1 00:00:00,400 --> 00:00:03,640 Speaker 1: July twelve, sixteen started out, It's just another day from 2 00:00:03,640 --> 00:00:06,280 Speaker 1: Matt Emmons. At the time, Matt was an I T 3 00:00:06,400 --> 00:00:09,600 Speaker 1: technician with the Illinois Board of Elections, and just as 4 00:00:09,640 --> 00:00:12,440 Speaker 1: everyone in the office was getting settled into the workday, 5 00:00:12,800 --> 00:00:16,640 Speaker 1: I think it was about one of his colleagues noticed 6 00:00:16,720 --> 00:00:21,480 Speaker 1: something strange with the state's voter registration system. It essentially 7 00:00:21,720 --> 00:00:26,720 Speaker 1: was at a dead stop. You couldn't do anything. So 8 00:00:26,800 --> 00:00:29,800 Speaker 1: Matt's colleague went about troubleshooting and found that the server 9 00:00:30,000 --> 00:00:35,159 Speaker 1: hosting the voter database was running on overdrive. Something was 10 00:00:35,240 --> 00:00:37,640 Speaker 1: jamming the system, so he took a look at the 11 00:00:37,680 --> 00:00:43,599 Speaker 1: request coming in. What's normally a trickle of orderly requests 12 00:00:43,640 --> 00:00:48,240 Speaker 1: like five times per second was suddenly more like a flood. 13 00:00:49,560 --> 00:00:52,080 Speaker 1: It was shortly after that that I believe I got 14 00:00:52,240 --> 00:00:55,040 Speaker 1: called over there. It didn't take long for Matt's team 15 00:00:55,320 --> 00:00:58,720 Speaker 1: to realize they were under attack. Within an hour they 16 00:00:58,760 --> 00:01:01,160 Speaker 1: found him fixed the security hole that the hackers used 17 00:01:01,200 --> 00:01:04,280 Speaker 1: to get into their system, and then for good measure, 18 00:01:04,400 --> 00:01:07,440 Speaker 1: they took the whole system offline while they started looking 19 00:01:07,480 --> 00:01:14,520 Speaker 1: for the culprits of the hack. Breaking news out of Washington, 20 00:01:14,640 --> 00:01:18,800 Speaker 1: twelve Russian intelligence officers indicted. Today, we now know this 21 00:01:18,880 --> 00:01:21,720 Speaker 1: is part of Russia's attempt to meddle with the sixteen 22 00:01:21,800 --> 00:01:24,920 Speaker 1: elections here in the United States, which of course has 23 00:01:24,959 --> 00:01:30,080 Speaker 1: dominated our headlines. Ever sank into and while we continue 24 00:01:30,120 --> 00:01:33,520 Speaker 1: to talk about what happened back then, the next election 25 00:01:33,640 --> 00:01:41,960 Speaker 1: is just around the corner, facing off government backed hackers 26 00:01:42,160 --> 00:01:46,520 Speaker 1: from Russia, Iran, North Korea, and even China. Our states 27 00:01:46,520 --> 00:01:50,960 Speaker 1: and municipalities ready for the next one. Am Ito, you're 28 00:01:51,000 --> 00:02:06,480 Speaker 1: listening to Decrypted stay with us? So, Cardike, you are 29 00:02:06,720 --> 00:02:10,240 Speaker 1: a cybersecurity reporter here at Bloomberg, brand new to our 30 00:02:10,280 --> 00:02:14,119 Speaker 1: tech team. Welcome to the show. Thanks so much. You're 31 00:02:14,120 --> 00:02:19,040 Speaker 1: just getting started on an incredibly complicated beat here. I 32 00:02:19,080 --> 00:02:22,920 Speaker 1: am it's been about a month. I am totally overwhelmed, 33 00:02:23,440 --> 00:02:26,400 Speaker 1: and I think I think I should be, because there's 34 00:02:26,400 --> 00:02:29,720 Speaker 1: just so much to understand in the world of cybersecurity. Um, 35 00:02:30,280 --> 00:02:33,639 Speaker 1: there's so many threat actors that pose risks to companies 36 00:02:33,720 --> 00:02:38,320 Speaker 1: and states and political parties. Fortunately, my focus will be 37 00:02:38,400 --> 00:02:42,680 Speaker 1: on election security and so I can narrow down my 38 00:02:42,760 --> 00:02:45,600 Speaker 1: attention reporting on that, and hopefully we'll have a lot 39 00:02:45,639 --> 00:02:48,440 Speaker 1: of interesting conversations to have in the weeks to come. 40 00:02:48,800 --> 00:02:51,639 Speaker 1: So this is the thing that you're going to dedicate 41 00:02:51,680 --> 00:02:54,880 Speaker 1: the next year to the next year. I hope to 42 00:02:54,880 --> 00:02:58,160 Speaker 1: be your guy on election security for our listeners who 43 00:02:58,280 --> 00:03:01,600 Speaker 1: don't quite remember all of the details of what happened 44 00:03:01,600 --> 00:03:06,200 Speaker 1: back in and this actually includes me. Can you go 45 00:03:06,320 --> 00:03:11,079 Speaker 1: over what Russian hackers actually succeeded in doing back then? 46 00:03:12,000 --> 00:03:15,520 Speaker 1: What they succeeded in most was disinformation and we're going 47 00:03:15,560 --> 00:03:18,320 Speaker 1: to set that aside. What we're going to talk about 48 00:03:18,480 --> 00:03:22,720 Speaker 1: are the three major hacks of election systems in the 49 00:03:22,760 --> 00:03:26,960 Speaker 1: United States. We are learning more about the hat into 50 00:03:27,000 --> 00:03:30,200 Speaker 1: the Democratic National Committee, including the first was of the 51 00:03:30,240 --> 00:03:33,079 Speaker 1: Democratic National Committee, which I think everyone knows the most 52 00:03:33,120 --> 00:03:36,480 Speaker 1: about on believe of the convention. Wiki leaks released thousands 53 00:03:36,560 --> 00:03:38,840 Speaker 1: of emails from the time. There are a number of 54 00:03:38,880 --> 00:03:43,960 Speaker 1: emails in which senior officials can be seen conspiring against 55 00:03:44,160 --> 00:03:47,280 Speaker 1: Bernie Sanders, the chair of the d n C, Congresswoman 56 00:03:47,320 --> 00:03:51,320 Speaker 1: Debbie Wasserman Schultz, has announced her resignation. It comes after 57 00:03:51,360 --> 00:03:55,360 Speaker 1: those leaked emails. We actually ran an episode about this 58 00:03:55,520 --> 00:03:58,920 Speaker 1: three years ago, so our listeners are well versed, very good. 59 00:03:59,400 --> 00:04:02,720 Speaker 1: The other two hacks they may not know as much about. 60 00:04:02,880 --> 00:04:06,680 Speaker 1: Justin Governor Rhonda Santis now says Russian hackers gained access 61 00:04:06,720 --> 00:04:11,720 Speaker 1: to voter databases into Florida counties ahead of the presidential election. 62 00:04:12,200 --> 00:04:15,000 Speaker 1: The first one is Florida, which nobody knows much about. 63 00:04:15,440 --> 00:04:19,440 Speaker 1: The DHS and the state officials have been a secretive 64 00:04:19,839 --> 00:04:22,039 Speaker 1: about this one. The governor can't say the names of 65 00:04:22,040 --> 00:04:25,120 Speaker 1: the counties involved because he signed a confidentiality agreement with 66 00:04:25,160 --> 00:04:30,080 Speaker 1: the FBI. Hackers sent phishing emails to county officials. Two 67 00:04:30,160 --> 00:04:34,200 Speaker 1: of them clicked on the links and allowed Russian hackers 68 00:04:34,240 --> 00:04:37,800 Speaker 1: access to their database. All we know is that votes 69 00:04:37,839 --> 00:04:41,120 Speaker 1: weren't changed. Then there's Illinois, which you know in a 70 00:04:41,200 --> 00:04:45,240 Speaker 1: lot more about because they've been forthcoming about what happened. 71 00:04:46,040 --> 00:04:48,240 Speaker 1: And briefly, what happened was that in the middle of 72 00:04:48,320 --> 00:04:53,160 Speaker 1: June of two thousand sixteen, hackers found an unlocked door 73 00:04:53,200 --> 00:04:57,080 Speaker 1: in the voter registration database, got in and downloaded as 74 00:04:57,160 --> 00:05:00,440 Speaker 1: much information as they could. After three weeks of unloading 75 00:05:00,440 --> 00:05:04,240 Speaker 1: and trying to change information, they said, Hi, Illinois, we've 76 00:05:04,240 --> 00:05:07,680 Speaker 1: been here all along, and they shut down their system. 77 00:05:07,680 --> 00:05:10,680 Speaker 1: This was the thing that Matt Emmons and his colleagues 78 00:05:10,720 --> 00:05:14,640 Speaker 1: discovered all the way out in July. That's right. So 79 00:05:14,760 --> 00:05:16,480 Speaker 1: three weeks after they got in in the middle of 80 00:05:16,560 --> 00:05:19,560 Speaker 1: July in two thousand and sixteen, Matt Emmons and his 81 00:05:19,640 --> 00:05:23,800 Speaker 1: colleagues discovered that Russian hackers have been in their system 82 00:05:23,839 --> 00:05:29,120 Speaker 1: all along, trying to gain access to social security numbers, 83 00:05:29,279 --> 00:05:33,960 Speaker 1: driver's license numbers, names addresses, phone numbers, anything related to 84 00:05:33,960 --> 00:05:38,880 Speaker 1: your voter registration information. They found that seventy six thousand 85 00:05:39,000 --> 00:05:43,120 Speaker 1: people's data had been accessed by Russian hackers in a 86 00:05:43,160 --> 00:05:46,560 Speaker 1: way that they could relate these data points to actual people, 87 00:05:46,920 --> 00:05:50,600 Speaker 1: and do these people know who they are? They do so. 88 00:05:50,640 --> 00:05:54,080 Speaker 1: They all received notifications in the mail shortly after the 89 00:05:54,080 --> 00:05:57,920 Speaker 1: hack informing them that their data had been compromised. Nothing 90 00:05:57,960 --> 00:06:02,520 Speaker 1: that's followed indicated that Russia did something with these names, 91 00:06:02,800 --> 00:06:04,840 Speaker 1: but they do have the information. But they do have 92 00:06:04,920 --> 00:06:08,880 Speaker 1: the information, that's right, So Illinois says nothing happened, No 93 00:06:09,000 --> 00:06:13,640 Speaker 1: data was changed because Russian hackers only had read access 94 00:06:13,720 --> 00:06:15,760 Speaker 1: to the data. They could download as much of it 95 00:06:15,800 --> 00:06:18,400 Speaker 1: as they wanted to, but they couldn't actually change anything. 96 00:06:18,480 --> 00:06:21,880 Speaker 1: They didn't have right permissions. The Department of Homeland Security 97 00:06:22,160 --> 00:06:25,520 Speaker 1: told the Senate Intelligence Committee earlier this year on the 98 00:06:25,560 --> 00:06:29,040 Speaker 1: report that we saw that they could have done more, 99 00:06:29,320 --> 00:06:32,680 Speaker 1: and they stayed quote. Why they didn't is an open 100 00:06:32,800 --> 00:06:39,839 Speaker 1: ended question. Yeah, it's weird. If if they were able 101 00:06:39,880 --> 00:06:42,800 Speaker 1: to go further, why wouldn't they The answer to that 102 00:06:42,880 --> 00:06:46,560 Speaker 1: is pure speculation, both on my part and the Department 103 00:06:46,560 --> 00:06:49,919 Speaker 1: of Homeland Security. They don't know the answer. But the 104 00:06:49,960 --> 00:06:53,560 Speaker 1: worst case scenario there is that they were seeking intelligence 105 00:06:53,880 --> 00:06:57,039 Speaker 1: for the future so that next time they really want 106 00:06:57,080 --> 00:06:59,919 Speaker 1: to access a database and change something they know how to, 107 00:07:00,839 --> 00:07:04,560 Speaker 1: or that they were there to drop secret malware that 108 00:07:04,680 --> 00:07:07,120 Speaker 1: they can trigger in the future when they want to. 109 00:07:07,800 --> 00:07:10,680 Speaker 1: Officials on both the federal and state level believe that 110 00:07:10,720 --> 00:07:14,800 Speaker 1: there is no malware in the Illinois voter registration database. Theoretically, 111 00:07:14,840 --> 00:07:18,640 Speaker 1: if hackers decided to do more than just download names 112 00:07:18,680 --> 00:07:23,000 Speaker 1: and addresses from the voter database, if they actually made 113 00:07:23,120 --> 00:07:26,080 Speaker 1: changes to that database, what could they do Because this 114 00:07:26,160 --> 00:07:29,400 Speaker 1: is different from going into the voting machines, for example, 115 00:07:29,600 --> 00:07:33,800 Speaker 1: and changing the ballots themselves. So the worst case scenario 116 00:07:33,880 --> 00:07:38,200 Speaker 1: here is that when you arrive to vote, the poll 117 00:07:38,240 --> 00:07:42,080 Speaker 1: book that has all the voter registration information wouldn't match 118 00:07:42,160 --> 00:07:45,120 Speaker 1: up with your own information. You couldn't verify that you 119 00:07:45,160 --> 00:07:48,320 Speaker 1: are the person who registered to vote, and you may 120 00:07:48,360 --> 00:07:51,560 Speaker 1: not be able to vote immediately, or you may have 121 00:07:51,680 --> 00:07:55,960 Speaker 1: to cast a provisional ballot that might be verified and 122 00:07:56,040 --> 00:07:59,520 Speaker 1: might not in the future. And why would hackers from 123 00:08:00,040 --> 00:08:03,040 Speaker 1: say Russia wants something like that. Well, there's a couple 124 00:08:03,040 --> 00:08:07,440 Speaker 1: of reasons. One, it's a form of voter suppression. There 125 00:08:07,520 --> 00:08:11,440 Speaker 1: might be fewer ballots cast if the registration system has 126 00:08:11,480 --> 00:08:17,200 Speaker 1: been altered b you, so mistrust in the election system. 127 00:08:17,240 --> 00:08:19,720 Speaker 1: There are fewer people coming out to vote if they 128 00:08:19,760 --> 00:08:23,120 Speaker 1: believe that even by registering to vote, when they arrive 129 00:08:23,520 --> 00:08:25,400 Speaker 1: they can actually vote or vote in the way that 130 00:08:25,440 --> 00:08:31,760 Speaker 1: they expect to. So they're creating roadblocks and mistrust in democracy. 131 00:08:31,960 --> 00:08:35,040 Speaker 1: So what is Illinois doing this time to better protect 132 00:08:35,080 --> 00:08:39,800 Speaker 1: their systems? So all states got a portion of million 133 00:08:39,840 --> 00:08:43,200 Speaker 1: dollars from the federal government in grants and they match 134 00:08:43,320 --> 00:08:45,559 Speaker 1: that with a small portion of their own, So thirteen 135 00:08:45,600 --> 00:08:48,080 Speaker 1: million in federal funds and five million from the state 136 00:08:49,240 --> 00:08:53,360 Speaker 1: to hire a new staff. The biggest hiring push has 137 00:08:53,400 --> 00:08:57,199 Speaker 1: been in a program called cyber Navigators, which is probably 138 00:08:57,240 --> 00:09:01,679 Speaker 1: the coolest name in election security since in the it 139 00:09:01,760 --> 00:09:04,880 Speaker 1: is kind of nerdy election security as Canton nerdy. So 140 00:09:05,080 --> 00:09:08,040 Speaker 1: they've spent a large chunk of change hiring these nine 141 00:09:08,080 --> 00:09:12,200 Speaker 1: cyber navigators who oversee different pockets of Illinois, and a 142 00:09:12,200 --> 00:09:15,319 Speaker 1: lot of these counties don't have much I T support, 143 00:09:15,440 --> 00:09:18,200 Speaker 1: so these individuals are meant to be the front lines 144 00:09:18,480 --> 00:09:22,319 Speaker 1: for these counties and ensuring that any vulnerabilities that currently 145 00:09:22,320 --> 00:09:25,920 Speaker 1: exist are plugged. So they're going to go through cycles 146 00:09:25,960 --> 00:09:30,200 Speaker 1: of assessment between now and over and over again to 147 00:09:30,280 --> 00:09:33,719 Speaker 1: ensure that there are no new vulnerabilities between now and 148 00:09:33,920 --> 00:09:37,680 Speaker 1: an election day. Are they doing anything else? Illinois has 149 00:09:37,720 --> 00:09:39,840 Speaker 1: a couple of things going on. They have what are 150 00:09:39,880 --> 00:09:44,200 Speaker 1: called Albert sensors installed. They allow both state and federal 151 00:09:44,200 --> 00:09:48,920 Speaker 1: officials to monitor Illinois voting apparatus, so if there's any 152 00:09:48,960 --> 00:09:52,400 Speaker 1: outside infiltration, both the state and the Department of Homeland 153 00:09:52,440 --> 00:09:56,120 Speaker 1: Security will know and should be able to respond. They 154 00:09:56,160 --> 00:09:59,760 Speaker 1: also have the National Guard on call and and what 155 00:10:00,040 --> 00:10:03,920 Speaker 1: the National Guard do. The National Guard is available in 156 00:10:03,960 --> 00:10:06,880 Speaker 1: the event of a hack on election day, so if 157 00:10:06,880 --> 00:10:11,000 Speaker 1: a remote county in Illinois is infiltrated, the National Guard 158 00:10:11,080 --> 00:10:13,080 Speaker 1: can call on their cyber warriors to get in a 159 00:10:13,160 --> 00:10:17,640 Speaker 1: chopper and fly to DeKalb County to respond to any 160 00:10:17,720 --> 00:10:26,200 Speaker 1: hack to protect the integrity of the election. We'll be 161 00:10:26,280 --> 00:10:41,679 Speaker 1: right back. So before the break Cardike. You walked us 162 00:10:41,679 --> 00:10:44,480 Speaker 1: through the different things that Illinois is doing to better 163 00:10:44,480 --> 00:10:48,560 Speaker 1: protect itself. It actually sounded like quite a bit to me. 164 00:10:49,720 --> 00:10:52,559 Speaker 1: I guess the big question is will that be enough? 165 00:10:53,280 --> 00:10:54,720 Speaker 1: I talked to a lot of people in the last 166 00:10:54,960 --> 00:10:57,199 Speaker 1: month and a half and it's a little more complicated 167 00:10:57,240 --> 00:11:00,480 Speaker 1: than just yes or no. One expert I talked to 168 00:11:00,720 --> 00:11:04,240 Speaker 1: is an analyst at fire Eye. His name is Luke McNamara. 169 00:11:04,480 --> 00:11:06,160 Speaker 1: I think you have with the states and many of 170 00:11:06,200 --> 00:11:08,680 Speaker 1: them playing catch up with the resources they have, and 171 00:11:08,720 --> 00:11:10,480 Speaker 1: I think it's a very difficult place to be in 172 00:11:10,559 --> 00:11:13,839 Speaker 1: when trying to reach a more coroactive footing to deal 173 00:11:13,880 --> 00:11:19,600 Speaker 1: with this threat. As the threat evolve, are these states 174 00:11:19,679 --> 00:11:23,760 Speaker 1: in a perpetual cycle of playing catch up? I think 175 00:11:23,840 --> 00:11:26,800 Speaker 1: some are are putting the right resources in place, that 176 00:11:26,880 --> 00:11:28,839 Speaker 1: putting the right investments in place, But it is a 177 00:11:28,920 --> 00:11:32,520 Speaker 1: very difficult problem to address, uh. And there's there's some 178 00:11:32,640 --> 00:11:35,520 Speaker 1: amount of irony here in that. A lot of the 179 00:11:35,600 --> 00:11:38,640 Speaker 1: threat vectors, a lot of the methodologies that we see, 180 00:11:38,679 --> 00:11:41,520 Speaker 1: even some of the more advanced threat actors utilizing, are 181 00:11:41,600 --> 00:11:44,400 Speaker 1: very simple in nature. When we look at how the 182 00:11:44,440 --> 00:11:48,920 Speaker 1: majority of intrusions begin, the majority of attacks begin, they 183 00:11:48,960 --> 00:11:52,160 Speaker 1: begin with spear fishing for the most part, and I 184 00:11:52,280 --> 00:11:57,199 Speaker 1: think even helping those county clerks, those election administrators understand 185 00:11:57,640 --> 00:12:01,200 Speaker 1: how to look for signs of spearfish and how to 186 00:12:01,240 --> 00:12:04,480 Speaker 1: identify that that I think can pay dividends and that 187 00:12:04,480 --> 00:12:08,120 Speaker 1: doesn't necessarily need to involve the deployment of expensive technology. 188 00:12:08,160 --> 00:12:11,280 Speaker 1: By the way, Luke's employer, fire I is helping at 189 00:12:11,360 --> 00:12:15,880 Speaker 1: least fifteen states along with municipalities and counties, the bigger 190 00:12:15,920 --> 00:12:18,920 Speaker 1: counties that can actually afford to pay fire EYE prepare 191 00:12:18,960 --> 00:12:22,640 Speaker 1: for And so we just heard Luke talk about spear fishing. 192 00:12:23,360 --> 00:12:26,960 Speaker 1: This is when hackers send county officials an email with 193 00:12:27,000 --> 00:12:31,240 Speaker 1: an attachment something like a click here exactly. They shouldn't 194 00:12:31,240 --> 00:12:34,880 Speaker 1: be clicking, but when they do, they allow the infiltraders 195 00:12:34,920 --> 00:12:38,320 Speaker 1: access to their networks. So fire I is trying to 196 00:12:38,320 --> 00:12:41,360 Speaker 1: make sure that county clerks aren't clicking. One of the 197 00:12:41,360 --> 00:12:45,280 Speaker 1: other things they're doing is offering intelligence to local officials 198 00:12:45,320 --> 00:12:48,560 Speaker 1: about their attackers. Fire I believe is that the best 199 00:12:48,640 --> 00:12:51,839 Speaker 1: way to prepare foreign adversary is to understand your adversary, 200 00:12:51,920 --> 00:12:55,240 Speaker 1: to know exactly why they want to infiltrate your system 201 00:12:55,280 --> 00:12:57,880 Speaker 1: and how they'll do it. I think certainly Russia, from 202 00:12:57,880 --> 00:13:01,080 Speaker 1: what we've seen UM they are have shown themselves to 203 00:13:01,080 --> 00:13:05,920 Speaker 1: be the most aggressive and going after democratic institutions and processes, 204 00:13:06,320 --> 00:13:08,520 Speaker 1: and I think as a result, it's very important for 205 00:13:08,600 --> 00:13:11,000 Speaker 1: us to pay attention to what we see, particularly with 206 00:13:11,040 --> 00:13:14,400 Speaker 1: European elections between now and UM. But I think that 207 00:13:14,440 --> 00:13:17,720 Speaker 1: maybe more hasn't been said about that there are other 208 00:13:17,760 --> 00:13:19,880 Speaker 1: threat groups that are active in the space. We've seen 209 00:13:19,960 --> 00:13:24,720 Speaker 1: China target elections Cambodia last year, certainly the case probably 210 00:13:24,760 --> 00:13:27,520 Speaker 1: as well for Iran. What's at stake when we talk 211 00:13:27,520 --> 00:13:31,880 Speaker 1: about election hacking? Are you worried about hackers hijacking election results? 212 00:13:31,880 --> 00:13:35,000 Speaker 1: Are we talking about the credibility of results? Or is 213 00:13:35,040 --> 00:13:39,000 Speaker 1: it something else altogether? Yeah? I think in many respects 214 00:13:39,200 --> 00:13:43,280 Speaker 1: it's the activity that falls short of actually compromising votes 215 00:13:43,520 --> 00:13:46,240 Speaker 1: that concerns me more. Um, they could do a repeat 216 00:13:46,240 --> 00:13:49,839 Speaker 1: of what we've seen them do in Ukraine in previous years, 217 00:13:49,880 --> 00:13:53,439 Speaker 1: where they compromised the central election commissioned website and then 218 00:13:53,480 --> 00:13:57,560 Speaker 1: posted out erroneous results. None of the actual results themselves 219 00:13:57,559 --> 00:14:01,040 Speaker 1: were changed, but it was sufficient enough to cause some 220 00:14:01,080 --> 00:14:03,800 Speaker 1: people probably to question what is is really real in 221 00:14:03,800 --> 00:14:06,959 Speaker 1: the situation. So I think those sorts of intrusions, those 222 00:14:06,960 --> 00:14:10,920 Speaker 1: sorts of attacks, the sorts of disinformation campaigns that maybe 223 00:14:10,920 --> 00:14:14,520 Speaker 1: fall short of actual compromising and deletion or destruction of 224 00:14:14,600 --> 00:14:18,400 Speaker 1: voter data, but I can still be effective at causing infusion. 225 00:14:18,760 --> 00:14:21,200 Speaker 1: Those are things that we should heavily consider and be 226 00:14:21,240 --> 00:14:27,360 Speaker 1: prepared for. Okay, So to sum it up, the good 227 00:14:27,400 --> 00:14:30,120 Speaker 1: news is that we now at least know to prepare 228 00:14:30,200 --> 00:14:33,120 Speaker 1: for this, which is a big step. And we also 229 00:14:33,160 --> 00:14:35,880 Speaker 1: know that the hackers gained access in pretty simple ways, 230 00:14:36,160 --> 00:14:40,240 Speaker 1: which means the defenses could be pretty simple too. But 231 00:14:40,280 --> 00:14:42,320 Speaker 1: then the bad news is that the hackers might step 232 00:14:42,400 --> 00:14:45,360 Speaker 1: up their game this time, and there are now more 233 00:14:45,600 --> 00:14:49,280 Speaker 1: potential adversaries than just Russia. Does that sound like a 234 00:14:49,280 --> 00:14:53,640 Speaker 1: good summary. That's about right, and that's probably pretty daunting 235 00:14:53,680 --> 00:14:57,000 Speaker 1: on its own. But that's only part of the problem. 236 00:14:57,040 --> 00:15:00,560 Speaker 1: And so I called Illinois Governor J. B. Pritzker I 237 00:15:01,440 --> 00:15:05,000 Speaker 1: riser Governor fritzger Good afternoon to talk through the other 238 00:15:05,080 --> 00:15:08,960 Speaker 1: challenges he's facing. And the biggest one is probably the 239 00:15:09,000 --> 00:15:12,400 Speaker 1: fact that he's trying to solve a federal security crisis 240 00:15:12,840 --> 00:15:16,920 Speaker 1: on a state budget. It's a national security issue, um, 241 00:15:17,400 --> 00:15:22,600 Speaker 1: and the federal government should be at the forefront. And 242 00:15:22,640 --> 00:15:24,920 Speaker 1: I'm finding, at least for our state, that the state 243 00:15:25,000 --> 00:15:27,400 Speaker 1: is at the forefront and the federal government is there 244 00:15:27,800 --> 00:15:33,360 Speaker 1: for uh less than the leadership role. I'm not viewing 245 00:15:33,400 --> 00:15:37,920 Speaker 1: myself as dependent upon Washington d C. I would say 246 00:15:38,080 --> 00:15:42,240 Speaker 1: the states would like more help, and we are. Um, 247 00:15:42,360 --> 00:15:45,880 Speaker 1: you know, we've expressed that by more help, is he 248 00:15:45,960 --> 00:15:49,720 Speaker 1: talking about federal money. Yeah, he wants Congress and the 249 00:15:49,720 --> 00:15:54,040 Speaker 1: Trump administration to approve new grants to give to states. 250 00:15:54,080 --> 00:15:58,040 Speaker 1: So far, Illinois received thirteen million dollars in two thousand 251 00:15:58,040 --> 00:16:01,480 Speaker 1: and eighteen. They matched five million of their own. But 252 00:16:01,560 --> 00:16:04,400 Speaker 1: what they really say they need is a hundred and 253 00:16:04,440 --> 00:16:08,360 Speaker 1: seventy five million dollars to gut their election apparatus and 254 00:16:08,440 --> 00:16:11,080 Speaker 1: build a system they believe is safe and secure, not 255 00:16:11,160 --> 00:16:14,880 Speaker 1: just for but for the future. So that's a major shortfall. 256 00:16:15,120 --> 00:16:17,400 Speaker 1: There's a massive gap in what they have and what 257 00:16:17,480 --> 00:16:20,720 Speaker 1: they need. And so aside from the shortfall and resources 258 00:16:21,280 --> 00:16:25,200 Speaker 1: to rebuild the state's election infrastructure, state and local governments 259 00:16:25,280 --> 00:16:28,239 Speaker 1: also don't have the money to hire the best engineers 260 00:16:28,240 --> 00:16:33,240 Speaker 1: to protect their systems. Look think about what someone like 261 00:16:33,480 --> 00:16:38,720 Speaker 1: Ron Garry, a with his background was probably earning in 262 00:16:38,760 --> 00:16:41,600 Speaker 1: the private sector Ron Garry, A, by the way, is 263 00:16:41,640 --> 00:16:46,200 Speaker 1: the state's Chief Information Officer and the Secretary of Innovation 264 00:16:46,240 --> 00:16:48,640 Speaker 1: and Technology, And so he used to be the c 265 00:16:48,840 --> 00:16:52,320 Speaker 1: i O at Farmers Insurance and Toyota of North America, 266 00:16:53,000 --> 00:16:56,640 Speaker 1: and then in Illinois the you know the showeries which 267 00:16:56,640 --> 00:17:00,640 Speaker 1: are published. So I'm not revealing anything that isn't publicly out. 268 00:17:01,280 --> 00:17:03,720 Speaker 1: Got a salary that we're offering to a c i 269 00:17:03,800 --> 00:17:06,040 Speaker 1: OH is in the neighborhood of a hundred and seventy 270 00:17:06,160 --> 00:17:09,480 Speaker 1: thousand dollars a year. And I don't think that typical 271 00:17:10,359 --> 00:17:15,680 Speaker 1: salaries that are offered for chief information officers or chief 272 00:17:16,160 --> 00:17:21,440 Speaker 1: information security officers for state government are commencer with being 273 00:17:21,440 --> 00:17:25,240 Speaker 1: competitive in any way with the private check Do you 274 00:17:25,240 --> 00:17:29,439 Speaker 1: get the sense that the governor thinks Illinois is writing nonetheless? 275 00:17:29,960 --> 00:17:31,760 Speaker 1: I don't think the governor of Illinois is going to 276 00:17:31,800 --> 00:17:34,000 Speaker 1: put a target on his back and say, we're not 277 00:17:34,080 --> 00:17:37,680 Speaker 1: prepared to come hack us, please please come hack us. No. Now, 278 00:17:37,720 --> 00:17:41,320 Speaker 1: I think I think, uh, they've hired some some good 279 00:17:41,320 --> 00:17:44,560 Speaker 1: people with their limited resources. The I T technician with 280 00:17:44,600 --> 00:17:48,840 Speaker 1: the Illinois State Board of Elections, Met Emmons. What's he 281 00:17:48,880 --> 00:17:52,280 Speaker 1: doing today? He's running the I T Department for the 282 00:17:52,320 --> 00:17:55,679 Speaker 1: State Board of Elections, and they are working with the 283 00:17:55,720 --> 00:17:58,560 Speaker 1: Department of Homeland Security and their own internal staff too 284 00:17:59,359 --> 00:18:03,280 Speaker 1: pepper their system with tests to ensure that there's nobody 285 00:18:03,280 --> 00:18:05,760 Speaker 1: in their system now who shouldn't be, and there's no 286 00:18:05,800 --> 00:18:09,280 Speaker 1: malware in their system now. He spent the last month 287 00:18:09,320 --> 00:18:13,199 Speaker 1: and a half reporting on this topic. Is America ready for? 288 00:18:15,080 --> 00:18:18,960 Speaker 1: It's so hard to say is America ready for? Because 289 00:18:18,960 --> 00:18:22,480 Speaker 1: the truth is that you have fifty states and all 290 00:18:22,520 --> 00:18:25,639 Speaker 1: the counties within those states that are now tasked with 291 00:18:25,720 --> 00:18:35,359 Speaker 1: defending the integrity of the presidential election. Is every county ready? 292 00:18:36,640 --> 00:18:39,880 Speaker 1: We certainly know that Illinois has done everything they can 293 00:18:40,240 --> 00:18:42,520 Speaker 1: in the last three and a half years to prepare for, 294 00:18:43,640 --> 00:18:47,400 Speaker 1: but there's all these smaller swing states and counties that 295 00:18:47,680 --> 00:18:49,720 Speaker 1: may not have the resources that a big state like 296 00:18:49,800 --> 00:18:53,840 Speaker 1: Illinois has to prepare. The DHS is traveling the country 297 00:18:53,880 --> 00:18:57,679 Speaker 1: to inform these and educate these county clerks, but to 298 00:18:57,760 --> 00:19:00,480 Speaker 1: what extent are they going to take action to respond? 299 00:19:00,760 --> 00:19:05,520 Speaker 1: And so is the entire country ready? Probably not, But 300 00:19:05,600 --> 00:19:09,960 Speaker 1: there's time between now and November, and everyone with a 301 00:19:09,960 --> 00:19:12,400 Speaker 1: stake in the game is probably doing everything they can 302 00:19:12,720 --> 00:19:22,679 Speaker 1: to prepare. Card K Rotra. Thank you for your story today, 303 00:19:23,280 --> 00:19:36,000 Speaker 1: Thank you for having Me Decrypted. Is produced by Meat 304 00:19:36,960 --> 00:19:40,240 Speaker 1: and Ethan Brooks, Emily Buso and Ann vander May are 305 00:19:40,400 --> 00:19:44,720 Speaker 1: story editors. Francesca Levi is the head of Bloomberg Podcasts. 306 00:19:45,040 --> 00:20:04,879 Speaker 1: We'll see you next week. No Came.