1 00:00:00,080 --> 00:00:03,720 Speaker 1: The Presidential Advisory Commission on Election Integrity met for the 2 00:00:03,760 --> 00:00:08,119 Speaker 1: first time yesterday, already facing at least seven federal lawsuits 3 00:00:08,200 --> 00:00:12,840 Speaker 1: questioning its integrity, its transparency, and its legitimacy, among other things. 4 00:00:13,240 --> 00:00:16,239 Speaker 1: In addressing the panel, President Trump referred to the claim 5 00:00:16,320 --> 00:00:19,599 Speaker 1: he's been making that his three million voter lost to 6 00:00:19,720 --> 00:00:22,880 Speaker 1: Hillary Clinton in the popular vote was due to fraudulent 7 00:00:22,960 --> 00:00:26,119 Speaker 1: ballots cast against him. People would come up to me 8 00:00:26,160 --> 00:00:31,960 Speaker 1: and express their concerns about voter inconsistencies and irregularities which 9 00:00:32,000 --> 00:00:34,919 Speaker 1: they saw, in some cases having to do with very 10 00:00:35,000 --> 00:00:39,240 Speaker 1: large numbers of people in certain states. Trump offered nothing 11 00:00:39,280 --> 00:00:42,320 Speaker 1: to support those claims, and at a news conference, the 12 00:00:42,400 --> 00:00:46,040 Speaker 1: chairman of the d n C Voting Rights Commission, Jason Kander, 13 00:00:46,360 --> 00:00:50,000 Speaker 1: said the Election Integrity Commission is a GOP attempt to 14 00:00:50,040 --> 00:00:54,160 Speaker 1: suppress the vote. This commission started as a way to 15 00:00:54,200 --> 00:00:57,800 Speaker 1: try and legitimize, to try and justify the biggest lie 16 00:00:57,840 --> 00:01:00,160 Speaker 1: that a sitting president has ever told, this commission being 17 00:01:00,200 --> 00:01:03,120 Speaker 1: the Trump Commission, but it is morphed from there and 18 00:01:03,120 --> 00:01:07,040 Speaker 1: what has become now is just a vehicle for voter suppression. 19 00:01:07,800 --> 00:01:11,039 Speaker 1: Joining us to discuss the questions surrounding this commission are 20 00:01:11,160 --> 00:01:14,680 Speaker 1: Richard brafal To, professor at Columbia Law School, and Jason's 21 00:01:14,720 --> 00:01:18,640 Speaker 1: need a policy analyst for the Heritage Foundation. Rich we've 22 00:01:18,680 --> 00:01:22,560 Speaker 1: talked about this commission before, but after hearing about its 23 00:01:22,640 --> 00:01:28,200 Speaker 1: first meeting, give me your impression of its mission. Well, 24 00:01:28,240 --> 00:01:30,680 Speaker 1: I think the impression from the meeting remains the same 25 00:01:30,720 --> 00:01:33,640 Speaker 1: as the impression that surrounded the hoof flaw for its 26 00:01:33,680 --> 00:01:36,800 Speaker 1: creation on the executive order setting it up. It's there 27 00:01:36,840 --> 00:01:40,120 Speaker 1: to make a case that there is a lot of 28 00:01:40,240 --> 00:01:43,880 Speaker 1: voter fraud, of the sort of um false impersonation of 29 00:01:44,000 --> 00:01:45,720 Speaker 1: a person coming to be a voter when they're not, 30 00:01:46,200 --> 00:01:48,720 Speaker 1: or voting by non citizens, or voting by people who 31 00:01:48,720 --> 00:01:50,960 Speaker 1: are ineligible. It's not there was no talk, for example, 32 00:01:51,000 --> 00:01:53,560 Speaker 1: about the electronic problems or hacking issues. There was no 33 00:01:53,640 --> 00:01:55,840 Speaker 1: talk about the laws that make it hard to vote. 34 00:01:55,880 --> 00:01:59,640 Speaker 1: It's entirely focused on making a case that there are 35 00:01:59,840 --> 00:02:03,480 Speaker 1: the unificant number of people voting who are not eligible 36 00:02:03,520 --> 00:02:07,840 Speaker 1: to vote. Jason, why isn't this commission looking at at 37 00:02:07,880 --> 00:02:10,320 Speaker 1: broader issues? I mean, even if there is some of 38 00:02:10,320 --> 00:02:13,640 Speaker 1: this in person voter fraud that folks like the President 39 00:02:13,760 --> 00:02:16,120 Speaker 1: and and Chris Kobacker's running the commission, even if some 40 00:02:16,120 --> 00:02:20,120 Speaker 1: of that is actually occurring. Um, it's an awfully inefficient 41 00:02:20,120 --> 00:02:21,680 Speaker 1: way if you want to reg an election. Why aren't 42 00:02:21,680 --> 00:02:23,640 Speaker 1: we looking at things like what rich was talking about 43 00:02:23,639 --> 00:02:27,440 Speaker 1: with you know, hacking of of election systems for example. Well, 44 00:02:27,520 --> 00:02:31,200 Speaker 1: the cybersecurity component was agreed um at the Commission meeting 45 00:02:31,200 --> 00:02:33,840 Speaker 1: to be examined in the future. And I believe that 46 00:02:33,880 --> 00:02:36,480 Speaker 1: there was also an agreement at the meeting that there 47 00:02:36,480 --> 00:02:40,160 Speaker 1: would be liaisons established between the Commission and the relevant 48 00:02:40,480 --> 00:02:43,560 Speaker 1: congressional committees that are looking into for an influence of 49 00:02:43,600 --> 00:02:45,839 Speaker 1: the election. But i'd i'd really like to push back 50 00:02:45,840 --> 00:02:48,320 Speaker 1: on the notion that, uh, you know, there is very 51 00:02:48,360 --> 00:02:52,040 Speaker 1: little fraud in the actual balloting process itself. We've been 52 00:02:52,360 --> 00:02:54,120 Speaker 1: you know, looking at this for several years at the 53 00:02:54,120 --> 00:02:57,160 Speaker 1: Heritage Foundation. We've compiled a database and it's not a 54 00:02:57,200 --> 00:03:00,560 Speaker 1: comprehensive nationwide database. It's merely designed to prove that there 55 00:03:00,639 --> 00:03:04,560 Speaker 1: is voter fraud, and that even small amounts of that 56 00:03:04,639 --> 00:03:07,800 Speaker 1: kind of fraud, you know, whether it's fraudulently cast absentee 57 00:03:07,840 --> 00:03:11,160 Speaker 1: ballots or a small amount of impersonation fraud can swing 58 00:03:11,240 --> 00:03:15,120 Speaker 1: type elections, and it is a problem that deserves a serious, 59 00:03:15,160 --> 00:03:19,239 Speaker 1: hard look and serious solutions. Rich, I know that Kolbach 60 00:03:19,720 --> 00:03:23,480 Speaker 1: has dedicated himself to rooting out voter fraud, and he's 61 00:03:23,480 --> 00:03:27,000 Speaker 1: obtained only nine voter fraud convictions in the last six years. 62 00:03:27,120 --> 00:03:30,359 Speaker 1: Eight of them were for voting in two states. So 63 00:03:31,120 --> 00:03:34,880 Speaker 1: do you believe that there is any real way for 64 00:03:35,040 --> 00:03:39,240 Speaker 1: voter fraud to tip an election? Well, I mean, in theory, 65 00:03:39,320 --> 00:03:41,480 Speaker 1: I guess there could be an election which is so 66 00:03:41,560 --> 00:03:43,920 Speaker 1: close that one vote is despositive, and we've had something 67 00:03:43,960 --> 00:03:47,760 Speaker 1: pretty close elections. But the the everence from many, many 68 00:03:47,800 --> 00:03:52,360 Speaker 1: different academic studies, from neutral parties, from court decisions that 69 00:03:52,440 --> 00:03:55,400 Speaker 1: have looked at this, from aggregations of all the cases 70 00:03:55,400 --> 00:03:57,960 Speaker 1: ever brought, going back really to the it's been an 71 00:03:58,000 --> 00:04:00,320 Speaker 1: effort on the part of Republicans and particularly back to 72 00:04:00,360 --> 00:04:05,360 Speaker 1: the Bush administration, is that the number of U proven 73 00:04:05,400 --> 00:04:09,480 Speaker 1: cases of voter score voter fraud is minuscularly tiny. We're 74 00:04:09,520 --> 00:04:13,040 Speaker 1: typically talking about in the single or double digits literally 75 00:04:13,120 --> 00:04:16,880 Speaker 1: digits out of out of millions of votes cast. So um, 76 00:04:17,240 --> 00:04:19,560 Speaker 1: the amount of attention being given to this kind of 77 00:04:19,680 --> 00:04:24,120 Speaker 1: fraud and importance of this actual existence is wildly disproportionate. James, 78 00:04:24,120 --> 00:04:25,599 Speaker 1: I'm gonna ask you to respond to that. But let 79 00:04:25,680 --> 00:04:27,800 Speaker 1: me let me try to separate two things out here. 80 00:04:27,839 --> 00:04:31,240 Speaker 1: I think what rich was talking about there is in 81 00:04:31,279 --> 00:04:34,400 Speaker 1: person voter fraud somebody going up and and voting when 82 00:04:34,400 --> 00:04:38,560 Speaker 1: they shouldn't, as opposed to absentee voter fraud. And the 83 00:04:38,600 --> 00:04:40,720 Speaker 1: reason I think those things need to be separated because 84 00:04:40,800 --> 00:04:43,880 Speaker 1: the first one perhaps can be dealt with by voter 85 00:04:43,960 --> 00:04:47,200 Speaker 1: id laws, but the second one that can't be Do 86 00:04:47,279 --> 00:04:49,320 Speaker 1: you have a lot of evidence of that first kind, 87 00:04:49,400 --> 00:04:52,880 Speaker 1: that in person voter fraud going on? Well, we do 88 00:04:53,000 --> 00:04:55,880 Speaker 1: have some cases in our database of impersonation fraud, and 89 00:04:55,920 --> 00:04:59,080 Speaker 1: we we certainly have cases of absentee ballot fraud as well. 90 00:04:59,120 --> 00:05:01,120 Speaker 1: But I'm not sure that I would agree with the 91 00:05:01,160 --> 00:05:04,920 Speaker 1: bifurcation that you're proposing, because you can certainly have an 92 00:05:04,920 --> 00:05:08,400 Speaker 1: I D type of requirement in the absentee ballot context. 93 00:05:08,440 --> 00:05:11,960 Speaker 1: And I'll give you an example. I before I changed 94 00:05:12,000 --> 00:05:15,960 Speaker 1: my residency out here to Virginia, I used to vote 95 00:05:15,960 --> 00:05:19,839 Speaker 1: in Ohio elections and I would cast a ballot and um, 96 00:05:19,960 --> 00:05:22,960 Speaker 1: you know, part of the absentee or early voting process 97 00:05:22,960 --> 00:05:25,640 Speaker 1: required that you sign and that you include UM an 98 00:05:25,640 --> 00:05:28,520 Speaker 1: Ohio driver's license number or some other form of of 99 00:05:28,680 --> 00:05:31,720 Speaker 1: identification in order to actually prove that you are who 100 00:05:31,800 --> 00:05:35,000 Speaker 1: you say you are, and so you know, that's the 101 00:05:35,040 --> 00:05:38,640 Speaker 1: type of a situation where I think that fraud can 102 00:05:38,720 --> 00:05:41,600 Speaker 1: be addressed through identification requirements in the same way that 103 00:05:41,720 --> 00:05:44,520 Speaker 1: it is addressed in the imperson Nation fraud contact. We're 104 00:05:44,520 --> 00:05:48,600 Speaker 1: talking with Richard Berfald, Professor, Columbia Law School and Jason's need, 105 00:05:48,600 --> 00:05:52,200 Speaker 1: a policy analyst for the Heritage Foundation about the Presidential 106 00:05:52,240 --> 00:05:56,480 Speaker 1: Advisory Commission on Election Integrity. Rich I want to let 107 00:05:56,480 --> 00:06:03,400 Speaker 1: your respond to Jason's comments before about using voter i 108 00:06:03,520 --> 00:06:07,400 Speaker 1: D more and particularly using it even when you have 109 00:06:07,800 --> 00:06:12,680 Speaker 1: um elections by mail. Yes, I think that's an interesting 110 00:06:12,720 --> 00:06:15,640 Speaker 1: point of these raising it's appropriate one. Uh, there's, as 111 00:06:15,640 --> 00:06:18,320 Speaker 1: I said before, the next to no evidence of in 112 00:06:18,400 --> 00:06:20,800 Speaker 1: person of voter ford. But there's there has been enough 113 00:06:20,800 --> 00:06:24,880 Speaker 1: studies actually about absentee and the many many legal changes 114 00:06:24,880 --> 00:06:27,400 Speaker 1: that were adopted by many states trying to address the 115 00:06:27,440 --> 00:06:29,880 Speaker 1: voter fraud problem. Up almost all of them focused on 116 00:06:30,320 --> 00:06:33,080 Speaker 1: the kind of a non existent in person problem. It 117 00:06:33,080 --> 00:06:34,760 Speaker 1: would be interesting to spend a little bit more time 118 00:06:34,760 --> 00:06:37,960 Speaker 1: thinking about absentee voting, which I think there are although 119 00:06:38,000 --> 00:06:39,800 Speaker 1: there I think some of the issues have to do 120 00:06:40,200 --> 00:06:43,000 Speaker 1: with sometimes the pressures that may be put on people 121 00:06:43,000 --> 00:06:46,000 Speaker 1: who are casting votes apps and taming and absent votes 122 00:06:46,040 --> 00:06:49,520 Speaker 1: are not cast in the privacy of of voting booth. 123 00:06:49,600 --> 00:06:52,040 Speaker 1: So it would be interesting to find out more about that. 124 00:06:54,200 --> 00:06:57,120 Speaker 1: It's want to be clear, Rich just talked about said 125 00:06:57,160 --> 00:06:59,920 Speaker 1: that next to no in person voter fraud. That is 126 00:07:00,080 --> 00:07:04,440 Speaker 1: also my understanding. Do you have evidence of a significant 127 00:07:04,520 --> 00:07:09,200 Speaker 1: number of in person voter fraud cases in the database? 128 00:07:09,279 --> 00:07:13,200 Speaker 1: We have a few examples of in person voter fraud 129 00:07:13,240 --> 00:07:16,160 Speaker 1: where where people actually went to a polling place and 130 00:07:16,200 --> 00:07:18,960 Speaker 1: either what's what's a few can you put Can you 131 00:07:18,960 --> 00:07:20,480 Speaker 1: put a number on it for us? Because I think 132 00:07:20,480 --> 00:07:22,880 Speaker 1: we're it would really help people because Donald Trump has 133 00:07:22,880 --> 00:07:26,120 Speaker 1: talked about three to five million illegal votes, and so, um, 134 00:07:26,160 --> 00:07:29,480 Speaker 1: it'd be nice to know how many in person illegal 135 00:07:29,560 --> 00:07:33,080 Speaker 1: votes we know we don't have been out there sure, 136 00:07:33,200 --> 00:07:34,840 Speaker 1: so you know, first of all, I guess that I 137 00:07:34,840 --> 00:07:37,760 Speaker 1: would um uh say that the three to five million 138 00:07:37,880 --> 00:07:39,960 Speaker 1: number that we've heard from the President and a few 139 00:07:39,960 --> 00:07:42,040 Speaker 1: other people who have repeated that figure. I don't think 140 00:07:42,040 --> 00:07:44,320 Speaker 1: that we necessarily need to assume first of all, that 141 00:07:44,640 --> 00:07:46,680 Speaker 1: you know, even if that figure is accurate and I'm 142 00:07:46,720 --> 00:07:48,240 Speaker 1: not sure that it is. But even if it is, 143 00:07:48,280 --> 00:07:51,400 Speaker 1: that all of those votes were cast, you know, illegally 144 00:07:51,440 --> 00:07:53,080 Speaker 1: in person. So I just think that we should we 145 00:07:53,120 --> 00:07:56,680 Speaker 1: should clarify that I don't know exactly how many, uh, 146 00:07:56,720 --> 00:07:59,800 Speaker 1: you know, in person voter fraud cases we have in 147 00:07:59,800 --> 00:08:01,280 Speaker 1: the out of base we have more than a thousand 148 00:08:01,400 --> 00:08:03,720 Speaker 1: entries and in you know, I admit that we have 149 00:08:03,840 --> 00:08:09,280 Speaker 1: far more absentee ballot related cases than we do impersonation fraud. Um. 150 00:08:09,600 --> 00:08:13,200 Speaker 1: You you're you're right to point out, um that you know, 151 00:08:14,200 --> 00:08:17,080 Speaker 1: voter identification laws will not solve every problem in the 152 00:08:17,120 --> 00:08:19,840 Speaker 1: absentee ballot context, because there are problems of people who 153 00:08:19,920 --> 00:08:23,160 Speaker 1: are illegally quote unquote assisting voters by putting pressure on 154 00:08:23,200 --> 00:08:25,000 Speaker 1: them to essentially vote one way or the other. But 155 00:08:25,040 --> 00:08:27,520 Speaker 1: I think that it would be a helpful, helpful provision, 156 00:08:27,800 --> 00:08:31,320 Speaker 1: and ultimately I'm hoping that the Voter Fraud Commission will 157 00:08:31,360 --> 00:08:33,719 Speaker 1: be able to look into two problems related to the 158 00:08:33,800 --> 00:08:37,960 Speaker 1: absentee ballot situation, as well as problems with fraud in 159 00:08:38,040 --> 00:08:40,520 Speaker 1: person at a polling place. I mean, just to put 160 00:08:40,520 --> 00:08:43,040 Speaker 1: it in perspective, there were roughly a hundred and thirty 161 00:08:43,040 --> 00:08:46,760 Speaker 1: million votes cast in presidential election when the guests a 162 00:08:46,760 --> 00:08:50,160 Speaker 1: comparable number was cast in So at that point where 163 00:08:50,200 --> 00:08:52,920 Speaker 1: like over two hundred and sixty million votes cast. Uh, 164 00:08:52,920 --> 00:08:54,480 Speaker 1: and that's just for president. I thought there were lower 165 00:08:54,559 --> 00:08:58,480 Speaker 1: level elections in the the the congressional elections in the 166 00:08:58,480 --> 00:09:00,760 Speaker 1: middle made some numbers probably half that, but soon in 167 00:09:00,800 --> 00:09:03,840 Speaker 1: another eighty million, eighty million votes, and then we have 168 00:09:04,200 --> 00:09:07,160 Speaker 1: state elections and we have local elections. In the odds 169 00:09:07,360 --> 00:09:09,120 Speaker 1: or so, this probable has been I don't know, and 170 00:09:09,280 --> 00:09:10,840 Speaker 1: very and I'm making this number up, but I think 171 00:09:10,840 --> 00:09:13,680 Speaker 1: it's about right a half a billion votes cast over 172 00:09:13,679 --> 00:09:17,120 Speaker 1: the last five years. If we're talking about a thousand 173 00:09:17,160 --> 00:09:19,520 Speaker 1: entries in the database, and those aren't proven cases, but 174 00:09:19,640 --> 00:09:24,840 Speaker 1: just often things that might be suspicious because of overlapping names. 175 00:09:25,280 --> 00:09:28,400 Speaker 1: I don't think we have a very high fractional votes there. Okay, 176 00:09:29,840 --> 00:09:31,800 Speaker 1: if if I could just move on to a little 177 00:09:31,840 --> 00:09:36,800 Speaker 1: bit of a different uh angle here, Rich the chairman 178 00:09:36,840 --> 00:09:38,959 Speaker 1: of the d n C Voting Rights Commission, said that 179 00:09:39,440 --> 00:09:42,720 Speaker 1: said that the Election Integrity Commission is an attempt to 180 00:09:42,760 --> 00:09:47,360 Speaker 1: suppress the vote by the GOP. When the Commission requested 181 00:09:47,400 --> 00:09:53,119 Speaker 1: this extensive personal voter information from the states, many citizens 182 00:09:53,120 --> 00:09:55,480 Speaker 1: in a lot of states took their names off the 183 00:09:55,600 --> 00:10:01,600 Speaker 1: voter rolls. So has the Commission already caused some voter suppression, Well, 184 00:10:02,040 --> 00:10:04,280 Speaker 1: that may be the case, I doubt even I don't 185 00:10:04,280 --> 00:10:07,080 Speaker 1: think they intended that, and I've been pretty critical of this, 186 00:10:07,360 --> 00:10:09,160 Speaker 1: but I think it just goes to show the concerns 187 00:10:09,200 --> 00:10:11,720 Speaker 1: about privacy and that may connect this up with the 188 00:10:11,760 --> 00:10:14,320 Speaker 1: problems of hacking and and sort of cyber crime in 189 00:10:14,320 --> 00:10:17,000 Speaker 1: involving voting. What the what the What the Commission's vice 190 00:10:17,080 --> 00:10:20,560 Speaker 1: chair asked for was a huge amounts of data, personal 191 00:10:20,640 --> 00:10:24,199 Speaker 1: data about voters, including their political party, their social Security number, 192 00:10:24,559 --> 00:10:26,600 Speaker 1: in ways that it was they had not gone through 193 00:10:26,640 --> 00:10:30,800 Speaker 1: the proper processes for asking for such critical private and 194 00:10:30,840 --> 00:10:33,880 Speaker 1: protected data. And I think there's an enormous concern out 195 00:10:33,920 --> 00:10:36,400 Speaker 1: there about the loss of privacy and the loss of 196 00:10:36,400 --> 00:10:38,920 Speaker 1: this kind of data may be connected to the voting, 197 00:10:39,000 --> 00:10:43,040 Speaker 1: may be connected to data identity theft. I mean, it 198 00:10:43,160 --> 00:10:46,240 Speaker 1: was kind of it was an amazingly sloppy move to 199 00:10:46,280 --> 00:10:48,600 Speaker 1: try and sort of ask for all that data in 200 00:10:48,640 --> 00:10:52,560 Speaker 1: an insecure way, including data that some some states, some 201 00:10:52,640 --> 00:10:54,320 Speaker 1: states do a lot to be released, some states allow 202 00:10:54,360 --> 00:10:57,480 Speaker 1: to be releasably to certain people learned certain circumstances, some don't. 203 00:10:57,640 --> 00:11:00,880 Speaker 1: Why I think you've got this big pushback the state regulators, 204 00:11:00,920 --> 00:11:04,880 Speaker 1: including Republican regulators, who felt that this was an enormous 205 00:11:05,080 --> 00:11:08,280 Speaker 1: intrusion into their databases, that it was not being done 206 00:11:08,280 --> 00:11:10,520 Speaker 1: in a secure way. And I suspect the voters were 207 00:11:10,559 --> 00:11:13,960 Speaker 1: reacting more about the concerned about laws of privacy. Can 208 00:11:14,000 --> 00:11:16,320 Speaker 1: I be anything else, Jason? What's your take on that 209 00:11:16,320 --> 00:11:19,280 Speaker 1: way of issues of privacy security? And I guess federalism 210 00:11:19,320 --> 00:11:22,400 Speaker 1: there too. What do you think? Sure? Well, you know, 211 00:11:22,480 --> 00:11:24,599 Speaker 1: before I address that, I did want to clarify that 212 00:11:24,640 --> 00:11:29,480 Speaker 1: our database UM are is proven instances of fraud. It 213 00:11:29,559 --> 00:11:32,160 Speaker 1: was it was mentioned earlier that you know, these might 214 00:11:32,160 --> 00:11:35,640 Speaker 1: just be hypothetical or allegations. These are one proven cases, 215 00:11:35,800 --> 00:11:39,040 Speaker 1: the vast majority, nearly a thousand of them criminal convictions 216 00:11:39,080 --> 00:11:40,800 Speaker 1: for voter fraud. So I just wanted to be clear 217 00:11:40,840 --> 00:11:43,839 Speaker 1: that we are talking about a non comprehensive database have 218 00:11:44,000 --> 00:11:47,400 Speaker 1: proven instances of fraud from forty seven states around the country, 219 00:11:47,679 --> 00:11:52,120 Speaker 1: and UM the vast majority of this database is within 220 00:11:52,160 --> 00:11:54,880 Speaker 1: the last decade, and we add cases that are matriculating 221 00:11:54,880 --> 00:11:57,600 Speaker 1: through the court system. We've added a slew of cases 222 00:11:57,640 --> 00:12:00,000 Speaker 1: that were decided in twenty seventeen, just within the last 223 00:12:00,120 --> 00:12:03,079 Speaker 1: few weeks. So this is a current, up to date database. 224 00:12:03,080 --> 00:12:05,520 Speaker 1: Now it does not represent every case in the United 225 00:12:05,559 --> 00:12:07,960 Speaker 1: States because we don't have the resources to go through 226 00:12:08,000 --> 00:12:10,560 Speaker 1: every court record. The point is simply to say that 227 00:12:10,640 --> 00:12:12,920 Speaker 1: voter fraud is real and that it has, you know, 228 00:12:12,960 --> 00:12:15,839 Speaker 1: tipped the balance in elections. We have elections in this 229 00:12:16,080 --> 00:12:19,440 Speaker 1: database right now that we're ordered to be thrown out 230 00:12:19,440 --> 00:12:22,319 Speaker 1: and redone because there was sufficient fraud to swing the outcome. 231 00:12:22,679 --> 00:12:26,079 Speaker 1: So now we have about a minute. Yeah, if I 232 00:12:26,120 --> 00:12:29,040 Speaker 1: can talk for just a second thing about the unregistering. 233 00:12:29,559 --> 00:12:31,679 Speaker 1: You know, I think if people are removing themselves from 234 00:12:31,720 --> 00:12:34,760 Speaker 1: the voter roles because they're afraid about privacy concerns, that 235 00:12:34,840 --> 00:12:38,760 Speaker 1: is an unfortunate overreaction because the data that was requested 236 00:12:39,240 --> 00:12:42,800 Speaker 1: is publicly available information that is routinely accessed. It's not 237 00:12:42,880 --> 00:12:45,240 Speaker 1: information which is locked away and evolved. It is routinely 238 00:12:45,280 --> 00:12:49,520 Speaker 1: accessed for political purposes by parties and candidates. In California, 239 00:12:49,559 --> 00:12:52,040 Speaker 1: for example, the state that is refusing to provide information 240 00:12:52,040 --> 00:12:55,400 Speaker 1: to the Commission. It is made available to journalistic organizations, 241 00:12:55,440 --> 00:12:58,920 Speaker 1: governmental organizations, private parties. There are federal and state laws 242 00:12:58,920 --> 00:13:01,160 Speaker 1: that make this publicly available, so I think it's an 243 00:13:01,200 --> 00:13:04,320 Speaker 1: unfortunate overreaction. And then we also have to consider this 244 00:13:04,360 --> 00:13:07,280 Speaker 1: could be some form of political protest. This could be 245 00:13:07,320 --> 00:13:09,560 Speaker 1: people who are ineligible that we're on the roles and 246 00:13:09,600 --> 00:13:11,360 Speaker 1: are now trying to get themselves off so that they 247 00:13:11,360 --> 00:13:14,040 Speaker 1: can't be identified as having committed a crime by voting 248 00:13:14,200 --> 00:13:17,600 Speaker 1: when they're ineligible. There's a lot of potential motivations for this, 249 00:13:17,800 --> 00:13:20,040 Speaker 1: and you know, if it's just people who are worried 250 00:13:20,040 --> 00:13:22,040 Speaker 1: about privacy, then I think that a lot of the 251 00:13:22,080 --> 00:13:24,280 Speaker 1: rhetoric around the Commission has contributed to that, and I 252 00:13:24,320 --> 00:13:26,240 Speaker 1: really do hope that they will re register so that 253 00:13:26,280 --> 00:13:31,600 Speaker 1: they can exercise their democratic rights. Privacy advocates have filed 254 00:13:31,640 --> 00:13:35,240 Speaker 1: suit arguing that federal law expressly bars government agencies from 255 00:13:35,280 --> 00:13:40,720 Speaker 1: collecting voter information. Question is whether the Commission is an agency, 256 00:13:40,800 --> 00:13:44,800 Speaker 1: and critics have also warned about it. Uh. We are 257 00:13:44,840 --> 00:13:47,319 Speaker 1: going to be talking more about this in the future. 258 00:13:47,520 --> 00:13:50,440 Speaker 1: I am sure. Thank you both for being on Bloomberg Law. 259 00:13:50,600 --> 00:13:55,120 Speaker 1: That's Richard Brufalt, professor at Columbia Law School and Jason's Need, 260 00:13:55,160 --> 00:13:57,760 Speaker 1: a policy analyst for the Heritage Foundation.