WEBVTT - Tech News: Reddit Takes Misinformation Seriously

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<v Speaker 1>Welcome to tech Stuff, a production from I Heart Radio.

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<v Speaker 1>Hey there, and welcome to tech Stuff. I'm your host,

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<v Speaker 1>Jonathan Strickland. I'm an executive producer with I Heart Radio

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<v Speaker 1>and I love all things tech. And this is the

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<v Speaker 1>tech news for Thursday, September second, two thousand twenty one.

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<v Speaker 1>Earlier this week, I talked about how thousands of subreddits

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<v Speaker 1>on the site Reddit are calling on Reddit to crack

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<v Speaker 1>down on COVID nineteen misinformation and disinformation that is otherwise

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<v Speaker 1>proliferating across the site. Reddit had quarantined a subreddit called

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<v Speaker 1>our slash No New Normal, meaning Reddit had effectively cut

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<v Speaker 1>off access to the subreddit for new users, but had

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<v Speaker 1>not actually shut it down. But now that's changed. Reddit

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<v Speaker 1>has subsequently banned the No New Normal subreddit completely, and

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<v Speaker 1>as warantined, more than fifty other subreddits also found to

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<v Speaker 1>have spread and promoted COVID misinformation. So it looks like

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<v Speaker 1>Reddit is making a shift, at least when it comes

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<v Speaker 1>to matters of public health. As I said earlier this week,

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<v Speaker 1>the official stance of the company had been let's just

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<v Speaker 1>let the users kind of hash out what to believe,

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<v Speaker 1>very similar to what Mark Zuckerberg said about content on Facebook.

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<v Speaker 1>And you know that can be fine if you're talking

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<v Speaker 1>about different points of view that have validity to them. Right,

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<v Speaker 1>If you have two people who disagree about something, but

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<v Speaker 1>they have valid reasons for that disagreement, letting them hash

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<v Speaker 1>it out, that makes sense and not taking sides until

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<v Speaker 1>we get that. But when it comes to truth versus misinformation,

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<v Speaker 1>it's a different matter entirely. Anyway, I'm not going to

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<v Speaker 1>go down that rabbit hole again. You already heard me

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<v Speaker 1>say that earlier this week. Instead, I'll say that Reddit

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<v Speaker 1>won't allow posts that promote quote falsifiable health information that

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<v Speaker 1>encourages or poses a significant risk of physical arm to

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<v Speaker 1>the reader end quote. I think that's the ethical choice here,

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<v Speaker 1>as this is not, you know, a case of the

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<v Speaker 1>dresses blue and black. No, you're an idiot, The dress

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<v Speaker 1>is white and gold. This is really about people spreading

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<v Speaker 1>narratives that have potentially tragic consequences, with more people getting sick,

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<v Speaker 1>hospitals becoming overwhelmed, and ultimately more people dying as a result.

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<v Speaker 1>I think Reddit's response is a good one. I also

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<v Speaker 1>think it was a necessary response, not just because it

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<v Speaker 1>was the right thing to do, as I believe it was,

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<v Speaker 1>but also because the subredits that were protesting all this

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<v Speaker 1>misinformation in the first place, We're starting to use some

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<v Speaker 1>pretty guerrilla warfare tactics to disrupt the subredits that we're

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<v Speaker 1>spreading misinformation going in there and like posting not safe

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<v Speaker 1>for work content and such in order to necessitate a

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<v Speaker 1>change in that subreddit status. And if Reddit had not

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<v Speaker 1>stepped in, the whole platform could have descended into a

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<v Speaker 1>chaotic mess. Samsung has entered used a new sensor for

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<v Speaker 1>mobile devices that has a resolution of two hundred megapixels.

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<v Speaker 1>That's pretty incredible stuff, but let's break down what that means.

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<v Speaker 1>Super Fast digital images when you zoom way way way in,

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<v Speaker 1>are made up of tiny little points of light called pixels,

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<v Speaker 1>and collectively, these pixels appear to us as you know,

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<v Speaker 1>photographs and videos and stuff when we're looking at them

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<v Speaker 1>on screens, and generally speaking, the more pixels you can

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<v Speaker 1>cram into a certain size frame, the more detail you

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<v Speaker 1>can capture in that image. Now, once you get beyond

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<v Speaker 1>a certain resolution, the human eye is going to have

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<v Speaker 1>a lot of trouble picking out any extra detail. So

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<v Speaker 1>if you're just looking at a full size image, you're

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<v Speaker 1>not likely to see the difference. So megapixels and cameras

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<v Speaker 1>really only matter up to a point unless you're looking

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<v Speaker 1>for a specific use case. So, for example, let's say

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<v Speaker 1>that you're a photographer and you want to take photos

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<v Speaker 1>of stuff that you later intend to enlarge so that

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<v Speaker 1>you can make movie poster sized print outs of it. Well,

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<v Speaker 1>in that case, you want a camera that has sensors

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<v Speaker 1>that can, yeah, you know, capture a lot of megapixels,

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<v Speaker 1>because otherwise, as you enlarge the image, you start to

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<v Speaker 1>lose that detail. If you've got, you know, are very

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<v Speaker 1>high megapixel camera, you can enlarge an image to a

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<v Speaker 1>pretty impressive degree and not lose any noticeable detail as

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<v Speaker 1>a result. So this means that in the future, if

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<v Speaker 1>you happen to buy one of these phones that's going

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<v Speaker 1>to have a two D megapixel image sensor, you could

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<v Speaker 1>theoretically snap a photo with your phone and then later

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<v Speaker 1>you could digitally zoom way, way way in on the

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<v Speaker 1>image to look at something specific, and you could even

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<v Speaker 1>crop the photo and have it take you know, a

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<v Speaker 1>full size photo as if you were you know, right

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<v Speaker 1>up on something as opposed to really far back from it,

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<v Speaker 1>and you don't lose any detail. In the image. That's

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<v Speaker 1>pretty cool, especially if you want to take photos of

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<v Speaker 1>stuff that you cannot get close to. Let's say like

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<v Speaker 1>you're taking a picture of a historic building and there's

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<v Speaker 1>a barrier where you're not supposed to cross, and you

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<v Speaker 1>want to get really fine detail on a specific part.

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<v Speaker 1>You can only zoom in so much with most digital cameras,

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<v Speaker 1>if especially if you don't have a telephoto lens. So

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<v Speaker 1>this is something that can help you with that, where

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<v Speaker 1>that pixel density can allow you to capture detail that

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<v Speaker 1>otherwise you might lose. Something else. The sensor does that

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<v Speaker 1>I think is really neat is it adapts to take

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<v Speaker 1>images in low light situations. So camera sensors are all

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<v Speaker 1>about capturing light when you get down to it, and

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<v Speaker 1>some digital cameras, whether they're in smartphones or otherwise, have

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<v Speaker 1>some trouble in dim light situations and they produce grainy

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<v Speaker 1>images as a result. The Samsung sensor will have blocks

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<v Speaker 1>of sixteen pixels essentially teaming up to act like a

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<v Speaker 1>single pixel. So in this case, the overall image would

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<v Speaker 1>get reduced to twelve point five megapixels instead of two

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<v Speaker 1>hundred because those blocks of sixteen would be acting as

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<v Speaker 1>one reducing it down to twelve point five megapixels, but

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<v Speaker 1>that those sixteen pixels will be able to more effectively

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<v Speaker 1>capture the light that's in the scene and thus produce

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<v Speaker 1>better low light photos as a result. So, yeah, there'll

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<v Speaker 1>be fewer megapixels, you won't be able to zoom in

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<v Speaker 1>as far without losing detail, but you'll be able to

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<v Speaker 1>get a better image out of a low light situation. Now,

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<v Speaker 1>there's no word yet on when we might expect to

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<v Speaker 1>see phones that actually have these sensors in them. I

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<v Speaker 1>imagine they'll be popping up after a generation or two

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<v Speaker 1>of new devices, So we're probably looking at you know,

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<v Speaker 1>not maybe not by early next year, but maybe mid

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<v Speaker 1>to late next year, maybe we start seeing devices that

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<v Speaker 1>have these kind of sensors in it. I think that's

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<v Speaker 1>pretty neat. You know. I've talked a lot this year

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<v Speaker 1>about data breaches and hackers in ransomware. I wish I

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<v Speaker 1>didn't have to talk about it so much, but it's

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<v Speaker 1>been happening a lot. Well, we're gonna get to some

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<v Speaker 1>similar stuff right now. Bleeping Computer, it's a website, has

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<v Speaker 1>a piece that says the ransomware hacker group lock Bit

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<v Speaker 1>two point oh is actively trying to recruit folks who

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<v Speaker 1>work inside large corporations and the whole purpose is to

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<v Speaker 1>try and help this ransomware group plant malware on corporate

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<v Speaker 1>machines to kind of act as like an in road

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<v Speaker 1>for the hackers. See, when we think about hackers and malware,

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<v Speaker 1>we often think about someone finding like, you know, a

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<v Speaker 1>technical backdoor vulnerability. They're on their computer, they're typing quickly,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, they type in a password a couple of

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<v Speaker 1>times to get access to a system. Or maybe we

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<v Speaker 1>think about someone using social engineering to convince a person

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<v Speaker 1>who is authorized to access systems to hand over that

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<v Speaker 1>access by tricking them. This is the classic. Hey, I'm

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<v Speaker 1>from I T and I need to install some new

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<v Speaker 1>software in your machine and it should only take a

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<v Speaker 1>few minutes if you want to go in, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>take a coffee break. That is more common than you

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<v Speaker 1>might think. But sometimes the malware is coming from inside

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<v Speaker 1>the house. Sometimes employees of these companies can be convinced

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<v Speaker 1>to turn on their employers and help out a ransomware group. Now,

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<v Speaker 1>ransomware gangs typically demand some pretty high prices to return

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<v Speaker 1>systems to their rightful owners. And in case you're not

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<v Speaker 1>really familiar with what ransomware is. It's usually some software

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<v Speaker 1>that will encrypt data on a computer system or a

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<v Speaker 1>full computer network so that that data becomes inaccessible unless

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<v Speaker 1>you happen to have the decryption key, and then the

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<v Speaker 1>ransomware group demands a ransom be paid in order for

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<v Speaker 1>them to turn over that decryption key, and so a

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<v Speaker 1>lot bit two point oh is saying that insiders stand

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<v Speaker 1>to earn quote millions of dollars end quote if they

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<v Speaker 1>go along with it. But let me say a couple

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<v Speaker 1>of things before some of you all decide that you're

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<v Speaker 1>going to stick it to the man and and become

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<v Speaker 1>the infection vector for malware to hit your company's systems. First,

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<v Speaker 1>the general advice that companies receive whenever they're hit with

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<v Speaker 1>ransomware is that they should not pay the ransom because one,

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<v Speaker 1>there's no guarantee that they will have control returned to them.

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<v Speaker 1>And to every single payout is a message that goes

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<v Speaker 1>out to the hacking community that says ransomware is a

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<v Speaker 1>good way to make money. So, in other words, paying

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<v Speaker 1>ransoms encourages future attacks, So that could mean you could

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<v Speaker 1>go through the trouble of performing a criminal act on

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<v Speaker 1>behalf of this ransomware group, putting yourself at risk and

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<v Speaker 1>your company at risk, and your company might never pay

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<v Speaker 1>out that ransom, so you end up making nothing for

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<v Speaker 1>that anyway, which means you've got a very high risk

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<v Speaker 1>in other words. But another reason not to do it

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<v Speaker 1>is that, let's say that the group is ready to

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<v Speaker 1>commit a crime and extort money out of a target, Well,

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<v Speaker 1>then what's to stop that same group from screwing over

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<v Speaker 1>the person and who gave them access in the first place.

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<v Speaker 1>I mean, it's not like you could come forward and say, hey,

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<v Speaker 1>those hackers that attack the systems, they promised to give

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<v Speaker 1>me money if I gave them access, and now they

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<v Speaker 1>stiffed me. You can't do that. It would be admitting

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<v Speaker 1>that you were part of the attack. So there's no

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<v Speaker 1>guarantee you would even get paid out. You know, don't

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<v Speaker 1>he help out ransomware gangs. And you know what, even

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<v Speaker 1>if they did pay you out, even if you did

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<v Speaker 1>get millions of dollars, you don't have to figure out

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<v Speaker 1>how to hide all that cash because trust me, organizations

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<v Speaker 1>like the I r S and law enforcement are really

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<v Speaker 1>gonna wonder how you got so flush with cash out

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<v Speaker 1>of nowhere. So long story short, don't pay ransoms and companies,

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<v Speaker 1>don't burn your employees and make them resent you, because

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<v Speaker 1>that's really what makes these sorts of schemes tempting. In fact,

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<v Speaker 1>we'll talk about more of along those lines in just

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<v Speaker 1>a moment, but before we get to that, let's take

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<v Speaker 1>a quick break. Okay, before the break, I was talking

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<v Speaker 1>about how companies need to be careful because if they

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<v Speaker 1>burn their employees, then they can create the sort of

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<v Speaker 1>environment where those employees would say, yeah, why don't I

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<v Speaker 1>screw over the company because they're screwing me over and

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<v Speaker 1>you don't want that. Well, let's talk about the story

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<v Speaker 1>of Julianna Barile, who recently pled guilty to charges that

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<v Speaker 1>she illegally accessed the computer systems of a New York

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<v Speaker 1>credit union and subsequently deleted more than twenty gigabytes of data.

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<v Speaker 1>So Bill was once an employee of this credit union

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<v Speaker 1>in New York, but she found her employment terminated this

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<v Speaker 1>past May. Now, someone in the I T department was

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<v Speaker 1>supposed to revoke her access to the credit union's computer systems,

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<v Speaker 1>which is pretty standard operating procedure when someone leaves a company,

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<v Speaker 1>whether it's through termination, or residue nation or retirement or

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<v Speaker 1>whatever it might be. It's just good info sec practice

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<v Speaker 1>to revoke system access when someone is no longer employed

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<v Speaker 1>by the company. But yeah, that didn't happen. And when

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<v Speaker 1>Barrill found out that she could still access the credit

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<v Speaker 1>Union system, she did, and then she started deleting stuff,

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<v Speaker 1>and that included like loan application folders and such. And

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<v Speaker 1>as someone who not too long ago went through the

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<v Speaker 1>process of applying for a loan, I could tell you

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<v Speaker 1>that any hiccup along the way is stressful and it's frustrating,

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<v Speaker 1>but having the whole thing wiped out by a disgruntled

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<v Speaker 1>former credit Union employee would make things way worse. According

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<v Speaker 1>to court documents, Burrile deleted some twenty thousand files and

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<v Speaker 1>more than three thousand directories in about forty minutes. The

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<v Speaker 1>credit Union has been able to restore some files from

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<v Speaker 1>backup and estimates that the cost for recovery has been

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<v Speaker 1>more than ten thousand dollars. And here's an example of

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<v Speaker 1>the sort of thing groups like lock a bit two

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<v Speaker 1>point oh that I talked about before the break. This

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<v Speaker 1>is what they're on the lookout for. People who have

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<v Speaker 1>access to a system and an ax to grind against

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<v Speaker 1>their company. What Brill did was wrong. She probably caused

0:13:14.960 --> 0:13:17.480
<v Speaker 1>more harm to the end the customers of the Create

0:13:17.559 --> 0:13:20.920
<v Speaker 1>Union than the Create Union itself, like all those people

0:13:20.960 --> 0:13:25.600
<v Speaker 1>who had loans in process. It's incredibly disruptive. Now. I

0:13:25.679 --> 0:13:29.000
<v Speaker 1>don't have the details around her termination, like why she

0:13:29.160 --> 0:13:32.440
<v Speaker 1>was let go, but obviously whether the reasons for that

0:13:32.520 --> 0:13:36.960
<v Speaker 1>termination were justified or not, we can all say that

0:13:37.000 --> 0:13:40.360
<v Speaker 1>the credit union really should have revoked her access straight away.

0:13:40.440 --> 0:13:43.280
<v Speaker 1>As soon as she was terminated, that access should have

0:13:43.280 --> 0:13:47.199
<v Speaker 1>been shut down. So there are you know, she's at fault,

0:13:47.240 --> 0:13:49.960
<v Speaker 1>certainly because she's the one who did the crime, but

0:13:50.040 --> 0:13:52.760
<v Speaker 1>the CREB union also bears some responsibility. I would not

0:13:52.800 --> 0:13:56.680
<v Speaker 1>be surprised if some credit Union customers sought action against

0:13:56.679 --> 0:13:59.840
<v Speaker 1>the Create Union for failing to protect their you know,

0:14:00.040 --> 0:14:04.520
<v Speaker 1>their information and their assets. Speaking of cybersecurity, let's talk

0:14:04.600 --> 0:14:07.600
<v Speaker 1>about cables for a second. Now. I think a lot

0:14:07.600 --> 0:14:11.040
<v Speaker 1>of people don't consider cables as you know, a cybersecurity

0:14:11.040 --> 0:14:14.040
<v Speaker 1>element that they need to worry about, particularly when you've

0:14:14.040 --> 0:14:17.600
<v Speaker 1>got tons of people connecting to public WiFi without running

0:14:17.600 --> 0:14:21.280
<v Speaker 1>a VPN or anything like that. But yeah, cables can

0:14:21.280 --> 0:14:26.200
<v Speaker 1>trip you up and uh, I don't just mean literally,

0:14:26.280 --> 0:14:29.160
<v Speaker 1>although they can do that too. Happens to be pretty

0:14:29.200 --> 0:14:32.560
<v Speaker 1>much once a day, but no. A cybersecurity researcher who

0:14:32.640 --> 0:14:36.880
<v Speaker 1>uses the handle MG has been creating cables that hide

0:14:37.040 --> 0:14:40.160
<v Speaker 1>sneaky hardware inside them for a while now, and he

0:14:40.240 --> 0:14:45.040
<v Speaker 1>calls them, oh MG cables cute, right, And he's recently

0:14:45.080 --> 0:14:48.920
<v Speaker 1>unveiled a new one that uses the USBC form factor,

0:14:49.280 --> 0:14:51.360
<v Speaker 1>which was something a lot of people thought wouldn't be

0:14:51.400 --> 0:14:53.640
<v Speaker 1>possible because if you look at one of those cables,

0:14:54.280 --> 0:14:56.960
<v Speaker 1>it has a very small plug at the end of it,

0:14:57.360 --> 0:14:58.800
<v Speaker 1>and you would think there's not a whole lot of

0:14:58.880 --> 0:15:02.120
<v Speaker 1>space for you to hide any secret tech in that

0:15:02.200 --> 0:15:06.160
<v Speaker 1>form factor. And for this to work, for these cables

0:15:06.160 --> 0:15:08.960
<v Speaker 1>to be a security threat, you have to be able

0:15:09.000 --> 0:15:13.160
<v Speaker 1>to hide specialized chips inside that cable, and you have

0:15:13.200 --> 0:15:15.080
<v Speaker 1>to do it effectively so that it doesn't look like

0:15:15.160 --> 0:15:18.120
<v Speaker 1>it's out of place. So what is so special about

0:15:18.120 --> 0:15:21.360
<v Speaker 1>these cables what makes them a security threat? Well, for

0:15:21.480 --> 0:15:26.440
<v Speaker 1>one thing, MG has incorporated a WiFi transceiver chip inside

0:15:26.440 --> 0:15:29.320
<v Speaker 1>the cable itself. So if you connect one of these

0:15:29.320 --> 0:15:33.760
<v Speaker 1>cables to a device like your phone or a tablet

0:15:33.880 --> 0:15:37.320
<v Speaker 1>or a computer, a remote hacker can see that WiFi

0:15:37.400 --> 0:15:41.600
<v Speaker 1>spot because the cable will have activated the WiFi hot spot,

0:15:41.640 --> 0:15:45.400
<v Speaker 1>it creates the power necessary to run it. The hacker

0:15:45.440 --> 0:15:49.240
<v Speaker 1>can log in through that WiFi hot spot to gain

0:15:49.360 --> 0:15:53.680
<v Speaker 1>access to the devices the cable connects to, and they

0:15:53.680 --> 0:15:57.080
<v Speaker 1>can start deploying payloads like a keystroke logger, which will

0:15:57.160 --> 0:15:59.720
<v Speaker 1>keep track of everything you type on that device, so

0:15:59.760 --> 0:16:02.400
<v Speaker 1>if you're typing out like passwords and stuff, they can

0:16:02.440 --> 0:16:06.840
<v Speaker 1>collect those passwords. The implications of this are pretty scary,

0:16:06.920 --> 0:16:09.000
<v Speaker 1>and it really drives home the fact that you should

0:16:09.040 --> 0:16:13.160
<v Speaker 1>not trust any cables that are not your own. Just

0:16:13.280 --> 0:16:17.640
<v Speaker 1>imagine someone quote unquote testing these cables by leaving them

0:16:17.680 --> 0:16:21.880
<v Speaker 1>in heavily trafficked areas like airport charging stations or a

0:16:21.880 --> 0:16:26.320
<v Speaker 1>coffee shop or whatever. The variations on these cables include

0:16:26.400 --> 0:16:30.560
<v Speaker 1>USBC two lightning connectors, which means you're not safe if

0:16:30.600 --> 0:16:33.480
<v Speaker 1>you're on a PC, an Android device, or an iOS

0:16:33.560 --> 0:16:37.080
<v Speaker 1>device if you are using one of these cables. And

0:16:37.120 --> 0:16:38.920
<v Speaker 1>like I said, from the outside, they look like just

0:16:39.120 --> 0:16:43.880
<v Speaker 1>normal USB or lightning cables. There's nothing about them that

0:16:44.000 --> 0:16:46.160
<v Speaker 1>would set you off and make you think, oh, well,

0:16:46.160 --> 0:16:50.480
<v Speaker 1>this is sus But they really are an incredibly effective

0:16:50.480 --> 0:16:53.600
<v Speaker 1>security penetration tool if the right person is making use

0:16:53.600 --> 0:16:56.760
<v Speaker 1>of them. The security company Hack five has partnered with

0:16:56.920 --> 0:16:59.560
<v Speaker 1>MG to sell these cables, which are now in mass production,

0:17:00.000 --> 0:17:02.840
<v Speaker 1>and the stated purpose. In fact, what hack five always

0:17:02.880 --> 0:17:06.440
<v Speaker 1>says is that this is all to provide security researchers

0:17:06.480 --> 0:17:10.320
<v Speaker 1>penetration testers with the tools they need to do various

0:17:10.359 --> 0:17:13.960
<v Speaker 1>testing and security measures. And to be fair, if something

0:17:14.119 --> 0:17:17.040
<v Speaker 1>is possible, even if you were to say, like, oh,

0:17:17.119 --> 0:17:19.680
<v Speaker 1>but you're making cables that could cause an enormous amount

0:17:19.720 --> 0:17:22.360
<v Speaker 1>of harm if they fell into the wrong hands, well,

0:17:22.400 --> 0:17:24.240
<v Speaker 1>the fact that we know it's possible just means that

0:17:24.320 --> 0:17:26.840
<v Speaker 1>someone sooner or later was going to make one for

0:17:27.160 --> 0:17:31.600
<v Speaker 1>nefarious purposes. So while while you might like feel weird

0:17:31.840 --> 0:17:34.240
<v Speaker 1>about the fact that a security researcher has creates something

0:17:34.280 --> 0:17:37.440
<v Speaker 1>that's a real security threat, in another way, you could

0:17:37.440 --> 0:17:40.000
<v Speaker 1>say it's a good thing because now we know that

0:17:40.000 --> 0:17:42.560
<v Speaker 1>this is possible, so we can be on the lookout

0:17:42.680 --> 0:17:46.399
<v Speaker 1>for stuff when we encounter it. Um Still, you know,

0:17:46.520 --> 0:17:48.400
<v Speaker 1>just knowing these things are out there kind of gives

0:17:48.400 --> 0:17:50.760
<v Speaker 1>me the heavy GEVs. So maybe I will get Shannon

0:17:50.760 --> 0:17:54.160
<v Speaker 1>Morris back on the show to talk about this, because

0:17:54.160 --> 0:17:58.080
<v Speaker 1>it's pretty incredible stuff, And again, don't trust anyone's cables

0:17:58.119 --> 0:18:00.720
<v Speaker 1>but your own, right unless you purchase stead and you

0:18:00.760 --> 0:18:04.639
<v Speaker 1>feel pretty good about it, don't use some other cable.

0:18:04.920 --> 0:18:07.159
<v Speaker 1>You never know what kind of tech it might be hiding.

0:18:07.440 --> 0:18:11.000
<v Speaker 1>It's also possible to have chips that could deploy malware

0:18:11.040 --> 0:18:13.320
<v Speaker 1>directly to a device if you plugged it in using

0:18:13.359 --> 0:18:17.720
<v Speaker 1>that cable. So word to the wise, be careful. Now

0:18:17.800 --> 0:18:20.040
<v Speaker 1>let's move over to India to talk about how that

0:18:20.080 --> 0:18:23.920
<v Speaker 1>country continues to make moves that I think are fairly

0:18:23.960 --> 0:18:27.960
<v Speaker 1>authoritarian when it comes to tech and digital information. I've

0:18:27.960 --> 0:18:31.240
<v Speaker 1>already taught about how the country's government has pressured social

0:18:31.280 --> 0:18:35.720
<v Speaker 1>networking platforms to either suppress messages that criticize the government

0:18:36.200 --> 0:18:40.120
<v Speaker 1>or to step back from enforcing misinformation policies when government

0:18:40.160 --> 0:18:43.840
<v Speaker 1>officials post stuff that appears to violate those policies. So,

0:18:43.880 --> 0:18:46.600
<v Speaker 1>in other words, like if a politician were to post

0:18:46.640 --> 0:18:52.000
<v Speaker 1>something that fact checkers thought was misleading or misinformation, then

0:18:52.119 --> 0:18:56.160
<v Speaker 1>Twitter might tag that post with a label that says

0:18:56.200 --> 0:18:59.960
<v Speaker 1>as much. And India has really objected to Twitter taking

0:19:00.080 --> 0:19:02.400
<v Speaker 1>that step, in fact, catting to the point where they

0:19:02.440 --> 0:19:07.000
<v Speaker 1>said we're shutting down Twitter in India. However, on top

0:19:07.040 --> 0:19:10.120
<v Speaker 1>of all those things I have not taught about VPNs

0:19:10.280 --> 0:19:16.040
<v Speaker 1>or virtual private networks, so vp ns are really legitimately useful.

0:19:16.760 --> 0:19:20.080
<v Speaker 1>A good VPN protects you from folks snooping on your business.

0:19:20.480 --> 0:19:22.680
<v Speaker 1>So you might use a vp N if you wanted

0:19:22.680 --> 0:19:25.119
<v Speaker 1>to connect to stuff like say your bank account, or

0:19:25.240 --> 0:19:28.600
<v Speaker 1>medical insurance, or any of a million things that are sensitive.

0:19:29.000 --> 0:19:32.600
<v Speaker 1>So essentially, you log into a server that's acting as

0:19:32.680 --> 0:19:36.240
<v Speaker 1>your virtual private network, and the server will then go

0:19:36.280 --> 0:19:39.600
<v Speaker 1>on to fetch all the stuff that you're wanting to

0:19:39.680 --> 0:19:43.560
<v Speaker 1>look at online and everything is encrypted. So let's say

0:19:43.600 --> 0:19:45.880
<v Speaker 1>you wanted to look at your bank statement, you would

0:19:45.880 --> 0:19:49.480
<v Speaker 1>send the command, it would go to the VPN first encrypted,

0:19:50.200 --> 0:19:53.200
<v Speaker 1>and then the VPN would go and send the request

0:19:53.359 --> 0:19:56.879
<v Speaker 1>to your bank, and the return would go through the

0:19:56.960 --> 0:19:59.959
<v Speaker 1>VPN before it came back to you, and from an

0:20:00.080 --> 0:20:02.520
<v Speaker 1>went outside, it would just look like all you were

0:20:02.560 --> 0:20:06.480
<v Speaker 1>doing was communicating with this one VPN server, but they

0:20:06.520 --> 0:20:08.960
<v Speaker 1>wouldn't be able to see what was happening. Beyond that point,

0:20:09.000 --> 0:20:11.720
<v Speaker 1>they wouldn't know what you were really looking at. As

0:20:11.760 --> 0:20:13.600
<v Speaker 1>long as the VPN is on the up and up,

0:20:14.520 --> 0:20:17.600
<v Speaker 1>which is an important point, and as long as the

0:20:17.680 --> 0:20:21.800
<v Speaker 1>VPN does you know good practices like purging user histories

0:20:22.160 --> 0:20:26.120
<v Speaker 1>that things are relatively secure and private. By the way,

0:20:26.520 --> 0:20:29.280
<v Speaker 1>you should be using a VPN pretty much any time

0:20:29.320 --> 0:20:32.480
<v Speaker 1>you're not on your own network, and if you don't

0:20:32.520 --> 0:20:35.800
<v Speaker 1>want your i sp knowing what you're looking at. For example,

0:20:36.119 --> 0:20:38.560
<v Speaker 1>let's say that you're shopping around for different I s

0:20:38.640 --> 0:20:41.560
<v Speaker 1>p s, Well, you might want to use a VPN

0:20:41.640 --> 0:20:45.720
<v Speaker 1>even on your home network as well. But India's Parliamentary

0:20:45.760 --> 0:20:50.040
<v Speaker 1>Standing Committee on Home Affairs wants a countrywide block on VPNs.

0:20:50.760 --> 0:20:55.200
<v Speaker 1>Why Well, the committee claims that VPNs are facilitating piracy

0:20:55.640 --> 0:20:58.840
<v Speaker 1>and illegal commerce and that it provides a haven for

0:20:58.920 --> 0:21:02.480
<v Speaker 1>hackers so that they can attack targets without fear of

0:21:02.520 --> 0:21:05.199
<v Speaker 1>being tracked down because all the attacks would seem to

0:21:05.200 --> 0:21:09.000
<v Speaker 1>originate from the VPN, not the hacker. But India also

0:21:09.119 --> 0:21:13.560
<v Speaker 1>recently liberalized VPNs. They noted that VPNs were really important

0:21:13.560 --> 0:21:15.880
<v Speaker 1>for people to be able to work remotely and log

0:21:15.920 --> 0:21:18.920
<v Speaker 1>into company systems. A lot of companies run their own

0:21:19.000 --> 0:21:23.800
<v Speaker 1>VPNs because it is a good security measure. It helps

0:21:23.880 --> 0:21:30.600
<v Speaker 1>protect proprietary or trade secret information from getting out into

0:21:30.680 --> 0:21:35.879
<v Speaker 1>the world at large. So VPNs do play a valid

0:21:35.920 --> 0:21:41.720
<v Speaker 1>and important role. So we have kind of a a

0:21:41.840 --> 0:21:44.920
<v Speaker 1>disconnect here, right, we have another example of governments trying

0:21:44.960 --> 0:21:47.960
<v Speaker 1>to get control of stuff that inherently is designed to

0:21:48.000 --> 0:21:50.880
<v Speaker 1>resist that kind of intrusion. And we'll have to see

0:21:50.880 --> 0:21:53.760
<v Speaker 1>how this one plays out. I've got a few more

0:21:53.800 --> 0:21:56.200
<v Speaker 1>stories for us to cover before we get to that.

0:21:56.400 --> 0:22:07.120
<v Speaker 1>Let's take another quick break. Okay, we're back and over

0:22:07.200 --> 0:22:11.200
<v Speaker 1>here in the United States, the Government Accountability Office recently

0:22:11.280 --> 0:22:13.920
<v Speaker 1>released a report, in fact, it was just last week

0:22:14.280 --> 0:22:18.639
<v Speaker 1>that revealed numerous federal agencies continued to use and even

0:22:18.680 --> 0:22:24.600
<v Speaker 1>plan on increasing the use of facial recognition technology. This

0:22:25.440 --> 0:22:29.280
<v Speaker 1>is disturbing because, as I have reported several times, even

0:22:29.320 --> 0:22:33.280
<v Speaker 1>if you're okay with the idea of this level of surveillance,

0:22:33.280 --> 0:22:38.000
<v Speaker 1>in general, this technology is imperfect and frequently there is

0:22:38.080 --> 0:22:42.439
<v Speaker 1>an inherent bias within the technology itself which leads to

0:22:42.520 --> 0:22:49.760
<v Speaker 1>false positives and misidentifications, particularly among populations of non white people. So,

0:22:49.800 --> 0:22:52.920
<v Speaker 1>in other words, this technology can lead to an increased

0:22:53.000 --> 0:22:58.080
<v Speaker 1>discrimination against non white groups. And there have already been

0:22:58.119 --> 0:23:02.600
<v Speaker 1>several cases in which, you know, law enforcement has relied

0:23:02.640 --> 0:23:06.080
<v Speaker 1>upon facial recognition technology that was later found to have

0:23:06.240 --> 0:23:10.600
<v Speaker 1>misidentified people of interest. And obviously, if the authorities have

0:23:10.680 --> 0:23:12.800
<v Speaker 1>tagged you as being someone they want to talk to

0:23:12.880 --> 0:23:17.639
<v Speaker 1>in connection with a crime that's pretty darn stressful and

0:23:17.680 --> 0:23:21.000
<v Speaker 1>can be incredibly disruptive to your life. And when you

0:23:21.080 --> 0:23:23.800
<v Speaker 1>have nothing to do with that crime, like you have

0:23:23.840 --> 0:23:26.520
<v Speaker 1>no connection to it whatsoever. It's just that this technology

0:23:26.560 --> 0:23:30.439
<v Speaker 1>has misidentified you, and then law enforcement is putting the

0:23:30.480 --> 0:23:33.199
<v Speaker 1>burden on you to somehow prove you had nothing to

0:23:33.240 --> 0:23:36.760
<v Speaker 1>do with a crime. Well, that's an injustice, and the

0:23:36.760 --> 0:23:40.000
<v Speaker 1>potential for such injustices appears to be on the rise.

0:23:40.080 --> 0:23:43.880
<v Speaker 1>According to this report, The g a O survey twenty

0:23:43.920 --> 0:23:47.640
<v Speaker 1>four different federal agencies and departments and found that eighteen

0:23:47.720 --> 0:23:51.920
<v Speaker 1>of them currently rely on facial recognition technology in some capacity,

0:23:52.160 --> 0:23:54.359
<v Speaker 1>and ten of them plan to use it even more

0:23:54.400 --> 0:23:58.199
<v Speaker 1>in the future. Now, this isn't just concerning to me.

0:23:58.720 --> 0:24:01.520
<v Speaker 1>The problem caused by facial recognition tech has been bad

0:24:01.640 --> 0:24:06.680
<v Speaker 1>enough that some major companies, including IBM, have stopped selling

0:24:06.720 --> 0:24:10.679
<v Speaker 1>that technology to law enforcement and regulation agencies. They have

0:24:10.840 --> 0:24:15.040
<v Speaker 1>essentially noted that this technology is it stands to do

0:24:15.119 --> 0:24:18.600
<v Speaker 1>more harm than good. Some states, like Maine have passed

0:24:18.680 --> 0:24:21.240
<v Speaker 1>laws that restrict the use of the tech, and there's

0:24:21.240 --> 0:24:24.760
<v Speaker 1>a debate at the federal level on issuing essentially a

0:24:24.840 --> 0:24:28.639
<v Speaker 1>nationwide ban on it, and here's hoping we see progress

0:24:28.840 --> 0:24:31.720
<v Speaker 1>here and less reliance on the technology that, at least

0:24:31.720 --> 0:24:35.000
<v Speaker 1>for some groups, has the capacity to cause a disproportionate

0:24:35.040 --> 0:24:39.240
<v Speaker 1>amount of harm. Facial recognition tech. I think it's great

0:24:39.320 --> 0:24:41.359
<v Speaker 1>if you're trying to unlock a phone, because if it

0:24:41.400 --> 0:24:43.520
<v Speaker 1>doesn't work, you can just put in your pen. You're fine.

0:24:44.080 --> 0:24:47.320
<v Speaker 1>It's irritating that it doesn't work in those cases, and

0:24:47.359 --> 0:24:50.520
<v Speaker 1>it does speak to a problem with bias, but that's

0:24:50.640 --> 0:24:54.119
<v Speaker 1>an inconvenience when we're talking about law enforcement using it

0:24:54.119 --> 0:24:57.000
<v Speaker 1>as justification to disrupt the lives of people who may

0:24:57.000 --> 0:25:00.000
<v Speaker 1>be completely innocent and have no connection to the matter

0:25:00.080 --> 0:25:03.960
<v Speaker 1>at hand. That's another issue entirely. It starts to get

0:25:04.320 --> 0:25:09.600
<v Speaker 1>close to some constitutional problems. Okay, time for some cryptocurrency talk.

0:25:10.160 --> 0:25:13.760
<v Speaker 1>So one problem with cryptocurrency isn't really the text fault.

0:25:13.800 --> 0:25:17.040
<v Speaker 1>And I know I come down on cryptocurrency pretty hard,

0:25:17.119 --> 0:25:20.840
<v Speaker 1>pretty frequently, But one thing that you know, I can't

0:25:20.840 --> 0:25:24.679
<v Speaker 1>really fault the tech for is that the technology itself

0:25:24.760 --> 0:25:28.359
<v Speaker 1>is so poorly understood that it gives scam artists the

0:25:28.359 --> 0:25:31.280
<v Speaker 1>opportunity to pull a fast one and cheat people out

0:25:31.320 --> 0:25:34.960
<v Speaker 1>of their money, or sometimes cheat entire businesses out of

0:25:35.000 --> 0:25:39.520
<v Speaker 1>their money. The United States Securities and Exchange Commission, or SEC,

0:25:40.240 --> 0:25:44.639
<v Speaker 1>has charged a man named Satish Kombani of violating various

0:25:44.680 --> 0:25:49.520
<v Speaker 1>registration laws meant to protect investors from scams. Kombani had

0:25:49.600 --> 0:25:54.280
<v Speaker 1>been the founder of bit Connect, a cryptocurrency exchange platform

0:25:54.320 --> 0:25:59.080
<v Speaker 1>that no longer exists because it was, you know, a

0:25:59.200 --> 0:26:02.000
<v Speaker 1>den of scumming villainy. I guess at the heart of

0:26:02.040 --> 0:26:07.040
<v Speaker 1>the matter is that Kombani fraudulently raised around two billion

0:26:07.359 --> 0:26:11.399
<v Speaker 1>dollars worth of investments from various retail companies in a

0:26:11.480 --> 0:26:15.760
<v Speaker 1>cryptocurrency investment scam. And as part of the scam, Kombani

0:26:15.880 --> 0:26:20.520
<v Speaker 1>showed potential investors fictitious returns of investment of around three

0:26:20.640 --> 0:26:25.639
<v Speaker 1>thousand seven annual return. So, in other words, let's say

0:26:25.680 --> 0:26:28.240
<v Speaker 1>that this was a real thing, that it was totally working,

0:26:28.720 --> 0:26:35.280
<v Speaker 1>and on January one, you invested one dollar into the

0:26:34.359 --> 0:26:38.280
<v Speaker 1>the strategy. January one, the following year, you would have

0:26:38.320 --> 0:26:42.560
<v Speaker 1>three thousand, seven hundred dollars. And if you invested ten grand,

0:26:42.880 --> 0:26:45.160
<v Speaker 1>or a hundred grand or a million, what you get

0:26:45.200 --> 0:26:51.120
<v Speaker 1>the idea, it's an astronomical return. Further, Kombani claimed that

0:26:51.200 --> 0:26:54.920
<v Speaker 1>bit connects own cryptocurrency which was called bit connect coin,

0:26:55.280 --> 0:26:59.320
<v Speaker 1>which isn't confusing at all, was a stable and safe

0:26:59.640 --> 0:27:02.639
<v Speaker 1>cryptocurrency that no one was gonna have to worry about.

0:27:03.280 --> 0:27:07.359
<v Speaker 1>Uh that failing only it totally wasn't stable and safe,

0:27:07.400 --> 0:27:13.360
<v Speaker 1>as the cryptocurrencies value plummeted by pent in January, and

0:27:13.440 --> 0:27:17.720
<v Speaker 1>that Kambani was doing the old Ponzi scheme. So that

0:27:17.840 --> 0:27:20.320
<v Speaker 1>involves getting a round of investors to give you money.

0:27:20.359 --> 0:27:25.400
<v Speaker 1>So you've got your initial flush of cash. Then when

0:27:25.400 --> 0:27:28.359
<v Speaker 1>it comes time to pay out the first investors, you

0:27:28.400 --> 0:27:30.639
<v Speaker 1>go find a second round of investors to give you

0:27:30.680 --> 0:27:34.040
<v Speaker 1>more money. You use the money from the second round

0:27:34.040 --> 0:27:37.439
<v Speaker 1>of investors to pay out your first round of investors.

0:27:37.680 --> 0:27:39.960
<v Speaker 1>But then you've got to go after a third round

0:27:40.040 --> 0:27:42.840
<v Speaker 1>of investors to help pay off that second round, and

0:27:42.920 --> 0:27:46.199
<v Speaker 1>so on. So ponzi schemes can break in huge amounts

0:27:46.200 --> 0:27:49.000
<v Speaker 1>of cash. They don't have to be connected at all

0:27:49.080 --> 0:27:52.119
<v Speaker 1>with cryptocurrency. But we have seen a lot of cryptocurrency

0:27:52.119 --> 0:27:55.399
<v Speaker 1>scams that are essentially Ponzi schemes in recent history, and

0:27:55.480 --> 0:27:57.560
<v Speaker 1>one common element about all of them is that they

0:27:57.720 --> 0:28:03.280
<v Speaker 1>always eventually come crashing down because sooner or later you

0:28:03.359 --> 0:28:05.520
<v Speaker 1>run out of folks who are willing to invest, and

0:28:05.560 --> 0:28:08.320
<v Speaker 1>it's time to pay the piper. Now. Maybe by then

0:28:08.359 --> 0:28:11.200
<v Speaker 1>you've made enough to make your escape, but it ain't

0:28:11.200 --> 0:28:15.240
<v Speaker 1>exactly the best get rich plan. Finally, Amazon and SpaceX

0:28:15.280 --> 0:28:18.159
<v Speaker 1>are having a fight down here on Earth over stuff

0:28:18.160 --> 0:28:21.880
<v Speaker 1>that's meant to float around in space. Specifically, the fight

0:28:22.000 --> 0:28:27.480
<v Speaker 1>revolves around Starlink, space X's satellite Internet communications system that

0:28:27.560 --> 0:28:30.520
<v Speaker 1>the company has had in beta testing for a while now.

0:28:30.920 --> 0:28:35.240
<v Speaker 1>So SpaceX's goal is to launch thousands of satellites up

0:28:35.240 --> 0:28:38.840
<v Speaker 1>into orbit to provide consistent satellite Internet coverage down here

0:28:38.880 --> 0:28:42.600
<v Speaker 1>on Earth. We're talking like thirty thousand satellites are more.

0:28:43.160 --> 0:28:46.840
<v Speaker 1>But SpaceX says that Amazon has been filing objections to

0:28:47.000 --> 0:28:52.760
<v Speaker 1>various SpaceX proposals in attempt to hinder SpaceX because, as

0:28:52.800 --> 0:28:57.600
<v Speaker 1>SpaceX puts it, Amazon's own satellite Internet solution, called Kiper,

0:28:58.200 --> 0:29:03.680
<v Speaker 1>is running behind schedule. So according to SpaceX, Amazon has

0:29:03.720 --> 0:29:07.600
<v Speaker 1>decided to try and slow down the competition while it

0:29:07.680 --> 0:29:11.640
<v Speaker 1>tries to get its own system up and running. Amazon, however,

0:29:11.840 --> 0:29:15.200
<v Speaker 1>filed complaints with the FCC saying that space X was

0:29:15.240 --> 0:29:18.360
<v Speaker 1>not following the proper rules when it comes to submitting

0:29:18.400 --> 0:29:22.920
<v Speaker 1>proposals for putting more satellites in orbit, and like I said,

0:29:23.000 --> 0:29:26.840
<v Speaker 1>we're talking about thousands of satellites here. And Amazon's complaint

0:29:26.920 --> 0:29:31.480
<v Speaker 1>is that SpaceX's proposal actually has two different configurations of

0:29:31.560 --> 0:29:34.800
<v Speaker 1>satellites in it, and you can't have two different ones

0:29:34.840 --> 0:29:37.040
<v Speaker 1>at the same time. Obviously, you can only have one.

0:29:37.800 --> 0:29:40.200
<v Speaker 1>And so Amazon says this is against the rules. The

0:29:40.280 --> 0:29:44.880
<v Speaker 1>rules require proposals to have no internal inconsistencies. You can't

0:29:45.320 --> 0:29:48.240
<v Speaker 1>say we might do it this way, or maybe we'll

0:29:48.280 --> 0:29:51.440
<v Speaker 1>do it this other way instead, according to Amazon, anyway,

0:29:51.520 --> 0:29:55.200
<v Speaker 1>the rules say you should commit to a single approach

0:29:56.080 --> 0:29:59.160
<v Speaker 1>in your proposal before the process can move forward. Meanwhile,

0:29:59.200 --> 0:30:02.120
<v Speaker 1>SpaceX is like, now, uh, you just want us to

0:30:02.320 --> 0:30:04.480
<v Speaker 1>not be able to go to the public comment phase.

0:30:04.680 --> 0:30:06.760
<v Speaker 1>And anyway, the public comment phase is where we could

0:30:06.760 --> 0:30:09.600
<v Speaker 1>hash all this out. It would all be fine. Now.

0:30:10.600 --> 0:30:13.760
<v Speaker 1>I am not on the side of either Amazon or

0:30:13.920 --> 0:30:17.680
<v Speaker 1>SpaceX in this matter. Personally, I actually worry about the

0:30:17.680 --> 0:30:20.480
<v Speaker 1>thousands of satellites that will be needed for both the

0:30:20.560 --> 0:30:24.680
<v Speaker 1>Starlink and the Amazon Keiper system to work. That is

0:30:24.720 --> 0:30:27.280
<v Speaker 1>a lot of stuff whizzing around out there in low

0:30:27.280 --> 0:30:31.240
<v Speaker 1>Earth orbit which could potentially become space junk and thus

0:30:31.440 --> 0:30:36.320
<v Speaker 1>interfere with other spacecraft. It can also interfere with astronomical

0:30:36.400 --> 0:30:41.479
<v Speaker 1>observations here on Earth. So I'm not super fan of

0:30:41.600 --> 0:30:44.480
<v Speaker 1>either of these things right now. But anyway, that's not

0:30:44.560 --> 0:30:46.840
<v Speaker 1>the point. The point is that Amazon and space X

0:30:46.880 --> 0:30:49.920
<v Speaker 1>are totes in a space fight just here on Earth,

0:30:50.760 --> 0:30:52.800
<v Speaker 1>and that's it. Those are all the stories I have

0:30:52.880 --> 0:30:56.360
<v Speaker 1>for you on Thursday, September two, two twenty one. I

0:30:56.400 --> 0:30:59.880
<v Speaker 1>hope you are well and safe. And for those of

0:31:00.000 --> 0:31:01.680
<v Speaker 1>you in the United States, I hope you have a

0:31:01.720 --> 0:31:05.480
<v Speaker 1>wonderful Labor Day weekend. And if you have any suggestions

0:31:05.480 --> 0:31:07.920
<v Speaker 1>for topics I should cover on tech Stuff, reach out

0:31:07.960 --> 0:31:09.520
<v Speaker 1>to me. The best way to do that is to

0:31:09.680 --> 0:31:12.360
<v Speaker 1>use Twitter, and I use the handle text stuff h

0:31:12.600 --> 0:31:16.600
<v Speaker 1>s W and I'll talk to you again really soon.

0:31:21.400 --> 0:31:24.440
<v Speaker 1>Text Stuff is an I Heart Radio production. For more

0:31:24.520 --> 0:31:27.880
<v Speaker 1>podcasts from I Heart Radio, visit the I Heart Radio app,

0:31:28.040 --> 0:31:31.200
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