cool nickname so we know who you are,

1028
01:03:17,000 --> 01:03:19,560
Speaker 1: but you're also anonymous. That's the that's the perfect way

1029
01:03:19,600 --> 01:03:22,560
Speaker 1: to do it. We will give you the appropriate clearance

1030
01:03:22,680 --> 01:03:24,360
Speaker 1: just by calling in, so you don't have to worry

1031
01:03:24,400 --> 01:03:28,800
Speaker 1: about that, and uh say whatever you want. Just let

1032
01:03:28,840 --> 01:03:31,240
Speaker 1: us know if we can use your voice and message

1033
01:03:31,280 --> 01:03:33,880
Speaker 1: on the air. If you don't like talking on the phone,

1034
01:03:33,920 --> 01:03:36,640
Speaker 1: why not instead type it all out in a good

1035
01:03:36,680 --> 01:03:40,240
Speaker 1: old fashioned email. We are conspiracy at i heart radio

1036
01:03:40,400 --> 01:04:01,000
Speaker 1: dot com st if they don't want you to know

1037
01:04:01,240 --> 01:04:04,240
Speaker 1: is a production of I heart Radio. For more podcasts

1038
01:04:04,240 --> 01:04:06,479
Speaker 1: from my heart Radio, visit the i heart radio app,

1039
01:04:06,560 --> 01:04:09,400
Speaker 1: Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to your favorite shows.