1 00:00:00,080 --> 00:00:12,960 Speaker 1: Ye, Welcome to the Bloomberg Surveillance Podcast. I'm Tom Keane. 2 00:00:13,480 --> 00:00:17,560 Speaker 1: Daily we bring you insight from the best in economics, finance, investment, 3 00:00:18,000 --> 00:00:23,480 Speaker 1: and international relations. Find Bloomberg Surveillance on Apple Podcasts, SoundCloud, 4 00:00:23,600 --> 00:00:28,040 Speaker 1: Bloomberg dot Com, and of course on the Bloomberg. Bloomberg 5 00:00:28,120 --> 00:00:31,800 Speaker 1: Surveillance from London and from New York. Paul Sweeney in 6 00:00:31,840 --> 00:00:35,040 Speaker 1: New York this morning. It has been a dreary and 7 00:00:35,159 --> 00:00:37,760 Speaker 1: rainy day in New York, and now the sad news 8 00:00:37,800 --> 00:00:42,280 Speaker 1: of Paul Woker has died here. I can't convey, folks, 9 00:00:42,720 --> 00:00:46,680 Speaker 1: the courage, the intellectual courage of Paul Worker in the 10 00:00:46,760 --> 00:00:50,640 Speaker 1: crucible of the late nineteen seventies and into the early 11 00:00:50,720 --> 00:00:55,560 Speaker 1: nineteen eighties. There is no precedent in our financial history 12 00:00:55,680 --> 00:01:00,440 Speaker 1: with an important report or Bob Moon is a friend. 13 00:01:01,800 --> 00:01:04,840 Speaker 1: When Saturday Night Live made fun of Jimmy Carter's inflation 14 00:01:04,880 --> 00:01:07,800 Speaker 1: headaches in the late nineteen seventies, it was rapidly becoming 15 00:01:07,800 --> 00:01:11,480 Speaker 1: no laughing matter. In the two thousand, trans continued, the 16 00:01:11,520 --> 00:01:14,440 Speaker 1: average blue collar annual wage in this country will be 17 00:01:14,480 --> 00:01:18,560 Speaker 1: five hundred and sixty eight thousand dollars. Good evening prices 18 00:01:18,600 --> 00:01:21,120 Speaker 1: in the United States during the first three months of 19 00:01:21,240 --> 00:01:24,039 Speaker 1: nineteen seventy nine went up at an annual rate of 20 00:01:25,520 --> 00:01:27,880 Speaker 1: That was the year Paul Woker became Chairman of the 21 00:01:27,920 --> 00:01:30,640 Speaker 1: Federal Reserve. He would go on to be credited with 22 00:01:30,680 --> 00:01:34,000 Speaker 1: breaking the back of inflation with some very tough medicine. 23 00:01:34,280 --> 00:01:37,559 Speaker 1: Under the Carter and Reagan administrations, Voker cranked interest rates 24 00:01:37,600 --> 00:01:41,440 Speaker 1: ever higher to stem rising prices and slay an inflation monster. 25 00:01:41,840 --> 00:01:44,160 Speaker 1: He talked about it years later in a retrospective for 26 00:01:44,200 --> 00:01:48,120 Speaker 1: the Federal Reserve. I do think there was a feeling 27 00:01:48,160 --> 00:01:50,760 Speaker 1: in the country then that there was something of an 28 00:01:50,800 --> 00:01:53,000 Speaker 1: emergency that had to be dealt with, had to be 29 00:01:53,080 --> 00:01:56,720 Speaker 1: dealt with by forceful action, and that kind of common 30 00:01:56,800 --> 00:01:59,080 Speaker 1: sense reaction that there would be a little pain and 31 00:01:59,160 --> 00:02:02,120 Speaker 1: impressss who struggled through those times would argue that a 32 00:02:02,120 --> 00:02:05,400 Speaker 1: little pain is a gross understatement. The prime lending rate 33 00:02:05,600 --> 00:02:08,400 Speaker 1: went to twenty one and a half percent today. Before 34 00:02:08,440 --> 00:02:11,600 Speaker 1: this week, it had never an American history been above 35 00:02:11,680 --> 00:02:14,960 Speaker 1: twenty Volker was vilified in some quarters for the impact 36 00:02:14,960 --> 00:02:17,720 Speaker 1: of those borrowing costs on businesses. There was a cement 37 00:02:17,800 --> 00:02:20,520 Speaker 1: company that used to put ads, full page ads in 38 00:02:20,520 --> 00:02:23,880 Speaker 1: the Wall Street Journal, sculling crossbones under my name or 39 00:02:23,919 --> 00:02:27,280 Speaker 1: under my picture or whatever, and they kind of rankled. 40 00:02:27,760 --> 00:02:31,280 Speaker 1: The outcry at the time was widespread. Farmers protested by 41 00:02:31,280 --> 00:02:34,600 Speaker 1: blockading the FEDS Washington d C. Headquarters with their tractors. 42 00:02:34,919 --> 00:02:38,000 Speaker 1: Home Builders and carpenters wrote Volker's name and fed address 43 00:02:38,120 --> 00:02:40,919 Speaker 1: on sections of two by four lumber and mailed them 44 00:02:41,080 --> 00:02:43,840 Speaker 1: complaining they had no use for wood since no one 45 00:02:43,960 --> 00:02:47,239 Speaker 1: was buying houses. The pain was also felt by carmakers. 46 00:02:47,360 --> 00:02:49,040 Speaker 1: The price of the car is bad enough that the 47 00:02:49,120 --> 00:02:53,239 Speaker 1: interest rate is ridiculous. Ultimately, though Vulker's tough medicine cured 48 00:02:53,280 --> 00:02:56,600 Speaker 1: the inflation problem. The inflation numbers from three came out 49 00:02:56,720 --> 00:02:58,440 Speaker 1: and they were the lowest that they have been since 50 00:02:58,520 --> 00:03:02,720 Speaker 1: nineteen seventy two, three point eight percent. That's down for 51 00:03:02,800 --> 00:03:05,040 Speaker 1: more than twelve percent in nineteen eighty and by the 52 00:03:05,080 --> 00:03:07,640 Speaker 1: end of nineteen eighty six, the consumer price index had 53 00:03:07,639 --> 00:03:11,040 Speaker 1: settled down to one point one percent. The achievement laid 54 00:03:11,040 --> 00:03:15,000 Speaker 1: the foundation for the economic expansions presided over by his successors, 55 00:03:15,200 --> 00:03:18,720 Speaker 1: Alan Greenspan and Ben Burnike. Folker would quip that the 56 00:03:18,720 --> 00:03:22,160 Speaker 1: best new financial product in recent decades was the automated 57 00:03:22,160 --> 00:03:26,239 Speaker 1: teller machine and scorned financial industry innovations such as credit 58 00:03:26,280 --> 00:03:29,280 Speaker 1: default swaps, mindful of the risks of the free market. 59 00:03:29,480 --> 00:03:32,520 Speaker 1: Financial crises have been a recurrent feature of free and 60 00:03:32,560 --> 00:03:35,640 Speaker 1: open carpital markets, not reached in the United States the 61 00:03:35,760 --> 00:03:39,120 Speaker 1: forty years of relative cran quality, where the exception up 62 00:03:39,120 --> 00:03:42,040 Speaker 1: the norm. Foker established a reputation as something of a 63 00:03:42,080 --> 00:03:45,200 Speaker 1: one man economic cleanup crew, called upon early in his 64 00:03:45,280 --> 00:03:48,040 Speaker 1: career at the Treasury Department to devise a successor to 65 00:03:48,080 --> 00:03:50,920 Speaker 1: the gold Standard, and again, as the nation was struggling 66 00:03:50,960 --> 00:03:53,240 Speaker 1: to pull out of the worst financial crisis since the 67 00:03:53,240 --> 00:03:56,440 Speaker 1: Great Depression, he counseled Barack Obama as head of the 68 00:03:56,480 --> 00:04:01,040 Speaker 1: Economic Recovery Advisory Board, proposing a simple, common sense reform 69 00:04:01,120 --> 00:04:04,040 Speaker 1: which we're calling the Vocal Rule. After this tall guy 70 00:04:04,080 --> 00:04:08,760 Speaker 1: behind me. Banks will no longer be allowed to own, 71 00:04:09,400 --> 00:04:14,000 Speaker 1: invest or sponsor hedge funds, private equity funds, or proprietary 72 00:04:14,040 --> 00:04:18,400 Speaker 1: trading operations for their own profit unrelated to serving their customers. 73 00:04:18,880 --> 00:04:21,719 Speaker 1: We cannot accept a system in which shareholders make money 74 00:04:21,720 --> 00:04:25,000 Speaker 1: on these operations if the bank wins, but tax bears 75 00:04:25,040 --> 00:04:27,760 Speaker 1: for the bill if the bank loses. When Vocal first 76 00:04:27,800 --> 00:04:31,680 Speaker 1: proposed banning speculation by federally insured banks in two thousand nine. 77 00:04:31,760 --> 00:04:34,560 Speaker 1: He did it in one paragraph. Four years later, the 78 00:04:34,640 --> 00:04:37,719 Speaker 1: nation's regulators issued a rule based on Volker's idea that 79 00:04:37,880 --> 00:04:41,080 Speaker 1: ran close to one hundred pages. Ultimately, much of the 80 00:04:41,120 --> 00:04:44,080 Speaker 1: so called vocal rule was rolled back, but he continued 81 00:04:44,120 --> 00:04:48,560 Speaker 1: to counsel against in anything goes approach that just doesn't fly. 82 00:04:48,839 --> 00:04:52,479 Speaker 1: And that's where we were, and that's what broke down. 83 00:04:52,680 --> 00:04:55,760 Speaker 1: Paul Volker, who stood six ft seven, was a giant 84 00:04:55,800 --> 00:04:58,200 Speaker 1: of the financial world through a career that spanned more 85 00:04:58,200 --> 00:05:01,200 Speaker 1: than half a century. He was ninety two years old. 86 00:05:01,600 --> 00:05:05,080 Speaker 1: I'm Bob Moon Bloomberg Radio. Thank you so much. Just 87 00:05:05,360 --> 00:05:08,880 Speaker 1: just extraordinary well done. How Bob does that? We are 88 00:05:09,040 --> 00:05:12,360 Speaker 1: so fortunate to have a former chairman of the sec 89 00:05:12,560 --> 00:05:16,960 Speaker 1: joint us Arthur Lovitt joins us now on chairman Broke Voker. Arthur, 90 00:05:17,120 --> 00:05:20,760 Speaker 1: I know you stood at lunch is, breakfast, dinners and 91 00:05:20,839 --> 00:05:27,039 Speaker 1: insecurities meetings listening to the impossible to accomplish theories of 92 00:05:27,120 --> 00:05:30,640 Speaker 1: Paul Woker, how gauge for us colored for us, if 93 00:05:30,680 --> 00:05:35,520 Speaker 1: you will, the absolute doubt that he could bring inflation down. 94 00:05:36,960 --> 00:05:42,479 Speaker 1: I think his policies, which were the right policies at 95 00:05:42,520 --> 00:05:46,920 Speaker 1: the time he issued them and spoke about them, there 96 00:05:47,000 --> 00:05:54,120 Speaker 1: was enormous skepticism and the financial community, and my personal 97 00:05:54,160 --> 00:05:59,080 Speaker 1: experience with him was that I believed him. I believed 98 00:05:59,200 --> 00:06:03,800 Speaker 1: in him, and I was very vocal in my support 99 00:06:03,920 --> 00:06:08,039 Speaker 1: for him, and he never forgot that. Uh. This goes 100 00:06:08,120 --> 00:06:12,880 Speaker 1: back nearly thirty years, and it's hard to imagine how 101 00:06:14,800 --> 00:06:19,800 Speaker 1: how much he was criticized for raising interest rates to 102 00:06:19,920 --> 00:06:27,000 Speaker 1: those levels. And Volca was a very straightforward, plain man 103 00:06:27,200 --> 00:06:33,280 Speaker 1: who spoke uh in plain, direct English. There was absolutely 104 00:06:33,440 --> 00:06:39,960 Speaker 1: no artifice, no guile, no game playing. He was straightforward, 105 00:06:40,279 --> 00:06:45,760 Speaker 1: upright and decent. He was as decent a person as 106 00:06:45,800 --> 00:06:49,280 Speaker 1: I've known in my whole life, and I was blessed 107 00:06:49,320 --> 00:06:54,599 Speaker 1: by the experience of having known him. He's been complicated, straightforward. 108 00:06:54,640 --> 00:06:57,719 Speaker 1: I like that. I like that Arthur uncomplicated. Out of 109 00:06:57,720 --> 00:07:00,440 Speaker 1: tea Neck, New Jersey, a pretty basic up ringing. His 110 00:07:00,880 --> 00:07:03,240 Speaker 1: father ran the government of te Neck for a while, 111 00:07:03,320 --> 00:07:07,279 Speaker 1: there was a mnicipal manager. But what I always felt 112 00:07:07,440 --> 00:07:12,960 Speaker 1: Arthur is so many people missed his absolute prodigious academics. 113 00:07:13,040 --> 00:07:17,760 Speaker 1: His command out of Princeton of the material to me, 114 00:07:17,960 --> 00:07:21,400 Speaker 1: was the foundation of his courage. He was. He was 115 00:07:21,600 --> 00:07:25,760 Speaker 1: truly The depth of his perspective was just extraordinary. Was 116 00:07:25,760 --> 00:07:29,480 Speaker 1: that evident in those great battles of the late seventies? Yes, 117 00:07:29,560 --> 00:07:32,400 Speaker 1: it was very evident that this was a man who 118 00:07:32,440 --> 00:07:37,880 Speaker 1: spoke without artifice, without gyle, with none of the embellishments 119 00:07:37,880 --> 00:07:41,640 Speaker 1: of the typical financial commentator of the period, and he 120 00:07:41,680 --> 00:07:47,400 Speaker 1: spoke in such direct terms that the average citizen could 121 00:07:47,480 --> 00:07:51,120 Speaker 1: easily understand what he was driving in and what he 122 00:07:51,240 --> 00:07:54,320 Speaker 1: was about. Arthur, give us a sense, take us back 123 00:07:54,320 --> 00:07:56,920 Speaker 1: if he would back to those late seventies. What kind 124 00:07:56,960 --> 00:08:00,680 Speaker 1: of support, if any, did fed Chairman Vulker see from 125 00:08:00,760 --> 00:08:03,920 Speaker 1: the broader financial community for his actions to try to 126 00:08:03,960 --> 00:08:07,680 Speaker 1: reign in inflation. He had some support, but it was limited. 127 00:08:07,960 --> 00:08:13,360 Speaker 1: It was by no means a public outcry on his behalf. 128 00:08:14,160 --> 00:08:17,760 Speaker 1: There were relatively few people who were outspoken in their 129 00:08:18,360 --> 00:08:23,440 Speaker 1: supportive Paul Vulcar, but he deeply appreciated whatever support he 130 00:08:23,520 --> 00:08:30,320 Speaker 1: got and maintained those as his most important relationships later 131 00:08:30,440 --> 00:08:36,240 Speaker 1: in life. He was an incredibly loyal individual individual throughout 132 00:08:37,000 --> 00:08:41,800 Speaker 1: his public and private lives, and his friendships were deep 133 00:08:41,840 --> 00:08:47,600 Speaker 1: and sustaining. He shared an office with a man named 134 00:08:48,240 --> 00:08:53,360 Speaker 1: Dick Ravit Yeah, and the two of them were close 135 00:08:53,920 --> 00:08:59,319 Speaker 1: up until the time that that Vulcar passed away, and 136 00:08:59,720 --> 00:09:04,840 Speaker 1: he maintained similar relationships with a number of people throughout 137 00:09:04,880 --> 00:09:08,240 Speaker 1: his life. And these were not people that were necessarily 138 00:09:09,320 --> 00:09:12,840 Speaker 1: the most well known. They were people who he valued 139 00:09:12,920 --> 00:09:16,960 Speaker 1: for their support and their friendship and their intelligence. Arthur, 140 00:09:16,960 --> 00:09:19,960 Speaker 1: we are so thrilled that you're with us today, Arthur Levett, 141 00:09:20,000 --> 00:09:23,920 Speaker 1: the former chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission. We're 142 00:09:23,920 --> 00:09:25,880 Speaker 1: now working to get a number of guests. I'm thrilled 143 00:09:25,880 --> 00:09:28,840 Speaker 1: to tell you that John Writing of RDQ Economics schedule 144 00:09:28,880 --> 00:09:31,920 Speaker 1: to join us here. Uh in a bit, if you're 145 00:09:31,960 --> 00:09:34,320 Speaker 1: just tuning in. The former Chairman of the Federal Reserve, 146 00:09:34,360 --> 00:09:38,360 Speaker 1: Paul Woker, his dead at ninety two. He's been extremely sick. 147 00:09:38,400 --> 00:09:42,360 Speaker 1: Paul extremely sick over the recent months. This is to 148 00:09:42,520 --> 00:09:45,720 Speaker 1: all of his friends and acquaintances of those walks around 149 00:09:45,760 --> 00:09:48,240 Speaker 1: the Upper east Side that you see him on. This 150 00:09:48,280 --> 00:09:51,040 Speaker 1: has not been a surprise in coming not been a surprise. 151 00:09:51,080 --> 00:09:54,360 Speaker 1: But as Bob Moon so uh, you know, elegantly put 152 00:09:54,440 --> 00:09:58,559 Speaker 1: and Arthur Levitt that commented as well, just an extraordinary 153 00:09:58,679 --> 00:10:02,360 Speaker 1: career in an out of public service. And you think back, 154 00:10:02,720 --> 00:10:04,000 Speaker 1: which it's hard for us to do. When you look 155 00:10:04,000 --> 00:10:06,640 Speaker 1: at inflation right now at one you know some of 156 00:10:06,679 --> 00:10:10,360 Speaker 1: those double digit numbers, it's just extraordinary. Well it was, 157 00:10:10,440 --> 00:10:12,640 Speaker 1: and it was the courage of lifting rates to break 158 00:10:12,640 --> 00:10:15,880 Speaker 1: it in the intellectual foundations and debate of that we're 159 00:10:15,920 --> 00:10:33,280 Speaker 1: as great as anything that we have today. Paul Workers 160 00:10:33,320 --> 00:10:36,000 Speaker 1: dead at ninety two. He has been very very ill. 161 00:10:36,120 --> 00:10:40,240 Speaker 1: This has been widely expected among the economics community, in 162 00:10:40,360 --> 00:10:44,520 Speaker 1: the New York financial community as well. We continue our 163 00:10:44,559 --> 00:10:47,600 Speaker 1: coverage Paul Sweeney in New York. I'm Tom keenan London. 164 00:10:47,640 --> 00:10:49,880 Speaker 1: Were thrilled to Diane swonk as with us, with Grant 165 00:10:49,880 --> 00:10:53,400 Speaker 1: Thornton on short notice, and of course our Michael McKee 166 00:10:53,480 --> 00:10:56,240 Speaker 1: joins us as well. Michael, of the group here, you're 167 00:10:56,280 --> 00:10:59,080 Speaker 1: the only one like me old enough to remember this agony. 168 00:10:59,440 --> 00:11:03,360 Speaker 1: Diane Wark was far too young. What were the theoretical 169 00:11:03,559 --> 00:11:09,760 Speaker 1: underpinnings to Paul Worker's courage? Were they evident? No? Not particularly. 170 00:11:09,920 --> 00:11:14,400 Speaker 1: But he came in and he changed the monetary policy 171 00:11:14,480 --> 00:11:18,480 Speaker 1: regime of the Fed to target the money supply, which 172 00:11:18,840 --> 00:11:21,320 Speaker 1: he said gave them two advantages when it was a 173 00:11:21,360 --> 00:11:25,079 Speaker 1: simple message to convey what they were doing. And he 174 00:11:25,120 --> 00:11:28,400 Speaker 1: said it also created an internal discipline within the FED. 175 00:11:28,720 --> 00:11:31,760 Speaker 1: I think there's a third thing that it did that 176 00:11:33,480 --> 00:11:37,520 Speaker 1: he wouldn't exactly say, but it it confused the markets 177 00:11:37,520 --> 00:11:41,440 Speaker 1: in the sense that, um, you had to uh focus 178 00:11:41,480 --> 00:11:43,920 Speaker 1: on the money supply as opposed to the level of 179 00:11:43,960 --> 00:11:47,640 Speaker 1: interest rates. That was the secondary effect. And so he 180 00:11:47,640 --> 00:11:50,640 Speaker 1: didn't just come in and say I'm raising rates. They 181 00:11:50,679 --> 00:11:53,440 Speaker 1: targeted the money supply. Therefore freights went up. Wasn't the 182 00:11:53,440 --> 00:11:56,520 Speaker 1: FEDS fault? People still felt it was the FEDS fault, 183 00:11:56,640 --> 00:11:59,240 Speaker 1: but but it took some of the pressure off diets walk. 184 00:11:59,360 --> 00:12:01,880 Speaker 1: This is fast and at as Mike shows the fixation 185 00:12:01,960 --> 00:12:03,800 Speaker 1: of M one, M two, M three, and I'm gonna 186 00:12:03,840 --> 00:12:07,719 Speaker 1: call the Chicago thought. Uh. Ages ago you were at 187 00:12:07,840 --> 00:12:12,760 Speaker 1: Michigan with a much more holistic economics. As well as 188 00:12:12,800 --> 00:12:16,520 Speaker 1: you've studied the courage of late Paul Volker. What was 189 00:12:16,559 --> 00:12:20,800 Speaker 1: the distinction that he executed in the late seventies and 190 00:12:20,880 --> 00:12:24,360 Speaker 1: into the early eighties. Well, not only did he dissent 191 00:12:24,480 --> 00:12:27,400 Speaker 1: and he voted against some of the stimulus that brought 192 00:12:27,480 --> 00:12:30,760 Speaker 1: us the stiflation of the latter part of the nineteen seventies, 193 00:12:31,040 --> 00:12:33,800 Speaker 1: he had the independence in fortitude to break the back 194 00:12:33,840 --> 00:12:38,840 Speaker 1: of inflation in the back to back recessions of and 195 00:12:38,920 --> 00:12:41,839 Speaker 1: a galaxy far away, far away, when we still had 196 00:12:41,880 --> 00:12:45,800 Speaker 1: inflation and ruining purchasing power, and people really forget how 197 00:12:45,880 --> 00:12:50,440 Speaker 1: corrosive and damaging that period was. And what's really important 198 00:12:50,440 --> 00:12:52,800 Speaker 1: to remember is when you turned this picket back on, 199 00:12:52,880 --> 00:12:56,359 Speaker 1: when he was done breaking the backup inflation, the economy 200 00:12:56,400 --> 00:12:59,160 Speaker 1: recovered in a way we've not seen since. There is 201 00:12:59,160 --> 00:13:02,920 Speaker 1: an ability that then but not only stop inflation, which 202 00:13:03,000 --> 00:13:06,319 Speaker 1: we have more tools to do, but also to reignite 203 00:13:06,360 --> 00:13:09,120 Speaker 1: growth in the nineteen eighties, and I think that's very 204 00:13:09,120 --> 00:13:12,240 Speaker 1: important as well. Also, Paul Boker had to resign. He 205 00:13:12,440 --> 00:13:14,760 Speaker 1: was pushed out at the Federal Reserve because of his 206 00:13:15,280 --> 00:13:19,079 Speaker 1: um backlash to deregulation in the financial services industry, and 207 00:13:19,240 --> 00:13:22,160 Speaker 1: Alan Greenspan was chosen as someone they thought at the 208 00:13:22,240 --> 00:13:25,720 Speaker 1: time was a political lackey that would be easy to manipulate. 209 00:13:25,840 --> 00:13:28,320 Speaker 1: They were wrong about that as well, they later found out. 210 00:13:28,520 --> 00:13:30,719 Speaker 1: But I think that's very important to remember as well, 211 00:13:30,760 --> 00:13:34,920 Speaker 1: that Paul Boker fought many of the deregulation any things 212 00:13:34,960 --> 00:13:38,240 Speaker 1: that some people believe contributed to the financial crisis in 213 00:13:38,360 --> 00:13:40,880 Speaker 1: two thousand and name so, Michael McKee One of the 214 00:13:40,960 --> 00:13:43,600 Speaker 1: things that the FED has to deal with today is 215 00:13:44,040 --> 00:13:48,720 Speaker 1: political pressure coming from the White House administration. Take us 216 00:13:48,720 --> 00:13:51,720 Speaker 1: back to those late seventies early eighties when former FED 217 00:13:51,800 --> 00:13:55,040 Speaker 1: Chairman Volker was, you know, working with the economy and 218 00:13:55,080 --> 00:13:57,520 Speaker 1: the result was indust rates going much higher. How much 219 00:13:57,559 --> 00:14:00,280 Speaker 1: support and our pushback did the FED have to deal 220 00:14:00,320 --> 00:14:02,840 Speaker 1: with him? Interestingly enough, he didn't get a huge amount 221 00:14:02,840 --> 00:14:06,760 Speaker 1: of pushback from the Carter administration. Jimmy Carter had put 222 00:14:06,800 --> 00:14:10,360 Speaker 1: him in there to do something about inflation. Uh, so 223 00:14:10,480 --> 00:14:13,839 Speaker 1: nothing like what we see today. But he did get 224 00:14:13,880 --> 00:14:17,360 Speaker 1: a lot of pushback from industry and consumers. We had 225 00:14:17,400 --> 00:14:21,120 Speaker 1: been builders, homebuilders delivering crates of two by fours to 226 00:14:21,200 --> 00:14:24,520 Speaker 1: the FED in protests. There were death threats. He had 227 00:14:24,560 --> 00:14:28,360 Speaker 1: to have a guard assigned to him. So it wasn't 228 00:14:28,440 --> 00:14:31,680 Speaker 1: an easy time at all. Uh. And of course anybody 229 00:14:31,680 --> 00:14:35,440 Speaker 1: who applied for mortgage in those days was that it 230 00:14:35,560 --> 00:14:39,080 Speaker 1: wasn't it wasn't a good time. When you create a 231 00:14:39,120 --> 00:14:42,680 Speaker 1: couple of recessions, Uh, you are definitely putting your career 232 00:14:42,720 --> 00:14:45,920 Speaker 1: and your reputation on the line. Diane, As we look 233 00:14:45,960 --> 00:14:48,800 Speaker 1: back now at some of the FED chair people to 234 00:14:49,360 --> 00:14:51,680 Speaker 1: chairman to succeed Mr Vulker, what do you think his 235 00:14:51,840 --> 00:14:55,760 Speaker 1: legacy was for those that succeeded him. Well, you know, 236 00:14:55,840 --> 00:14:58,680 Speaker 1: it's really interesting is even people you know, people like 237 00:14:58,760 --> 00:15:00,920 Speaker 1: Janet Ellen who was working at the Photo Reserve of 238 00:15:00,920 --> 00:15:03,840 Speaker 1: the nineteen seventies during this day inflation, or Stan Fisher, 239 00:15:04,120 --> 00:15:07,160 Speaker 1: who's your same age, who also was working as an 240 00:15:07,160 --> 00:15:10,560 Speaker 1: economist in the nineteen seventies. There was a legacy that 241 00:15:10,600 --> 00:15:13,160 Speaker 1: we saw that came out of that era, a fear 242 00:15:13,360 --> 00:15:16,760 Speaker 1: of going back to that kind of inflationary problem, and 243 00:15:16,760 --> 00:15:19,200 Speaker 1: it's part of the reason why you saw so many 244 00:15:19,680 --> 00:15:21,960 Speaker 1: different views about what should happen in the way that 245 00:15:22,040 --> 00:15:25,120 Speaker 1: the crisis and fears that inflation would come back. Now 246 00:15:25,120 --> 00:15:27,880 Speaker 1: those fears proved wrong, and that it's a different era 247 00:15:28,000 --> 00:15:30,920 Speaker 1: with different dynamics. But I think it really is important 248 00:15:31,000 --> 00:15:33,720 Speaker 1: that he forced people to think hard about what the 249 00:15:33,760 --> 00:15:37,000 Speaker 1: consequences of that action the day could be down the road. 250 00:15:37,720 --> 00:15:41,240 Speaker 1: And Dan swak there's a photograph of President Reagan and 251 00:15:41,240 --> 00:15:44,080 Speaker 1: this is the Reagan that Michael mckeennew before ray Vic 252 00:15:44,840 --> 00:15:51,520 Speaker 1: with Chairman Vulker. I'm guessing and the accessibility of this 253 00:15:51,680 --> 00:15:57,160 Speaker 1: exceptionally smart individual was just extraordinary. I think of one 254 00:15:57,160 --> 00:16:00,800 Speaker 1: of your great mentors Ned Graham, like at Michigan the wait, 255 00:16:00,960 --> 00:16:06,600 Speaker 1: his accessibility to me was truly second to none. He 256 00:16:06,720 --> 00:16:09,200 Speaker 1: really was accessible. And you know this is remember there 257 00:16:09,200 --> 00:16:12,640 Speaker 1: were stories written about him to smoking his cigars and 258 00:16:12,680 --> 00:16:15,240 Speaker 1: how kind of he lived his life in a very 259 00:16:15,320 --> 00:16:18,080 Speaker 1: low key way. This is not someone who considered himself 260 00:16:18,120 --> 00:16:21,160 Speaker 1: out of an ivory tower in any way whatsoever. And 261 00:16:21,200 --> 00:16:24,880 Speaker 1: I think I remember reading those stories in school and thinking, 262 00:16:24,880 --> 00:16:27,080 Speaker 1: you know this, I mean, he was someone to be 263 00:16:27,160 --> 00:16:29,840 Speaker 1: revered and someone to be admired given what was going 264 00:16:29,920 --> 00:16:32,640 Speaker 1: on and in industry, as Michael pointed out, I mean 265 00:16:32,680 --> 00:16:34,200 Speaker 1: I was in the heart of the auto industry that 266 00:16:34,280 --> 00:16:36,480 Speaker 1: was taking the burn of this. Remember just miles north 267 00:16:36,520 --> 00:16:39,120 Speaker 1: of me when I was in Ann Harbor. Unemployment rate 268 00:16:39,160 --> 00:16:42,080 Speaker 1: and flot Michigan went up above twenty five during this era, 269 00:16:42,240 --> 00:16:45,200 Speaker 1: So you know, it really was a difficult time to 270 00:16:45,280 --> 00:16:48,120 Speaker 1: be in his position, and he handled it in in 271 00:16:48,160 --> 00:16:51,160 Speaker 1: a totally unique way and being a human being. Now 272 00:16:51,200 --> 00:16:54,000 Speaker 1: we are out of time. This has been wonderful. Michael McKeith, 273 00:16:54,080 --> 00:16:55,800 Speaker 1: thank you so much for joining us out of all 274 00:16:55,800 --> 00:16:59,920 Speaker 1: of our economic coverage Bloomberg Radio, Bloomberg Television, diet swamps. 275 00:17:00,080 --> 00:17:03,040 Speaker 1: Thank you so much for joining us with Grant Thornton. 276 00:17:03,160 --> 00:17:20,080 Speaker 1: I just really extraordinary. Today Chairman Voker has died ninety 277 00:17:20,119 --> 00:17:23,080 Speaker 1: two years old. Paul Woker has been grievously ill for 278 00:17:23,240 --> 00:17:25,639 Speaker 1: some months now. This is not a surprise to the 279 00:17:25,680 --> 00:17:31,439 Speaker 1: economics community, but nevertheless it marks a significant passing. We 280 00:17:31,480 --> 00:17:34,399 Speaker 1: are thrilled now to bring you John Riding of rt 281 00:17:34,560 --> 00:17:38,440 Speaker 1: Q Economics, who has an underlying theory which so much 282 00:17:38,600 --> 00:17:42,680 Speaker 1: links to the theory of Paul Boker. John, I am 283 00:17:42,720 --> 00:17:46,600 Speaker 1: thrilled you could join us. This was not Keynesian theory 284 00:17:47,040 --> 00:17:51,720 Speaker 1: neo Keynesian theory. It was a belief in the foundation 285 00:17:51,880 --> 00:17:55,560 Speaker 1: of interest rates, the linkage to money. It goes back 286 00:17:55,600 --> 00:17:59,639 Speaker 1: to Irving Fisher f I s H. E. R. Moving 287 00:17:59,680 --> 00:18:02,879 Speaker 1: forward even to the textbooks of Stanley Fisher. The former 288 00:18:03,440 --> 00:18:07,800 Speaker 1: vice chairman, described for us the monetary fervor of the 289 00:18:08,000 --> 00:18:12,640 Speaker 1: seventies that led to vocals courage. Well, I think it's 290 00:18:12,920 --> 00:18:16,600 Speaker 1: very difficult in these low inflation times for people who 291 00:18:16,680 --> 00:18:21,560 Speaker 1: are much younger than you and I to even comprehend 292 00:18:22,320 --> 00:18:25,479 Speaker 1: the inflation problems of the nineties seventies, both in the 293 00:18:25,600 --> 00:18:28,760 Speaker 1: UK where I was studying economics at the time, at 294 00:18:28,760 --> 00:18:32,920 Speaker 1: Cambridge University, and here in the US inflation reached double digits, 295 00:18:33,359 --> 00:18:36,840 Speaker 1: was a persistent rise. People would teaching the idea that 296 00:18:37,280 --> 00:18:41,159 Speaker 1: maybe we're supposed to beating inflation. We should index the 297 00:18:41,680 --> 00:18:47,400 Speaker 1: tax system, we should should index wages, we should accommodate inflation. 298 00:18:48,119 --> 00:18:52,840 Speaker 1: And really Paul Walker was the person with the political 299 00:18:53,000 --> 00:18:57,199 Speaker 1: courage to do what Arthur Byrne said they could have 300 00:18:57,200 --> 00:18:59,159 Speaker 1: done any time, but didn't have the will to do it, 301 00:18:59,160 --> 00:19:02,840 Speaker 1: which was to defeat inflation. But the economic consequences of 302 00:19:02,880 --> 00:19:07,639 Speaker 1: defeating inflation, because people's expectations were not aligned to a 303 00:19:07,840 --> 00:19:12,400 Speaker 1: lower inflation rate, were very significant. For a period of time, 304 00:19:13,080 --> 00:19:15,360 Speaker 1: it was so important here folks, and this goes back 305 00:19:15,440 --> 00:19:18,560 Speaker 1: John to the world stopped. I believe it was Thursday 306 00:19:18,600 --> 00:19:20,880 Speaker 1: at three or four pm, and they announced M one, 307 00:19:21,040 --> 00:19:25,000 Speaker 1: M two, M three. John explain out of Nut Vixel, 308 00:19:25,119 --> 00:19:28,199 Speaker 1: and you're one of our great Vixellian economists, how we 309 00:19:28,320 --> 00:19:32,480 Speaker 1: got to the monetary The monetorism went rather of of 310 00:19:32,600 --> 00:19:35,960 Speaker 1: Professor Freeman in Chicago and the great David Laidler, the 311 00:19:36,080 --> 00:19:40,480 Speaker 1: giant of Western Ontario. What did they what was their 312 00:19:40,640 --> 00:19:46,280 Speaker 1: ferment that led Volker to the courage in the late seventies. Well, 313 00:19:46,520 --> 00:19:49,840 Speaker 1: it was really the idea that inflation, in the words 314 00:19:49,840 --> 00:19:53,240 Speaker 1: of Mount Freetment, is always in everywhere and monetary phenomenon. Now. 315 00:19:53,280 --> 00:19:56,919 Speaker 1: At the time that was probably more belief in what 316 00:19:57,040 --> 00:19:59,920 Speaker 1: I call high Church monetarism, the idea that strictly control 317 00:20:00,200 --> 00:20:03,840 Speaker 1: the money supply would in turn lead to strict control 318 00:20:03,880 --> 00:20:07,439 Speaker 1: of inflation. And in that sense the view was was wrong. 319 00:20:07,520 --> 00:20:10,840 Speaker 1: But the interesting decision the banking did something very similar 320 00:20:11,200 --> 00:20:15,960 Speaker 1: were this This set had been announcing the level of 321 00:20:16,000 --> 00:20:19,199 Speaker 1: interest rates that it was controlling. It dropped that and 322 00:20:19,320 --> 00:20:24,800 Speaker 1: moved to this monetary targeting. Really because Falcon New and 323 00:20:24,840 --> 00:20:27,320 Speaker 1: the Bank of England knew as well the interest rates 324 00:20:27,320 --> 00:20:30,240 Speaker 1: were going to go to politically unacceptable level, so it 325 00:20:30,280 --> 00:20:33,240 Speaker 1: had to be the market setting interest rates, not the 326 00:20:33,280 --> 00:20:36,640 Speaker 1: Federal Reserve setting interest rates, or to be more tractors 327 00:20:36,680 --> 00:20:40,800 Speaker 1: on the doorstep the set more people uh complaints from 328 00:20:40,800 --> 00:20:45,200 Speaker 1: agricultural lobby and others, so that they switched to saying, 329 00:20:45,440 --> 00:20:48,520 Speaker 1: if we control the money supply this pace, it will 330 00:20:48,560 --> 00:20:52,679 Speaker 1: bring inflation down. But if people don't adjust the expectations, 331 00:20:52,960 --> 00:20:55,320 Speaker 1: then the market is going to set interest rates much higher. 332 00:20:55,359 --> 00:20:58,800 Speaker 1: And that is effectively what happened for a short period 333 00:20:58,880 --> 00:21:02,520 Speaker 1: of time of a couple of years. Then the world 334 00:21:02,560 --> 00:21:06,080 Speaker 1: moved back to more formal interest rate targeting, which the 335 00:21:06,119 --> 00:21:10,000 Speaker 1: fact finally came out and in the year early and 336 00:21:10,160 --> 00:21:12,880 Speaker 1: admitted that they were talking interest rates again when when 337 00:21:12,920 --> 00:21:15,240 Speaker 1: we all knew that but for a while, which really 338 00:21:16,080 --> 00:21:21,520 Speaker 1: a very smart political decision to allow the market to 339 00:21:21,640 --> 00:21:26,440 Speaker 1: determine the interest rate consequences of controlling inflation. Hey, John, 340 00:21:26,480 --> 00:21:29,159 Speaker 1: what I find maybe most fascinating about the life of 341 00:21:29,200 --> 00:21:31,879 Speaker 1: Paul Vulgar is that twenty years after leaving the Federal 342 00:21:31,920 --> 00:21:35,119 Speaker 1: Reserve at the age of eighty one, President Obama taps 343 00:21:35,200 --> 00:21:38,560 Speaker 1: him to come in take a look at the banks 344 00:21:38,680 --> 00:21:41,080 Speaker 1: after the financial crisis, or you know, right at the 345 00:21:41,119 --> 00:21:43,520 Speaker 1: end of the financial crisis, and the net result is 346 00:21:43,560 --> 00:21:46,639 Speaker 1: something called the vocal Vocal rule. Tell us what the 347 00:21:46,680 --> 00:21:49,840 Speaker 1: vocal rule is, what it does, and kind of what 348 00:21:49,960 --> 00:21:54,200 Speaker 1: its legacy has been. Well, as pro Voker described the 349 00:21:54,240 --> 00:21:57,600 Speaker 1: Fatal rule and how it's finally implemented and currently implements 350 00:21:57,680 --> 00:22:03,600 Speaker 1: quite differently. I actually went to listen to him right 351 00:22:03,640 --> 00:22:06,160 Speaker 1: around the time of him talking about the vocal which 352 00:22:06,160 --> 00:22:08,040 Speaker 1: is really very simple, which is, if you're a bank 353 00:22:08,080 --> 00:22:12,240 Speaker 1: and you're taking deposit assurance and therefore the risks in 354 00:22:12,240 --> 00:22:14,960 Speaker 1: a sense of subsidized by the taxpayer, who shouldn't be 355 00:22:14,960 --> 00:22:19,560 Speaker 1: out taking investment banking risk. Now we'd had a breakdown 356 00:22:19,880 --> 00:22:24,639 Speaker 1: of that separation between commercial banking investment banking, or you know, 357 00:22:25,400 --> 00:22:28,800 Speaker 1: in years leading up to that, and so in this 358 00:22:30,000 --> 00:22:33,719 Speaker 1: mind it was a very very simple proposition. In the end, 359 00:22:33,760 --> 00:22:37,720 Speaker 1: it was a hundred page regulation. So um, I don't 360 00:22:37,800 --> 00:22:41,240 Speaker 1: think it was implemented in the way that Paul would 361 00:22:41,359 --> 00:22:44,359 Speaker 1: necessarily have wanted it to be implemented. But in the 362 00:22:44,480 --> 00:22:48,199 Speaker 1: US we don't follow the spirit of the law. We 363 00:22:48,280 --> 00:22:49,920 Speaker 1: follow the letter of the low and the letter of 364 00:22:49,960 --> 00:22:53,800 Speaker 1: the law tends to be written very very long. John 365 00:22:53,880 --> 00:22:56,800 Speaker 1: writing with us with Q Economics as we consider the 366 00:22:56,880 --> 00:22:59,880 Speaker 1: life the heritage of Paul Poker debt at ninety two. 367 00:23:00,560 --> 00:23:03,880 Speaker 1: Uh this morning, I should say this weekend as well, 368 00:23:04,240 --> 00:23:06,800 Speaker 1: John Riding were in a new and modern age. You 369 00:23:06,920 --> 00:23:09,440 Speaker 1: codified in your time at bear Stearns the idea of 370 00:23:09,520 --> 00:23:12,880 Speaker 1: a central bank on the golf course, and that potting 371 00:23:13,000 --> 00:23:16,280 Speaker 1: range kept being moved. How deep, how deep was the 372 00:23:16,400 --> 00:23:19,560 Speaker 1: rough that Paul Walker was in explained to us just 373 00:23:19,720 --> 00:23:22,719 Speaker 1: exactly how bad it was at the bank of England 374 00:23:22,720 --> 00:23:27,320 Speaker 1: and the FED in nine seventy nine. That was it was, 375 00:23:27,640 --> 00:23:30,199 Speaker 1: It was very bad. In fact, it was on the 376 00:23:30,280 --> 00:23:33,560 Speaker 1: verge of leading to you know, major change in in 377 00:23:33,680 --> 00:23:38,919 Speaker 1: the political environment and the economic, tax and regulatory environment. UH. 378 00:23:39,040 --> 00:23:42,520 Speaker 1: In nine miss Statue was elected to inflation of the 379 00:23:42,560 --> 00:23:48,560 Speaker 1: UK goal closed much of them. Yeah, you know, the 380 00:23:48,680 --> 00:23:52,560 Speaker 1: US was not not class about that. But you know, 381 00:23:52,640 --> 00:23:56,560 Speaker 1: we had Lotald Reagan replacing Jimmy Coxon. Then we had 382 00:23:56,560 --> 00:23:58,880 Speaker 1: this view of that that race need to be low. 383 00:23:58,960 --> 00:24:02,040 Speaker 1: We need to incentive is the private sector to take 384 00:24:02,240 --> 00:24:06,480 Speaker 1: risk and not tax phantom gains away because inflation that 385 00:24:06,600 --> 00:24:10,600 Speaker 1: those kind of rates creates massive phantom games. Let's say 386 00:24:10,840 --> 00:24:13,960 Speaker 1: that the inflation rates ten percent, which about what it 387 00:24:14,080 --> 00:24:17,840 Speaker 1: was when Paul Walker came into the FED, and let's 388 00:24:17,880 --> 00:24:22,080 Speaker 1: say that nominal interest rates were twelve percent. You know, 389 00:24:22,160 --> 00:24:23,879 Speaker 1: the tax system is going to attach us if you 390 00:24:23,920 --> 00:24:26,600 Speaker 1: were really making twelve percent when the government's already taking 391 00:24:26,640 --> 00:24:31,280 Speaker 1: ten percent in terms of inflation. So capitalism was struggling 392 00:24:31,480 --> 00:24:35,480 Speaker 1: to function. There was a tremendous misallocation of resources. UH. 393 00:24:35,480 --> 00:24:39,840 Speaker 1: And that was something that Paul Valker need knew needed 394 00:24:39,840 --> 00:24:42,760 Speaker 1: to be fixed and had the courage to fix it, 395 00:24:43,760 --> 00:24:46,000 Speaker 1: John writing, thank you so much on short notice for 396 00:24:46,080 --> 00:24:49,800 Speaker 1: joining us today. He's a lad Q Economics and just 397 00:24:49,880 --> 00:24:52,560 Speaker 1: the thrill to have Mr Writing former Bank of England 398 00:24:52,560 --> 00:24:56,800 Speaker 1: and said remember where this is just a great, great unity. 399 00:24:58,160 --> 00:25:02,080 Speaker 1: Thanks for listening to The Bloomberg's Van Last podcast. Subscribe 400 00:25:02,200 --> 00:25:07,000 Speaker 1: and listen to interviews on Apple Podcasts, SoundCloud, or whichever 401 00:25:07,200 --> 00:25:11,160 Speaker 1: podcast platform you prefer. I'm on Twitter at Tom Keane 402 00:25:11,680 --> 00:25:15,360 Speaker 1: before the podcast. You can always catch us worldwide. I'm 403 00:25:15,400 --> 00:25:16,280 Speaker 1: Bloomberg Radio