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Speaker 1: From UFOs to psychic powers and government conspiracies. History is

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Speaker 1: riddled with unexplained events. You can turn back now or

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Speaker 1: learn the stuff they don't want you to know. A

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Speaker 1: production of I Heart Brading. Hello, welcome back to the show.

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Speaker 1: My name is Matt, my name is Noel. They call

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Speaker 1: me Ben. We are joined as always with our super

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Speaker 1: producer Alexis code named Doc Holiday Jackson. Most importantly, you

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Speaker 1: are you. You are here, and that makes this the

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Speaker 1: stuff they don't want you to know. This podcast is

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Speaker 1: brought to you in part by seers without their consent.

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Speaker 1: It is time for our weekly listener male segment. This

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Speaker 1: one I am especially excited for because it is gonna

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Speaker 1: be pretty creepy. We're gonna go to some some creepy

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Speaker 1: things from your fellow conspiracy realists. And I've got to

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Speaker 1: tell you, while we were preparing for this, we've been

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Speaker 1: as open and transparent as we can about all our

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Speaker 1: weird secret projects that we have going on. But as

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Speaker 1: we were preparing for this, I just have to say, Uh,

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Speaker 1: it made my day to hear from so many people

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Speaker 1: reaching out with amazing ideas, reaching out with amazing follow ups,

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Speaker 1: and you really are maybe the end of this the arbitrary,

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Speaker 1: clentric lend of the year. Maybe it's making me be

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Speaker 1: a little sentimental, but I thought, um, I've just been

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Speaker 1: so impressed lately by the correspondence we're getting, you know

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Speaker 1: what I mean. We just had so many of you

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Speaker 1: do interesting things, which is probably my favorite aspect of it.

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Speaker 1: And you've experienced things that are you know, that I

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Speaker 1: have never experienced. And so when you call us with

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Speaker 1: a personal account, when you leave an email with a

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Speaker 1: personal account, it's just, uh, yeah, it brightens all of

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Speaker 1: our days because it gives us the gift of knowledge,

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Speaker 1: you know, something new, which is something I think we

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Speaker 1: all cherish moreen now Star Animation Icon that's like, think

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Speaker 1: about it in concrete terms, how how amazing is it

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Speaker 1: that we can do multiple episodes on the amazing potential

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Speaker 1: and the dangers of plastics and we can say, hey,

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Speaker 1: if you if you work with this firsthand, let us know.

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Speaker 1: And then we have people who have written to us

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Speaker 1: from those rarefied fields in very particular disciplines, so so

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Speaker 1: rarefied in fact that they have to write to us anonymously.

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Speaker 1: We've also had a lot of people speak with us

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Speaker 1: about the dangers of the surveillance state in which the

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Speaker 1: majority of humanity and money laundering in the art world. Yes,

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Speaker 1: all kinds of stuff. I'm telling you, fart is the future.

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Speaker 1: We did understand what's happening here. We did a illumination

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Speaker 1: Global Unlimited NOL one of our long time sponsors, big Fan.

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Speaker 1: We're all contractually fear them anyway. Yeah, we're contractually obligated

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Speaker 1: to both be big fans and fear of them, I think.

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Speaker 1: But the it was that was the only contract as

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Speaker 1: signing blood now that you mentioned it. But we we're

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Speaker 1: talking about the concept of privacy, which is relatively new

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Speaker 1: in its modern sense, and we're talking about the idea

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Speaker 1: of surveillance, and there's something you know inherently Creepy got

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Speaker 1: a great message about some issues with d I y

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Speaker 1: uh signal jammers and ring or nest cameras, and then

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Speaker 1: you know, it's it's towards the hollow days now. So

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Speaker 1: a lot of people, some of whom were in the

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Speaker 1: audience today, probably have a little elf doll on their

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Speaker 1: shelf to sort of normalize surveillance for their children, which

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Speaker 1: not to date, not to date, uh, the four of

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Speaker 1: us too much. But I don't think any of us

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Speaker 1: grew up with that, did you Guys? I can grow

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Speaker 1: up with it, but my daughter did. I had to

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Speaker 1: do it, uh, And I kind of resented it being

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Speaker 1: thrust upon me, to be honest, because it's yet another

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Speaker 1: lie that you have to kind of like, you know,

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Speaker 1: force upon your kids because they're aware of it, because

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Speaker 1: other kids talk about it and it's like a book,

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Speaker 1: it's at the store and stuff. So you know, I

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Speaker 1: just I don't really care for it, but you know,

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Speaker 1: eventually she there's a whole deal behind it, like you're

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Speaker 1: not allowed to touch it or it's magic will disappear,

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Speaker 1: you know. I mean, it's the most insidious kind of lie. Uh.

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Speaker 1: And you're right. We talked about this before. It really

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Speaker 1: is an enforcement of this kind of like nanny state.

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Speaker 1: It's one of Santa's little agents kind of like watching

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Speaker 1: you at all times. It does sort of give you

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Speaker 1: a little more peek behind the garden of how the

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Speaker 1: hell Santa could possibly keep surveillance and tabs on all

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Speaker 1: these kids at the same time, because it's got these

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Speaker 1: little stooges that do it for him. But yeah, none

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Speaker 1: of it's real. Yeah, this sort of normalization of surveillance

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Speaker 1: in someone's private home. They're private like sphere, and what

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Speaker 1: we found recently is a precedent for this kind of

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Speaker 1: thing on an even more or welly and level. And

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Speaker 1: maybe that's where we start today. What do you think, mat, Yeah,

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Speaker 1: let's do it. We're gonna go to a message from

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Speaker 1: Tall Pockets and we will get to you in one moment.

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Speaker 1: Tall Pockets, I just want to really quickly state that

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Speaker 1: children when they're in the age when they've got a

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Speaker 1: cell phone now, are aware that their parents can track

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Speaker 1: them to some extent or maybe have access to things

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Speaker 1: they do on that phone to some extent um. I think,

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Speaker 1: you know, there's no set range or age when a

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Speaker 1: child can have a cell phone or use a cell phone,

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Speaker 1: you know, for emergency purposes, to social media, to contact

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Speaker 1: parents and all kinds of things. But there's an age

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Speaker 1: range before that that you know, Again not to generalize,

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Speaker 1: but but having a stuffed doll or a doll toy

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Speaker 1: is generally before you get to cell phone level status

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Speaker 1: at that age. So we're talking about that early developmental

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Speaker 1: stage for many children here in this message from Tall Pockets,

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Speaker 1: and for me that's why, just as a spoiler, it's

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Speaker 1: so disturbing. Okay, Tall Pockets says, Hey, guys, call me

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Speaker 1: Tall Pockets if you like. If you ever wondered what

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Speaker 1: a mashup of stuff they don't want you to know

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Speaker 1: and ridiculous history would look like if orphan Annie came

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Speaker 1: face to face with spycraft. Are you picturing a princess doll?

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Speaker 1: Are you really wild? Anyway? My boyfriend and I visited

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Speaker 1: the Museum of Failure tonight. Not the actual Museum of

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Speaker 1: Failure because, as it turns out, it's permanently closed. Failed

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Speaker 1: or a brilliant business strategy anyway, alongside such notable gems

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Speaker 1: as the Zoom New Coke and the Monosky I don't

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Speaker 1: want to owe the Mono Ski brilliant. Uh, these were

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Speaker 1: complete failures. Uh. One that I had never heard of

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Speaker 1: the My Friend Kayla doll, available from to seen. This

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Speaker 1: Bluetooth enabled doll was marketed as the perfect friend. She

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Speaker 1: knows all about you, she listens to you. No, that's

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Speaker 1: not sinister in the least. These dolls would learn what

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Speaker 1: a child said and sink it to the Internet to

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Speaker 1: generate responses. Great, right, applause? Yeah. So, first of all,

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Speaker 1: that sounds like the Google Home that was in my

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Speaker 1: house as my son was growing up at a very

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Speaker 1: early age where he would just ask things, and I'm

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Speaker 1: sure it knew all kinds of things and knows all

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Speaker 1: kinds of things about my son. Um. But this in

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Speaker 1: doll form, oh, seems nefarious. So let's let's keep going

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Speaker 1: with what Sorry, that was Matt speaking. Let's go back

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Speaker 1: into what Tall Pocket says. The doll can talk about

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Speaker 1: movies and shows and other toys. It records what the

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Speaker 1: child says so it can maintain some semblance of a conversation.

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Speaker 1: No one would ever hack this or use it to

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Speaker 1: inundate kids with ads, or record their conversation and sell

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Speaker 1: it to companies to make more effective targeted ads. No,

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Speaker 1: they would, never they did. This is so unexpected. These

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Speaker 1: dolls are actually banned in Germany as they violate the

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Speaker 1: German Telecommunications Act and are considered a concealed espionage device,

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Speaker 1: and the Spy Museum Berlin has one on display. So

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Speaker 1: we've covered listening to recording conversations, selling private data to

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Speaker 1: marketing groups, and extra sneaky ad placements in the form

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Speaker 1: of a convo with your bff, Kala, Did I miss anything?

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Speaker 1: Oh right, it's a doll that's inherently creepy. I hope

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Speaker 1: you find this as fascinating and disturbing as I did.

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Speaker 1: Thank you for all the work you do. You guys

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Speaker 1: always make me laugh inappropriately in the office, much to

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Speaker 1: the alarm of my unassuming coworkers. And then tall Pockets

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Speaker 1: and as several very important links that we're going to

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Speaker 1: discuss today, as well as a picture of my friend,

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Speaker 1: Princess Kayla. It's amazing what she knows, it really is.

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Speaker 1: And before we find out exactly what she knows, guys,

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Speaker 1: what do you say we listen to an advertisement for

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Speaker 1: this ye, this friend of ours? Mr? Is it going

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Speaker 1: to be old timey? No? It is not. No, it

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Speaker 1: is not. Here we go sorry, that's the horror version.

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Speaker 1: Hold on one second, let me change that. Kayla those

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Speaker 1: millions of things baby gate cood a baby is called

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Speaker 1: the kid. Kayla knows millions of things and she plays

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Speaker 1: games with you too. You love memory match. I know

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Speaker 1: your favorite pudding is strawberry captics. How does she know that?

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Speaker 1: Kayla knows so much about you? And Kayla has a

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Speaker 1: new princess look and activity. It's like from the nineties

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Speaker 1: or something or what not. To Okay, I missed that.

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Speaker 1: I don't like that one bit it. It It reminds me

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Speaker 1: of It reminds me of the thing in Squid Game,

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Speaker 1: the the high um red light green light doll and

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Speaker 1: the little creepy song that she sings that vibe if

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Speaker 1: that doll itself knew everything about you. Uh, this is Oh,

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Speaker 1: this is insidious. Also full disclosure. Uh, Tall Pockets, if

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Speaker 1: you are the person I'm thinking of. Uh, thank you

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Speaker 1: so much for this letter, because I'm pretty sure we're

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Speaker 1: friends on the internet. Somehow I think Tall Pockets is

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Speaker 1: onto something. And I know we all three looked into

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Speaker 1: this and can confirm the story is true. But thank

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Speaker 1: you so much for writing in because I had not

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Speaker 1: heard of this. I'm just not a at that time

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Speaker 1: in my life, well at any time in my life.

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Speaker 1: I've just not been a guy who's particularly into you.

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Speaker 1: Uh dolls. Now I get it. There's no no shame

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Speaker 1: in that event, umastaks man. There's all kinds of stuff

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Speaker 1: that we can point to. Hear. My favorite thing, the

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Speaker 1: Tall Pockets sent us an article from the BBC News.

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Speaker 1: It is titled German parents told to destroy Kala dolls

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Speaker 1: over hacking fears. It was posted in February of seventeen.

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Speaker 1: It's an official watchdog in Germany that had literally told

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Speaker 1: all the parents out there in Germany that bought this

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Speaker 1: Kala doll to destroy them because they're dangerous, because they're

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Speaker 1: hacking vulnerabilities within them that can cause them to be

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Speaker 1: listening devices for nefarious folks. It's pretty amazing. It's the

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Speaker 1: Federal Network Agency. It's got a name that I cannot pronounce.

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Speaker 1: I bet you could, noll. Let's see, give it to me,

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Speaker 1: Matt bun bund Nets, Bunda's nets again tour Bundas Bunda Tour.

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Speaker 1: That is my best college try so there. It is

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Speaker 1: the bud to which oversees telecommunications. There are the folks

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Speaker 1: who said, hey, this is a bad thing, do not

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Speaker 1: do this. Um. But then, of course, at that time,

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Speaker 1: this group called the UK Toy Retailers Association came back with, hey, y'all,

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Speaker 1: this isn't a big deal. Come on, Caleb's fine. Do

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Speaker 1: you know why they said that? Because Caleb was a

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Speaker 1: massive seller, that she was extremely popular. She was kind

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Speaker 1: of the tickle me Elmo every day. Maybe it's so funny.

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Speaker 1: The tagline on the box is it's amazing what she knows.

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Speaker 1: It's inherently creepy. I mean. And also, do you remember

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Speaker 1: there's an episode this is totally black Mirrors Territory. There

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Speaker 1: was that episode with Ashley Oh, you know, played by um,

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Speaker 1: what's your name? Miley Cyrus and she was kind of

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Speaker 1: a sentient doll or whatever. And there's there's a twist

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Speaker 1: of the story. But also the subject of this email

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Speaker 1: is Chucky now with bluetooth. And when the updated the

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Speaker 1: child's play movies, what do you think they did? They

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Speaker 1: did exactly this. They made it a Bluetooth connected friendship

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Speaker 1: doll companion thing that you know, gets hacked and becomes

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Speaker 1: a murderer. Um, so yeah, average it's for the kids. Also,

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Speaker 1: I had shouted that out earlier too. It's amazing what

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Speaker 1: she knows, which is at the bottom of the box.

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Speaker 1: But there's a second thing, which is like a comic

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Speaker 1: book speech speech bubble. Yes, that says I know so

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Speaker 1: much about you. It's just this is the kind of

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Speaker 1: thing that would make me leave a store. Actually, yeah,

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Speaker 1: it's super weird. Oh but it's kids safe, guys, because

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Speaker 1: there's a logo on the bottom that says so so

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Speaker 1: it's fine. It does it does say it's kids safe. Well,

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Speaker 1: this is just something I want to remind us as

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Speaker 1: we're thinking about this. We are all now used to

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Speaker 1: the Amazon and Google and all the other devices in

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Speaker 1: our homes that just listen to us at all times

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Speaker 1: and you know, respond when we address them. But Google

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Speaker 1: Home didn't come out. It wasn't released until this thing

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Speaker 1: came out in so it's an early adopter of this

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Speaker 1: kind of technology where you can just say things to

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Speaker 1: it and ask it questions. It then queries you know,

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Speaker 1: Google or the Internet and comes back with an answer.

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Speaker 1: This thing Kayla looking at you with these eyes that

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Speaker 1: I'm looking at right now in my screen that I'm

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Speaker 1: feeling very uncomfortable about. She's just talking to you and

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Speaker 1: telling you all the answers that you have as a child.

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Speaker 1: And if you go back to that BBC article I

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Speaker 1: just want to talk about. I think it's called Vivid

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Speaker 1: Toy group. They were the ones who distributed Kayla my

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Speaker 1: friend Kayla or Princess Kayla, my friend, Princess Kayla whatever,

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Speaker 1: she has all kinds of a k A s. They

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Speaker 1: release some statements back in seventeen that we're just saying, yes,

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Speaker 1: we're aware of this kind of abuse of our technology, right,

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Speaker 1: hacking that has occurred. These are isolated incidents. Nobody needs

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Speaker 1: to worry about this stuff. It's not a big deal.

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Speaker 1: They were just you know, one offs. But then, of course,

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Speaker 1: when the Federal Network Agency comes back through and says, no, no, no, no, no, y'all,

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Speaker 1: we gotta we gotta kill Kala with fire. Uh, you know,

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Speaker 1: it's pretty serious. Agreed. Agreed. I mean to say the

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Speaker 1: quiet part out loud. This is a new avenue of

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Speaker 1: espionage quite potentially, right. I'd be surprised if it didn't happen.

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Speaker 1: The bluetooth stuff is relatively insecure. You could also just

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Speaker 1: imagine how many high level conversations parents have around their children, right,

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Speaker 1: you know, maybe there's a maybe there's a kid playing

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Speaker 1: with their Kala doll while the parents are talking and

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Speaker 1: one of them works at an embassy somewhere. Oh hey,

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Speaker 1: how is your day at work? Nah? These Russians again,

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Speaker 1: crimea is gonna be a thing in a few years,

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Speaker 1: and no one's listening in Ukraine will be a thing

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Speaker 1: as well. Like that information could be valuable and it

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Speaker 1: could be very easy to find. Um, I don't know, man,

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Speaker 1: surveillance and children. Uh, surveillance via children is an effective

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Speaker 1: and in my opinion, highly unethical strategy. Like consider consider

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Speaker 1: how much YouTube algorithms learn. Right, there are a lot

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Speaker 1: of parents or who have to you know, you want

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Speaker 1: to distract your kid for a second again, set still

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Speaker 1: in focus, and then they're they're in the hands of

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Speaker 1: a video service that has its algorithms tuned to what

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Speaker 1: they like, creating a feedback loop. It's crazy. You can

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Speaker 1: indicated this to the top of the story map. But

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Speaker 1: Bluetooth is notoriously vulnerable, right in terms of like you know,

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Speaker 1: a way in people's systems, especially when it was you

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Speaker 1: know early on them early on the morning, that that

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Speaker 1: isn't necessarily early. But you know, every with every update,

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Speaker 1: more things get fixed, right, more vulnerabilities with any software

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Speaker 1: indoor hardware that you're dealing with. What is it the

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Speaker 1: that same agency told uh Sudich Zitong Daily that Kayla

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Speaker 1: quote amounted to a concealed transmitting device, which was illegal

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Speaker 1: under an article of the German telecom's law. So how

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Speaker 1: big she got? How big do you think Kayla got

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Speaker 1: in Vienna before it got shut out with That's what happened.

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Speaker 1: Somebody from the agency received one as a gift or

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Speaker 1: something and was just playing with it and then realized,

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Speaker 1: like in some moment late at night after her daughter

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Speaker 1: had gone to bed, and she's sitting there, you know,

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Speaker 1: just looking at the thing and trying to figure it out,

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Speaker 1: and then it just starts talking to her, and it's

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Speaker 1: a somebody from the opposition. Yea. It was the same

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Speaker 1: with like those kind of bluetooth nanny cams or whatever,

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Speaker 1: anything that's like broadcasting on that type of more or

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Speaker 1: less open um. You know, I have frequency, I guess

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Speaker 1: you'd call it. You can intercept those super easily and

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Speaker 1: monitor a feed coming out of one of those cameras,

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Speaker 1: or you could broadcast onto them. Yeah, dangerous stuff. Thank

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Speaker 1: you so much, Tall Pockets for we're reaching out to

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Speaker 1: us and sending us this is just fascinating story. Um.

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Speaker 1: I will now be forever horrified by that face of

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Speaker 1: my friend Princess Kayla. Congratulations. We'll be right back with

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Speaker 1: another message from you. Uh not you, Tall Pockets. Sorry,

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Speaker 1: we did your thing, but but you and we're back

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Speaker 1: with another piece of mail or correspondence, whatever you want

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Speaker 1: to call it from you the public. The conspiracy realists

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Speaker 1: of the world. And this one is also about privacy,

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Speaker 1: about privacy in terms of money, cold hard cash or

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Speaker 1: or actually crypto currency. Um. This message comes from the

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Speaker 1: what is it the fearful order? No, not trusty, the

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Speaker 1: trust the honor of course, thank you, Ben. This one

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Speaker 1: comes to us from the trusty otto. I'm just gonna

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Speaker 1: get right into it. Greetings, gentlemen. After listening to your

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Speaker 1: recent show on money laundering, I pondered about other ways

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Speaker 1: that groups are using to clean their funds. With the

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Speaker 1: boom of cryptocurrencies in the past five years, the government

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Speaker 1: has no way to regulate these different transactions. They're working

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Speaker 1: on it, though, aren't they. Um, While all transactions are

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Speaker 1: being recorded in the blockchain, and those record records will

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Speaker 1: still be there when the government does create some regulation. Uh.

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Speaker 1: There are ways around it. I know you mentioned in

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Speaker 1: f t s and how they might be used, but

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Speaker 1: there's still another way. Tornado cash is one way that

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Speaker 1: is most worrisome. When someone who obtains cryptocurrency, either through

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Speaker 1: illicit activities or lawful ways, Uh, they can put some

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Speaker 1: of those funds into these this Tornado cash system. Now

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Speaker 1: they will not be able to remove that money right away.

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Speaker 1: The longer they weigh and the more money they put

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Speaker 1: in by others, it makes it very difficult to see

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Speaker 1: whose funds are who's and when they remove them or not.

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Speaker 1: It's like an IOU system. I'm sure I'm missing some

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Speaker 1: of the intricacies of the system as I'm no expert,

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Speaker 1: but this is a basic overview to the best of

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Speaker 1: my knowledge. I definitely see the other use for some people,

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Speaker 1: but with the recent thefts of ethereum, the kind of

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Speaker 1: system will ensure that those bad actors will just have

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Speaker 1: UH to wait to cash out. I know that some

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Speaker 1: markets will not allow the sale of these stolen ethereum,

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Speaker 1: but if they are allowed to put it into Tornado

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Speaker 1: cash um, it is as good as gone. Anyways, I

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Speaker 1: love the show and the three of you guys always

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Speaker 1: have space in my playlist. UH keep those investigations and

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Speaker 1: look forward to hearing your take on this. Cheers the

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Speaker 1: trustee otter Um. So we don't have to go too

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Speaker 1: much into this, but just a quick refresher. When we

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Speaker 1: day that you know, blockchain or like you know, regular

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Speaker 1: cryptocurrency transactions aren't anonymous. It's sort of the way like

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Speaker 1: when you know, we found out all the ways that

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Speaker 1: the CIA were monitoring, you know, phone calls of American citizens,

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Speaker 1: not necessarily with data they could attribute directly to an

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Speaker 1: identity one to one, but they could see all these patterns.

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Speaker 1: They can see this number called this number, and that

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Speaker 1: number called that number, and then by analyzing it, you

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Speaker 1: can kind of see repetitions in the pattern and kind

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Speaker 1: of get a sense of who is who if you

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Speaker 1: even know who one person that you're monitoring is. It's

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Speaker 1: the same with the blockchain. Blockchain, you know, transactions have

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Speaker 1: a unique you know, key or set of kind of

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Speaker 1: letters and numbers that are associated with whatever wallet they

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Speaker 1: are coming from, you know, to or from, and if

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Speaker 1: you know who one of them is, then over time

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Speaker 1: you can kind of figure out who others are that

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Speaker 1: are you know, being transacted with. It's called um I

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Speaker 1: guess you'd call it metadata where it's not directly giving

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Speaker 1: you the identity of the person. Although if you are

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Speaker 1: using cryptocurrency exchange, you do have to have some sort

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Speaker 1: of identification to be, you know, to join that exchange

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Speaker 1: and to buy stuff from it, So it wouldn't be

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Speaker 1: that far of a leap for the government to petition,

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Speaker 1: you know, those organizations to get that information. So there

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Speaker 1: are ways to stay kind of anonymous using cryptocurrency on

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Speaker 1: the internet, um, but it does require some effort. Uh.

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Speaker 1: So it's not inherently like some people might say or think,

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Speaker 1: um anonymous. But with this system or this standard I guess,

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Speaker 1: or this like you know app or whatever you wanna

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Speaker 1: call it tornado cash, it's correct what trust the odor

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Speaker 1: is saying that it's essentially combining mixing different transactions so

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Speaker 1: that it's it doesn't like read as a single transaction. Again,

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Speaker 1: I'm not an expert either, but it is something that

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Speaker 1: is a little bit troublesome because it does make it

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Speaker 1: much much much more difficult to trace the kind of

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Speaker 1: chain of custody uh and the you know, the providence

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Speaker 1: of these kinds of transactions. So it's definitely something um

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Speaker 1: the government would probably will not be into. But as

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Speaker 1: we know, legislation hasn't even caught up to cryptocurrency in

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Speaker 1: a way they can even really do anything about it yet.

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Speaker 1: So these develop these developers out there that are already

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Speaker 1: figuring out ways to deal with the future when regulation

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Speaker 1: does come down, so they can hide there, you know,

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Speaker 1: um piles of cryptocurrency away from the government or at

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Speaker 1: the very least um be able to kind of you know,

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Speaker 1: store them and then cash out away from the watchful

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Speaker 1: eye of Uncle Sam and not have to pay taxes,

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Speaker 1: let alone if this money is being used in black

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Speaker 1: market activities like human trafficking or you know, serious drug

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Speaker 1: transactions or whatever. So UM And it's interesting because this standard,

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Speaker 1: or this Tornado Cash is actually launching a much more

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Speaker 1: you could call it mainstream kind of like standardized thing

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Speaker 1: on a sub strata kind of of the blockchain called

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Speaker 1: Layer two that is where a lot of these like

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Speaker 1: date decentralized finance projects take place UM on different UM

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Speaker 1: like there's Polygone, there's all these other standards in their

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Speaker 1: L two, which is like not the traditional regular blockchain.

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Speaker 1: It's like almost like a you know, if you could

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Speaker 1: look at the web and then you've got the dark Web.

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Speaker 1: It's like almost like their parallel kind of ledgers that

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Speaker 1: are happening at the same time, but it's a different standard.

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Speaker 1: So essentially they're rolling out something on something called the

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Speaker 1: Arbitrum layer to UH network that will allow people to

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Speaker 1: directly use this Tornado Cash standard to mask their transactions. UM.

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Speaker 1: It is considered a fully decentralized ethereum so that's the basis,

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Speaker 1: you know, that's the coin that you would use to

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Speaker 1: try to to disguise these transactions. They're calling it a

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Speaker 1: decentralized Ethereum Mixer Protocol UH, and it apparently masks the

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Speaker 1: path that the coin takes from center to receiver UM,

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Speaker 1: allowing you to who have completely private transactions without the

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Speaker 1: need to use other more kind of privacy focused coins

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Speaker 1: that require you to do a lot more like exchanging

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Speaker 1: and like you have to pay fees every time you

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Speaker 1: do those UM and also layer two networks on this

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Speaker 1: Ethereum standard are very very fast and have very low

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Speaker 1: fees UM while also benefiting from the you know, uh

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Speaker 1: security and decentralization that Ethereum you know as a standard offers.

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Speaker 1: So this is a little bit troublesome. You know, there's

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Speaker 1: a great article uh from Shrimpy Academy that helped helped

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Speaker 1: break it down for me as someone who's also not

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Speaker 1: an expert on this. We know that blockchain technology can

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Speaker 1: hide your identity, but it cannot hide the trace of transactions.

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Speaker 1: Tornadoes cash is is what's called non custodial, meaning that

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Speaker 1: there's not there's not someone who is an overall authority watching.

426
00:26:01,720 --> 00:26:05,680
Speaker 1: And there's a great example in this article about how

427
00:26:05,720 --> 00:26:09,080
Speaker 1: simple and full proof the design of this Tornado cash

428
00:26:09,160 --> 00:26:13,320
Speaker 1: thing is. If you are um, let's say you they

429
00:26:13,320 --> 00:26:15,720
Speaker 1: have a great example in this Let's say you are

430
00:26:15,960 --> 00:26:21,280
Speaker 1: tracking down a hacker and this hacker stole something using

431
00:26:22,320 --> 00:26:26,280
Speaker 1: a specific type of strategy like a flash loan exploit

432
00:26:26,480 --> 00:26:28,600
Speaker 1: tryna have to get into. You can search for the

433
00:26:28,640 --> 00:26:33,800
Speaker 1: address that holds the stolen assets using something called ether scan,

434
00:26:34,440 --> 00:26:37,159
Speaker 1: and then maybe you find that they use Tornado cash

435
00:26:37,240 --> 00:26:41,240
Speaker 1: to launder the money. You're only like real data point

436
00:26:41,440 --> 00:26:44,600
Speaker 1: is that address, and then knowing the amount the hackers stole,

437
00:26:45,240 --> 00:26:49,600
Speaker 1: and if they're mixing up in Tornado cash, which is

438
00:26:49,840 --> 00:26:52,280
Speaker 1: as you said, well, it's a it's a more complex

439
00:26:52,440 --> 00:26:55,480
Speaker 1: version of a coin mixer, a token mixer, a thing

440
00:26:55,520 --> 00:26:59,240
Speaker 1: that already existed. But so like, let's say you know

441
00:26:59,359 --> 00:27:04,680
Speaker 1: that they took fifty ethereum somehow, and then you are

442
00:27:04,720 --> 00:27:07,360
Speaker 1: trying to figure out how how to find it. Then

443
00:27:07,400 --> 00:27:10,040
Speaker 1: you could say maybe you say, well, let me look

444
00:27:10,040 --> 00:27:14,160
Speaker 1: at every trade that was for the amount of fifty ethereum.

445
00:27:14,200 --> 00:27:17,119
Speaker 1: But if they're clever, they would just do transactions for

446
00:27:17,240 --> 00:27:21,199
Speaker 1: ten ethereum, and they would do that five times, and

447
00:27:21,240 --> 00:27:24,160
Speaker 1: that makes it a much more common transaction. And then

448
00:27:24,280 --> 00:27:26,840
Speaker 1: it gets mixed up with all these other addresses of

449
00:27:26,920 --> 00:27:30,159
Speaker 1: people who might have had a similar con uh, similar

450
00:27:30,400 --> 00:27:35,160
Speaker 1: interaction or transaction, and then it becomes impossible to find

451
00:27:35,560 --> 00:27:40,600
Speaker 1: the person because they're using something called smart contracts. Uh.

452
00:27:40,840 --> 00:27:44,680
Speaker 1: These accept deposits made an ethereum, but they get withdrawn

453
00:27:44,800 --> 00:27:49,600
Speaker 1: to other addresses, so there's no real way of knowing

454
00:27:49,680 --> 00:27:53,040
Speaker 1: who the original center is unless you've got some good

455
00:27:53,480 --> 00:27:57,440
Speaker 1: you know, I don't know, you've got some outside variables. Yeah,

456
00:27:57,480 --> 00:28:00,359
Speaker 1: this is this is tough because it's it's gonna be

457
00:28:00,440 --> 00:28:03,280
Speaker 1: used for crime, right, we could say that, right, that's

458
00:28:03,280 --> 00:28:05,720
Speaker 1: like I mean, I don't see, well, I don't see

459
00:28:05,720 --> 00:28:07,639
Speaker 1: what any other reason for it to exist. Right. No,

460
00:28:08,160 --> 00:28:11,600
Speaker 1: I hear you guys speaking Latin to me, and all

461
00:28:11,640 --> 00:28:15,600
Speaker 1: I hear is crime. This is crime. This is all

462
00:28:16,359 --> 00:28:20,240
Speaker 1: to do crime and get your money in crime. That's

463
00:28:20,280 --> 00:28:26,080
Speaker 1: literally your crime money. Okay, great, I know what a

464
00:28:26,080 --> 00:28:28,560
Speaker 1: blockchain is now, I know that. I guess Now you

465
00:28:28,600 --> 00:28:31,920
Speaker 1: can mix that chop and you can get your money

466
00:28:31,920 --> 00:28:35,840
Speaker 1: out of the blender somehow. Like Yeah, it's like a

467
00:28:35,880 --> 00:28:40,800
Speaker 1: delightful game of crime twister. You know, well, also I

468
00:28:40,920 --> 00:28:44,000
Speaker 1: have to wave the flag here. It is possible, you know,

469
00:28:44,080 --> 00:28:49,520
Speaker 1: if you are coordinating protests and an authoritarian state, if

470
00:28:49,600 --> 00:28:54,160
Speaker 1: you are attempting to I'm just listening to possibilities. If

471
00:28:54,200 --> 00:28:59,880
Speaker 1: you are attempting to escape a situation of domestic violence

472
00:29:00,800 --> 00:29:04,280
Speaker 1: or something like that with someone who is tyrannically controlling

473
00:29:04,320 --> 00:29:07,680
Speaker 1: your income, which is a thing excusing people do, then

474
00:29:08,120 --> 00:29:12,200
Speaker 1: uh there there, I would say they are non crime

475
00:29:13,240 --> 00:29:18,680
Speaker 1: uses for this technology. But got also a math side

476
00:29:18,680 --> 00:29:21,080
Speaker 1: on this one is I would say I would say

477
00:29:21,120 --> 00:29:25,240
Speaker 1: that would be the exception and not the rule. Right, Yeah, Unfortunately,

478
00:29:25,320 --> 00:29:30,120
Speaker 1: as that's probably accurate. You know, um, it's interesting because,

479
00:29:30,640 --> 00:29:33,320
Speaker 1: as you said at the very top of this story,

480
00:29:33,560 --> 00:29:37,120
Speaker 1: nal um, and as I'm sure you know, trust the order,

481
00:29:37,600 --> 00:29:43,320
Speaker 1: the regulatory bodies are still kind of like strange cats

482
00:29:43,720 --> 00:29:46,560
Speaker 1: sniffing this new world of crypto, and they need to

483
00:29:46,560 --> 00:29:50,680
Speaker 1: figure out how to maintain their status quo, and they

484
00:29:50,760 --> 00:29:54,040
Speaker 1: also want to figure out, let's be honest, how to

485
00:29:54,120 --> 00:29:59,280
Speaker 1: make their percentage off it. That's one of their main concerns. Unfortunately,

486
00:29:59,600 --> 00:30:04,120
Speaker 1: book industry and banking and public industries like governments. So

487
00:30:04,840 --> 00:30:09,640
Speaker 1: at this point, though the tornado already came through like this,

488
00:30:09,640 --> 00:30:14,560
Speaker 1: this kind of approach, How would you stop it? Like,

489
00:30:14,680 --> 00:30:20,400
Speaker 1: the only way I could see somebody, some institution addressing

490
00:30:20,440 --> 00:30:23,840
Speaker 1: this in an effective manner, it would depend on new

491
00:30:23,920 --> 00:30:29,800
Speaker 1: regulations being imposed. So something that says like, Okay, if

492
00:30:29,840 --> 00:30:32,200
Speaker 1: you were in the world of crypto, you have to

493
00:30:32,440 --> 00:30:37,640
Speaker 1: be somehow registered in some way, which sovereign powers could

494
00:30:37,680 --> 00:30:40,360
Speaker 1: require people to do that, or they could try and

495
00:30:40,400 --> 00:30:44,480
Speaker 1: then you would Maybe it's a thing where certain activities

496
00:30:44,640 --> 00:30:48,320
Speaker 1: are sus so like if you use any kind of

497
00:30:48,360 --> 00:30:52,280
Speaker 1: coin mixing service, you have to you have to answer

498
00:30:52,360 --> 00:30:56,600
Speaker 1: to some country's version of the of the alphabet gang

499
00:30:56,880 --> 00:31:00,960
Speaker 1: and they're like, hey, I noticed you. Uh noticed you've

500
00:31:01,000 --> 00:31:06,800
Speaker 1: been mixing your coins. Look back on your social media. So, um,

501
00:31:07,160 --> 00:31:09,480
Speaker 1: some real red flags there. Now that's true. It could

502
00:31:09,520 --> 00:31:13,200
Speaker 1: be it could definitely become a signifier in and of itself, uh,

503
00:31:13,280 --> 00:31:15,480
Speaker 1: that that activity is going on, and then therefore it

504
00:31:15,520 --> 00:31:19,160
Speaker 1: could be compelling They could compel you to justify it

505
00:31:19,160 --> 00:31:22,080
Speaker 1: in some way. I don't know. Like again, the technology

506
00:31:22,120 --> 00:31:24,520
Speaker 1: that the government is using and the legislation is still

507
00:31:24,800 --> 00:31:27,120
Speaker 1: very very slow on the draw. I mean, even like

508
00:31:27,160 --> 00:31:30,360
Speaker 1: I think Biden announced some initiative that was going to

509
00:31:30,440 --> 00:31:33,480
Speaker 1: start attempting to tax things like n f T s

510
00:31:33,520 --> 00:31:36,160
Speaker 1: and um, you know crypto hold things. But even that

511
00:31:36,160 --> 00:31:39,440
Speaker 1: wouldn't go into effect until next year. Um. And you know,

512
00:31:39,520 --> 00:31:41,400
Speaker 1: I know people that have been in this space for

513
00:31:41,520 --> 00:31:46,200
Speaker 1: like a decade, you know, people who have genuinely made fortunes.

514
00:31:46,800 --> 00:31:49,440
Speaker 1: So what happens when it all comes crashing down? You know,

515
00:31:50,040 --> 00:31:52,720
Speaker 1: there have to be things in place for folks like

516
00:31:52,760 --> 00:31:56,600
Speaker 1: that to protect themselves. Yeah, you gotta get up you know. Well,

517
00:31:56,680 --> 00:32:00,520
Speaker 1: also that those regulations may happen sooner because because the

518
00:32:00,840 --> 00:32:05,920
Speaker 1: Biden administration has decided that. Remember during their campaign they

519
00:32:05,920 --> 00:32:10,080
Speaker 1: were like, we're gonna cancel student loans. Uh, and I

520
00:32:10,120 --> 00:32:13,600
Speaker 1: think it was last night or today they announced we

521
00:32:13,640 --> 00:32:15,880
Speaker 1: meant we were not going to do that, so pay

522
00:32:16,000 --> 00:32:21,320
Speaker 1: up right. So yeah, so like maybe they could. Maybe

523
00:32:21,320 --> 00:32:23,960
Speaker 1: they're going to get their lawyers on crypto instead. Maybe

524
00:32:23,960 --> 00:32:27,360
Speaker 1: that's the plan. Well, it's definitely a plan. Um. But

525
00:32:27,440 --> 00:32:29,520
Speaker 1: I think our plan for now should take a quick

526
00:32:29,520 --> 00:32:31,920
Speaker 1: break here from we're from our sponsors and then come

527
00:32:31,960 --> 00:32:41,520
Speaker 1: back with one more piece of listener mail. And we

528
00:32:41,680 --> 00:32:47,000
Speaker 1: have returned. Our next piece of correspondence comes from the

529
00:32:47,120 --> 00:32:50,320
Speaker 1: one and only Dark Sky here's what dark Sky had

530
00:32:50,360 --> 00:32:54,120
Speaker 1: to say in your recent Listener Mail episode about death

531
00:32:54,160 --> 00:32:58,160
Speaker 1: at Groom late who touched briefly on international arms dealing.

532
00:32:58,720 --> 00:33:01,080
Speaker 1: This seems like a good tie to share something I

533
00:33:01,200 --> 00:33:05,479
Speaker 1: found quite by accident recently, out of general curiosity. I

534
00:33:05,560 --> 00:33:08,800
Speaker 1: was viewing the wiki page for Sears as in the

535
00:33:08,920 --> 00:33:13,080
Speaker 1: nearly defunct US retail chain. We know it well, dark Sky.

536
00:33:13,280 --> 00:33:15,960
Speaker 1: Somewhere on Wikipedia, I can't find it now, there was

537
00:33:15,960 --> 00:33:20,200
Speaker 1: a reference to a subsidiary of Sears called Sears World Trade.

538
00:33:20,880 --> 00:33:24,480
Speaker 1: Long story short, Apparently Sears World Trade was involved in

539
00:33:24,480 --> 00:33:28,120
Speaker 1: international arms steels and possibly providing cover for U. S

540
00:33:28,160 --> 00:33:31,400
Speaker 1: intelligence operations. This would have been in the early and

541
00:33:31,520 --> 00:33:35,360
Speaker 1: mid nineteen eighties. Here's a quote, says dark Sky from

542
00:33:35,360 --> 00:33:38,080
Speaker 1: one of the Sears board members at the time. That

543
00:33:38,200 --> 00:33:42,960
Speaker 1: name sure seems familiar. We received periodic reports on Sears

544
00:33:42,960 --> 00:33:46,320
Speaker 1: World Trade as an entire company, but I don't personally

545
00:33:46,360 --> 00:33:50,680
Speaker 1: remember being briefed on those particular activities. Said as I'm

546
00:33:50,680 --> 00:33:53,240
Speaker 1: sure you can tell by the voice I'm doing. Donald Rumsfeld,

547
00:33:53,560 --> 00:33:57,680
Speaker 1: former Secretary of Defense, who was serving on Sears board

548
00:33:57,720 --> 00:34:00,080
Speaker 1: at the time of the interview. And then dark I

549
00:34:00,200 --> 00:34:03,200
Speaker 1: goes on to share a couple of links to dig

550
00:34:03,240 --> 00:34:07,040
Speaker 1: into and concludes with an adam boy for us, saying,

551
00:34:07,120 --> 00:34:09,640
Speaker 1: great show, keep it up, Thanks so much, Dark Sky,

552
00:34:09,880 --> 00:34:13,239
Speaker 1: and keep the correspondence coming. Oh man, you touched a

553
00:34:13,360 --> 00:34:17,719
Speaker 1: nerve dude. Sears the pre pandemic. The office that we

554
00:34:17,800 --> 00:34:21,799
Speaker 1: all worked in was an old and historic Sears. On

555
00:34:21,880 --> 00:34:26,200
Speaker 1: another show that our crew does, Ridiculous History, we explored

556
00:34:26,239 --> 00:34:30,520
Speaker 1: the history of that building and Sears in general. If

557
00:34:30,600 --> 00:34:33,799
Speaker 1: you are not from the US, you may not be

558
00:34:34,040 --> 00:34:38,960
Speaker 1: familiar with this department store, but in its heyday, it

559
00:34:39,160 --> 00:34:42,960
Speaker 1: was the Walmart of its time. It was ubiquitous. You

560
00:34:42,960 --> 00:34:48,880
Speaker 1: could order everything from like shoelaces, two guns, to entire

561
00:34:48,960 --> 00:34:51,719
Speaker 1: houses from Sears and they would just ship it to

562
00:34:51,800 --> 00:34:55,800
Speaker 1: wherever you happen to be at. So I have to say,

563
00:34:56,600 --> 00:35:01,320
Speaker 1: I am I am surprised that I'm surprised we didn't

564
00:35:01,360 --> 00:35:04,640
Speaker 1: talk about it in our earlier episode, but also at

565
00:35:04,680 --> 00:35:06,400
Speaker 1: the same level, I don't know how you guys feel.

566
00:35:06,400 --> 00:35:09,960
Speaker 1: I'm not surprised that Sears was doing this. What what

567
00:35:10,040 --> 00:35:12,840
Speaker 1: about you guys? Initial reactions before we break down what

568
00:35:12,960 --> 00:35:15,880
Speaker 1: Dark Sky is referencing here. They're very good at selling

569
00:35:15,920 --> 00:35:19,520
Speaker 1: things and at least they had people on board who

570
00:35:19,520 --> 00:35:23,800
Speaker 1: were excellent at that. Well, they also invented catalog culture

571
00:35:24,080 --> 00:35:27,520
Speaker 1: and essentially not only sold things, but sold the concept

572
00:35:27,560 --> 00:35:29,920
Speaker 1: of the kinds of the kind of lifestyle you should

573
00:35:29,920 --> 00:35:32,759
Speaker 1: have that required certain things. You know. They sort of

574
00:35:32,800 --> 00:35:35,520
Speaker 1: invented like the American dream and sold it to the

575
00:35:35,560 --> 00:35:38,960
Speaker 1: American people essentially. And in this case, if your lifestyle

576
00:35:39,120 --> 00:35:44,320
Speaker 1: is you know, being a warlord or you know, running

577
00:35:44,320 --> 00:35:47,239
Speaker 1: a military in a different country that maybe doesn't have

578
00:35:47,280 --> 00:35:50,160
Speaker 1: access to a ton of weapons manufacturing, they did a

579
00:35:50,200 --> 00:35:53,680
Speaker 1: good job for showing them what life could be like. Yeah, yeah,

580
00:35:53,840 --> 00:35:57,560
Speaker 1: fingers on a hand. As we've said before, the higher

581
00:35:57,640 --> 00:36:03,000
Speaker 1: you get in any hierarchy, the smaller your circle becomes.

582
00:36:03,080 --> 00:36:06,960
Speaker 1: And also, uh, at the same time, as countertuitive as

583
00:36:07,000 --> 00:36:10,080
Speaker 1: it may sound, you are also more likely to have

584
00:36:10,280 --> 00:36:16,320
Speaker 1: ven diagram contacts with other industries. Right, Like the the

585
00:36:16,360 --> 00:36:22,880
Speaker 1: average person working in a factory making widgets might not

586
00:36:23,360 --> 00:36:27,640
Speaker 1: know the person who makes gadgets, but the guy who's

587
00:36:27,680 --> 00:36:30,640
Speaker 1: in charge of that factory probably does know the guy

588
00:36:30,760 --> 00:36:34,040
Speaker 1: or the person excuse me, who runs the gadget factory.

589
00:36:34,120 --> 00:36:37,600
Speaker 1: That's just an unfortunate side effect of the tribalism of

590
00:36:37,640 --> 00:36:41,040
Speaker 1: the species. And that's this is where it gets interesting

591
00:36:41,360 --> 00:36:44,640
Speaker 1: because Dark Sky sent us this great article. I feel

592
00:36:44,640 --> 00:36:48,040
Speaker 1: like this is a fun I feel like this would

593
00:36:48,040 --> 00:36:50,440
Speaker 1: be a fun live episode for us to do. But

594
00:36:50,520 --> 00:36:54,440
Speaker 1: we want to introduce you to the the Gucci Maine

595
00:36:54,760 --> 00:37:00,000
Speaker 1: of this story with Sears. It's guiding Frank Carlucci. Uh,

596
00:37:00,000 --> 00:37:04,360
Speaker 1: if you are a if you're a fan of reading

597
00:37:04,560 --> 00:37:07,480
Speaker 1: about US politics and you can get really deep in

598
00:37:07,520 --> 00:37:10,840
Speaker 1: the weeds, you might remember this guy as the national

599
00:37:10,960 --> 00:37:15,640
Speaker 1: security advisor for a time to former President Ronald Reagan.

600
00:37:16,560 --> 00:37:22,120
Speaker 1: After Carlucci left his job as the National Security Advisor,

601
00:37:22,920 --> 00:37:26,399
Speaker 1: he got hired on it Sears to run this subsidiary

602
00:37:26,480 --> 00:37:31,440
Speaker 1: the Dark Sky mentioned Sears World Trade. Sears World Trade,

603
00:37:32,040 --> 00:37:37,480
Speaker 1: let's just unpack these matrociaka dolls. Sears World Trade had

604
00:37:37,480 --> 00:37:41,320
Speaker 1: its own subsidiaries, and one of those subsidiaries, the Singing Oversaw,

605
00:37:41,800 --> 00:37:47,000
Speaker 1: had the name International Planning and Analysis Center Incorporated, a

606
00:37:47,120 --> 00:37:52,000
Speaker 1: name that is just just beige and blase enough to

607
00:37:52,120 --> 00:37:56,440
Speaker 1: be suspicious. Who was in charge of that Who was

608
00:37:56,480 --> 00:37:59,440
Speaker 1: a charge of that center? A retired four star general

609
00:37:59,520 --> 00:38:06,359
Speaker 1: named j Ames Allen, along with twelve other former military officers.

610
00:38:07,640 --> 00:38:12,640
Speaker 1: They provided this subsidiary of a subsidiary of sears. Look

611
00:38:12,680 --> 00:38:18,000
Speaker 1: at those proxies, admire those nesting dolls. They provided advice

612
00:38:18,160 --> 00:38:21,719
Speaker 1: on how to sell anti aircraft missiles, how to sell

613
00:38:21,760 --> 00:38:28,160
Speaker 1: transport planes, are flight simulators, radar, and trailers to the

614
00:38:28,280 --> 00:38:32,320
Speaker 1: US and Canada. So they were talking with private industry

615
00:38:32,360 --> 00:38:36,759
Speaker 1: like defense manufacturers, and they were they were pulling contacts,

616
00:38:36,800 --> 00:38:39,200
Speaker 1: which is what a lot of the uh A lot

617
00:38:39,320 --> 00:38:41,920
Speaker 1: of the public service folks who go to the dark side,

618
00:38:42,320 --> 00:38:45,080
Speaker 1: that's what they end up doing. Their nepotism is their

619
00:38:45,480 --> 00:38:49,200
Speaker 1: uh CV, their resume. You know, I mean what we

620
00:38:49,280 --> 00:38:52,000
Speaker 1: have on paper here at least over the span of

621
00:38:52,080 --> 00:38:56,879
Speaker 1: time since this was going down and what was the eighties? Correct, Yeah,

622
00:38:57,120 --> 00:38:59,880
Speaker 1: that's great. You know, I'm I'm making references to warlords

623
00:38:59,880 --> 00:39:03,319
Speaker 1: and you know, selling selling weapons in other places that

624
00:39:03,600 --> 00:39:08,520
Speaker 1: maybe maybe enemies of Western powers or something like that.

625
00:39:08,560 --> 00:39:10,359
Speaker 1: But in this case they are talking about the US

626
00:39:10,400 --> 00:39:14,480
Speaker 1: and Canada. When we know about something like this, I

627
00:39:14,640 --> 00:39:17,360
Speaker 1: always have the suspicion that it goes deeper and it

628
00:39:17,400 --> 00:39:22,000
Speaker 1: goes further out to more nefarious things. That doesn't necessarily

629
00:39:22,000 --> 00:39:24,359
Speaker 1: mean that it's true, just because I feel that way,

630
00:39:24,719 --> 00:39:27,200
Speaker 1: just putting that out there, I feel, you man, that's

631
00:39:27,239 --> 00:39:31,800
Speaker 1: a fair like gut check that everybody has to what

632
00:39:32,200 --> 00:39:34,040
Speaker 1: do we do in D and D. You got a

633
00:39:34,120 --> 00:39:37,040
Speaker 1: role initiative and you've got a role for constitution. You

634
00:39:37,040 --> 00:39:40,120
Speaker 1: have to make sure that we're not going too far

635
00:39:40,280 --> 00:39:43,600
Speaker 1: down a rabbit hole of conjecture versus a rabbit hole

636
00:39:43,640 --> 00:39:46,960
Speaker 1: of fact. But there's there's a lot of stuff that

637
00:39:47,000 --> 00:39:49,520
Speaker 1: doesn't look good for this, one of the main things

638
00:39:49,640 --> 00:39:52,719
Speaker 1: being that when this story broke in the mid nineties,

639
00:39:52,760 --> 00:39:55,880
Speaker 1: I think around eighty six or so. When this story broke,

640
00:39:56,840 --> 00:40:01,000
Speaker 1: Sears response was, Oh, yeah, we it's a small part

641
00:40:01,000 --> 00:40:05,280
Speaker 1: of the company and uh uh, we're gonna sell it anyway.

642
00:40:06,000 --> 00:40:09,400
Speaker 1: We we might sell it to some other company, Okay,

643
00:40:09,440 --> 00:40:11,520
Speaker 1: we might sell it to the people who run it now,

644
00:40:12,200 --> 00:40:16,160
Speaker 1: which is chefkas. But then there was also the second

645
00:40:16,200 --> 00:40:21,680
Speaker 1: aspect of sketchiness. Here is the deniability factor. Rumsfeld said,

646
00:40:21,840 --> 00:40:24,600
Speaker 1: Oh yeah, I don't I don't remember doing that, And

647
00:40:25,120 --> 00:40:30,080
Speaker 1: people at Sears were like, oh, is that with that subsidiary?

648
00:40:30,160 --> 00:40:33,800
Speaker 1: Was doing it? Just so small? And you know about that? Yeah,

649
00:40:33,840 --> 00:40:37,840
Speaker 1: that's crazy, which is which is kind of like I

650
00:40:38,000 --> 00:40:43,360
Speaker 1: heart media saying podcast huh, that's wild. We didn't know

651
00:40:43,360 --> 00:40:47,040
Speaker 1: our podcasts, Yeah, we didn't know our podcasting arm was

652
00:40:47,080 --> 00:40:51,600
Speaker 1: doing podcasts anyway, so they're doing down there in Atlanta.

653
00:40:52,600 --> 00:40:55,120
Speaker 1: Then what was the name of the division again, The

654
00:40:55,280 --> 00:40:58,840
Speaker 1: name of the first subsidiary is Sears World Trade. The

655
00:40:58,960 --> 00:41:02,320
Speaker 1: name of the subsidiar that was doing the international arms

656
00:41:02,320 --> 00:41:08,439
Speaker 1: trade consulting is International Planning and Analysis Center Incorporated or iPad,

657
00:41:08,560 --> 00:41:12,160
Speaker 1: which is clearly a subsidiary of Illumination Global Unlimited. Right, Well,

658
00:41:12,239 --> 00:41:15,239
Speaker 1: that's our show, folks, Thanks so much for tuning. We

659
00:41:15,239 --> 00:41:18,239
Speaker 1: shouldn't be talking about Oh no, no, no, no, you're right,

660
00:41:18,280 --> 00:41:20,920
Speaker 1: you're on the money. Uh, well, they're They're evolved in

661
00:41:20,960 --> 00:41:23,720
Speaker 1: pretty much every company I think at some point. Again,

662
00:41:24,200 --> 00:41:28,160
Speaker 1: but this is this is fascinating because if you're interested

663
00:41:28,280 --> 00:41:31,279
Speaker 1: in the history of Sears, please do check out that

664
00:41:31,400 --> 00:41:36,200
Speaker 1: ridiculous history episode. But also I think this is indicative

665
00:41:36,800 --> 00:41:41,239
Speaker 1: of just how much of a reach this place had.

666
00:41:41,480 --> 00:41:45,400
Speaker 1: And And to me, okay, so I'm torn hashtag Natalie

667
00:41:45,480 --> 00:41:50,840
Speaker 1: and Bruglia. I'm wondering, like, what is the primary player

668
00:41:51,600 --> 00:41:56,560
Speaker 1: in this Sears World Trade situation was? Was it Sears

669
00:41:56,680 --> 00:42:00,080
Speaker 1: making a lot of money? I would imagine not. I

670
00:42:00,320 --> 00:42:02,359
Speaker 1: I think it made less than one percent of their

671
00:42:02,400 --> 00:42:05,560
Speaker 1: sales for quite a while what it seems to me like,

672
00:42:06,080 --> 00:42:08,319
Speaker 1: and this is without doing an episode on this, what

673
00:42:08,440 --> 00:42:12,960
Speaker 1: it seems to me like is some shady consulting was

674
00:42:13,000 --> 00:42:16,600
Speaker 1: going on and it had the Sears brand name attached

675
00:42:17,000 --> 00:42:20,160
Speaker 1: as kind of a cover or uh, you know, like

676
00:42:20,200 --> 00:42:23,080
Speaker 1: a sheet pelt for a wolf. What do you guys think?

677
00:42:23,320 --> 00:42:26,960
Speaker 1: Am I off base there? I feel like around the money,

678
00:42:27,160 --> 00:42:29,359
Speaker 1: I'm looking down at the bottom of this Washington Post

679
00:42:29,480 --> 00:42:34,480
Speaker 1: article titled Carlucci supervised arm Advisors at Sears. Wow, from

680
00:42:35,360 --> 00:42:38,040
Speaker 1: hip going down all the way to the bottom of it,

681
00:42:38,760 --> 00:42:41,520
Speaker 1: and it's exactly what you're referencing. They're talking about Sears

682
00:42:41,560 --> 00:42:46,560
Speaker 1: World Trades revenue, Sears Roebucks, which you know, the above them,

683
00:42:47,000 --> 00:42:50,600
Speaker 1: and then I P. A c. Total revenue of Sears

684
00:42:50,640 --> 00:42:55,600
Speaker 1: Roebuck was forty point seven billion dollars in and then

685
00:42:56,080 --> 00:42:59,240
Speaker 1: I P. A c. Only made three point five million

686
00:42:59,600 --> 00:43:04,399
Speaker 1: only Well, I mean, but think about that a huge

687
00:43:04,400 --> 00:43:08,080
Speaker 1: amount of money. But think about the difference. Like you're

688
00:43:08,080 --> 00:43:11,680
Speaker 1: talking about this tiny little arm, this thing within the

689
00:43:11,920 --> 00:43:15,520
Speaker 1: thing made that small amount. You can only imagine that

690
00:43:15,600 --> 00:43:19,440
Speaker 1: this is it exists there for a reason that they

691
00:43:19,480 --> 00:43:22,680
Speaker 1: haven't stated, in my mind, for for them to keep

692
00:43:22,719 --> 00:43:25,840
Speaker 1: around a thing. That's that's that's small and not divert

693
00:43:25,880 --> 00:43:28,760
Speaker 1: those resources somewhere else where. They can clearly be making

694
00:43:28,960 --> 00:43:32,319
Speaker 1: lots more money. Lets me know, or at least sets

695
00:43:32,320 --> 00:43:34,480
Speaker 1: off my alarms that this is important to them for

696
00:43:34,520 --> 00:43:38,360
Speaker 1: some other reason. Oh yeah, oh yeah, man. And there's

697
00:43:38,480 --> 00:43:43,040
Speaker 1: there's another. There's another piece of the puzzle. This is

698
00:43:43,080 --> 00:43:46,440
Speaker 1: not quite the bow on the Christmas gift, but let's

699
00:43:46,440 --> 00:43:49,560
Speaker 1: call this the rapping for the present dark sky. You

700
00:43:49,760 --> 00:43:54,120
Speaker 1: also sent in a great article from the Nation, which

701
00:43:54,120 --> 00:43:55,759
Speaker 1: is when the first things are popped up to me

702
00:43:55,880 --> 00:44:00,200
Speaker 1: as well. And this article is from two thousand and two,

703
00:44:00,880 --> 00:44:03,879
Speaker 1: and it talks about the further adventures of our man

704
00:44:04,040 --> 00:44:07,640
Speaker 1: Frank car Lucci. He's so car Lucci right now. He

705
00:44:07,800 --> 00:44:12,480
Speaker 1: went on from Sears World Trade and I Pack to

706
00:44:13,040 --> 00:44:17,040
Speaker 1: become the chairman of a returning guest on our show,

707
00:44:17,920 --> 00:44:24,640
Speaker 1: the car Lysle Group Fellowship. Yes, zero poop involved, this

708
00:44:24,719 --> 00:44:33,680
Speaker 1: is true. Oh man, Carlucci runs deep. So let's check

709
00:44:33,719 --> 00:44:36,080
Speaker 1: this out. So if you want to learn more about

710
00:44:36,080 --> 00:44:38,840
Speaker 1: the car Lysle Group, I mean, you can go to

711
00:44:38,880 --> 00:44:42,040
Speaker 1: their official website if that's you know. If you're into

712
00:44:42,080 --> 00:44:45,520
Speaker 1: airbrush art, go to their website and read there about

713
00:44:45,600 --> 00:44:51,080
Speaker 1: us UH. If you are into learning more about the controversy,

714
00:44:51,360 --> 00:44:55,040
Speaker 1: check out a Wired article of from twenty ten by

715
00:44:55,120 --> 00:45:01,080
Speaker 1: Spencer Ackerman which talks about the reach of car Lysle Group.

716
00:45:01,360 --> 00:45:04,840
Speaker 1: Because the car Lysle Group, amongst there there are many

717
00:45:05,120 --> 00:45:09,680
Speaker 1: other things. It's not been officially censured for this, but

718
00:45:10,480 --> 00:45:15,440
Speaker 1: there's compelling evidence or circumstantial evidence that they're also deep

719
00:45:15,719 --> 00:45:20,759
Speaker 1: in the arms trade. And before car Lucci went to

720
00:45:21,920 --> 00:45:26,480
Speaker 1: the Reagan administration and Captain, before car Lucci went to Sears,

721
00:45:26,640 --> 00:45:29,160
Speaker 1: and before car Lucci went to the car Lysle Group,

722
00:45:29,520 --> 00:45:33,279
Speaker 1: he had a job at another company. The company that's

723
00:45:33,320 --> 00:45:36,160
Speaker 1: what we call it on this show. So from C

724
00:45:36,360 --> 00:45:40,680
Speaker 1: I A to the executive branch to your favorite department

725
00:45:40,719 --> 00:45:43,479
Speaker 1: store if you were alive, you know, if you're alive

726
00:45:43,560 --> 00:45:49,440
Speaker 1: during its heyday two, an incredibly powerful global investment firm.

727
00:45:49,560 --> 00:45:53,160
Speaker 1: It's just more and more I'm wondering more and more.

728
00:45:53,160 --> 00:45:57,440
Speaker 1: I'm wondering, like who is really voting in this country,

729
00:45:57,520 --> 00:46:01,440
Speaker 1: by which I mean who is affecting the decisions of policy?

730
00:46:01,840 --> 00:46:04,440
Speaker 1: And it's so hard not to be cynical, you know

731
00:46:04,440 --> 00:46:07,359
Speaker 1: what I mean, It's so hard not to think that

732
00:46:07,440 --> 00:46:11,120
Speaker 1: these are fingers on a hand and I'm not saying

733
00:46:11,120 --> 00:46:14,160
Speaker 1: this is how everything works, but I'm saying in this case,

734
00:46:14,440 --> 00:46:17,560
Speaker 1: I think Dark Sky is onto something. I think Sears

735
00:46:17,600 --> 00:46:20,840
Speaker 1: just got caught up because their their name looked clean.

736
00:46:21,320 --> 00:46:23,879
Speaker 1: You know, dude, there's so many dots to be connected here.

737
00:46:23,880 --> 00:46:26,840
Speaker 1: I need a conspiracy board. Yeah, yeah, you kill it

738
00:46:26,880 --> 00:46:30,000
Speaker 1: at the conspiracy boards though, You're amazing at that. Oh.

739
00:46:30,120 --> 00:46:32,360
Speaker 1: I can mock him up, to shoot him on video,

740
00:46:32,480 --> 00:46:35,319
Speaker 1: for sure. I can make fake ones all day. Let's

741
00:46:35,400 --> 00:46:38,080
Speaker 1: do it. But I need somebody out there that can

742
00:46:38,239 --> 00:46:43,239
Speaker 1: actually connect these dots from Rumsfeld and Sears to all

743
00:46:43,280 --> 00:46:48,120
Speaker 1: of these things. Roosevelt when he brought Carlucci on, and

744
00:46:48,120 --> 00:46:51,640
Speaker 1: then Rumsfeld when he's in off you know, in office

745
00:46:51,760 --> 00:46:55,600
Speaker 1: essentially um hanging out in the upper echelons like you

746
00:46:55,640 --> 00:46:59,239
Speaker 1: talked about that, those closed circles at the top. I mean,

747
00:46:59,280 --> 00:47:01,280
Speaker 1: I just want to follow Rumsfeld and then we'll follow

748
00:47:01,360 --> 00:47:05,520
Speaker 1: car Lucci. Somebody out there put those two together. Oh.

749
00:47:05,640 --> 00:47:07,880
Speaker 1: Car Lucci was also, by the way, kicking it with

750
00:47:08,000 --> 00:47:11,640
Speaker 1: Project for New American Century. Shout out to them. Yeah,

751
00:47:11,840 --> 00:47:15,480
Speaker 1: on the US Taiwan Business Council. Uh. He was a

752
00:47:15,480 --> 00:47:18,799
Speaker 1: member of the board of Trustees of the RAND Corporation.

753
00:47:19,120 --> 00:47:23,320
Speaker 1: I'm telling you, man, it's deeper than wrapped. It's quote

754
00:47:23,320 --> 00:47:28,360
Speaker 1: at press. Uh. He was on the Drug Policy Alliance. Oh,

755
00:47:28,400 --> 00:47:31,560
Speaker 1: I mean this guy, Oh my god, this guy had

756
00:47:32,040 --> 00:47:34,360
Speaker 1: I don't know if he had many interests, but he

757
00:47:34,400 --> 00:47:37,080
Speaker 1: had a lot of organizations that he used to push

758
00:47:37,080 --> 00:47:40,839
Speaker 1: his interest He was really on the Drug Policy Alliance. Yeah, yeah,

759
00:47:40,960 --> 00:47:44,360
Speaker 1: for sure, he was on the Drug Policy Alliance back

760
00:47:44,440 --> 00:47:47,240
Speaker 1: in oh he was a member of the honorary board

761
00:47:48,440 --> 00:47:52,040
Speaker 1: that dates back to two thousand and ten. Uh. He

762
00:47:52,200 --> 00:47:58,000
Speaker 1: passed away in and you know, at this point we

763
00:47:58,360 --> 00:48:07,120
Speaker 1: cannot a thickly draw hard conclusions about what Carlucci's motivations were,

764
00:48:08,080 --> 00:48:11,759
Speaker 1: you know, or what what led him to be connected

765
00:48:11,880 --> 00:48:17,279
Speaker 1: with so many organizations, some of which are remained pretty controversial,

766
00:48:17,400 --> 00:48:20,080
Speaker 1: I would say in the modern day. But we can

767
00:48:20,440 --> 00:48:24,080
Speaker 1: say that there are a lot of thoughts to connect.

768
00:48:24,200 --> 00:48:27,319
Speaker 1: This is awesome, Dark Sky, thank you so much for

769
00:48:27,440 --> 00:48:30,680
Speaker 1: sending this. Uh. I would love to dig in more

770
00:48:30,920 --> 00:48:34,319
Speaker 1: and see if this is an episode. I think there's

771
00:48:34,360 --> 00:48:37,120
Speaker 1: something cool about that. But anyhow, that's how that's why

772
00:48:37,160 --> 00:48:40,719
Speaker 1: we shouted out sears in the beginning. So we're gonna

773
00:48:40,880 --> 00:48:45,600
Speaker 1: holiday for listener mail. But I have a surprise for us,

774
00:48:45,960 --> 00:48:48,319
Speaker 1: Matt Noel, I mean it's not really a surprise. I

775
00:48:48,360 --> 00:48:51,160
Speaker 1: mentioned it off air, but we got an actual letter.

776
00:48:51,640 --> 00:48:55,120
Speaker 1: I'm covering the address looked at it yet, No I

777
00:48:55,160 --> 00:48:57,120
Speaker 1: was waiting for you guys, So we have no idea

778
00:48:57,160 --> 00:49:02,640
Speaker 1: what's inside there. True surprise, all right, We just know

779
00:49:02,840 --> 00:49:06,080
Speaker 1: that our friend Eric Eric sent this. And if you're

780
00:49:06,080 --> 00:49:08,920
Speaker 1: on our Facebook group, here's where it gets crazy. Then

781
00:49:08,960 --> 00:49:12,960
Speaker 1: you've heard from Eric. Uh So, all right, so here

782
00:49:13,000 --> 00:49:15,920
Speaker 1: we go. Here's the cover's gonna well, I guess we'll

783
00:49:15,920 --> 00:49:19,600
Speaker 1: have to narrate this. Oh no, this birthday cards late

784
00:49:20,200 --> 00:49:25,120
Speaker 1: and it is a dashing looking pig on a motorcycle

785
00:49:25,560 --> 00:49:29,360
Speaker 1: wearing a helmet. Safety first. Uh and the letter reads,

786
00:49:29,480 --> 00:49:32,600
Speaker 1: oh oh whoa, we got swagged, we got stickers. Okay.

787
00:49:33,239 --> 00:49:36,799
Speaker 1: The letter reads Matt Nolan ben I apologize for this

788
00:49:36,880 --> 00:49:39,120
Speaker 1: coming later than I expected. I just wanted to say

789
00:49:39,160 --> 00:49:42,400
Speaker 1: happy birthday to you all. So this from August, I guess,

790
00:49:42,640 --> 00:49:45,399
Speaker 1: and thank you for all of the wonderful shows you make.

791
00:49:45,600 --> 00:49:49,759
Speaker 1: Will we all have wonderful birthdays? Sincerely, E P. S.

792
00:49:49,920 --> 00:49:53,600
Speaker 1: I hope you enjoy the stickers. Just don't fight over

793
00:49:53,680 --> 00:49:59,839
Speaker 1: who gets which d I a stickers. So okay, I'll

794
00:49:59,840 --> 00:50:03,960
Speaker 1: do show you these, um and we can distribute these

795
00:50:04,000 --> 00:50:06,239
Speaker 1: when we hang out off air. But we've got some

796
00:50:06,280 --> 00:50:11,080
Speaker 1: happy birthday stickers. We've got a great project paper clip sticker.

797
00:50:11,120 --> 00:50:15,160
Speaker 1: I don't know if you can see it. Uh yeah,

798
00:50:15,440 --> 00:50:19,799
Speaker 1: and we've got it's pad away here Unicorn with its

799
00:50:19,880 --> 00:50:23,880
Speaker 1: midsection removed, shooting lasers out of his eyes to Unicorn.

800
00:50:24,080 --> 00:50:29,600
Speaker 1: Uh Denvertic. It's the Denver sculpture from the airport. It's

801
00:50:29,640 --> 00:50:36,680
Speaker 1: the Denver Intergalactic Astro Astro Park established. Uh. So we've

802
00:50:36,760 --> 00:50:41,839
Speaker 1: we've got these, and thank you so much. Eric. That's

803
00:50:41,840 --> 00:50:44,919
Speaker 1: so cool you guys. We got an actual letter. Yeah,

804
00:50:44,920 --> 00:50:47,360
Speaker 1: thank you Eric. That's really kind of really cool stuff.

805
00:50:47,400 --> 00:50:51,280
Speaker 1: Appreciate the wishes and the stickers. I will take whichever

806
00:50:51,600 --> 00:50:55,960
Speaker 1: of the three. You guys don't want to look at

807
00:50:55,960 --> 00:50:59,959
Speaker 1: all these? Okay, yeah, we got we have an embarrassment

808
00:51:00,040 --> 00:51:02,719
Speaker 1: of sticker riches and Saul thinks that Eric, I have

809
00:51:02,800 --> 00:51:07,040
Speaker 1: an embarrassment of sticker, like just like corded stickers, because

810
00:51:07,080 --> 00:51:09,360
Speaker 1: I got my in my old age. I'm just afraid

811
00:51:09,400 --> 00:51:12,719
Speaker 1: of like sticking things on things. Um. Back in the

812
00:51:12,960 --> 00:51:14,759
Speaker 1: back in my younger years, I would just stick a

813
00:51:14,760 --> 00:51:17,680
Speaker 1: sticker on anything. Now I just have piles and piles

814
00:51:17,680 --> 00:51:20,480
Speaker 1: of unused stickers. But maybe I'll be a news resolution

815
00:51:20,480 --> 00:51:22,960
Speaker 1: of mine. I'm gonna change that behavior started sticking up

816
00:51:23,000 --> 00:51:29,680
Speaker 1: the whole you know world. Were you a bumper sticker

817
00:51:29,719 --> 00:51:32,680
Speaker 1: guy at one point? Oh no, I despise bumper stickers.

818
00:51:32,719 --> 00:51:34,560
Speaker 1: That is a real pet peeve of mine. But you know,

819
00:51:34,640 --> 00:51:37,960
Speaker 1: cool little cutout stickers. And my kid actually just got

820
00:51:37,960 --> 00:51:40,160
Speaker 1: a really cool electric guitar for her birthday. She just

821
00:51:40,200 --> 00:51:42,879
Speaker 1: turned thirteen, and she's already stickering it up. So maybe

822
00:51:42,920 --> 00:51:47,320
Speaker 1: I'll donate some of these to her, cause that's that's awesome.

823
00:51:47,440 --> 00:51:52,040
Speaker 1: And thank you again to Tall Pockets, Thank you to

824
00:51:52,160 --> 00:51:54,359
Speaker 1: trust the Otter, thank you to the the Dark Sky, thank

825
00:51:54,400 --> 00:51:56,759
Speaker 1: you to Eric, and thank you to everyone who has

826
00:51:56,920 --> 00:52:00,560
Speaker 1: tuned in over the years. We can't wait to hear

827
00:52:00,640 --> 00:52:03,200
Speaker 1: from you, specifically you if you want to be a

828
00:52:03,239 --> 00:52:06,719
Speaker 1: part of this show, well, spoiler, you're already a part

829
00:52:06,719 --> 00:52:09,120
Speaker 1: of the show. But if you want to share a

830
00:52:09,160 --> 00:52:13,560
Speaker 1: message with your fellow conspiracy realist, let's team up. Let's collaborate.

831
00:52:13,719 --> 00:52:16,720
Speaker 1: Dare I say, let's conspire. We try to be easy

832
00:52:16,760 --> 00:52:18,719
Speaker 1: to find online. Let's try you can find us on

833
00:52:18,760 --> 00:52:20,720
Speaker 1: the internet. We are on Facebook, we are on Twitter,

834
00:52:20,800 --> 00:52:24,239
Speaker 1: We are on YouTube under the handle conspiracy Stuff. On Instagram,

835
00:52:24,280 --> 00:52:26,920
Speaker 1: you can find us under the handle at conspiracy stuff.

836
00:52:27,080 --> 00:52:29,680
Speaker 1: Show Yes and if you want to use your mouth

837
00:52:29,719 --> 00:52:32,359
Speaker 1: and your phone to contact us, you can dial one

838
00:52:32,520 --> 00:52:36,080
Speaker 1: eight three three st d w y t K. You

839
00:52:36,080 --> 00:52:39,080
Speaker 1: will hear Ben's voice some music, and then you have

840
00:52:39,160 --> 00:52:42,040
Speaker 1: three minutes say whatever you'd like and give yourself a

841
00:52:42,040 --> 00:52:44,440
Speaker 1: cool nickname. We can't wait to say it. Just let

842
00:52:44,480 --> 00:52:46,600
Speaker 1: us know if we can use your voice and message

843
00:52:46,760 --> 00:52:49,000
Speaker 1: on the air. If you've got more than three minutes

844
00:52:49,040 --> 00:52:51,640
Speaker 1: worth of things to say, and maybe links or some

845
00:52:51,719 --> 00:52:55,000
Speaker 1: other information you want to share that's more easily typed. Instead,

846
00:52:55,080 --> 00:52:58,439
Speaker 1: send us a good old fashioned email. We are conspiracy

847
00:52:58,480 --> 00:53:19,840
Speaker 1: at iHeart radio dot com. Stuff they Don't Want you

848
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Speaker 1: to Know is a production of I Heart Radio. For

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Speaker 1: more podcasts from my heart Radio, visit the i heart

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Speaker 1: Radio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to your

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Speaker 1: favorite shows.