WEBVTT - Will We Be Safe From Election Hacking in 2020? 0:00:00.400 --> 0:00:03.640 July twelve, sixteen started out, It's just another day from 0:00:03.640 --> 0:00:06.280 Matt Emmons. At the time, Matt was an I T 0:00:06.400 --> 0:00:09.600 technician with the Illinois Board of Elections, and just as 0:00:09.640 --> 0:00:12.440 everyone in the office was getting settled into the workday, 0:00:12.800 --> 0:00:16.640 I think it was about one of his colleagues noticed 0:00:16.720 --> 0:00:21.480 something strange with the state's voter registration system. It essentially 0:00:21.720 --> 0:00:26.720 was at a dead stop. You couldn't do anything. So 0:00:26.800 --> 0:00:29.800 Matt's colleague went about troubleshooting and found that the server 0:00:30.000 --> 0:00:35.159 hosting the voter database was running on overdrive. Something was 0:00:35.240 --> 0:00:37.640 jamming the system, so he took a look at the 0:00:37.680 --> 0:00:43.599 request coming in. What's normally a trickle of orderly requests 0:00:43.640 --> 0:00:48.240 like five times per second was suddenly more like a flood. 0:00:49.560 --> 0:00:52.080 It was shortly after that that I believe I got 0:00:52.240 --> 0:00:55.040 called over there. It didn't take long for Matt's team 0:00:55.320 --> 0:00:58.720 to realize they were under attack. Within an hour they 0:00:58.760 --> 0:01:01.160 found him fixed the security hole that the hackers used 0:01:01.200 --> 0:01:04.280 to get into their system, and then for good measure, 0:01:04.400 --> 0:01:07.440 they took the whole system offline while they started looking 0:01:07.480 --> 0:01:14.520 for the culprits of the hack. Breaking news out of Washington, 0:01:14.640 --> 0:01:18.800 twelve Russian intelligence officers indicted. Today, we now know this 0:01:18.880 --> 0:01:21.720 is part of Russia's attempt to meddle with the sixteen 0:01:21.800 --> 0:01:24.920 elections here in the United States, which of course has 0:01:24.959 --> 0:01:30.080 dominated our headlines. Ever sank into and while we continue 0:01:30.120 --> 0:01:33.520 to talk about what happened back then, the next election 0:01:33.640 --> 0:01:41.960 is just around the corner, facing off government backed hackers 0:01:42.160 --> 0:01:46.520 from Russia, Iran, North Korea, and even China. Our states 0:01:46.520 --> 0:01:50.960 and municipalities ready for the next one. Am Ito, you're 0:01:51.000 --> 0:02:06.480 listening to Decrypted stay with us? So, Cardike, you are 0:02:06.720 --> 0:02:10.240 a cybersecurity reporter here at Bloomberg, brand new to our 0:02:10.280 --> 0:02:14.119 tech team. Welcome to the show. Thanks so much. You're 0:02:14.120 --> 0:02:19.040 just getting started on an incredibly complicated beat here. I 0:02:19.080 --> 0:02:22.920 am it's been about a month. I am totally overwhelmed, 0:02:23.440 --> 0:02:26.400 and I think I think I should be, because there's 0:02:26.400 --> 0:02:29.720 just so much to understand in the world of cybersecurity. Um, 0:02:30.280 --> 0:02:33.639 there's so many threat actors that pose risks to companies 0:02:33.720 --> 0:02:38.320 and states and political parties. Fortunately, my focus will be 0:02:38.400 --> 0:02:42.680 on election security and so I can narrow down my 0:02:42.760 --> 0:02:45.600 attention reporting on that, and hopefully we'll have a lot 0:02:45.639 --> 0:02:48.440 of interesting conversations to have in the weeks to come. 0:02:48.800 --> 0:02:51.639 So this is the thing that you're going to dedicate 0:02:51.680 --> 0:02:54.880 the next year to the next year. I hope to 0:02:54.880 --> 0:02:58.160 be your guy on election security for our listeners who 0:02:58.280 --> 0:03:01.600 don't quite remember all of the details of what happened 0:03:01.600 --> 0:03:06.200 back in and this actually includes me. Can you go 0:03:06.320 --> 0:03:11.079 over what Russian hackers actually succeeded in doing back then? 0:03:12.000 --> 0:03:15.520 What they succeeded in most was disinformation and we're going 0:03:15.560 --> 0:03:18.320 to set that aside. What we're going to talk about 0:03:18.480 --> 0:03:22.720 are the three major hacks of election systems in the 0:03:22.760 --> 0:03:26.960 United States. We are learning more about the hat into 0:03:27.000 --> 0:03:30.200 the Democratic National Committee, including the first was of the 0:03:30.240 --> 0:03:33.079 Democratic National Committee, which I think everyone knows the most 0:03:33.120 --> 0:03:36.480 about on believe of the convention. Wiki leaks released thousands 0:03:36.560 --> 0:03:38.840 of emails from the time. There are a number of 0:03:38.880 --> 0:03:43.960 emails in which senior officials can be seen conspiring against 0:03:44.160 --> 0:03:47.280 Bernie Sanders, the chair of the d n C, Congresswoman 0:03:47.320 --> 0:03:51.320 Debbie Wasserman Schultz, has announced her resignation. It comes after 0:03:51.360 --> 0:03:55.360 those leaked emails. We actually ran an episode about this 0:03:55.520 --> 0:03:58.920 three years ago, so our listeners are well versed, very good. 0:03:59.400 --> 0:04:02.720 The other two hacks they may not know as much about. 0:04:02.880 --> 0:04:06.680 Justin Governor Rhonda Santis now says Russian hackers gained access 0:04:06.720 --> 0:04:11.720 to voter databases into Florida counties ahead of the presidential election. 0:04:12.200 --> 0:04:15.000 The first one is Florida, which nobody knows much about. 0:04:15.440 --> 0:04:19.440 The DHS and the state officials have been a secretive 0:04:19.839 --> 0:04:22.039 about this one. The governor can't say the names of 0:04:22.040 --> 0:04:25.120 the counties involved because he signed a confidentiality agreement with 0:04:25.160 --> 0:04:30.080 the FBI. Hackers sent phishing emails to county officials. Two 0:04:30.160 --> 0:04:34.200 of them clicked on the links and allowed Russian hackers 0:04:34.240 --> 0:04:37.800 access to their database. All we know is that votes 0:04:37.839 --> 0:04:41.120 weren't changed. Then there's Illinois, which you know in a 0:04:41.200 --> 0:04:45.240 lot more about because they've been forthcoming about what happened. 0:04:46.040 --> 0:04:48.240 And briefly, what happened was that in the middle of 0:04:48.320 --> 0:04:53.160 June of two thousand sixteen, hackers found an unlocked door 0:04:53.200 --> 0:04:57.080 in the voter registration database, got in and downloaded as 0:04:57.160 --> 0:05:00.440 much information as they could. After three weeks of unloading 0:05:00.440 --> 0:05:04.240 and trying to change information, they said, Hi, Illinois, we've 0:05:04.240 --> 0:05:07.680 been here all along, and they shut down their system. 0:05:07.680 --> 0:05:10.680 This was the thing that Matt Emmons and his colleagues 0:05:10.720 --> 0:05:14.640 discovered all the way out in July. That's right. So 0:05:14.760 --> 0:05:16.480 three weeks after they got in in the middle of 0:05:16.560 --> 0:05:19.560 July in two thousand and sixteen, Matt Emmons and his 0:05:19.640 --> 0:05:23.800 colleagues discovered that Russian hackers have been in their system 0:05:23.839 --> 0:05:29.120 all along, trying to gain access to social security numbers, 0:05:29.279 --> 0:05:33.960 driver's license numbers, names addresses, phone numbers, anything related to 0:05:33.960 --> 0:05:38.880 your voter registration information. They found that seventy six thousand 0:05:39.000 --> 0:05:43.120 people's data had been accessed by Russian hackers in a 0:05:43.160 --> 0:05:46.560 way that they could relate these data points to actual people, 0:05:46.920 --> 0:05:50.600 and do these people know who they are? They do so. 0:05:50.640 --> 0:05:54.080 They all received notifications in the mail shortly after the 0:05:54.080 --> 0:05:57.920 hack informing them that their data had been compromised. Nothing 0:05:57.960 --> 0:06:02.520 that's followed indicated that Russia did something with these names, 0:06:02.800 --> 0:06:04.840 but they do have the information. But they do have 0:06:04.920 --> 0:06:08.880 the information, that's right, So Illinois says nothing happened, No 0:06:09.000 --> 0:06:13.640 data was changed because Russian hackers only had read access 0:06:13.720 --> 0:06:15.760 to the data. They could download as much of it 0:06:15.800 --> 0:06:18.400 as they wanted to, but they couldn't actually change anything. 0:06:18.480 --> 0:06:21.880 They didn't have right permissions. The Department of Homeland Security 0:06:22.160 --> 0:06:25.520 told the Senate Intelligence Committee earlier this year on the 0:06:25.560 --> 0:06:29.040 report that we saw that they could have done more, 0:06:29.320 --> 0:06:32.680 and they stayed quote. Why they didn't is an open 0:06:32.800 --> 0:06:39.839 ended question. Yeah, it's weird. If if they were able 0:06:39.880 --> 0:06:42.800 to go further, why wouldn't they The answer to that 0:06:42.880 --> 0:06:46.560 is pure speculation, both on my part and the Department 0:06:46.560 --> 0:06:49.919 of Homeland Security. They don't know the answer. But the 0:06:49.960 --> 0:06:53.560 worst case scenario there is that they were seeking intelligence 0:06:53.880 --> 0:06:57.039 for the future so that next time they really want 0:06:57.080 --> 0:06:59.919 to access a database and change something they know how to, 0:07:00.839 --> 0:07:04.560 or that they were there to drop secret malware that 0:07:04.680 --> 0:07:07.120 they can trigger in the future when they want to. 0:07:07.800 --> 0:07:10.680 Officials on both the federal and state level believe that 0:07:10.720 --> 0:07:14.800 there is no malware in the Illinois voter registration database. Theoretically, 0:07:14.840 --> 0:07:18.640 if hackers decided to do more than just download names 0:07:18.680 --> 0:07:23.000 and addresses from the voter database, if they actually made 0:07:23.120 --> 0:07:26.080 changes to that database, what could they do Because this 0:07:26.160 --> 0:07:29.400 is different from going into the voting machines, for example, 0:07:29.600 --> 0:07:33.800 and changing the ballots themselves. So the worst case scenario 0:07:33.880 --> 0:07:38.200 here is that when you arrive to vote, the poll 0:07:38.240 --> 0:07:42.080 book that has all the voter registration information wouldn't match 0:07:42.160 --> 0:07:45.120 up with your own information. You couldn't verify that you 0:07:45.160 --> 0:07:48.320 are the person who registered to vote, and you may 0:07:48.360 --> 0:07:51.560 not be able to vote immediately, or you may have 0:07:51.680 --> 0:07:55.960 to cast a provisional ballot that might be verified and 0:07:56.040 --> 0:07:59.520 might not in the future. And why would hackers from 0:08:00.040 --> 0:08:03.040 say Russia wants something like that. Well, there's a couple 0:08:03.040 --> 0:08:07.440 of reasons. One, it's a form of voter suppression. There 0:08:07.520 --> 0:08:11.440 might be fewer ballots cast if the registration system has 0:08:11.480 --> 0:08:17.200 been altered b you, so mistrust in the election system. 0:08:17.240 --> 0:08:19.720 There are fewer people coming out to vote if they 0:08:19.760 --> 0:08:23.120 believe that even by registering to vote, when they arrive 0:08:23.520 --> 0:08:25.400 they can actually vote or vote in the way that 0:08:25.440 --> 0:08:31.760 they expect to. So they're creating roadblocks and mistrust in democracy. 0:08:31.960 --> 0:08:35.040 So what is Illinois doing this time to better protect 0:08:35.080 --> 0:08:39.800 their systems? So all states got a portion of million 0:08:39.840 --> 0:08:43.200 dollars from the federal government in grants and they match 0:08:43.320 --> 0:08:45.559 that with a small portion of their own, So thirteen 0:08:45.600 --> 0:08:48.080 million in federal funds and five million from the state 0:08:49.240 --> 0:08:53.360 to hire a new staff. The biggest hiring push has 0:08:53.400 --> 0:08:57.199 been in a program called cyber Navigators, which is probably 0:08:57.240 --> 0:09:01.679 the coolest name in election security since in the it 0:09:01.760 --> 0:09:04.880 is kind of nerdy election security as Canton nerdy. So 0:09:05.080 --> 0:09:08.040 they've spent a large chunk of change hiring these nine 0:09:08.080 --> 0:09:12.200 cyber navigators who oversee different pockets of Illinois, and a 0:09:12.200 --> 0:09:15.319 lot of these counties don't have much I T support, 0:09:15.440 --> 0:09:18.200 so these individuals are meant to be the front lines 0:09:18.480 --> 0:09:22.319 for these counties and ensuring that any vulnerabilities that currently 0:09:22.320 --> 0:09:25.920 exist are plugged. So they're going to go through cycles 0:09:25.960 --> 0:09:30.200 of assessment between now and over and over again to 0:09:30.280 --> 0:09:33.719 ensure that there are no new vulnerabilities between now and 0:09:33.920 --> 0:09:37.680 an election day. Are they doing anything else? Illinois has 0:09:37.720 --> 0:09:39.840 a couple of things going on. They have what are 0:09:39.880 --> 0:09:44.200 called Albert sensors installed. They allow both state and federal 0:09:44.200 --> 0:09:48.920 officials to monitor Illinois voting apparatus, so if there's any 0:09:48.960 --> 0:09:52.400 outside infiltration, both the state and the Department of Homeland 0:09:52.440 --> 0:09:56.120 Security will know and should be able to respond. They 0:09:56.160 --> 0:09:59.760 also have the National Guard on call and and what 0:10:00.040 --> 0:10:03.920 the National Guard do. The National Guard is available in 0:10:03.960 --> 0:10:06.880 the event of a hack on election day, so if 0:10:06.880 --> 0:10:11.000 a remote county in Illinois is infiltrated, the National Guard 0:10:11.080 --> 0:10:13.080 can call on their cyber warriors to get in a 0:10:13.160 --> 0:10:17.640 chopper and fly to DeKalb County to respond to any 0:10:17.720 --> 0:10:26.200 hack to protect the integrity of the election. We'll be 0:10:26.280 --> 0:10:41.679 right back. So before the break Cardike. You walked us 0:10:41.679 --> 0:10:44.480 through the different things that Illinois is doing to better 0:10:44.480 --> 0:10:48.560 protect itself. It actually sounded like quite a bit to me. 0:10:49.720 --> 0:10:52.559 I guess the big question is will that be enough? 0:10:53.280 --> 0:10:54.720 I talked to a lot of people in the last 0:10:54.960 --> 0:10:57.199 month and a half and it's a little more complicated 0:10:57.240 --> 0:11:00.480 than just yes or no. One expert I talked to 0:11:00.720 --> 0:11:04.240 is an analyst at fire Eye. His name is Luke McNamara. 0:11:04.480 --> 0:11:06.160 I think you have with the states and many of 0:11:06.200 --> 0:11:08.680 them playing catch up with the resources they have, and 0:11:08.720 --> 0:11:10.480 I think it's a very difficult place to be in 0:11:10.559 --> 0:11:13.839 when trying to reach a more coroactive footing to deal 0:11:13.880 --> 0:11:19.600 with this threat. As the threat evolve, are these states 0:11:19.679 --> 0:11:23.760 in a perpetual cycle of playing catch up? I think 0:11:23.840 --> 0:11:26.800 some are are putting the right resources in place, that 0:11:26.880 --> 0:11:28.839 putting the right investments in place, But it is a 0:11:28.920 --> 0:11:32.520 very difficult problem to address, uh. And there's there's some 0:11:32.640 --> 0:11:35.520 amount of irony here in that. A lot of the 0:11:35.600 --> 0:11:38.640 threat vectors, a lot of the methodologies that we see, 0:11:38.679 --> 0:11:41.520 even some of the more advanced threat actors utilizing, are 0:11:41.600 --> 0:11:44.400 very simple in nature. When we look at how the 0:11:44.440 --> 0:11:48.920 majority of intrusions begin, the majority of attacks begin, they 0:11:48.960 --> 0:11:52.160 begin with spear fishing for the most part, and I 0:11:52.280 --> 0:11:57.199 think even helping those county clerks, those election administrators understand 0:11:57.640 --> 0:12:01.200 how to look for signs of spearfish and how to 0:12:01.240 --> 0:12:04.480 identify that that I think can pay dividends and that 0:12:04.480 --> 0:12:08.120 doesn't necessarily need to involve the deployment of expensive technology. 0:12:08.160 --> 0:12:11.280 By the way, Luke's employer, fire I is helping at 0:12:11.360 --> 0:12:15.880 least fifteen states along with municipalities and counties, the bigger 0:12:15.920 --> 0:12:18.920 counties that can actually afford to pay fire EYE prepare 0:12:18.960 --> 0:12:22.640 for And so we just heard Luke talk about spear fishing. 0:12:23.360 --> 0:12:26.960 This is when hackers send county officials an email with 0:12:27.000 --> 0:12:31.240 an attachment something like a click here exactly. They shouldn't 0:12:31.240 --> 0:12:34.880 be clicking, but when they do, they allow the infiltraders 0:12:34.920 --> 0:12:38.320 access to their networks. So fire I is trying to 0:12:38.320 --> 0:12:41.360 make sure that county clerks aren't clicking. One of the 0:12:41.360 --> 0:12:45.280 other things they're doing is offering intelligence to local officials 0:12:45.320 --> 0:12:48.560 about their attackers. Fire I believe is that the best 0:12:48.640 --> 0:12:51.839 way to prepare foreign adversary is to understand your adversary, 0:12:51.920 --> 0:12:55.240 to know exactly why they want to infiltrate your system 0:12:55.280 --> 0:12:57.880 and how they'll do it. I think certainly Russia, from 0:12:57.880 --> 0:13:01.080 what we've seen UM they are have shown themselves to 0:13:01.080 --> 0:13:05.920 be the most aggressive and going after democratic institutions and processes, 0:13:06.320 --> 0:13:08.520 and I think as a result, it's very important for 0:13:08.600 --> 0:13:11.000 us to pay attention to what we see, particularly with 0:13:11.040 --> 0:13:14.400 European elections between now and UM. But I think that 0:13:14.440 --> 0:13:17.720 maybe more hasn't been said about that there are other 0:13:17.760 --> 0:13:19.880 threat groups that are active in the space. We've seen 0:13:19.960 --> 0:13:24.720 China target elections Cambodia last year, certainly the case probably 0:13:24.760 --> 0:13:27.520 as well for Iran. What's at stake when we talk 0:13:27.520 --> 0:13:31.880 about election hacking? Are you worried about hackers hijacking election results? 0:13:31.880 --> 0:13:35.000 Are we talking about the credibility of results? Or is 0:13:35.040 --> 0:13:39.000 it something else altogether? Yeah? I think in many respects 0:13:39.200 --> 0:13:43.280 it's the activity that falls short of actually compromising votes 0:13:43.520 --> 0:13:46.240 that concerns me more. Um, they could do a repeat 0:13:46.240 --> 0:13:49.839 of what we've seen them do in Ukraine in previous years, 0:13:49.880 --> 0:13:53.439 where they compromised the central election commissioned website and then 0:13:53.480 --> 0:13:57.560 posted out erroneous results. None of the actual results themselves 0:13:57.559 --> 0:14:01.040 were changed, but it was sufficient enough to cause some 0:14:01.080 --> 0:14:03.800 people probably to question what is is really real in 0:14:03.800 --> 0:14:06.959 the situation. So I think those sorts of intrusions, those 0:14:06.960 --> 0:14:10.920 sorts of attacks, the sorts of disinformation campaigns that maybe 0:14:10.920 --> 0:14:14.520 fall short of actual compromising and deletion or destruction of 0:14:14.600 --> 0:14:18.400 voter data, but I can still be effective at causing infusion. 0:14:18.760 --> 0:14:21.200 Those are things that we should heavily consider and be 0:14:21.240 --> 0:14:27.360 prepared for. Okay, So to sum it up, the good 0:14:27.400 --> 0:14:30.120 news is that we now at least know to prepare 0:14:30.200 --> 0:14:33.120 for this, which is a big step. And we also 0:14:33.160 --> 0:14:35.880 know that the hackers gained access in pretty simple ways, 0:14:36.160 --> 0:14:40.240 which means the defenses could be pretty simple too. But 0:14:40.280 --> 0:14:42.320 then the bad news is that the hackers might step 0:14:42.400 --> 0:14:45.360 up their game this time, and there are now more 0:14:45.600 --> 0:14:49.280 potential adversaries than just Russia. Does that sound like a 0:14:49.280 --> 0:14:53.640 good summary. That's about right, and that's probably pretty daunting 0:14:53.680 --> 0:14:57.000 on its own. But that's only part of the problem. 0:14:57.040 --> 0:15:00.560 And so I called Illinois Governor J. B. Pritzker I 0:15:01.440 --> 0:15:05.000 riser Governor fritzger Good afternoon to talk through the other 0:15:05.080 --> 0:15:08.960 challenges he's facing. And the biggest one is probably the 0:15:09.000 --> 0:15:12.400 fact that he's trying to solve a federal security crisis 0:15:12.840 --> 0:15:16.920 on a state budget. It's a national security issue, um, 0:15:17.400 --> 0:15:22.600 and the federal government should be at the forefront. And 0:15:22.640 --> 0:15:24.920 I'm finding, at least for our state, that the state 0:15:25.000 --> 0:15:27.400 is at the forefront and the federal government is there 0:15:27.800 --> 0:15:33.360 for uh less than the leadership role. I'm not viewing 0:15:33.400 --> 0:15:37.920 myself as dependent upon Washington d C. I would say 0:15:38.080 --> 0:15:42.240 the states would like more help, and we are. Um, 0:15:42.360 --> 0:15:45.880 you know, we've expressed that by more help, is he 0:15:45.960 --> 0:15:49.720 talking about federal money. Yeah, he wants Congress and the 0:15:49.720 --> 0:15:54.040 Trump administration to approve new grants to give to states. 0:15:54.080 --> 0:15:58.040 So far, Illinois received thirteen million dollars in two thousand 0:15:58.040 --> 0:16:01.480 and eighteen. They matched five million of their own. But 0:16:01.560 --> 0:16:04.400 what they really say they need is a hundred and 0:16:04.440 --> 0:16:08.360 seventy five million dollars to gut their election apparatus and 0:16:08.440 --> 0:16:11.080 build a system they believe is safe and secure, not 0:16:11.160 --> 0:16:14.880 just for but for the future. So that's a major shortfall. 0:16:15.120 --> 0:16:17.400 There's a massive gap in what they have and what 0:16:17.480 --> 0:16:20.720 they need. And so aside from the shortfall and resources 0:16:21.280 --> 0:16:25.200 to rebuild the state's election infrastructure, state and local governments 0:16:25.280 --> 0:16:28.239 also don't have the money to hire the best engineers 0:16:28.240 --> 0:16:33.240 to protect their systems. Look think about what someone like 0:16:33.480 --> 0:16:38.720 Ron Garry, a with his background was probably earning in 0:16:38.760 --> 0:16:41.600 the private sector Ron Garry, A, by the way, is 0:16:41.640 --> 0:16:46.200 the state's Chief Information Officer and the Secretary of Innovation 0:16:46.240 --> 0:16:48.640 and Technology, And so he used to be the c 0:16:48.840 --> 0:16:52.320 i O at Farmers Insurance and Toyota of North America, 0:16:53.000 --> 0:16:56.640 and then in Illinois the you know the showeries which 0:16:56.640 --> 0:17:00.640 are published. So I'm not revealing anything that isn't publicly out. 0:17:01.280 --> 0:17:03.720 Got a salary that we're offering to a c i 0:17:03.800 --> 0:17:06.040 OH is in the neighborhood of a hundred and seventy 0:17:06.160 --> 0:17:09.480 thousand dollars a year. And I don't think that typical 0:17:10.359 --> 0:17:15.680 salaries that are offered for chief information officers or chief 0:17:16.160 --> 0:17:21.440 information security officers for state government are commencer with being 0:17:21.440 --> 0:17:25.240 competitive in any way with the private check Do you 0:17:25.240 --> 0:17:29.439 get the sense that the governor thinks Illinois is writing nonetheless? 0:17:29.960 --> 0:17:31.760 I don't think the governor of Illinois is going to 0:17:31.800 --> 0:17:34.000 put a target on his back and say, we're not 0:17:34.080 --> 0:17:37.680 prepared to come hack us, please please come hack us. No. Now, 0:17:37.720 --> 0:17:41.320 I think I think, uh, they've hired some some good 0:17:41.320 --> 0:17:44.560 people with their limited resources. The I T technician with 0:17:44.600 --> 0:17:48.840 the Illinois State Board of Elections, Met Emmons. What's he 0:17:48.880 --> 0:17:52.280 doing today? He's running the I T Department for the 0:17:52.320 --> 0:17:55.679 State Board of Elections, and they are working with the 0:17:55.720 --> 0:17:58.560 Department of Homeland Security and their own internal staff too 0:17:59.359 --> 0:18:03.280 pepper their system with tests to ensure that there's nobody 0:18:03.280 --> 0:18:05.760 in their system now who shouldn't be, and there's no 0:18:05.800 --> 0:18:09.280 malware in their system now. He spent the last month 0:18:09.320 --> 0:18:13.199 and a half reporting on this topic. Is America ready for? 0:18:15.080 --> 0:18:18.960 It's so hard to say is America ready for? Because 0:18:18.960 --> 0:18:22.480 the truth is that you have fifty states and all 0:18:22.520 --> 0:18:25.639 the counties within those states that are now tasked with 0:18:25.720 --> 0:18:35.359 defending the integrity of the presidential election. Is every county ready? 0:18:36.640 --> 0:18:39.880 We certainly know that Illinois has done everything they can 0:18:40.240 --> 0:18:42.520 in the last three and a half years to prepare for, 0:18:43.640 --> 0:18:47.400 but there's all these smaller swing states and counties that 0:18:47.680 --> 0:18:49.720 may not have the resources that a big state like 0:18:49.800 --> 0:18:53.840 Illinois has to prepare. The DHS is traveling the country 0:18:53.880 --> 0:18:57.679 to inform these and educate these county clerks, but to 0:18:57.760 --> 0:19:00.480 what extent are they going to take action to respond? 0:19:00.760 --> 0:19:05.520 And so is the entire country ready? Probably not, But 0:19:05.600 --> 0:19:09.960 there's time between now and November, and everyone with a 0:19:09.960 --> 0:19:12.400 stake in the game is probably doing everything they can 0:19:12.720 --> 0:19:22.679 to prepare. Card K Rotra. Thank you for your story today, 0:19:23.280 --> 0:19:36.000 Thank you for having Me Decrypted. Is produced by Meat 0:19:36.960 --> 0:19:40.240 and Ethan Brooks, Emily Buso and Ann vander May are 0:19:40.400 --> 0:19:44.720 story editors. Francesca Levi is the head of Bloomberg Podcasts. 0:19:45.040 --> 0:20:04.879 We'll see you next week. No Came.