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Speaker 1: Bloomberg Audio Studios, podcasts, radio news.

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Speaker 2: Fighting in the Middle East escalated over the weekend, with

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Speaker 2: Israel and Hesbela stepping up their exchange of air strikes.

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Speaker 2: As of this afternoon, local authorities say over three hundred

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Speaker 2: and fifty people were killed and more than twelve hundred

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Speaker 2: were injured in Lebanon by a series of Israeli air

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Speaker 2: strikes on Monday, and the US is sending a small

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Speaker 2: number of additional troops to the region amid the increasing tensions.

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Speaker 2: The latest escalation came after thousands of simultaneous explosions last

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Speaker 2: week across Lebanon, the targeted members of Hesbola and a

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Speaker 2: Ron backed militant group.

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Speaker 3: We are hearing of handheld radio's walkie talkie devices also

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Speaker 3: exploding in people's hands, cars, and across at homes.

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Speaker 2: On Tuesday, an estimated three thousand to five thousand pager

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Speaker 2: devices being used by members of Hesbela blew up all

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Speaker 2: at once. The next day, waki talkies Hesbela used started exploding.

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Speaker 3: Too, so they were oftentimes on people's waist as you

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Speaker 3: would expect for a page it, they were in people's bags.

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Speaker 2: Peter Martin is a Bloomberg reporter based in Nairobi who

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Speaker 2: covers defense and intelligence.

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Speaker 3: Lots of the people who were injured, most of them

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Speaker 3: were HESBLA operatives, but there were also a number of

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Speaker 3: civilian bystanders.

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Speaker 2: At least thirty nine people died, including children, and thousands

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Speaker 2: of people were injured. Lebanese officials believed these attacks on

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Speaker 2: pagers and walkie talkies were planned and carried out by Israel.

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Speaker 2: Israel has not confirmed or denied responsibility, and its officials

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Speaker 2: are refusing to speak about the incidents, but reporting suggests

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Speaker 2: Israel may have found a way to get explosives into

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Speaker 2: the low tech devices while they were being made or

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Speaker 2: before they were delivered.

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Speaker 3: One of the working theories at the moment, which is

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Speaker 3: not being fully corroborated, is that these were inserted with

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Speaker 3: amounts of explosives at some point in the supply chain.

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Speaker 2: National security experts say this wouldn't be the first time

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Speaker 2: foreign actors have infiltrated a supply chain to carry out

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Speaker 2: an attack. In fact, it's happening way more often than

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Speaker 2: you might think.

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Speaker 3: What we know from speaking to current and former intelligence

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Speaker 3: officials from the US and elsewhere is that supply chain

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Speaker 3: tampering is rampant.

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Speaker 2: Today on the show, what the pager explosions in Lebanon

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Speaker 2: reveal about the growing threat to global supply chains and

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Speaker 2: what countries like the US and China are doing to

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Speaker 2: protect their technology from foreign interference. This is the big

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Speaker 2: take from Bloomberg News. I'm Sarah Holder. To understand what

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Speaker 2: we know and what we still don't know about these attacks,

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Speaker 2: I sat down with Katrina Manson.

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Speaker 1: I'm a snybersecurity reporter at Bloomberg.

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Speaker 2: Katrina told me the hasbelow was using low tech communications

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Speaker 2: devices like pagers in the first place because they seemed

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Speaker 2: less vulnerable to surveillance from Israel or the US. But

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Speaker 2: that couldn't protect the products from physical tampering.

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Speaker 1: Well, there are number of different ways you can get

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Speaker 1: into a supply chain. Ultimately, a factory produces a thing.

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Speaker 1: Once it leaves the factory, someone can intercept it, take it,

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Speaker 1: add something to it, and get it to the end user.

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Speaker 2: That's called interception meddling. That occurs after a product's been made.

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Speaker 2: But it's also possible that the factory assembling the product

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Speaker 2: could have tampered with it, or that another company down

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Speaker 2: the supply chain could have tampered with one of its components.

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Speaker 2: What do we know about when, where and how these

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Speaker 2: devices became explosives.

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Speaker 1: One of the leading theories at this point has to

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Speaker 1: be that from the point of manufacture these pages had

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Speaker 1: explosives in them. How the got into Hesbola, how they

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Speaker 1: were manufactured, where they were manufactured is I think one

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Speaker 1: of the questions to be explored.

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Speaker 2: The brand on the pagers was gold Apollo, that's a

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Speaker 2: Taiwanese company, but gold Apollo said they didn't actually manufacture

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Speaker 2: those models. They pointed to a company based in Hungary,

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Speaker 2: saying they produced the pagers, but.

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Speaker 1: The Hungarian government has said that the company registered in

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Speaker 1: Hungary had no manufacturing facility, So that question becomes was

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Speaker 1: it actually manufactured in Israel all along?

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Speaker 2: It could be months or even years before we understand

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Speaker 2: how exactly these pagers were tampered with. But Katrina says

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Speaker 2: this challenge in identifying each link in a supply chain

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Speaker 2: is part of a larger problem, and it goes beyond

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Speaker 2: just this incident.

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Speaker 1: And you can try and deconstruct even something for the military,

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Speaker 1: which you would imagine would be the most checked thing.

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Speaker 1: There's a supplier who has the contract that's a subcontractor,

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Speaker 1: that's a subcontractor, and some where down that line, it's

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Speaker 1: been explained to me, is the mom and pop shop,

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Speaker 1: and where are they located? Does the ultimate contractor that's

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Speaker 1: selling into the Pentagon actually know?

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Speaker 2: Naturally, having several companies involved in making these goods can

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Speaker 2: introduce major security threats, and these kinds of supply chain

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Speaker 2: threats are something that officials have been watching for a

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Speaker 2: while now, as.

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Speaker 1: People have scrambled to understand the nature of supply chain attacks,

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Speaker 1: which this one surely is. I think one question has

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Speaker 1: been is this a new weapon of war? What I've

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Speaker 1: learned is that it is not. A senior former intelligence

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Speaker 1: official on the US side told me. In fact, supply

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Speaker 1: chain attacks are ongoing. This is not something new. What

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Speaker 1: is new is the scale, the targeted nature, although of

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Speaker 1: course there's significant collateral damage. Children were killed, and also

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Speaker 1: the fact that it happened so publicly, and of course

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Speaker 1: the fact that they were able to pull it off.

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Speaker 2: Reports suggests that it was a text message that triggered

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Speaker 2: the explosions in thousands of pages and walkie talkies around Lebanon.

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Speaker 1: One key question is the actual message that delivered to

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Speaker 1: the pages. Did that carry coded malware, some kind of

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Speaker 1: payload that triggered the explosives inside the pages to go off.

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Speaker 1: Or did the message just mean that operatives took their

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Speaker 1: pages out and was there a separate vulnerability in the

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Speaker 1: pages that was remote detonated a simultaneous attack. It probably,

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Speaker 1: we think at this stage, uses both cyber and hardware,

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Speaker 1: software and hardware combined. I think the combination of this

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Speaker 1: is very interesting. We all know now about cyber attacks

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Speaker 1: disrupting access to your computer, your data, your files. Here

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Speaker 1: it does something much more dangerous and clearly deadly. It

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Speaker 1: uses something digital to create a real world effect. Well

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Speaker 1: that is jargon for it has killed people.

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Speaker 2: Katrina says that combination of both software and hardware is

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Speaker 2: part of the reason why this attack is such a

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Speaker 2: watershed moment for people concerned about supply chain vulnerabilities, national security,

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Speaker 2: and for people on the ground in the Middle East.

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Speaker 1: Interceptions playing around with technology to mess things up. That

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Speaker 1: is not new and now, of course are explosions, but

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Speaker 1: this is a horror show of three thousand explosions at once.

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Speaker 1: The Israelis have shown that they could find a way

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Speaker 1: into the pockets of Hesbella operatives on a scale that,

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Speaker 1: of course, will leave lasting psychological impact on Hesbelah.

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Speaker 2: Well, how has it impacted Lemanon and what has that

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Speaker 2: collateral damage been even in the days after the attack.

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Speaker 1: Well, first of all, you've got children dying, You've got

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Speaker 1: pages going off in grocery markets, in cars, everyone's attention

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Speaker 1: was on this page. For that item of low tech

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Speaker 1: communication to be the thing that exploded is very psychologically

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Speaker 1: damaging and operationally damaging, logistically damaging, and of course it

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Speaker 1: creates questions of what can I touch next? What else

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Speaker 1: could go wrong?

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Speaker 2: So what else could go wrong, not just in the

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Speaker 2: Middle East, but in devices all over the world, And

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Speaker 2: what are governments doing to prevent these kinds of attacks?

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Speaker 2: That's after the break The attacks in Lebanon were a public,

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Speaker 2: tangible example of supply chain vulnerabilities being exploited, and Bloomberg

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Speaker 2: defense reporter Peter Martin told me they were a major

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Speaker 2: warning for people around the world.

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Speaker 3: I think it's a moment of reckoning for a lot

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Speaker 3: of global policymakers. The US and China have been thinking

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Speaker 3: for years about how they're diversified supply chains could be

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Speaker 3: impacted by their interdependence.

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Speaker 2: Of course, it's easier said than done to unravel that interdependence,

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Speaker 2: in part because it's hard to know exactly what products

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Speaker 2: and what components of those products could be compromised.

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Speaker 3: In the past, when I've spoken to Pentagon officials, I've

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Speaker 3: heard that in some of the US's kind of top

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Speaker 3: ticket items, the US military has no idea how many

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Speaker 3: Chinese components there are. They're working hard to figure it out,

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Speaker 3: but we're talking about incredibly complex pieces of machinery that

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Speaker 3: involve everything from nuts and bolts to the latest semiconductors,

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Speaker 3: and the attempt to unravel that is really complicated and

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Speaker 3: really expensive.

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Speaker 2: How can countries like the US disentangle themselves from other

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Speaker 2: countries when it comes to the manufacturing process.

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Speaker 3: I think it's really a question of de risking. The

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Speaker 3: idea that any country could produce every thing it needed

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Speaker 3: on its own is not really realistic. It would just

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Speaker 3: be too expensive and too difficult to do it. The

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Speaker 3: way that the US has tried to get at it

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Speaker 3: in recent years is through this concept of friendshuring, so

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Speaker 3: making sure that US supply chains for national security equipment,

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Speaker 3: for example, run through friendly countries like say Japan, the

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Speaker 3: United Kingdom, NATO members, so not trying to do everything

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Speaker 3: at home, but trying to make sure that they're at

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Speaker 3: least produced by countries that are friendly to US interests.

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Speaker 2: Cybersecurity reporter Katrina Manson says the US government is particularly

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Speaker 2: concerned about relying on Chinese telecommunications equipment from companies like Huawei,

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Speaker 2: which it is deemed a threat.

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Speaker 1: They've come up with a policy called rip and replace.

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Speaker 1: That's the idea that every single component potentially could be

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Speaker 1: at risk, and the US is really trying to get

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Speaker 1: Huawei out of its supply chain.

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Speaker 2: There's also an effort to push for what's called a

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Speaker 2: bill of materials.

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Speaker 1: Where the providers are sent actually certify, yes, we can

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Speaker 1: tell you exactly who has put ingredients into our cake,

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Speaker 1: our technological cake, and we can say we are confident

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Speaker 1: that they're okay. Now, that's actually a really hard question

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Speaker 1: to answer.

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Speaker 2: Now. All these efforts are not necessarily because the US

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Speaker 2: is worried that a bunch of iPhones are suddenly going

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Speaker 2: to explode in the way that Pagris did across Lebanon.

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Speaker 1: What's been put to me is that this is a

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Speaker 1: specific kind of attack that is not likely to be

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Speaker 1: repeated many times. It's taken years and years and years

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Speaker 1: to develop. It's specific to the kind of risk that

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Speaker 1: the Israelis are prepared to take on and the logistics

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Speaker 1: that they're able to devote. And the phrase goes, you

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Speaker 1: use it, you lose it. So now that it's happened

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Speaker 1: and the whole world has seen, the operation is a bust.

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Speaker 1: I think the idea that members of the public will

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Speaker 1: find that their phones are going to explode on them

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Speaker 1: is extremely unlikely. What it does show, I think for

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Speaker 1: the public is that devices have vulnerability tees. Nefarious acts

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Speaker 1: can occur should anyone have the intent on a number

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Speaker 1: of devices that are connected to you and your home.

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Speaker 1: I was at a conference the other day where Ambassador

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Speaker 1: Nate Fick, he's the cyber envoid for State Department, and

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Speaker 1: he said, I was making a house with my wife

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Speaker 1: ten years back, and the contractors came to me and said,

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Speaker 1: this is the least connected house we've ever come across

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Speaker 1: designs for He's made sure to exclude digitally connected devices

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Speaker 1: from his home. That says something I think so, And

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Speaker 1: of course we're all being surveiled now. Your phone is

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Speaker 1: the most dangerous weapon ever to be invented. I've had

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Speaker 1: numerous US officials say that, and there's a real sense

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Speaker 1: that people still don't understand that danger or have become

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Speaker 1: comfortable with it.

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Speaker 2: The US and other governments are trying to stay on

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Speaker 2: top of these supply chain threats with regulation. Congress has

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Speaker 2: tried to ban TikTok in an effort to protect US

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Speaker 2: consumer data, and just today the Biden administration proposed a

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Speaker 2: ban on hardware and software for connected cars coming from

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Speaker 2: China or Russia. But Peter Martin told me he thinks

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Speaker 2: it's impossible to secure supply chains across the board. At

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Speaker 2: the end of the day, you've got to prioritize.

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Speaker 3: It's really a question of thinking about what degree of

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Speaker 3: risk is acceptable for which technology. So in the case

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Speaker 3: of a fighter jet, for example, highly sophisticated piece of equipment,

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Speaker 3: very expensive, involves the life of the pilot and missions

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Speaker 3: that are critical to US national security, the US is

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Speaker 3: going to want to have as much control over that

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Speaker 3: supply chain as possible. When it comes to personal electronics,

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Speaker 3: the threshold is going to be much lower, although, of course,

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Speaker 3: events in Lebanon showed that just because an item is mundane,

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Speaker 3: it doesn't mean that it's safe.

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Speaker 2: This is The Big Take from Bloomberg News. I'm Sarah Holder.

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Speaker 2: This episode was produced by Julia Press. It was edited

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Speaker 2: by Caitlin Kenny, Dan Flatley, and Andrew Martin. It was

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Speaker 2: mixed by Alexander Sugura. It was fact checked by Adrianna Tapia.

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Speaker 2: Our senior producer is Naomi Shaven. Our senior editor is

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Speaker 2: Elizabeth Ponso. Our executive producer is Nicole Beamster. War Stage

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Speaker 2: Bauman is Bloomberg's head of Podcasts. If you liked this episode,

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Speaker 2: make sure to subscribe and review The Big Take wherever

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Speaker 2: you listen to podcasts. It helps people find the show.

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Speaker 2: Thanks for listening. We'll be back tomorrow