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Speaker 1: So the big question is this, how do investors like

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Speaker 1: us get access to the ideas, information, and most importantly,

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Speaker 1: the right people that give us the tools and information

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Speaker 1: we need to make informed and educated decisions to have success.

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Speaker 1: That is the question, and this podcast will give us

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Speaker 1: the answers. This is Mark Moss, your host. Let's get

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Speaker 1: this started. Hello, and welcome to another episode of the

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Speaker 1: Market Disruptors podcast. Today I am sitting down with David Silver.

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Speaker 1: He's the securities fraud and investment loss attorney. He represents

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Speaker 1: clients who have lost money bendy fraud, at etcetera. He's

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Speaker 1: not a couple of really big cases that we get into.

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Speaker 1: One is this big sim swapping that has been a

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Speaker 1: big problem. People are getting their cryptocurrencies hacked into install

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Speaker 1: in because of this, and so we talk about sim swapping,

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Speaker 1: what the case is looking like. We get into how

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Speaker 1: you can protect yourself from sim swapping if it does

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Speaker 1: happen to you, what you should do, And we also

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Speaker 1: get into some other stuff with coin base and the

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Speaker 1: Burke Versus coin based case, talking about the Bitcoin cash

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Speaker 1: fork and what happened there, as well as a bunch

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Speaker 1: of other legal issues that you should be aware of

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Speaker 1: ramifications that you may have if you've had a loss,

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Speaker 1: and so much more good stuff. Let's go ahead and

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Speaker 1: just jump right into it with David. All Right, everyone,

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Speaker 1: welcome back to another episode of the Market Disruptors podcast. Today,

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Speaker 1: I am sitting down with David Silver and he's an

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Speaker 1: attorney working on the securities fraud, investment loss, et cetera.

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Speaker 1: And um it's h He's got a couple of exciting

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Speaker 1: things that he's working on we want to talk about.

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Speaker 1: So let's just go ahead and just jump right into it. Hey, David,

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Speaker 1: Hey Mark, how are you. Hey? I'm doing good. Thanks,

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Speaker 1: Thanks for taking the time to come on. Um, I

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Speaker 1: know we've worked together a little bit, kind of had

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Speaker 1: a relationship for a while, but uh, really just kind

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Speaker 1: of excited to talk to you and hear about some

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Speaker 1: of the bigger stuff that's going on in the market

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Speaker 1: today that people should be aware of. But for a

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Speaker 1: little bit of background, why don't you just kind of

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Speaker 1: tell everybody who you are, where you're from, and how

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Speaker 1: you got to crypto, what you're doing. Sure, my name

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Speaker 1: is David Silver, I'm a founding partner or at Silver Miller.

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Speaker 1: Um I got to crypto like most people accidentally. Um.

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Speaker 1: I was sitting in a bar in two thousand and

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Speaker 1: twelve in Utah and some guy was trying to impress.

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Speaker 1: We were on a board of directors for a philanthropical

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Speaker 1: organization and some guy was trying to impress the other

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Speaker 1: four guys at the table and started talking about bitcoin

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Speaker 1: and the US. The four of us kind of did

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Speaker 1: what everyone did, especially back then. We shook our heads.

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Speaker 1: We were like, this is nothing, I mean, come on,

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Speaker 1: and he took all of our cell phones and he

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Speaker 1: gave us And at the time I thought he gave

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Speaker 1: us all the equal amount of bitcoin, but he gave

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Speaker 1: me five bitcoin. He opened up a coin based account

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Speaker 1: of gave me five bitcoin in two thousand twelve, which

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Speaker 1: at the time was worth about two hundred bucks. So

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Speaker 1: I was like, yeah, cool, some guya gave me a

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Speaker 1: thousand bucks. He's going to jail. I'm never gonna touch

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Speaker 1: this stuff. I've never got anything to do with it.

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Speaker 1: And then I ended up doing a case for someone

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Speaker 1: about crypto against a company called Crypsy into that some

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Speaker 1: fifteen and then when the ship hit the fan in

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Speaker 1: two thousand seventeen, I logged back into that account, the

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Speaker 1: coin based account for the first time in about five years,

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Speaker 1: and those five bitcoin were worth about a hundred and

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Speaker 1: thirty thousand dollars. I was like, I was like, that's crazy.

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Speaker 1: And the guy never went to jail, which was a

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Speaker 1: good side. Um. It turns out that the other four

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Speaker 1: guys at the table, he only gave them one bitcoin

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Speaker 1: each and he was trying to impress me, and I

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Speaker 1: thank him. At work, I sent them some very nice

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Speaker 1: follows of wine when things were peaking. I still hold

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Speaker 1: those five bitcoins, so I while I'm not necessarily a

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Speaker 1: I have never I can honestly say I have never

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Speaker 1: bought a cryptocurrency. I have only received them. So I

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Speaker 1: still I guess if by accident, I'm a bitcoin maximalist

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Speaker 1: because I basically hold bitcoin through my lawsuits. I do

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Speaker 1: now hold others by almost what I would call accident

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Speaker 1: or you know, the malfians of others, because I do

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Speaker 1: take paim in. You know, I do take payment and

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Speaker 1: contingency fee. I represent lots of people. Some of my

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Speaker 1: big loss suits are I've got the only class action

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Speaker 1: against coin base. Uh that's called like delve coin Base.

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Speaker 1: I've got a big case against I've got a couple

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Speaker 1: of big cases against cracking. The biggest one relates to

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Speaker 1: a flash crash in May two thousand seventeen. Got it's

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Speaker 1: been a while now, May two thousand seventeen, when the

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Speaker 1: price of Eve went from nine to twenty six over

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Speaker 1: about two hours. That case is actually set to be

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Speaker 1: tried soon. I got some class actions. I was part

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Speaker 1: of originally the class action against Teza's I've got the

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Speaker 1: class action against Gigawatt to connect one Coin, Nano Monkey Capital,

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Speaker 1: and I guess we're gonna talk about today. I also

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Speaker 1: do a lot of SIM swapping cases. I got about

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Speaker 1: forty SIM swapping cases where people cell phones are hija

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Speaker 1: act in one one way or another and they lose

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Speaker 1: a lot of their crypto. Yeah. Wow, that's a that's

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Speaker 1: a lot of cases. You sound like a pretty busy guy. Yeah.

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Speaker 1: This is good for me, it's bad for other people.

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Speaker 1: Yeah right. Yeah. So I want to talk about the

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Speaker 1: SIM swapping because that's a hot topic and and it

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Speaker 1: really relates to a lot of people. We should all

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Speaker 1: be aware of it because it's a major security issue

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Speaker 1: for sure. Um, but just kind of overall, Um, it

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Speaker 1: seems like, I mean, with a lot of these cases

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Speaker 1: that you mentioned, you know, with the flash crash for example.

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Speaker 1: I mean really it's about um holding these businesses, whether

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Speaker 1: they're exchanges or whatever, accountable for what they're doing, right,

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Speaker 1: I mean that kind of sums it up so um.

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Speaker 1: In in the cracking flash cash for example, people were

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Speaker 1: uh subject to losses because they couldn't get in and

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Speaker 1: sell their coins or whatever. Um, and so holding them accountable. Right.

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Speaker 1: So basically, and you know mine, I'll share my screen

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Speaker 1: for a second. Um, So basically we're gonna walk through.

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Speaker 1: Just make sure I got the right one which who

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Speaker 1: which screen of my sharing? I see? Yeah, I see,

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Speaker 1: I see your SIM swap fraud. Um. So this is

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Speaker 1: a podcast f So for the podcast, I'll go ahead

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Speaker 1: and a link to this uh link to this image

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Speaker 1: for you guys. Yeah. So basically the image is showing,

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Speaker 1: you know, it's the walking through for whether sim swap

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Speaker 1: is and sim swapping effectively. Um. There's I have my telephone,

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Speaker 1: I have my cell phone service with a T and

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Speaker 1: T and all right, about one o'clock in the morning

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Speaker 1: on a Friday night, SIM swappers will call a T

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Speaker 1: and T and they will sim swap and they will

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Speaker 1: ask for a T and T to swap the SIM

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Speaker 1: card from my iPhone to another phone, and effectively what

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Speaker 1: ends up happening is my phone I lose the network

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Speaker 1: access to a T and T and the hacker gets

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Speaker 1: to take over the network access on their phone, So

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Speaker 1: all of my phone calls, my text messages, everything goes

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Speaker 1: to the hackers phone instead of mind is that like

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Speaker 1: porting your number over? It's so there are two types

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Speaker 1: of There are two types of hacks. The porting is

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Speaker 1: a little more complicated and hackers have stayed away from it.

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Speaker 1: About two three years ago, it was more popular for

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Speaker 1: the hackers to port your number, but porting takes a

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Speaker 1: day or two. The SIM swap is instantaneous, so they

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Speaker 1: actually moved to the SIM swapping over the SIM over

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Speaker 1: the porting. Uh. They're actually after the consensus in May

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Speaker 1: of two thousand nineteen, the last main consensus in New York.

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Speaker 1: Sim porting on Verizon became a problem again. And there

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Speaker 1: are a lot of UH, simports, but for the most

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Speaker 1: part right now, where we're seeing or sims swaps, not

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Speaker 1: some imports alright, So they're they're effectively the same, I mean,

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Speaker 1: the same outcome and the same risk to the user.

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Speaker 1: It's the same risk to the user, you actually lose

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Speaker 1: your cell phone number on the sim port, so that

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Speaker 1: usually they'll move it from like a T and T

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Speaker 1: to a smaller provider and it comes more complicated. Uh,

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Speaker 1: with a SIMS swap. The moment you realize you've been swapped,

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Speaker 1: you can walk into an a T and T store

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Speaker 1: and they can fix it instantaneously. Unfortunately, the hackers are

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Speaker 1: so good it takes them about an hour to clean

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Speaker 1: out all of your email and all of your crypto accounts. Literally,

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Speaker 1: we've seen it as quickly as six minutes. So let's

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Speaker 1: so let's walk through that. So, um, the hacker gets

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Speaker 1: into a T and T S database or convinces a

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Speaker 1: store employee to swap over the sim for example, and

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Speaker 1: now they have access to my phone, uh, text messages,

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Speaker 1: et cetera. And then what do they do with that?

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Speaker 1: So what ends up happening is when the hacker gets

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Speaker 1: access to your phone, a lot of your accounts and

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Speaker 1: we found especially your Gmail accounts and your iCloud accounts

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Speaker 1: are being are able to be reset on two factor

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Speaker 1: authentication through SMS confirmation. So what the hacker does is

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Speaker 1: he logs into your Gmail clicks I forgot my password.

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Speaker 1: Then Gmail will send him an SMS two factor authentication

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Speaker 1: back to the cell phone, which the hacker now controls.

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Speaker 1: They'll reset your Gmail account and then use your Gmail account.

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Speaker 1: He'll look for what emails you're getting. They'll look for,

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Speaker 1: you know, if you have a coin based account, you know,

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Speaker 1: he'll know you have a coin based will go the

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Speaker 1: coin base, will then try and reset your coin base.

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Speaker 1: The problem we've seen is a lot of people think

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Speaker 1: they're protected because they have two factor authentication with Google

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Speaker 1: authenticator or author and it turns out most people's accounts,

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Speaker 1: even the Google authenticator or the author are still tied

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Speaker 1: as back up too there to SMS authentication and can

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Speaker 1: be reset by having control of the cell phone. Hmm.

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Speaker 1: And the second thing is a lot of people on

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Speaker 1: their Gmail account keep their seed information so they can

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Speaker 1: reset accounts, or they keep there, or they keep their

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Speaker 1: backup for their authie or they're Authie or their Google

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Speaker 1: authenticator on their Gmail or eye cloud and i Cloud

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Speaker 1: for instance. You can't even un attached two factor authentication

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Speaker 1: with SMS right now, It's virtually impossible. Anyone who keeps

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Speaker 1: anything store on eye cloud is the easiest hack out there. Mhmm, yeah, interesting.

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Speaker 1: I know, I know with with Gmail, it does obviously

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Speaker 1: keeps your phone number as well. Um, what about you know,

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Speaker 1: what about people that have their two factor authentication on

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Speaker 1: a like a separate device, so it's not on their phone.

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Speaker 1: Are you saying that that may not adder because if

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Speaker 1: they get access to their phone number, they might not

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Speaker 1: even need to have access to the to f A.

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Speaker 1: So let's use something like treasure, you know where Treaser

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Speaker 1: is its own backup. There are a lot of people

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Speaker 1: who keep their seed information in their email, right and

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Speaker 1: some of the so in some of the lawsuits at

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Speaker 1: and T, T Mobile, Verizon, they're blaming the user for

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Speaker 1: not securing their crypto assets to the best of their ability.

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Speaker 1: And you know, it's it is a defense. So in theory,

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Speaker 1: you should be protected if you're you know, third party

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Speaker 1: secure wallet is truly secure. Unfortunately, what the hackers have

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Speaker 1: found is they are most people use a backup for

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Speaker 1: their security. That backup is usually stored in their email,

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Speaker 1: whether it be their Gmail or their eye cloud. And

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Speaker 1: they come in and they sit and they basically come

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Speaker 1: in and they get through the back door of the

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Speaker 1: security measure because most people are lazy and keep everything

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Speaker 1: in their email accout right. So yeah, always a bad

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Speaker 1: idea to keep your seed in your computer anywhere. I

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Speaker 1: think we saw Ian Billina said that he kept his

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Speaker 1: in his ever note account, which I use every note

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Speaker 1: like crazy. Um, I think if you put it in

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Speaker 1: Google Drive or uh job box, anywhere that's digital, you

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Speaker 1: have the risk of a hacker getting access to that. So,

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Speaker 1: um I keeping your backup seed on paper is something

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Speaker 1: that I've always done, but I am concerned. Um as

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Speaker 1: you say, like if they get access to the email

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Speaker 1: that you log into your exchange with and then they're

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Speaker 1: able to reset your exchange with just your cell phone

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Speaker 1: number and not needing the two f a. Um. So

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Speaker 1: here's where you know a lot of people have a

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Speaker 1: false sense of security. Where do they use coin based cracking, Gemini,

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Speaker 1: bit Trux coloniacs. They'll think that they're safe because they're

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Speaker 1: using Google two factor authentication or off the the log

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Speaker 1: into those as their second factor. So on coin based

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Speaker 1: or cry can you can use SMS two factory authentication.

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Speaker 1: If you're using SMS and your phones compromise, you're gonna

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Speaker 1: be compromised, right you use Google authenticator or off the

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Speaker 1: you can still be compromised if the hacker. The first

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Speaker 1: thing the hacker looks for is the Google Authenticator or

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Speaker 1: AF the emails in your Gmail account so they are

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Speaker 1: able to replicate out of your If they can, they

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Speaker 1: will change that and they will immediately then go after

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Speaker 1: your exchange accounts and they are and they have been

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Speaker 1: quite successful at it. Interesting, So that frames up the

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Speaker 1: let's that frames up the overall issue. Um, the big

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Speaker 1: one that's super popular right now. I know you said

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Speaker 1: you have thirty or so that you're working on. But

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Speaker 1: the one that's really taken kind of media headlines is

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Speaker 1: this Turpin versus A T and T um. Some of

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Speaker 1: that looks like, I mean, it came out. I think

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Speaker 1: maybe they brought it up where like actually a T

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Speaker 1: and T kind of has a history of being hacked

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Speaker 1: and people getting access to it. Is that kind of

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Speaker 1: what framed it up? And are they trying to show

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Speaker 1: like negligence on A T and T s part there?

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Speaker 1: So the problem with the A T and T and

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Speaker 1: Michael Turpin's case, and I you know, at the end

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Speaker 1: of the day talking about Michael's case, I am not

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Speaker 1: Michael's lawyer. I don't represent Michael. I have no inside

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Speaker 1: knowledge about Michael's case. I want to make that clear.

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Speaker 1: Um I did said, I did sit next to Michael

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Speaker 1: at consensus on the panel where we both talked about

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Speaker 1: sim swapping cases. But effectively, what makes Michael's case unique

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Speaker 1: is that Michael had his second fact, he had an

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Speaker 1: enhanced security pen for his A T and T account.

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Speaker 1: So most people when they log into when they go

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Speaker 1: there with an A T and T store, they get

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Speaker 1: a four to Japan. Michael had a six or eight

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Speaker 1: to Japan. I personally had a six or eight to Japan,

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Speaker 1: and I also was a victim of sim swapping. Uh

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Speaker 1: So A T and T is offering you an enhanced

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Speaker 1: mechanism to uh secure your account because they are aware

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Speaker 1: this is a problem. So ironically, what ends up happening

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Speaker 1: is that after we have these type of you know,

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Speaker 1: false sense of security measures, a T and T employee

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Speaker 1: simply bypassed your security when someone calls in and anyone

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Speaker 1: can bypass by, you know, whether it's telling your birthday

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Speaker 1: or giving some other personal information. Now we've learned through

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Speaker 1: Michael's lawsuit and other criminal indictments that A T and

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Speaker 1: T employees or contractors, along with Horizon and T Mobile,

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Speaker 1: we're selling the consumer protected information that was used to

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Speaker 1: access the accounts. So again, you know, there's there's federal

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Speaker 1: law play here, state law play here, and there's also

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Speaker 1: the terms of service of a T and T a

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Speaker 1: play here, because a T and T when you sign

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Speaker 1: up with them. And this is just about Michael's case,

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Speaker 1: but this is the same for any major carrier, not

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Speaker 1: just talking about Michael's case exclusively. You waive your rights

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Speaker 1: to a class action. How many people have been hurt

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Speaker 1: unlike Michael. So Michael lost about twenty four million dollars

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Speaker 1: and tokens at the peak of the market. Um, now

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Speaker 1: he's doing punitive damages of an extra two hundred million dollars. Really,

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Speaker 1: the only people who get punitive damages are on TV.

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Speaker 1: You've ever you very rarely see that in real life. Um.

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Speaker 1: But what's interesting here is of even like the thirty

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Speaker 1: and forty people I represent, those are the people who

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Speaker 1: have damages in excess of twenty fifty hundred thousand, a million,

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Speaker 1: two million dollars and damages. I speak to so many

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Speaker 1: people who have been hit and compromised, who lost half

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Speaker 1: a bitcoin, you know, a thousand dollars worth of ripple

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Speaker 1: because there's a class action waiver. None of those people

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Speaker 1: are able to get representation by you know, a contingency

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Speaker 1: fee lawyer. I mean I get yelled and screamed out

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Speaker 1: all the why won't you take my case? This is horrible.

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Speaker 1: I've got this, I've got that. So for every case

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Speaker 1: I do take, I have to turn down four or five.

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Speaker 1: But the hackers are doing in mass and then are

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Speaker 1: successful on a couple like Turpin, like you know some

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Speaker 1: of my clients. But for everyone, they're successful, and they

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Speaker 1: also probably fail on five to ten. You know, people

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Speaker 1: they're hacking, But what do they do. They walk around Consensus,

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Speaker 1: They walk around every cryptoconference. They take everyone's business cards.

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Speaker 1: Your business card has your email on it, your cell

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Speaker 1: phone number on it, your name on it. Even if

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Speaker 1: they're not working with insiders, they try. They can, some

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Speaker 1: of them socially engineered backwards. But they are looking for

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Speaker 1: you know, most people at Consensus are trying to sound

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Speaker 1: more important than they are, so they're gonna be like

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Speaker 1: I hold this token and I use coin base, I

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Speaker 1: do X, I have my money here. And for the hackers,

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Speaker 1: it's just you know, sometimes people are the Rome Wars enemies.

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Speaker 1: They are trying to show off, they're trying to do things,

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Speaker 1: and they're losing their own money. Yeah, wow, how how

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Speaker 1: how easy that could be once you get that that

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Speaker 1: key information, I can see that. Um, it's interesting you

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Speaker 1: talk about how a T and T gives you an

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Speaker 1: extra security measure, um, which which tricks you into or

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Speaker 1: kind of gives you this false sense of security. I guess, um,

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Speaker 1: when you have that that extra measures that you've put

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Speaker 1: in place, showing that you have been proactive to be

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Speaker 1: more secure, does that put more damage or claim unto them?

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Speaker 1: So unfortunately, the answer is called comparative negligence. And while

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Speaker 1: every while we're all trying to get a T and

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Speaker 1: T to be fully responsible, a T and T s

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Speaker 1: defense and I'm not saying I agree with it, but

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Speaker 1: their defenses. They're not an insurance company for you for

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Speaker 1: your assets. And then they are not a and they're

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Speaker 1: not a security company for you for your assets. So

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Speaker 1: they're not responsible. First, let's say the fact that you

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Speaker 1: turned around decided to put your coins on an exchange

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Speaker 1: that you know had extra security measures that you yourself

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Speaker 1: did not avail yourself to. Yeah, they're responsible. You're responsible

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Speaker 1: because there's a third party intervening act i e. That

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Speaker 1: hacker of the criminal, and you're responsible because you yourself

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Speaker 1: had your seat information for your treasure wallet in your

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Speaker 1: Gmail account, right. You know your Gmail account wasn't backed

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Speaker 1: up with two factor authentication. You could have stopped them

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Speaker 1: getting your access. But the simpswap itself is the first

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Speaker 1: step of many steps, and if you were taking better

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Speaker 1: protection in steps two, three, and four, you would have

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Speaker 1: lost any money. Yeah, I was curious. I'm with T Mobile. Um,

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Speaker 1: it seems like it's all around a T and T.

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Speaker 1: But you did mention there's stuff going on in T

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Speaker 1: Mobile when this had gotten hot, and maybe back in

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Speaker 1: they had contacted me and said, hey, we can lock

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Speaker 1: your account. Do you want to like enable this where, um,

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Speaker 1: you know no what he can change it unless you

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Speaker 1: come into the store. I said yes, But I think

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Speaker 1: I've heard of the case where even people had done

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Speaker 1: that but it still was getting swapped. Is that? Yes?

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Speaker 1: So the reason why people to talk about Turpin Turpins

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Speaker 1: and federal court in California, it's public. My forty cases

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Speaker 1: are all in arbitration and not public, So that's why

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Speaker 1: those are all getting talked about, right, now I would

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Speaker 1: say mostly I the large percentage of people I speak

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Speaker 1: to are A T and T. The next is T Mobile,

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Speaker 1: the next is Horizon, and last is Sprint. I guess

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Speaker 1: since they're gonna be emerging soon, Sprint and T Mobile

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Speaker 1: will be one. Yeah. Wow, Yeah, I could see how

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Speaker 1: they could say. I mean, hey, we can't be responsible

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Speaker 1: for your whole life. I mean, we can be responsible

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Speaker 1: for damages to your cell phone, but not twenty five

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Speaker 1: million dollars in in crypto. Um. I kind of get that.

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Speaker 1: But I mean, given their size and negligence, I guess something.

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Speaker 1: I mean, you wouldn't be taking these cases on if

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Speaker 1: you didn't think there was an outcome coming. Right, Well,

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Speaker 1: let's think it back, because you're using a word a

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Speaker 1: lot of people use when they call me up. They're like, well,

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Speaker 1: A T T is negligent and what they did, they're

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Speaker 1: responsible there. The problem is, when you sign your cell

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Speaker 1: phone contract, it's basically like signing a mortgage. It's probably

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Speaker 1: thirty pages long their terms and conditions. You actually specifically

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Speaker 1: agree that they're not responsible for any negligence on your account.

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Speaker 1: You also specifically agree that your damages are limited, so

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Speaker 1: you know it's When I tell people, you know, what

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00:21:33,000 --> 00:21:35,520
Speaker 1: the value of their cases are worth, they're like, well,

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Speaker 1: that's not fair, and I'm like, well, I understand that,

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Speaker 1: but I don't make the law. You know. You you know,

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Speaker 1: you know, be very like I get to look at

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Speaker 1: your Twitter account, you know, nowadays, and I'm like, look,

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Speaker 1: all the people that you want to vote for, you

387
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Speaker 1: want to have an office, those are the people who

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Speaker 1: are protecting the big companies, not you. You know, if

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Speaker 1: you want to vote with your pocket book, then you

390
00:21:55,480 --> 00:21:57,680
Speaker 1: know you should vote for people who want to give

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Speaker 1: you access to the courts. You know. You may not

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Speaker 1: like liberal Democrats for instance, like Elizabeth Warren and Bernie Sanders,

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Speaker 1: but they are the ones who would allow you to sue.

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Speaker 1: You know, if you vote for, you know, a Republican,

395
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Speaker 1: you know, Republicans tend to say you shouldn't have access

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Speaker 1: to courts. And I'm not meaning to make this political

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Speaker 1: either way. I'm just saying that, you know, you can't

398
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Speaker 1: have the both ways. You can't say that the terms

399
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Speaker 1: of conditions don't matter, the law doesn't matter. I got robbed.

400
00:22:27,320 --> 00:22:29,520
Speaker 1: I want my money back, you know. And it's especially

401
00:22:29,520 --> 00:22:32,480
Speaker 1: we're in the crypto community. We have so many libertarians

402
00:22:32,960 --> 00:22:35,959
Speaker 1: and anarchists. You know, it's one of my most favorite

403
00:22:36,040 --> 00:22:39,560
Speaker 1: quotes that I've had in my path. Everyone's an anarchist

404
00:22:39,640 --> 00:22:42,880
Speaker 1: until they lose their money. Then they want a lawyer. Yeah,

405
00:22:42,960 --> 00:22:45,880
Speaker 1: that's true, and and uh I agree with that statement.

406
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Speaker 1: I I tend to fall on that that side of

407
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Speaker 1: the of the line, I guess. But I'm I'm willing

408
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Speaker 1: to accept that responsibility. You know, I grew up. Um

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Speaker 1: I see, uh, you know all these personal injury cases

410
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Speaker 1: and uh, you know, I see it's like people access

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Speaker 1: to land and they want to be able to go

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Speaker 1: do these things, and but then they get hurt there

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Speaker 1: and then they want somebody responsible. So it's like, we

414
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Speaker 1: want the freedom, but we don't want to we don't

415
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Speaker 1: want the responsibility that comes with the freedom, right. I

416
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Speaker 1: guess that's kind of what you're saying. Well, it's think

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Speaker 1: of someone who you know, wants to jump out of

418
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Speaker 1: a plane and have a parachute on. You know, statistically

419
00:23:20,320 --> 00:23:22,639
Speaker 1: you're pretty safe if the parachute works and you know

420
00:23:22,680 --> 00:23:25,800
Speaker 1: how the skydive. But now you decide to take it

421
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Speaker 1: one step further. You want to jump off of a

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Speaker 1: bridge with a with a skydiving pack on your because

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Speaker 1: you think you're an outdoor adventure of you know, sportsman,

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Speaker 1: and all of a sudden, when you know something goes

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Speaker 1: wrong because you only you're supposed to have twenty tho

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Speaker 1: fet you only have five thousand feet. You want to

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Speaker 1: see the guy who told you about going on the

428
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Speaker 1: bridge here. If your money was at you know, Morgan

429
00:23:49,520 --> 00:23:53,520
Speaker 1: Stanley Wells, far Ago, Goldman Sacks and your cell phone

430
00:23:53,560 --> 00:23:55,959
Speaker 1: was swapped, the hacker would take three days to get

431
00:23:56,000 --> 00:23:57,840
Speaker 1: your money and you would get your money back. The

432
00:23:57,880 --> 00:24:01,080
Speaker 1: fact that it's crypto and it happens instant enviously is

433
00:24:01,119 --> 00:24:05,159
Speaker 1: the problem. For instance, I'll give another great example. A

434
00:24:05,160 --> 00:24:07,080
Speaker 1: lot of clients who lost their money in the US

435
00:24:07,119 --> 00:24:10,360
Speaker 1: on bit max. Use bit max and when you're in US,

436
00:24:11,760 --> 00:24:13,680
Speaker 1: so now they're like, well, I want my money back.

437
00:24:13,800 --> 00:24:17,000
Speaker 1: Someone stole my money. Well where is your money? Well,

438
00:24:17,000 --> 00:24:19,280
Speaker 1: I can't give you that information. May mean you can't

439
00:24:19,280 --> 00:24:22,399
Speaker 1: give me that information, Well, it's it's it was I

440
00:24:22,440 --> 00:24:24,840
Speaker 1: was using bit max, you know, and bit max and

441
00:24:24,840 --> 00:24:27,119
Speaker 1: the money was stolen. But what the email addressed were

442
00:24:27,119 --> 00:24:29,239
Speaker 1: you using? How are you logging in? Well? I had

443
00:24:29,280 --> 00:24:32,920
Speaker 1: a proton email account that you know, the hacker guy

444
00:24:32,960 --> 00:24:35,760
Speaker 1: that I can't get back. Now. Well, if you can't

445
00:24:35,840 --> 00:24:39,479
Speaker 1: prove your damages, you can't see And that's become an

446
00:24:39,520 --> 00:24:42,520
Speaker 1: interesting twist in this, you know, just it's kind of

447
00:24:42,560 --> 00:24:44,840
Speaker 1: like you know too, It's kind of like to mafios is.

448
00:24:45,280 --> 00:24:47,280
Speaker 1: The first guy steals the money, the second guy steals

449
00:24:47,280 --> 00:24:49,520
Speaker 1: the money from the first guy. The first guy wants

450
00:24:49,560 --> 00:24:51,000
Speaker 1: to go to the cops. The cops say, where did

451
00:24:51,000 --> 00:24:52,320
Speaker 1: you get the money? It goes, well, I stole it

452
00:24:52,320 --> 00:24:55,400
Speaker 1: from individual number one. You know. It's it's a real

453
00:24:55,520 --> 00:24:59,800
Speaker 1: problem because this doesn't happen even on these halts. It

454
00:25:00,040 --> 00:25:03,560
Speaker 1: they don't get your legacy bank accounts for that. And

455
00:25:03,640 --> 00:25:06,040
Speaker 1: you know, you got to conchoose your poisons. And that's

456
00:25:06,400 --> 00:25:10,160
Speaker 1: part of the telecoms defenses. If you were more secure,

457
00:25:10,560 --> 00:25:12,359
Speaker 1: if you put your money in the banks, none of

458
00:25:12,400 --> 00:25:16,840
Speaker 1: this would happen to you. Yeah, use crypto, live by crypto. Yeah,

459
00:25:16,960 --> 00:25:20,320
Speaker 1: that makes sense. I'm curious, Um, I'm curious. You're talking

460
00:25:20,359 --> 00:25:24,600
Speaker 1: about like proving this, so, like I would imagine there

461
00:25:24,600 --> 00:25:27,159
Speaker 1: has to be some proof that there was damages. I

462
00:25:27,200 --> 00:25:29,720
Speaker 1: saw in Turpin's case, for example, he had to show

463
00:25:29,760 --> 00:25:32,800
Speaker 1: that proved that the sim swap led to loss. So

464
00:25:33,600 --> 00:25:36,080
Speaker 1: I've been hacked. I had a I had a hot wallet,

465
00:25:36,160 --> 00:25:38,320
Speaker 1: an app on my phone, and one day I logged

466
00:25:38,359 --> 00:25:41,840
Speaker 1: in and all my money was gone. But how can

467
00:25:41,880 --> 00:25:43,880
Speaker 1: I prove that was hacked? All you see is a

468
00:25:43,880 --> 00:25:47,400
Speaker 1: is a debit out of the account. Again, I still

469
00:25:47,440 --> 00:25:49,840
Speaker 1: to this day don't know how that happened. I have

470
00:25:50,119 --> 00:25:53,919
Speaker 1: really good security and it was just gone. How do

471
00:25:54,000 --> 00:25:56,359
Speaker 1: I prove that was stolen and hacked? And I didn't

472
00:25:56,359 --> 00:25:59,720
Speaker 1: just transfer it somewhere. So that's another good reason why

473
00:25:59,800 --> 00:26:01,879
Speaker 1: p bull you know, aren't getting a hundred cents on

474
00:26:01,920 --> 00:26:05,720
Speaker 1: their dollar in these cases because that is virtually impossible

475
00:26:05,760 --> 00:26:09,680
Speaker 1: to prove given the nature. So what we've some sort

476
00:26:09,680 --> 00:26:11,720
Speaker 1: of things that we're doing. We do what we call

477
00:26:11,760 --> 00:26:14,520
Speaker 1: it an anatomy of the hack. We show how the

478
00:26:14,520 --> 00:26:19,240
Speaker 1: hacker gets in instantaneously goes hacks your accounts in you know,

479
00:26:19,320 --> 00:26:22,480
Speaker 1: the US exchanges use the information from the I P

480
00:26:22,600 --> 00:26:27,000
Speaker 1: addresses on the US exchanges, and there's just a mechanical way.

481
00:26:28,000 --> 00:26:31,280
Speaker 1: But you're making a valid point, and points to telecoms

482
00:26:31,280 --> 00:26:33,320
Speaker 1: are making. But how do we know that just wasn't you?

483
00:26:33,400 --> 00:26:35,280
Speaker 1: Then you're not thinking it. I had a guy who

484
00:26:35,280 --> 00:26:38,120
Speaker 1: claims he lost five million dollars, and when we kept

485
00:26:38,320 --> 00:26:41,200
Speaker 1: having him for proof, he couldn't even provide the simple

486
00:26:41,240 --> 00:26:43,679
Speaker 1: proof we asked for. I look him, I said, you know,

487
00:26:43,760 --> 00:26:46,399
Speaker 1: we can't. If you can't prove the damages and you

488
00:26:46,440 --> 00:26:49,760
Speaker 1: can't get me the lawyer you're a lawyer to believe

489
00:26:49,800 --> 00:26:52,719
Speaker 1: that your damages are legitimate, I will never be able

490
00:26:52,760 --> 00:26:56,600
Speaker 1: to convince the other side. I guess, um, if we

491
00:26:56,640 --> 00:26:59,000
Speaker 1: could show that a T and T or whatever carrier

492
00:26:59,119 --> 00:27:03,640
Speaker 1: did sup WoT the swift um sim unauthorized, and then

493
00:27:03,760 --> 00:27:07,320
Speaker 1: you could see these uh you know, the trail of

494
00:27:07,320 --> 00:27:09,760
Speaker 1: of of the Gmail or whatever, and then the accounts

495
00:27:09,760 --> 00:27:12,280
Speaker 1: emptied out and it all happened within an hour. I

496
00:27:12,320 --> 00:27:15,640
Speaker 1: guess that's kind of compelling. Yes, but it's also something

497
00:27:15,680 --> 00:27:19,160
Speaker 1: you can fake nowadays. I couldn't fake. I couldn't fake

498
00:27:19,200 --> 00:27:23,679
Speaker 1: a T and T having an unauthorized sim swab. Well, no,

499
00:27:23,920 --> 00:27:28,000
Speaker 1: you couldn't, but you can do. You can get give

500
00:27:28,040 --> 00:27:31,960
Speaker 1: me your personal information. I can call a T and

501
00:27:32,040 --> 00:27:37,159
Speaker 1: T and say I am I'm Mark Morris, here's my number,

502
00:27:37,720 --> 00:27:40,680
Speaker 1: and then you saw, I mean, and it's it's a legitimate.

503
00:27:40,760 --> 00:27:43,480
Speaker 1: It's a legitimate, and started the telephone companies I'm not

504
00:27:43,520 --> 00:27:45,439
Speaker 1: giving them a new defense that they've never heard of

505
00:27:46,119 --> 00:27:48,440
Speaker 1: talking to you about this. This is something they're well

506
00:27:48,480 --> 00:27:51,560
Speaker 1: aware of. And it's another reason why you know, it's

507
00:27:51,600 --> 00:27:54,320
Speaker 1: hard to prove these cases. There's a reason why David

508
00:27:54,359 --> 00:27:57,000
Speaker 1: Silver has most of them because you can only do

509
00:27:57,080 --> 00:28:00,000
Speaker 1: this in math. To do this one off without people

510
00:28:00,040 --> 00:28:06,160
Speaker 1: paying you is problematic. Yeah. So, um, then just real quick,

511
00:28:06,200 --> 00:28:08,120
Speaker 1: I mean, since you've been seeing this so much, then

512
00:28:08,200 --> 00:28:10,679
Speaker 1: kind of wrap up this talk. Um, what can the

513
00:28:10,760 --> 00:28:15,359
Speaker 1: average person do to protect themselves against this one? You

514
00:28:15,359 --> 00:28:18,639
Speaker 1: should be have enhanced security on your phone. You should

515
00:28:18,720 --> 00:28:21,520
Speaker 1: tell with the carriers. You should have enhanced pins. You

516
00:28:21,560 --> 00:28:23,720
Speaker 1: should know what it is. You should store those pins

517
00:28:23,960 --> 00:28:28,040
Speaker 1: now in you're you know, email accounts. UH. Two. You

518
00:28:28,040 --> 00:28:32,920
Speaker 1: should use second to two factor authentication with Google Authenticator

519
00:28:32,960 --> 00:28:37,040
Speaker 1: and authe again not storing the reset account information or

520
00:28:37,080 --> 00:28:40,960
Speaker 1: the information in your Gmail accounts. You should make sure

521
00:28:41,000 --> 00:28:45,040
Speaker 1: your Gmail and your email accounts are secured by something

522
00:28:45,080 --> 00:28:50,560
Speaker 1: other than SMS UH password protection. That's really the key thing.

523
00:28:50,880 --> 00:28:53,840
Speaker 1: You don't want to use SMS for any form of

524
00:28:53,880 --> 00:28:57,800
Speaker 1: your second factor authentication, and that's really the starting point.

525
00:28:58,440 --> 00:29:03,000
Speaker 1: The other things are you shouldn't not leave your crypto

526
00:29:04,240 --> 00:29:08,080
Speaker 1: on an exchange that is not protected. I'll use coin

527
00:29:08,200 --> 00:29:10,560
Speaker 1: base for instance. You can now use coin based vault,

528
00:29:10,880 --> 00:29:14,520
Speaker 1: which requires two email addresses and two days before money

529
00:29:14,560 --> 00:29:18,880
Speaker 1: moves right. You can use bit tracks. You can white

530
00:29:19,000 --> 00:29:22,000
Speaker 1: list and only allow certain I P s access to

531
00:29:22,000 --> 00:29:25,880
Speaker 1: your account. There are measures, and if you have more

532
00:29:25,960 --> 00:29:30,560
Speaker 1: than a hundred thousand, whatever the number in your mind,

533
00:29:30,600 --> 00:29:35,880
Speaker 1: that's too much to lose. Those are extra security precautions

534
00:29:35,920 --> 00:29:38,240
Speaker 1: you should be taken. And I'll say this, and I

535
00:29:38,280 --> 00:29:42,600
Speaker 1: say it all the time. What exchange you use matters, um,

536
00:29:42,680 --> 00:29:46,360
Speaker 1: so don't be don't be a fool, and you know,

537
00:29:46,720 --> 00:29:49,960
Speaker 1: use exchanges that aren't in the US and aren't the

538
00:29:50,000 --> 00:29:52,920
Speaker 1: more legitimate ones. I think it's also a good point

539
00:29:52,960 --> 00:29:56,320
Speaker 1: that exchanges are not bank accounts, and um, they're not

540
00:29:56,360 --> 00:29:58,520
Speaker 1: meant to be bank account They're not meant to secure

541
00:29:58,520 --> 00:30:00,120
Speaker 1: and instore your coins. And some of them a as

542
00:30:00,120 --> 00:30:02,440
Speaker 1: you mentioned like coin Base, does provide like a vault,

543
00:30:02,440 --> 00:30:05,360
Speaker 1: which is pretty cool, but most exchanges are not bank accounts,

544
00:30:05,360 --> 00:30:07,200
Speaker 1: are not meant to be that way. And you make

545
00:30:07,320 --> 00:30:09,720
Speaker 1: an absolutely valid point that I want to reiterate, which

546
00:30:09,760 --> 00:30:12,680
Speaker 1: is just the more money you have, the more serious

547
00:30:12,680 --> 00:30:15,440
Speaker 1: you need to take your security and I got I

548
00:30:15,520 --> 00:30:18,560
Speaker 1: got some swapped. I didn't lose I didn't lose money.

549
00:30:18,600 --> 00:30:21,720
Speaker 1: My personal data was compromised if I didn't lose any crypto.

550
00:30:22,280 --> 00:30:23,680
Speaker 1: And you know, at the end of the day, I

551
00:30:23,680 --> 00:30:26,600
Speaker 1: creep most of my crypto on exchanges because if something

552
00:30:26,640 --> 00:30:30,000
Speaker 1: goes wrong, I want to hold people accountable, and there

553
00:30:30,000 --> 00:30:33,840
Speaker 1: are certain security measures that I take. I use coin

554
00:30:33,880 --> 00:30:35,760
Speaker 1: based vault, and people say to me all the time,

555
00:30:35,760 --> 00:30:38,320
Speaker 1: but David, you're a suing coin base, you're you're you

556
00:30:38,400 --> 00:30:40,360
Speaker 1: say how bad they are? First of all, I would

557
00:30:40,400 --> 00:30:43,720
Speaker 1: sue Goldman Sacks every day and twice on Sunday if

558
00:30:43,720 --> 00:30:48,640
Speaker 1: I had legitimate cases against Goldman Sacks. What crypto exchanges

559
00:30:48,680 --> 00:30:51,360
Speaker 1: were in two thousand, fourteen fifteen are not what they

560
00:30:51,400 --> 00:30:56,200
Speaker 1: are today. I constantly praise Brian Armstrong and the winkle Bights,

561
00:30:56,600 --> 00:30:59,480
Speaker 1: you know, for what they're doing, working with regulators and

562
00:30:59,520 --> 00:31:03,600
Speaker 1: trying to transparent. And the more transparent and you know,

563
00:31:03,680 --> 00:31:07,520
Speaker 1: the better these exchanges come become, the more likely it

564
00:31:07,600 --> 00:31:10,760
Speaker 1: is the Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies go up and value

565
00:31:10,760 --> 00:31:13,240
Speaker 1: and mainstream people will be able to use that because

566
00:31:13,280 --> 00:31:16,240
Speaker 1: they feel secure about it. Yeah, that's a great point.

567
00:31:16,920 --> 00:31:21,920
Speaker 1: So um as a as as as a builder in

568
00:31:21,960 --> 00:31:24,320
Speaker 1: the space. So let's say that I'm running an exchange,

569
00:31:24,440 --> 00:31:26,600
Speaker 1: or I have an app or some dapt that manages

570
00:31:26,640 --> 00:31:30,640
Speaker 1: things like, um, what should I be if I'm a builder?

571
00:31:30,720 --> 00:31:33,640
Speaker 1: What should we be aware of to keep ourselves out

572
00:31:33,680 --> 00:31:37,160
Speaker 1: of trouble? I mean, I guess just making sure we

573
00:31:37,240 --> 00:31:39,000
Speaker 1: were not negligent. I mean we do our best. I

574
00:31:39,040 --> 00:31:40,400
Speaker 1: mean it seems like it's just kind of like a

575
00:31:40,440 --> 00:31:43,720
Speaker 1: pretty dangerous space to be in. So there are people

576
00:31:43,760 --> 00:31:48,400
Speaker 1: who have written interesting articles on you know, medium about

577
00:31:48,600 --> 00:31:51,000
Speaker 1: people like themselves who are in this space who have

578
00:31:51,040 --> 00:31:55,320
Speaker 1: been hacked and what they did wrong, and most of

579
00:31:55,360 --> 00:31:58,320
Speaker 1: it boiled down to, uh, it was it do as

580
00:31:58,360 --> 00:32:01,560
Speaker 1: I say, not as I do. The amount of laziness

581
00:32:01,560 --> 00:32:05,960
Speaker 1: and protecting their crypto assets was staggering. Whether it was

582
00:32:06,080 --> 00:32:09,440
Speaker 1: Turpin who's I mean, Michael had more you know I

583
00:32:09,600 --> 00:32:14,680
Speaker 1: c O S tokens than probably anyone in the space. Um,

584
00:32:14,720 --> 00:32:16,800
Speaker 1: you know, there are other people who have posted and

585
00:32:16,800 --> 00:32:20,719
Speaker 1: talked about how yep they had Gmail accounts with you know,

586
00:32:21,360 --> 00:32:25,800
Speaker 1: just SMS two factor authentication. I think people are learning.

587
00:32:25,880 --> 00:32:28,120
Speaker 1: I think that people are starting to talk about this more.

588
00:32:28,680 --> 00:32:30,840
Speaker 1: But it's you know, as much as you want to

589
00:32:30,840 --> 00:32:34,720
Speaker 1: blame others. Especially in crypto where everything is somewhat masked

590
00:32:35,360 --> 00:32:39,800
Speaker 1: and somewhat instantaneous, you are responsible for yourself, no one else.

591
00:32:40,200 --> 00:32:43,800
Speaker 1: You know, it's your keys, your coins, it's your coins,

592
00:32:43,840 --> 00:32:46,479
Speaker 1: your money. No one else is out there looking for you.

593
00:32:46,520 --> 00:32:51,000
Speaker 1: They want to take it. Yeah. Yeah, And and one

594
00:32:51,040 --> 00:32:53,840
Speaker 1: of the things that we love about bitcoin and cryptocurrencies

595
00:32:53,880 --> 00:32:56,560
Speaker 1: is finality. Right, So when the transaction happens, it's final.

596
00:32:56,640 --> 00:33:00,400
Speaker 1: But that works in two ways. It's bad. So UM,

597
00:33:00,440 --> 00:33:03,480
Speaker 1: as a as a user of the ecosystem, as a

598
00:33:03,600 --> 00:33:07,360
Speaker 1: user of coins, exchanges and things like that, Um, what

599
00:33:07,560 --> 00:33:11,240
Speaker 1: kinds of things should I, um be aware of that

600
00:33:11,360 --> 00:33:13,800
Speaker 1: might happen to me that that possibly I could have

601
00:33:13,840 --> 00:33:16,280
Speaker 1: a claim on, right? I mean, so, um, I was

602
00:33:16,320 --> 00:33:19,160
Speaker 1: on an exchange and you mentioned like, uh, all of

603
00:33:19,160 --> 00:33:22,240
Speaker 1: a sudden, I can't trade on it or obviously hacks

604
00:33:22,280 --> 00:33:24,480
Speaker 1: are easy, right, But like, what are some other things

605
00:33:24,480 --> 00:33:26,760
Speaker 1: that we might be seen or people might be aware of,

606
00:33:27,080 --> 00:33:29,400
Speaker 1: have have happened to them that maybe they should think

607
00:33:29,400 --> 00:33:32,440
Speaker 1: about having a claim on. So this and this is

608
00:33:32,440 --> 00:33:35,200
Speaker 1: a nice segue to brokeby coin base that we were

609
00:33:35,200 --> 00:33:39,200
Speaker 1: going to talk about, because brokeby coin Base is my news.

610
00:33:40,000 --> 00:33:43,000
Speaker 1: It's my new favorite case of my new favorite case

611
00:33:43,040 --> 00:33:48,440
Speaker 1: of the week. Um. Effectively, everyone should be talking about

612
00:33:48,520 --> 00:33:52,760
Speaker 1: everyone in crypto should be talking about brokeby coin Base

613
00:33:53,120 --> 00:33:55,600
Speaker 1: because at the end of the day, this just changed

614
00:33:55,640 --> 00:33:59,600
Speaker 1: the law. I mean it is cases caseflow has built

615
00:33:59,640 --> 00:34:02,560
Speaker 1: one case to the time, and a court in California

616
00:34:02,680 --> 00:34:05,240
Speaker 1: came out and just they said something crazy. They said

617
00:34:05,720 --> 00:34:08,799
Speaker 1: that at the end of the day, crypto exchanges are

618
00:34:08,840 --> 00:34:17,359
Speaker 1: responsible for maintaining functional marketplaces and dysfunctional. A dysfunctional marketplace

619
00:34:18,000 --> 00:34:21,439
Speaker 1: is a liability for the exchange. What does that mean?

620
00:34:22,920 --> 00:34:29,000
Speaker 1: So let's use a hypothetical situation. There's an exchange that

621
00:34:29,120 --> 00:34:32,399
Speaker 1: has a flash crash and the price of bitcoins right

622
00:34:32,400 --> 00:34:34,279
Speaker 1: now dropped from I know it's trading out right now

623
00:34:34,280 --> 00:34:37,479
Speaker 1: twelve thousand bucks a couple within a couple hundred bucks

624
00:34:37,480 --> 00:34:40,399
Speaker 1: of that. If the price of bitcoin on coin base

625
00:34:40,440 --> 00:34:47,880
Speaker 1: went from twelve hundred to three and coin Base allowed

626
00:34:47,920 --> 00:34:50,640
Speaker 1: training to go on but locked everyone out of their

627
00:34:50,640 --> 00:34:55,719
Speaker 1: accounts except for insiders, I be insane that you know,

628
00:34:55,800 --> 00:34:57,960
Speaker 1: they would say there's something wrong, but we're gonna allow

629
00:34:58,000 --> 00:35:00,360
Speaker 1: people you know who have back to who are trading

630
00:35:00,400 --> 00:35:04,440
Speaker 1: on who had professional institutional accounts to come in and

631
00:35:04,480 --> 00:35:07,200
Speaker 1: buy everyone's, you know, sell orders that we're going to

632
00:35:07,400 --> 00:35:11,440
Speaker 1: cascading effects. That would be a dysfunctional marketplace because the

633
00:35:11,480 --> 00:35:14,520
Speaker 1: coin base would know something's wrong, they would allow that

634
00:35:14,840 --> 00:35:18,440
Speaker 1: something wrong to continue, and they wouldn't stop the market.

635
00:35:19,400 --> 00:35:23,080
Speaker 1: And what Burke said was they didn't make a judgment

636
00:35:23,120 --> 00:35:27,640
Speaker 1: call about whether the bc H being sold at the time,

637
00:35:28,160 --> 00:35:32,160
Speaker 1: whether that is the definition of a dysfunctional marketplace, because

638
00:35:32,160 --> 00:35:35,120
Speaker 1: in that lawsuit, the accusation is that during the first

639
00:35:35,160 --> 00:35:39,000
Speaker 1: couple of minutes of trading price fight, some people couldn't

640
00:35:39,040 --> 00:35:42,520
Speaker 1: get in, some market orders replaced some warrant. The court

641
00:35:42,560 --> 00:35:45,759
Speaker 1: didn't say that is by definition of dysfunctional marketplace. The

642
00:35:45,840 --> 00:35:50,319
Speaker 1: court's tympically said, as it reads the law and as

643
00:35:50,440 --> 00:35:52,560
Speaker 1: it believes, and it actually says it in the opinion,

644
00:35:53,000 --> 00:35:56,400
Speaker 1: this is what we believe the California Supreme Court would decide.

645
00:35:56,920 --> 00:35:59,959
Speaker 1: We are sitting because it's a federal court case. There's

646
00:36:00,000 --> 00:36:03,680
Speaker 1: a federal court judge interpreting what California law would say,

647
00:36:03,840 --> 00:36:06,440
Speaker 1: and it said that we believe the California Supreme Court

648
00:36:06,440 --> 00:36:12,840
Speaker 1: wouldn't believe the cryptocurrency exchanges are responsible for maintaining functional marketplaces.

649
00:36:12,880 --> 00:36:15,960
Speaker 1: By the way, that's what they sell. That's what they're

650
00:36:16,000 --> 00:36:21,440
Speaker 1: advertising is look at Krakens advertising, coin bases advertising. Gemini

651
00:36:21,560 --> 00:36:25,160
Speaker 1: is advertising. They are selling to you use our exchange.

652
00:36:25,200 --> 00:36:28,840
Speaker 1: We are safe, we are secure, and we serve a

653
00:36:29,160 --> 00:36:36,040
Speaker 1: functional marketplace. So that the word dysfunctional sounds a little confusing.

654
00:36:36,080 --> 00:36:37,360
Speaker 1: I mean when you put it in those terms in

655
00:36:37,440 --> 00:36:41,400
Speaker 1: your example, it sounds more insider kind of fraudulent activity,

656
00:36:41,400 --> 00:36:43,480
Speaker 1: like hey, everyone's locked out, but are few people are

657
00:36:43,520 --> 00:36:47,239
Speaker 1: able to take advantage of this market? Um. Dysfunctional to

658
00:36:47,280 --> 00:36:51,120
Speaker 1: me sounds more like, um, something eltside of our control happens.

659
00:36:51,120 --> 00:36:54,000
Speaker 1: So let's say, for example, bitcoin shoots from twelve thousand

660
00:36:54,000 --> 00:36:57,480
Speaker 1: to twenty thousand, everybody jumps in to buy it, and

661
00:36:57,640 --> 00:37:00,160
Speaker 1: it's just too much volume and and exchange hand and

662
00:37:00,200 --> 00:37:03,600
Speaker 1: the and the site crashes and that's like a legitimate problem.

663
00:37:03,640 --> 00:37:06,680
Speaker 1: Would that be considered dysfunctional or it's kind of like, hey,

664
00:37:06,800 --> 00:37:08,879
Speaker 1: we're locking you out, but we're allowing you in, which

665
00:37:08,880 --> 00:37:12,120
Speaker 1: is kind of more insider. So I think that's gonna

666
00:37:12,120 --> 00:37:14,560
Speaker 1: be what the courts. And that's why I say case law.

667
00:37:14,840 --> 00:37:19,319
Speaker 1: This didn't change the law. The laws builds one case

668
00:37:19,360 --> 00:37:23,080
Speaker 1: at the time, which your jurisprudence. But what it says is,

669
00:37:23,400 --> 00:37:26,480
Speaker 1: now we're gonna see what exactly you're asking. What is

670
00:37:26,520 --> 00:37:31,719
Speaker 1: the line of dysfunctionality? Is it dysfunctional? If I put

671
00:37:31,760 --> 00:37:34,840
Speaker 1: in in order and it takes point one second to

672
00:37:35,160 --> 00:37:38,680
Speaker 1: go through, but the person behind me went through point

673
00:37:38,719 --> 00:37:42,839
Speaker 1: in half of that time, the speed equal dysfunctionality, that's

674
00:37:42,880 --> 00:37:45,480
Speaker 1: gonna be a lining. It's kind of like, you know, uh,

675
00:37:45,920 --> 00:37:50,719
Speaker 1: using a real world example, um someone who It used

676
00:37:50,760 --> 00:37:55,920
Speaker 1: to be that you were allowed to drinks before you drive.

677
00:37:56,840 --> 00:37:59,600
Speaker 1: Now you're allowed one and a half drinks before you drive.

678
00:37:59,800 --> 00:38:03,360
Speaker 1: The lines constantly shifting and people are becoming more liable.

679
00:38:03,520 --> 00:38:07,760
Speaker 1: The McDonald's case where someone stilled hot coffee in their laps.

680
00:38:09,120 --> 00:38:12,399
Speaker 1: Before that happened, wasn't if someone gave you a cup

681
00:38:12,440 --> 00:38:16,080
Speaker 1: of coffee. It wasn't necessarily illegal for McDonald's to hand

682
00:38:16,120 --> 00:38:18,799
Speaker 1: you a cup of coffee. And now you can get suit.

683
00:38:18,880 --> 00:38:21,320
Speaker 1: Now McDonald's is still not illegal. It's still legal for

684
00:38:21,360 --> 00:38:23,360
Speaker 1: them giving you a cup of coffee. But now if

685
00:38:23,360 --> 00:38:27,279
Speaker 1: you're still it on yourself and it's degrees and you

686
00:38:27,320 --> 00:38:30,160
Speaker 1: burn yourself, they're liable. Someone had to go to court

687
00:38:30,200 --> 00:38:32,920
Speaker 1: and draw that line in that distinction. But if you

688
00:38:32,960 --> 00:38:34,640
Speaker 1: pour a cup of coffee on your lap, it's only

689
00:38:34,680 --> 00:38:38,680
Speaker 1: fifty degrees and you don't burn yourself. That's okay, people,

690
00:38:38,800 --> 00:38:41,560
Speaker 1: We're learning where the lines are gonna be drawn. UM.

691
00:38:41,760 --> 00:38:44,799
Speaker 1: I personally believe that if an exchange knows of a

692
00:38:44,840 --> 00:38:50,000
Speaker 1: problem and those there's this dysfunction in their marketplace, they

693
00:38:50,000 --> 00:38:52,719
Speaker 1: have an obligation to shut that down, not look at

694
00:38:52,760 --> 00:38:56,719
Speaker 1: users and say, no, this was dysfunctional, but we're gonna

695
00:38:56,760 --> 00:39:00,120
Speaker 1: allow it to go because we're crypto cryptocurrency exchange and

696
00:39:00,160 --> 00:39:03,760
Speaker 1: there are no rules. Uh, turns out there are rules

697
00:39:03,760 --> 00:39:05,839
Speaker 1: in crypto and I'm proud of this judge. I think

698
00:39:05,840 --> 00:39:08,840
Speaker 1: it did a great job. Yeah, it makes sense. It

699
00:39:08,880 --> 00:39:12,080
Speaker 1: makes sense. I you know, I would hate to see

700
00:39:12,120 --> 00:39:16,040
Speaker 1: them being held responsible for things that were outside their control,

701
00:39:16,440 --> 00:39:18,680
Speaker 1: but things that they could control and they allowed to

702
00:39:18,719 --> 00:39:20,680
Speaker 1: go on. I mean, somebody has to be responsible that

703
00:39:20,719 --> 00:39:23,840
Speaker 1: you have to run an honest business, right, So UM

704
00:39:23,880 --> 00:39:28,520
Speaker 1: I get it from that perspective. So then overall, as

705
00:39:28,520 --> 00:39:32,080
Speaker 1: a user in the ecosystem, UM, I guess at the

706
00:39:32,120 --> 00:39:35,800
Speaker 1: end of the day, if I have um suffered damages

707
00:39:35,920 --> 00:39:39,640
Speaker 1: that I believe are because of negligence or because of

708
00:39:39,760 --> 00:39:43,960
Speaker 1: purposeful wrongdoing. Then then I potentially might have some recourse right,

709
00:39:44,000 --> 00:39:47,000
Speaker 1: and then that's where someone will contact you. So yeah,

710
00:39:47,040 --> 00:39:49,640
Speaker 1: a lot of people reach out to me and about

711
00:39:49,680 --> 00:39:55,080
Speaker 1: their cryptocurrency experiences, and the recourses is unique to each case.

712
00:39:55,840 --> 00:39:59,280
Speaker 1: I very rarely do what I consider lost profit cases.

713
00:39:59,600 --> 00:40:01,520
Speaker 1: That doesn't mean that no one's ever gonna win a

714
00:40:01,520 --> 00:40:04,600
Speaker 1: loss profit case, but it's very hard. Most people who

715
00:40:04,640 --> 00:40:08,440
Speaker 1: call me up saying I bought bitcoin and nine thousand,

716
00:40:08,560 --> 00:40:11,600
Speaker 1: I was gonna sell it at thirteen thousand. Coin Base

717
00:40:11,800 --> 00:40:14,799
Speaker 1: was swamped a couple of weeks ago, and they went

718
00:40:14,840 --> 00:40:17,760
Speaker 1: down for a little bit when it hit like thirteen

719
00:40:18,080 --> 00:40:20,480
Speaker 1: when it went from like seven thousand to thirteen thousand

720
00:40:20,719 --> 00:40:22,520
Speaker 1: in a couple of days, and they were like, well,

721
00:40:22,600 --> 00:40:25,680
Speaker 1: I was gonna sell that exact peak, and I wanted

722
00:40:25,680 --> 00:40:28,640
Speaker 1: that exact price I wasn't able to And now it's

723
00:40:28,640 --> 00:40:31,680
Speaker 1: back to nine thousand, and you know, there are a

724
00:40:31,719 --> 00:40:33,400
Speaker 1: lot of people who feel that should be a case.

725
00:40:33,600 --> 00:40:36,960
Speaker 1: Look this what brokeby coin Base said, Maybe that is

726
00:40:37,000 --> 00:40:39,520
Speaker 1: a good case. I'm not saying that that's not a winner.

727
00:40:39,960 --> 00:40:42,640
Speaker 1: But most of the cases I handled, we do our

728
00:40:42,719 --> 00:40:46,560
Speaker 1: analysis on a cost basis out of pocket. How much

729
00:40:46,560 --> 00:40:49,000
Speaker 1: money did you put in? How much money do you

730
00:40:49,040 --> 00:40:52,000
Speaker 1: presently have? And we do our analysis based on that,

731
00:40:52,440 --> 00:40:55,319
Speaker 1: because at the end of the day, this isn't new technology,

732
00:40:55,480 --> 00:40:58,319
Speaker 1: this is a new asset class. You know, it's some

733
00:40:58,600 --> 00:41:03,560
Speaker 1: there is some true truth that there is some limited predictability.

734
00:41:04,320 --> 00:41:07,520
Speaker 1: So um, you you you you, you take care of losses,

735
00:41:07,560 --> 00:41:10,040
Speaker 1: but not lost opportunities, I guess would be a good

736
00:41:10,040 --> 00:41:12,719
Speaker 1: way to something. Ask for lost opportunities. And somebody's in

737
00:41:12,719 --> 00:41:15,919
Speaker 1: some of the lawsuits, but most of the complaints I've

738
00:41:15,920 --> 00:41:20,800
Speaker 1: heard on exchange related matters or lost profit cases, someone

739
00:41:20,840 --> 00:41:23,040
Speaker 1: magically knew when the peak was gonna be and they

740
00:41:23,080 --> 00:41:25,759
Speaker 1: were gonna sell it the peak. Sure, alright, I know,

741
00:41:25,800 --> 00:41:27,680
Speaker 1: we gotta start wrapping this up here. I'd like to

742
00:41:27,719 --> 00:41:30,520
Speaker 1: just kind of ask you, though, where you sit, um

743
00:41:30,760 --> 00:41:35,080
Speaker 1: in this whole ecosystem. So um, I wonder if maybe

744
00:41:35,120 --> 00:41:38,000
Speaker 1: being an attorney gets you a little bit jaded where

745
00:41:38,000 --> 00:41:39,960
Speaker 1: you start to see all the bad. I'm curious what

746
00:41:40,000 --> 00:41:43,319
Speaker 1: you think about bitcoin overall and cryptocurrencies. I mean, are

747
00:41:43,360 --> 00:41:45,279
Speaker 1: you are you a believer in bitcoin? Do you see

748
00:41:45,320 --> 00:41:48,120
Speaker 1: the future um with that? Or are you still more

749
00:41:48,120 --> 00:41:52,680
Speaker 1: of a skeptic and you see all the problems. Yeah, uh,

750
00:41:52,880 --> 00:41:56,359
Speaker 1: I could I see this cryptocurrency to point out, I'm

751
00:41:56,400 --> 00:41:59,760
Speaker 1: a believer in the technology. I'm a believer in cryptology.

752
00:42:00,520 --> 00:42:03,360
Speaker 1: I'm a believer that this is moving in the right direction.

753
00:42:03,960 --> 00:42:06,120
Speaker 1: But we're still at the same point of the Internet

754
00:42:06,280 --> 00:42:08,759
Speaker 1: right now where everyone was just looking at porn and

755
00:42:08,800 --> 00:42:13,359
Speaker 1: buying drugs. You know, we're building the more the more

756
00:42:13,640 --> 00:42:18,120
Speaker 1: usable aspects, and when use cases are actually use cases

757
00:42:19,080 --> 00:42:23,440
Speaker 1: is when crypto two point it will happen. I you,

758
00:42:23,600 --> 00:42:25,840
Speaker 1: as far as I'm concerned, you can spin a becuse

759
00:42:25,960 --> 00:42:30,320
Speaker 1: all twelve or two thousand cryptocurrencies on the wheel, spin

760
00:42:30,360 --> 00:42:32,239
Speaker 1: the wheel, and that's gonna be the one that's successful

761
00:42:32,280 --> 00:42:34,600
Speaker 1: in the end. So you think bitcoin has as much

762
00:42:34,600 --> 00:42:37,120
Speaker 1: of a chance as anyone else, Well, I think the

763
00:42:37,239 --> 00:42:39,120
Speaker 1: leader in the house and the bigger the mode. You know,

764
00:42:39,120 --> 00:42:42,520
Speaker 1: I'm a Wren Buffet fan. So the bigger the mode,

765
00:42:42,520 --> 00:42:45,560
Speaker 1: the more likely you are to succeed. You know, I

766
00:42:45,840 --> 00:42:47,920
Speaker 1: don't know. In the effect, the longer you've been around,

767
00:42:47,920 --> 00:42:50,400
Speaker 1: the more likely you are to be around. Yeah, everyone's

768
00:42:50,440 --> 00:42:53,920
Speaker 1: testing bitcoin more. There's more testing, there's more you know,

769
00:42:54,560 --> 00:42:57,560
Speaker 1: people who are trying to show what bitcoin canny can't do.

770
00:42:57,920 --> 00:42:59,920
Speaker 1: So I'm a believer in the space and the function

771
00:43:00,000 --> 00:43:03,000
Speaker 1: aldi I believe. I went to all the conferences in

772
00:43:03,120 --> 00:43:05,920
Speaker 1: sixteen and seventeen where everyone told me every I C

773
00:43:06,040 --> 00:43:08,520
Speaker 1: O was going to change the world. I'm still waiting

774
00:43:08,520 --> 00:43:13,000
Speaker 1: for the use cases. Until there's use case, there's really

775
00:43:13,000 --> 00:43:16,239
Speaker 1: no reason why it's trading at these numbers. You don't

776
00:43:16,239 --> 00:43:19,680
Speaker 1: think bitcoin has any use case at all today? I mean,

777
00:43:19,960 --> 00:43:22,480
Speaker 1: I mean I would argue, like, obviously if you're in

778
00:43:22,520 --> 00:43:26,440
Speaker 1: an oppressive regime, even even China. Today we see a

779
00:43:26,480 --> 00:43:28,759
Speaker 1: massive use case to bitcoin right where people need to

780
00:43:28,800 --> 00:43:31,520
Speaker 1: get money out, people need to protect it. You you,

781
00:43:31,520 --> 00:43:33,359
Speaker 1: you know, we look at like a list of activities,

782
00:43:33,760 --> 00:43:36,080
Speaker 1: but that's also argued that's a use case. I mean,

783
00:43:36,200 --> 00:43:39,040
Speaker 1: it's a listed but like it's proving its case that

784
00:43:39,120 --> 00:43:42,640
Speaker 1: it's being able to be used against opposition or whatever.

785
00:43:42,760 --> 00:43:45,640
Speaker 1: So there is use case. But I'll agree with you.

786
00:43:45,680 --> 00:43:47,239
Speaker 1: But I'll agree with you because I do believe the

787
00:43:47,320 --> 00:43:49,879
Speaker 1: use case to replace gold, you know, the Winklevy that's

788
00:43:49,880 --> 00:43:52,480
Speaker 1: their big argument. You know, it's goal to point out.

789
00:43:53,000 --> 00:43:55,480
Speaker 1: So I don't disagree with what you're saying, but that

790
00:43:55,520 --> 00:43:57,280
Speaker 1: doesn't give it the value it twelve that I believe

791
00:43:57,280 --> 00:44:00,680
Speaker 1: it's heavily it's a heavily manipulated market. So we're talking

792
00:44:00,719 --> 00:44:04,200
Speaker 1: about use case first value. Now, I would agree with

793
00:44:04,200 --> 00:44:06,560
Speaker 1: you that that's a use case in theory. If it

794
00:44:06,560 --> 00:44:11,080
Speaker 1: works properly, censorship resistant, it's easily transportable, you know, it's

795
00:44:11,080 --> 00:44:13,520
Speaker 1: got a lot of good value. But the problem is,

796
00:44:13,600 --> 00:44:17,040
Speaker 1: I believe it's a heavily manipulated market on valuation, So

797
00:44:17,080 --> 00:44:21,560
Speaker 1: I'm comparing valuation to use Yeah, I wasn't talking valuations.

798
00:44:21,600 --> 00:44:23,120
Speaker 1: We could argue till the day, you know, to the

799
00:44:23,160 --> 00:44:24,920
Speaker 1: day is over. I was just talking about just just

800
00:44:25,040 --> 00:44:27,359
Speaker 1: use cases. And where you saw it was, like I said,

801
00:44:27,400 --> 00:44:29,479
Speaker 1: just curious because I would imagine seeing all the bad

802
00:44:29,600 --> 00:44:31,600
Speaker 1: maybe contain to you and maybe you start to like

803
00:44:31,719 --> 00:44:34,120
Speaker 1: lose sight of like how big this is or something. No,

804
00:44:34,280 --> 00:44:36,080
Speaker 1: I think that I think that it's going to be.

805
00:44:36,280 --> 00:44:40,000
Speaker 1: It's a disruptor. I do believe that you know, there's

806
00:44:40,080 --> 00:44:43,120
Speaker 1: value in it. We're you know, and when I give

807
00:44:43,200 --> 00:44:45,400
Speaker 1: my speeches to people who have never seen bitcoin and

808
00:44:45,480 --> 00:44:48,600
Speaker 1: know what bitcoin is or cryptocurrency, I say, look, take

809
00:44:48,640 --> 00:44:51,120
Speaker 1: out a dollar bill, look at the serial number. This

810
00:44:51,200 --> 00:44:53,920
Speaker 1: is an enhancement version of being able to prove that

811
00:44:53,960 --> 00:44:56,120
Speaker 1: the money you have is real. That's a use case.

812
00:44:56,440 --> 00:44:59,080
Speaker 1: I believe in that. So if that's the question, then yeah,

813
00:44:59,080 --> 00:45:02,480
Speaker 1: it's absolutely And also I think also I'm curious on

814
00:45:02,520 --> 00:45:06,960
Speaker 1: the just a differentiation because bitcoin was launched anonymously, decentralized

815
00:45:07,520 --> 00:45:10,640
Speaker 1: UM obviously was not a scam, uh the coin itself.

816
00:45:10,640 --> 00:45:12,520
Speaker 1: Now we talk about the exchanges different but like now

817
00:45:12,600 --> 00:45:14,560
Speaker 1: you deal with all these I c o s, right,

818
00:45:14,960 --> 00:45:17,920
Speaker 1: and like a lot of them clearly are scams, and

819
00:45:17,960 --> 00:45:20,759
Speaker 1: so like it seems like there's a huge divide, right

820
00:45:20,840 --> 00:45:23,040
Speaker 1: Bitcoin over here and everything else kind of over here.

821
00:45:23,160 --> 00:45:27,680
Speaker 1: Maybe well, anyone who's positive in the space, they have

822
00:45:27,800 --> 00:45:31,120
Speaker 1: to make that differentiation. So I totally agree with you

823
00:45:31,160 --> 00:45:34,880
Speaker 1: on that. UM So from the point of it being

824
00:45:35,160 --> 00:45:40,200
Speaker 1: the aspect of yeah, the I c O over Bitcoin, Yes,

825
00:45:40,280 --> 00:45:43,080
Speaker 1: I completely agree with you. And I do think that

826
00:45:43,120 --> 00:45:46,839
Speaker 1: the more use cases out of crypto, when we can

827
00:45:46,880 --> 00:45:50,200
Speaker 1: show that there's no manipulation in the system is when

828
00:45:50,280 --> 00:45:54,800
Speaker 1: the next moon will happen. You know, there's got to

829
00:45:54,880 --> 00:45:58,719
Speaker 1: be they've got to remove. But for people like me,

830
00:45:58,760 --> 00:46:01,239
Speaker 1: in order to remove that, you have to remove some

831
00:46:01,360 --> 00:46:04,080
Speaker 1: of the things that the O G crowd loves. You

832
00:46:04,120 --> 00:46:06,799
Speaker 1: can have to remove some of the anonymous factors in it.

833
00:46:07,360 --> 00:46:08,920
Speaker 1: But I would love to see I would love to

834
00:46:08,960 --> 00:46:11,480
Speaker 1: see the manipulation of the gold and silver markets go away.

835
00:46:11,560 --> 00:46:14,919
Speaker 1: And that's been a few thousand years so and that's

836
00:46:14,960 --> 00:46:18,359
Speaker 1: my example when people ask me about you know, well, look,

837
00:46:18,400 --> 00:46:21,000
Speaker 1: you know, you got all this fraud in you know,

838
00:46:21,040 --> 00:46:24,400
Speaker 1: the marketplaces, yet the bank failures the Look look at

839
00:46:24,440 --> 00:46:26,759
Speaker 1: how much regulation is there and how much fraud is

840
00:46:26,760 --> 00:46:29,960
Speaker 1: still there. Almost the more regulations there, the worst it gets.

841
00:46:30,960 --> 00:46:33,359
Speaker 1: But at the end of the day, I feel more

842
00:46:33,440 --> 00:46:35,400
Speaker 1: comfortable playing my money in the bank than I do

843
00:46:35,440 --> 00:46:39,279
Speaker 1: on the cryptocurrency exchange. So I don't disagree with you

844
00:46:39,719 --> 00:46:42,000
Speaker 1: that there that there is a ton of fraud under

845
00:46:42,000 --> 00:46:47,120
Speaker 1: the regulation under regulated society, but in unregulated society, I

846
00:46:47,120 --> 00:46:49,799
Speaker 1: think the fraud is gonna be even worse. Yeah, and

847
00:46:49,840 --> 00:46:52,040
Speaker 1: we should always be up, we should always be optimizing

848
00:46:52,080 --> 00:46:55,800
Speaker 1: for the risk. So just take that into consideration. I

849
00:46:55,840 --> 00:46:59,200
Speaker 1: agree we're super early in this technology. It is not

850
00:46:59,640 --> 00:47:01,520
Speaker 1: I don't believe it's a store of value today. It's

851
00:47:01,560 --> 00:47:04,640
Speaker 1: definitely not a money today. Um, it's a collectible. It's

852
00:47:04,640 --> 00:47:11,839
Speaker 1: a speculative asset and uh manager risk accordingly, right, So yeah,

853
00:47:11,960 --> 00:47:14,879
Speaker 1: good stuff I'd like to talk more a little bit

854
00:47:14,880 --> 00:47:17,480
Speaker 1: about about some of that, the manipulation and whatnot, but

855
00:47:17,480 --> 00:47:20,240
Speaker 1: but we're out of time. You gotta respect your time, um,

856
00:47:20,280 --> 00:47:23,600
Speaker 1: but I appreciate you coming on. So for anybody who

857
00:47:23,640 --> 00:47:26,840
Speaker 1: thinks that they may have been taking advantage of or

858
00:47:26,880 --> 00:47:28,440
Speaker 1: something like that, what's the best way to reach out

859
00:47:28,440 --> 00:47:31,000
Speaker 1: to you or good with my website where they reach

860
00:47:31,040 --> 00:47:34,600
Speaker 1: out to you. So go to the website Silver Miller

861
00:47:34,719 --> 00:47:39,000
Speaker 1: Law dot com, follow me on Twitter DC silver is

862
00:47:39,040 --> 00:47:43,760
Speaker 1: my Twitter handle, UM, and just look me up. Whatever

863
00:47:43,800 --> 00:47:46,400
Speaker 1: you do, if someone takes advantage of you, find a

864
00:47:46,480 --> 00:47:51,120
Speaker 1: lawyer who has experience, because someone out there can help you. Yeah. Great,

865
00:47:51,239 --> 00:47:53,280
Speaker 1: all right, David, thanks so much for your time. Thanks

866
00:47:53,280 --> 00:47:56,280
Speaker 1: mat Hey. If you like this episode of the Market

867
00:47:56,280 --> 00:47:59,640
Speaker 1: Disruptors Podcast, please help us take this to the top

868
00:47:59,719 --> 00:48:02,320
Speaker 1: of the podcast charts. Just please do me a favor

869
00:48:02,360 --> 00:48:05,920
Speaker 1: and rate review and subscribe. Taking fifteen seconds to just

870
00:48:06,000 --> 00:48:08,359
Speaker 1: leave a quick review goes a long way and helping

871
00:48:08,440 --> 00:48:11,439
Speaker 1: us reach more people and disrupt more markets. I really

872
00:48:11,480 --> 00:48:13,840
Speaker 1: appreciate you listening and I'll see you next time on

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00:48:13,880 --> 00:48:15,240
Speaker 1: the Market Disruptors Podcast.