WEBVTT - Thats So Project Raven

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<v Speaker 1>Get in touch with technology with tech Stuff from how

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<v Speaker 1>stuff works dot com. Hey there, and welcome to tech Stuff.

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<v Speaker 1>I'm your host, Johnathan Strickland. I'm an executive producer here

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<v Speaker 1>at how Stuff Works, and I heart radio and I

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<v Speaker 1>love all things tech and today. As often is the

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<v Speaker 1>case with tech Stuff, even though I say I love

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<v Speaker 1>all things tech at the beginning of the show, it

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<v Speaker 1>begins with a caveat because I don't love everything. In

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<v Speaker 1>this particular story, it's a really shocking one. On January nineteen,

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<v Speaker 1>Reuter's published a long piece about a secret spy project

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<v Speaker 1>out of the United Arab Emirates. The project is called

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<v Speaker 1>Project Raven and how the agency that was overseeing Project

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<v Speaker 1>Raven had hired away hackers and cybersecurity experts, a lot

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<v Speaker 1>of them from America, including American citizens who had previously

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<v Speaker 1>worked for the United States National Security Agency or n

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<v Speaker 1>s A, which is a pretty big deal. So what

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<v Speaker 1>exactly is going on here? Well, in this episode, I'm

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<v Speaker 1>going to talk about the n s A and what

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<v Speaker 1>it does first before I get into Project Craven. And

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<v Speaker 1>I'm doing that for two real important reasons. One is

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<v Speaker 1>that Project Raven employed lots of former n s A

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<v Speaker 1>employees or contractors, and Project Craven appears to use many

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<v Speaker 1>of the same techniques that have been developed and relied

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<v Speaker 1>upon over at the n s A for many years.

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<v Speaker 1>Another is that while much of Project Raven is still

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<v Speaker 1>a mystery, we haven't seen all of the documents that

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<v Speaker 1>Reuters has referred to. That Reuters came in possession too

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<v Speaker 1>of some of these documents rather, but we haven't. I

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<v Speaker 1>haven't seen them all. But I figure that by understanding

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<v Speaker 1>what the n s A is and what it does,

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<v Speaker 1>we can extrapolate quite a bit to understand what Project

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<v Speaker 1>Raven is all about. So we're gonna start with talking

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<v Speaker 1>about the n s A and what they do, and

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<v Speaker 1>then switch over to Project Raven in more detail. So

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<v Speaker 1>the n s A formally became an agency back in

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<v Speaker 1>nineteen fifty two, but the motivation for creating the n

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<v Speaker 1>s A dates further back. In fact, it dates back

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<v Speaker 1>to the First World War. A guy named Herbert Osborne Yardley,

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<v Speaker 1>who was a telegraph operator, served as a cryptographer with

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<v Speaker 1>American forces in France during World War One. This was

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<v Speaker 1>not unusual. A lot of telegraph operators worked in various

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<v Speaker 1>theaters of war, either as communications officers or cryptographers, and

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<v Speaker 1>he recognized that the United States really needed to step

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<v Speaker 1>up its game because he was handling communications from top

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<v Speaker 1>brass and he found that the American Command was using

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<v Speaker 1>codes that were outdated and or easy to break. He

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<v Speaker 1>even broke a few of them on his own. So

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<v Speaker 1>he advocated for a much wronger approach to cryptography, and

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<v Speaker 1>he would eventually become the lead of the so called

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<v Speaker 1>Cipher Bureau, sometimes also known as the Black Chamber. Pretty

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<v Speaker 1>ominous sounding name right there. This office would intercept messages

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<v Speaker 1>from around the world and attempt to decode them to

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<v Speaker 1>figure out what the heck is really going on out there.

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<v Speaker 1>And this practice was not universally accepted in government circles,

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<v Speaker 1>and the un S Secretary of State Henry L. Stimpson,

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<v Speaker 1>who served under President Herbert Hoover, famously pulled funding for

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<v Speaker 1>the office in nineteen nine. He found the very concept

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<v Speaker 1>of reading messages intended for other people to be abhorrent,

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<v Speaker 1>or at least that's what he said. He essentially made

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<v Speaker 1>a comment along the lines of a gentleman does not

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<v Speaker 1>read another gentleman's letters, so you wouldn't intercept someone's mail

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<v Speaker 1>and read what that was written. To them and then

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<v Speaker 1>pass it back along. That would be illegal, and he says, well,

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<v Speaker 1>the same thing should be true between nations. Now, there's

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<v Speaker 1>definitely a healthy debate that we could have about whether

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<v Speaker 1>or not the methods used by the Black Chamber were

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<v Speaker 1>justifiable or ethical. According to the Saturday Evening Post, this agency,

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<v Speaker 1>the Black Chamber was known for making deals with telegraph

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<v Speaker 1>companies to get access to communications across those companies infrastructures.

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<v Speaker 1>So it would be a lot like the news that

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<v Speaker 1>broke in when Edwards Snowden revealed that the n s

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<v Speaker 1>A had agreements or had essentially strong armed major internet

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<v Speaker 1>companies in order to get access to electronic communication companies

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<v Speaker 1>like Google, Facebook, Yahoo, and Microsoft, among others. Now, we're

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<v Speaker 1>going to get back to that, but anyway, my point

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<v Speaker 1>is something's never changed, right. This was originally back in

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<v Speaker 1>uh the nineteen twenties with telegraph companies, and then you

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<v Speaker 1>fast forward to the twenty tens and you find out

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<v Speaker 1>the same things going on, but now with internet companies.

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<v Speaker 1>You also realized that Yardley's response to the office getting

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<v Speaker 1>shut down was to write a tell all book about

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<v Speaker 1>the Black Chamber. It essentially said, well, if you're gonna

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<v Speaker 1>if you're going to close out the Cipher Bureau, then

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<v Speaker 1>I'm going to write a book about all the stuff

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<v Speaker 1>we did. And he effectively spilled the secret beans to

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<v Speaker 1>the world, much like Edward Snowden did in although to

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<v Speaker 1>be fair, uh, Yardley was doing it kind of out

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<v Speaker 1>of spite, whereas Snowden apparently was doing it because he

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<v Speaker 1>had strong feelings that the um the practices of the

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<v Speaker 1>n s A were We're against freedom, really against a

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<v Speaker 1>certainly against an expectation of privacy. So history really does

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<v Speaker 1>repeat itself in some ways. Well. While the Black Chamber

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<v Speaker 1>was in the process of getting shut down, in nine,

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<v Speaker 1>the United States Army opened up its own intelligence gathering

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<v Speaker 1>office called the Signal Intelligence Service or s i S.

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<v Speaker 1>The s I S took possession of the files that

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<v Speaker 1>Yardley's office had generated during its operations, so they got

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<v Speaker 1>hold of the Cipher Bureau files. This new office became

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<v Speaker 1>the core of the n s A when President Truman

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<v Speaker 1>formally created the agency in nineteen fifty two. According to

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<v Speaker 1>the n s a's own website, the purpose of the

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<v Speaker 1>agency is to end i quote, save lives, defend vital networks,

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<v Speaker 1>advanced US goals, and alliances and protect privacy rights. That

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<v Speaker 1>last one is kind of interesting to me. The n

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<v Speaker 1>s A is part of the Department of Defense, so

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<v Speaker 1>it is no longer a branch of the army or

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<v Speaker 1>any specific branch of the military. It's part of the

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<v Speaker 1>Department of Defense overall. It's meant to gather intelligence, both

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<v Speaker 1>foreign and domestic, largely through signal processing or intercepting electronic

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<v Speaker 1>means and radio means of communication. But you might wonder

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<v Speaker 1>what the heck is the difference between the n s

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<v Speaker 1>A and the other intelligence agencies, because we talk a

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<v Speaker 1>lot about different intelligence agencies and it's pretty easy to

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<v Speaker 1>get them all confused. So you've got the c i

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<v Speaker 1>A or the Central Intelligence Agency. That agency focuses on

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<v Speaker 1>foreign intelligence, and it's mostly concerned with the kind of

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<v Speaker 1>spy stuff we associate with the movies, though in reality

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<v Speaker 1>it's rarely anywhere near as glamorous or as easy to follow.

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<v Speaker 1>Things get a lot more messy and a lot less

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<v Speaker 1>um flashy in real life. But this is the agency

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<v Speaker 1>that oversees covert ops and counterintelligence efforts in other countries

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<v Speaker 1>and passes information along to the executive branch of the government.

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<v Speaker 1>For those of you not in the United States, the

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<v Speaker 1>executive branch would include the president and the presidential staff.

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<v Speaker 1>The FBI, or the Federal Bureau of Investigations, fills a

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<v Speaker 1>similar role, but for domestic concerns, so stuff that happens

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<v Speaker 1>inside the United States and usually involving US citizens. It's

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<v Speaker 1>also the lead law enforcement agency and focuses a lot

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<v Speaker 1>on counter terrorism and just investigations in general. So this

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<v Speaker 1>is the agency that was famously profiled in the X Files,

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<v Speaker 1>although obviously that was a real work of fiction anyway,

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<v Speaker 1>the n s A is mostly concerned with making and

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<v Speaker 1>breaking codes, so it focuses on ways to communicate secretly,

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<v Speaker 1>and they do this in order to keep us interest

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<v Speaker 1>safe and also how to break all the other codes

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<v Speaker 1>that are out there so that we know what the

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<v Speaker 1>heck is going on. And they do this both for

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<v Speaker 1>foreign communications and domestic communications, which leads critics to point

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<v Speaker 1>at the n s A and say they're spying on you,

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<v Speaker 1>and the n s A might say, sure, we have

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<v Speaker 1>all your data, but we don't look at it unless

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<v Speaker 1>you have given us a reason to look at it.

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<v Speaker 1>Fun times. We'll touch on that a little more a

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<v Speaker 1>bit later. There's also one other agency, in the intelligence community.

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<v Speaker 1>I feel that I should mention which is the Defense

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<v Speaker 1>Intelligence Agency or d i A. You don't tend to

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<v Speaker 1>hear about this a lot in the United States, especially

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<v Speaker 1>if you're just you know, a citizen, a civilian. This

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<v Speaker 1>is part of the Department of Defense, just like the

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<v Speaker 1>n s A is, and this agency focuses specifically on

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<v Speaker 1>military intelligence and combat support. So, uh, that's why you

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<v Speaker 1>don't tend to hear it in your day to day

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<v Speaker 1>life as a civilian. It's really a military application. Until recently,

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<v Speaker 1>the general public in the United States had not heard

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<v Speaker 1>a whole lot about the n s A, with a

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<v Speaker 1>couple of famous exceptions, and this was something the agency

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<v Speaker 1>itself took advantage of. The CIA and FBI are far

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<v Speaker 1>more prominent in the American psyche, there typically romanticized in

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<v Speaker 1>popular culture as the stuff of spies and crime investigations. Now,

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<v Speaker 1>when the n s A was first formed in the

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<v Speaker 1>nineteen fifties, it was effectively a secret organization that was

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<v Speaker 1>not publicly disclosed. In fact, there was a little bit

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<v Speaker 1>of a joke that n s A stood for no

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<v Speaker 1>such agency. However, the nature of communications and the widespread

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<v Speaker 1>use of cipher in cryptography, and the growing ranks of

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<v Speaker 1>an SSAY employees meant that by the late nineteen sixties,

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<v Speaker 1>it was pretty much impossible to maintain that the n

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<v Speaker 1>s A was non existent or even trying to keep

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<v Speaker 1>it a shadow organization. It became clear at that point

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<v Speaker 1>that there was such an agency, although a lot of

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<v Speaker 1>people still didn't really understand what it was doing, so

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<v Speaker 1>the n s A activities weren't widely communicated or understood

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<v Speaker 1>among the general public. There were a few spikes and awareness,

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<v Speaker 1>as I alluded to earlier in the mid nineteen seventies,

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<v Speaker 1>in the aftermath of the Watergate scandal, there was a

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<v Speaker 1>major one. There was a Senate investigation that revealed that

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<v Speaker 1>the n s A had been intercepting telegrams leaving or

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<v Speaker 1>entering the United States, including correspondence between American citizens, and

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<v Speaker 1>it was a program called Project Shamrock. Another shocking revelation

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<v Speaker 1>was that the n s A had been monitoring communications

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<v Speaker 1>between civil rights leaders during the nineteen sixties, including Martin

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<v Speaker 1>Luther King Jr. And a couple of U. S senators

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<v Speaker 1>as well. There were records that the agency was also

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<v Speaker 1>keeping tabs on people who objected to the United States

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<v Speaker 1>being involved in the Vietnam War, and all of this

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<v Speaker 1>led to Congress establishing a new set of guidelines that

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<v Speaker 1>the n s A would have to follow, and it

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<v Speaker 1>was meant to restrict how and when they could collect information.

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<v Speaker 1>It was called the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act or FISA

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<v Speaker 1>f i s A. To get permission to spy on

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<v Speaker 1>American citizens, the n s A would first have to

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<v Speaker 1>get permission from a special court established just for that purpose.

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<v Speaker 1>It was called a surveillance court or an intelligence court.

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<v Speaker 1>This wasn't quite the same thing as securing a warrant

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<v Speaker 1>through a normal court, but it was a check on

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<v Speaker 1>the NSA's power. They couldn't just wantonly start listening in

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<v Speaker 1>on people and and have it be legal. So things

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<v Speaker 1>pretty much went that way for the next couple of

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<v Speaker 1>decades until September eleven two one. That's when we had

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<v Speaker 1>the terrorist attacks here in the United States that were

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<v Speaker 1>so devastating, and in the wake of that, the President

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<v Speaker 1>of the United States at that time, George W. Bush,

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<v Speaker 1>expanded the n s a s powers and authorized the

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<v Speaker 1>agency to monitor communications, including phone calls and emails, of

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<v Speaker 1>American citizens without having to secure a warrant. From this

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<v Speaker 1>surveillance court first, the idea being that this would speed

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<v Speaker 1>things up and potentially prevent further catastrophe. But the flip

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<v Speaker 1>side of that was there was no oversight. There there

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<v Speaker 1>were no checks on this power. The New York Times

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<v Speaker 1>broke a story about this warrantless wire tapping program in

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<v Speaker 1>two thousand five, and then a couple of years later,

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<v Speaker 1>under tremendous political pressure, President Bush ended the practice. But

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<v Speaker 1>then we get to when a former contractor with the

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<v Speaker 1>n essay someone who had worked with the c i

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<v Speaker 1>A before that, a guy named Edward Snowden, dumped an

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<v Speaker 1>enormous amount of information on the world, revealing that the

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<v Speaker 1>n s A had been gathering data about telephone calls

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<v Speaker 1>and Internet communication between millions of Americans in widespread operations.

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<v Speaker 1>The n s A attempted to mitigate the impact of

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<v Speaker 1>this revelation, uh in part by saying that while it

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<v Speaker 1>was in fact gathering all this information, no one was,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, actually looking at the information unless they needed to,

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<v Speaker 1>in which case they totally said they were securing permission

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<v Speaker 1>first from a top secret court that couldn't publish its decisions.

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<v Speaker 1>This might sound like a get off of jail free

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<v Speaker 1>card to you, and a lot of people criticized this approach,

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<v Speaker 1>the idea that the n s A could go to

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<v Speaker 1>a secret court and get approval without having to reveal

0:13:43.320 --> 0:13:46.880
<v Speaker 1>any of this to anybody, and then do a search

0:13:46.920 --> 0:13:50.319
<v Speaker 1>on all this data that likely would include stuff about

0:13:50.360 --> 0:13:53.079
<v Speaker 1>you in it, and anything they turned up they could

0:13:53.120 --> 0:13:56.640
<v Speaker 1>potentially focus on and and use in some way further

0:13:56.720 --> 0:13:59.760
<v Speaker 1>down the road. That was pretty disturbing. So they were

0:14:00.080 --> 0:14:02.920
<v Speaker 1>think the information like crazy, but they said, we aren't

0:14:03.120 --> 0:14:07.440
<v Speaker 1>going to search it or look for anything specific unless

0:14:07.480 --> 0:14:12.200
<v Speaker 1>we already have approval. This still was not really comforting

0:14:12.200 --> 0:14:15.160
<v Speaker 1>to a lot of people. It wasn't something that many

0:14:15.200 --> 0:14:18.480
<v Speaker 1>people found justifiable. There were a lot of complaints and

0:14:18.480 --> 0:14:24.120
<v Speaker 1>criticisms um and it also it involved an increase in

0:14:24.160 --> 0:14:28.960
<v Speaker 1>resentment toward companies like Google, Facebook, Microsoft, companies that were

0:14:29.520 --> 0:14:33.440
<v Speaker 1>at least in appearance, cooperating with the n s A. However,

0:14:33.480 --> 0:14:35.920
<v Speaker 1>I covered a lot of this back in when the

0:14:35.920 --> 0:14:39.000
<v Speaker 1>news first broke, So rather than go over all that again,

0:14:39.000 --> 0:14:42.200
<v Speaker 1>we'll just move on. And this was the super fast

0:14:42.320 --> 0:14:46.120
<v Speaker 1>overview of n s A. Obviously, there's tons of stuff

0:14:46.120 --> 0:14:47.720
<v Speaker 1>we could talk about. You could do a full mini

0:14:47.800 --> 0:14:50.160
<v Speaker 1>series about the n s a no problem. And if

0:14:50.200 --> 0:14:51.800
<v Speaker 1>I were to do that, I would have to bring

0:14:51.840 --> 0:14:55.280
<v Speaker 1>Ben Bolan on because if you want to talk about

0:14:55.320 --> 0:14:57.720
<v Speaker 1>people who know stuff that they don't want anyone else

0:14:57.760 --> 0:14:59.920
<v Speaker 1>to know, they know, he's the guy to go to.

0:15:01.120 --> 0:15:03.440
<v Speaker 1>Right now, let's take a quick break and when we

0:15:03.480 --> 0:15:07.080
<v Speaker 1>come back, we'll cover the story that inspired this particular episode.

0:15:07.320 --> 0:15:18.480
<v Speaker 1>But first a word from our sponsor. On January nineteen,

0:15:19.120 --> 0:15:21.760
<v Speaker 1>as I said earlier, Reuters published a special report. The

0:15:21.800 --> 0:15:25.160
<v Speaker 1>title of that special report is Inside the U a

0:15:25.320 --> 0:15:29.480
<v Speaker 1>e S Secret hacking team of US mercenaries. It is

0:15:29.600 --> 0:15:33.680
<v Speaker 1>an amazing read. I highly recommend you seek it out. Now.

0:15:33.720 --> 0:15:36.680
<v Speaker 1>I'm going to cover the basics of that piece in

0:15:36.720 --> 0:15:41.000
<v Speaker 1>this episode, but I wanted to give special mention to

0:15:41.200 --> 0:15:45.880
<v Speaker 1>journalists Christopher Byng and Joel Schekman who wrote the piece.

0:15:46.520 --> 0:15:51.160
<v Speaker 1>Most of the article focuses on Lori Stroud, who is

0:15:51.200 --> 0:15:55.320
<v Speaker 1>an x n s A employee through who later on

0:15:55.440 --> 0:15:57.520
<v Speaker 1>worked with the n s A through a security contractor

0:15:57.560 --> 0:16:00.640
<v Speaker 1>as well, who then landed a position with a United

0:16:00.680 --> 0:16:04.760
<v Speaker 1>Arab Emirates top secret program Project Raven. Stroud has the

0:16:04.760 --> 0:16:08.120
<v Speaker 1>distinction of being involved in that massively publicized n s

0:16:08.200 --> 0:16:12.440
<v Speaker 1>A league from as well so Nut's backtrack a bit.

0:16:12.680 --> 0:16:15.840
<v Speaker 1>Stroud started as a direct employee of the n s

0:16:15.880 --> 0:16:19.520
<v Speaker 1>A back in two thousand three. Then in two thousand

0:16:19.680 --> 0:16:23.040
<v Speaker 1>nine she officially left as being an n s A

0:16:23.160 --> 0:16:25.720
<v Speaker 1>employee and came back to work for the n s

0:16:25.800 --> 0:16:29.040
<v Speaker 1>A as a contractor of a part of a team

0:16:29.040 --> 0:16:33.200
<v Speaker 1>of cybersecurity and intrusion experts or you could call them

0:16:33.240 --> 0:16:36.240
<v Speaker 1>hackers if you like, who worked as a consultant to

0:16:36.400 --> 0:16:38.920
<v Speaker 1>the n s A. H The consulting company she was

0:16:38.960 --> 0:16:42.320
<v Speaker 1>working with was called Booze. Alan Hamilton's still is called Booze.

0:16:42.320 --> 0:16:45.920
<v Speaker 1>Allen Hamilton's still exists. So she was still working for

0:16:45.960 --> 0:16:48.040
<v Speaker 1>the n s A, but as a contractor rather than

0:16:48.080 --> 0:16:50.640
<v Speaker 1>as a full time employee. She could actually make a

0:16:50.680 --> 0:16:53.840
<v Speaker 1>lot more money doing essentially the same work as she

0:16:53.920 --> 0:16:57.200
<v Speaker 1>had been doing before. And it was Stroud who actually

0:16:57.240 --> 0:17:01.280
<v Speaker 1>recommended that Edwards Snowden be brought on her team at

0:17:01.320 --> 0:17:04.239
<v Speaker 1>the n s A. And I've already explained how that

0:17:04.280 --> 0:17:10.240
<v Speaker 1>turned out anyway, after Snowden shocked the world by leaking

0:17:10.240 --> 0:17:12.239
<v Speaker 1>all the information on what the n s A had

0:17:12.240 --> 0:17:16.400
<v Speaker 1>been up to and then fled the United States, understandably,

0:17:16.440 --> 0:17:20.400
<v Speaker 1>Stroud's team from Booze Allen Hamilton's was pretty much persona

0:17:20.480 --> 0:17:24.399
<v Speaker 1>non grata at the n s A. No one was

0:17:24.560 --> 0:17:27.439
<v Speaker 1>really keen to work with them. They they ended up

0:17:27.560 --> 0:17:30.719
<v Speaker 1>bearing a lot of the responsibility because they had recommended

0:17:30.800 --> 0:17:34.200
<v Speaker 1>Snowdon to be put on the n s A team

0:17:34.200 --> 0:17:37.040
<v Speaker 1>in the first place, So that doesn't reflect well when

0:17:37.080 --> 0:17:41.080
<v Speaker 1>your recommendation turns around and purposefully dumps a ton of

0:17:41.080 --> 0:17:45.639
<v Speaker 1>top secret information. Stroud received an offer from another former

0:17:45.760 --> 0:17:49.919
<v Speaker 1>NSA agent named Mark Buyer to work through a different

0:17:50.080 --> 0:17:54.120
<v Speaker 1>security consulting firm, this one called cyber Point, and Stroud

0:17:54.320 --> 0:17:58.080
<v Speaker 1>would be able to work on a prestigious cyber security

0:17:58.119 --> 0:18:01.760
<v Speaker 1>project overseas in Abu Dhabi, and she took the offer.

0:18:02.600 --> 0:18:05.560
<v Speaker 1>He said it was very attractive, so she leaves Booze

0:18:05.560 --> 0:18:11.200
<v Speaker 1>Allen and joins CyberPoint. Stroud is then sent to Abu Dhabi,

0:18:11.240 --> 0:18:14.760
<v Speaker 1>and upon arriving, she was initially told her job was

0:18:14.800 --> 0:18:18.200
<v Speaker 1>going to be in counter terrorism, so essentially she would

0:18:18.240 --> 0:18:22.760
<v Speaker 1>work with other experts to detect intrusion attempts on the

0:18:22.880 --> 0:18:26.480
<v Speaker 1>ua ES government servers, so if anyone was trying to

0:18:26.520 --> 0:18:28.919
<v Speaker 1>hack in, she was supposed to be part of the

0:18:28.960 --> 0:18:31.360
<v Speaker 1>team detecting that sort of stuff. Determining who was doing

0:18:31.400 --> 0:18:34.399
<v Speaker 1>it and blocking them. She would also be in charge

0:18:34.400 --> 0:18:37.879
<v Speaker 1>of patching vulnerabilities. This was just meant to be a

0:18:37.960 --> 0:18:41.359
<v Speaker 1>defensive project. And she also found out her office was

0:18:41.400 --> 0:18:44.600
<v Speaker 1>going to be in a converted mansion in Abu Dhabi.

0:18:44.720 --> 0:18:47.919
<v Speaker 1>The facility is called the Villa, and it all seemed

0:18:48.000 --> 0:18:50.879
<v Speaker 1>too good to be true, and upon arrival she was

0:18:50.960 --> 0:18:56.160
<v Speaker 1>brought into two different briefings back to back. The first briefing,

0:18:56.600 --> 0:18:59.560
<v Speaker 1>which according to Reuters, has been referred to as the

0:18:59.600 --> 0:19:03.280
<v Speaker 1>Purple briefing, was pretty much the story I just told

0:19:03.280 --> 0:19:06.000
<v Speaker 1>you that Stroud was told before she came on board

0:19:06.320 --> 0:19:08.560
<v Speaker 1>that she would be working to protect the ua ES

0:19:08.680 --> 0:19:13.520
<v Speaker 1>computer and communications infrastructure. Upon the conclusion of that briefing, however,

0:19:13.920 --> 0:19:16.879
<v Speaker 1>she was told that whole story was just a cover story,

0:19:17.119 --> 0:19:19.760
<v Speaker 1>that that wasn't really what she would be doing. And

0:19:19.800 --> 0:19:23.000
<v Speaker 1>then she was told what her real purpose was and

0:19:23.160 --> 0:19:26.040
<v Speaker 1>she was received the second briefing, which was dubbed the

0:19:26.160 --> 0:19:29.639
<v Speaker 1>Black briefing. Now, this is a top secret project that

0:19:29.760 --> 0:19:33.560
<v Speaker 1>was meant to be denied by anyone working in the

0:19:33.680 --> 0:19:37.199
<v Speaker 1>u A government as even existing. The team at Reuters, however,

0:19:37.520 --> 0:19:40.320
<v Speaker 1>actually got hold of a copy of the materials used

0:19:40.320 --> 0:19:44.080
<v Speaker 1>in the black briefing. Those materials concerned the U a

0:19:44.240 --> 0:19:48.479
<v Speaker 1>e S National Electronic Security Authority, or in e s

0:19:48.520 --> 0:19:53.000
<v Speaker 1>A NISSA. It's essentially the U a e S version

0:19:53.440 --> 0:19:55.679
<v Speaker 1>of the n s A here in the United States.

0:19:56.200 --> 0:20:00.359
<v Speaker 1>So according to Reuters, the information in this briefing outline

0:20:00.440 --> 0:20:03.359
<v Speaker 1>the true purpose of Project Raven and that it was

0:20:03.400 --> 0:20:09.000
<v Speaker 1>meant to be quote offensive operational division of NISSA end quote.

0:20:09.320 --> 0:20:12.240
<v Speaker 1>So that means instead of trying to detect intrusions and

0:20:12.240 --> 0:20:15.600
<v Speaker 1>plug security vulnerabilities, Strold would actually be working with a

0:20:15.640 --> 0:20:19.840
<v Speaker 1>team dedicated to spying on other people too, gathering data

0:20:19.920 --> 0:20:24.280
<v Speaker 1>on them, to intercepting communications and deciphering those communications. But

0:20:24.359 --> 0:20:26.080
<v Speaker 1>that's pretty much what she was doing at the n

0:20:26.160 --> 0:20:28.639
<v Speaker 1>s A, so it wasn't like this was a huge

0:20:28.720 --> 0:20:31.199
<v Speaker 1>change in what she had been doing leading up to

0:20:31.240 --> 0:20:32.920
<v Speaker 1>this point. In fact, that was the whole reason why

0:20:32.960 --> 0:20:36.760
<v Speaker 1>she was hired. NISSA would supply the team of Project

0:20:36.880 --> 0:20:40.400
<v Speaker 1>Raven with a list of people that it said were

0:20:40.560 --> 0:20:44.760
<v Speaker 1>enemies of the UAE government. Then the Project Raven team

0:20:45.200 --> 0:20:48.359
<v Speaker 1>was tasked to gather as much information on those people

0:20:48.480 --> 0:20:52.000
<v Speaker 1>as they possibly could. They would track their movements using

0:20:52.040 --> 0:20:55.080
<v Speaker 1>location data. They would build out what amounted to be

0:20:55.200 --> 0:20:59.600
<v Speaker 1>dossiers on each of those people, electronic dossiers and just

0:21:00.119 --> 0:21:03.080
<v Speaker 1>amount huge amounts of information that could potentially be used

0:21:03.320 --> 0:21:07.640
<v Speaker 1>by other parts of the UAE government. And let's talk

0:21:07.680 --> 0:21:10.320
<v Speaker 1>about that for a second. The government of the United

0:21:10.359 --> 0:21:14.239
<v Speaker 1>Arab Emirates is a little complicated if you're looking at

0:21:14.240 --> 0:21:17.600
<v Speaker 1>it from the perspective of an American like me, you know,

0:21:17.640 --> 0:21:22.000
<v Speaker 1>compared to the American system of government. Now, for those

0:21:22.000 --> 0:21:25.000
<v Speaker 1>who aren't that familiar, the name of the nation implies this.

0:21:25.160 --> 0:21:28.440
<v Speaker 1>The UAE is not just a single unified people. It's

0:21:28.480 --> 0:21:34.120
<v Speaker 1>actually a collection of seven monarchies or emirates kingdoms. Two

0:21:34.119 --> 0:21:37.200
<v Speaker 1>of those are ruled by the same royal family and

0:21:37.320 --> 0:21:39.560
<v Speaker 1>the others are ruled by different families. So you end

0:21:39.680 --> 0:21:42.800
<v Speaker 1>up even though you have seven emirates, you have six

0:21:43.000 --> 0:21:47.439
<v Speaker 1>ruling families. So the six rulers, the six heads of

0:21:47.440 --> 0:21:52.800
<v Speaker 1>those ruling families are collectively the Federal Supreme Council of

0:21:52.840 --> 0:21:56.160
<v Speaker 1>the u a E. In addition to that Council, there

0:21:56.240 --> 0:21:59.399
<v Speaker 1>is a Council of Ministers that's led by the Prime Minister.

0:21:59.520 --> 0:22:01.639
<v Speaker 1>More on that in a second. And there's also a

0:22:01.680 --> 0:22:05.480
<v Speaker 1>group of leaders called the Federal National Council. Uh. Some

0:22:05.760 --> 0:22:08.960
<v Speaker 1>of the members of this council, they're about forty people

0:22:09.040 --> 0:22:12.560
<v Speaker 1>in it total. Some of them are appointed and some

0:22:12.680 --> 0:22:15.880
<v Speaker 1>of them are elected. Uh. And then there's the Federal

0:22:15.920 --> 0:22:19.400
<v Speaker 1>Supreme Court, which is very similar to the Supreme Court

0:22:19.400 --> 0:22:22.119
<v Speaker 1>in the United States, at least in theory. The Federal

0:22:22.200 --> 0:22:27.960
<v Speaker 1>Supreme Council, that group of leaders technically elects a president

0:22:28.040 --> 0:22:31.880
<v Speaker 1>and a vice president to oversee the entire United Arab Emirates.

0:22:32.440 --> 0:22:35.919
<v Speaker 1>Practically speaking, however, the president is the head of the

0:22:36.000 --> 0:22:40.400
<v Speaker 1>ruling family of Abu Dhabi called Al nah Jan. The

0:22:40.520 --> 0:22:43.879
<v Speaker 1>vice president and the prime minister. The same person is

0:22:43.920 --> 0:22:47.679
<v Speaker 1>the head of the ruling family of Al Maktoum, that

0:22:48.119 --> 0:22:52.600
<v Speaker 1>as the royal family that oversees Dubai. Now, there are

0:22:52.640 --> 0:22:55.440
<v Speaker 1>no political parties in the u A. In fact, they're

0:22:55.600 --> 0:22:58.639
<v Speaker 1>illegal in the u A, and ultimately everyone in the

0:22:58.640 --> 0:23:01.760
<v Speaker 1>government is there on the pledge sure of the ruling families.

0:23:01.800 --> 0:23:06.400
<v Speaker 1>There's not really a democratic process here. The elected members,

0:23:06.440 --> 0:23:09.719
<v Speaker 1>you know, I mentioned that though, that that forty member

0:23:10.000 --> 0:23:13.639
<v Speaker 1>Federal National Council, some of them are elected. Those elected

0:23:14.000 --> 0:23:18.440
<v Speaker 1>members are only advisors. The only people who have any

0:23:18.560 --> 0:23:25.000
<v Speaker 1>legislative authority are appointed. So again, all power ultimately comes

0:23:25.000 --> 0:23:28.240
<v Speaker 1>from these ruling families. The government of the u a

0:23:28.320 --> 0:23:32.320
<v Speaker 1>E has drawn criticism regarding how it operates, and the

0:23:32.400 --> 0:23:35.879
<v Speaker 1>UAE government is eager to get more information on those

0:23:35.960 --> 0:23:41.640
<v Speaker 1>who do criticize the government. They are not particularly well

0:23:41.720 --> 0:23:45.200
<v Speaker 1>looked upon by the u a E. Before a Project Raven,

0:23:45.600 --> 0:23:48.680
<v Speaker 1>the u a E largely relied on primitive means to

0:23:48.840 --> 0:23:54.480
<v Speaker 1>spy on these identified enemies to get electronic data on them.

0:23:54.520 --> 0:23:59.800
<v Speaker 1>So typically in the old days, NISSA that that a

0:24:00.000 --> 0:24:04.080
<v Speaker 1>agency would send an operative to get physical access to

0:24:04.119 --> 0:24:08.560
<v Speaker 1>a targets computer or mobile device and install monitoring software

0:24:08.560 --> 0:24:11.000
<v Speaker 1>on it. So you actually have to get to that

0:24:11.040 --> 0:24:15.040
<v Speaker 1>person's computer and then install some malware. That's actually a

0:24:15.080 --> 0:24:17.920
<v Speaker 1>pretty tricky challenge, even if the target happens to live

0:24:17.960 --> 0:24:21.320
<v Speaker 1>within the borders of your country. But some of u

0:24:21.440 --> 0:24:25.800
<v Speaker 1>a es identified enemies are foreigners who live abroad, so

0:24:25.840 --> 0:24:29.800
<v Speaker 1>getting physical access to their machines wasn't always practical or

0:24:29.840 --> 0:24:33.359
<v Speaker 1>in some cases wasn't even possible, and that's where we

0:24:33.440 --> 0:24:36.919
<v Speaker 1>get to Project Raven. The u a E wanted people

0:24:37.080 --> 0:24:42.000
<v Speaker 1>who had experience designing malware that could monitor communications and

0:24:42.040 --> 0:24:46.200
<v Speaker 1>then send reports back to h Q on an ongoing basis,

0:24:46.840 --> 0:24:51.760
<v Speaker 1>so the government formed Project Raven in two thousand nine. Initially,

0:24:52.000 --> 0:24:54.960
<v Speaker 1>the plan was just to hire on American experts to

0:24:55.160 --> 0:24:59.080
<v Speaker 1>design and lead the program for between five to ten years,

0:24:59.480 --> 0:25:02.000
<v Speaker 1>and the goal would be to pass on that that

0:25:02.320 --> 0:25:07.960
<v Speaker 1>knowledge and skill set to to mentor Imarati intelligence officers

0:25:08.160 --> 0:25:10.760
<v Speaker 1>so that they could then take over the program from

0:25:10.800 --> 0:25:14.000
<v Speaker 1>that point and run it themselves. So then they would

0:25:14.000 --> 0:25:17.880
<v Speaker 1>phase out the American operatives from Project Raven, and the

0:25:17.960 --> 0:25:20.720
<v Speaker 1>u a E. Wanted people who understood how to infiltrate

0:25:20.720 --> 0:25:24.960
<v Speaker 1>a machine remotely, which, as it turns out, often depends

0:25:25.040 --> 0:25:29.280
<v Speaker 1>largely upon social engineering. Now, I've talked about social engineering

0:25:29.320 --> 0:25:31.760
<v Speaker 1>several times on this show, but just to remind you

0:25:31.800 --> 0:25:34.159
<v Speaker 1>what it's all about. It's a term for a broad

0:25:34.359 --> 0:25:37.240
<v Speaker 1>range of strategies that are all meant to manipulate a

0:25:37.280 --> 0:25:41.200
<v Speaker 1>person using social interactions, rather than trying to brute force

0:25:41.359 --> 0:25:45.800
<v Speaker 1>your way into a computer system. It's much much easier

0:25:45.960 --> 0:25:50.199
<v Speaker 1>to trick someone into voluntarily sharing their login information with

0:25:50.280 --> 0:25:53.280
<v Speaker 1>you than it is to brute force your way into

0:25:53.359 --> 0:25:57.479
<v Speaker 1>the typically secure system. So, for example, you might pose

0:25:57.640 --> 0:26:00.159
<v Speaker 1>as an I T professional who has been higher on

0:26:00.240 --> 0:26:03.080
<v Speaker 1>to install updates to a computer and say, I need

0:26:03.160 --> 0:26:05.679
<v Speaker 1>to install this update, give me your log in so

0:26:05.760 --> 0:26:07.199
<v Speaker 1>I can put it on there and then I'll be

0:26:07.240 --> 0:26:09.680
<v Speaker 1>off your way. But in reality, what you're doing is

0:26:09.720 --> 0:26:13.080
<v Speaker 1>installing malware to spy on a person's every move. In

0:26:13.119 --> 0:26:16.359
<v Speaker 1>the case with Project Raven, one of the stories they

0:26:16.440 --> 0:26:21.080
<v Speaker 1>told was some operatives who posed as human rights activists

0:26:21.440 --> 0:26:25.360
<v Speaker 1>who were sympathetic to the missions of other activists target

0:26:25.480 --> 0:26:29.040
<v Speaker 1>activists people the u a A had identified as being

0:26:29.119 --> 0:26:31.560
<v Speaker 1>enemies of the state, and it was all in an

0:26:31.560 --> 0:26:34.240
<v Speaker 1>effort to win over their confidence and trick them into

0:26:34.240 --> 0:26:37.760
<v Speaker 1>installing malware, and it worked. We've seen this sort of

0:26:37.760 --> 0:26:40.560
<v Speaker 1>stuff work lots of times and lots of different applications.

0:26:41.440 --> 0:26:45.160
<v Speaker 1>Project Raven received directives to focus on people who were

0:26:45.200 --> 0:26:49.440
<v Speaker 1>known to speak out against the UAE government. Project Raven

0:26:49.440 --> 0:26:53.000
<v Speaker 1>would monitor social media and gather data about people who

0:26:53.080 --> 0:26:56.320
<v Speaker 1>had said critical things about the UAE and the monarchies.

0:26:56.960 --> 0:26:59.520
<v Speaker 1>Stroud relayed that it wasn't her team that ever made

0:26:59.560 --> 0:27:02.520
<v Speaker 1>a decision and to go after anyone or to take

0:27:02.640 --> 0:27:05.720
<v Speaker 1>action against someone. They were just there to dig up

0:27:05.800 --> 0:27:09.600
<v Speaker 1>dirt and occasionally trick people into installing malware. Now that

0:27:09.680 --> 0:27:12.879
<v Speaker 1>sounds a little bit like a justification to me something

0:27:13.119 --> 0:27:15.680
<v Speaker 1>that someone might cling to in order not to get

0:27:15.680 --> 0:27:18.359
<v Speaker 1>too wrapped up and how involved you are in the

0:27:18.440 --> 0:27:21.800
<v Speaker 1>overall big picture stuff. But it also was away for

0:27:21.920 --> 0:27:24.800
<v Speaker 1>the u a E to separate the operatives in Project

0:27:24.920 --> 0:27:28.840
<v Speaker 1>Raven from any actions so that the Raven activities wouldn't

0:27:28.880 --> 0:27:32.360
<v Speaker 1>stand out too much. There was a plausible deniability element there.

0:27:32.800 --> 0:27:35.120
<v Speaker 1>The u a E likely didn't want to draw any

0:27:35.160 --> 0:27:41.080
<v Speaker 1>attention to these operatives from especially not from the international community,

0:27:41.200 --> 0:27:43.840
<v Speaker 1>and probably not from the n s A in particular,

0:27:44.280 --> 0:27:48.040
<v Speaker 1>because anything that would target, say an American citizen, would

0:27:48.119 --> 0:27:51.720
<v Speaker 1>immediately jump up on the n s AS red flag

0:27:51.840 --> 0:27:55.520
<v Speaker 1>list of this is unacceptable. You can't use American operatives

0:27:55.560 --> 0:27:59.840
<v Speaker 1>to help spy on Americans. Defensive measures are one thing,

0:28:00.200 --> 0:28:05.240
<v Speaker 1>but actively spying on people as another. Another interesting point

0:28:05.280 --> 0:28:08.840
<v Speaker 1>in the report is how Stroud seemed able to deal

0:28:08.880 --> 0:28:11.000
<v Speaker 1>with the realities of her work as long as it

0:28:11.040 --> 0:28:15.480
<v Speaker 1>didn't involve targeting American citizens. Monitoring the activities of a

0:28:15.520 --> 0:28:18.760
<v Speaker 1>British journalist, for example, seemed like fair game, but when

0:28:18.840 --> 0:28:21.879
<v Speaker 1>it came to doing the same to American citizens, she

0:28:22.000 --> 0:28:25.320
<v Speaker 1>felt that was a betrayal. And I find this particularly

0:28:25.400 --> 0:28:29.520
<v Speaker 1>interesting that somehow a person's citizenship makes an action against

0:28:29.520 --> 0:28:33.760
<v Speaker 1>them either acceptable or not acceptable. That as long as

0:28:33.840 --> 0:28:36.240
<v Speaker 1>it's not against the people from my own country, this

0:28:36.359 --> 0:28:39.280
<v Speaker 1>is okay. But once it is people from my own country,

0:28:39.320 --> 0:28:43.120
<v Speaker 1>it's not okay. Never mind if the other countries are

0:28:43.200 --> 0:28:47.680
<v Speaker 1>allied with the home country or not. In two thousand fifteen,

0:28:48.040 --> 0:28:51.360
<v Speaker 1>the UAE told Project Raven employees that if they wanted

0:28:51.400 --> 0:28:54.160
<v Speaker 1>to continue on with the program, they would need to

0:28:54.240 --> 0:28:59.080
<v Speaker 1>join a UAE cyber defense company called Dark Matter. So

0:28:59.120 --> 0:29:02.360
<v Speaker 1>this was the u A saying we're handing over control

0:29:02.400 --> 0:29:05.760
<v Speaker 1>of Project Raven to a different consulting firm. This consulting

0:29:05.800 --> 0:29:08.160
<v Speaker 1>firm is Dark Matter, and if you want to stay on,

0:29:08.400 --> 0:29:10.640
<v Speaker 1>you need to sign on with them. Over the next

0:29:10.640 --> 0:29:13.960
<v Speaker 1>couple of years, the American team members were digitally sequestered

0:29:14.360 --> 0:29:17.160
<v Speaker 1>from some of the Project Raven operations, and by that

0:29:17.240 --> 0:29:20.840
<v Speaker 1>what I mean is they were not given full access

0:29:20.920 --> 0:29:24.600
<v Speaker 1>to all of the information that Project Raven was gathering.

0:29:24.880 --> 0:29:28.720
<v Speaker 1>The Americans made up a good percentage of the operatives

0:29:29.080 --> 0:29:33.040
<v Speaker 1>in Project Raven who were intercepting communications and gathering data,

0:29:33.120 --> 0:29:34.960
<v Speaker 1>but they weren't the only ones. There were a lot

0:29:34.960 --> 0:29:38.440
<v Speaker 1>of citizens of the Emirates who were there too. Who

0:29:38.440 --> 0:29:42.200
<v Speaker 1>were also working on this, and there were some information,

0:29:42.280 --> 0:29:47.080
<v Speaker 1>some files that the American team was specifically told don't

0:29:47.160 --> 0:29:50.760
<v Speaker 1>look at this stuff, this isn't for you. There were

0:29:50.800 --> 0:29:54.680
<v Speaker 1>these Immaradi only collections of data, which led to concern

0:29:54.720 --> 0:29:58.200
<v Speaker 1>among the American team that maybe some of the targets

0:29:58.200 --> 0:30:02.360
<v Speaker 1>of Project Raven could be the Americans, which would put

0:30:02.880 --> 0:30:06.720
<v Speaker 1>them in a pretty tight spot. And as it turns out,

0:30:07.280 --> 0:30:09.640
<v Speaker 1>they were right to be worried. I'll explain more in

0:30:09.680 --> 0:30:12.480
<v Speaker 1>a second, but let's take another quick break to thank

0:30:12.480 --> 0:30:22.800
<v Speaker 1>our sponsor. As it turns out, Stroud's work earned her

0:30:22.840 --> 0:30:25.960
<v Speaker 1>a promotion to lead analysts, and while doing her job,

0:30:26.040 --> 0:30:30.040
<v Speaker 1>she started noticing some troubling trends. She found files dedicated

0:30:30.080 --> 0:30:34.360
<v Speaker 1>to American targets, including several journalists. She brought that to

0:30:34.400 --> 0:30:37.880
<v Speaker 1>the attention of her superiors. Because the American operatives had

0:30:37.880 --> 0:30:42.240
<v Speaker 1>been reassured that the program would not target American citizens,

0:30:43.000 --> 0:30:47.120
<v Speaker 1>she was reprimanded because she looked into these areas that

0:30:47.440 --> 0:30:50.040
<v Speaker 1>the Americans were told don't look here, and she had

0:30:50.120 --> 0:30:53.200
<v Speaker 1>looked there. She her her job as lead analysts gave

0:30:53.240 --> 0:30:57.400
<v Speaker 1>her the access um and but she didn't technically have

0:30:58.280 --> 0:31:01.640
<v Speaker 1>permission to look at that Her manager, who had convinced

0:31:01.640 --> 0:31:03.239
<v Speaker 1>her to take the job in the first place, had

0:31:03.280 --> 0:31:05.600
<v Speaker 1>said that any targeting of Americans was only to be

0:31:05.640 --> 0:31:08.600
<v Speaker 1>handled by non American staff on Project Raven, but that

0:31:08.720 --> 0:31:13.480
<v Speaker 1>hardly seems comforting. Stroud was initially put on leave after

0:31:13.880 --> 0:31:16.640
<v Speaker 1>she brought this stuff to the attention of her superiors,

0:31:16.960 --> 0:31:20.440
<v Speaker 1>and her passport was confiscated, which had to have been terrifying.

0:31:20.920 --> 0:31:22.960
<v Speaker 1>She was stuck in the U a e. For about

0:31:23.200 --> 0:31:25.560
<v Speaker 1>a couple of months before the government allowed her to leave,

0:31:25.960 --> 0:31:29.320
<v Speaker 1>and upon her return to the United States, she quickly

0:31:29.400 --> 0:31:31.720
<v Speaker 1>sought out the FBI to tell them about what was

0:31:31.760 --> 0:31:35.520
<v Speaker 1>going on, and then, presumably at some point around that

0:31:35.600 --> 0:31:39.360
<v Speaker 1>same time, approached the journalists from Reuters to start sharing

0:31:39.360 --> 0:31:42.240
<v Speaker 1>her story with them. And this is where we start

0:31:42.280 --> 0:31:45.160
<v Speaker 1>to get into a very tough series of questions. And

0:31:45.200 --> 0:31:47.920
<v Speaker 1>I'm not I'm not being flippant about this. I really

0:31:47.920 --> 0:31:50.960
<v Speaker 1>do think these are difficult questions to answer. The very

0:31:51.080 --> 0:31:55.960
<v Speaker 1>nature of intelligence and counter intelligence is fraught with ethical issues.

0:31:56.560 --> 0:32:00.760
<v Speaker 1>So on the one hand, they're definitely governments or organizations

0:32:00.760 --> 0:32:04.280
<v Speaker 1>and people out there who, through their goals and methods,

0:32:04.760 --> 0:32:08.840
<v Speaker 1>may cause harm to entire populations and even entire countries

0:32:09.200 --> 0:32:11.880
<v Speaker 1>and knowing what they're up to is absolutely key in

0:32:11.920 --> 0:32:15.880
<v Speaker 1>making sure that harm doesn't actually happen to prevent it

0:32:15.920 --> 0:32:19.160
<v Speaker 1>from happening. On the other hand, it's very easy to

0:32:19.200 --> 0:32:24.080
<v Speaker 1>get sloppy with this, to over extend this capability and

0:32:24.080 --> 0:32:26.440
<v Speaker 1>to loop in people who are just living their lives

0:32:27.040 --> 0:32:31.000
<v Speaker 1>or you know, here in America, we at least in theory,

0:32:31.160 --> 0:32:35.080
<v Speaker 1>have have a dedication to freedom of the press and

0:32:35.120 --> 0:32:38.680
<v Speaker 1>freedom of speech. So people who speak up for causes

0:32:38.760 --> 0:32:41.720
<v Speaker 1>they believe in, if they're not inciting people to violence

0:32:41.840 --> 0:32:46.440
<v Speaker 1>or are advocating for destruction of any sort, if they're

0:32:46.480 --> 0:32:50.760
<v Speaker 1>advocating for change, like human rights activists are. In the

0:32:50.800 --> 0:32:54.480
<v Speaker 1>American perspective, that's totally within their rights and that should

0:32:54.480 --> 0:32:56.880
<v Speaker 1>be supported. But that's not the way it is all

0:32:56.880 --> 0:33:00.960
<v Speaker 1>over the world. Laurie Stroud's line, the line she drew

0:33:00.960 --> 0:33:05.160
<v Speaker 1>where she said everything before this is pretty much okay.

0:33:05.200 --> 0:33:09.160
<v Speaker 1>That line stopped at targeting American citizens. Now someone else

0:33:09.560 --> 0:33:12.360
<v Speaker 1>might have a different line. They might extend their boundaries

0:33:12.360 --> 0:33:16.640
<v Speaker 1>to include people from other nations. Uh, but you know,

0:33:16.680 --> 0:33:19.960
<v Speaker 1>not for terrorists, but maybe for people who are human

0:33:20.040 --> 0:33:25.040
<v Speaker 1>rights activists or are criticizing a government but not calling

0:33:25.120 --> 0:33:29.360
<v Speaker 1>for an overthrow or revolution or something. Those people might say, well, no,

0:33:29.440 --> 0:33:31.680
<v Speaker 1>I'm gonna I'm gonna include those in my line to

0:33:31.880 --> 0:33:34.560
<v Speaker 1>not just people from my own country, but people who

0:33:34.560 --> 0:33:37.800
<v Speaker 1>aren't doing any active harm but are advocating for change.

0:33:38.240 --> 0:33:41.080
<v Speaker 1>A third type of person might say, Nope, everyone's fair game.

0:33:41.240 --> 0:33:42.640
<v Speaker 1>I was paid to do a job and I'm just

0:33:42.680 --> 0:33:47.000
<v Speaker 1>gonna do my job. And that leads to another series

0:33:47.040 --> 0:33:50.000
<v Speaker 1>of questions. There's this idea of taking on this sort

0:33:50.040 --> 0:33:53.280
<v Speaker 1>of work on a contract basis for governments other than

0:33:53.320 --> 0:33:56.960
<v Speaker 1>your own home country. Is that ethical? If you were

0:33:57.000 --> 0:34:00.120
<v Speaker 1>to renounce your citizenship and you became the citizen as

0:34:00.160 --> 0:34:03.840
<v Speaker 1>inn of another country, I think you could easily argue

0:34:03.880 --> 0:34:07.240
<v Speaker 1>that you no longer hold any allegiance to your former homeland,

0:34:07.400 --> 0:34:10.640
<v Speaker 1>and now your new home is what you will. You

0:34:11.040 --> 0:34:14.840
<v Speaker 1>have allied yourself too, But assuming you remain a citizen

0:34:15.000 --> 0:34:18.399
<v Speaker 1>of Country A, would it then be okay to join

0:34:18.480 --> 0:34:22.680
<v Speaker 1>an intelligence agency and country B. Even if countries A

0:34:22.880 --> 0:34:27.560
<v Speaker 1>and B are allies, that still seems a little questionable,

0:34:27.640 --> 0:34:31.799
<v Speaker 1>particularly if, as your role as an intelligence officer in

0:34:31.840 --> 0:34:35.319
<v Speaker 1>country BE occasionally requires you to spy on people in

0:34:35.360 --> 0:34:39.080
<v Speaker 1>Country A. Project Raven was originally intended to be a

0:34:39.120 --> 0:34:42.120
<v Speaker 1>program in which the experts from America would share those

0:34:42.160 --> 0:34:47.600
<v Speaker 1>knowledge and all those skills with Amiradi intelligence agencies. But

0:34:48.000 --> 0:34:51.839
<v Speaker 1>even that little bit of a gray area what would

0:34:51.880 --> 0:34:55.560
<v Speaker 1>be problematic in some cases. I mean, if they were

0:34:55.600 --> 0:34:59.520
<v Speaker 1>to share any any sort of practices that were considered

0:34:59.560 --> 0:35:02.800
<v Speaker 1>top C secret and therefore not practices the n s

0:35:02.880 --> 0:35:06.839
<v Speaker 1>A would be terribly keen on other countries getting hold of.

0:35:07.480 --> 0:35:10.600
<v Speaker 1>That's a problem all in itself. The fact that Reuters

0:35:10.760 --> 0:35:14.200
<v Speaker 1>used the word mercenary in the headline for their peace

0:35:15.600 --> 0:35:19.640
<v Speaker 1>that has a lot of implications. Mercenaries hold no allegiance

0:35:19.680 --> 0:35:22.680
<v Speaker 1>to any particular authority. They go where the money is,

0:35:23.200 --> 0:35:26.400
<v Speaker 1>so a mercenary might work for one side in a

0:35:26.480 --> 0:35:31.480
<v Speaker 1>conflict and then switch sides to the opposition with no

0:35:32.040 --> 0:35:35.279
<v Speaker 1>thought about it other than the money's right. Related to

0:35:35.280 --> 0:35:39.160
<v Speaker 1>the story is the revelation that the UAE apparently took

0:35:39.200 --> 0:35:44.200
<v Speaker 1>advantage of a security vulnerability in iPhones that used to exist.

0:35:44.280 --> 0:35:47.000
<v Speaker 1>It has since been patched, So according to c net,

0:35:47.040 --> 0:35:52.200
<v Speaker 1>the UAE government purchased this app from some unnamed outside country.

0:35:52.239 --> 0:35:54.400
<v Speaker 1>So someone else developed it, and then the u A

0:35:54.600 --> 0:35:59.120
<v Speaker 1>government bought it, and the original programmers created a tool

0:35:59.320 --> 0:36:02.640
<v Speaker 1>called car the mom that exploited the vulnerability in the

0:36:02.640 --> 0:36:05.680
<v Speaker 1>iPhone by sending a message through the native I message

0:36:05.680 --> 0:36:09.400
<v Speaker 1>app on iPhones. So, according to reports, all you had

0:36:09.480 --> 0:36:13.239
<v Speaker 1>to do was send one of these messages through the

0:36:13.400 --> 0:36:17.399
<v Speaker 1>I Message app to the target iPhone and that would

0:36:17.440 --> 0:36:20.640
<v Speaker 1>be enough to compromise the target iPhone. From then on,

0:36:21.040 --> 0:36:25.640
<v Speaker 1>Karma would gather data including messages, email, location information, and

0:36:25.680 --> 0:36:29.000
<v Speaker 1>photos from the iPhone and automatically send it back to

0:36:29.080 --> 0:36:34.960
<v Speaker 1>the spies. This operation happened from seventeen. It did come

0:36:35.000 --> 0:36:37.920
<v Speaker 1>to an end, but that's because Apple issued a security

0:36:37.920 --> 0:36:41.520
<v Speaker 1>patch that fixed some of those vulnerabilities in sen and

0:36:41.560 --> 0:36:45.040
<v Speaker 1>it limited the usefulness of Karma. While Apple had already

0:36:45.040 --> 0:36:48.160
<v Speaker 1>fixed this problem, and it's possible that Apple did this

0:36:48.239 --> 0:36:52.400
<v Speaker 1>withhout even knowing that Karma existed. The news that it

0:36:52.440 --> 0:36:56.040
<v Speaker 1>was in widespread use in the UAE was another blow

0:36:56.160 --> 0:36:59.960
<v Speaker 1>against the company, which is also reeling from the revelation

0:37:00.080 --> 0:37:03.680
<v Speaker 1>that a security flaw in the FaceTime video calling app

0:37:03.719 --> 0:37:06.400
<v Speaker 1>on iPhones can allow someone to listen in on a

0:37:06.440 --> 0:37:09.960
<v Speaker 1>person's iPhone just by making a video call, even if

0:37:09.960 --> 0:37:13.319
<v Speaker 1>the other person didn't accept the incoming call. So let's

0:37:13.360 --> 0:37:16.200
<v Speaker 1>say you use FaceTime to call somebody they haven't taken

0:37:16.239 --> 0:37:19.799
<v Speaker 1>the call, it would activate the microphone, so you could

0:37:19.840 --> 0:37:24.800
<v Speaker 1>listen in on the target iPhone microphone, which is pretty

0:37:24.840 --> 0:37:27.640
<v Speaker 1>scary stuff. I'm gonna do a full episode about that

0:37:27.800 --> 0:37:30.120
<v Speaker 1>in the future. I have a guest I want to

0:37:30.160 --> 0:37:33.600
<v Speaker 1>bring on to have a discussion about this. In the

0:37:33.640 --> 0:37:38.000
<v Speaker 1>wake of this Reuter's report, the Committee to Protect Journalists,

0:37:38.040 --> 0:37:41.440
<v Speaker 1>which is a nonprofit headquartered in America and it promotes

0:37:41.480 --> 0:37:44.520
<v Speaker 1>freedom of the press around the world, issued a statement

0:37:44.560 --> 0:37:48.400
<v Speaker 1>criticizing Project Raven and the targeting of journalists in particular.

0:37:48.800 --> 0:37:52.680
<v Speaker 1>A coordinator at the organization said, quote, what we've learned

0:37:52.719 --> 0:37:56.600
<v Speaker 1>about Project Raven raises significant concerns over the links to

0:37:56.640 --> 0:37:59.719
<v Speaker 1>which the UAE will go in targeting journalists, and the

0:37:59.800 --> 0:38:05.320
<v Speaker 1>involvement of former US intelligent officials is also disturbing. Immaradi

0:38:05.400 --> 0:38:08.880
<v Speaker 1>officials must stop targeting the press at home and abroad,

0:38:09.200 --> 0:38:11.840
<v Speaker 1>and the US must make it clear to their allies

0:38:12.160 --> 0:38:16.880
<v Speaker 1>that hacking journalists phones is not a legitimate counter terror strategy.

0:38:17.080 --> 0:38:20.560
<v Speaker 1>End quote. Now, I wish I had an answer to

0:38:20.840 --> 0:38:24.240
<v Speaker 1>how it would be best to conduct intelligence and counterintelligence

0:38:24.239 --> 0:38:28.000
<v Speaker 1>operations because the stakes can be very, very high. They're

0:38:28.040 --> 0:38:31.040
<v Speaker 1>certainly high for the people who are under surveillance, and

0:38:31.080 --> 0:38:34.279
<v Speaker 1>it's potentially high for millions of people depending upon the

0:38:34.320 --> 0:38:37.920
<v Speaker 1>specific situation. My main takeaway from this story is that

0:38:38.080 --> 0:38:41.719
<v Speaker 1>it's important to guard your own security as best you can.

0:38:42.480 --> 0:38:46.799
<v Speaker 1>Is best to practice smart secure behaviors, use stuff like

0:38:46.960 --> 0:38:52.520
<v Speaker 1>VPNs and encryption whenever possible. Don't trust that services that

0:38:52.560 --> 0:38:55.719
<v Speaker 1>depend upon your data for business will be ethical and

0:38:55.760 --> 0:38:58.480
<v Speaker 1>how they handle that data or careful in how they

0:38:58.520 --> 0:39:00.520
<v Speaker 1>handle it, and someone else might get hold of it.

0:39:00.800 --> 0:39:04.400
<v Speaker 1>And remember that even if an agency or organization is

0:39:04.440 --> 0:39:08.799
<v Speaker 1>not actively doing bad things against people, in general, agencies

0:39:08.800 --> 0:39:12.680
<v Speaker 1>and organizations are made up of people, and individual people

0:39:13.200 --> 0:39:15.279
<v Speaker 1>may behave in ways that are outside the perhaps the

0:39:15.320 --> 0:39:19.840
<v Speaker 1>parameters of the respective organizations. I'll give you a specific

0:39:19.880 --> 0:39:24.600
<v Speaker 1>example back in One of the many stories that came

0:39:24.600 --> 0:39:27.440
<v Speaker 1>out in the wake of this data dump about the

0:39:27.520 --> 0:39:30.160
<v Speaker 1>n s A was that there were some n s

0:39:30.239 --> 0:39:33.520
<v Speaker 1>A employees who had been misusing the tools developed for

0:39:33.600 --> 0:39:38.200
<v Speaker 1>the widespread wire tapping project for their own personal benefit.

0:39:38.760 --> 0:39:41.759
<v Speaker 1>So n s A was saying, yes, we're gathering all

0:39:41.840 --> 0:39:44.479
<v Speaker 1>this data, but we're not looking at it. We're only

0:39:44.520 --> 0:39:47.759
<v Speaker 1>interested in specific information at any given time, and when

0:39:47.760 --> 0:39:50.399
<v Speaker 1>we are, we go through the proper procedures to make

0:39:50.440 --> 0:39:54.520
<v Speaker 1>sure all the teas acrossed, all the eyes are dotted,

0:39:55.040 --> 0:39:58.279
<v Speaker 1>and then we will conduct our investigation. So sure we've

0:39:58.320 --> 0:40:00.680
<v Speaker 1>got the evidence already, but we won't get it until

0:40:00.719 --> 0:40:04.560
<v Speaker 1>we've got the proper authority to do so. But that

0:40:04.600 --> 0:40:06.800
<v Speaker 1>did not stop some members of the n s A

0:40:06.920 --> 0:40:10.520
<v Speaker 1>staff from using those very same tools to spy on

0:40:10.680 --> 0:40:16.480
<v Speaker 1>specific people they knew personally, like ex lovers or a spouse.

0:40:17.440 --> 0:40:22.640
<v Speaker 1>So while the agency could have been as good as

0:40:22.640 --> 0:40:26.920
<v Speaker 1>its word and said, yes, we aren't doing anything unethical

0:40:26.960 --> 0:40:28.719
<v Speaker 1>with this, we're following all the rules that have been

0:40:28.760 --> 0:40:32.719
<v Speaker 1>set down. Nothing outside of that as being done. Even

0:40:32.760 --> 0:40:36.240
<v Speaker 1>if they're telling the truth about that people in the agency,

0:40:36.320 --> 0:40:41.960
<v Speaker 1>we're overstepping their bounds and abusing this tool because they

0:40:41.960 --> 0:40:44.560
<v Speaker 1>were people and because the tool let them do that.

0:40:45.440 --> 0:40:48.680
<v Speaker 1>So even if you trust in governments, let's say that

0:40:48.760 --> 0:40:51.040
<v Speaker 1>you know you, you're like I, I believe ultimately that

0:40:51.080 --> 0:40:53.000
<v Speaker 1>the people in the government are good people. I'm going

0:40:53.040 --> 0:40:56.799
<v Speaker 1>to trust them. Remember, not everyone working in those governments

0:40:57.040 --> 0:41:00.319
<v Speaker 1>happens to be trustworthy, and they may take advantage of

0:41:00.440 --> 0:41:03.200
<v Speaker 1>tools even if the overall government is on the up

0:41:03.200 --> 0:41:07.640
<v Speaker 1>and up about it, so be careful out there. I

0:41:07.680 --> 0:41:11.080
<v Speaker 1>wanted to cover this because it reminds us of how

0:41:11.120 --> 0:41:15.840
<v Speaker 1>important information is, how it can be used as a

0:41:15.880 --> 0:41:18.920
<v Speaker 1>weapon against us, even if we haven't done anything wrong,

0:41:19.560 --> 0:41:21.920
<v Speaker 1>and that we should keep that in mind and not

0:41:22.040 --> 0:41:27.080
<v Speaker 1>be too cavalier about how we, you know, store data,

0:41:27.160 --> 0:41:30.600
<v Speaker 1>how we access data, the kinds of technologies we use,

0:41:30.640 --> 0:41:33.120
<v Speaker 1>the kind of services we use. It's good to keep

0:41:33.160 --> 0:41:35.400
<v Speaker 1>this in mind because you never know when it's going

0:41:35.440 --> 0:41:37.520
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<v Speaker 1>this one's in the top three. That wraps up this

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