Speaker 1: Welcome to the Psychology Podcast, where we give you insights
Speaker 1: into the mind, brained behavior and creativity. I'm doctor Scott
Speaker 1: Barry Kaufman, and in each episode I have a conversation
Speaker 1: with a guest who will stimulate your mind and give
Speaker 1: you a greater understanding of yourself, others, and the world
Speaker 1: to live in. Hopefully we'll also provide a glimpse into
Speaker 1: human possibility. Thanks for listening and enjoy the podcast Today.
Speaker 1: It's a pleasure to have Molly Crockett on the podcast.
Speaker 1: Doctor Crockett is an Assistant professor of psychology at Yale
Speaker 1: University and a Distinguished Research Fellow at the Oxford Center
Speaker 1: for Neuroethics. Prior to joining Yale, Doctor Crockett was a
Speaker 1: faculty member the University of Oxford's Department of Experimental Psychology
Speaker 1: and a fellow of Jesus College. She owns a BSc
Speaker 1: In neuroscience from UCLA and a PhD in experimental psychology
Speaker 1: from the University of Cambridge WHOO, and completed a Welcome
Speaker 1: Trust postdoctoral fellowship with economists and neuroscientists at the University
Speaker 1: of Zurich and University College London. Molly, I'm so excited
Speaker 1: to finally have you on the Psychology Podcast. It's so
Speaker 1: great to be here. Thank you so much for inviting me. Oh, yes,
Speaker 1: you know, we were just reminiscing about how we've known
Speaker 1: each other for quite some time. You know, we were
Speaker 1: classmates together, and I have this mental image of the
Speaker 1: first time I met you. I think it was at
Speaker 1: King's College reception at Cambridge probably, yeah, in like two
Speaker 1: thousand and I want to say, like five six sixx yeah,
Speaker 1: two thousand and six, and we both like, I'm trying
Speaker 1: to remember the conversation, but I remember we're both like lost. Yeah,
Speaker 1: I mean, Cambridge is a pretty weird place to show up.
Speaker 1: I grew up in southern California, where none of the
Speaker 1: buildings are older than about fifty years old. To show
Speaker 1: up at King's College is pretty amazing. I think we
Speaker 1: yes discovered pretty quickly we were both psychologists, and that
Speaker 1: was the point of It's been such a delight for
Speaker 1: me to watch your career sore. Yeah, it's just so cool. Anyway, Oh,
Speaker 1: thank you, that's very good. I wanted to talk a
Speaker 1: little bit about how your research has changed over the
Speaker 1: years and how you got into the research you're doing. Now,
Speaker 1: because if I recall correctly, at Cambridge you were doing
Speaker 1: really groundbreaking work on the brain and implications for like
Speaker 1: for medicine. I believe in like neurochemistry, interventions and things
Speaker 1: of that nature. Yeah, so my research has changed quite
Speaker 1: a lot over the years. I guess when I showed
Speaker 1: up a Cambridge in two thousand and six, I went
Speaker 1: there to work with Trevor Robbins and Luke Clark on
Speaker 1: how serotonin influences cognition and behavior. And at the very
Speaker 1: beginning of that work I was primarily interested in self
Speaker 1: control and impulsivity. And it was sort of through a
Speaker 1: series of happy accidents that I ended up working on morality,
Speaker 1: and initially was working on serotonin and morality, how serotonin
Speaker 1: affects our moral judgments, our decisions about how to respond
Speaker 1: to on fairness, for example. But eventually my interests broadened
Speaker 1: out beyond the neurochemical aspects of morality, and now in
Speaker 1: my lab we're doing a wide range of approaches to
Speaker 1: questions that broadly concern social behavior and moral judgment, and
Speaker 1: we use methods from brain imaging and still a bit
Speaker 1: of pharmacology to behavioral experiments and now most recently looking
Speaker 1: at very large data sets of behavior on social media.
Speaker 1: That's with the postdoc in my lab, Billy Brady. So
Speaker 1: it's really exciting for me to be able to always
Speaker 1: be learning new approaches to understanding something so complex as
Speaker 1: human morality, because I really do think you need to
Speaker 1: kind of throw the kitchen sink at it. It's one
Speaker 1: of those age old questions that really benefit. It's from
Speaker 1: approaches that are not just multi disciplinary, but also using
Speaker 1: lots of different methods, and I feel incredibly lucky to
Speaker 1: be able to do my job. It's really fun. Yeah,
Speaker 1: I love that you bring all these different perspectives to
Speaker 1: studying a really and really important topic that's like the
Speaker 1: topic some could argue is like the topic of our age.
Speaker 1: It's just amazing to see how things have changed. I mean,
Speaker 1: my first met since that two thousand and six, Like
Speaker 1: I don't feel like none of this stuff was in
Speaker 1: my head at the time, like as on my radar,
Speaker 1: as even an important research topic like you know here,
Speaker 1: I was in my little silo at Cambridge, like studying intelligence.
Speaker 1: But times have changed and my research interests have also
Speaker 1: changed dramatically since then as well. I mean, it's just
Speaker 1: so interesting because like here we are like twenty nineteen.
Speaker 1: That's true, I was. I was not on Twitter in
Speaker 1: two thousand and six. But when did Twitter start? It
Speaker 1: started around then? I think I'm not sure. I'm not sure.
Speaker 1: I think I didn't get on Twitter until twenty eleven. Yeah,
Speaker 1: I think the same for me, or maybe twenty twelve
Speaker 1: for me. I don't think it's made me happier as
Speaker 1: a person. Would you agree with that experience? You know?
Speaker 1: It's these kinds of things are hard to self assess.
Speaker 1: I mean, on the one hand, I clearly gain some
Speaker 1: value from it because I spend a lot of time
Speaker 1: on social media. But there are different kinds of values there.
Speaker 1: What philosophers like to distinguish between first order desires and
Speaker 1: second order desires, So they're your first order, immediate desires,
Speaker 1: like I want to log into Twitter and check my
Speaker 1: latest number of likes and followers, and then there's your
Speaker 1: second order desire about whether you want to have that
Speaker 1: initial desire. And I think I find myself increasingly in
Speaker 1: moments where my first order desires with respect to technology
Speaker 1: use are not in line with my second order desires. Well,
Speaker 1: that conflict arises in lots of different situations you know,
Speaker 1: and so that's important topic investigation in itself, Like when
Speaker 1: they like kind of like system one in system two
Speaker 1: are aligned, and when they are really really divergent from
Speaker 1: each other or conflict. Well, should we just jump into
Speaker 1: your research on moral outrage? Sure, you do it. You
Speaker 1: wrote this terrific paper on moral outrage in the digital Age.
Speaker 1: One finding from that really stuck out at me. You said,
Speaker 1: I found it so interesting that you found that am
Speaker 1: moral acts encountered online tend to cite stronger moral outrage
Speaker 1: than a moral acts encountered in person or via traditional
Speaker 1: forms of media. And I feel like there's so many
Speaker 1: implications of that for morality, you know, for a lot
Speaker 1: of things. I was just wondering, like how you interpret
Speaker 1: that finding in the sense of, like, do you think
Speaker 1: people are more likely to like signal things online that
Speaker 1: they don't actually really genuinely authentically believe, but they kind
Speaker 1: of get caught up in this peer pressure to signal things. Well,
Speaker 1: I think that that's a separate question that is maybe
Speaker 1: loosely related to the first question about the strength of
Speaker 1: emotional reactions to material encountered online versus offline. And I
Speaker 1: think one important limitation of the data that I've looked
Speaker 1: at to note is that the data comes from an
Speaker 1: experienced sampling study that was led by Will Hoffman and
Speaker 1: colleagues and published in twenty fourteen, and they had participants
Speaker 1: in this study responding multiple times a day to randomly
Speaker 1: timed text messages that sent them a link to a
Speaker 1: survey that asked them whether in the past hour they
Speaker 1: had witnessed, been the target of, learned about, or committed
Speaker 1: any moral or immral acts, and then if the answer
Speaker 1: was yes, they asked various follow up questions, including how
Speaker 1: angry do you feel about this incident? And how discussed
Speaker 1: it and so on. So I was able to analyze
Speaker 1: these moral outrage responses a mixture of anger and discussed
Speaker 1: really to immoral events people learned about depending on where
Speaker 1: they had learned about that. But the analysis doesn't distinguish
Speaker 1: between different types of content, So we don't know from
Speaker 1: this data whether the thing that people are outraged about
Speaker 1: online is the same thing that they are outraged about
Speaker 1: that they read about in the news. And I think
Speaker 1: what's driving those differences, even though I can't be sure
Speaker 1: because the data doesn't go down to that level of detail,
Speaker 1: but most likely what's driving the differences in the emotional
Speaker 1: response is that people are probably more likely to see
Speaker 1: really really outrage provoking content online compared to other forms
Speaker 1: of media because that content is getting selected for by
Speaker 1: newspeed algorithms that prioritize content that's most likely to draw
Speaker 1: user engagement. And there's quite a lot of research now,
Speaker 1: I mean, some research initially looking at virality by Joonah
Speaker 1: Berger and Katie Milkman, who you might have connected with
Speaker 1: at PEN, showing that like emotion content is more likely
Speaker 1: to go viral, and then more recently Billy Brady and
Speaker 1: colleagues and n YU have shown that specifically moral emotions
Speaker 1: are especially especially likely to go viral, and of course
Speaker 1: outrage ism moral emotion. And so it stands to reason
Speaker 1: that the reason why in that data set we see
Speaker 1: stronger outrage responses to immral acts learn about online than
Speaker 1: offline is probably because that content is getting selected for
Speaker 1: its virality or potential to go viral. So do these
Speaker 1: things like operate by somewhere like cultural evolution principles or
Speaker 1: like mimemic transmission principles. Yeah, potentially, I mean, I think
Speaker 1: it's a nice analogy to think of the selection of
Speaker 1: content on social media by news feed algorithms as operating
Speaker 1: according to some sort of evolutionary principle where fitness is
Speaker 1: measured by engagement social reward, you know, like yeah, tribal.
Speaker 1: I mean, that's one the most deep seated revolutionary instincts,
Speaker 1: is the need for belonging, right. Yeah, that's a theoretical
Speaker 1: piece that has a little bit of data on it,
Speaker 1: and now in my lab there's a whole team that's
Speaker 1: being led by Billy Brady, a postdoc in my lab,
Speaker 1: to test some of the questions that I outline in
Speaker 1: that piece with actual data. So that's been super exciting.
Speaker 1: I'm learning all about machine learning algorithithms and how to
Speaker 1: trade classifiers, and it's been a wonderful educational journey. But yeah,
Speaker 1: the initial piece was really a reaction to recognizing that
Speaker 1: I was spending way more time on social media than
Speaker 1: I really intended to, and that a lot of my
Speaker 1: choices to share certain kinds of content were feeling really
Speaker 1: non intentional. And of course, my background from the Cambridge
Speaker 1: days working with Trevor Robbins, who, along with Barry Everett,
Speaker 1: developed really foundational work on drug addiction and how drug
Speaker 1: addiction and you know, in some cases can be modeled
Speaker 1: as a shift from goal directed behavior to habit based behavior.
Speaker 1: You know, I was sort of steeped in those ideas
Speaker 1: as a graduate student in Cambridge and started to think
Speaker 1: about my own behavior on social media as potentially transitioning
Speaker 1: from goal directed to habitual And of course, one of
Speaker 1: the seminole findings that's come out of work on goals
Speaker 1: and Habits by Tony Dickinson, also Cambridge. Anyway, Yeah, Tony Dickinson,
Speaker 1: and I believe Dickinson and Shanks Is in the eighties
Speaker 1: published this paper on different schedules of reward and they
Speaker 1: showed that variable interval reinforcement, a sort of random, unpredictable
Speaker 1: delivery of rewards, is the best well or you know,
Speaker 1: the most effective way to establish a habit. And that's
Speaker 1: of course exactly how social rewards are delivered to us
Speaker 1: on social media, right. You don't know when your post
Speaker 1: is going to get liked, you don't know how many
Speaker 1: likes it's going to get, and so we post something
Speaker 1: and then we're like refreshing the page like a rat
Speaker 1: pressing a lever for cocaine. And you know, these are
Speaker 1: very very basic principles of reinforcement learning, and engineers Facebook
Speaker 1: and Twitter know this and have designed their systems to
Speaker 1: maximize the amount of time we spend on the platforms,
Speaker 1: and you know, and there's all sorts of value judgments
Speaker 1: one can make about whether that's morally right or morally wrong.
Speaker 1: You know. I see my role as a scientist to
Speaker 1: really describe what's happening and to gather data about the
Speaker 1: effect of different kinds of technology design on behavior. You know,
Speaker 1: there is a lot of potential for moral panic around
Speaker 1: these issues, and there's quite a lot of opinions about
Speaker 1: what social media is doing to our mental health, our
Speaker 1: social relationships, democracy, et cetera. Right, But like you know,
Speaker 1: for every thousand opinions, there's maybe one data point, right, So,
Speaker 1: like the amount of actual data relative to the number
Speaker 1: of opinions out there is in my view, problematically small.
Speaker 1: And so what we're doing in my lab is trying
Speaker 1: to actually apply psychological theory to test some ideas and
Speaker 1: see whether we can find empirical evidence for them. It's great.
Speaker 1: Relating to the addiction point that you made reinforcement learning,
Speaker 1: there's one I want to pull out. One of your
Speaker 1: juicy you have a lot of juicy quotes in that paper,
Speaker 1: this one. I tweeted this to the Did you see
Speaker 1: I tweeted all this stuff from you today? I got
Speaker 1: so excited in your favor. Just as habitual snacker, just
Speaker 1: as a habitual snacker eats without feeling hungry, a habitual
Speaker 1: online shamer might express outrage without actually feeling outraged. So
Speaker 1: if we apply those same principles to like the addiction
Speaker 1: of anything like cocaine, for instance, you know, we know
Speaker 1: that with the dopamine, the difference beween wanting and liking,
Speaker 1: you know, systems of delpamine, you can actually not enjoy
Speaker 1: doing it at all, but you kind of feel compelling. Right,
Speaker 1: So there are two really important things I want to
Speaker 1: emphasize here. The first is that the hypothesis about habits
Speaker 1: that I lay out in that paper is a hypothesis.
Speaker 1: We don't actually have data to support this yet, although
Speaker 1: of course it feels very intuitive that a lot of
Speaker 1: is already. No, it's fine. No, I think it is
Speaker 1: a hypothesis that we're testing, and I think hopefully in
Speaker 1: the next couple of months we'll have some empirical support
Speaker 1: that's consistent with this. But I want to make sure
Speaker 1: that listeners flag this as like an idea that's not
Speaker 1: been established yet. The second thing that I think is
Speaker 1: really important to distinguish, especially in the context of social
Speaker 1: media and all the opinions out there, is that there's
Speaker 1: an important distinction between habitual behavior and addiction. And addiction
Speaker 1: of course, you know, you may know more about it
Speaker 1: than me. I'm not a scholar of addiction, but I
Speaker 1: have close colleagues who are, and like, it's really important
Speaker 1: to emphasize that an addiction has a very specific definition,
Speaker 1: both in terms of its neurobiology and its behavioral consequences.
Speaker 1: And I had one really important hallmark of an addiction
Speaker 1: is that there's persistent, uh, you know, continuation of the
Speaker 1: behavior despite negative consequences. And I think probably a lot
Speaker 1: of people using social media might wish they use it
Speaker 1: less and might feel like they are automatically or impulsively
Speaker 1: logging in, but I'm not sure that they would go
Speaker 1: so far to say is that the consequences for them
Speaker 1: are negative and therefore it wouldn't meet, you know, the
Speaker 1: strict definition for an addiction. So you know, there are
Speaker 1: tons of othds out there like, oh, you're addicted to Facebook,
Speaker 1: you're addicted to Twitter. One of my favorite ones is
Speaker 1: Twitter is what did somebody write? Twitter is the crystal
Speaker 1: meth of newsrooms? That was an opinion piece in the
Speaker 1: Wasatchington Post that came out after the Covington Catholic controversy
Speaker 1: had kind of entered phase two after the initial outrage
Speaker 1: over the video that went viral showing kids and maga
Speaker 1: hats shouting at a Native American man. As more footage
Speaker 1: came out, it became clear that the situation was more
Speaker 1: complicated than it initially had been presented, and several journalists
Speaker 1: sort of walked back their initial opinions and deleted tweets
Speaker 1: that they had written, and there was a sort of
Speaker 1: very very temporary moment of reckoning I think amongst many
Speaker 1: journalists about Twitter and what kinds of behaviors it incentivizes. Right, But,
Speaker 1: like you know, is Twitter the crystal method of newsrooms?
Speaker 1: Like that's probably an overstatement based on what we know
Speaker 1: about the science of addiction, And I personally would love
Speaker 1: to see more input from scientists who actually study addiction,
Speaker 1: because you know, it's not helpful or actual addiction research
Speaker 1: to have the lines being very blurred in terms of
Speaker 1: what counts as an addiction and what what doesn't Thank you, Molly,
Speaker 1: that that was really terrific and important nuance. So thank
Speaker 1: you for saying all that. You know, similar debates are
Speaker 1: raging with in terms of sex addiction. Is is that
Speaker 1: a lot of people don't think that it could it exists,
Speaker 1: you know, And so maybe the most like reasonable thing
Speaker 1: to say right now is like, there are lots of
Speaker 1: things in this world that give us, quote, a dopamine hit,
Speaker 1: you know, and just because we have these deep seated
Speaker 1: like like social rewards, for instance, it's evolved to probably
Speaker 1: be one of the most rewarding things in that dopamine system.
Speaker 1: But that doesn't mean that every time we get a
Speaker 1: dopamine hit from something, we're addicted to that thing. So
Speaker 1: maybe that's just the most reasonable thing. Yeah. Yeah, So
Speaker 1: let's talk about outrage fatigue. Did you coin that because
Speaker 1: I used that phrase? No, definitely, no other no, others
Speaker 1: have talked about that. I mean, that's another thing that
Speaker 1: that I think there's not really good data one way
Speaker 1: or the other. And if you look at the larger
Speaker 1: social psych literature on anger expression and aggression, like there's
Speaker 1: actually evidence that would support the existence of a phenomenon
Speaker 1: like outrage fatigue, you know, basic processes like you know,
Speaker 1: desensitization and habituation. At the same time, there is some
Speaker 1: evidence from studies of aggression that there's a sensitization process
Speaker 1: as well, in the sense that like you know, you know,
Speaker 1: venting anger makes you more likely to you know, to
Speaker 1: aggress in the future because you're sort of ruminating about
Speaker 1: it and you're you're not letting it go. So I
Speaker 1: think that the broader question of whether outrage fatigue is
Speaker 1: happening on mass is again, like from what we know
Speaker 1: from psychological research, it's a mixed bag, and there's just
Speaker 1: not data on this. It's an intriguing idea, isn't it.
Speaker 1: I Mean it's similar to you know called compassion fatigue
Speaker 1: as well, well, you know, like and that has been
Speaker 1: site of a little like Adam Grant and read Rebel
Speaker 1: a really cool article in hartstory about that. So maybe
Speaker 1: there's some more principles there, certainly. Yeah, And it's interesting
Speaker 1: to think about, like if that phenomenon does exist, if
Speaker 1: it's a real thing, then then should we be thinking
Speaker 1: about like you know, rationing our outrage, like reserving it
Speaker 1: for issues that we personally find most important. But then
Speaker 1: how do you even define that given that our moral
Speaker 1: judgments are so contact sensitive and sensitive to factors that
Speaker 1: are even unrelated to the topic at hand. So, and
Speaker 1: it just seems very fraught to think about how how
Speaker 1: we might try to regulate our own outrage in a
Speaker 1: in a principled way. I'm not saying that we should
Speaker 1: or shouldn't try to do that, but I'm like deeply
Speaker 1: respectful of like how thority and complicated a project that
Speaker 1: would be right, Like, you know, if we you know,
Speaker 1: let's say for the sake of argument, let's say that
Speaker 1: outrage fatigue exists, and like we discover that, you know,
Speaker 1: for the average human, like you know, expressing outrage, you know,
Speaker 1: you can you can express outrage and feel it, you know,
Speaker 1: for real, like I don't know, twice a day, just
Speaker 1: to pick a totally fictional random number. Right. Well, then,
Speaker 1: like when the first time we encounter something outrageous occurs,
Speaker 1: what do we do with that? Like what if there's
Speaker 1: something worse that's coming? Do you not want to waste
Speaker 1: our outrage on the first thing you see? Yeah? But
Speaker 1: I mean, it's it feels preposterous to try and think
Speaker 1: about emotions in that way, right, like's evolved to serve
Speaker 1: very specific functions and like to try and impose some
Speaker 1: sort of you know, goal directed, intentional means and they're
Speaker 1: you know, of experiencing them. Is is a huge project.
Speaker 1: Although I guess as and saying those words, this is
Speaker 1: in some sense a project of mindfulness, right like in
Speaker 1: you know, in mindfulness practice. And I know that you've
Speaker 1: you've had people on the show who are way more
Speaker 1: expert than me on this, and you've written about it yourself.
Speaker 1: But like, one aspect of mindfulness practice is finding a
Speaker 1: way to not act on every emotion that we experience
Speaker 1: and to allow them to rise and fall and without judgment,
Speaker 1: observe that happening without getting caught up in them, right
Speaker 1: to cultivate a sense of equanimity with what's happening outside
Speaker 1: of us and inside of us. So, yeah, it's probabe,
Speaker 1: someone should do a study a mindfulness intervention for outrage fatigue, Like,
Speaker 1: someone should do that study. It would be really interesting. Yeah,
Speaker 1: I at one hundred and forty seven things I wanted
Speaker 1: to respond to about that. Hold on, if I pick
Speaker 1: one in the moment, this is a tough thing about
Speaker 1: doing this podcast in the moment, some of what you're
Speaker 1: saying seems a now to the ego depletion research. You know,
Speaker 1: maybe there's like a not an ego depletion, you know,
Speaker 1: the self control of bound weist research all that, but
Speaker 1: maybe there's like a capassion which just goes into the
Speaker 1: calls and benefits of outrage, fatigue of outrage, and not fatigue,
Speaker 1: but just a showing outrage. Absolutely, absolutely, and I think
Speaker 1: that's something that's that's really important to highlight. You know,
Speaker 1: outrage gets a lot of negative press, especially these days,
Speaker 1: and my own article that you read has been interpreted
Speaker 1: by some people as making an argument that outrage is bad.
Speaker 1: I don't know if that was your impression, but I
Speaker 1: want to make it very clear that I am not
Speaker 1: making any value judgments about whether outrage is a good
Speaker 1: thing or a bad thing. It's an emotion, it's complicated,
Speaker 1: it can have good consequences. It motivates collective action. Victoria's Spring,
Speaker 1: Darryl Cameron and Mina Chakara wrote a really nice paper
Speaker 1: in Ticks highlighting some of the upsides of outrage. That's
Speaker 1: what the papers called the upside of outrage. But there
Speaker 1: are of course also downsides, many of which you know
Speaker 1: are are being talked about now in terms of potentially
Speaker 1: exacerbating social conflicts and political polarization and whatnot, oversimplifying issues
Speaker 1: and you know, turning complex characters into all good or
Speaker 1: all bad like these are consequences of outrage too. And
Speaker 1: having studied extensively the psychological processes and neurobiological processes of
Speaker 1: decisions to punish other people for perceived violations of social
Speaker 1: norms like fairness, so you know, work on ultimatum game
Speaker 1: for example, that was my That was what my dissertation
Speaker 1: was on at Cambridge, and how how people decide whether
Speaker 1: to accept being treated unfairly or to engage in costly punishment,
Speaker 1: so paying some money to themselves to destroy the pie
Speaker 1: of someone who's been really selfish. Right, And one thing
Speaker 1: that I found in my post doctoral research is that
Speaker 1: if you put people in situations where they can punish
Speaker 1: on fairness on behalf of either themselves or on behalf
Speaker 1: of another person, people reliably do this. And if you
Speaker 1: ask them afterwards why why did you punish, and you
Speaker 1: get them to rate their agreement with various statements like
Speaker 1: I punished because I really cared about fairness and I
Speaker 1: wanted to teach them a lesson, or I punished because
Speaker 1: it just felt really satisfying and I wanted to get revenge.
Speaker 1: And you can ask many statements like this, and you
Speaker 1: can then group the statements into more sort of socially
Speaker 1: minded and deterrents focused motive so I want to teach
Speaker 1: this person a lesson so they're not going to do
Speaker 1: it again in the future, and retributive motives like I
Speaker 1: just wanted to screw that person, right, And what we
Speaker 1: find is that people are unwilling to endorse having punished
Speaker 1: out of revenge, Like we don't see high agreement with
Speaker 1: those items, but people are very willing to say that
Speaker 1: they punished because they care about fairness, they wanted to
Speaker 1: teach a lesson, these like you know, good outcomes of
Speaker 1: the nation. Sure, yeah, yeah, absolutely, I think this is
Speaker 1: capturing social desirability. But the way we design the experiment,
Speaker 1: we can actually infer from their behavioral responses how much
Speaker 1: they cared about these different motives. Because half the time
Speaker 1: when they're punishing, the person who gets punished never finds out,
Speaker 1: so there's no way they can teach a lesson through
Speaker 1: that secret punishment because the person never finds out they've
Speaker 1: been punished, So that kind of punishment can only be
Speaker 1: explained by pure retribution motives. Right, So we have on
Speaker 1: this experiment measurement of the actual motives that we can
Speaker 1: infer from behavior, and then people sell reports of their motives,
Speaker 1: and what we find is they don't really match up
Speaker 1: that well. So oh humans, humans deterrent punishment. So punishment
Speaker 1: that is actually communicative, that actually does teach a lesson
Speaker 1: to the recipient, that's correlated reasonably well with people's self
Speaker 1: reports of I punish because I wanted to teach a lesson,
Speaker 1: But the retributive punishment is totally uncorrelated with self reports
Speaker 1: of retributive motives. So what does suggests to me is
Speaker 1: that in the case of these punishment decisions, people to
Speaker 1: some extent are either unaware of or unwilling to report
Speaker 1: the sort of less socially desirable motives that drive a
Speaker 1: lot of punishment behavior. And I wonder, I have no
Speaker 1: evidence for, but I wonder how much of this is
Speaker 1: now at play on social media, where it's very very
Speaker 1: easy to punish perceive violations of social norms. You can
Speaker 1: very easily, you know, write a tweet to shame someone,
Speaker 1: call them out for a behavior that you think is bad.
Speaker 1: You can retweet or like other people's statements of that,
Speaker 1: And like, I'm not sure how much people are aware
Speaker 1: of what their motives are when they're engaging in this behavior.
Speaker 1: And you know, these are just really interesting questions from
Speaker 1: a psychological perspective, but I think they also have really
Speaker 1: important implications potentially for our democracy and our social discourse
Speaker 1: more broadly. You know, So I feel like I'm constantly
Speaker 1: kind of switching between taking on and off different hats.
Speaker 1: There's the like Malia's scientist hat, which is like, when
Speaker 1: I'm wearing the scientist hat, I care about using data
Speaker 1: to portray the world in the most accurate way that
Speaker 1: I can and trying as best I can to keep
Speaker 1: my own political beliefs and value judgments out of it.
Speaker 1: But then there's also like my citizen hat, where I
Speaker 1: like started working on these issues because I felt really
Speaker 1: concerned about the direction that the country's going and I
Speaker 1: wanted to use my training in a way to like
Speaker 1: maybe do whatever I can to help the situation. But
Speaker 1: it's like complicated, you know, juggling those different identities, and
Speaker 1: I definitely have had missteps where like I have let
Speaker 1: my own values, like you know, creep into you know,
Speaker 1: a talk or an interview where I, you know, I'm
Speaker 1: talking about the science, but then maybe the way that
Speaker 1: I presented is tinge with some of my value that
Speaker 1: I'm doing the best that I can, Like, it's it's
Speaker 1: it's hard, though, and it feels increasingly complicated to do
Speaker 1: science on issues that are that are the topic of
Speaker 1: a lot of heated social discourse. And I'm sure I'm
Speaker 1: preaching to the choir to you having worked on intelligence, right, Like,
Speaker 1: it's hard to try and maintain an objective view of
Speaker 1: the scientific problem when there's this deafening chorus of people
Speaker 1: telling you how you should or should not think about
Speaker 1: the problem. And if you think about it in this way,
Speaker 1: then not only are you wrong, but you're also a
Speaker 1: bad person. And like, and the stakes just feel so high, right,
Speaker 1: more so than ever before, you know, compared to two
Speaker 1: thousand and six, Like, so were you yeah, you know so?
Speaker 1: And it's it keeps things interesting. I will say that
Speaker 1: it sure does and stressful if we can be honest. No,
Speaker 1: I appreciate you being vulnerable enough to admit that I
Speaker 1: admitted something similarly on Twitter recently. These hats that we
Speaker 1: put on, and when we're in one mode of that hat,
Speaker 1: we can kind of be blind to the implications for
Speaker 1: like if we were in the other hat, you know,
Speaker 1: and then we're in another hat and we think about
Speaker 1: all these implications and things and then yeah, so it does.
Speaker 1: You know, it's a lot easier to like just pick
Speaker 1: an identity, to pick one hat. I guess is the
Speaker 1: because I am trying to maybe, like this conversation with
Speaker 1: you right now, it's helping me as well kind of
Speaker 1: formulate more directly what exactly the conflict is. And maybe
Speaker 1: it's just like it's a lot of there are people
Speaker 1: that seem to like be very comfortable just picking one
Speaker 1: hat and staying with it and being part of that
Speaker 1: tribe is a great feeling of like certainty and like,
Speaker 1: you know, we can and I find it. Yeah, I
Speaker 1: want to just like have this nuance to every single
Speaker 1: thing that comes in front of me. Yeah, I mean
Speaker 1: you mentioned humility earlier, and I think I'm finding that
Speaker 1: as a value increasingly helpful, especially as I'm starting in
Speaker 1: my research to touch more on issues to deal with
Speaker 1: race and gender, and I feel very intimidated by working
Speaker 1: on these issues because I know that I have so
Speaker 1: much to learn, and you know, I you know, there
Speaker 1: are many ways to be humble in the pursuit of
Speaker 1: scientific knowledge and particularly when asking questions around you know,
Speaker 1: injustice and inequality. You know, like I just try to
Speaker 1: learn as much as I can, and you know, I'm
Speaker 1: going to get stuff wrong sometimes, and you know, the
Speaker 1: discomfort of being wrong is a you know, is dwarfed
Speaker 1: by the discomfort of so many people who are in
Speaker 1: far less privileged positions than me. So I'm very happy
Speaker 1: to be uncomfortable if that can help me learn more
Speaker 1: and can help the broader systems of injustice and oppression
Speaker 1: that we are, you know, increasingly talking about as a society,
Speaker 1: both offline and online. I love that so much what
Speaker 1: you just said. I can't like it enough on social media.
Speaker 1: You know, as someone who's teaching a course at Columbia
Speaker 1: Barnard College about the science of living well, we can
Speaker 1: no longer just talk about the psychological aspects divorced from
Speaker 1: the context of people who don't even have the opportunities
Speaker 1: in the first place to exercise those psychological strengths, character
Speaker 1: strengths and things. So this is just constantly on my
Speaker 1: mind these days, like every day. It's on my mind
Speaker 1: these days because I'm seeing things and my students are
Speaker 1: really teaching me a lot of things that I'm learning about,
Speaker 1: you know, like they're so intertwined that yeah, maybe this
Speaker 1: whole idea of you're really helping me in this conversation
Speaker 1: as well to think about this and more parly, so
Speaker 1: thank you, well, thank you. Yeah, maybe like I need
Speaker 1: to not think about it as like different hats, like
Speaker 1: I take this hat on and then off, and then
Speaker 1: I put this on and off, Like maybe like we
Speaker 1: need to think of these things always always intertwined. I'm
Speaker 1: just thinking, like, especially in the field I work in
Speaker 1: the positive psychology and the science of like how to
Speaker 1: live well, I don't even know if we can ever
Speaker 1: if I can ever really have these different hats, like
Speaker 1: I think they need all the hats need to be
Speaker 1: on at the same time. Maybe is a better metaphor. Yeah, anyway,
Speaker 1: thank you so much for that. Students are the best.
Speaker 1: I mean, yeah, I agree, It's been really wonderful just
Speaker 1: having their questions and feedback as I've been presenting, you know,
Speaker 1: I teach a social neuroscience class, and I just did
Speaker 1: the lectures on punishment and outrage last week, and it's
Speaker 1: always such an informative exercise to present the work to
Speaker 1: fresh minds and they're they're living this, you know. And
Speaker 1: one thing that I wonder a lot about. And I'm
Speaker 1: curious your your perspective on this, because I know you've
Speaker 1: you've looked a lot at development and adjustment and kids
Speaker 1: as they're you know, learning who they are and how
Speaker 1: to navigate through the world. You know, I really wonder
Speaker 1: what technologies like social media might be doing to the
Speaker 1: way young people construe the social world. Right, Like, when
Speaker 1: you think about our moral emotions and instincts that evolved
Speaker 1: in a very different environment than the one we now
Speaker 1: find ourselves in, and in particular, moral emotions and moral
Speaker 1: behaviors are exquisitely tuned to concerns about reputation, right, because
Speaker 1: reputation is everything. It's you know, everything, at least it
Speaker 1: was in our ancestry and small tribes, well hard to
Speaker 1: gain and easy to lose, right, And like, how does
Speaker 1: it change the way you conduct yourself if you live
Speaker 1: in a world where it's on display anything you say
Speaker 1: or do, any casual comment is preserved forever on the
Speaker 1: Internet and could go viral at any time. It's preserved there,
Speaker 1: you know, not everything, of course, we're not like in
Speaker 1: full surveillance mode yet, but like anything you say publicly
Speaker 1: online can be preserved and could go viral and could
Speaker 1: be there for your future employees or your future dates
Speaker 1: to see and evaluate. And I remember being a teenager
Speaker 1: and like you say stupid stuff when you're a teenager, right,
Speaker 1: like that, like part of becoming an adult, and part
Speaker 1: of becoming you know, a person who's more sensitive to
Speaker 1: others or around them is screwing up and having people
Speaker 1: you know gently call you out on it and you learn, right,
Speaker 1: And our technologies like social media fundamentally changing the process
Speaker 1: of moral learning and young people. Huge question. I don't
Speaker 1: even know how to begin answering that question, but I
Speaker 1: think it's an important question. Well, you know, but the
Speaker 1: people different political ends are going to be divided on
Speaker 1: that question. So some people are going to see it
Speaker 1: as a good thing. Some people are going to say
Speaker 1: that it's causing teenagers to grow up to be so
Speaker 1: hyper sensitive to every minor thing that like, you know,
Speaker 1: could be perceived as a moral that we like have
Speaker 1: this authoritarian society. You could see there's like these different
Speaker 1: views in the political spectrum. I think there's a lot
Speaker 1: of projection onto high you know. Again, like I feel
Speaker 1: like a broken record sometimes, but like I mean, that's
Speaker 1: why it's so important that we actually do research on
Speaker 1: this so we can get a grip on like, you know,
Speaker 1: maybe it actually has no effect. Like you know, there
Speaker 1: was a paper that came out in Nature Human Behavior
Speaker 1: a few weeks ago. Amy Urban and some colleagues at
Speaker 1: Oxford did a multiverse analysis where they basically took these
Speaker 1: large data sets and then analyze the data in every
Speaker 1: possible way it could be analyzed. And the research question was,
Speaker 1: broadly speaking, I'm probably getting the details wrong, but like,
Speaker 1: is social media use or internet use harmful for well
Speaker 1: being particularly in young people? And like some studies say
Speaker 1: that it's harmful and others say that it's not harmful,
Speaker 1: And like the data are very murky, partially because like
Speaker 1: the way that the questions are asked are really high level.
Speaker 1: They're not getting deep into the psychological processes. Yeah, so
Speaker 1: like if the dependent variable if what you're I don't know,
Speaker 1: if well both actually independent and dependent variable, right, so
Speaker 1: like well being is such a complicated construct, as you
Speaker 1: know because you're teaching a class on it. And then
Speaker 1: also internet use is very complicated, like spending time online,
Speaker 1: Like you can't use a basic predictor like how many
Speaker 1: hours a day do you use the Internet? Like somebody
Speaker 1: who's spending all of that time going down YouTube rabbit
Speaker 1: holes about you know, flat earth and you know violent
Speaker 1: conspiracy theories is going to have a very different impact
Speaker 1: of that time on well being than someone who's like
Speaker 1: you know, using Facebook to message with their best friend
Speaker 1: we moved away. Well, my colleagues at Penn the World
Speaker 1: well Being Project, found that the language used on Twitter
Speaker 1: was a better predictor of county wide heart disease than
Speaker 1: every single other measure of heart disease combined. Like that's
Speaker 1: usually looked at by like the WHO or something like that. Wow.
Speaker 1: So you know, that's just one example of how even
Speaker 1: like constantly ruminating and using certain like negative aggressive language
Speaker 1: on Twitter, let's talk about some goodness among humans. Because
Speaker 1: you found this paper and tell me if my conclusion
Speaker 1: of this paper is wrong, but you found that, yes,
Speaker 1: it is true that we very quickly form moral impressions
Speaker 1: of people as either good or bad. But there's a
Speaker 1: certain flexibility that humans have as well that build in
Speaker 1: that show illustrate the human capacity for forgiveness. Yeah. So
Speaker 1: this is research that was led by my PhD student,
Speaker 1: Jennifer Segal, and we were interested in understanding, at a
Speaker 1: very mechanistic level, how people develop beliefs about the moral
Speaker 1: character of other agents. And so we ran a series
Speaker 1: of experiments where the basic task is to observe other
Speaker 1: people making decisions that can benefit themselves but harm someone else,
Speaker 1: and your job as an observer is to try and
Speaker 1: predict whether this other person is going to go for
Speaker 1: the selfish, harmful option or whether they will sacrifice their
Speaker 1: own interests to benefit the other person. And we compare
Speaker 1: how people form these beliefs about character for others who
Speaker 1: are relatively selfish versus others who are relatively altruistic. And
Speaker 1: what we find is that for both the good guys
Speaker 1: and the bad guys, people form pretty accurate beliefs about
Speaker 1: how good or bad those other people are, but the
Speaker 1: beliefs about the bad characters are much more uncertain and
Speaker 1: much more flexibly updated. If you get new information, then
Speaker 1: the beliefs about the good well that's good and bad finding. Well, yeah,
Speaker 1: so if you get if you get information that that
Speaker 1: somebody's pretty good, then you kind of park that belief
Speaker 1: and you're like, Okay, cool, I don't have to worry
Speaker 1: about this person. I have this relatively stable belief that
Speaker 1: they're good. And learning rates from new information are pretty slow,
Speaker 1: So once someone has an impression that someone's good, then
Speaker 1: they're pretty stable in that. And I think that comports
Speaker 1: with our own experience, like our friends, like you know,
Speaker 1: we know they're good people and we're you know, even
Speaker 1: if they occasionally let us down, like you know, for
Speaker 1: the most part, we have this stable, good impression of them.
Speaker 1: When we get information that somebody might be bad, then
Speaker 1: this seems to transport the belief into this like volatile
Speaker 1: and uncertain state where it's much more quickly updated. And
Speaker 1: that could be in the good direction or the bad direction,
Speaker 1: and I think is adaptive either way. So, like you
Speaker 1: get some information that somebody like might be a jerk,
Speaker 1: and now you're like, Okay, what do I do with
Speaker 1: this person? Well, first of all, you probably spend a
Speaker 1: lot more of your attention thinking about this person, like
Speaker 1: they're occupying more of your headspace so to speak. And
Speaker 1: I think we can all think of examples of people
Speaker 1: in our lives where are like, eh, I don't know
Speaker 1: about this person. I don't know if they're trustworthy, and
Speaker 1: we're really really sensitive to any new information we might
Speaker 1: get about people like this. If we get information that,
Speaker 1: you know, what, actually that thing that they did that
Speaker 1: made you question their motives, like maybe it was an
Speaker 1: accident or you know, it's not as bad as you thought,
Speaker 1: and so you're like, Okay, cool, Now that I have
Speaker 1: this new information that they're actually reasonably trustworthy, then the
Speaker 1: belief can recover, right, So we're you know, we're not
Speaker 1: stuck with bad beliefs we have about people. But at
Speaker 1: the same time, if it turns out that person is
Speaker 1: even worse than we thought, then we're also able to
Speaker 1: adjust our belief in the downward direction as well. And broadly,
Speaker 1: I think that it's it's adaptive to have a cognitive
Speaker 1: system that develops character beliefs in this way, because like,
Speaker 1: what do you do with potentially and trustworthy people how
Speaker 1: to make a good decision about that relationship? Well? Probably,
Speaker 1: but you know, we live in a world where good
Speaker 1: people can make mistakes, and if we were to write
Speaker 1: somebody off at the first sign of trouble, we would
Speaker 1: be overcorrecting and we would miss out on a potentially
Speaker 1: long relationship of mutual benefit with that person. And so
Speaker 1: especially in an environment where most people are trustworthy and cooperative,
Speaker 1: when that's what the prevailing norms are, and that's what
Speaker 1: seems to be like innate stance that humans have is
Speaker 1: you know, generally cooperative and trusty. And you know, there's
Speaker 1: a lot of psychological research on this, like having that
Speaker 1: bias to leave room for movement in your bad beliefs
Speaker 1: is one that should be adaptive, absolutely, And this study
Speaker 1: that you connected with your colleagues focused on minor offenses.
Speaker 1: So Alexander Toddov yeah, asked the question, you know, what
Speaker 1: if the transgressions are major? He said, quote what if
Speaker 1: you were a participant in the quote bad agent was
Speaker 1: inflicting physical pain on you or somebody you love to
Speaker 1: maximize their earnings rather than on a stranger. And so
Speaker 1: it does make me think that there might be just
Speaker 1: a hypothesis, you know what we I think we do
Speaker 1: view the r Kellys of the world differently, you know,
Speaker 1: like Bill Cosby's and you know all that you know, right, Yeah,
Speaker 1: we're not going to forgive Bill Cosby that easily. That's
Speaker 1: something I definitely should have mentioned at the beginning, which
Speaker 1: is that the kinds of selfish versus altruistic behaviors that
Speaker 1: we were studying in these experiments were very minor in
Speaker 1: the sense that these are the kinds of like most
Speaker 1: of the most of the behaviors that we form impressions
Speaker 1: of others on day to day are things like somebody
Speaker 1: didn't return our call, or somebody was late to meet us, right,
Speaker 1: like not this person is an axe murderer. But surprisingly,
Speaker 1: a lot of the literature on impression formation and social
Speaker 1: psychology asks how people form impressions of others based on
Speaker 1: information like this person was an ex murder. Well, no,
Speaker 1: I'm perhaps being hyperbolic. I definitely know, like like sold
Speaker 1: drugs to high school students. That's like a that's definitely
Speaker 1: a stimulus that I've seen in a study that I've
Speaker 1: read for various acts of theft. A lot of the
Speaker 1: of the impression information research is based on extreme good
Speaker 1: and bad acts, not all of it, not the whole literature,
Speaker 1: but quite a lot of it. And that's really interesting
Speaker 1: given that, like, you know, most of us are not
Speaker 1: encountering those types of behaviors in our daily lives, and
Speaker 1: so we deliberately wanted to look at impression formation from
Speaker 1: these more minor transgressions, with the caveat of course that
Speaker 1: like these learning processes are very likely to be different,
Speaker 1: if not in kinds, then at least in degree for
Speaker 1: more extreme transgressions. Thank you. So let's wrap up this
Speaker 1: conversation with a Twitter lightning round. Oh got so, I
Speaker 1: asked on Twitter. You know people to ask you questions,
Speaker 1: So I'm going to just and you can be very
Speaker 1: succinct and quick in your answer. Sure, So, Lara meltem
Speaker 1: Bilkman said, what are the patterns or biomarkers in the
Speaker 1: physical brain which are associated with altruism? Oh? Great question,
Speaker 1: and I was just lecturing about this to my class.
Speaker 1: So there are a number of brain systems that have
Speaker 1: been implicated in altruism. One of them is empathy, and
Speaker 1: of course this dates back to psychological work by Dan
Speaker 1: Batson and others highlighting the link between empathy and altruism
Speaker 1: and pathic responses in the brain, particularly in networks involved
Speaker 1: in experience sharing, like the anterior insula and antira singulate cortex.
Speaker 1: Have been linked with altruistic behavior. The mentalizing network as well,
Speaker 1: so the ability to take perspectives of others, including the
Speaker 1: temporal prival junction, has been linked to altruism, and the
Speaker 1: septal area as well, which is very deep within the brain.
Speaker 1: That area has been shown to respond to different kinds
Speaker 1: of empathy and also predict helping behaviors, as reported through
Speaker 1: daily diaries. This is a really nice study by Sylvia
Speaker 1: Morelli and colleagues. There's also evidence that the reward system
Speaker 1: of the brain responds not just to our own rewards,
Speaker 1: but also to seeing others get rewards, so to the
Speaker 1: extent that we vicariously share the reward experiences about this
Speaker 1: is also predictive of altruism. I could go on, I'll
Speaker 1: wrap up, but like, there's actually I have like an
Speaker 1: hour and a half of lecture material on this very question.
Speaker 1: So Brian Gallagher asked, do you see yourself as more
Speaker 1: sympathetic to any particular ethical school, for example, virtue, ethics, utilitarianism, deontology. Oh,
Speaker 1: what a great question. That's tricky to answer. I think
Speaker 1: in part because the more I learn and read about
Speaker 1: different ethical perspectives, the more I feel like I don't
Speaker 1: know what my own is. I think I definitely lean consequentialists,
Speaker 1: but I wouldn't say that I'm an extreme hardcore consequentialist.
Speaker 1: We actually, my student, former student Jim Everett and collaborator
Speaker 1: Guy Kahan, a philosopher at Oxford, led the development of
Speaker 1: a scale to measure utilitarianism. And you can find out
Speaker 1: how utilitarian you are online. I can. I can give
Speaker 1: you the show notes. Yeah, yeah, I'm like slightly, I'm
Speaker 1: above average utilitarianism on that scale, but not at the extreme.
Speaker 1: So Jeffrey Miller asks, how can effective altruism succeed as
Speaker 1: a movement if most people are morally disgusted by utilitarian reasoning?
Speaker 1: Great question, I get that a lot. I actually I've
Speaker 1: had several conversations with the Effective Altruism group. I was
Speaker 1: just at a student dinner a couple of days ago
Speaker 1: chatting with that about this very question. So research that
Speaker 1: I've done with Jim Everett again and Dave Pizzarro has
Speaker 1: suggested that people find utilitarian decision makers less trustworthy than
Speaker 1: dante logical decision makers. And of course effective altruism as
Speaker 1: a movement, being quite utilitarian and nature is concerned about
Speaker 1: social perceptions given this research. One thing that we found
Speaker 1: in those studies is that if a utilitarian decision maker
Speaker 1: expresses that they felt conflicted about their utilitarian decision or
Speaker 1: you know, they found it very difficult, then this erases
Speaker 1: the differences in trustworthiness. So what that suggests is that
Speaker 1: to the extent you can signal concern for others and
Speaker 1: you know, other social emotions that are sometimes overridden in
Speaker 1: utilitarian choices, and that that can restore trustworthiness. Okay, but
Speaker 1: there still is an uphill battle if you're an effective altruist. Yeah, okay,
Speaker 1: last last question. I saved that I saved the best
Speaker 1: for last. Obviously that's my my subjective valuing. But Brian
Speaker 1: Eyre asks, how do you manage to be a brilliant scientist,
Speaker 1: a pro managing a big multidisciplinary lab like Clockwork and
Speaker 1: an ext and be an extremely kind, caring and motivating
Speaker 1: supervisor all in one person and still somehow sleep. Oh
Speaker 1: that's very very kind, overly kind, I mean, I think
Speaker 1: to answer in one word, I guess it would be
Speaker 1: great attitude, Like I just feel so grateful to be
Speaker 1: able to do this work and to be at a
Speaker 1: place like Yale that I'm surrounded by so many smart
Speaker 1: and kind and motivated people, and you know, my lab
Speaker 1: is amazing, and I just feel really, really lucky and
Speaker 1: grateful to be able to play a role in supervising
Speaker 1: those students, and they make my work and my approach
Speaker 1: to science better. So yeah, it's easy to do that,
Speaker 1: I think when you take a step back and think
Speaker 1: about like, like in two thousand and six when we met, like,
Speaker 1: I could never have predicted that I would be, you know,
Speaker 1: where I am and doing this work, and you know,
Speaker 1: I'm very grateful for that. And I do sleep. I sleep.
Speaker 1: Try to sleep at eight hours, and that's a lot.
Speaker 1: Your fans will be very happy to hear that. That's
Speaker 1: a non negotiable. I wish I had. You know, I've
Speaker 1: met many people I won't I won't have them, but
Speaker 1: like I know scientists who can get by on like
Speaker 1: four hours, and I'm very jealous. I wish I needed
Speaker 1: a sleep because then I could do more of the
Speaker 1: stuff that I love doing. But for now, I have
Speaker 1: to get by on my eight hours. Well, thank you
Speaker 1: Mollie for such an exciting and nuanced and thoughtful chat today.
Speaker 1: Thank you so much, Thanks for listening to the Psychology Podcast.
Speaker 1: I hope you enjoyed this episode. If you'd like to
Speaker 1: react in some way to something you heard, I encourage
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