WEBVTT - Identifying, Understanding and Fighting Fraud 0:00:00.120 --> 0:00:04.120 This is Bloomberg Business Week with Carol Masser and Bloomberg 0:00:04.240 --> 0:00:08.680 Quick Takes Tim Stenovich on Bloomberg Radio, a Bloomberg opinion 0:00:08.720 --> 0:00:12.440 column caught my attention, and in it, our columnist Chris 0:00:12.520 --> 0:00:16.360 Hughes asked, after thirty years, why was KPMG still auditing 0:00:16.400 --> 0:00:20.239 Silicon Valley Bank. His point, long term client relationships are 0:00:20.320 --> 0:00:23.560 known are a known risk to audit quality, and that 0:00:23.680 --> 0:00:26.720 KPMG's your thirty year run at SVB demands a fresh 0:00:26.720 --> 0:00:30.920 look at the issue fraud accounting misses nothing new and 0:00:31.000 --> 0:00:34.000 writing about all of this with a timely book is 0:00:34.080 --> 0:00:36.840 Kelly Richmond Pope. She's professor in the School of Accountancy 0:00:36.880 --> 0:00:41.040 at A Paul University, a forensic accountant expert to her 0:00:41.080 --> 0:00:43.599 new book is Fully One Scam Stories and Secrets from 0:00:43.600 --> 0:00:46.519 the trillion dollar fraud Industry, and she joins justin me 0:00:46.800 --> 0:00:50.440 via zoom in Chicago. Kelly, good to have you here 0:00:50.520 --> 0:00:53.400 on Bloomberg Radio. You have made a study out of fraud. 0:00:53.880 --> 0:00:58.240 Why is that? I think when I was as early 0:00:58.280 --> 0:01:00.600 as I can remember, in high school, I was fascinated 0:01:00.840 --> 0:01:03.800 by why people still And there was a neighbor of 0:01:03.880 --> 0:01:08.240 mine that was a bank executive that went to federal prison, 0:01:08.360 --> 0:01:10.840 and I thought, why would someone risk at all to 0:01:10.920 --> 0:01:13.560 do this? So my interest in it really started at 0:01:13.560 --> 0:01:16.480 a very very early age, and I went on to 0:01:16.600 --> 0:01:19.200 graduate school and when I was working on my PhD, 0:01:20.040 --> 0:01:23.480 my research area was around ethics, but I was interested 0:01:23.600 --> 0:01:26.320 in fraud because I believe that that's the absence of ethics. 0:01:26.360 --> 0:01:28.600 So I say all that to say, I'm probably just 0:01:28.640 --> 0:01:32.479 a little bit nosy, and I just turned it all 0:01:32.520 --> 0:01:35.160 into something. It's like journalist, I get it, so get it, 0:01:35.200 --> 0:01:37.720 so okay, So fraud. I mean, I think about the 0:01:37.800 --> 0:01:40.280 year that was. We've talked a lot about the thorough 0:01:40.280 --> 0:01:44.119 nos fraud, the alleged fraud at FTX by Sam Bankman Freed. 0:01:44.120 --> 0:01:47.280 We're looking at three bank failures where accountants and sometimes 0:01:47.440 --> 0:01:50.320 risk officers are supposed to be watching things. I'm not 0:01:50.400 --> 0:01:55.040 saying there was fraud, but nonetheless fraud hoppens over and 0:01:55.160 --> 0:02:00.640 over again. Why well, behind every good fraud As a person, 0:02:00.960 --> 0:02:05.640 and I think people are the worst computers, so they 0:02:06.000 --> 0:02:10.000 fulfilled with errors, and so I think that we find 0:02:10.040 --> 0:02:14.880 ourselves sometimes in difficult situations. And one of the arguments 0:02:14.919 --> 0:02:17.840 that I was wanting to make in the book is 0:02:17.880 --> 0:02:22.400 that everyone doesn't steal because of greed. And I really 0:02:22.440 --> 0:02:25.000 want to be specific about saying that they are different 0:02:25.040 --> 0:02:28.600 types of perpetrators. There's different types of prey, and they're 0:02:28.600 --> 0:02:31.200 different types of whistleblowers. And so a lot of times 0:02:31.200 --> 0:02:35.200 we think that people just are greedy and they just take, take, take, 0:02:35.240 --> 0:02:38.160 and that's something that I call an intentional perpetrator. But 0:02:38.200 --> 0:02:41.560 there's this other category, these two other categories, and they 0:02:41.639 --> 0:02:45.800 are accidental perpetrators and righteous perpetrators. And they don't always 0:02:45.800 --> 0:02:50.040 engage in fraud because they just want just because they're greedy. 0:02:50.200 --> 0:02:53.800 Sometimes they just are following the boss's orders and they 0:02:54.280 --> 0:02:56.760 make a transaction or turn a blind eye to something 0:02:56.840 --> 0:02:58.480 that they know is wrong, and they're trying to help 0:02:58.520 --> 0:03:02.200 the team. That's the acci dental perpetrator. The righteous perpetrator, 0:03:02.240 --> 0:03:04.240 on the other hand, may just want to help a 0:03:04.280 --> 0:03:06.760 friend and has the power and the privilege in an 0:03:06.840 --> 0:03:10.440 organization to do that. So the argument that I make 0:03:10.480 --> 0:03:13.760 and is everyone is not your bernar madeoffs and even 0:03:14.040 --> 0:03:17.680 homes Elizabeth Holmes, I would put her and my righteous 0:03:17.720 --> 0:03:21.440 perpetrator category. Yeah, she's a perpetrator, but the reason how 0:03:21.480 --> 0:03:24.640 she started was really because she wanted to do good 0:03:24.680 --> 0:03:27.200 for the world, and so I want people to understand 0:03:27.200 --> 0:03:30.160 that there's different categories and we need to think about 0:03:30.400 --> 0:03:34.560 everyone doesn't steal because of greed. We sometimes create environments 0:03:35.320 --> 0:03:39.240 where people find themselves in very difficult situations and that 0:03:39.280 --> 0:03:41.520 can lead to fraud too. And Kelly, when you were 0:03:41.520 --> 0:03:44.160 talking about these righteous purps and you were talking about 0:03:44.320 --> 0:03:47.360 thorough Nos specifically, but you also wrote about how there's 0:03:47.400 --> 0:03:49.280 this robin Hood effect. So I'm trying to kind of 0:03:49.280 --> 0:03:52.760 wrap my mind around that how she was helping others 0:03:52.760 --> 0:03:54.880 and so can you break down how do people cheat 0:03:54.920 --> 0:03:58.560 and then start to actually rationalize that because it is 0:03:58.560 --> 0:04:01.160 hard to think about how that works. Especially if you 0:04:01.840 --> 0:04:05.160 talk to Theroodos investors, they're gonna they might be able 0:04:05.160 --> 0:04:08.600 to hold on. Okay. So one of the stories in 0:04:08.640 --> 0:04:11.119 the book is about a woman that I met doing 0:04:11.160 --> 0:04:13.960 the research. Her name is Kayla Ravello, and she was 0:04:14.000 --> 0:04:18.400 a very successful partner in the own Wall Street Wall Street, 0:04:19.000 --> 0:04:23.560 big big law firms there and what she wanted to do, 0:04:24.000 --> 0:04:26.760 or what she ended up doing, was awarding her husband 0:04:26.839 --> 0:04:30.520 or her ex husband, a contract to really help him 0:04:30.960 --> 0:04:33.520 help promote a business that he needed to start. He 0:04:33.520 --> 0:04:36.920 couldn't find a job. So she was an equity partner 0:04:37.000 --> 0:04:40.600 in the law firm. She was a well compensated person. 0:04:40.720 --> 0:04:43.080 She didn't need the money. She was trying to help 0:04:43.120 --> 0:04:46.159 her husband. So really, what I'm talking about is the 0:04:46.240 --> 0:04:50.760 initial rationalization as to how someone commits fraud. Think about 0:04:50.760 --> 0:04:53.920 Elizabeth Holmes at the very beginning. Now she evolved into 0:04:53.960 --> 0:04:56.120 something a little bit more, but at the very beginning, 0:04:56.520 --> 0:05:01.119 her intentions were really to people hate getting their blood drawn. 0:05:01.240 --> 0:05:04.000 What if I could create something that just allows for 0:05:04.080 --> 0:05:06.159 just a drop of blood to run all the tests 0:05:06.160 --> 0:05:08.960 that you possibly could use or we possibly need. That's 0:05:09.040 --> 0:05:11.440 would be a really great thing if it worked. Correct 0:05:11.520 --> 0:05:14.800 or we in agreement there, right, totally? Okay, So we're 0:05:14.839 --> 0:05:20.800 talking about the initial intentions and so thinking about specifically 0:05:20.880 --> 0:05:23.719 Kayla and other people that I've interviewed over the years. 0:05:24.400 --> 0:05:27.760 Everyone is not doing this for their own personal gain. 0:05:28.080 --> 0:05:31.400 Some people are doing this to help others. That first 0:05:31.440 --> 0:05:35.280 fraud story that I was thinking about when we first 0:05:35.320 --> 0:05:37.559 started talking, that neighbor that I was telling you about 0:05:37.839 --> 0:05:40.680 when you read the case documents about what his fraud 0:05:40.760 --> 0:05:44.080 was about, his rationalization was I wanted to help a 0:05:44.120 --> 0:05:47.320 friend whose struggle, whose business was struggling, he had a 0:05:47.360 --> 0:05:49.520 great job, he didn't need to do this, He didn't 0:05:49.520 --> 0:05:52.760 receive any personal gain. He was just trying to help 0:05:52.800 --> 0:05:55.880 a friend. And there's there's their startup. So that's the 0:05:55.920 --> 0:05:59.440 part that I'm talking about. Some people just are trying 0:05:59.480 --> 0:06:03.000 to help and they so are you saying, though, though, 0:06:03.200 --> 0:06:06.800 then we should excuse I didn't say that. Okay, okay, 0:06:06.880 --> 0:06:08.880 I didn't say we shouldn't excuse you. But what you'll 0:06:08.960 --> 0:06:13.480 notice is variability in sentencing. So if you notice, everyone 0:06:14.200 --> 0:06:19.440 that engages in fraud gets different types of sentences. Now, 0:06:19.440 --> 0:06:21.479 that depends on the judge, it depends on the jurisdiction. 0:06:21.839 --> 0:06:24.599 But what I'm thinking is a lot of it depends 0:06:24.640 --> 0:06:28.960 on their rationalization, their original intention, And so that that's 0:06:28.960 --> 0:06:31.720 what I'm pushing people to think about. So I'm not 0:06:31.800 --> 0:06:34.800 saying that we should not they should not serve time, 0:06:35.440 --> 0:06:37.440 not saying that at all, But I'm just really thinking 0:06:37.480 --> 0:06:41.840 about how it happens. How do you think about companies 0:06:42.400 --> 0:06:44.960 who may be aware of a flaw and a product 0:06:45.960 --> 0:06:50.039 and believe because they're making so much money over it, 0:06:50.880 --> 0:06:54.520 that better to deal with the litigation later, or their 0:06:54.640 --> 0:06:58.720 lawsuits later if something goes wrong because they're going to 0:06:58.800 --> 0:07:00.920 make so much more money on the front side or 0:07:01.000 --> 0:07:03.720 the initially that it doesn't really matter what they pay 0:07:03.720 --> 0:07:05.800 out later. How do you how do you think about 0:07:05.839 --> 0:07:08.919 that kind of I don't know fraud is the right word. 0:07:09.000 --> 0:07:11.560 So this is the interesting thing. What you're what you're 0:07:11.560 --> 0:07:16.720 talking about now is the prey category, the innocent bystanders 0:07:16.800 --> 0:07:20.280 that are impacted by that corporate decision. So we know 0:07:20.320 --> 0:07:25.040 that there's a company pharmaceutical companies exactly. I could go on, yeah, right, 0:07:25.320 --> 0:07:29.160 And so what's scary about us as consumers is we 0:07:29.200 --> 0:07:32.680 don't always know when those conversations are happening. And that's 0:07:32.720 --> 0:07:35.160 why you need a whistleblower in the room, somebody that 0:07:35.200 --> 0:07:38.679 will alert us when those kinds of decisions are being made. 0:07:38.920 --> 0:07:42.480 So when you think about the fraud cycle, you need everybody. 0:07:42.520 --> 0:07:45.120 You need well, you don't really need perpetrators, but you 0:07:45.120 --> 0:07:49.000 definitely need you definitely need whistleblowers because there will always 0:07:49.040 --> 0:07:51.880 be perpetrators in the mix, and there's always going to 0:07:51.960 --> 0:07:55.320 be victims, and you need the voices of whistleblowers. And 0:07:55.400 --> 0:07:58.600 even like I talk about there's different types of perpetrators, 0:07:58.600 --> 0:08:01.400 there's also different types of whistle blowers. Three types that 0:08:01.440 --> 0:08:06.239 I talk about, an accidental whistle blower, a noble whistle blower, 0:08:06.680 --> 0:08:10.400 and a vigilante whistle blower. Now, vigilante whistle blower is 0:08:10.440 --> 0:08:15.920 the category that I believe where snitch, rat, cross, tattletale, 0:08:16.240 --> 0:08:19.840 those kinds of terms come from. Because vigilante whistle blowers 0:08:19.840 --> 0:08:22.840 they don't they tell, whether it has anything to do 0:08:22.920 --> 0:08:26.280 with them or not, they are telling, and so they 0:08:26.320 --> 0:08:30.280 don't mind becoming a whistle blower. I mean, they are 0:08:30.320 --> 0:08:32.280 ready for the fight. They're almost like, bring it on, 0:08:32.400 --> 0:08:35.920 I'm ready for you. The other two categories are people 0:08:35.960 --> 0:08:39.280 that don't necessarily identify as being a whistle blower, and 0:08:39.320 --> 0:08:42.960 they're just doing their job. They stumble upon something or 0:08:43.160 --> 0:08:45.640 they turn a blind die, they step out, they don't 0:08:45.640 --> 0:08:47.679 try to blind excuse me, they don't try to blind die, 0:08:47.679 --> 0:08:51.040 and they step outside of the group and tell. And 0:08:51.080 --> 0:08:55.000 so those accidental whistle blowers and noble whistle blowers tend 0:08:55.120 --> 0:08:59.120 to tend to have a fair amount of backlash when 0:08:59.160 --> 0:09:02.200 they do what they do. What I'm arguing is you 0:09:02.240 --> 0:09:05.720 need all of them in an organization because when these 0:09:05.920 --> 0:09:09.319 companies are making decisions to say, well, what's the cost 0:09:09.400 --> 0:09:12.520 of a life if we if we change this safety protocol, 0:09:12.520 --> 0:09:14.920 it's going to cost us one hundred million dollars and 0:09:15.000 --> 0:09:18.280 the probability of something happening is one percent. Let's roll 0:09:18.320 --> 0:09:20.439 the dice and see what happens. You probably want to 0:09:20.480 --> 0:09:23.079 whistle blower in the room that's gonna let us know 0:09:23.160 --> 0:09:25.920 that's happening. Yeah, whether it's like the ultimate checks and 0:09:25.960 --> 0:09:29.760 balance system. I have to say, Kelly, on a podcast 0:09:29.840 --> 0:09:33.120 you talked about accounting is the backbone of everything. There's 0:09:33.160 --> 0:09:36.040 always a money story, and I feel that way when 0:09:36.080 --> 0:09:40.200 we talk about business stories or just anything in the world. 0:09:40.200 --> 0:09:43.560 There's always a business aspect, of market aspect of money aspect. 0:09:44.000 --> 0:09:50.679 So as fraud always about money. Oh that's a good question. 0:09:51.880 --> 0:09:56.600 I think all roads lead back to money. So if 0:09:56.640 --> 0:09:59.720 I had to say yes or no, I'm gonna say yes. 0:10:01.200 --> 0:10:04.320 Broad is about money? Okay? Ninety nine point nine percent 0:10:04.360 --> 0:10:06.680 of the time. Is it always? Though? You know you 0:10:06.720 --> 0:10:10.600 talk about the importance of accounting, and is it always 0:10:10.880 --> 0:10:12.480 if we just look at the books of something and 0:10:12.480 --> 0:10:14.640 the financials we're going to find potentially that's where we 0:10:14.640 --> 0:10:18.760 can find something wrong. Well, yes, and so one you're 0:10:19.040 --> 0:10:23.840 understanding your basic financial statements, income statement, balance sheet, statement, retainer, 0:10:23.920 --> 0:10:26.080 and a statement to cash flows. Understanding how they work 0:10:26.120 --> 0:10:29.840 together is very important. But also reading the notes to 0:10:29.880 --> 0:10:32.640 the financial statements, which many people might think are the 0:10:32.679 --> 0:10:36.000 most boring aspects of the financial statements, really tells you 0:10:36.520 --> 0:10:39.360 the story behind the numbers. So you have to think 0:10:39.360 --> 0:10:42.760 about those numbers are just one like the end of 0:10:42.840 --> 0:10:45.360 a set of behaviors. So if you read the notes, 0:10:45.400 --> 0:10:48.119 it sort of helps put those those numbers in contexts. 0:10:48.480 --> 0:10:54.000 So understanding accounting I think helps you ask really important questions. 0:10:54.000 --> 0:10:56.520 And you don't have to be a CPA. I think 0:10:56.520 --> 0:11:00.120 like an introductory accounting class can just give you some 0:11:00.240 --> 0:11:03.760 basic knowledge of understanding why would an executive want to 0:11:03.800 --> 0:11:06.760 overstate revenues and a certain period, why would an executive 0:11:06.800 --> 0:11:10.040 want to understate expenses and a certain quarter? Like why 0:11:10.320 --> 0:11:13.079 why do those behaviors happen? And if you understand like 0:11:13.120 --> 0:11:16.839 the accounting equation and you and you understand revenue minus 0:11:16.840 --> 0:11:19.800 expenses equals netting income and it makes sense if you 0:11:19.880 --> 0:11:23.559 understand the difference between our cruel accounting versus cash basis accounting, 0:11:23.720 --> 0:11:27.600 there's so much that makes sense and I think it helps, 0:11:27.640 --> 0:11:31.040 I mean, I think it helps um right, I mean, listen, 0:11:31.080 --> 0:11:32.839 you're not thinking you're not going to get an argument 0:11:32.920 --> 0:11:35.920 from us because we're so into data and understanding balance sheets. 0:11:36.160 --> 0:11:38.719 You know, in the previous segment, I kicked it off 0:11:38.760 --> 0:11:43.080 talking about a Bloomberg opinion column where our columnist Chris 0:11:43.160 --> 0:11:49.280 Hughes talks about KA KPMG, well known auditor and accounting firm, 0:11:49.720 --> 0:11:53.559 you know, auditing Silicon Valley Banks books for thirty years, 0:11:53.600 --> 0:11:57.559 and talked about long term client relationships are a known 0:11:57.880 --> 0:12:00.480 risk to audit quality. And there is something about when 0:12:00.480 --> 0:12:02.280 you've got an auditor who's been with you for a 0:12:02.320 --> 0:12:05.680 long time, right, it's in their best interests to make 0:12:05.720 --> 0:12:08.240 sure that they kind of maintain that relationship. And you 0:12:08.320 --> 0:12:11.240 do wonder if things get too friendly and cozy, is 0:12:11.280 --> 0:12:15.160 there something ripe to go wrong? Do you agree with 0:12:15.240 --> 0:12:18.800 something like that in that relationship. So I think we 0:12:18.840 --> 0:12:20.680 have to break it down a little bit further because 0:12:20.720 --> 0:12:24.559 we're talking about a firm auditing a client. But what 0:12:24.679 --> 0:12:27.880 we're what we're not realizing is there's lots of turnover 0:12:28.000 --> 0:12:31.600 in those teams, and you're you're not talking about the 0:12:31.640 --> 0:12:34.480 exact same person or the same team doing the same 0:12:34.520 --> 0:12:38.320 thing for thirty twenty years. That's not really what we're saying. Now. 0:12:38.800 --> 0:12:41.720 Is it good practice best practice to have three to 0:12:41.760 --> 0:12:44.920 five year rotation? Sure, is it less risky to have 0:12:45.440 --> 0:12:50.760 more rotation. You have new eyes sometimes bring better due 0:12:50.760 --> 0:12:53.200 diligence to the table. But I think that we are 0:12:53.240 --> 0:12:57.760 forgetting the fact that these are teams that are rotating out. 0:12:57.880 --> 0:13:00.000 You have new people that are coming in on these 0:13:00.120 --> 0:13:02.000 teams all the time. So I think we have to 0:13:02.000 --> 0:13:06.360 remember that aspect of the operational aspects of an audit team. 0:13:06.800 --> 0:13:08.600 All right, to be fair, I'm not saying anything went 0:13:08.600 --> 0:13:11.640 wrong or there was anything amiss. Oh sure, Oh no, no, no, no, 0:13:11.480 --> 0:13:14.240 no no, it was just an opinion calumnist ahead, Jess, 0:13:14.240 --> 0:13:16.760 come on back, and Kelly, you made a point in 0:13:16.800 --> 0:13:19.079 the last segment when you were talking about the role 0:13:19.280 --> 0:13:23.680 of whistle blowers. What specific advice do you have for 0:13:23.800 --> 0:13:27.280 somebody who could potentially fall into that category in the future, 0:13:27.320 --> 0:13:30.200 because it does seem like an extremely tough position to 0:13:30.200 --> 0:13:32.360 be in as far as risking your employment and what 0:13:32.400 --> 0:13:35.480 that could potentially mean for your future. I think a 0:13:35.520 --> 0:13:37.520 couple things come to mind. I think, first, do you 0:13:37.559 --> 0:13:41.599 have to think about your role in whatever the transaction 0:13:41.720 --> 0:13:44.080 or the scenario that you are reporting about, what was 0:13:44.120 --> 0:13:50.199 your role in it? What is what is your plan B? 0:13:50.640 --> 0:13:53.400 So can you exit this company? Can you? Can you 0:13:53.440 --> 0:13:57.199 find another job easily? What kind of evidence do you 0:13:57.240 --> 0:14:00.480 have to support whatever claim? And what kind of internal 0:14:00.480 --> 0:14:03.640 support do you have to support whatever claim you are 0:14:03.640 --> 0:14:06.040 about to make? But I think assessing your role in 0:14:06.080 --> 0:14:10.640 the transaction is very important because your credibility is going 0:14:10.679 --> 0:14:14.720 to be questioned. I think understanding your tenure in that 0:14:14.880 --> 0:14:19.960 whatever that organization is very important. And realize that you 0:14:20.240 --> 0:14:23.360 probably won't have a lot of supporters, but it's going 0:14:23.400 --> 0:14:25.800 to be a tough road. But a lot of people 0:14:25.880 --> 0:14:29.560 have fought the good fight and won, but it will 0:14:29.600 --> 0:14:33.000 be a tough road. An operative word being fight. I'm 0:14:33.120 --> 0:14:36.120 using that on purpose. I wanted to switch gears and 0:14:36.200 --> 0:14:38.680 point to something that you had in your book talking 0:14:38.680 --> 0:14:41.520 about your red flag list. So you talk about how 0:14:41.680 --> 0:14:44.480 never trusting anyone who doesn't like dogs, or talking about 0:14:44.520 --> 0:14:47.080 anybody who doesn't agree with Whitney Houston is the greatest 0:14:47.120 --> 0:14:51.960 singer of all time. No, she I definitely agree. Tell 0:14:52.040 --> 0:14:56.440 us why you made this list and basically just the 0:14:56.480 --> 0:14:59.000 whole point of that as far as the motivation behind it, 0:14:59.480 --> 0:15:02.320 you know, as silly as it may sound, they are 0:15:02.400 --> 0:15:05.960 red flags that really alert you to something, and that 0:15:06.120 --> 0:15:08.760 alerting you to something is what makes you dig a 0:15:08.800 --> 0:15:13.080 little deep. For example, if you have been working professionally 0:15:13.240 --> 0:15:17.800 for twenty years and you don't have a LinkedIn profile 0:15:17.920 --> 0:15:21.680 or a picture on LinkedIn, it's suspicious. I'm not saying 0:15:21.720 --> 0:15:25.880 it's fraudulent, but it's suspicious. If you still have mail 0:15:26.000 --> 0:15:30.520 directed to your parents' house and you are a working professional, 0:15:30.880 --> 0:15:36.200 it's suspicious. Again, not saying that it's fraudulent, but suspicious. 0:15:36.600 --> 0:15:41.680 If you cannot say thank you or please, it's suspicious, right, 0:15:41.880 --> 0:15:45.720 you know, thinking about if you still and some people 0:15:45.800 --> 0:15:47.680 this may be a little bit more controversy, but if 0:15:47.720 --> 0:15:51.280 you still have a Hotmail account as a little suspicious, right, 0:15:51.360 --> 0:15:54.080 Like I mean, who doesn't have a Gmail account these days? 0:15:54.120 --> 0:15:57.400 So it makes you think about cyber fraud. I mean, 0:15:57.400 --> 0:16:01.240 they're things that you just shouldn't just rush under the 0:16:01.320 --> 0:16:05.160 table or under the rug. But it's suspicious. It's just 0:16:05.200 --> 0:16:07.720 those things that we all make us, you know, and 0:16:07.720 --> 0:16:09.640 again it makes us feel uncomfortable that we've got to 0:16:09.680 --> 0:16:11.880 kind of keep o Kelly, we've got to run. But 0:16:12.000 --> 0:16:15.760 really appreciate checking in with you. Kelly Richmond Pope at 0:16:15.760 --> 0:16:19.160 DePaul University. Her book It is out today, fully one Scam, 0:16:19.240 --> 0:16:22.440 Stories and Secrets from the trillion dollars fraud industry