WEBVTT - Fighting Back Against Crypto Scams and Loss

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<v Speaker 1>So the big question is this, how do investors like

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<v Speaker 1>us get access to the ideas, information, and most importantly,

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<v Speaker 1>the right people that give us the tools and information

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<v Speaker 1>we need to make informed and educated decisions to have success.

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<v Speaker 1>That is the question, and this podcast will give us

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<v Speaker 1>the answers. This is Mark Moss, your host. Let's get

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<v Speaker 1>this started. Hello, and welcome to another episode of the

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<v Speaker 1>Market Disruptors podcast. Today I am sitting down with David Silver.

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<v Speaker 1>He's the securities fraud and investment loss attorney. He represents

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<v Speaker 1>clients who have lost money bendy fraud, at etcetera. He's

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<v Speaker 1>not a couple of really big cases that we get into.

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<v Speaker 1>One is this big sim swapping that has been a

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<v Speaker 1>big problem. People are getting their cryptocurrencies hacked into install

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<v Speaker 1>in because of this, and so we talk about sim swapping,

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<v Speaker 1>what the case is looking like. We get into how

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<v Speaker 1>you can protect yourself from sim swapping if it does

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<v Speaker 1>happen to you, what you should do, And we also

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<v Speaker 1>get into some other stuff with coin base and the

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<v Speaker 1>Burke Versus coin based case, talking about the Bitcoin cash

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<v Speaker 1>fork and what happened there, as well as a bunch

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<v Speaker 1>of other legal issues that you should be aware of

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<v Speaker 1>ramifications that you may have if you've had a loss,

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<v Speaker 1>and so much more good stuff. Let's go ahead and

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<v Speaker 1>just jump right into it with David. All Right, everyone,

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<v Speaker 1>welcome back to another episode of the Market Disruptors podcast. Today,

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<v Speaker 1>I am sitting down with David Silver and he's an

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<v Speaker 1>attorney working on the securities fraud, investment loss, et cetera.

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<v Speaker 1>And um it's h He's got a couple of exciting

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<v Speaker 1>things that he's working on we want to talk about.

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<v Speaker 1>So let's just go ahead and just jump right into it. Hey, David,

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<v Speaker 1>Hey Mark, how are you. Hey? I'm doing good. Thanks,

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<v Speaker 1>Thanks for taking the time to come on. Um, I

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<v Speaker 1>know we've worked together a little bit, kind of had

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<v Speaker 1>a relationship for a while, but uh, really just kind

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<v Speaker 1>of excited to talk to you and hear about some

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<v Speaker 1>of the bigger stuff that's going on in the market

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<v Speaker 1>today that people should be aware of. But for a

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<v Speaker 1>little bit of background, why don't you just kind of

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<v Speaker 1>tell everybody who you are, where you're from, and how

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<v Speaker 1>you got to crypto, what you're doing. Sure, my name

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<v Speaker 1>is David Silver, I'm a founding partner or at Silver Miller.

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<v Speaker 1>Um I got to crypto like most people accidentally. Um.

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<v Speaker 1>I was sitting in a bar in two thousand and

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<v Speaker 1>twelve in Utah and some guy was trying to impress.

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<v Speaker 1>We were on a board of directors for a philanthropical

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<v Speaker 1>organization and some guy was trying to impress the other

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<v Speaker 1>four guys at the table and started talking about bitcoin

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<v Speaker 1>and the US. The four of us kind of did

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<v Speaker 1>what everyone did, especially back then. We shook our heads.

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<v Speaker 1>We were like, this is nothing, I mean, come on,

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<v Speaker 1>and he took all of our cell phones and he

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<v Speaker 1>gave us And at the time I thought he gave

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<v Speaker 1>us all the equal amount of bitcoin, but he gave

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<v Speaker 1>me five bitcoin. He opened up a coin based account

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<v Speaker 1>of gave me five bitcoin in two thousand twelve, which

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<v Speaker 1>at the time was worth about two hundred bucks. So

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<v Speaker 1>I was like, yeah, cool, some guya gave me a

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<v Speaker 1>thousand bucks. He's going to jail. I'm never gonna touch

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<v Speaker 1>this stuff. I've never got anything to do with it.

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<v Speaker 1>And then I ended up doing a case for someone

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<v Speaker 1>about crypto against a company called Crypsy into that some

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<v Speaker 1>fifteen and then when the ship hit the fan in

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<v Speaker 1>two thousand seventeen, I logged back into that account, the

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<v Speaker 1>coin based account for the first time in about five years,

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<v Speaker 1>and those five bitcoin were worth about a hundred and

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<v Speaker 1>thirty thousand dollars. I was like, I was like, that's crazy.

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<v Speaker 1>And the guy never went to jail, which was a

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<v Speaker 1>good side. Um. It turns out that the other four

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<v Speaker 1>guys at the table, he only gave them one bitcoin

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<v Speaker 1>each and he was trying to impress me, and I

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<v Speaker 1>thank him. At work, I sent them some very nice

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<v Speaker 1>follows of wine when things were peaking. I still hold

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<v Speaker 1>those five bitcoins, so I while I'm not necessarily a

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<v Speaker 1>I have never I can honestly say I have never

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<v Speaker 1>bought a cryptocurrency. I have only received them. So I

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<v Speaker 1>still I guess if by accident, I'm a bitcoin maximalist

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<v Speaker 1>because I basically hold bitcoin through my lawsuits. I do

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<v Speaker 1>now hold others by almost what I would call accident

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<v Speaker 1>or you know, the malfians of others, because I do

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<v Speaker 1>take paim in. You know, I do take payment and

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<v Speaker 1>contingency fee. I represent lots of people. Some of my

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<v Speaker 1>big loss suits are I've got the only class action

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<v Speaker 1>against coin base. Uh that's called like delve coin Base.

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<v Speaker 1>I've got a big case against I've got a couple

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<v Speaker 1>of big cases against cracking. The biggest one relates to

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<v Speaker 1>a flash crash in May two thousand seventeen. Got it's

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<v Speaker 1>been a while now, May two thousand seventeen, when the

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<v Speaker 1>price of Eve went from nine to twenty six over

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<v Speaker 1>about two hours. That case is actually set to be

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<v Speaker 1>tried soon. I got some class actions. I was part

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<v Speaker 1>of originally the class action against Teza's I've got the

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<v Speaker 1>class action against Gigawatt to connect one Coin, Nano Monkey Capital,

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<v Speaker 1>and I guess we're gonna talk about today. I also

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<v Speaker 1>do a lot of SIM swapping cases. I got about

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<v Speaker 1>forty SIM swapping cases where people cell phones are hija

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<v Speaker 1>act in one one way or another and they lose

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<v Speaker 1>a lot of their crypto. Yeah. Wow, that's a that's

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<v Speaker 1>a lot of cases. You sound like a pretty busy guy. Yeah.

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<v Speaker 1>This is good for me, it's bad for other people.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah right. Yeah. So I want to talk about the

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<v Speaker 1>SIM swapping because that's a hot topic and and it

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<v Speaker 1>really relates to a lot of people. We should all

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<v Speaker 1>be aware of it because it's a major security issue

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<v Speaker 1>for sure. Um, but just kind of overall, Um, it

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<v Speaker 1>seems like, I mean, with a lot of these cases

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<v Speaker 1>that you mentioned, you know, with the flash crash for example.

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<v Speaker 1>I mean really it's about um holding these businesses, whether

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<v Speaker 1>they're exchanges or whatever, accountable for what they're doing, right,

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<v Speaker 1>I mean that kind of sums it up so um.

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<v Speaker 1>In in the cracking flash cash for example, people were

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<v Speaker 1>uh subject to losses because they couldn't get in and

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<v Speaker 1>sell their coins or whatever. Um, and so holding them accountable. Right.

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<v Speaker 1>So basically, and you know mine, I'll share my screen

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<v Speaker 1>for a second. Um, So basically we're gonna walk through.

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<v Speaker 1>Just make sure I got the right one which who

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<v Speaker 1>which screen of my sharing? I see? Yeah, I see,

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<v Speaker 1>I see your SIM swap fraud. Um. So this is

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<v Speaker 1>a podcast f So for the podcast, I'll go ahead

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<v Speaker 1>and a link to this uh link to this image

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<v Speaker 1>for you guys. Yeah. So basically the image is showing,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, it's the walking through for whether sim swap

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<v Speaker 1>is and sim swapping effectively. Um. There's I have my telephone,

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<v Speaker 1>I have my cell phone service with a T and

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<v Speaker 1>T and all right, about one o'clock in the morning

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<v Speaker 1>on a Friday night, SIM swappers will call a T

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<v Speaker 1>and T and they will sim swap and they will

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<v Speaker 1>ask for a T and T to swap the SIM

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<v Speaker 1>card from my iPhone to another phone, and effectively what

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<v Speaker 1>ends up happening is my phone I lose the network

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<v Speaker 1>access to a T and T and the hacker gets

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<v Speaker 1>to take over the network access on their phone, So

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<v Speaker 1>all of my phone calls, my text messages, everything goes

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<v Speaker 1>to the hackers phone instead of mind is that like

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<v Speaker 1>porting your number over? It's so there are two types

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<v Speaker 1>of There are two types of hacks. The porting is

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<v Speaker 1>a little more complicated and hackers have stayed away from it.

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<v Speaker 1>About two three years ago, it was more popular for

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<v Speaker 1>the hackers to port your number, but porting takes a

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<v Speaker 1>day or two. The SIM swap is instantaneous, so they

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<v Speaker 1>actually moved to the SIM swapping over the SIM over

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<v Speaker 1>the porting. Uh. They're actually after the consensus in May

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<v Speaker 1>of two thousand nineteen, the last main consensus in New York.

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<v Speaker 1>Sim porting on Verizon became a problem again. And there

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<v Speaker 1>are a lot of UH, simports, but for the most

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<v Speaker 1>part right now, where we're seeing or sims swaps, not

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<v Speaker 1>some imports alright, So they're they're effectively the same, I mean,

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<v Speaker 1>the same outcome and the same risk to the user.

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<v Speaker 1>It's the same risk to the user, you actually lose

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<v Speaker 1>your cell phone number on the sim port, so that

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<v Speaker 1>usually they'll move it from like a T and T

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<v Speaker 1>to a smaller provider and it comes more complicated. Uh,

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<v Speaker 1>with a SIMS swap. The moment you realize you've been swapped,

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<v Speaker 1>you can walk into an a T and T store

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<v Speaker 1>and they can fix it instantaneously. Unfortunately, the hackers are

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<v Speaker 1>so good it takes them about an hour to clean

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<v Speaker 1>out all of your email and all of your crypto accounts. Literally,

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<v Speaker 1>we've seen it as quickly as six minutes. So let's

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<v Speaker 1>so let's walk through that. So, um, the hacker gets

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<v Speaker 1>into a T and T S database or convinces a

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<v Speaker 1>store employee to swap over the sim for example, and

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<v Speaker 1>now they have access to my phone, uh, text messages,

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<v Speaker 1>et cetera. And then what do they do with that?

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<v Speaker 1>So what ends up happening is when the hacker gets

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<v Speaker 1>access to your phone, a lot of your accounts and

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<v Speaker 1>we found especially your Gmail accounts and your iCloud accounts

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<v Speaker 1>are being are able to be reset on two factor

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<v Speaker 1>authentication through SMS confirmation. So what the hacker does is

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<v Speaker 1>he logs into your Gmail clicks I forgot my password.

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<v Speaker 1>Then Gmail will send him an SMS two factor authentication

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<v Speaker 1>back to the cell phone, which the hacker now controls.

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<v Speaker 1>They'll reset your Gmail account and then use your Gmail account.

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<v Speaker 1>He'll look for what emails you're getting. They'll look for,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, if you have a coin based account, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>he'll know you have a coin based will go the

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<v Speaker 1>coin base, will then try and reset your coin base.

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<v Speaker 1>The problem we've seen is a lot of people think

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<v Speaker 1>they're protected because they have two factor authentication with Google

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<v Speaker 1>authenticator or author and it turns out most people's accounts,

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<v Speaker 1>even the Google authenticator or the author are still tied

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<v Speaker 1>as back up too there to SMS authentication and can

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<v Speaker 1>be reset by having control of the cell phone. Hmm.

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<v Speaker 1>And the second thing is a lot of people on

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<v Speaker 1>their Gmail account keep their seed information so they can

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<v Speaker 1>reset accounts, or they keep there, or they keep their

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<v Speaker 1>backup for their authie or they're Authie or their Google

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<v Speaker 1>authenticator on their Gmail or eye cloud and i Cloud

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<v Speaker 1>for instance. You can't even un attached two factor authentication

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<v Speaker 1>with SMS right now, It's virtually impossible. Anyone who keeps

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<v Speaker 1>anything store on eye cloud is the easiest hack out there. Mhmm, yeah, interesting.

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<v Speaker 1>I know, I know with with Gmail, it does obviously

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<v Speaker 1>keeps your phone number as well. Um, what about you know,

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<v Speaker 1>what about people that have their two factor authentication on

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<v Speaker 1>a like a separate device, so it's not on their phone.

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<v Speaker 1>Are you saying that that may not adder because if

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<v Speaker 1>they get access to their phone number, they might not

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<v Speaker 1>even need to have access to the to f A.

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<v Speaker 1>So let's use something like treasure, you know where Treaser

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<v Speaker 1>is its own backup. There are a lot of people

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<v Speaker 1>who keep their seed information in their email, right and

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<v Speaker 1>some of the so in some of the lawsuits at

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<v Speaker 1>and T, T Mobile, Verizon, they're blaming the user for

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<v Speaker 1>not securing their crypto assets to the best of their ability.

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<v Speaker 1>And you know, it's it is a defense. So in theory,

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<v Speaker 1>you should be protected if you're you know, third party

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<v Speaker 1>secure wallet is truly secure. Unfortunately, what the hackers have

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<v Speaker 1>found is they are most people use a backup for

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<v Speaker 1>their security. That backup is usually stored in their email,

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<v Speaker 1>whether it be their Gmail or their eye cloud. And

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<v Speaker 1>they come in and they sit and they basically come

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<v Speaker 1>in and they get through the back door of the

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<v Speaker 1>security measure because most people are lazy and keep everything

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<v Speaker 1>in their email accout right. So yeah, always a bad

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<v Speaker 1>idea to keep your seed in your computer anywhere. I

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<v Speaker 1>think we saw Ian Billina said that he kept his

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<v Speaker 1>in his ever note account, which I use every note

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<v Speaker 1>like crazy. Um, I think if you put it in

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<v Speaker 1>Google Drive or uh job box, anywhere that's digital, you

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<v Speaker 1>have the risk of a hacker getting access to that. So,

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<v Speaker 1>um I keeping your backup seed on paper is something

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<v Speaker 1>that I've always done, but I am concerned. Um as

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<v Speaker 1>you say, like if they get access to the email

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<v Speaker 1>that you log into your exchange with and then they're

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<v Speaker 1>able to reset your exchange with just your cell phone

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<v Speaker 1>number and not needing the two f a. Um. So

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<v Speaker 1>here's where you know a lot of people have a

0:12:41.280 --> 0:12:45.880
<v Speaker 1>false sense of security. Where do they use coin based cracking, Gemini,

0:12:46.120 --> 0:12:51.400
<v Speaker 1>bit Trux coloniacs. They'll think that they're safe because they're

0:12:51.480 --> 0:12:55.160
<v Speaker 1>using Google two factor authentication or off the the log

0:12:55.200 --> 0:12:59.559
<v Speaker 1>into those as their second factor. So on coin based

0:12:59.640 --> 0:13:02.720
<v Speaker 1>or cry can you can use SMS two factory authentication.

0:13:03.240 --> 0:13:05.960
<v Speaker 1>If you're using SMS and your phones compromise, you're gonna

0:13:05.960 --> 0:13:11.360
<v Speaker 1>be compromised, right you use Google authenticator or off the

0:13:12.000 --> 0:13:15.760
<v Speaker 1>you can still be compromised if the hacker. The first

0:13:15.760 --> 0:13:20.680
<v Speaker 1>thing the hacker looks for is the Google Authenticator or

0:13:20.720 --> 0:13:25.280
<v Speaker 1>AF the emails in your Gmail account so they are

0:13:25.360 --> 0:13:28.439
<v Speaker 1>able to replicate out of your If they can, they

0:13:28.440 --> 0:13:31.760
<v Speaker 1>will change that and they will immediately then go after

0:13:31.840 --> 0:13:34.240
<v Speaker 1>your exchange accounts and they are and they have been

0:13:34.320 --> 0:13:38.920
<v Speaker 1>quite successful at it. Interesting, So that frames up the

0:13:39.480 --> 0:13:43.839
<v Speaker 1>let's that frames up the overall issue. Um, the big

0:13:43.880 --> 0:13:46.640
<v Speaker 1>one that's super popular right now. I know you said

0:13:46.679 --> 0:13:48.560
<v Speaker 1>you have thirty or so that you're working on. But

0:13:48.600 --> 0:13:50.760
<v Speaker 1>the one that's really taken kind of media headlines is

0:13:50.800 --> 0:13:55.480
<v Speaker 1>this Turpin versus A T and T um. Some of

0:13:55.520 --> 0:13:58.160
<v Speaker 1>that looks like, I mean, it came out. I think

0:13:58.200 --> 0:14:00.439
<v Speaker 1>maybe they brought it up where like actually a T

0:14:00.520 --> 0:14:02.760
<v Speaker 1>and T kind of has a history of being hacked

0:14:02.800 --> 0:14:05.440
<v Speaker 1>and people getting access to it. Is that kind of

0:14:05.440 --> 0:14:07.120
<v Speaker 1>what framed it up? And are they trying to show

0:14:07.160 --> 0:14:09.000
<v Speaker 1>like negligence on A T and T s part there?

0:14:10.080 --> 0:14:12.439
<v Speaker 1>So the problem with the A T and T and

0:14:12.480 --> 0:14:15.480
<v Speaker 1>Michael Turpin's case, and I you know, at the end

0:14:15.520 --> 0:14:18.080
<v Speaker 1>of the day talking about Michael's case, I am not

0:14:18.240 --> 0:14:21.160
<v Speaker 1>Michael's lawyer. I don't represent Michael. I have no inside

0:14:21.200 --> 0:14:24.000
<v Speaker 1>knowledge about Michael's case. I want to make that clear.

0:14:24.840 --> 0:14:27.560
<v Speaker 1>Um I did said, I did sit next to Michael

0:14:27.720 --> 0:14:30.880
<v Speaker 1>at consensus on the panel where we both talked about

0:14:30.920 --> 0:14:35.400
<v Speaker 1>sim swapping cases. But effectively, what makes Michael's case unique

0:14:36.000 --> 0:14:39.600
<v Speaker 1>is that Michael had his second fact, he had an

0:14:39.680 --> 0:14:43.360
<v Speaker 1>enhanced security pen for his A T and T account.

0:14:43.720 --> 0:14:46.680
<v Speaker 1>So most people when they log into when they go

0:14:46.760 --> 0:14:48.800
<v Speaker 1>there with an A T and T store, they get

0:14:48.800 --> 0:14:51.680
<v Speaker 1>a four to Japan. Michael had a six or eight

0:14:51.760 --> 0:14:54.640
<v Speaker 1>to Japan. I personally had a six or eight to Japan,

0:14:54.680 --> 0:14:57.920
<v Speaker 1>and I also was a victim of sim swapping. Uh

0:14:58.880 --> 0:15:01.160
<v Speaker 1>So A T and T is offering you an enhanced

0:15:01.160 --> 0:15:04.880
<v Speaker 1>mechanism to uh secure your account because they are aware

0:15:04.960 --> 0:15:08.440
<v Speaker 1>this is a problem. So ironically, what ends up happening

0:15:08.560 --> 0:15:12.280
<v Speaker 1>is that after we have these type of you know,

0:15:13.920 --> 0:15:17.560
<v Speaker 1>false sense of security measures, a T and T employee

0:15:17.600 --> 0:15:22.240
<v Speaker 1>simply bypassed your security when someone calls in and anyone

0:15:22.240 --> 0:15:24.680
<v Speaker 1>can bypass by, you know, whether it's telling your birthday

0:15:24.760 --> 0:15:28.640
<v Speaker 1>or giving some other personal information. Now we've learned through

0:15:29.040 --> 0:15:33.160
<v Speaker 1>Michael's lawsuit and other criminal indictments that A T and

0:15:33.200 --> 0:15:37.600
<v Speaker 1>T employees or contractors, along with Horizon and T Mobile,

0:15:38.000 --> 0:15:43.600
<v Speaker 1>we're selling the consumer protected information that was used to

0:15:43.640 --> 0:15:49.680
<v Speaker 1>access the accounts. So again, you know, there's there's federal

0:15:49.760 --> 0:15:53.560
<v Speaker 1>law play here, state law play here, and there's also

0:15:53.560 --> 0:15:56.000
<v Speaker 1>the terms of service of a T and T a

0:15:56.040 --> 0:15:59.240
<v Speaker 1>play here, because a T and T when you sign

0:15:59.320 --> 0:16:01.560
<v Speaker 1>up with them. And this is just about Michael's case,

0:16:01.560 --> 0:16:04.480
<v Speaker 1>but this is the same for any major carrier, not

0:16:04.600 --> 0:16:08.240
<v Speaker 1>just talking about Michael's case exclusively. You waive your rights

0:16:08.280 --> 0:16:12.360
<v Speaker 1>to a class action. How many people have been hurt

0:16:12.520 --> 0:16:16.080
<v Speaker 1>unlike Michael. So Michael lost about twenty four million dollars

0:16:16.080 --> 0:16:20.200
<v Speaker 1>and tokens at the peak of the market. Um, now

0:16:20.200 --> 0:16:23.960
<v Speaker 1>he's doing punitive damages of an extra two hundred million dollars. Really,

0:16:23.960 --> 0:16:26.320
<v Speaker 1>the only people who get punitive damages are on TV.

0:16:26.480 --> 0:16:31.040
<v Speaker 1>You've ever you very rarely see that in real life. Um.

0:16:31.080 --> 0:16:33.840
<v Speaker 1>But what's interesting here is of even like the thirty

0:16:33.880 --> 0:16:36.520
<v Speaker 1>and forty people I represent, those are the people who

0:16:36.520 --> 0:16:40.560
<v Speaker 1>have damages in excess of twenty fifty hundred thousand, a million,

0:16:40.640 --> 0:16:44.320
<v Speaker 1>two million dollars and damages. I speak to so many

0:16:44.360 --> 0:16:48.240
<v Speaker 1>people who have been hit and compromised, who lost half

0:16:48.280 --> 0:16:51.480
<v Speaker 1>a bitcoin, you know, a thousand dollars worth of ripple

0:16:52.160 --> 0:16:54.600
<v Speaker 1>because there's a class action waiver. None of those people

0:16:54.600 --> 0:16:57.920
<v Speaker 1>are able to get representation by you know, a contingency

0:16:57.960 --> 0:16:59.600
<v Speaker 1>fee lawyer. I mean I get yelled and screamed out

0:16:59.640 --> 0:17:02.640
<v Speaker 1>all the why won't you take my case? This is horrible.

0:17:02.920 --> 0:17:05.680
<v Speaker 1>I've got this, I've got that. So for every case

0:17:05.760 --> 0:17:08.000
<v Speaker 1>I do take, I have to turn down four or five.

0:17:08.600 --> 0:17:11.480
<v Speaker 1>But the hackers are doing in mass and then are

0:17:11.520 --> 0:17:15.879
<v Speaker 1>successful on a couple like Turpin, like you know some

0:17:15.960 --> 0:17:18.960
<v Speaker 1>of my clients. But for everyone, they're successful, and they

0:17:19.000 --> 0:17:21.840
<v Speaker 1>also probably fail on five to ten. You know, people

0:17:21.880 --> 0:17:25.120
<v Speaker 1>they're hacking, But what do they do. They walk around Consensus,

0:17:26.119 --> 0:17:30.160
<v Speaker 1>They walk around every cryptoconference. They take everyone's business cards.

0:17:30.440 --> 0:17:32.640
<v Speaker 1>Your business card has your email on it, your cell

0:17:32.680 --> 0:17:36.280
<v Speaker 1>phone number on it, your name on it. Even if

0:17:36.359 --> 0:17:38.840
<v Speaker 1>they're not working with insiders, they try. They can, some

0:17:38.920 --> 0:17:42.920
<v Speaker 1>of them socially engineered backwards. But they are looking for

0:17:43.040 --> 0:17:45.720
<v Speaker 1>you know, most people at Consensus are trying to sound

0:17:45.760 --> 0:17:48.159
<v Speaker 1>more important than they are, so they're gonna be like

0:17:48.320 --> 0:17:51.919
<v Speaker 1>I hold this token and I use coin base, I

0:17:52.040 --> 0:17:55.360
<v Speaker 1>do X, I have my money here. And for the hackers,

0:17:55.400 --> 0:17:59.040
<v Speaker 1>it's just you know, sometimes people are the Rome Wars enemies.

0:17:59.359 --> 0:18:02.040
<v Speaker 1>They are trying to show off, they're trying to do things,

0:18:02.200 --> 0:18:06.200
<v Speaker 1>and they're losing their own money. Yeah, wow, how how

0:18:06.240 --> 0:18:08.199
<v Speaker 1>how easy that could be once you get that that

0:18:08.320 --> 0:18:11.200
<v Speaker 1>key information, I can see that. Um, it's interesting you

0:18:11.240 --> 0:18:14.160
<v Speaker 1>talk about how a T and T gives you an

0:18:14.160 --> 0:18:18.000
<v Speaker 1>extra security measure, um, which which tricks you into or

0:18:18.160 --> 0:18:21.920
<v Speaker 1>kind of gives you this false sense of security. I guess, um,

0:18:22.040 --> 0:18:24.760
<v Speaker 1>when you have that that extra measures that you've put

0:18:24.760 --> 0:18:27.240
<v Speaker 1>in place, showing that you have been proactive to be

0:18:27.320 --> 0:18:32.080
<v Speaker 1>more secure, does that put more damage or claim unto them?

0:18:32.160 --> 0:18:38.160
<v Speaker 1>So unfortunately, the answer is called comparative negligence. And while

0:18:38.320 --> 0:18:40.119
<v Speaker 1>every while we're all trying to get a T and

0:18:40.160 --> 0:18:43.080
<v Speaker 1>T to be fully responsible, a T and T s

0:18:43.160 --> 0:18:44.920
<v Speaker 1>defense and I'm not saying I agree with it, but

0:18:44.920 --> 0:18:48.480
<v Speaker 1>their defenses. They're not an insurance company for you for

0:18:48.560 --> 0:18:52.200
<v Speaker 1>your assets. And then they are not a and they're

0:18:52.200 --> 0:18:55.560
<v Speaker 1>not a security company for you for your assets. So

0:18:55.840 --> 0:18:59.040
<v Speaker 1>they're not responsible. First, let's say the fact that you

0:18:59.160 --> 0:19:03.600
<v Speaker 1>turned around decided to put your coins on an exchange

0:19:03.640 --> 0:19:07.480
<v Speaker 1>that you know had extra security measures that you yourself

0:19:07.520 --> 0:19:12.600
<v Speaker 1>did not avail yourself to. Yeah, they're responsible. You're responsible

0:19:12.600 --> 0:19:15.639
<v Speaker 1>because there's a third party intervening act i e. That

0:19:15.960 --> 0:19:20.639
<v Speaker 1>hacker of the criminal, and you're responsible because you yourself

0:19:20.800 --> 0:19:24.320
<v Speaker 1>had your seat information for your treasure wallet in your

0:19:24.359 --> 0:19:27.879
<v Speaker 1>Gmail account, right. You know your Gmail account wasn't backed

0:19:27.920 --> 0:19:31.000
<v Speaker 1>up with two factor authentication. You could have stopped them

0:19:31.000 --> 0:19:34.680
<v Speaker 1>getting your access. But the simpswap itself is the first

0:19:34.720 --> 0:19:37.440
<v Speaker 1>step of many steps, and if you were taking better

0:19:37.480 --> 0:19:40.959
<v Speaker 1>protection in steps two, three, and four, you would have

0:19:41.000 --> 0:19:45.040
<v Speaker 1>lost any money. Yeah, I was curious. I'm with T Mobile. Um,

0:19:45.160 --> 0:19:46.440
<v Speaker 1>it seems like it's all around a T and T.

0:19:46.560 --> 0:19:48.200
<v Speaker 1>But you did mention there's stuff going on in T

0:19:48.359 --> 0:19:51.320
<v Speaker 1>Mobile when this had gotten hot, and maybe back in

0:19:53.080 --> 0:19:55.840
<v Speaker 1>they had contacted me and said, hey, we can lock

0:19:55.960 --> 0:19:59.040
<v Speaker 1>your account. Do you want to like enable this where, um,

0:19:59.080 --> 0:20:01.119
<v Speaker 1>you know no what he can change it unless you

0:20:01.160 --> 0:20:03.480
<v Speaker 1>come into the store. I said yes, But I think

0:20:03.520 --> 0:20:05.800
<v Speaker 1>I've heard of the case where even people had done

0:20:05.800 --> 0:20:08.600
<v Speaker 1>that but it still was getting swapped. Is that? Yes?

0:20:09.040 --> 0:20:12.040
<v Speaker 1>So the reason why people to talk about Turpin Turpins

0:20:12.040 --> 0:20:15.719
<v Speaker 1>and federal court in California, it's public. My forty cases

0:20:15.760 --> 0:20:20.040
<v Speaker 1>are all in arbitration and not public, So that's why

0:20:20.040 --> 0:20:22.560
<v Speaker 1>those are all getting talked about, right, now I would

0:20:22.560 --> 0:20:25.520
<v Speaker 1>say mostly I the large percentage of people I speak

0:20:25.600 --> 0:20:29.480
<v Speaker 1>to are A T and T. The next is T Mobile,

0:20:30.800 --> 0:20:33.879
<v Speaker 1>the next is Horizon, and last is Sprint. I guess

0:20:33.880 --> 0:20:37.840
<v Speaker 1>since they're gonna be emerging soon, Sprint and T Mobile

0:20:37.840 --> 0:20:41.760
<v Speaker 1>will be one. Yeah. Wow, Yeah, I could see how

0:20:41.800 --> 0:20:44.399
<v Speaker 1>they could say. I mean, hey, we can't be responsible

0:20:44.440 --> 0:20:46.240
<v Speaker 1>for your whole life. I mean, we can be responsible

0:20:46.240 --> 0:20:48.240
<v Speaker 1>for damages to your cell phone, but not twenty five

0:20:48.359 --> 0:20:53.200
<v Speaker 1>million dollars in in crypto. Um. I kind of get that.

0:20:53.440 --> 0:20:56.720
<v Speaker 1>But I mean, given their size and negligence, I guess something.

0:20:56.840 --> 0:20:58.520
<v Speaker 1>I mean, you wouldn't be taking these cases on if

0:20:58.560 --> 0:21:00.919
<v Speaker 1>you didn't think there was an outcome coming. Right, Well,

0:21:01.040 --> 0:21:02.840
<v Speaker 1>let's think it back, because you're using a word a

0:21:02.880 --> 0:21:05.600
<v Speaker 1>lot of people use when they call me up. They're like, well,

0:21:05.640 --> 0:21:07.960
<v Speaker 1>A T T is negligent and what they did, they're

0:21:08.000 --> 0:21:11.840
<v Speaker 1>responsible there. The problem is, when you sign your cell

0:21:11.880 --> 0:21:15.479
<v Speaker 1>phone contract, it's basically like signing a mortgage. It's probably

0:21:15.480 --> 0:21:20.000
<v Speaker 1>thirty pages long their terms and conditions. You actually specifically

0:21:20.040 --> 0:21:24.760
<v Speaker 1>agree that they're not responsible for any negligence on your account.

0:21:25.160 --> 0:21:30.080
<v Speaker 1>You also specifically agree that your damages are limited, so

0:21:30.880 --> 0:21:32.919
<v Speaker 1>you know it's When I tell people, you know, what

0:21:33.000 --> 0:21:35.520
<v Speaker 1>the value of their cases are worth, they're like, well,

0:21:35.560 --> 0:21:38.240
<v Speaker 1>that's not fair, and I'm like, well, I understand that,

0:21:38.280 --> 0:21:41.320
<v Speaker 1>but I don't make the law. You know. You you know,

0:21:41.400 --> 0:21:42.840
<v Speaker 1>you know, be very like I get to look at

0:21:42.840 --> 0:21:45.880
<v Speaker 1>your Twitter account, you know, nowadays, and I'm like, look,

0:21:46.000 --> 0:21:48.199
<v Speaker 1>all the people that you want to vote for, you

0:21:48.200 --> 0:21:50.320
<v Speaker 1>want to have an office, those are the people who

0:21:50.320 --> 0:21:53.720
<v Speaker 1>are protecting the big companies, not you. You know, if

0:21:53.760 --> 0:21:55.440
<v Speaker 1>you want to vote with your pocket book, then you

0:21:55.480 --> 0:21:57.680
<v Speaker 1>know you should vote for people who want to give

0:21:57.720 --> 0:22:00.639
<v Speaker 1>you access to the courts. You know. You may not

0:22:00.920 --> 0:22:06.080
<v Speaker 1>like liberal Democrats for instance, like Elizabeth Warren and Bernie Sanders,

0:22:06.119 --> 0:22:08.399
<v Speaker 1>but they are the ones who would allow you to sue.

0:22:08.840 --> 0:22:10.800
<v Speaker 1>You know, if you vote for, you know, a Republican,

0:22:11.240 --> 0:22:13.399
<v Speaker 1>you know, Republicans tend to say you shouldn't have access

0:22:13.440 --> 0:22:15.360
<v Speaker 1>to courts. And I'm not meaning to make this political

0:22:15.440 --> 0:22:18.240
<v Speaker 1>either way. I'm just saying that, you know, you can't

0:22:18.240 --> 0:22:22.400
<v Speaker 1>have the both ways. You can't say that the terms

0:22:22.440 --> 0:22:27.320
<v Speaker 1>of conditions don't matter, the law doesn't matter. I got robbed.

0:22:27.320 --> 0:22:29.520
<v Speaker 1>I want my money back, you know. And it's especially

0:22:29.520 --> 0:22:32.480
<v Speaker 1>we're in the crypto community. We have so many libertarians

0:22:32.960 --> 0:22:35.959
<v Speaker 1>and anarchists. You know, it's one of my most favorite

0:22:36.040 --> 0:22:39.560
<v Speaker 1>quotes that I've had in my path. Everyone's an anarchist

0:22:39.640 --> 0:22:42.880
<v Speaker 1>until they lose their money. Then they want a lawyer. Yeah,

0:22:42.960 --> 0:22:45.880
<v Speaker 1>that's true, and and uh I agree with that statement.

0:22:46.040 --> 0:22:48.879
<v Speaker 1>I I tend to fall on that that side of

0:22:48.960 --> 0:22:51.240
<v Speaker 1>the of the line, I guess. But I'm I'm willing

0:22:51.240 --> 0:22:53.960
<v Speaker 1>to accept that responsibility. You know, I grew up. Um

0:22:54.000 --> 0:22:56.840
<v Speaker 1>I see, uh, you know all these personal injury cases

0:22:57.720 --> 0:23:00.600
<v Speaker 1>and uh, you know, I see it's like people access

0:23:00.640 --> 0:23:02.479
<v Speaker 1>to land and they want to be able to go

0:23:02.640 --> 0:23:05.200
<v Speaker 1>do these things, and but then they get hurt there

0:23:05.640 --> 0:23:07.199
<v Speaker 1>and then they want somebody responsible. So it's like, we

0:23:07.200 --> 0:23:09.400
<v Speaker 1>want the freedom, but we don't want to we don't

0:23:09.400 --> 0:23:11.399
<v Speaker 1>want the responsibility that comes with the freedom, right. I

0:23:11.400 --> 0:23:13.680
<v Speaker 1>guess that's kind of what you're saying. Well, it's think

0:23:13.720 --> 0:23:16.240
<v Speaker 1>of someone who you know, wants to jump out of

0:23:16.240 --> 0:23:20.280
<v Speaker 1>a plane and have a parachute on. You know, statistically

0:23:20.320 --> 0:23:22.639
<v Speaker 1>you're pretty safe if the parachute works and you know

0:23:22.680 --> 0:23:25.800
<v Speaker 1>how the skydive. But now you decide to take it

0:23:25.880 --> 0:23:28.200
<v Speaker 1>one step further. You want to jump off of a

0:23:28.240 --> 0:23:33.040
<v Speaker 1>bridge with a with a skydiving pack on your because

0:23:33.080 --> 0:23:36.359
<v Speaker 1>you think you're an outdoor adventure of you know, sportsman,

0:23:36.760 --> 0:23:38.680
<v Speaker 1>and all of a sudden, when you know something goes

0:23:38.720 --> 0:23:41.560
<v Speaker 1>wrong because you only you're supposed to have twenty tho

0:23:41.840 --> 0:23:43.919
<v Speaker 1>fet you only have five thousand feet. You want to

0:23:43.920 --> 0:23:45.639
<v Speaker 1>see the guy who told you about going on the

0:23:45.640 --> 0:23:49.399
<v Speaker 1>bridge here. If your money was at you know, Morgan

0:23:49.520 --> 0:23:53.520
<v Speaker 1>Stanley Wells, far Ago, Goldman Sacks and your cell phone

0:23:53.560 --> 0:23:55.959
<v Speaker 1>was swapped, the hacker would take three days to get

0:23:56.000 --> 0:23:57.840
<v Speaker 1>your money and you would get your money back. The

0:23:57.880 --> 0:24:01.080
<v Speaker 1>fact that it's crypto and it happens instant enviously is

0:24:01.119 --> 0:24:05.159
<v Speaker 1>the problem. For instance, I'll give another great example. A

0:24:05.160 --> 0:24:07.080
<v Speaker 1>lot of clients who lost their money in the US

0:24:07.119 --> 0:24:10.360
<v Speaker 1>on bit max. Use bit max and when you're in US,

0:24:11.760 --> 0:24:13.680
<v Speaker 1>so now they're like, well, I want my money back.

0:24:13.800 --> 0:24:17.000
<v Speaker 1>Someone stole my money. Well where is your money? Well,

0:24:17.000 --> 0:24:19.280
<v Speaker 1>I can't give you that information. May mean you can't

0:24:19.280 --> 0:24:22.399
<v Speaker 1>give me that information, Well, it's it's it was I

0:24:22.440 --> 0:24:24.840
<v Speaker 1>was using bit max, you know, and bit max and

0:24:24.840 --> 0:24:27.119
<v Speaker 1>the money was stolen. But what the email addressed were

0:24:27.119 --> 0:24:29.239
<v Speaker 1>you using? How are you logging in? Well? I had

0:24:29.280 --> 0:24:32.920
<v Speaker 1>a proton email account that you know, the hacker guy

0:24:32.960 --> 0:24:35.760
<v Speaker 1>that I can't get back. Now. Well, if you can't

0:24:35.840 --> 0:24:39.479
<v Speaker 1>prove your damages, you can't see And that's become an

0:24:39.520 --> 0:24:42.520
<v Speaker 1>interesting twist in this, you know, just it's kind of

0:24:42.560 --> 0:24:44.840
<v Speaker 1>like you know too, It's kind of like to mafios is.

0:24:45.280 --> 0:24:47.280
<v Speaker 1>The first guy steals the money, the second guy steals

0:24:47.280 --> 0:24:49.520
<v Speaker 1>the money from the first guy. The first guy wants

0:24:49.560 --> 0:24:51.000
<v Speaker 1>to go to the cops. The cops say, where did

0:24:51.000 --> 0:24:52.320
<v Speaker 1>you get the money? It goes, well, I stole it

0:24:52.320 --> 0:24:55.400
<v Speaker 1>from individual number one. You know. It's it's a real

0:24:55.520 --> 0:24:59.800
<v Speaker 1>problem because this doesn't happen even on these halts. It

0:25:00.040 --> 0:25:03.560
<v Speaker 1>they don't get your legacy bank accounts for that. And

0:25:03.640 --> 0:25:06.040
<v Speaker 1>you know, you got to conchoose your poisons. And that's

0:25:06.400 --> 0:25:10.160
<v Speaker 1>part of the telecoms defenses. If you were more secure,

0:25:10.560 --> 0:25:12.359
<v Speaker 1>if you put your money in the banks, none of

0:25:12.400 --> 0:25:16.840
<v Speaker 1>this would happen to you. Yeah, use crypto, live by crypto. Yeah,

0:25:16.960 --> 0:25:20.320
<v Speaker 1>that makes sense. I'm curious, Um, I'm curious. You're talking

0:25:20.359 --> 0:25:24.600
<v Speaker 1>about like proving this, so, like I would imagine there

0:25:24.600 --> 0:25:27.159
<v Speaker 1>has to be some proof that there was damages. I

0:25:27.200 --> 0:25:29.720
<v Speaker 1>saw in Turpin's case, for example, he had to show

0:25:29.760 --> 0:25:32.800
<v Speaker 1>that proved that the sim swap led to loss. So

0:25:33.600 --> 0:25:36.080
<v Speaker 1>I've been hacked. I had a I had a hot wallet,

0:25:36.160 --> 0:25:38.320
<v Speaker 1>an app on my phone, and one day I logged

0:25:38.359 --> 0:25:41.840
<v Speaker 1>in and all my money was gone. But how can

0:25:41.880 --> 0:25:43.880
<v Speaker 1>I prove that was hacked? All you see is a

0:25:43.880 --> 0:25:47.400
<v Speaker 1>is a debit out of the account. Again, I still

0:25:47.440 --> 0:25:49.840
<v Speaker 1>to this day don't know how that happened. I have

0:25:50.119 --> 0:25:53.919
<v Speaker 1>really good security and it was just gone. How do

0:25:54.000 --> 0:25:56.359
<v Speaker 1>I prove that was stolen and hacked? And I didn't

0:25:56.359 --> 0:25:59.720
<v Speaker 1>just transfer it somewhere. So that's another good reason why

0:25:59.800 --> 0:26:01.879
<v Speaker 1>p bull you know, aren't getting a hundred cents on

0:26:01.920 --> 0:26:05.720
<v Speaker 1>their dollar in these cases because that is virtually impossible

0:26:05.760 --> 0:26:09.680
<v Speaker 1>to prove given the nature. So what we've some sort

0:26:09.680 --> 0:26:11.720
<v Speaker 1>of things that we're doing. We do what we call

0:26:11.760 --> 0:26:14.520
<v Speaker 1>it an anatomy of the hack. We show how the

0:26:14.520 --> 0:26:19.240
<v Speaker 1>hacker gets in instantaneously goes hacks your accounts in you know,

0:26:19.320 --> 0:26:22.480
<v Speaker 1>the US exchanges use the information from the I P

0:26:22.600 --> 0:26:27.000
<v Speaker 1>addresses on the US exchanges, and there's just a mechanical way.

0:26:28.000 --> 0:26:31.280
<v Speaker 1>But you're making a valid point, and points to telecoms

0:26:31.280 --> 0:26:33.320
<v Speaker 1>are making. But how do we know that just wasn't you?

0:26:33.400 --> 0:26:35.280
<v Speaker 1>Then you're not thinking it. I had a guy who

0:26:35.280 --> 0:26:38.120
<v Speaker 1>claims he lost five million dollars, and when we kept

0:26:38.320 --> 0:26:41.200
<v Speaker 1>having him for proof, he couldn't even provide the simple

0:26:41.240 --> 0:26:43.679
<v Speaker 1>proof we asked for. I look him, I said, you know,

0:26:43.760 --> 0:26:46.399
<v Speaker 1>we can't. If you can't prove the damages and you

0:26:46.440 --> 0:26:49.760
<v Speaker 1>can't get me the lawyer you're a lawyer to believe

0:26:49.800 --> 0:26:52.719
<v Speaker 1>that your damages are legitimate, I will never be able

0:26:52.760 --> 0:26:56.600
<v Speaker 1>to convince the other side. I guess, um, if we

0:26:56.640 --> 0:26:59.000
<v Speaker 1>could show that a T and T or whatever carrier

0:26:59.119 --> 0:27:03.640
<v Speaker 1>did sup WoT the swift um sim unauthorized, and then

0:27:03.760 --> 0:27:07.320
<v Speaker 1>you could see these uh you know, the trail of

0:27:07.320 --> 0:27:09.760
<v Speaker 1>of of the Gmail or whatever, and then the accounts

0:27:09.760 --> 0:27:12.280
<v Speaker 1>emptied out and it all happened within an hour. I

0:27:12.320 --> 0:27:15.640
<v Speaker 1>guess that's kind of compelling. Yes, but it's also something

0:27:15.680 --> 0:27:19.160
<v Speaker 1>you can fake nowadays. I couldn't fake. I couldn't fake

0:27:19.200 --> 0:27:23.679
<v Speaker 1>a T and T having an unauthorized sim swab. Well, no,

0:27:23.920 --> 0:27:28.000
<v Speaker 1>you couldn't, but you can do. You can get give

0:27:28.040 --> 0:27:31.960
<v Speaker 1>me your personal information. I can call a T and

0:27:32.040 --> 0:27:37.159
<v Speaker 1>T and say I am I'm Mark Morris, here's my number,

0:27:37.720 --> 0:27:40.680
<v Speaker 1>and then you saw, I mean, and it's it's a legitimate.

0:27:40.760 --> 0:27:43.480
<v Speaker 1>It's a legitimate, and started the telephone companies I'm not

0:27:43.520 --> 0:27:45.439
<v Speaker 1>giving them a new defense that they've never heard of

0:27:46.119 --> 0:27:48.440
<v Speaker 1>talking to you about this. This is something they're well

0:27:48.480 --> 0:27:51.560
<v Speaker 1>aware of. And it's another reason why you know, it's

0:27:51.600 --> 0:27:54.320
<v Speaker 1>hard to prove these cases. There's a reason why David

0:27:54.359 --> 0:27:57.000
<v Speaker 1>Silver has most of them because you can only do

0:27:57.080 --> 0:28:00.000
<v Speaker 1>this in math. To do this one off without people

0:28:00.040 --> 0:28:06.160
<v Speaker 1>paying you is problematic. Yeah. So, um, then just real quick,

0:28:06.200 --> 0:28:08.120
<v Speaker 1>I mean, since you've been seeing this so much, then

0:28:08.200 --> 0:28:10.679
<v Speaker 1>kind of wrap up this talk. Um, what can the

0:28:10.760 --> 0:28:15.359
<v Speaker 1>average person do to protect themselves against this one? You

0:28:15.359 --> 0:28:18.639
<v Speaker 1>should be have enhanced security on your phone. You should

0:28:18.720 --> 0:28:21.520
<v Speaker 1>tell with the carriers. You should have enhanced pins. You

0:28:21.560 --> 0:28:23.720
<v Speaker 1>should know what it is. You should store those pins

0:28:23.960 --> 0:28:28.040
<v Speaker 1>now in you're you know, email accounts. UH. Two. You

0:28:28.040 --> 0:28:32.920
<v Speaker 1>should use second to two factor authentication with Google Authenticator

0:28:32.960 --> 0:28:37.040
<v Speaker 1>and authe again not storing the reset account information or

0:28:37.080 --> 0:28:40.960
<v Speaker 1>the information in your Gmail accounts. You should make sure

0:28:41.000 --> 0:28:45.040
<v Speaker 1>your Gmail and your email accounts are secured by something

0:28:45.080 --> 0:28:50.560
<v Speaker 1>other than SMS UH password protection. That's really the key thing.

0:28:50.880 --> 0:28:53.840
<v Speaker 1>You don't want to use SMS for any form of

0:28:53.880 --> 0:28:57.800
<v Speaker 1>your second factor authentication, and that's really the starting point.

0:28:58.440 --> 0:29:03.000
<v Speaker 1>The other things are you shouldn't not leave your crypto

0:29:04.240 --> 0:29:08.080
<v Speaker 1>on an exchange that is not protected. I'll use coin

0:29:08.200 --> 0:29:10.560
<v Speaker 1>base for instance. You can now use coin based vault,

0:29:10.880 --> 0:29:14.520
<v Speaker 1>which requires two email addresses and two days before money

0:29:14.560 --> 0:29:18.880
<v Speaker 1>moves right. You can use bit tracks. You can white

0:29:19.000 --> 0:29:22.000
<v Speaker 1>list and only allow certain I P s access to

0:29:22.000 --> 0:29:25.880
<v Speaker 1>your account. There are measures, and if you have more

0:29:25.960 --> 0:29:30.560
<v Speaker 1>than a hundred thousand, whatever the number in your mind,

0:29:30.600 --> 0:29:35.880
<v Speaker 1>that's too much to lose. Those are extra security precautions

0:29:35.920 --> 0:29:38.240
<v Speaker 1>you should be taken. And I'll say this, and I

0:29:38.280 --> 0:29:42.600
<v Speaker 1>say it all the time. What exchange you use matters, um,

0:29:42.680 --> 0:29:46.360
<v Speaker 1>so don't be don't be a fool, and you know,

0:29:46.720 --> 0:29:49.960
<v Speaker 1>use exchanges that aren't in the US and aren't the

0:29:50.000 --> 0:29:52.920
<v Speaker 1>more legitimate ones. I think it's also a good point

0:29:52.960 --> 0:29:56.320
<v Speaker 1>that exchanges are not bank accounts, and um, they're not

0:29:56.360 --> 0:29:58.520
<v Speaker 1>meant to be bank account They're not meant to secure

0:29:58.520 --> 0:30:00.120
<v Speaker 1>and instore your coins. And some of them a as

0:30:00.120 --> 0:30:02.440
<v Speaker 1>you mentioned like coin Base, does provide like a vault,

0:30:02.440 --> 0:30:05.360
<v Speaker 1>which is pretty cool, but most exchanges are not bank accounts,

0:30:05.360 --> 0:30:07.200
<v Speaker 1>are not meant to be that way. And you make

0:30:07.320 --> 0:30:09.720
<v Speaker 1>an absolutely valid point that I want to reiterate, which

0:30:09.760 --> 0:30:12.680
<v Speaker 1>is just the more money you have, the more serious

0:30:12.680 --> 0:30:15.440
<v Speaker 1>you need to take your security and I got I

0:30:15.520 --> 0:30:18.560
<v Speaker 1>got some swapped. I didn't lose I didn't lose money.

0:30:18.600 --> 0:30:21.720
<v Speaker 1>My personal data was compromised if I didn't lose any crypto.

0:30:22.280 --> 0:30:23.680
<v Speaker 1>And you know, at the end of the day, I

0:30:23.680 --> 0:30:26.600
<v Speaker 1>creep most of my crypto on exchanges because if something

0:30:26.640 --> 0:30:30.000
<v Speaker 1>goes wrong, I want to hold people accountable, and there

0:30:30.000 --> 0:30:33.840
<v Speaker 1>are certain security measures that I take. I use coin

0:30:33.880 --> 0:30:35.760
<v Speaker 1>based vault, and people say to me all the time,

0:30:35.760 --> 0:30:38.320
<v Speaker 1>but David, you're a suing coin base, you're you're you

0:30:38.400 --> 0:30:40.360
<v Speaker 1>say how bad they are? First of all, I would

0:30:40.400 --> 0:30:43.720
<v Speaker 1>sue Goldman Sacks every day and twice on Sunday if

0:30:43.720 --> 0:30:48.640
<v Speaker 1>I had legitimate cases against Goldman Sacks. What crypto exchanges

0:30:48.680 --> 0:30:51.360
<v Speaker 1>were in two thousand, fourteen fifteen are not what they

0:30:51.400 --> 0:30:56.200
<v Speaker 1>are today. I constantly praise Brian Armstrong and the winkle Bights,

0:30:56.600 --> 0:30:59.480
<v Speaker 1>you know, for what they're doing, working with regulators and

0:30:59.520 --> 0:31:03.600
<v Speaker 1>trying to transparent. And the more transparent and you know,

0:31:03.680 --> 0:31:07.520
<v Speaker 1>the better these exchanges come become, the more likely it

0:31:07.600 --> 0:31:10.760
<v Speaker 1>is the Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies go up and value

0:31:10.760 --> 0:31:13.240
<v Speaker 1>and mainstream people will be able to use that because

0:31:13.280 --> 0:31:16.240
<v Speaker 1>they feel secure about it. Yeah, that's a great point.

0:31:16.920 --> 0:31:21.920
<v Speaker 1>So um as a as as as a builder in

0:31:21.960 --> 0:31:24.320
<v Speaker 1>the space. So let's say that I'm running an exchange,

0:31:24.440 --> 0:31:26.600
<v Speaker 1>or I have an app or some dapt that manages

0:31:26.640 --> 0:31:30.640
<v Speaker 1>things like, um, what should I be if I'm a builder?

0:31:30.720 --> 0:31:33.640
<v Speaker 1>What should we be aware of to keep ourselves out

0:31:33.680 --> 0:31:37.160
<v Speaker 1>of trouble? I mean, I guess just making sure we

0:31:37.240 --> 0:31:39.000
<v Speaker 1>were not negligent. I mean we do our best. I

0:31:39.040 --> 0:31:40.400
<v Speaker 1>mean it seems like it's just kind of like a

0:31:40.440 --> 0:31:43.720
<v Speaker 1>pretty dangerous space to be in. So there are people

0:31:43.760 --> 0:31:48.400
<v Speaker 1>who have written interesting articles on you know, medium about

0:31:48.600 --> 0:31:51.000
<v Speaker 1>people like themselves who are in this space who have

0:31:51.040 --> 0:31:55.320
<v Speaker 1>been hacked and what they did wrong, and most of

0:31:55.360 --> 0:31:58.320
<v Speaker 1>it boiled down to, uh, it was it do as

0:31:58.360 --> 0:32:01.560
<v Speaker 1>I say, not as I do. The amount of laziness

0:32:01.560 --> 0:32:05.960
<v Speaker 1>and protecting their crypto assets was staggering. Whether it was

0:32:06.080 --> 0:32:09.440
<v Speaker 1>Turpin who's I mean, Michael had more you know I

0:32:09.600 --> 0:32:14.680
<v Speaker 1>c O S tokens than probably anyone in the space. Um,

0:32:14.720 --> 0:32:16.800
<v Speaker 1>you know, there are other people who have posted and

0:32:16.800 --> 0:32:20.719
<v Speaker 1>talked about how yep they had Gmail accounts with you know,

0:32:21.360 --> 0:32:25.800
<v Speaker 1>just SMS two factor authentication. I think people are learning.

0:32:25.880 --> 0:32:28.120
<v Speaker 1>I think that people are starting to talk about this more.

0:32:28.680 --> 0:32:30.840
<v Speaker 1>But it's you know, as much as you want to

0:32:30.840 --> 0:32:34.720
<v Speaker 1>blame others. Especially in crypto where everything is somewhat masked

0:32:35.360 --> 0:32:39.800
<v Speaker 1>and somewhat instantaneous, you are responsible for yourself, no one else.

0:32:40.200 --> 0:32:43.800
<v Speaker 1>You know, it's your keys, your coins, it's your coins,

0:32:43.840 --> 0:32:46.479
<v Speaker 1>your money. No one else is out there looking for you.

0:32:46.520 --> 0:32:51.000
<v Speaker 1>They want to take it. Yeah. Yeah, And and one

0:32:51.040 --> 0:32:53.840
<v Speaker 1>of the things that we love about bitcoin and cryptocurrencies

0:32:53.880 --> 0:32:56.560
<v Speaker 1>is finality. Right, So when the transaction happens, it's final.

0:32:56.640 --> 0:33:00.400
<v Speaker 1>But that works in two ways. It's bad. So UM,

0:33:00.440 --> 0:33:03.480
<v Speaker 1>as a as a user of the ecosystem, as a

0:33:03.600 --> 0:33:07.360
<v Speaker 1>user of coins, exchanges and things like that, Um, what

0:33:07.560 --> 0:33:11.240
<v Speaker 1>kinds of things should I, um be aware of that

0:33:11.360 --> 0:33:13.800
<v Speaker 1>might happen to me that that possibly I could have

0:33:13.840 --> 0:33:16.280
<v Speaker 1>a claim on, right? I mean, so, um, I was

0:33:16.320 --> 0:33:19.160
<v Speaker 1>on an exchange and you mentioned like, uh, all of

0:33:19.160 --> 0:33:22.240
<v Speaker 1>a sudden, I can't trade on it or obviously hacks

0:33:22.280 --> 0:33:24.480
<v Speaker 1>are easy, right, But like, what are some other things

0:33:24.480 --> 0:33:26.760
<v Speaker 1>that we might be seen or people might be aware of,

0:33:27.080 --> 0:33:29.400
<v Speaker 1>have have happened to them that maybe they should think

0:33:29.400 --> 0:33:32.440
<v Speaker 1>about having a claim on. So this and this is

0:33:32.440 --> 0:33:35.200
<v Speaker 1>a nice segue to brokeby coin base that we were

0:33:35.200 --> 0:33:39.200
<v Speaker 1>going to talk about, because brokeby coin Base is my news.

0:33:40.000 --> 0:33:43.000
<v Speaker 1>It's my new favorite case of my new favorite case

0:33:43.040 --> 0:33:48.440
<v Speaker 1>of the week. Um. Effectively, everyone should be talking about

0:33:48.520 --> 0:33:52.760
<v Speaker 1>everyone in crypto should be talking about brokeby coin Base

0:33:53.120 --> 0:33:55.600
<v Speaker 1>because at the end of the day, this just changed

0:33:55.640 --> 0:33:59.600
<v Speaker 1>the law. I mean it is cases caseflow has built

0:33:59.640 --> 0:34:02.560
<v Speaker 1>one case to the time, and a court in California

0:34:02.680 --> 0:34:05.240
<v Speaker 1>came out and just they said something crazy. They said

0:34:05.720 --> 0:34:08.799
<v Speaker 1>that at the end of the day, crypto exchanges are

0:34:08.840 --> 0:34:17.359
<v Speaker 1>responsible for maintaining functional marketplaces and dysfunctional. A dysfunctional marketplace

0:34:18.000 --> 0:34:21.439
<v Speaker 1>is a liability for the exchange. What does that mean?

0:34:22.920 --> 0:34:29.000
<v Speaker 1>So let's use a hypothetical situation. There's an exchange that

0:34:29.120 --> 0:34:32.399
<v Speaker 1>has a flash crash and the price of bitcoins right

0:34:32.400 --> 0:34:34.279
<v Speaker 1>now dropped from I know it's trading out right now

0:34:34.280 --> 0:34:37.479
<v Speaker 1>twelve thousand bucks a couple within a couple hundred bucks

0:34:37.480 --> 0:34:40.399
<v Speaker 1>of that. If the price of bitcoin on coin base

0:34:40.440 --> 0:34:47.880
<v Speaker 1>went from twelve hundred to three and coin Base allowed

0:34:47.920 --> 0:34:50.640
<v Speaker 1>training to go on but locked everyone out of their

0:34:50.640 --> 0:34:55.719
<v Speaker 1>accounts except for insiders, I be insane that you know,

0:34:55.800 --> 0:34:57.960
<v Speaker 1>they would say there's something wrong, but we're gonna allow

0:34:58.000 --> 0:35:00.360
<v Speaker 1>people you know who have back to who are trading

0:35:00.400 --> 0:35:04.440
<v Speaker 1>on who had professional institutional accounts to come in and

0:35:04.480 --> 0:35:07.200
<v Speaker 1>buy everyone's, you know, sell orders that we're going to

0:35:07.400 --> 0:35:11.440
<v Speaker 1>cascading effects. That would be a dysfunctional marketplace because the

0:35:11.480 --> 0:35:14.520
<v Speaker 1>coin base would know something's wrong, they would allow that

0:35:14.840 --> 0:35:18.440
<v Speaker 1>something wrong to continue, and they wouldn't stop the market.

0:35:19.400 --> 0:35:23.080
<v Speaker 1>And what Burke said was they didn't make a judgment

0:35:23.120 --> 0:35:27.640
<v Speaker 1>call about whether the bc H being sold at the time,

0:35:28.160 --> 0:35:32.160
<v Speaker 1>whether that is the definition of a dysfunctional marketplace, because

0:35:32.160 --> 0:35:35.120
<v Speaker 1>in that lawsuit, the accusation is that during the first

0:35:35.160 --> 0:35:39.000
<v Speaker 1>couple of minutes of trading price fight, some people couldn't

0:35:39.040 --> 0:35:42.520
<v Speaker 1>get in, some market orders replaced some warrant. The court

0:35:42.560 --> 0:35:45.759
<v Speaker 1>didn't say that is by definition of dysfunctional marketplace. The

0:35:45.840 --> 0:35:50.319
<v Speaker 1>court's tympically said, as it reads the law and as

0:35:50.440 --> 0:35:52.560
<v Speaker 1>it believes, and it actually says it in the opinion,

0:35:53.000 --> 0:35:56.400
<v Speaker 1>this is what we believe the California Supreme Court would decide.

0:35:56.920 --> 0:35:59.959
<v Speaker 1>We are sitting because it's a federal court case. There's

0:36:00.000 --> 0:36:03.680
<v Speaker 1>a federal court judge interpreting what California law would say,

0:36:03.840 --> 0:36:06.440
<v Speaker 1>and it said that we believe the California Supreme Court

0:36:06.440 --> 0:36:12.840
<v Speaker 1>wouldn't believe the cryptocurrency exchanges are responsible for maintaining functional marketplaces.

0:36:12.880 --> 0:36:15.960
<v Speaker 1>By the way, that's what they sell. That's what they're

0:36:16.000 --> 0:36:21.440
<v Speaker 1>advertising is look at Krakens advertising, coin bases advertising. Gemini

0:36:21.560 --> 0:36:25.160
<v Speaker 1>is advertising. They are selling to you use our exchange.

0:36:25.200 --> 0:36:28.840
<v Speaker 1>We are safe, we are secure, and we serve a

0:36:29.160 --> 0:36:36.040
<v Speaker 1>functional marketplace. So that the word dysfunctional sounds a little confusing.

0:36:36.080 --> 0:36:37.360
<v Speaker 1>I mean when you put it in those terms in

0:36:37.440 --> 0:36:41.400
<v Speaker 1>your example, it sounds more insider kind of fraudulent activity,

0:36:41.400 --> 0:36:43.480
<v Speaker 1>like hey, everyone's locked out, but are few people are

0:36:43.520 --> 0:36:47.239
<v Speaker 1>able to take advantage of this market? Um. Dysfunctional to

0:36:47.280 --> 0:36:51.120
<v Speaker 1>me sounds more like, um, something eltside of our control happens.

0:36:51.120 --> 0:36:54.000
<v Speaker 1>So let's say, for example, bitcoin shoots from twelve thousand

0:36:54.000 --> 0:36:57.480
<v Speaker 1>to twenty thousand, everybody jumps in to buy it, and

0:36:57.640 --> 0:37:00.160
<v Speaker 1>it's just too much volume and and exchange hand and

0:37:00.200 --> 0:37:03.600
<v Speaker 1>the and the site crashes and that's like a legitimate problem.

0:37:03.640 --> 0:37:06.680
<v Speaker 1>Would that be considered dysfunctional or it's kind of like, hey,

0:37:06.800 --> 0:37:08.879
<v Speaker 1>we're locking you out, but we're allowing you in, which

0:37:08.880 --> 0:37:12.120
<v Speaker 1>is kind of more insider. So I think that's gonna

0:37:12.120 --> 0:37:14.560
<v Speaker 1>be what the courts. And that's why I say case law.

0:37:14.840 --> 0:37:19.319
<v Speaker 1>This didn't change the law. The laws builds one case

0:37:19.360 --> 0:37:23.080
<v Speaker 1>at the time, which your jurisprudence. But what it says is,

0:37:23.400 --> 0:37:26.480
<v Speaker 1>now we're gonna see what exactly you're asking. What is

0:37:26.520 --> 0:37:31.719
<v Speaker 1>the line of dysfunctionality? Is it dysfunctional? If I put

0:37:31.760 --> 0:37:34.840
<v Speaker 1>in in order and it takes point one second to

0:37:35.160 --> 0:37:38.680
<v Speaker 1>go through, but the person behind me went through point

0:37:38.719 --> 0:37:42.839
<v Speaker 1>in half of that time, the speed equal dysfunctionality, that's

0:37:42.880 --> 0:37:45.480
<v Speaker 1>gonna be a lining. It's kind of like, you know, uh,

0:37:45.920 --> 0:37:50.719
<v Speaker 1>using a real world example, um someone who It used

0:37:50.760 --> 0:37:55.920
<v Speaker 1>to be that you were allowed to drinks before you drive.

0:37:56.840 --> 0:37:59.600
<v Speaker 1>Now you're allowed one and a half drinks before you drive.

0:37:59.800 --> 0:38:03.360
<v Speaker 1>The lines constantly shifting and people are becoming more liable.

0:38:03.520 --> 0:38:07.760
<v Speaker 1>The McDonald's case where someone stilled hot coffee in their laps.

0:38:09.120 --> 0:38:12.399
<v Speaker 1>Before that happened, wasn't if someone gave you a cup

0:38:12.440 --> 0:38:16.080
<v Speaker 1>of coffee. It wasn't necessarily illegal for McDonald's to hand

0:38:16.120 --> 0:38:18.799
<v Speaker 1>you a cup of coffee. And now you can get suit.

0:38:18.880 --> 0:38:21.320
<v Speaker 1>Now McDonald's is still not illegal. It's still legal for

0:38:21.360 --> 0:38:23.360
<v Speaker 1>them giving you a cup of coffee. But now if

0:38:23.360 --> 0:38:27.279
<v Speaker 1>you're still it on yourself and it's degrees and you

0:38:27.320 --> 0:38:30.160
<v Speaker 1>burn yourself, they're liable. Someone had to go to court

0:38:30.200 --> 0:38:32.920
<v Speaker 1>and draw that line in that distinction. But if you

0:38:32.960 --> 0:38:34.640
<v Speaker 1>pour a cup of coffee on your lap, it's only

0:38:34.680 --> 0:38:38.680
<v Speaker 1>fifty degrees and you don't burn yourself. That's okay, people,

0:38:38.800 --> 0:38:41.560
<v Speaker 1>We're learning where the lines are gonna be drawn. UM.

0:38:41.760 --> 0:38:44.799
<v Speaker 1>I personally believe that if an exchange knows of a

0:38:44.840 --> 0:38:50.000
<v Speaker 1>problem and those there's this dysfunction in their marketplace, they

0:38:50.000 --> 0:38:52.719
<v Speaker 1>have an obligation to shut that down, not look at

0:38:52.760 --> 0:38:56.719
<v Speaker 1>users and say, no, this was dysfunctional, but we're gonna

0:38:56.760 --> 0:39:00.120
<v Speaker 1>allow it to go because we're crypto cryptocurrency exchange and

0:39:00.160 --> 0:39:03.760
<v Speaker 1>there are no rules. Uh, turns out there are rules

0:39:03.760 --> 0:39:05.839
<v Speaker 1>in crypto and I'm proud of this judge. I think

0:39:05.840 --> 0:39:08.840
<v Speaker 1>it did a great job. Yeah, it makes sense. It

0:39:08.880 --> 0:39:12.080
<v Speaker 1>makes sense. I you know, I would hate to see

0:39:12.120 --> 0:39:16.040
<v Speaker 1>them being held responsible for things that were outside their control,

0:39:16.440 --> 0:39:18.680
<v Speaker 1>but things that they could control and they allowed to

0:39:18.719 --> 0:39:20.680
<v Speaker 1>go on. I mean, somebody has to be responsible that

0:39:20.719 --> 0:39:23.840
<v Speaker 1>you have to run an honest business, right, So UM

0:39:23.880 --> 0:39:28.520
<v Speaker 1>I get it from that perspective. So then overall, as

0:39:28.520 --> 0:39:32.080
<v Speaker 1>a user in the ecosystem, UM, I guess at the

0:39:32.120 --> 0:39:35.800
<v Speaker 1>end of the day, if I have um suffered damages

0:39:35.920 --> 0:39:39.640
<v Speaker 1>that I believe are because of negligence or because of

0:39:39.760 --> 0:39:43.960
<v Speaker 1>purposeful wrongdoing. Then then I potentially might have some recourse right,

0:39:44.000 --> 0:39:47.000
<v Speaker 1>and then that's where someone will contact you. So yeah,

0:39:47.040 --> 0:39:49.640
<v Speaker 1>a lot of people reach out to me and about

0:39:49.680 --> 0:39:55.080
<v Speaker 1>their cryptocurrency experiences, and the recourses is unique to each case.

0:39:55.840 --> 0:39:59.280
<v Speaker 1>I very rarely do what I consider lost profit cases.

0:39:59.600 --> 0:40:01.520
<v Speaker 1>That doesn't mean that no one's ever gonna win a

0:40:01.520 --> 0:40:04.600
<v Speaker 1>loss profit case, but it's very hard. Most people who

0:40:04.640 --> 0:40:08.440
<v Speaker 1>call me up saying I bought bitcoin and nine thousand,

0:40:08.560 --> 0:40:11.600
<v Speaker 1>I was gonna sell it at thirteen thousand. Coin Base

0:40:11.800 --> 0:40:14.799
<v Speaker 1>was swamped a couple of weeks ago, and they went

0:40:14.840 --> 0:40:17.760
<v Speaker 1>down for a little bit when it hit like thirteen

0:40:18.080 --> 0:40:20.480
<v Speaker 1>when it went from like seven thousand to thirteen thousand

0:40:20.719 --> 0:40:22.520
<v Speaker 1>in a couple of days, and they were like, well,

0:40:22.600 --> 0:40:25.680
<v Speaker 1>I was gonna sell that exact peak, and I wanted

0:40:25.680 --> 0:40:28.640
<v Speaker 1>that exact price I wasn't able to And now it's

0:40:28.640 --> 0:40:31.680
<v Speaker 1>back to nine thousand, and you know, there are a

0:40:31.719 --> 0:40:33.400
<v Speaker 1>lot of people who feel that should be a case.

0:40:33.600 --> 0:40:36.960
<v Speaker 1>Look this what brokeby coin Base said, Maybe that is

0:40:37.000 --> 0:40:39.520
<v Speaker 1>a good case. I'm not saying that that's not a winner.

0:40:39.960 --> 0:40:42.640
<v Speaker 1>But most of the cases I handled, we do our

0:40:42.719 --> 0:40:46.560
<v Speaker 1>analysis on a cost basis out of pocket. How much

0:40:46.560 --> 0:40:49.000
<v Speaker 1>money did you put in? How much money do you

0:40:49.040 --> 0:40:52.000
<v Speaker 1>presently have? And we do our analysis based on that,

0:40:52.440 --> 0:40:55.319
<v Speaker 1>because at the end of the day, this isn't new technology,

0:40:55.480 --> 0:40:58.319
<v Speaker 1>this is a new asset class. You know, it's some

0:40:58.600 --> 0:41:03.560
<v Speaker 1>there is some true truth that there is some limited predictability.

0:41:04.320 --> 0:41:07.520
<v Speaker 1>So um, you you you you, you take care of losses,

0:41:07.560 --> 0:41:10.040
<v Speaker 1>but not lost opportunities, I guess would be a good

0:41:10.040 --> 0:41:12.719
<v Speaker 1>way to something. Ask for lost opportunities. And somebody's in

0:41:12.719 --> 0:41:15.919
<v Speaker 1>some of the lawsuits, but most of the complaints I've

0:41:15.920 --> 0:41:20.800
<v Speaker 1>heard on exchange related matters or lost profit cases, someone

0:41:20.840 --> 0:41:23.040
<v Speaker 1>magically knew when the peak was gonna be and they

0:41:23.080 --> 0:41:25.759
<v Speaker 1>were gonna sell it the peak. Sure, alright, I know,

0:41:25.800 --> 0:41:27.680
<v Speaker 1>we gotta start wrapping this up here. I'd like to

0:41:27.719 --> 0:41:30.520
<v Speaker 1>just kind of ask you, though, where you sit, um

0:41:30.760 --> 0:41:35.080
<v Speaker 1>in this whole ecosystem. So um, I wonder if maybe

0:41:35.120 --> 0:41:38.000
<v Speaker 1>being an attorney gets you a little bit jaded where

0:41:38.000 --> 0:41:39.960
<v Speaker 1>you start to see all the bad. I'm curious what

0:41:40.000 --> 0:41:43.319
<v Speaker 1>you think about bitcoin overall and cryptocurrencies. I mean, are

0:41:43.360 --> 0:41:45.279
<v Speaker 1>you are you a believer in bitcoin? Do you see

0:41:45.320 --> 0:41:48.120
<v Speaker 1>the future um with that? Or are you still more

0:41:48.120 --> 0:41:52.680
<v Speaker 1>of a skeptic and you see all the problems. Yeah, uh,

0:41:52.880 --> 0:41:56.359
<v Speaker 1>I could I see this cryptocurrency to point out, I'm

0:41:56.400 --> 0:41:59.760
<v Speaker 1>a believer in the technology. I'm a believer in cryptology.

0:42:00.520 --> 0:42:03.360
<v Speaker 1>I'm a believer that this is moving in the right direction.

0:42:03.960 --> 0:42:06.120
<v Speaker 1>But we're still at the same point of the Internet

0:42:06.280 --> 0:42:08.759
<v Speaker 1>right now where everyone was just looking at porn and

0:42:08.800 --> 0:42:13.359
<v Speaker 1>buying drugs. You know, we're building the more the more

0:42:13.640 --> 0:42:18.120
<v Speaker 1>usable aspects, and when use cases are actually use cases

0:42:19.080 --> 0:42:23.440
<v Speaker 1>is when crypto two point it will happen. I you,

0:42:23.600 --> 0:42:25.840
<v Speaker 1>as far as I'm concerned, you can spin a becuse

0:42:25.960 --> 0:42:30.320
<v Speaker 1>all twelve or two thousand cryptocurrencies on the wheel, spin

0:42:30.360 --> 0:42:32.239
<v Speaker 1>the wheel, and that's gonna be the one that's successful

0:42:32.280 --> 0:42:34.600
<v Speaker 1>in the end. So you think bitcoin has as much

0:42:34.600 --> 0:42:37.120
<v Speaker 1>of a chance as anyone else, Well, I think the

0:42:37.239 --> 0:42:39.120
<v Speaker 1>leader in the house and the bigger the mode. You know,

0:42:39.120 --> 0:42:42.520
<v Speaker 1>I'm a Wren Buffet fan. So the bigger the mode,

0:42:42.520 --> 0:42:45.560
<v Speaker 1>the more likely you are to succeed. You know, I

0:42:45.840 --> 0:42:47.920
<v Speaker 1>don't know. In the effect, the longer you've been around,

0:42:47.920 --> 0:42:50.400
<v Speaker 1>the more likely you are to be around. Yeah, everyone's

0:42:50.440 --> 0:42:53.920
<v Speaker 1>testing bitcoin more. There's more testing, there's more you know,

0:42:54.560 --> 0:42:57.560
<v Speaker 1>people who are trying to show what bitcoin canny can't do.

0:42:57.920 --> 0:42:59.920
<v Speaker 1>So I'm a believer in the space and the function

0:43:00.000 --> 0:43:03.000
<v Speaker 1>aldi I believe. I went to all the conferences in

0:43:03.120 --> 0:43:05.920
<v Speaker 1>sixteen and seventeen where everyone told me every I C

0:43:06.040 --> 0:43:08.520
<v Speaker 1>O was going to change the world. I'm still waiting

0:43:08.520 --> 0:43:13.000
<v Speaker 1>for the use cases. Until there's use case, there's really

0:43:13.000 --> 0:43:16.239
<v Speaker 1>no reason why it's trading at these numbers. You don't

0:43:16.239 --> 0:43:19.680
<v Speaker 1>think bitcoin has any use case at all today? I mean,

0:43:19.960 --> 0:43:22.480
<v Speaker 1>I mean I would argue, like, obviously if you're in

0:43:22.520 --> 0:43:26.440
<v Speaker 1>an oppressive regime, even even China. Today we see a

0:43:26.480 --> 0:43:28.759
<v Speaker 1>massive use case to bitcoin right where people need to

0:43:28.800 --> 0:43:31.520
<v Speaker 1>get money out, people need to protect it. You you,

0:43:31.520 --> 0:43:33.359
<v Speaker 1>you know, we look at like a list of activities,

0:43:33.760 --> 0:43:36.080
<v Speaker 1>but that's also argued that's a use case. I mean,

0:43:36.200 --> 0:43:39.040
<v Speaker 1>it's a listed but like it's proving its case that

0:43:39.120 --> 0:43:42.640
<v Speaker 1>it's being able to be used against opposition or whatever.

0:43:42.760 --> 0:43:45.640
<v Speaker 1>So there is use case. But I'll agree with you.

0:43:45.680 --> 0:43:47.239
<v Speaker 1>But I'll agree with you because I do believe the

0:43:47.320 --> 0:43:49.879
<v Speaker 1>use case to replace gold, you know, the Winklevy that's

0:43:49.880 --> 0:43:52.480
<v Speaker 1>their big argument. You know, it's goal to point out.

0:43:53.000 --> 0:43:55.480
<v Speaker 1>So I don't disagree with what you're saying, but that

0:43:55.520 --> 0:43:57.280
<v Speaker 1>doesn't give it the value it twelve that I believe

0:43:57.280 --> 0:44:00.680
<v Speaker 1>it's heavily it's a heavily manipulated market. So we're talking

0:44:00.719 --> 0:44:04.200
<v Speaker 1>about use case first value. Now, I would agree with

0:44:04.200 --> 0:44:06.560
<v Speaker 1>you that that's a use case in theory. If it

0:44:06.560 --> 0:44:11.080
<v Speaker 1>works properly, censorship resistant, it's easily transportable, you know, it's

0:44:11.080 --> 0:44:13.520
<v Speaker 1>got a lot of good value. But the problem is,

0:44:13.600 --> 0:44:17.040
<v Speaker 1>I believe it's a heavily manipulated market on valuation, So

0:44:17.080 --> 0:44:21.560
<v Speaker 1>I'm comparing valuation to use Yeah, I wasn't talking valuations.

0:44:21.600 --> 0:44:23.120
<v Speaker 1>We could argue till the day, you know, to the

0:44:23.160 --> 0:44:24.920
<v Speaker 1>day is over. I was just talking about just just

0:44:25.040 --> 0:44:27.359
<v Speaker 1>use cases. And where you saw it was, like I said,

0:44:27.400 --> 0:44:29.479
<v Speaker 1>just curious because I would imagine seeing all the bad

0:44:29.600 --> 0:44:31.600
<v Speaker 1>maybe contain to you and maybe you start to like

0:44:31.719 --> 0:44:34.120
<v Speaker 1>lose sight of like how big this is or something. No,

0:44:34.280 --> 0:44:36.080
<v Speaker 1>I think that I think that it's going to be.

0:44:36.280 --> 0:44:40.000
<v Speaker 1>It's a disruptor. I do believe that you know, there's

0:44:40.080 --> 0:44:43.120
<v Speaker 1>value in it. We're you know, and when I give

0:44:43.200 --> 0:44:45.400
<v Speaker 1>my speeches to people who have never seen bitcoin and

0:44:45.480 --> 0:44:48.600
<v Speaker 1>know what bitcoin is or cryptocurrency, I say, look, take

0:44:48.640 --> 0:44:51.120
<v Speaker 1>out a dollar bill, look at the serial number. This

0:44:51.200 --> 0:44:53.920
<v Speaker 1>is an enhancement version of being able to prove that

0:44:53.960 --> 0:44:56.120
<v Speaker 1>the money you have is real. That's a use case.

0:44:56.440 --> 0:44:59.080
<v Speaker 1>I believe in that. So if that's the question, then yeah,

0:44:59.080 --> 0:45:02.480
<v Speaker 1>it's absolutely And also I think also I'm curious on

0:45:02.520 --> 0:45:06.960
<v Speaker 1>the just a differentiation because bitcoin was launched anonymously, decentralized

0:45:07.520 --> 0:45:10.640
<v Speaker 1>UM obviously was not a scam, uh the coin itself.

0:45:10.640 --> 0:45:12.520
<v Speaker 1>Now we talk about the exchanges different but like now

0:45:12.600 --> 0:45:14.560
<v Speaker 1>you deal with all these I c o s, right,

0:45:14.960 --> 0:45:17.920
<v Speaker 1>and like a lot of them clearly are scams, and

0:45:17.960 --> 0:45:20.759
<v Speaker 1>so like it seems like there's a huge divide, right

0:45:20.840 --> 0:45:23.040
<v Speaker 1>Bitcoin over here and everything else kind of over here.

0:45:23.160 --> 0:45:27.680
<v Speaker 1>Maybe well, anyone who's positive in the space, they have

0:45:27.800 --> 0:45:31.120
<v Speaker 1>to make that differentiation. So I totally agree with you

0:45:31.160 --> 0:45:34.880
<v Speaker 1>on that. UM So from the point of it being

0:45:35.160 --> 0:45:40.200
<v Speaker 1>the aspect of yeah, the I c O over Bitcoin, Yes,

0:45:40.280 --> 0:45:43.080
<v Speaker 1>I completely agree with you. And I do think that

0:45:43.120 --> 0:45:46.839
<v Speaker 1>the more use cases out of crypto, when we can

0:45:46.880 --> 0:45:50.200
<v Speaker 1>show that there's no manipulation in the system is when

0:45:50.280 --> 0:45:54.800
<v Speaker 1>the next moon will happen. You know, there's got to

0:45:54.880 --> 0:45:58.719
<v Speaker 1>be they've got to remove. But for people like me,

0:45:58.760 --> 0:46:01.239
<v Speaker 1>in order to remove that, you have to remove some

0:46:01.360 --> 0:46:04.080
<v Speaker 1>of the things that the O G crowd loves. You

0:46:04.120 --> 0:46:06.799
<v Speaker 1>can have to remove some of the anonymous factors in it.

0:46:07.360 --> 0:46:08.920
<v Speaker 1>But I would love to see I would love to

0:46:08.960 --> 0:46:11.480
<v Speaker 1>see the manipulation of the gold and silver markets go away.

0:46:11.560 --> 0:46:14.919
<v Speaker 1>And that's been a few thousand years so and that's

0:46:14.960 --> 0:46:18.359
<v Speaker 1>my example when people ask me about you know, well, look,

0:46:18.400 --> 0:46:21.000
<v Speaker 1>you know, you got all this fraud in you know,

0:46:21.040 --> 0:46:24.400
<v Speaker 1>the marketplaces, yet the bank failures the Look look at

0:46:24.440 --> 0:46:26.759
<v Speaker 1>how much regulation is there and how much fraud is

0:46:26.760 --> 0:46:29.960
<v Speaker 1>still there. Almost the more regulations there, the worst it gets.

0:46:30.960 --> 0:46:33.359
<v Speaker 1>But at the end of the day, I feel more

0:46:33.440 --> 0:46:35.400
<v Speaker 1>comfortable playing my money in the bank than I do

0:46:35.440 --> 0:46:39.279
<v Speaker 1>on the cryptocurrency exchange. So I don't disagree with you

0:46:39.719 --> 0:46:42.000
<v Speaker 1>that there that there is a ton of fraud under

0:46:42.000 --> 0:46:47.120
<v Speaker 1>the regulation under regulated society, but in unregulated society, I

0:46:47.120 --> 0:46:49.799
<v Speaker 1>think the fraud is gonna be even worse. Yeah, and

0:46:49.840 --> 0:46:52.040
<v Speaker 1>we should always be up, we should always be optimizing

0:46:52.080 --> 0:46:55.800
<v Speaker 1>for the risk. So just take that into consideration. I

0:46:55.840 --> 0:46:59.200
<v Speaker 1>agree we're super early in this technology. It is not

0:46:59.640 --> 0:47:01.520
<v Speaker 1>I don't believe it's a store of value today. It's

0:47:01.560 --> 0:47:04.640
<v Speaker 1>definitely not a money today. Um, it's a collectible. It's

0:47:04.640 --> 0:47:11.839
<v Speaker 1>a speculative asset and uh manager risk accordingly, right, So yeah,

0:47:11.960 --> 0:47:14.879
<v Speaker 1>good stuff I'd like to talk more a little bit

0:47:14.880 --> 0:47:17.480
<v Speaker 1>about about some of that, the manipulation and whatnot, but

0:47:17.480 --> 0:47:20.240
<v Speaker 1>but we're out of time. You gotta respect your time, um,

0:47:20.280 --> 0:47:23.600
<v Speaker 1>but I appreciate you coming on. So for anybody who

0:47:23.640 --> 0:47:26.840
<v Speaker 1>thinks that they may have been taking advantage of or

0:47:26.880 --> 0:47:28.440
<v Speaker 1>something like that, what's the best way to reach out

0:47:28.440 --> 0:47:31.000
<v Speaker 1>to you or good with my website where they reach

0:47:31.040 --> 0:47:34.600
<v Speaker 1>out to you. So go to the website Silver Miller

0:47:34.719 --> 0:47:39.000
<v Speaker 1>Law dot com, follow me on Twitter DC silver is

0:47:39.040 --> 0:47:43.760
<v Speaker 1>my Twitter handle, UM, and just look me up. Whatever

0:47:43.800 --> 0:47:46.400
<v Speaker 1>you do, if someone takes advantage of you, find a

0:47:46.480 --> 0:47:51.120
<v Speaker 1>lawyer who has experience, because someone out there can help you. Yeah. Great,

0:47:51.239 --> 0:47:53.280
<v Speaker 1>all right, David, thanks so much for your time. Thanks

0:47:53.280 --> 0:47:56.280
<v Speaker 1>mat Hey. If you like this episode of the Market

0:47:56.280 --> 0:47:59.640
<v Speaker 1>Disruptors Podcast, please help us take this to the top

0:47:59.719 --> 0:48:02.320
<v Speaker 1>of the podcast charts. Just please do me a favor

0:48:02.360 --> 0:48:05.920
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0:48:06.000 --> 0:48:08.359
<v Speaker 1>leave a quick review goes a long way and helping

0:48:08.440 --> 0:48:11.439
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0:48:11.480 --> 0:48:13.840
<v Speaker 1>appreciate you listening and I'll see you next time on

0:48:13.880 --> 0:48:15.240
<v Speaker 1>the Market Disruptors Podcast.