Speaker 1: Welcome to the Votes and Verdicts podcast hosted by Bloomberg Intelligence,
Speaker 1: the investment research arm of Bloomberg LPA. In this podcast series,
Speaker 1: we talk about the intersection of business policy and law.
Speaker 1: My name is Holly Frome. I'm an analyst with Bloomberg
Speaker 1: Intelligence covering consumer and industrials litigation. Today's podcast, we'll focus
Speaker 1: on several key court rulings impacting tariffs, and specifically a
Speaker 1: May twentieth decision by the US Court of International Trade
Speaker 1: and May twenty ninth decision by a Washington, d c.
Speaker 1: District Court holding that President Trump's reciprocal tariffs and tariffs
Speaker 1: imposed on China, Canada, and Mexico were unlawful. I'm delighted
Speaker 1: to be joined today by law Professor John Yu. Professor
Speaker 1: U is a Senior Research Fellow at the Cibitas Institut,
Speaker 1: a Distinguished Visiting Professor at the School of Civil Leadership
Speaker 1: at the University of Texas Austin, the Emmanuel Heller Professor
Speaker 1: of Law at the University of California at Berkeley, and
Speaker 1: a non resident Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.
Speaker 1: Professor U served as an official in the US Department
Speaker 1: of Justice General Counsel of the US Senate Judiciary Committee,
Speaker 1: and was a law clerk for Supreme Court Justice Clarence
Speaker 1: Thomas and Federal Appeals Judge Lawrence Silberman. He has written
Speaker 1: or assisted in the writing of numerous books on constitutional
Speaker 1: law national security in the Supreme Court and graduated Harvard
Speaker 1: College and Yale Law School. Professor U also serves on
Speaker 1: the board of the Pacific Legal Foundation, which is representing
Speaker 1: businesses that have filed a case called Princess Austin versus
Speaker 1: Customs and a separate lawsuit against the Trump administration over
Speaker 1: the tariffs we will discuss today. Thank you so much
Speaker 1: for joining us, Professor U. So, just by way of background,
Speaker 1: the International Trade Court on May twenty eighth found executive
Speaker 1: orders imposing so called reciprocal terrors were also called worldwide
Speaker 1: terraffs and terraffs in China, Canada, and Mexico related to
Speaker 1: fentanyl trafficking unlawful. The Court found reciprocal terrafts lawful because
Speaker 1: it found the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, the law
Speaker 1: the President used to impose them, doesn't permit unbounded teriffs.
Speaker 1: If it did, the Court said it would violate the
Speaker 1: major questions and non delegation doctrines, and with respect to
Speaker 1: fentanyl trafficking terraffs, it found that the terriffs don't deal
Speaker 1: with the emergency as required by what's the Internationalency Economic
Speaker 1: Powers Act were also known as AIPA. So, as many
Speaker 1: people know, the President posed reciprocal terrafs on the grounds
Speaker 1: that the trade deficit constituted an emergency. And you've said
Speaker 1: that the judges of the International Trade Court could have
Speaker 1: rejected the reciprocal terraces on the straightforward ground that the
Speaker 1: trade deficit doesn't qualify as an unusual and extraordinary threat
Speaker 1: as required by AEPA, But the court didn't make that determination.
Speaker 1: Why do you think they didn't?
Speaker 2: Thanks for having me, Holly, And it's an interesting question.
Speaker 2: There's really two different parts to it. One is what's
Speaker 2: the right role of the courts? And that's the question
Speaker 2: you just asked, why didn't the courts reach a certain
Speaker 2: question or not? And then the second one is just
Speaker 2: under the statute is this and appropriate use of the
Speaker 2: emergency international Economic powers? So I think as to the
Speaker 2: first question, courts have always been reluctant to second guess
Speaker 2: the executive branch, and when it decides there's an emergency.
Speaker 2: In fact, I don't think that any court really ever
Speaker 2: has overturned a finding of it by the president of
Speaker 2: an emergency. This is because courts feel a great deal
Speaker 2: of reluctance in this area to try to determine what
Speaker 2: the facts are. They understand that emergencies are fast moving,
Speaker 2: that they happen in an unanticipated way. That's in fact
Speaker 2: why Congress often delegates broad authority to the president. So
Speaker 2: I think that this court, this Court of International Trade,
Speaker 2: which is a very unusual court. It's in fact, for
Speaker 2: most of its history it was actually an administrative agency,
Speaker 2: and it's not like the other kinds of federal courts
Speaker 2: were used to reading about, which have what we call
Speaker 2: a general jurisdiction. They can hear almost any issue under
Speaker 2: federal law. This court especially created just to hear really
Speaker 2: cases about dumping and unfair subsidies in the trade context.
Speaker 2: I don't think they wanted to step out and be
Speaker 2: the first federal court to ever overturn of finding a
Speaker 2: presidential emergency. That doesn't mean that, you know, as to
Speaker 2: the second question I raised, under the law itself, this
Speaker 2: is an emergency. It might just be that this court thought,
Speaker 2: maybe be it should be the Supreme Court or the
Speaker 2: Federal Circuit, the higher appeals court that take this fateful step.
Speaker 1: Yeah, that makes sense. And then I wonder why, well
Speaker 1: we'll get I guess we'll get to it later because
Speaker 1: you know, there's another district court case that found the
Speaker 1: tarifs and lawful for different reasons, which we'll get to.
Speaker 1: That court also didn't say that the trade deficit wasn't
Speaker 1: an emergency, but the President has said that the trade
Speaker 1: imbalances have hollowed out our manufacturing base, inhibited our abilities
Speaker 1: to scale domestic manufacturing, undermine critical supply chains, and rendered
Speaker 1: our defense industrial based dependent on foreign adversaries. So why
Speaker 1: do you think that that doesn't lead to the conclusion
Speaker 1: that trade balance imbalances and other trade barriers doesn't arise
Speaker 1: to the level of an unusual and extraordinary threat. Yeah.
Speaker 2: I think, Holly, that if the courts do get to
Speaker 2: the question, if they do, unlike as you said, the
Speaker 2: Court of a National Trade just take off what we
Speaker 2: called denovo, a fresh look at whether an emergency exist
Speaker 2: or not. I don't think this is what Congress had
Speaker 2: in mind with AIPA. As you said in your introduction,
Speaker 2: you quoted the statute, it requires an unusual and extraordinary
Speaker 2: threat to the national security or foreign policy of the
Speaker 2: United States. You go back and look, and first, I
Speaker 2: don't think that the trade deficit has suddenly fallen upon us.
Speaker 2: We've had a trade deficit consistently for about fifty years
Speaker 2: since the Nixon administration. And in fact, Nixon was the
Speaker 2: last person to kind of try something, last president to
Speaker 2: try something like this, to pose a kind of universal
Speaker 2: tariff in order to solve the trade deficit, which didn't work.
Speaker 2: And so the trade deficit has fluctuated up and down.
Speaker 2: And I also looked, and if you correct for inflation,
Speaker 2: the trade deficit today is about where the trade deficit
Speaker 2: was at the beginning of the second Bush term. So
Speaker 2: it's been about many years. And the inflation adjusted size
Speaker 2: of the budget deficit, there's a percentage of GDP for example,
Speaker 2: is really not change at all. So to me, it
Speaker 2: seems that an emergency, you know, something unusual, extraordinary, something
Speaker 2: that has an enormous impact, and it's something that's all
Speaker 2: of a sudden, it's something that has fallen us in
Speaker 2: an unanticipated way. Whereas this emergency is a non emergency.
Speaker 2: The trade deficit is just the fact of the economic life,
Speaker 2: or a trade SURPPLUS would be two. And it's been
Speaker 2: fluctuating up and down four or five decades now, got it.
Speaker 1: So what the International Trade Court said was that if
Speaker 1: the president is going to address trade deficits, he has
Speaker 1: to do that through Section one twenty two of the
Speaker 1: Trade Act and not through I do you agree with
Speaker 1: that ruling.
Speaker 2: I think that's an I don't think that's correct. So
Speaker 2: I think there's a number of ways that the president
Speaker 2: can impact trade, and I think that's why this legal question,
Speaker 2: the first one is this an emergency is all important
Speaker 2: because if you then turn to AIPA and you read
Speaker 2: the powers that are given to the president, it doesn't
Speaker 2: use the word tariff, but it uses the words which
Speaker 2: you make up a tariff. It says that the president
Speaker 2: is allowed to regulate block sees any kind of transaction
Speaker 2: with a foreign party. Essentially, so, for example, under APA,
Speaker 2: and keep in mind, AEPA grandfathered in other kinds of
Speaker 2: international emergencies that have been declared and trade sanctions that
Speaker 2: have been used, you could regularly impose an embargo on
Speaker 2: a trade embargo on an entire country. So the predecessor
Speaker 2: of TAIPA was something called the Trading with the Enemy Act,
Speaker 2: and so when Congress, which was passed in nineteen seventeen,
Speaker 2: and so when Congress passed AEPA in nineteen seventy seven,
Speaker 2: it was trying to change how presidents could use those powers,
Speaker 2: but they didn't really change the powers that the president
Speaker 2: got from the statute. And so under the Trading with
Speaker 2: the Enemy Act and then even under AEPA, presidents have
Speaker 2: regularly imposed trade sanctions that go even farther beyond teriffs,
Speaker 2: to the point of cutting off all trade with the country.
Speaker 2: For example, we're talking right now about secondary Russian sanctions,
Speaker 2: which would be to impose trade sanctions on country that
Speaker 2: do trade with Russia, not even primary sanctions, which are
Speaker 2: sanctions that are just directly on US Russian trade, which
Speaker 2: is now very small. This to me is even more
Speaker 2: powerful tool than just straightforward tariffs, and that would be
Speaker 2: done under IPA. I think the way to understand what
Speaker 2: these powers are is that they're very broad, broader than
Speaker 2: these x under the other trade laws. But I think
Speaker 2: what they're really aimed at, in combination with the first question,
Speaker 2: is this an emergency, is that the purpose of the
Speaker 2: statute was to aim at individual countries. So, for example,
Speaker 2: if President Trump were to say, a trade with China
Speaker 2: and China itself is a national security and foreign policy threat,
Speaker 2: so I'm going to impose sanctions on China, for example,
Speaker 2: in order to protect American national security related industries, or
Speaker 2: to build up alternate sources for raw materials or for
Speaker 2: basic electronic components that if we rely on China for
Speaker 2: I think that would fall under AUPA.
Speaker 1: So do you think he would have been on better
Speaker 1: legal footing perhaps if he had directed it in a
Speaker 1: specific country instead of the you know, the worldwide chairis
Speaker 1: where he directed it in almost every country.
Speaker 2: Exactly right, Holly. That I think is the way APA
Speaker 2: is supposed to work is here's a country like a China,
Speaker 2: like a Russia, they now pose a threat to our
Speaker 2: national security. Then AIPA gives you much broader therapy power
Speaker 2: than just terriffs. You know, president could just close off
Speaker 2: all trade, not just trade. You can close off trade,
Speaker 2: you could close off travel, you could close off communications
Speaker 2: with that country. But it has to be I think,
Speaker 2: country by country, and it has to be because, of course,
Speaker 2: you find that country is a threat, not because they're
Speaker 2: just part of the overall trade deficit that we have.
Speaker 2: That makes sense. So the District Court of Washington, d c. However,
Speaker 2: said that AIPA doesn't authorize tariffs at all. And one
Speaker 2: of the points the court raised was that AIPA never
Speaker 2: even mentions the word tariff. What do you think, what
Speaker 2: do you make of the argument that if Congress meant
Speaker 2: to authorize the president to impose terriffs vi iepa, it
Speaker 2: would have explicitly said so in the statute. You know,
Speaker 2: this is a I think a problem with that opinion
Speaker 2: and the Court of International Trades opinion is that I
Speaker 2: think they ignore that Supreme Court decisions in this area
Speaker 2: of international emergencies and economic powers. It has very different
Speaker 2: fundamentals than domestic law. So you mentioned earlier that the
Speaker 2: Quarter of International Trade had held that the Trump administration
Speaker 2: was violating what's called the major Questions doctrine. This is
Speaker 2: essentially what the Court in Washington has helped too. And
Speaker 2: this idea that the Supreme Court has articulated in cases
Speaker 2: like striking down President Biden's effort to forgive student loans
Speaker 2: or the nationwide vaccine mandate. This is the idea that
Speaker 2: a statute that's vague, isn't to be read to give
Speaker 2: the executive branch power on a question of major economic
Speaker 2: or social or political importance. In other words, if Congress
Speaker 2: really wanted to give the executive branch that power, for example,
Speaker 2: to acquire a nationwide COVID nineteen vaccine mandate, it would
Speaker 2: say so in the statute. And courts aren't to give
Speaker 2: the president the benefit of the doubt. And that's been
Speaker 2: a very important development under the Robbers Court. But the
Speaker 2: Supreme Court has never applied that to foreign affairs. And
Speaker 2: so there's another line of cases involving international economic regulations
Speaker 2: where the Court has rejected exactly that argument, and in
Speaker 2: fact it rejected it exactly in the area of interpreting AIPA.
Speaker 2: The first major use of AEPA was against Iran, and
Speaker 2: it was to resolve the Iranian hostages crisis. Is a
Speaker 2: case called Dames and Moore versus Reagan. And in that case,
Speaker 2: the Court, I'm sorry, the President had to execute certain
Speaker 2: economic sunctions and lifting of sanctions that were not permitted
Speaker 2: under a EPA. The Court said that even though the
Speaker 2: statute did not clearly deny the authority to provide the
Speaker 2: authority for that, it was going to give the president
Speaker 2: the benefit of the doubt because it involved foreign affairs
Speaker 2: and involved national security, involved fast moving events that the
Speaker 2: court was reluctant to resecond guests. And that's exactly I
Speaker 2: think what's going on here. So that's why I think
Speaker 2: really the hard question for the courts are going to
Speaker 2: be are they going to review the emergency declaration? I
Speaker 2: think once they do, then the major questions doctrine. So
Speaker 2: far the Supreme Court can always change his mind. The
Speaker 2: major questions doctrine and the theory of it has not
Speaker 2: been held to apply to IBA. Got it.
Speaker 1: So the International Trade Court said that if the law
Speaker 1: allowed unbounded terrafts, as it found a reciprocal terrafs were,
Speaker 1: it would violate the non delegation doctrine which you talked about.
Speaker 1: And that doctrine, you know, as you said, this says
Speaker 1: that Congress can't delegate a power to the president without
Speaker 1: providing intelligible principle or limits around that power. And you
Speaker 1: said you believe this line of reasoning, though, opens the
Speaker 1: door for Trump to prevail on appeal. Can you explain
Speaker 1: why you think that?
Speaker 2: Yes, So this pulls from that case in dameson Moore
Speaker 2: versus Reagan. The Court held that, So, I don't want
Speaker 2: to get too complicated, but this was the deal that
Speaker 2: freed the hostages in nineteen eighty and part of the
Speaker 2: deal was the United States had to had frozen all
Speaker 2: Iranian government assets in the United States under a EPA,
Speaker 2: and a whole bunch of people and companies had also
Speaker 2: sued Iran's government for nationalizing all their assets and had
Speaker 2: won judgments and attached them all throughout the country. And
Speaker 2: so as part of that deal, the Carter first and
Speaker 2: then the Reagan administration had to free up all that
Speaker 2: money and send it out of the country. AIPA doesn't
Speaker 2: allow you to do that. AIPA doesn't actually say that you,
Speaker 2: the president, in the course of a national emergency, can
Speaker 2: take away basically lift all those attachments and basically eliminate
Speaker 2: all those judgments in court. And so the Supreme Court said, yes,
Speaker 2: we admit. They were very open. They said, we admit
Speaker 2: that the Statute APA doesn't specifically give the president that power.
Speaker 2: It gives a president a lot of other broad powers.
Speaker 2: And so we think that in the area of an
Speaker 2: economic regulation during an international emergency, we are going to
Speaker 2: basically give the president the benefit of the doubt, let
Speaker 2: him exercise that power, just kind of like filling a
Speaker 2: gap in the statute and not strike down something during
Speaker 2: the during an international emergency, which we don't want to
Speaker 2: second guests. So that case really is the one that
Speaker 2: the Trump administration should be relying on, and I'm sure
Speaker 2: they will as this case moves up to the Supreme Court.
Speaker 2: It's actually quite I don't think they did, though. I
Speaker 2: think it's really puzzling that the trial courts weren't confronted
Speaker 2: with this case and so have to explain, you know,
Speaker 2: why they were able, you know, why they were able
Speaker 2: to hold what they did in the face of you know,
Speaker 2: the most recent This is the clearest Supreme Court President
Speaker 2: president on the IPIS Statute itself.
Speaker 1: So, if this case does make its way to the
Speaker 1: Supreme Court, do you think there's a way that they
Speaker 1: can affirm the International Trade Court's decision with regard to
Speaker 1: worldwide sheriffs but disagree with its reason for finding them
Speaker 1: am awful.
Speaker 2: Yes, I mean, I think the easiest thing the Supreme
Speaker 2: Court could do would be to say we don't consider
Speaker 2: this an emergency within the meaning of the Statute. And
Speaker 2: to do that would be to look at, as I said,
Speaker 2: all the emergencies under the Trading with the Enemy Act
Speaker 2: and look at that which were all nations specific, and
Speaker 2: then to say, you know the purpose of the statue
Speaker 2: and the way it's been used, And that's the thing
Speaker 2: a court has been looking at a lot in its
Speaker 2: recent cases in other areas, is what's been the tradition
Speaker 2: and history, what's been the practice under the statute and
Speaker 2: say these all appeared to us to be aimed at
Speaker 2: specific countries that pose a threat, and then actually gives
Speaker 2: you broader powers and terrors. But that what the Congress
Speaker 2: didn't think an international emergency would be is something that's
Speaker 2: again been with us for fifty years, hasn't really changed
Speaker 2: in twenty years. So it's hard to say it's an emergency.
Speaker 1: You've said that the Trade Court's decision intrudes into foreign
Speaker 1: policy in a manner no federal court has ever done before.
Speaker 1: Can you explain what you mean by that?
Speaker 2: So this is the thing I think that's dangerous. You know,
Speaker 2: it's close to but different than the argument I was making,
Speaker 2: which is, I don't know though, if the courts want
Speaker 2: to get in the position of saying we can decide
Speaker 2: whether this is an emergency or not just on our
Speaker 2: own power. I think what's easier about what I just
Speaker 2: laid out what the court would try to do is
Speaker 2: figure out what did Congress think is an emergency? You know,
Speaker 2: what does Congress think it was doing. What did Congress
Speaker 2: think it was doing when it passed the EYEPA law.
Speaker 2: What kind of international emergencies did it have in mind
Speaker 2: when it said unusual an extraordinary threat to the national
Speaker 2: security and foreign policy United States? But I think what
Speaker 2: the courts will be cautious of is sort of deciding
Speaker 2: for itself whether something is an emergency. I think you
Speaker 2: mentioned that the Court the lower courts have been doing
Speaker 2: this in other areas, specifically immigration cases, and so far
Speaker 2: the Supreme Court is actually intervened mean to overturn the
Speaker 2: cases where the Supreme Court the lower courts have done
Speaker 2: this and said, reconsider what you're doing. It's not clear
Speaker 2: that this is what the federal courts should be. You know,
Speaker 2: this is this this question is included in our powers,
Speaker 2: the question of what is an international emergency in terms
Speaker 2: of just the president's powers, in terms of the constitution.
Speaker 2: All they would have to do in the course that
Speaker 2: I think they might follow is just say this is
Speaker 2: what we think, congressman, when they gave the power to
Speaker 2: the president in the first place.
Speaker 1: I wonder if they would run into that same problem,
Speaker 1: you know, that they are overstepping their authority. The courts
Speaker 1: when they if they decide, you know, Congress didn't meanness
Speaker 1: because AIPA is meant to be meant to give the
Speaker 1: president powers you know in the invention emergency that Congress
Speaker 1: can't contemplate.
Speaker 2: Yes, I think that's a fair question. I think that's
Speaker 2: the best argument for the Trump administration is to say, uh,
Speaker 2: you shouldn't really the courts, you really shouldn't limit yourself
Speaker 2: to what Congress thought was an international emergency. Congress is
Speaker 2: very broad words in the statute. They knew they couldn't
Speaker 2: anticipate the future. And that's a very point of an
Speaker 2: emergency is you can't write laws in advance to really
Speaker 2: deal with them because they haven't happened yet and they're extraordinary.
Speaker 2: And that's the whole point of these emergency statutes in
Speaker 2: the first place. And you can see I agree with
Speaker 2: that. You can see the courts are reluctant, at least the
Speaker 2: Supreme Court has been reluctant to have the federal courts
Speaker 2: tread into this area, which you look at the Constitution.
Speaker 2: Obviously it sets up Congress and the President as the
Speaker 2: branches to lead the country in the context of an emergency.
Speaker 2: But at the same time, you could see the Supreme
Speaker 2: War is not going to say that's an unlimited power
Speaker 2: either that at some point, you know, at some point,
Speaker 2: the courts, I don't think, are going to allow a
Speaker 2: president to declare an emergency for something that's really slow moving,
Speaker 2: really is permanent kind of social problem. So the example
Speaker 2: I give is, I don't think the Court would say
Speaker 2: that climate change is an an international economic emergency because
Speaker 2: it has been going on for so long and is
Speaker 2: very slow moving that I don't think the Court, for example,
Speaker 2: would allow presidents to say climate change triggers i EPA powers.
Speaker 1: Right, That's an interesting example. I've never heard that one
Speaker 1: used before, but that makes sense to me. So you've
Speaker 1: said that the International Trade Court's decision with respect to
Speaker 1: the trafficking terraffs, and what the Court did there was
Speaker 1: they said that those don't deal with the fentanyl emergency.
Speaker 1: And you've said the Court's decision would allow courts to
Speaker 1: sit in judgment over the weather the president has chosen
Speaker 1: the most effective means to achieve its goals. Do you
Speaker 1: support an approach that makes the presence means of dealing
Speaker 1: with an emergency not subject to judicial review? And if not,
Speaker 1: what role do you think the courts should have in
Speaker 1: reviewing such questions?
Speaker 2: Well, I think this was the problem that you know,
Speaker 2: the Supreme Court is going to be worried about that
Speaker 2: if the trial courts really start getting into the business
Speaker 2: of reviewing is this an international emergency at all? And
Speaker 2: then this is what the corporal then went a head
Speaker 2: and said, is this responsive what the government's doing responsive
Speaker 2: to the international emergency? I think that's really an area
Speaker 2: where courts have very little competence. And this was a
Speaker 2: good example. The Court said below that we don't see
Speaker 2: how putting trade sanctions in Mexico and Canada have anything
Speaker 2: to do with the flow fentanyl into the United States.
Speaker 2: So how does the court know that The reason that
Speaker 2: the administration might have done that, for example, is to say, well,
Speaker 2: we're putting that sanction on Mexico because if they start
Speaker 2: to suffer a lot of economic losses from terrorists, then
Speaker 2: the government in Mexico will start to take the steps
Speaker 2: that we want them to take to reduce ventanyl and
Speaker 2: that seems perfectly logical to me. It may not be
Speaker 2: high probability. That's up to you know, the President and
Speaker 2: the Secretary Stay and the just Department, the DEA. They're
Speaker 2: the ones who have the real information about how fentyel's
Speaker 2: getting into the country, and they're the ones who really
Speaker 2: have to make the hard decisions about how to try
Speaker 2: to stop it from getting into the country. I don't
Speaker 2: see how a judge can just sit back in Washington
Speaker 2: and just say I don't think it's going to work.
Speaker 2: You know, the court doesn't have the kind of experience
Speaker 2: or information regarding our national security to make those kinds
Speaker 2: of decisions. But that's what I think is worrisome. I
Speaker 2: think that for the Supreme Court or if they are
Speaker 2: going to let trial courts make decisions about is this
Speaker 2: really an emergency? And then the next step would then
Speaker 2: an WLB is what the court, I'm sorry, is what
Speaker 2: the administration proposing in response effective? That's that's that's something
Speaker 2: no court has ever done, actually is to been has
Speaker 2: been to hold on whether a certain measure by the
Speaker 2: government is really effective or not for our national security.
Speaker 1: So this is my final question. My So many commentators
Speaker 1: have said that no court will rule that the fenttional
Speaker 1: trafficking isn't is not an emergency. Do you agree with that?
Speaker 1: And if so, is there any other way the Supreme Court,
Speaker 1: if it follows precedent, can find venttional trafficking terrorists on lawful.
Speaker 2: So I think that that that the chance of survival
Speaker 2: of the President's tariffs are much higher for the ones
Speaker 2: that were you know, they're separate, right, the ones that
Speaker 2: are that were in ounced on China and Mexico and
Speaker 2: Canada are separate from the other terrorifts what I call
Speaker 2: it the court calls these worldwide tariffs, for example. So
Speaker 2: I think that is much more in line those targeted
Speaker 2: terrorists are much more in line with how AIPA might
Speaker 2: buso saying the rise of fentanyl which is coming through
Speaker 2: and the present saying is coming through the borders of
Speaker 2: Canada and Mexico and it's produced by China. And because
Speaker 2: of that, I'm going to impose these terroriffs in order
Speaker 2: to get those down, you know, those ventanyl trafficking down.
Speaker 2: That's actually I think much more likely to survive than
Speaker 2: every country in the world's going to pay ten percent terrorists.
Speaker 1: Right, that makes sense, Professor you. I could keep you
Speaker 1: here for hours asking questions, but I know you have
Speaker 1: other things to do. Thank you so much for joining
Speaker 1: me today. Well, we'll be keeping a lookout for more
Speaker 1: articles you publish on the topic. Thanks you so much
Speaker 1: again
Speaker 2: To