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Speaker 1: Welcome to Tech Stuff, a production from iHeartRadio. Hey there,

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Speaker 1: and welcome to tech Stuff. I'm your host, Jonathan Strickland.

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Speaker 1: I'm an executive producer with iHeartRadio and how the tech

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Speaker 1: are you? So before I talk about the news for Tuesday,

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Speaker 1: March seven, twenty twenty three, I want to give y'all

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Speaker 1: a heads up that tomorrow a special guest host takes

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Speaker 1: over the show, Bridget Todd, also known as the host

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Speaker 1: of There Are No Girls on the Internet, among many

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Speaker 1: other things, And I'm really excited to have y'all hear

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Speaker 1: this special episode. I don't want to spoil anything, but

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Speaker 1: I'm definitely looking forward to everyone getting a chance to

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Speaker 1: hear it. So make sure you tune in tomorrow to

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Speaker 1: get that special episode, and I'll be back on the

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Speaker 1: following Thursday. But now let's get to the news for today.

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Speaker 1: And first up, for a change, I really just have

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Speaker 1: one story explicitly about AI today, and it's about Microsoft's

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Speaker 1: incorporation of AI. This one was developed by open Ai

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Speaker 1: and it has to do with Microsoft's products for enterprises

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Speaker 1: for businesses. All right, So, first off, Microsoft had previously

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Speaker 1: invested a billion dollars in open ai and more recently,

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Speaker 1: the two organizations I've entered into a type of partnership,

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Speaker 1: Though details are scarce as to the extent of that partnership,

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Speaker 1: some folks estimate that the agreement has Microsoft investing ten

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Speaker 1: billion dollars with open AI over the next several years. Anyway,

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Speaker 1: this week, Microsoft has unveiled how it is integrating AI

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Speaker 1: into suits like power Platform, which is a platform with

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Speaker 1: tools for developers that kind of stuff, as well as

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Speaker 1: Dynamics three sixty five, which is used for enterprise resource planning. So,

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Speaker 1: in other words, these aren't not consumer facing products. You know,

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Speaker 1: if you don't happen to work in these fields, you'll

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Speaker 1: never really encounter them. They are meant to be tools

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Speaker 1: that businesses can use to optimize processes and stuff. So

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Speaker 1: the idea is that the AI will assist companies and

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Speaker 1: employees to do jobs, particularly those that are highly repetitive.

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Speaker 1: In other words, Microsoft's pitch is that this AI augments

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Speaker 1: what you're already doing, and thus the name they picked

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Speaker 1: copilot really makes sense. These tools are not intended to

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Speaker 1: replace decision makers. Instead, it's supposed to make their jobs

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Speaker 1: easier and less repetitive. And side note my own personal

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Speaker 1: opinion is. I think Tesla could probably take notes on

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Speaker 1: how Microsoft's naming approach went this way, because I think

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Speaker 1: Copilot is a much more responsible naming convention than say,

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Speaker 1: full self driving, when the actual technology is not full

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Speaker 1: self drive. Anyway, that being said, I haven't personally had

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Speaker 1: any experience using Copilot. It's really for stuff that's outside

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Speaker 1: my job duties, so I can't actually comment on the

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Speaker 1: quality of the tools performance, but supposed to do things

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Speaker 1: like help marketing departments identify new customers. For example, let's

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Speaker 1: say you've got a product or a service. Then you're

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Speaker 1: doing pretty well, but you're leaving money on the table

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Speaker 1: because you haven't identified people who would be really good customers.

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Speaker 1: You you never reached out to them because you weren't

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Speaker 1: aware of them or whatever. This tool is meant to

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Speaker 1: help people identify those potential customers and then craft communications

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Speaker 1: that are likely to resonate with them. That sort of thing. Further,

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Speaker 1: when building, say a message to potential customers, Copilot will

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Speaker 1: clearly label all the pieces of that communication that had

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Speaker 1: been crafted by AI, which will give real human beings

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Speaker 1: in whatever organization we're talking about a chance to review

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Speaker 1: these communications to make sure that everything's accurate and appropriate,

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Speaker 1: and you know, it doesn't end up just being a

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Speaker 1: message that says that, you know, robots should kill all

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Speaker 1: humans or something. Last week, I talked about how there's

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Speaker 1: a bill in the US House of Representatives that could

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Speaker 1: potentially call for the ban of TikTok. Well, the Senate,

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Speaker 1: which is the other branch of the US Congress, plans

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Speaker 1: to unveil a similar bill today. In both cases, the

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Speaker 1: aim really does go beyond TikTok. I mean, obviously the

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Speaker 1: app is a big reason for these proposals in both cases,

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Speaker 1: but in neither case is it exclusively the target. So

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Speaker 1: the Senate version is said to give the President of

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Speaker 1: the US the authority to restrict technology from foreign countries

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Speaker 1: if it's reasonable to suspect that those companies might be

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Speaker 1: using the tech to compromise the US's national security. And y'all,

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Speaker 1: this does get super tricky. I talked last week about

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Speaker 1: how the ACLU claims that banning TikTok would amount to

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Speaker 1: violating the First Amendment, which is the right to free speech,

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Speaker 1: and I honestly don't know about that one way or

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Speaker 1: the other. There's no doubt that as technology gets more advanced,

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Speaker 1: and starts to lean heavier on stuff like cloud computing

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Speaker 1: and has the potential to serve as a data gathering system.

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Speaker 1: We should be concerned, In fact, we should already be

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Speaker 1: concerned about this, because it's already happening all around us,

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Speaker 1: whether we're talking about companies that are foreign or domestic.

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Speaker 1: I mean, that is happening. That's what's going on with Meta,

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Speaker 1: it's what's going on with Google. Pretty much any big

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Speaker 1: tech company is doing this. But here, obviously, the concern

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Speaker 1: is tech companies that are ultimately located outside the United States.

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Speaker 1: From a national security perspective, I can understand that there's

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Speaker 1: a fear that foreign companies could potentially pose a threat.

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Speaker 1: We've already seen similar movements the US against foreign companies. So,

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Speaker 1: for example, the US banned telecom companies from using tech

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Speaker 1: from the Chinese company Huawei out of concern that that

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Speaker 1: could be used as a massive surveillance system. So Huawei

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Speaker 1: makes all sorts of networking equipment, among other things, and

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Speaker 1: the fear was that if telecom companies were integrating Huawei

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Speaker 1: systems within their infrastructure, that it could turn the telecommunications

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Speaker 1: industry in the United States into a giant espionage service

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Speaker 1: for the Chinese government. That was the fear. And you know,

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Speaker 1: we in the United States would much rather the NSA

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Speaker 1: do all the spying on communications within our country. Now

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Speaker 1: keep an American anyway. I haven't seen the proposed bill

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Speaker 1: yet because it wasn't released while I was writing this.

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Speaker 1: By the time you hear it, it may have already

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Speaker 1: been released. I will say that according to reports, it

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Speaker 1: does have bipartisan support, and we've seen other parts of

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Speaker 1: the world, like the EU, to a stronger stance against

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Speaker 1: letting information flow out of a region to foreign countries

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Speaker 1: without restriction. Right. The EU guards citizen data very carefully

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Speaker 1: and is quick to jump on companies that don't follow

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Speaker 1: the regulations within the EU, and I have long said

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Speaker 1: that the United States kind of fell behind on this.

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Speaker 1: So in some ways, I think this is correcting a

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Speaker 1: problem that has been around for ages. And of course,

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Speaker 1: if you look at China, it actually takes this whole

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Speaker 1: concept to an extreme right. It doesn't just limit what

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Speaker 1: goes out, it limits what comes in. You know, it

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Speaker 1: limits what citizens are able to access. And see you

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Speaker 1: can't even access lots of different Western based tools within China.

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Speaker 1: So there's clearly a spectrum here between letting everything go

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Speaker 1: flow in and flow out, everyone access everything and let

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Speaker 1: everything access us, and then the extreme of China, where

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Speaker 1: you take really authoritative control over what can be seen

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Speaker 1: and accessed. And I don't think either extreme is good.

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Speaker 1: I think you need to find someplace in the middle

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Speaker 1: where things work out properly. And I honestly don't know

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Speaker 1: where this Senate bill is going to fall along that spectrum.

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Speaker 1: I haven't had chance to read it yet, but I'm

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Speaker 1: sure i'll talk about this later on this week once

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Speaker 1: we have more information, and I definitely want to see

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Speaker 1: moves that will protect citizens without escalating into an issue

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Speaker 1: where the United States just becomes even more isolationist and

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Speaker 1: insular than we already are. Okay, do you remember Cambridge

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Speaker 1: Analytica and that scandal, So essentially a political marketing company

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Speaker 1: was using data that had been collected by an app developer,

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Speaker 1: a Facebook app developer who had crafted a survey app

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Speaker 1: for Facebook. Now, back in the days when this app

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Speaker 1: was created, Facebook's API was not particularly careful about the

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Speaker 1: kinds of information and app could gather, so it was

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Speaker 1: possible to design an app to scoop up all sorts

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Speaker 1: of data even if that information had nothing to do

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Speaker 1: with whatever the app was doing. In the Cambridge Analytica case,

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Speaker 1: this included getting a look at folks who hadn't even

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Speaker 1: used the app themselves. And here's how it would work.

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Speaker 1: Person A decides that they want to install this app

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Speaker 1: and take the survey, partly because it's a paid survey,

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Speaker 1: so they have an incentive, a monetary incentive to participate.

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Speaker 1: So they install the app on Facebook and they take

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Speaker 1: the survey. Now, persons B through Z, who happened to

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Speaker 1: be friends with person A, they don't download the app.

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Speaker 1: They don't install the app and take the survey. However,

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Speaker 1: the app gets access to person A's views as if

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Speaker 1: it were person a. So in other words, it can

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Speaker 1: actually look at all the profiles of all the friends

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Speaker 1: that person A has as if it were person A.

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Speaker 1: So it can collect all this information on persons B

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Speaker 1: through Z, even though none of them consented to have

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Speaker 1: their data shared. They didn't have a say in this. Well,

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Speaker 1: now Australia, nearly a decade after all this happened, is

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Speaker 1: hearing a case about this. The High Court is going

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Speaker 1: to hear a case that claims that as many as

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Speaker 1: three hundred thousand people in Australia had their data harvested

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Speaker 1: thanks to just fifty three people using the quids. Think

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Speaker 1: about that, fifty three people use this app and in

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Speaker 1: the process, around three hundred thousand people have their information

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Speaker 1: exposed and gathered by the app developer. And further, the

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Speaker 1: case claims that Facebook should be held accountable for allowing

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Speaker 1: this data harvest to happen. Now, since this incident that

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Speaker 1: happened nearly a decade ago, Facebook has subsequently beefed up

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Speaker 1: its restrictions. Further, the company is challenging the validity of

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Speaker 1: the case brought against it because at the time of

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Speaker 1: the incident, Facebook says it didn't have any commercial business

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Speaker 1: set up in Australia, no staff, no offices, no real

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Speaker 1: means of generating revenue within the country, nothing, and that

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Speaker 1: as such, the law that concerns this whole case, the

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Speaker 1: law that Facebook has been alleged to have broken, would

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Speaker 1: not apply because it has a prerequisite that the company

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Speaker 1: that carried out that broke the law rather carried out

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Speaker 1: business within Australia. So Facebook is saying, we didn't carry

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Speaker 1: out business in Australia, we didn't have any offices here,

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Speaker 1: we offered our platform here, but we weren't generating revenue.

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Speaker 1: There was no business being done. Now, there have been

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Speaker 1: lower courts that have disagreed with that conclusion, but Facebook's

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Speaker 1: pushing it as part of their defense. Now, if it

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Speaker 1: loses the case, the company faces a two point two

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Speaker 1: million dollars fine, which for Facebook that's not that much.

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Speaker 1: So even if the High Court ultimately rejects Facebook's arguments

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Speaker 1: and finds the company guilty, Facebook is not going to

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Speaker 1: be taking a massive hit when it's compared to its

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Speaker 1: overall revenue. And speaking of Facebook slash Meta, numerous outlets

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Speaker 1: like Bloomberg have reported that more layoffs are imminent at

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Speaker 1: the company. So if you remember Meta downsized by thirteen

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Speaker 1: percent late last year and actual numbers of employees, that's

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Speaker 1: around eleven thousand people who lost their jobs. According to Bloomberg,

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Speaker 1: that initial round of layoffs was really related to a

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Speaker 1: reorganization effort, which largely included cutting entire teams and also

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Speaker 1: managerial levels. The idea being that they wanted to flatten

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Speaker 1: out the hierarchy, so they didn't want to have as

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Speaker 1: many vertical levels between entry level employees and top brass.

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Speaker 1: So this was like a middle management clearinghouse kind of situation. However,

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Speaker 1: Bloomberg says that the upcoming layoffs will be more about

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Speaker 1: financial results than a reorganization, So it's possible we'll see

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Speaker 1: departments that are not heavily associated with revenue affected the most.

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Speaker 1: But time will tell a lot of people think that

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Speaker 1: this is going to unfold within the week or early

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Speaker 1: next week, so we'll just have to keep an eye out.

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Speaker 1: All right, we've got more news to cover, but first

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Speaker 1: let's take a quick break. We're back. UDN reports that

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Speaker 1: Intel has finalized its design of two nanometer and one

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Speaker 1: point eight nanimeter fabrication processes. Remember a nanometer is a

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Speaker 1: billion of a meter. However, when you hear these numbers,

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Speaker 1: it does not actually mean that Intel is about to

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Speaker 1: churn out chips that have components that measure two nanometers

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Speaker 1: or one point eight nanometers in size. It's actually just

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Speaker 1: a naming convention at this point. Once upon a time,

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Speaker 1: the numbers actually did refer to the size of the

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Speaker 1: individual components on a chip, but we abandoned that several

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Speaker 1: generations back. We kept the naming convention, which is odd

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Speaker 1: because it's a naming convention where the numbers keep going down,

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Speaker 1: but those numbers don't actually refer to the size of

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Speaker 1: anything on the chip anymore. Also, I should mention that

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Speaker 1: these processes have been designed but not actually built out.

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Speaker 1: So in other words, Intel has come out up with

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Speaker 1: the approach they're going to take, but they haven't actually

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Speaker 1: created the manufacturing process itself. So we're not going to

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Speaker 1: get chips right away that have these new features on them.

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Speaker 1: And if you're wondering why we don't go smaller anymore, really,

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Speaker 1: when it comes down to it, I mean, some stuff

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Speaker 1: does get shrunk from generation to generation, but not as

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Speaker 1: much as what the Naming Convention would have you think.

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Speaker 1: And the big reason for that comes down to quantum physics.

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Speaker 1: If you make components small enough, then quantum mechanics come

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Speaker 1: into play and electrons will decide to do whatever the

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Speaker 1: heck they want to do instead of following these careful

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Speaker 1: pathways you built for them with your transistors and whatnot.

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Speaker 1: That's being a little flippant, but it's also true anyway.

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Speaker 1: Intel is introducing a lot of stuff all at once

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Speaker 1: with the one point eight nanimeter fabrication process, also known

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Speaker 1: as the eighteen A process. The A stands for Angstrom

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Speaker 1: because you know, you have to go down from the

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Speaker 1: nanoscale to the Angstrom scale. Intel has a new transistor

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Speaker 1: design with this eighteen A approach. It is shrinking some

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Speaker 1: components so some things are getting smaller, and also has

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Speaker 1: added backside power delivery. And as Tom's Hardware point out,

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Speaker 1: there's a lot of stuff that has been incorporated into

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Speaker 1: this new design. It's a bold and potentially risky approach.

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Speaker 1: So typically what Intel does is follow a pretty standard

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Speaker 1: tick talk pattern, which means it comes up with a

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Speaker 1: new design for chip architecture, and then it builds a

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Speaker 1: chip based on that design. Then in the next generation

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Speaker 1: it optimizes that design, and then after optimizing the previous design,

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Speaker 1: Intel goes and makes another new design. So it goes

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Speaker 1: talk tick talk, So new architecture optimization, new architecture optimization.

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Speaker 1: Once upon a time, the architecture really did refer more

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Speaker 1: to shrinking things down, Like you would design an architecture

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Speaker 1: and then the next generation you would shrink it down.

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Speaker 1: The next generation you would build a new architecture based

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Speaker 1: on that new size you had reached, then you would

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Speaker 1: shrink it down. That kind of thing. We're kind of

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Speaker 1: beyond that at this point anyway, we're not likely to

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Speaker 1: see any chips based off this new process for at

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Speaker 1: least a year. Intel hopes to have it in place

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Speaker 1: by early twenty twenty four. Earlier on in this episode,

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Speaker 1: I talked about how Huawei has come under suspicion by

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Speaker 1: the US government, which then pushed telecom companies to ditch

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Speaker 1: Huawei equipment in their networks. Well, in another Huawei related story,

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Speaker 1: the company recently participated as an exhibitor at the Mobile

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Speaker 1: World Congress event in Spain, and visitors to Huawei's booth

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Speaker 1: were given personal security badges. They had to wear them

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Speaker 1: while they were in the booth, and they were meant

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Speaker 1: to hand the badges back when they were ready to

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Speaker 1: leave the booth. Only some folks forgot to hand the

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Speaker 1: badges back and they ultimately walked off with them, and

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Speaker 1: then some of them just left their badges lying around,

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Speaker 1: And then of course people got a little curious and

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Speaker 1: they took the badge which was on a lanyard, one

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Speaker 1: of those extending lanyards where you got the little plastic

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Speaker 1: clip that has the spool in site it so you

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Speaker 1: can extend and retract your badge. Well, someone found out

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Speaker 1: that inside that plastic clip, there was a tiny circuit board,

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Speaker 1: like they popped the clip open, and besides the spool

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Speaker 1: for the lanyard there was a chip, And so folks

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Speaker 1: started to speculate what this circuitry could be. Was Whahwei

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Speaker 1: trying to track people? So the company said, essentially yeah,

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Speaker 1: because those badges were meant to track where people were

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Speaker 1: going within the booth and how much time they were

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Speaker 1: spending at specific parts of the booth, that kind of thing.

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Speaker 1: This in turn would inform Huawei about what people were

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Speaker 1: most interested in. Folks were expected to hand over the

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Speaker 1: badges after the end of their visit, so it wasn't

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Speaker 1: like Huawei was trying to bug someone and track all

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Speaker 1: their movements throughout all of Mobile World Congress. They were

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Speaker 1: just really, according to what they're saying, interested in what

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Speaker 1: people were doing when they were actually visiting Huawei's booth.

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Speaker 1: Now there's concerned that individual badges could be connected to

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Speaker 1: specific people, like if they were personalized. I don't know

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Speaker 1: if they were personalized because the report I read it

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Speaker 1: and go into detail, but if they were, then there's

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Speaker 1: some concern about that data being linked to a specific individual.

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Speaker 1: But huawehas said that they're following their privacy policy, they're

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Speaker 1: going to protect that information. That that's not really what

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Speaker 1: they're really focused on. They're looking at what parts of

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Speaker 1: their booth design were effective and what wasn't. Honestly, I

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Speaker 1: get the feeling this is a story that's more innocent

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Speaker 1: than malicious. I didn't see anything to indicate that the

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Speaker 1: circuitry could really do anything sinister. It looks like it's

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Speaker 1: a passive RFID and Bluetooth system, so something that when

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Speaker 1: it passes within range of an emitter can reflect back

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Speaker 1: a response which just gives the system information of where

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Speaker 1: someone is and how long they are there. It didn't

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Speaker 1: look like it was capable of doing more than that

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Speaker 1: to me, but that was at a casual glance based

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Speaker 1: upon some photographs, and I just think that this one

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Speaker 1: is probably not that big of a deal. Honestly, I

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Speaker 1: think Huawei is pretty much telling the truth here. However,

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Speaker 1: it does really illustrate how Huawei has a reputation associated

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Speaker 1: with it. Whether that reputation is fair or not is

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Speaker 1: up for debate, but I think it shows that there's

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Speaker 1: this kind of cloud of suspicion that's associated with the company.

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Speaker 1: In a new segment that I'd like to call y'all

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Speaker 1: got to read this. I want to give a shout

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Speaker 1: out to Wired. Wired published a piece that's titled Inside

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Speaker 1: the Suspicion Machine, and it's about governments using systems that

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Speaker 1: reduce people to data points for the purposes of making

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Speaker 1: really important decisions regarding those people. It opens talking about

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Speaker 1: a welfare system in Europe and how such an algorithmic

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Speaker 1: approach can be used by administrators of these systems to

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Speaker 1: determine who is taking advantage of the system. As Wired

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Speaker 1: points out, they said, it's not like it's being used

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Speaker 1: to determine how much welfare a person requires, but rather

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Speaker 1: how likely is it that this person is abusing the system,

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Speaker 1: like it's taking an accusatory stance out of the gate. Well,

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Speaker 1: this reminds me a lot about a story we covered

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Speaker 1: recently about how a lot of HR leaders expect that

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Speaker 1: they will at least partly be relying on AI and

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Speaker 1: algorithms when it comes to making layoff decisions. So to

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Speaker 1: do that, you kind of have to reduce people into

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Speaker 1: a collection of data points so that an algorithmic system

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Speaker 1: can actually make decisions, and compare this set of numbers

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Speaker 1: against this set of numbers. But there are a lot

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Speaker 1: of dangers with this approach, including bias potentially leading to

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Speaker 1: specific populations of people being disproportionately targeted and affected by

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Speaker 1: these kinds of decisions. Now, the piece on Wired is extensive,

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Speaker 1: it is thorough, it is a great read. So I

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Speaker 1: recommend go check out the piece again. It's on Wired.

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Speaker 1: It's titled Inside the Suspicion Machine. Also, just for the

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Speaker 1: interest of full disclosure, I do not know any of

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Speaker 1: the people who contributed to that article. I do not

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Speaker 1: have any connection with Wired other than being a subscriber.

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Speaker 1: It's just my recommendation as someone who reads a lot

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Speaker 1: about tech. You know, in the early days of the pandemic,

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Speaker 1: when everyone was scrambling to find ways to work in

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Speaker 1: a suddenly decentralized remote approach, conference tools like Zoom really

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Speaker 1: took off, followed closely by people determined to disrupt work

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Speaker 1: being done through these tools. Well, we haven't emerged from

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Speaker 1: the disruption stage yet because recently a meeting that was

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Speaker 1: being held by the US Federal Reserve had to be

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Speaker 1: canceled in process due to a stream hijacker who blasted

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Speaker 1: pornographic content to the attendees of the Zoom meeting, which

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Speaker 1: was like a couple hundred people. I think now you

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Speaker 1: might remember there were similar stories from just a couple

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Speaker 1: of years ago about people who found that they could

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Speaker 1: access corporate meetings that failed to protect their links, and

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Speaker 1: also that didn't use any kind of password protection. I

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Speaker 1: saw a rapid adoption throughout the industry of things like

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Speaker 1: protected links and passwords after that kind of happened because

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Speaker 1: it was easy to do. It was pretty easy to

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Speaker 1: find links that were being shared publicly, but they weren't

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Speaker 1: intended to be public meetings, and then people would just

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Speaker 1: crash them. So this is kind of similar to that.

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Speaker 1: The Federal Reserves Brent Jarks issued an apology for the

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Speaker 1: incident and committed to finding out how the hijack happened

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Speaker 1: and how to prevent it from happening again. Okay, I've

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Speaker 1: got a couple more news stories, but before I get

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Speaker 1: to those, let's take another quick break. We're back. So,

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Speaker 1: Engadget has a piece about Honda's newest robot, which, unlike

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Speaker 1: the Tesla Optimus robot, and unlike Honda's own retired Asimo robot,

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Speaker 1: isn't humanoid. It's not built to look like a human.

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Speaker 1: It doesn't have legs and arms, no, Instead, Honda's robot

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Speaker 1: is actually the third generation of its autonomous work vehicle

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Speaker 1: or a w V design, So it's a type of

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Speaker 1: kind of self guided electric wagon. It's meant to carry

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Speaker 1: payloads and has a large enough surface flat surface that

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Speaker 1: can carry two pallets worth of payload, and it can

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Speaker 1: support up to two thousand pounds per go. It has

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Speaker 1: a top speed of around ten miles per hour. That's

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Speaker 1: actually fairly darned zippy for something like this, and it

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Speaker 1: reportedly can go for twenty eight miles before needing a recharge.

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Speaker 1: I don't know if that's under a full load. It

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Speaker 1: might be less time under a full load. But this

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Speaker 1: is not the first automous work vehicle, like I said,

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Speaker 1: it's actually the third generation, and Honda says it is

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Speaker 1: capable of working either by remote control, so you could

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Speaker 1: have someone actually steering this remotely, or it can operate

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Speaker 1: completely autonomously. Honda anticipates that the AWV will have utility

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Speaker 1: in environments like warehouses and construction sites and that kind

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Speaker 1: of thing. That it's designed to also be able to

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Speaker 1: travel over rough terrain, so a construction site would be fine.

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Speaker 1: So Honda now is looking to form strategic partnerships with

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Speaker 1: construction companies to kind of test the AWV in the

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Speaker 1: real world, Like, let's actually put this thing on real

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Speaker 1: construction sites and see if it ends up being a

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Speaker 1: useful tool. I think that this is actually a great

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Speaker 1: example of a robot the engineer build to perform a

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Speaker 1: specific function with a form that supports that function. I

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Speaker 1: talked about this earlier when we chatted about the Optimus

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Speaker 1: robot a few episodes ago. Where building a humanoid robot

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Speaker 1: is cool, like it's neat to see humanoid robots, no

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Speaker 1: doubt about it. They are fascinating, they are incredibly complicated.

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Speaker 1: It's impressive work, but it's not always or not necessarily

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Speaker 1: the best tool for the job. Sometimes it's better to

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Speaker 1: design a robot that is engineered to tackle a specific

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Speaker 1: task as efficiently as possible, which may not have anything

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Speaker 1: to do with the human form, and then you get

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Speaker 1: great results. If you try to create a humanoid robot

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Speaker 1: that can do anything, often it doesn't do anything very well,

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Speaker 1: Like it can do lots of different stuff, but it's

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Speaker 1: not necessarily performing at the top level. Whereas if you

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Speaker 1: build specific purpose built robots to do a small group

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Speaker 1: of tasks, you can get much better results. Typically, we're

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Speaker 1: just at that stage, like humanoid robots are really complicated

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Speaker 1: and difficult to pull off. So I think Honda's approach

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Speaker 1: makes way more sense than companies like Tesla that are

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Speaker 1: pushing this humanoid approach, at least in the near term.

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Speaker 1: Maybe in the future we'll get to a point where

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Speaker 1: building a humanoid robot that's really good at everything will

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Speaker 1: be a relatively trivial task. But right now, just making

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Speaker 1: them walk or be able to open a door and

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Speaker 1: walk through without falling over is harder than it sounds. Finally,

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Speaker 1: Japan's H three rocket didn't do so well this week

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Speaker 1: in its first test flight. So this is a new

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Speaker 1: launch vehicle that Japan's government has developed to put payloads

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Speaker 1: into orbit. Competitions getting really tight when it comes to

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Speaker 1: putting satellites up into space. So during its first launch,

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00:27:59,040 --> 00:28:03,520
Speaker 1: the second stage of the vehicle failed to ignite, so

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Speaker 1: the administrators of Japan's space program gave the order to

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Speaker 1: the vehicle for it to self destruct. The vehicle did

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00:28:12,920 --> 00:28:15,280
Speaker 1: self destruct. It came crashing down the ocean off the

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Speaker 1: coast of the Philippines, and Japan says there are no

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Speaker 1: reports of any injuries or damage caused by the wreckage

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Speaker 1: falling to Earth. But what it was meant to do

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00:28:25,600 --> 00:28:29,240
Speaker 1: was to put a satellite called the Advanced Land Observing

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00:28:29,280 --> 00:28:33,720
Speaker 1: Satellite three into orbit, and this satellite's purpose was to

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Speaker 1: monitor conditions on the ground to help the government coordinate

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00:28:37,560 --> 00:28:40,280
Speaker 1: efforts in the wake of a disaster. And it also

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00:28:40,400 --> 00:28:44,680
Speaker 1: carried some other tools for the defense ministry that would

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00:28:44,720 --> 00:28:48,720
Speaker 1: be able to detect ballistic missile launches. And that makes

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00:28:48,720 --> 00:28:51,560
Speaker 1: a lot of sense because if you know about Japan

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00:28:51,600 --> 00:28:55,160
Speaker 1: and North Korea, you know that North Korea will occasionally

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00:28:55,240 --> 00:28:59,640
Speaker 1: hold test launches and fire missiles into the Sea of Japan.

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00:29:00,200 --> 00:29:03,040
Speaker 1: So having a system that detects those sorts of things

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00:29:03,160 --> 00:29:05,960
Speaker 1: totally makes sense. But all of that obviously was lost

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00:29:06,040 --> 00:29:09,600
Speaker 1: because the vehicle failed to attain orbit and had to

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00:29:09,600 --> 00:29:14,840
Speaker 1: be put into self destruct mode. Numerous administrators in Japan's

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00:29:14,840 --> 00:29:19,800
Speaker 1: space agency have expressed regret over the failure and apologies

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00:29:20,000 --> 00:29:23,200
Speaker 1: for the failed launch. There are even questions about how

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00:29:23,200 --> 00:29:26,880
Speaker 1: this might affect the government's space industry moving forward, which

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00:29:27,120 --> 00:29:29,400
Speaker 1: it sounds incredible to me because, I mean, obviously any

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00:29:29,480 --> 00:29:33,960
Speaker 1: failure is regrettable. Right, you don't want to ever see

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00:29:33,960 --> 00:29:39,280
Speaker 1: a failure, but technology does fail, and we're talking about

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00:29:39,360 --> 00:29:42,320
Speaker 1: rocket science. There's a reason you say, well, that's not

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00:29:42,440 --> 00:29:46,360
Speaker 1: rocket science because rocket science is hard. It is really hard.

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00:29:47,040 --> 00:29:50,120
Speaker 1: But I think this also is tough because it follows

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00:29:50,280 --> 00:29:55,360
Speaker 1: on Japan's previous launch vehicle, the H two A, which

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00:29:55,360 --> 00:29:59,480
Speaker 1: had a reputation for being extremely reliable, had a successful

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00:29:59,560 --> 00:30:03,400
Speaker 1: launch eight of around ninety seven point eight percent. So

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00:30:03,440 --> 00:30:06,440
Speaker 1: when you're following that track record and your first launch

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00:30:06,440 --> 00:30:08,160
Speaker 1: out of the gate is a failure, I could see

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00:30:08,200 --> 00:30:12,280
Speaker 1: how this could be a real black mark on the

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00:30:12,360 --> 00:30:15,960
Speaker 1: program as a whole. So I'm not sure where Japan's

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00:30:16,000 --> 00:30:19,640
Speaker 1: gonna go based on this failure, but yeah, I thought

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Speaker 1: I would cover that. And that's it for the News today, Tuesday,

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Speaker 1: March twenty three. Just a reminder tomorrow we have a

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00:30:28,280 --> 00:30:31,000
Speaker 1: special episode of tech Stuff coming out, hosted by bridget

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00:30:31,040 --> 00:30:33,640
Speaker 1: Todd of There Are No Girls in the Internet. I

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00:30:33,720 --> 00:30:36,240
Speaker 1: look forward to hearing your thoughts on that show, and

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00:30:36,320 --> 00:30:39,720
Speaker 1: I'll be back on Thursday with more tech news and

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00:30:39,760 --> 00:30:43,080
Speaker 1: then it's off to Austin, Texas, where I'll be at

479
00:30:43,080 --> 00:30:45,520
Speaker 1: south By Southwest. So if you see me in Austin

480
00:30:45,680 --> 00:30:49,960
Speaker 1: over the weekend. You can wave. I'll probably be on

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00:30:50,040 --> 00:30:54,480
Speaker 1: my way somewhere, probably Torchi's Tacos if I'm honest, because yes,

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00:30:54,560 --> 00:30:57,720
Speaker 1: I am basic. And the taco of the month is

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00:30:57,960 --> 00:31:00,480
Speaker 1: the Rosco, which is a chicken and waffles taco, and

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00:31:00,600 --> 00:31:05,080
Speaker 1: y'all I got to get one. Okay, okay, Sorry kind

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00:31:05,080 --> 00:31:07,480
Speaker 1: of lost the thread there. If you have suggestions for

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00:31:07,520 --> 00:31:09,720
Speaker 1: topics I should cover in future episodes of tech Stuff,

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00:31:09,760 --> 00:31:12,360
Speaker 1: please reach out. You can do so on Twitter. The

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Speaker 1: handle for the show is tech Stuff HSW or you

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Speaker 1: voice message up to thirty seconds in way, and I'll

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00:31:31,920 --> 00:31:41,280
Speaker 1: talk to you again and really soon. Tech Stuff is

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00:31:41,320 --> 00:31:45,880
Speaker 1: an iHeartRadio production. For more podcasts from iHeartRadio, visit the

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Speaker 1: favorite shows.