WEBVTT - Tech News: Meta Takes a Loss on Giphy 0:00:04.440 --> 0:00:12.360 Welcome to tech Stuff, a production from iHeartRadio. Hey there, 0:00:12.400 --> 0:00:15.800 and welcome to tech Stuff. I'm your host Jonathan Strickland, 0:00:15.840 --> 0:00:19.119 Diamond executive producer with iHeartRadio and how the tech are you? 0:00:19.640 --> 0:00:22.680 Sign for the Tech News for Tuesday, May twenty third, 0:00:23.040 --> 0:00:27.200 twenty twenty three. And first up, we got a couple 0:00:27.240 --> 0:00:32.320 of stories about how social network platforms facilitated the rapid 0:00:32.479 --> 0:00:38.360 spread of misinformation and how that in turn created more chaos. Also, 0:00:38.840 --> 0:00:41.839 this first one has a dash of AI in it, 0:00:42.400 --> 0:00:46.040 so that's a bonus. So first up, Yesterday, an AI 0:00:46.280 --> 0:00:50.960 generated image showing a plume of dark smoke that appeared 0:00:51.000 --> 0:00:54.960 to be the result of an explosion that was apparently 0:00:55.200 --> 0:00:58.520 near the Pentagon here in the United States went viral. 0:00:58.880 --> 0:01:01.960 But as I said, that is image was AI generated. 0:01:02.440 --> 0:01:06.039 There was no such explosion that happened anywhere close to 0:01:06.080 --> 0:01:09.080 the Pentagon. In fact, if you zoomed in a bit 0:01:09.200 --> 0:01:11.400 on that image, you would see that there were some 0:01:11.560 --> 0:01:15.319 hinky ness to the image. There were details in the 0:01:15.360 --> 0:01:17.600 photo that looked a bit off, kind of like how 0:01:17.840 --> 0:01:20.800 you know, if you do an AI generated image of 0:01:20.840 --> 0:01:24.559 a person, the AI just doesn't seem to get fingers right. 0:01:25.520 --> 0:01:28.880 Often the fingers in images that are generated by AI 0:01:29.040 --> 0:01:32.280 are the things of nightmares. I guess AI just thinks 0:01:32.280 --> 0:01:34.480 that we have spaghetti at the end of our hands. Anyway, 0:01:35.080 --> 0:01:37.800 at the time of this recording, I haven't seen anything 0:01:37.800 --> 0:01:41.920 about who might have generated the image. Initially reportedly, it 0:01:41.959 --> 0:01:45.680 was actually on Facebook before it really took off on Twitter. 0:01:46.360 --> 0:01:49.840 We do know that several Russian based news sites or 0:01:50.480 --> 0:01:53.960 propaganda sites depending upon your point of view, ran with 0:01:54.040 --> 0:01:57.800 the story and they published it as a breaking news item, 0:01:58.280 --> 0:02:01.840 and it even caused a small dip in the stock market. 0:02:02.240 --> 0:02:04.640 But this stumble corrected itself once where it got out 0:02:04.760 --> 0:02:07.640 the whole thing was just a hoax. So this is 0:02:07.680 --> 0:02:11.280 a case where misinformation really was more of an inconvenience 0:02:11.360 --> 0:02:14.480 than a real threat because of the rapid response and 0:02:14.880 --> 0:02:20.200 the debunking of this image. But it does show that again, 0:02:20.360 --> 0:02:28.320 social networks really facilitate incredible rapid spread of misinformation. Now 0:02:28.400 --> 0:02:31.880 let's go to story number two, and this one takes 0:02:31.880 --> 0:02:35.440 place in the UK. Now, this one doesn't involve AI, 0:02:35.960 --> 0:02:39.919 but it does involve social networks and a very real tragedy. 0:02:40.320 --> 0:02:43.320 So yesterday, a couple of teenagers were riding on an 0:02:43.360 --> 0:02:48.280 off road bike or scooter in Cardiff, Wales, and they 0:02:48.320 --> 0:02:53.160 got involved in a traffic accident and both teenagers died 0:02:53.200 --> 0:02:58.200 from their injuries. Now that is undeniably terrible, a horrible loss. 0:02:58.639 --> 0:03:02.240 Police then arrived on the scene of the accident, but 0:03:02.320 --> 0:03:05.800 on social media there was this narrative that began to 0:03:05.919 --> 0:03:10.119 form that accused the police of actually causing the accident. 0:03:10.639 --> 0:03:13.480 The narrative said that the police were in a pursuit 0:03:13.520 --> 0:03:16.480 and that in turn created the accident in which the 0:03:16.480 --> 0:03:20.520 two teenagers lost their lives. But that was just not true. 0:03:20.600 --> 0:03:23.400 The police weren't involved in a pursuit. There was no 0:03:23.560 --> 0:03:27.359 police presence until after the accident happened and police were 0:03:27.360 --> 0:03:30.360 called to the scene. However, this didn't stop the story 0:03:30.400 --> 0:03:34.440 from spreading online rapidly and people in the community began 0:03:34.600 --> 0:03:37.400 to assembol and what started off as kind of a 0:03:37.440 --> 0:03:41.520 demonstration of anger toward police escalated into a full blown riot, 0:03:41.960 --> 0:03:45.080 with the crowd throwing stuff at police officers. Some of 0:03:45.080 --> 0:03:47.920 those police officers suffered injuries, although from what I understand, 0:03:47.960 --> 0:03:51.000 none of them were really serious injuries. And again it 0:03:51.040 --> 0:03:54.840 turned out that the story that the police had contributed 0:03:54.880 --> 0:03:57.600 to this accident was just a lie. But the time 0:03:57.680 --> 0:03:59.760 that message was getting out there, things were already out 0:03:59.800 --> 0:04:04.200 of the crowd continued to roam the streets until the 0:04:04.240 --> 0:04:08.000 early hours of this morning, and then they dispersed. Now, 0:04:08.040 --> 0:04:11.000 to be clear, I do not think it's fair to 0:04:11.080 --> 0:04:16.800 blame social networks for the actual misinformation. Rather, social networks 0:04:16.920 --> 0:04:21.880 facilitated the spread of misinformation. They didn't make it. They 0:04:21.960 --> 0:04:25.320 just made it way easier for it to spread around. Now, 0:04:25.360 --> 0:04:28.839 I do not know if any recommendation algorithms played a 0:04:28.880 --> 0:04:33.520 part in that. It's possible because the algorithm could promote 0:04:33.640 --> 0:04:36.000 stories that seem to be driving a lot of engagement 0:04:36.600 --> 0:04:39.600 among people of a specific region. Right, it might be, Oh, 0:04:39.839 --> 0:04:44.280 people around you are really interested in this particular story, 0:04:44.800 --> 0:04:47.160 and then you get served up that story and it 0:04:47.240 --> 0:04:50.279 perpetuates itself. That's a possibility, But I don't know for 0:04:50.320 --> 0:04:54.480 a fact that that happened, But you know, it's a possibility, 0:04:54.480 --> 0:04:58.040 and at the very least, it definitely did spread across 0:04:58.040 --> 0:05:03.719 social media. Well, misinformation has been a thing long before 0:05:03.800 --> 0:05:09.640 social networks ever existed, and rumors have passed around well 0:05:10.279 --> 0:05:13.960 and truly without social networks. Right, So it's not like 0:05:14.040 --> 0:05:16.240 if we got rid of social networks, this would no 0:05:16.320 --> 0:05:21.200 longer be a problem. It's just that it's extremely efficient 0:05:22.120 --> 0:05:25.680 to spread misinformation at this point, much more so than 0:05:25.680 --> 0:05:28.960 it was in the past. And now let's talk about 0:05:29.080 --> 0:05:32.960 end to end encryption. It continues to face challenges from 0:05:33.000 --> 0:05:37.440 political leaders around the world. I've talked about how many nations, 0:05:37.480 --> 0:05:40.520 including the United States, have looked for ways to work 0:05:40.560 --> 0:05:45.160 around end to end encryption or perhaps even ban it outright. 0:05:45.720 --> 0:05:48.680 And it's usually in the desire to scan messages for 0:05:48.800 --> 0:05:54.080 signs of illegal content, so it could be an attempt 0:05:54.160 --> 0:05:58.640 to look for communication between would be terrorists or to 0:05:59.040 --> 0:06:02.240 search for evidence of people trafficking in illegal materials like 0:06:02.360 --> 0:06:07.320 child pornography. Spain's government has joined the list of governments 0:06:07.320 --> 0:06:11.280 that are very much taking aim into end encryption. This 0:06:11.400 --> 0:06:14.400 is not a unique view even in the European Union. 0:06:14.440 --> 0:06:17.160 There are lots of countries in the EU that have 0:06:17.640 --> 0:06:21.680 proposed creating rules that would allow a government to scan 0:06:22.240 --> 0:06:26.400 and monitor communications, which means that you would have to 0:06:26.440 --> 0:06:29.200 get rid of into end encryption, because the very nature 0:06:29.200 --> 0:06:31.400 of into end encryption is that only the people at 0:06:31.520 --> 0:06:37.440 either end can access the encrypted information. So anyone who 0:06:38.720 --> 0:06:42.920 tries to intercept the information somewhere in the middle they're 0:06:42.920 --> 0:06:45.880 just going to be left with encrypted nonsense. They can't 0:06:45.960 --> 0:06:49.279 read it. Now, this is a really complicated problem. So 0:06:49.360 --> 0:06:52.000 on the one hand, you do have the legitimate concern 0:06:52.560 --> 0:06:55.719 that more needs to be done, for example, to protect 0:06:55.880 --> 0:06:59.760 children from becoming victims. I think it's hard to deny 0:06:59.800 --> 0:07:03.400 that right, that we need to be better at protecting 0:07:03.520 --> 0:07:08.599 children from child predators. On the other hand, this measure 0:07:08.720 --> 0:07:12.120 means an end to private communication, and there are some 0:07:12.280 --> 0:07:16.360 situations where such communication is absolutely critical. You know, authoritarian 0:07:16.440 --> 0:07:22.680 governments could abuse and have abused this kind of process 0:07:23.040 --> 0:07:26.520 to crack down on perceived threats, and those threats might 0:07:26.600 --> 0:07:30.640 just be someone like a journalist or an activist, or 0:07:31.160 --> 0:07:34.920 you know, a political rival, and yeah, it's all done 0:07:35.120 --> 0:07:38.920 in the name of protecting the state, but it really 0:07:38.920 --> 0:07:42.560 comes down to an authoritarian display of power and denying 0:07:42.640 --> 0:07:47.280 other people the right to privacy. And I can't pretend 0:07:47.320 --> 0:07:50.080 to have the answers here. I don't think getting rid 0:07:50.080 --> 0:07:54.240 of ENDO end encryption is a good idea. However, Now, 0:07:54.320 --> 0:07:57.480 one agency that would probably love to see into end 0:07:57.560 --> 0:08:02.320 encryption go away is THEBI. I say that with some 0:08:02.480 --> 0:08:06.720 level of confidence because the US Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 0:08:07.360 --> 0:08:12.240 released an April twenty twenty two opinion detailing more than 0:08:12.280 --> 0:08:16.240 two hundred and seventy five thousand instances of the FBI 0:08:16.360 --> 0:08:22.040 conducting warrantless searches of citizen communications between twenty twenty and 0:08:22.280 --> 0:08:26.080 early twenty twenty one. Now I should add that opinion. 0:08:26.400 --> 0:08:30.840 That court opinion is also highly redacted, so there are 0:08:30.840 --> 0:08:34.000 a lot of blacked out spots in that report. But 0:08:34.840 --> 0:08:38.439 essentially it's saying the FBI searched through communications more than 0:08:38.440 --> 0:08:43.640 a quarter of a million times of presumably American citizen 0:08:43.679 --> 0:08:48.680 communications without securing a warrant to do it in one year. Now, 0:08:48.679 --> 0:08:52.360 the FBI was relying on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 0:08:52.480 --> 0:08:57.840 or FISA. FISA, which allows for warrantless digital searches and 0:08:57.920 --> 0:09:02.920 monitoring of communication, but only for communications between foreign individuals 0:09:02.960 --> 0:09:06.440 outside of America. Like, it's not supposed to be used 0:09:06.720 --> 0:09:12.560 to spy on communications of American citizens. However, the law 0:09:12.880 --> 0:09:16.400 allows officials to do a sort of three degrees of 0:09:16.480 --> 0:09:21.360 separation style gain. They can look at the target's communications, 0:09:21.440 --> 0:09:25.240 so they've identified somebody that they want to surveil for 0:09:25.320 --> 0:09:29.080 whatever reason. This person's a foreign individual, they're not in 0:09:29.080 --> 0:09:32.719 the United States, and thus there's no warrant needed, So 0:09:32.760 --> 0:09:35.240 they look at the target's communications, but then they can 0:09:35.280 --> 0:09:38.040 also look at whom the target has been in contact with. 0:09:38.760 --> 0:09:40.760 Then they can even go one step further. They can 0:09:40.800 --> 0:09:46.240 look at the contacts that the contact had. So let's 0:09:46.240 --> 0:09:48.920 say you got an old fishing buddy, and your old 0:09:48.920 --> 0:09:51.280 fishing buddy happens to be friends with a shady person 0:09:51.280 --> 0:09:54.200 who turns out to have been on the FBI's radar. Well, 0:09:54.240 --> 0:09:57.080 by extension, you could be on the FBI's radar two 0:09:57.480 --> 0:10:00.679 because you're connected to your friend and your friend is 0:10:00.720 --> 0:10:04.400 connected to this other person. Now, FISA isn't supposed to 0:10:04.480 --> 0:10:07.760 let agents investigate American citizens, but because of this degree 0:10:07.800 --> 0:10:12.080 of separation thing, it can happen like a lot, like 0:10:12.080 --> 0:10:14.440 two hundred and seventy eight thousand times in the matter 0:10:14.480 --> 0:10:16.920 of a year or so. And the court opinion shows 0:10:16.920 --> 0:10:19.360 that the FBI was using these techniques to run searches 0:10:19.360 --> 0:10:24.479 on people who most assuredly were not foreign agents communicating overseas, 0:10:24.760 --> 0:10:28.959 such as protesters during Black Lives Matter protests in the 0:10:29.000 --> 0:10:32.120 wake of George Floyd's death. So here we have what 0:10:32.200 --> 0:10:36.000 appears to be a pretty clear series of offenses against 0:10:36.000 --> 0:10:40.600 American citizens perpetuated by the FBI. And this is just 0:10:40.800 --> 0:10:44.760 one reason why end to end encryption is important because 0:10:44.840 --> 0:10:48.000 if the quote unquote good guys are breaking the rules, 0:10:48.760 --> 0:10:52.160 that's not good. All Right, we're gonna take a quick break. 0:10:52.200 --> 0:10:54.520 When we come back, we've got some more tech news 0:10:54.520 --> 0:11:06.959 to cover. Okay, now, we got a double whammie section 0:11:07.080 --> 0:11:09.480 for Meta. So first up, the EU has leveled a 0:11:09.600 --> 0:11:14.679 one point three billion dollar fine against Meta. That's a 0:11:14.840 --> 0:11:18.400 princely sum, saying that the company failed to keep EU 0:11:18.520 --> 0:11:22.120 citizen data safe and private. So essentially, the violation here 0:11:22.640 --> 0:11:28.120 involves transmitting EU citizen data to US based servers, which 0:11:28.160 --> 0:11:30.959 is something that the EU is very much against, without 0:11:31.120 --> 0:11:34.880 there being further protections in place for that information. So 0:11:34.960 --> 0:11:37.280 you might remember in past episodes, I've talked about how 0:11:37.360 --> 0:11:42.640 the fear about TikTok largely centers around this belief that 0:11:42.920 --> 0:11:46.040 it's a company that could be sending personal data belonging 0:11:46.040 --> 0:11:51.360 to American citizens to China. Well, that fear exists despite 0:11:51.360 --> 0:11:53.240 the fact that we don't actually have evidence of this 0:11:53.559 --> 0:11:57.440 having happened. It could have happened. I'm not saying it didn't, 0:11:57.760 --> 0:12:00.400 I'm just saying that we we haven't seen evidence of 0:12:00.440 --> 0:12:03.360 it yet. However, here we have a case of an 0:12:03.360 --> 0:12:07.640 American company essentially doing the same thing, channeling EU citizen 0:12:07.720 --> 0:12:12.640 data from the European Union to US based computer servers, 0:12:13.200 --> 0:12:16.560 and you could say, wow, the turns they have tabled. 0:12:17.040 --> 0:12:18.920 And now Meta has been ordered to pay more than 0:12:19.000 --> 0:12:22.439 a billion dollars in fines relating to this offense. Now, Meta, 0:12:22.480 --> 0:12:25.040 of course plans to appeal the ruling and the fine. 0:12:25.400 --> 0:12:28.640 I think that's obvious, But regulators say that Meta's offenses 0:12:28.679 --> 0:12:33.040 are systemic and continuous in violation of the rules of GDPR. 0:12:33.679 --> 0:12:37.079 I think Meta is hoping to wait this out so 0:12:37.080 --> 0:12:39.680 that the US and the EU come to an agreement 0:12:40.160 --> 0:12:44.319 on how and under what circumstances a US based company 0:12:44.320 --> 0:12:47.760 can transmit EU based data back to the United States. 0:12:48.240 --> 0:12:51.240 And part of the hold up is this concern that 0:12:51.320 --> 0:12:56.640 the US government could potentially spy on European Union citizen data. 0:12:57.040 --> 0:13:00.200 They could use it as a surveillance tool, which you 0:13:00.280 --> 0:13:02.840 might say sounds far fetched, But we just got done 0:13:02.960 --> 0:13:07.200 talking about the FBI doing that to American citizens. So 0:13:07.280 --> 0:13:10.319 there you go. The other big punch to Meta's stomach 0:13:10.400 --> 0:13:13.360 this week comes in the form of Giffee, or if 0:13:13.400 --> 0:13:18.839 you prefer Jiffy, not the peanut butter, but the animated 0:13:18.880 --> 0:13:23.920 giff database and search engine. Now. Meta purchased Giffee a 0:13:23.960 --> 0:13:28.040 few years ago for four hundred million dollars, But then 0:13:28.160 --> 0:13:31.760 regulators in the UK determined that Meta's possession of Giffee 0:13:32.160 --> 0:13:36.800 constituted anti competitive business practices and ordered Meta to divest 0:13:36.880 --> 0:13:41.040 itself of the company, which now Meta has done. Meta 0:13:41.120 --> 0:13:44.719 sold Giffee off to another company called shutter Stock. You 0:13:44.800 --> 0:13:47.840 might be familiar with them, but Meta did not recapture 0:13:47.880 --> 0:13:50.559 the four hundred million dollars it had spent on Giffee 0:13:50.600 --> 0:13:54.079 just a few years ago. Instead, shutter Stock purchased Giffee 0:13:54.080 --> 0:13:58.120 for the equivalent of fifty three million dollars. Now that's 0:13:58.160 --> 0:14:00.360 still a healthy chunk of change, Don't get me wrong, 0:14:00.800 --> 0:14:04.920 it's a far cry from four hundred million AUCI. The 0:14:05.040 --> 0:14:08.520 US Surgeon General has issued an advisory stating that there's 0:14:08.559 --> 0:14:11.240 not enough evidence to say social media is safe for 0:14:11.360 --> 0:14:14.720 kids to use, which I suppose you could flip and say, 0:14:15.080 --> 0:14:17.680 is there evidence showing that the use of social media 0:14:17.800 --> 0:14:20.840 is harmful to kids? I mean, I know that that's 0:14:20.920 --> 0:14:24.320 the belief, but what does the actual evidence, say, and 0:14:24.360 --> 0:14:27.200 I think the problem is that there's not enough research 0:14:27.240 --> 0:14:31.480 to draw conclusions. However, there is a concern that social 0:14:31.480 --> 0:14:34.920 media could contribute to mental health problems among the youth, 0:14:35.400 --> 0:14:39.760 which at least seems to make sense. But we don't 0:14:39.960 --> 0:14:43.880 have all the data yet, right, so I don't know 0:14:44.000 --> 0:14:46.800 that we've yet been able to determine whether social media 0:14:46.920 --> 0:14:50.160 use among kids is good, bad, or indifferent. I think 0:14:50.200 --> 0:14:52.320 one problem with a lot of studies is it comes 0:14:52.360 --> 0:14:55.000 down to a chicken or egg kind of problem. And 0:14:55.040 --> 0:14:59.640 what I mean by that is are people developing mental 0:14:59.640 --> 0:15:03.520 health problems because they spend too much time on social media? 0:15:03.680 --> 0:15:07.520 Or is it that people who have mental health challenges 0:15:08.120 --> 0:15:11.520 are more likely to spend more time on social media, 0:15:11.560 --> 0:15:13.680 So it could be like a correlation but not a 0:15:13.840 --> 0:15:17.720 causation situation. Here it falls into a similar challenge of 0:15:17.760 --> 0:15:21.000 determining if violent video games have a negative impact on 0:15:21.080 --> 0:15:25.160 mental health. Do violent video games make people violent or 0:15:25.800 --> 0:15:29.800 do violent people tend to like violent video games which 0:15:29.800 --> 0:15:32.320 could also be enjoyed by people who aren't violent at all. 0:15:32.800 --> 0:15:36.200 So this advisory is really meant to encourage families to 0:15:36.640 --> 0:15:41.200 think really seriously about social media use and to encourage 0:15:41.240 --> 0:15:44.520 healthy family behaviors, and I think that's a good message 0:15:44.520 --> 0:15:48.400 no matter how the research ultimately shakes out. Rapper ice 0:15:48.480 --> 0:15:51.080 Cube has a few things to say about AI, and 0:15:51.160 --> 0:15:55.920 they are not complementary. He actually called AI demonic and 0:15:56.080 --> 0:16:00.240 referenced the recent songs featuring AI generated voices mimicking people 0:16:00.520 --> 0:16:04.760 like Drake. Ice Cube said, quote, somebody can't take your 0:16:04.800 --> 0:16:08.520 original voice and manipulate it without having to pay end quote. 0:16:08.960 --> 0:16:11.480 That's not necessarily the case. As we've said on the 0:16:11.520 --> 0:16:15.520 show before, existing law does not really cover synthesized voices. 0:16:15.960 --> 0:16:19.840 You can't copyright a voice. You can't trademark it either. 0:16:20.400 --> 0:16:24.360 But ice Cube's concerns are understandable. If someone is replicating 0:16:24.440 --> 0:16:27.560 a specific person's voice in order to make something new, 0:16:28.440 --> 0:16:31.800 that sort of proves that the original voice has value 0:16:31.840 --> 0:16:34.800 to it. Otherwise, why are you copying it? Why wouldn't 0:16:34.840 --> 0:16:38.080 you just make a new synthesized voice that doesn't sound 0:16:38.120 --> 0:16:42.560 like anyone? In particular, if you're using AI to copy 0:16:42.600 --> 0:16:46.760 the style and the sound of someone specific, that kind 0:16:46.760 --> 0:16:49.920 of confirms that the original has value, and that to 0:16:49.960 --> 0:16:53.200 me suggests that we do need to develop laws to 0:16:53.240 --> 0:16:56.600 protect those things, and some states do have some laws 0:16:56.640 --> 0:16:59.760 that protect that, but it's not across the United States. 0:17:00.000 --> 0:17:01.840 Other parts of the world need to think about this too. 0:17:02.440 --> 0:17:05.320 It's a brave new world to have such Ai people 0:17:05.359 --> 0:17:08.840 in it. In space news, NASA has awarded the private 0:17:08.880 --> 0:17:12.119 space company Blue Origin a contract to land astronauts on 0:17:12.240 --> 0:17:15.960 the Moon. The lunar lander will be named Blue Moon, 0:17:16.400 --> 0:17:18.879 which makes me want to launch right into do wop music. 0:17:19.200 --> 0:17:21.880 But I'll spare you, as well as my super producer 0:17:21.960 --> 0:17:25.080 Tari from having to endure that dig de don ding 0:17:25.119 --> 0:17:29.679 Blue Moon. Sorry slipped out. This won't be the lunar 0:17:29.760 --> 0:17:32.920 lander used in the upcoming planned missions to the Moon 0:17:33.040 --> 0:17:35.880 that are part of the early part of the Project Artemis. 0:17:36.080 --> 0:17:38.000 Those are actually going to use a lunar lander that's 0:17:38.040 --> 0:17:41.720 created by SpaceX, and that one is the Human Landing 0:17:41.800 --> 0:17:45.920 System or HLS. It's interesting that NASA is using both 0:17:46.000 --> 0:17:49.560 companies for this purpose, but eventually the plan is to 0:17:49.680 --> 0:17:53.280 establish a permanent facility on the Moon. As for when 0:17:53.359 --> 0:17:56.399 Blue Moon will see us standing alone without a dream 0:17:56.480 --> 0:17:58.800 in our heart, well, it's going to be like twenty 0:17:58.840 --> 0:18:02.879 twenty nine or so. Finally, IBM is investing a huge 0:18:02.920 --> 0:18:05.920 amount of money, like one hundred million Bucks and we'll 0:18:05.920 --> 0:18:10.080 be partnering with the Universities of Chicago and Tokyo to 0:18:10.160 --> 0:18:14.639 build a quantum supercomputer that aims to have one hundred 0:18:14.720 --> 0:18:19.560 thousand cubits, and I guess that would be a hundred 0:18:19.880 --> 0:18:24.679 kill cubits. Currently, I think the largest quantum computer is 0:18:24.720 --> 0:18:27.119 IBM's Ospray. I could be wrong about that, but I 0:18:27.119 --> 0:18:29.800 think it's the Ospray, and as I recall, the Osprey 0:18:29.840 --> 0:18:33.760 has four hundred and thirty three cubits. IBM is also 0:18:33.920 --> 0:18:38.320 planning on launching the Condor computer sometime this year. I 0:18:38.359 --> 0:18:40.480 believe that one is going to have slightly more than 0:18:40.560 --> 0:18:46.919 one thousand cubits, but one hundred thousand is tremendous. It 0:18:47.000 --> 0:18:51.320 is so enormous. Now, just a reminder, a cubit is 0:18:51.359 --> 0:18:55.680 a quantum bit, and unlike a classical bit, which can 0:18:55.800 --> 0:18:59.760 either be a zero or a one, a cubit can 0:18:59.800 --> 0:19:03.600 be placed into superposition, meaning it can be both zero 0:19:03.840 --> 0:19:08.359 and one simultaneously. Technically every value in between as well, 0:19:09.160 --> 0:19:12.320 and it all gets very very quantum. So I recommend 0:19:12.320 --> 0:19:15.240 looking through the tech stuff archives for episodes about quantum 0:19:15.280 --> 0:19:18.680 computing if you want to learn more. As for a deadline, 0:19:18.840 --> 0:19:21.600 IBM's looking a decade out with a goal of this 0:19:21.720 --> 0:19:25.960 quantum supercomputer doing science and stuff by twenty thirty three. 0:19:26.960 --> 0:19:30.080 And that's it for the Tech News today, May twenty third, 0:19:30.200 --> 0:19:33.800 twenty twenty three. I hope you are all well, and 0:19:33.840 --> 0:19:43.760 I'll talk to you again really soon. Tech Stuff is 0:19:43.800 --> 0:19:48.359 an iHeartRadio production. For more podcasts from iHeartRadio, visit the 0:19:48.400 --> 0:19:52.000 iHeartRadio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to your 0:19:52.040 --> 0:19:56.560 favorite shows.