WEBVTT - The Financial Markets and COVID-19 

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<v Speaker 1>Pushkin from Pushkin Industries. This is Deep Background, the show

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<v Speaker 1>where we explore the stories behind the stories in the news.

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<v Speaker 1>I'm Noah Feldman. Today. We're returning to covid are once

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<v Speaker 1>and it seems almost eternal topic. But we're not going

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<v Speaker 1>to be talking about viruses and vaccines, at least not directly. Instead,

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<v Speaker 1>our topic today is the very bizarre behavior of financial

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<v Speaker 1>markets that we're observing right now, both stock market and

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<v Speaker 1>the bond market under circumstances of global pandemic. To help

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<v Speaker 1>make sense of the somewhat bizarre and anomalous behaviors of

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<v Speaker 1>the markets right now, I'm joined by an expert on

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<v Speaker 1>those things. He's Boas Weinstein, the founder of Saba Capital,

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<v Speaker 1>a hedge fund in Manhattan. Boas has been deep in

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<v Speaker 1>the markets for almost twenty years now, and he has

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<v Speaker 1>a repute as among the most intellectually brilliant students of

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<v Speaker 1>the subject. We spoke on Monday. Wells, thank you very

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<v Speaker 1>much for joining me. I want to start with something

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<v Speaker 1>that maybe probably is incredibly obvious to people in your

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<v Speaker 1>line of work, but the rest of us are a

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<v Speaker 1>little bit puzzled by, and that is the economy is

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<v Speaker 1>in a shambles. Companies are shutting down, thirty million people

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<v Speaker 1>are just about are going to be unemployed, and yet

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<v Speaker 1>the stock market, after an initial marked decline, has been

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<v Speaker 1>climbing mostly back up. At the most basic level, why

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<v Speaker 1>is this happening? So I myself, I'm scratching my head

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<v Speaker 1>wondering how can that be? And so you know, there

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<v Speaker 1>are a number of explanations, but let's just talk about

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<v Speaker 1>the best one, the easiest to understand. And so, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>I think nobody would disagree that the economic picture looks terrible.

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<v Speaker 1>It's worse in the quarter that we're now in than

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<v Speaker 1>in the first quarter was pretty terrible. But stocks represent

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<v Speaker 1>the future cash blows of a company for all of time.

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<v Speaker 1>So a dollar earned in twenty twenty two may be

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<v Speaker 1>less certain and less valuable than a dollar in today,

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<v Speaker 1>But since the interest rates are hovering near zero, the

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<v Speaker 1>difference between those two dollars, one earned today and one

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<v Speaker 1>earned a year or two from now, is not that

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<v Speaker 1>significant in a financial model, and so that's what's meant

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<v Speaker 1>by the time value of money. So even if you

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<v Speaker 1>write off this year as a year where corporate profits

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<v Speaker 1>in the aggregate are going to be quite weak, if

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<v Speaker 1>you believe that the economy is headed for a V

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<v Speaker 1>shaped recovery, you can justify stock prices where they are today.

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<v Speaker 1>And of course there's this question, is a V shaped

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<v Speaker 1>recovery the best guess of what the future holds? So

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<v Speaker 1>V shape recovery we can all picture it. We shot

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<v Speaker 1>down on one egg of the V, and then we're

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<v Speaker 1>going to shoot back up on the other leg of

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<v Speaker 1>the V. There are other options, though, and they all

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<v Speaker 1>have little letters attached to them. So what are some

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<v Speaker 1>of the other options, and maybe help us while you're

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<v Speaker 1>describing the different options, help us think about whether one

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<v Speaker 1>is more credible to believe in than the other. Right,

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<v Speaker 1>So the cousin of the of the V is the U.

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<v Speaker 1>In fact, they're right next to each other in the alphabet,

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<v Speaker 1>which you didn't need me to come on and talk about.

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<v Speaker 1>And so in that telling, it's unclear where we are

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<v Speaker 1>in the U. Did we hit the bottom and we're

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<v Speaker 1>about to start curving upward or things going to get worse?

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<v Speaker 1>But we know they're going to get better. And so

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<v Speaker 1>I think people can also not fret about stock prices

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<v Speaker 1>if they think we're in a U. And I should

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<v Speaker 1>also say part of why we even think we might

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<v Speaker 1>be here. Has a ton to do with what the

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<v Speaker 1>Federal Reserve and the government has been doing, which we'll

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<v Speaker 1>get to, i'm sure in just a minute. But aside

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<v Speaker 1>from V and you you know, there's then all of

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<v Speaker 1>a sudden, you start getting too much scarier letters. The

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<v Speaker 1>L is dreaded, the L is really bad. But I

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<v Speaker 1>think the W is really where my head is at,

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<v Speaker 1>that we're going to be in a world where we

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<v Speaker 1>just don't know, and the emotional side of investing, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>is the Fed's interventions going to be enough, Is the

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<v Speaker 1>economy can recovery? Is there going to be a vaccine

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<v Speaker 1>soon enough? You know, we're going to get these fits

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<v Speaker 1>and arts and rallies and der markets are very very typical,

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<v Speaker 1>so that in a sense that's not unusual. And so

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<v Speaker 1>for me, the W best reflects the seesaw that we're

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<v Speaker 1>going to be in. So let's talk about the W,

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<v Speaker 1>because in the W, we first come down like the

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<v Speaker 1>beginning of the V, and then we start to come

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<v Speaker 1>back up again, and we're probably in that second bit

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<v Speaker 1>of the W where we're coming back up, and then

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<v Speaker 1>it's going to go back down again before it comes

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<v Speaker 1>up and in that theory. Presumably one of the reasons

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<v Speaker 1>that we're coming back up is the government's intervention, the

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<v Speaker 1>Federal reserves intervention of essentially pouring cash into the economy

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<v Speaker 1>and giving it to investors at incredibly low, unimaginably previously

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<v Speaker 1>low interest rates, just draining cheap cash. How is that

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<v Speaker 1>affecting the market. I mean, I've heard people say, and

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<v Speaker 1>this seems intuitively plausible, that because there's just so much

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<v Speaker 1>money coming in that reassures investors to keep the values

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<v Speaker 1>of stocks high. But I've heard other people saying, well,

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<v Speaker 1>it's not even that sophisticated. There's no reassurance. It's just

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<v Speaker 1>free money. And what are you gonna do with the

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<v Speaker 1>free money. You're gonna have to put it into the

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<v Speaker 1>markets because you've got to put it somewhere, right, Well,

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<v Speaker 1>you know there's that you have to put it somewhere.

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<v Speaker 1>Wall Street's really built on alphabet, soup, and acronyms, and

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<v Speaker 1>that is best encapsulated with two, which is fear of

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<v Speaker 1>missing out. So fomo if you don't put it somewhere,

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<v Speaker 1>and then things do go up. The emotional side of

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<v Speaker 1>did you miss it? You know, why were you not

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<v Speaker 1>following the herd. And then of course, Tina, there is

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<v Speaker 1>no alternative. Tina's really really special in this market. And

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<v Speaker 1>so to your question, you know, it's not just low

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<v Speaker 1>interest rates. We've been in a low interest rate world forever,

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<v Speaker 1>well at least for many years, even if it's lower now.

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<v Speaker 1>But it's also the enormous amount of purchasing of US

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<v Speaker 1>traguries mortgage backed securities, which I think people have to understand,

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<v Speaker 1>take them out of the hands of investors, and then

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<v Speaker 1>they have cash. They sold them because they got, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>an amazing price, and now the question is where do

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<v Speaker 1>they put it? And they could leave it in cash,

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<v Speaker 1>but the theory, of course is that many of those

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<v Speaker 1>investors will put it somewhere else. But the fed's backing

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<v Speaker 1>of the market has extended to the commercial paper funding facility,

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<v Speaker 1>the primary dealer credit facility, the money market mutual fund

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<v Speaker 1>liquidity facility, and I could name ten more if you

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<v Speaker 1>only let me. And so they've really gone whole hog

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<v Speaker 1>and are not done yet. And so if you just

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<v Speaker 1>look in the aggregate of what the stimulus has been

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<v Speaker 1>from the three bills thus far, I find this quite shocking.

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<v Speaker 1>The stimulus in the aggregate is greater than the stimulus

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<v Speaker 1>that happened over a four year period after the Great Depression.

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<v Speaker 1>So we've already just in a few short months, spent

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<v Speaker 1>a bigger percentage of our GDP than was spent to

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<v Speaker 1>stimulate the economy back in nineteen twenty nine. And of

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<v Speaker 1>course back then it didn't quite work right. It wasn't

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<v Speaker 1>really until I know, there's a big debate about this,

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<v Speaker 1>but it really wasn't until a World War two that

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<v Speaker 1>we got the kind of rise in production that helped

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<v Speaker 1>get the economy out of the doldrums. Sure, so that

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<v Speaker 1>could be the reason why they have to go bigger

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<v Speaker 1>this time. So the question is was it just a

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<v Speaker 1>question of size, or can the government, in the face

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<v Speaker 1>of a credibly steep correction, recession, maybe even depression, can

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<v Speaker 1>they actually stop up all of that supply of people

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<v Speaker 1>who want to exit risk and restore the markets. And

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<v Speaker 1>I think that question is going to go and fits

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<v Speaker 1>and starts, which is where the w comes in. Even

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<v Speaker 1>where we are with respect to the economy turning back

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<v Speaker 1>on Visa VI, the pandemic ebbing, and you know, all

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<v Speaker 1>these things are open questions, and so I think one

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<v Speaker 1>interesting kind of meta question about The original topic here

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<v Speaker 1>is why do investors have such confidence? You know, we're

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<v Speaker 1>supposed to have confidence in markets that look like markets

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<v Speaker 1>we've been in. The people you know that have been

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<v Speaker 1>trained in finance, whether it's at Wharton or Harvard or

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<v Speaker 1>anywhere else, or you know, from the mean streets of

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<v Speaker 1>Wall Street have used models and heuristics that apply to

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<v Speaker 1>a certain range of examples. And are we not now

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<v Speaker 1>in uncharted territory for anyone who was, you know, barely

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<v Speaker 1>alive even during the Great Depression? How can you have

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<v Speaker 1>confidence that the market ought to be higher than it

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<v Speaker 1>was a year ago? And that's I think where, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>I start to feel like this has a lot more

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<v Speaker 1>to do with temporary factors in psychology. And I see

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<v Speaker 1>examples from a different market than the stock market, from

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<v Speaker 1>the credit market, which is the aggregate bigger than the

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<v Speaker 1>stock markets, that's the bond market, the loan market, and

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<v Speaker 1>I see signs that are much more worrying than the

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<v Speaker 1>confidence inspired by the recent rallying stocks. Let's turn to

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<v Speaker 1>that other market. So until now, we've been mostly talking

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<v Speaker 1>about the stock market, which is equity, which means that

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<v Speaker 1>what's being traded our shares, which means you still have

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<v Speaker 1>an ownership stake in that company going forward, and even

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<v Speaker 1>if the company were to fail, if you hold shares

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<v Speaker 1>in it, you still have a claim on the assets

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<v Speaker 1>of the company, and if it reorganizes itself, you still

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<v Speaker 1>hold onto your shares. Bond markets are different. There, we're

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<v Speaker 1>trading the money that the companies owe, the cash that

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<v Speaker 1>they owe. Tell us what are the bad signs, the

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<v Speaker 1>ominous signs that you're seeing there, because my impression is

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<v Speaker 1>that the bond markets do not share the apparent enthusiasm

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<v Speaker 1>of the stock market. Well, so, firstly, there are arguments

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<v Speaker 1>that they ought to share in it because if you

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<v Speaker 1>look at what the FED has done, some of it

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<v Speaker 1>is to in fact restore confidence in that market. The

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<v Speaker 1>FED hasn't resorted to buying stocks yet, but they have

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<v Speaker 1>agreed to buy basically pools of risky credit, not low

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<v Speaker 1>risk mortgage backed securities or US treasuries, but high risk

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<v Speaker 1>in fact, things that are called junk. The FED has

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<v Speaker 1>gone to buying junk through exchange traded funds and also

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<v Speaker 1>lending to companies that used to be investment grade and

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<v Speaker 1>are now raded junk. And that occurred late in March

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<v Speaker 1>because of COVID, and so we saw it most notably

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<v Speaker 1>happened to Ford and to Macy's and to energy companies

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<v Speaker 1>like Occidental Petroleum. And so the things that are most

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<v Speaker 1>worrying to me in the bond market that you don't

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<v Speaker 1>see in the stock market is that despite that action,

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<v Speaker 1>despite the FED being there to lend, we see a

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<v Speaker 1>lot of hiled companies that were already a pretty risky spot. So,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, recently J. C. Penny has announced that it's

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<v Speaker 1>skipping its interest payments. It's days away from actually filing

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<v Speaker 1>for bankruptcy. Jay Crewe has filed for bankruptcy. Neiman Marcus

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<v Speaker 1>filed for bankruacy. So some of those, one might say, well,

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<v Speaker 1>they were already teetering for a while, so you know,

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<v Speaker 1>how unusual is that. On the other hand, we've seen

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<v Speaker 1>companies that were trading very well before COVID that have

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<v Speaker 1>been dramatically affected, notably Hurts, which was a company whose

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<v Speaker 1>bonds were trading at one hundred at the full claim.

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<v Speaker 1>You know, you make a loan and you're owed back

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<v Speaker 1>one hundred percent. The bonds of Hurts or the gaming

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<v Speaker 1>reservation Mohegan's Son were even above par and now they're

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<v Speaker 1>down into the teens or twenties cents in the dollar

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<v Speaker 1>in the case of Hurts and Mohican Son has fallen

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<v Speaker 1>in half. And so there are a number of companies

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<v Speaker 1>despite all of this, that are defaulting, that will default.

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<v Speaker 1>Expectations for a default rate is extremely high in credit

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<v Speaker 1>and also for small businesses. And so despite all of

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<v Speaker 1>this money being offered to airlines to cruise lines, I

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<v Speaker 1>see continued fear in the credit market, as evidenced by

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<v Speaker 1>the price of the bonds, and also a market called

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<v Speaker 1>the credit rative market. And I see banks that are

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<v Speaker 1>using this derivatives market to hedge themselves to American Airlines,

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<v Speaker 1>United Airlines, Royal Caribbean forward hedging in a way that

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<v Speaker 1>to me, the prices suggest these companies have a real

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<v Speaker 1>chance of defaulting, even though that is inconsistent with the

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<v Speaker 1>idea that the government is going to save those companies.

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<v Speaker 1>So from an intuitive perspective of all that makes sense. Right. So,

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<v Speaker 1>I mean, to the ordinary civilian you think of Hurts,

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<v Speaker 1>They're doing just fine. They're a well run company. Lots

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<v Speaker 1>of people are renting cars, fewer people maybe owned cars.

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<v Speaker 1>So then in the long run you expect a lot

0:11:48.956 --> 0:11:50.556
<v Speaker 1>of people to rent cars. You expect Hurts to be

0:11:50.596 --> 0:11:53.076
<v Speaker 1>able to pay back its debts, then suddenly no one's

0:11:53.116 --> 0:11:55.836
<v Speaker 1>going anywhere, and you expect it to be a lot

0:11:55.916 --> 0:11:57.756
<v Speaker 1>more likely the Hurts won't be able to pay off

0:11:57.756 --> 0:12:00.396
<v Speaker 1>its debts. So that sort of makes common sense. And

0:12:00.436 --> 0:12:03.356
<v Speaker 1>then the thing that you would imagine would not make

0:12:03.396 --> 0:12:04.956
<v Speaker 1>it go down would just be that the government was

0:12:04.956 --> 0:12:08.156
<v Speaker 1>going to effectively bail out Hurts, right, that the government

0:12:08.196 --> 0:12:10.076
<v Speaker 1>was going to buy their debt or make of they're

0:12:10.116 --> 0:12:11.636
<v Speaker 1>debt in some way. And if people think maybe the

0:12:11.636 --> 0:12:14.436
<v Speaker 1>government won't do that for Hurts, then what you're describing

0:12:14.556 --> 0:12:17.796
<v Speaker 1>makes a lot of sense. And it seems as though

0:12:18.516 --> 0:12:21.916
<v Speaker 1>the credit markets are behaving closer to what an outsider

0:12:21.956 --> 0:12:25.276
<v Speaker 1>to the financial markets would expect, and that it's the

0:12:25.476 --> 0:12:28.596
<v Speaker 1>stock market that's the surprising bit. Am I getting that right? Yeah,

0:12:28.836 --> 0:12:31.876
<v Speaker 1>it would be incongruous to have a default rate which

0:12:31.916 --> 0:12:33.956
<v Speaker 1>is in the double digits, which is what's really being

0:12:33.956 --> 0:12:37.396
<v Speaker 1>expected now. So it's not that i'mbarished and mine is

0:12:37.396 --> 0:12:39.476
<v Speaker 1>in the double digits, but others are in the single digits.

0:12:39.596 --> 0:12:42.956
<v Speaker 1>We're expecting a default rate equal or greater to what

0:12:43.076 --> 0:12:45.916
<v Speaker 1>happened in two thousand and eight when we had Lehman

0:12:45.956 --> 0:12:49.436
<v Speaker 1>Brothers default in all of the General Motors and Chrysler

0:12:49.476 --> 0:12:52.156
<v Speaker 1>and everything that came after it. We're expecting actually a

0:12:52.236 --> 0:12:55.076
<v Speaker 1>higher default rate and for a much longer period of time.

0:12:55.396 --> 0:12:57.836
<v Speaker 1>And the third part, which is pernicious is that the

0:12:57.916 --> 0:13:00.756
<v Speaker 1>recoveries what the bond holders are getting back for suffering

0:13:00.756 --> 0:13:03.676
<v Speaker 1>these defaults, are very very low. There was just last

0:13:03.716 --> 0:13:07.916
<v Speaker 1>week a auction of recently defaulted bonds for a company

0:13:07.956 --> 0:13:11.556
<v Speaker 1>called Whiting Petroleum, and those bonds only fetched seven cents

0:13:11.556 --> 0:13:14.156
<v Speaker 1>in the dollar. So normally, as a bond holder, since

0:13:14.156 --> 0:13:15.836
<v Speaker 1>you have a claim on the assets of the company,

0:13:15.876 --> 0:13:19.076
<v Speaker 1>you might expect a recovery more like thirty cents forty cents,

0:13:19.116 --> 0:13:22.316
<v Speaker 1>even if you didn't have a security, you know, like

0:13:22.436 --> 0:13:25.596
<v Speaker 1>in a mortgage. But recoveries have been very low, defaults

0:13:25.596 --> 0:13:29.996
<v Speaker 1>have been high, and so it's really historically inconsistent to

0:13:30.076 --> 0:13:32.556
<v Speaker 1>have a world where the default rate is high, companies

0:13:32.596 --> 0:13:35.076
<v Speaker 1>are defaulting, and the stock market is high at the

0:13:35.076 --> 0:13:37.836
<v Speaker 1>same time. Of course, it didn't have to be this way.

0:13:37.916 --> 0:13:40.836
<v Speaker 1>Companies could have been less levered, which would have given

0:13:40.876 --> 0:13:43.836
<v Speaker 1>them more liquidity, more time to weather the storm. But

0:13:44.036 --> 0:13:46.116
<v Speaker 1>you know, there are a lot of signs pre COVID

0:13:46.436 --> 0:13:49.556
<v Speaker 1>that leverage was running extremely high at the corporate level

0:13:49.716 --> 0:13:52.876
<v Speaker 1>and the default rate was even picking up. Despite the

0:13:52.916 --> 0:13:55.156
<v Speaker 1>bull market we were in, there were wearying signs from

0:13:55.156 --> 0:13:57.996
<v Speaker 1>the credit market, which is what I followed day in

0:13:57.996 --> 0:14:00.516
<v Speaker 1>and day out, which was already giving you pause. And

0:14:00.596 --> 0:14:02.636
<v Speaker 1>here we are, the defaults are not just coming through.

0:14:02.876 --> 0:14:06.036
<v Speaker 1>I would say the stigma of defaulting has changed, because

0:14:06.076 --> 0:14:08.916
<v Speaker 1>now it's not well, we mismanaged the business or a

0:14:09.316 --> 0:14:11.596
<v Speaker 1>Y and z, it's blame it on COVID, which is

0:14:11.636 --> 0:14:14.516
<v Speaker 1>not necessarily unfair. But the stigma of missing a bond

0:14:14.516 --> 0:14:18.636
<v Speaker 1>payment feels, you know, and I can't exactly say why,

0:14:18.836 --> 0:14:23.316
<v Speaker 1>feel like in the marketplace defaulting is becoming more tolerable

0:14:23.396 --> 0:14:26.276
<v Speaker 1>and it's it's contagious. Well, I mean you sort of

0:14:26.316 --> 0:14:28.756
<v Speaker 1>have said why, right, I mean, here you have companies

0:14:28.756 --> 0:14:31.516
<v Speaker 1>that are already highly levered, meeting they already owe as

0:14:31.596 --> 0:14:34.116
<v Speaker 1>much money as they could conceivably owe, and maybe more

0:14:34.156 --> 0:14:36.356
<v Speaker 1>than they should, and so they were a little teetery.

0:14:36.956 --> 0:14:38.916
<v Speaker 1>And then as you say, you know, this is human nature,

0:14:38.916 --> 0:14:41.716
<v Speaker 1>there's an excuse to do it. You say, well, you

0:14:41.756 --> 0:14:43.796
<v Speaker 1>know it's true that they were contributing factors, but really,

0:14:43.836 --> 0:14:45.916
<v Speaker 1>we would have gotten through this were it not for

0:14:45.956 --> 0:14:49.596
<v Speaker 1>this unforeseeable event, And it just seems like that's the

0:14:49.596 --> 0:14:51.996
<v Speaker 1>way excuse has hurt done all the time. You know,

0:14:52.036 --> 0:14:53.676
<v Speaker 1>it's a sort of dog gate my homework way of

0:14:53.716 --> 0:14:55.316
<v Speaker 1>thinking about it, But there's some truth to it if

0:14:55.316 --> 0:14:57.316
<v Speaker 1>the dog really ate your homework, or at least you

0:14:57.316 --> 0:14:59.596
<v Speaker 1>know it slobbered all over it. So I think you've

0:14:59.636 --> 0:15:03.236
<v Speaker 1>given a sufficient psychological account of why not only would

0:15:03.276 --> 0:15:05.676
<v Speaker 1>companies say this, but other people would be prepared to

0:15:05.676 --> 0:15:07.476
<v Speaker 1>listen to it. And the contagion point also makes sense.

0:15:07.516 --> 0:15:10.556
<v Speaker 1>If lots of companies are doing it, there's just a

0:15:10.556 --> 0:15:12.676
<v Speaker 1>limit to how much stigma you can attach to each

0:15:12.716 --> 0:15:15.036
<v Speaker 1>company that does it, and so pretty soon there's not

0:15:15.036 --> 0:15:16.956
<v Speaker 1>that much stigma. So that part, I think you've already

0:15:16.996 --> 0:15:21.276
<v Speaker 1>explained it. Well, it's probably fun to note that there

0:15:21.396 --> 0:15:24.036
<v Speaker 1>is one person that took bankruptcy to a new level

0:15:24.076 --> 0:15:26.876
<v Speaker 1>and it didn't stop him from making the most out

0:15:26.876 --> 0:15:29.636
<v Speaker 1>of it, and that's that's our president, whose company suffered

0:15:29.676 --> 0:15:32.396
<v Speaker 1>bankruptcy dozens of times. So anyhow, I don't know if

0:15:32.396 --> 0:15:34.196
<v Speaker 1>that really has a role, but you know, that's actually

0:15:34.196 --> 0:15:37.516
<v Speaker 1>fundamentally what's happening that companies are defaulting. We'll be back

0:15:37.556 --> 0:15:50.196
<v Speaker 1>in just a moment. Let's turn Baus to what's going

0:15:50.236 --> 0:15:53.876
<v Speaker 1>to happen next? You say the bond markets are a

0:15:53.876 --> 0:15:56.796
<v Speaker 1>little bit are more than a little bit nervous. They're concerned,

0:15:56.916 --> 0:16:00.356
<v Speaker 1>and if you're right, you're also suggesting the possibility that

0:16:00.436 --> 0:16:04.556
<v Speaker 1>the stock market itself could go down. What's going to happen?

0:16:04.876 --> 0:16:09.116
<v Speaker 1>You know, how prepared is the government for another crisis?

0:16:09.316 --> 0:16:11.276
<v Speaker 1>You know, for the third leg in the w where

0:16:11.716 --> 0:16:15.116
<v Speaker 1>having boosted us all up, we go back down again.

0:16:15.556 --> 0:16:19.196
<v Speaker 1>What will that day look like? Well, so now you're

0:16:19.196 --> 0:16:22.076
<v Speaker 1>asking me to opine about this murkiness that I said

0:16:22.156 --> 0:16:24.636
<v Speaker 1>was highly uncertain and hard to predict. We'll give us

0:16:24.676 --> 0:16:27.076
<v Speaker 1>a range of options. How about that? In my telling

0:16:27.116 --> 0:16:30.196
<v Speaker 1>of it, having seen what happened, where at the first

0:16:30.196 --> 0:16:33.076
<v Speaker 1>sign of trouble the government stepped in and arranged a

0:16:33.156 --> 0:16:36.036
<v Speaker 1>marriage in two thousand and eight between JP Morgan and

0:16:36.076 --> 0:16:39.876
<v Speaker 1>bear Stearns. Bear Sterns needed a rescue and so they

0:16:39.876 --> 0:16:42.436
<v Speaker 1>were saved and the default didn't occur. But then with

0:16:42.556 --> 0:16:46.836
<v Speaker 1>Lehman Brothers the default did occur, And with General Motors

0:16:46.876 --> 0:16:48.676
<v Speaker 1>and Christ's Third the default did occur. And so there

0:16:48.756 --> 0:16:51.596
<v Speaker 1>is this question of if we really do have finite money,

0:16:51.636 --> 0:16:53.956
<v Speaker 1>if there is something to be believed in what Mitch

0:16:53.996 --> 0:16:56.436
<v Speaker 1>McConnell said, you know, worrying about the total level of

0:16:56.476 --> 0:17:00.196
<v Speaker 1>debt and said quite instantly early things about perhaps municipalities

0:17:00.236 --> 0:17:02.956
<v Speaker 1>need to default. So if the D word is going

0:17:02.996 --> 0:17:06.156
<v Speaker 1>to you know, be present and causing pain for investors,

0:17:06.396 --> 0:17:09.716
<v Speaker 1>I think rationing the stimulus to where it's most needed

0:17:10.156 --> 0:17:12.556
<v Speaker 1>is maybe how things are going to evolve. And so

0:17:12.596 --> 0:17:15.476
<v Speaker 1>maybe the answer isn't to save every company that's going

0:17:15.516 --> 0:17:18.996
<v Speaker 1>to get hurt because of the COVID crisis, but instead

0:17:19.316 --> 0:17:23.276
<v Speaker 1>protect the jobs of those companies without necessarily protecting the

0:17:23.316 --> 0:17:26.036
<v Speaker 1>bond holders. And so that's one way it could evolve.

0:17:26.116 --> 0:17:29.036
<v Speaker 1>And in that way, asset prices can go down, bond

0:17:29.036 --> 0:17:31.436
<v Speaker 1>prices certainly can go down, and even stock prices should

0:17:31.436 --> 0:17:34.636
<v Speaker 1>go down. And in that world, you know, perhaps the

0:17:34.676 --> 0:17:38.716
<v Speaker 1>dollars are better spent on the individual investor. And it

0:17:38.756 --> 0:17:41.636
<v Speaker 1>really raises I think something that's going on right now,

0:17:41.676 --> 0:17:42.956
<v Speaker 1>we can see it. We don't have to wait for

0:17:42.996 --> 0:17:45.476
<v Speaker 1>the future. This is something I listened with interest to

0:17:45.876 --> 0:17:48.596
<v Speaker 1>a week ago said by Larry Summers on Bloomberg TV,

0:17:48.916 --> 0:17:51.556
<v Speaker 1>which is if you look at how companies are scrambling

0:17:51.636 --> 0:17:54.196
<v Speaker 1>right now to raise money. Almost all of that money

0:17:54.276 --> 0:17:57.716
<v Speaker 1>is being raised in the debt market. So just ten

0:17:57.796 --> 0:18:02.396
<v Speaker 1>days ago Boeing raised twenty five billion dollars through more debt.

0:18:02.516 --> 0:18:06.596
<v Speaker 1>Forward raised seven billion GM four billion. Retailers like Polls

0:18:06.716 --> 0:18:08.996
<v Speaker 1>or Gap Stores came into the debt market to bar

0:18:09.156 --> 0:18:12.476
<v Speaker 1>own more money. But Summers raised the question of is

0:18:12.476 --> 0:18:15.036
<v Speaker 1>that actually the best thing for the company when it

0:18:15.036 --> 0:18:18.116
<v Speaker 1>comes to solvency. Ought they not raise equity at the

0:18:18.156 --> 0:18:20.556
<v Speaker 1>same time, or aught they not raise significant amounts of

0:18:20.556 --> 0:18:23.996
<v Speaker 1>equity instead of debt as a way to bolster their balancie.

0:18:24.036 --> 0:18:25.716
<v Speaker 1>It is a way for them to have cash without

0:18:25.716 --> 0:18:27.636
<v Speaker 1>having the obligation to pay it back. And so in

0:18:27.676 --> 0:18:30.476
<v Speaker 1>the way that I think a lot of Americans are

0:18:30.556 --> 0:18:33.116
<v Speaker 1>upset when they see companies take money and go buy

0:18:33.116 --> 0:18:35.676
<v Speaker 1>back shares. In a sense, this is like the inverse

0:18:35.716 --> 0:18:38.196
<v Speaker 1>of it. Well, now they're in trouble, why don't they

0:18:38.236 --> 0:18:40.356
<v Speaker 1>issue shares? Why don't they raise money? The way I

0:18:40.396 --> 0:18:43.316
<v Speaker 1>saw over my career companies do in times of fear,

0:18:43.596 --> 0:18:45.556
<v Speaker 1>like in two thousand and two when we had and

0:18:45.756 --> 0:18:49.036
<v Speaker 1>Ron default in worldcome a lot of companies at that

0:18:49.076 --> 0:18:51.756
<v Speaker 1>point in time chose to raise equity. And so while

0:18:51.796 --> 0:18:56.356
<v Speaker 1>it is happening today, the International steel company Mittal raised

0:18:56.396 --> 0:18:59.836
<v Speaker 1>some equity, United did Carnival did. I think the best

0:18:59.876 --> 0:19:02.836
<v Speaker 1>answer of why it's not happening is that the management

0:19:02.916 --> 0:19:05.556
<v Speaker 1>is too afraid to dilute their shareholders, and so the

0:19:05.556 --> 0:19:07.876
<v Speaker 1>amounts of money they would need to raise to deal

0:19:07.876 --> 0:19:10.036
<v Speaker 1>with the COVID crisis is so great that they would

0:19:10.036 --> 0:19:13.156
<v Speaker 1>really be hurting their stock price, but they would be

0:19:13.356 --> 0:19:17.396
<v Speaker 1>shoring up their liquidity and their solvency, and so that's

0:19:17.436 --> 0:19:20.476
<v Speaker 1>to me. The next phase is that whether the government's

0:19:20.516 --> 0:19:24.036
<v Speaker 1>loans come with equity stakes, which basically creates that situation

0:19:24.036 --> 0:19:26.756
<v Speaker 1>where they are diluted, or companies do it themselves where

0:19:26.956 --> 0:19:30.076
<v Speaker 1>they access the markets, whether they're forced to or want

0:19:30.116 --> 0:19:33.276
<v Speaker 1>to through equity, which would be a much in my view,

0:19:33.396 --> 0:19:36.636
<v Speaker 1>much better outcome for all of Americans. And when you

0:19:36.676 --> 0:19:39.236
<v Speaker 1>say that the corporate management doesn't want to dilute their shareholders,

0:19:39.356 --> 0:19:41.396
<v Speaker 1>do you mean that they're basically just worried that then

0:19:41.436 --> 0:19:44.876
<v Speaker 1>the shareholders will vote them out. Well, part of it

0:19:44.916 --> 0:19:46.756
<v Speaker 1>is maybe just the amount of money they need to

0:19:46.796 --> 0:19:49.036
<v Speaker 1>raise is so great that they just couldn't get there

0:19:49.236 --> 0:19:51.476
<v Speaker 1>purely with equity, but we're seeing a lot of the

0:19:51.556 --> 0:19:53.916
<v Speaker 1>capital raising done purely on the debt side, So it

0:19:53.956 --> 0:19:56.196
<v Speaker 1>doesn't answer why are they not doing both or why

0:19:56.236 --> 0:19:58.356
<v Speaker 1>are they not doing heavy amounts of equity. And I

0:19:58.396 --> 0:20:00.596
<v Speaker 1>think some of it comes back to the greed of

0:20:00.876 --> 0:20:03.156
<v Speaker 1>not wanting their share price to go down. But by

0:20:03.316 --> 0:20:06.396
<v Speaker 1>taking out more debt, you're creating a more levered situation,

0:20:06.436 --> 0:20:10.156
<v Speaker 1>a company that is more exposed to a prolonged downturn

0:20:10.276 --> 0:20:13.196
<v Speaker 1>leading to default. And so it might be in the

0:20:13.196 --> 0:20:15.996
<v Speaker 1>shareholder's interest, and I think the FED in somebody's has

0:20:16.036 --> 0:20:19.556
<v Speaker 1>encouraged it by saying they're going to backstop lending to

0:20:19.676 --> 0:20:22.796
<v Speaker 1>fallen angels and they're going to buy high oldtfs, when

0:20:22.836 --> 0:20:25.356
<v Speaker 1>really there should be a lot more equity raised. When

0:20:25.356 --> 0:20:29.236
<v Speaker 1>the government signals that it's willing to basically ensure companies,

0:20:29.796 --> 0:20:33.116
<v Speaker 1>why shouldn't they go borrow that money in cash. They're

0:20:33.116 --> 0:20:35.596
<v Speaker 1>gambling that someone's going to back them up if they fail.

0:20:35.836 --> 0:20:38.436
<v Speaker 1>That's fairer baus. Let me just close by asking you

0:20:38.716 --> 0:20:41.796
<v Speaker 1>what should I be asking you about what's going to

0:20:41.876 --> 0:20:43.956
<v Speaker 1>happen or what is happening that I haven't I mean,

0:20:43.956 --> 0:20:46.716
<v Speaker 1>there's obviously a huge amount of complexity here, and you've

0:20:46.756 --> 0:20:50.036
<v Speaker 1>gone very far towards clarifying and simplifying it for the

0:20:50.076 --> 0:20:52.556
<v Speaker 1>listeners and for me, which I'm really grateful for. But

0:20:52.676 --> 0:20:54.236
<v Speaker 1>what am I not asking you that I should be

0:20:54.276 --> 0:20:57.476
<v Speaker 1>asking you? So the thing that I most want to

0:20:57.516 --> 0:21:00.836
<v Speaker 1>get off my chest is that I see a market

0:21:00.996 --> 0:21:06.716
<v Speaker 1>that normal, non professional investors believe is driven by fundamental forces,

0:21:06.916 --> 0:21:09.996
<v Speaker 1>and I see it more than ever driven by technical forces.

0:21:10.116 --> 0:21:13.196
<v Speaker 1>And define that what are technical forces? So instead of

0:21:13.196 --> 0:21:16.036
<v Speaker 1>what's the intrinsic value of a company worth using a

0:21:16.076 --> 0:21:18.756
<v Speaker 1>financial model, it's who's doing what to whom and in

0:21:18.796 --> 0:21:21.396
<v Speaker 1>what quantity? How many sellers are there compared to buyers?

0:21:21.716 --> 0:21:25.996
<v Speaker 1>What's the relationship between related instruments such as the debt

0:21:25.996 --> 0:21:28.156
<v Speaker 1>of a company and the equity of a company, And

0:21:28.236 --> 0:21:31.996
<v Speaker 1>I see large divergences. As an investor, I've always been

0:21:32.076 --> 0:21:35.276
<v Speaker 1>much more focused on relative value on looking at a company.

0:21:35.556 --> 0:21:39.316
<v Speaker 1>Let's take United Airlines, which is having tremendous issues. They

0:21:39.356 --> 0:21:41.716
<v Speaker 1>had to shelve a debt deal. They were bringing debt,

0:21:41.796 --> 0:21:43.916
<v Speaker 1>They did bring a little bit of equity beforehand, and

0:21:43.956 --> 0:21:45.956
<v Speaker 1>they had to shelve it over lack of demand. And

0:21:45.996 --> 0:21:48.036
<v Speaker 1>I look at the difference in price between the debt

0:21:48.036 --> 0:21:50.756
<v Speaker 1>of the US airlines and the equity which still has

0:21:50.796 --> 0:21:54.476
<v Speaker 1>considerable value, and I see a dislocation there compared to history.

0:21:54.516 --> 0:21:56.556
<v Speaker 1>I see that the debt is actually giving a much

0:21:56.596 --> 0:21:59.556
<v Speaker 1>more negative picture. And so when I look at the

0:21:59.596 --> 0:22:03.556
<v Speaker 1>market today versus five years ago and even much further back,

0:22:03.596 --> 0:22:07.196
<v Speaker 1>I see a market really driven by technical forces, and

0:22:07.236 --> 0:22:10.236
<v Speaker 1>so the things that are of interest to my relative

0:22:10.276 --> 0:22:13.876
<v Speaker 1>value strategies are off the charts. Interesting right now, there's

0:22:14.036 --> 0:22:16.436
<v Speaker 1>a type of trade that we've been doing for about

0:22:16.436 --> 0:22:18.956
<v Speaker 1>a dozen companies that in my twenty two years of

0:22:18.956 --> 0:22:20.996
<v Speaker 1>doing this type of trade has never been this good,

0:22:21.356 --> 0:22:23.756
<v Speaker 1>and normally you don't expect that to be, you know,

0:22:23.916 --> 0:22:27.196
<v Speaker 1>in a market where we're only ten fifteen percent off

0:22:27.236 --> 0:22:29.476
<v Speaker 1>of the high. My takeaway from that is is that

0:22:29.596 --> 0:22:36.116
<v Speaker 1>markets are highly unstable because relationships that tend to correlate

0:22:36.196 --> 0:22:38.916
<v Speaker 1>are right now breaking down. There's a lot of havoc.

0:22:38.956 --> 0:22:42.636
<v Speaker 1>There's a lot of market segmentation where some investors are

0:22:42.636 --> 0:22:44.836
<v Speaker 1>only doing one kind of thing and other investors are

0:22:44.836 --> 0:22:47.716
<v Speaker 1>doing another, and it's led to an opportunity set which

0:22:47.716 --> 0:22:49.996
<v Speaker 1>is really quite exceptional for my kind of strategy. But

0:22:50.036 --> 0:22:52.836
<v Speaker 1>it also even though I don't have any more crystal

0:22:52.836 --> 0:22:56.716
<v Speaker 1>ball than anyone else. It does give me great caution

0:22:56.796 --> 0:22:58.916
<v Speaker 1>when it comes to the direction of markets. I'm quite

0:22:58.956 --> 0:23:01.556
<v Speaker 1>worried that the markets are going to be headed lower

0:23:02.036 --> 0:23:04.876
<v Speaker 1>and that the if the V comes, you know, the

0:23:04.956 --> 0:23:07.396
<v Speaker 1>V was already mostly priced in, and the risk of

0:23:07.396 --> 0:23:09.716
<v Speaker 1>it not being a V is far greater based on

0:23:09.796 --> 0:23:12.356
<v Speaker 1>current levels. Well, it's not a cheerful moment on which

0:23:12.356 --> 0:23:14.916
<v Speaker 1>to end, but it is definitely honest and I really

0:23:14.956 --> 0:23:16.796
<v Speaker 1>appreciate it. Boaz, thank you so much for your time.

0:23:16.876 --> 0:23:21.636
<v Speaker 1>Thank you, Noah. Boaz's account gives us substantial food for

0:23:21.716 --> 0:23:24.196
<v Speaker 1>thought when we think about the behavior of the financial

0:23:24.236 --> 0:23:29.156
<v Speaker 1>markets right now. He's validating our general concern that there's

0:23:29.196 --> 0:23:32.156
<v Speaker 1>something strange about the way that the stock market the

0:23:32.196 --> 0:23:36.316
<v Speaker 1>equity markets continue to be behaving as though a V

0:23:36.476 --> 0:23:40.756
<v Speaker 1>shape recovery were to be soon expected. Going forward, the

0:23:40.836 --> 0:23:44.236
<v Speaker 1>deep question is whether the different signals being sent by

0:23:44.316 --> 0:23:48.876
<v Speaker 1>bond markets and the stock market will eventually come into coordination.

0:23:49.676 --> 0:23:52.116
<v Speaker 1>Logically speaking, if they do, there's only two ways that

0:23:52.156 --> 0:23:54.676
<v Speaker 1>can happen. Either things can get better in the bond

0:23:54.716 --> 0:23:57.276
<v Speaker 1>markets than they are now, or it seems much more

0:23:57.356 --> 0:24:01.156
<v Speaker 1>likely things in the stock market can get a lot worse.

0:24:02.196 --> 0:24:05.036
<v Speaker 1>Above all, I'm really struck that just as we're highly

0:24:05.076 --> 0:24:08.636
<v Speaker 1>dependent upon scientists in a moment of pandemic to try

0:24:08.676 --> 0:24:12.436
<v Speaker 1>to explain in ordinary language what's going on, we're also

0:24:12.516 --> 0:24:16.396
<v Speaker 1>dependent on financial market experts to try to explain to

0:24:16.436 --> 0:24:19.156
<v Speaker 1>the rest of us what they see happening in their

0:24:19.196 --> 0:24:24.156
<v Speaker 1>own very distinctive and very consequential world. Until the next

0:24:24.196 --> 0:24:27.476
<v Speaker 1>time I speak to you, be careful, be safe, and

0:24:27.556 --> 0:24:32.916
<v Speaker 1>be well. Deep background is brought to you by Pushkin Industries.

0:24:33.236 --> 0:24:36.236
<v Speaker 1>Our producer is Lydia Jane Cott, with research help from

0:24:36.356 --> 0:24:40.236
<v Speaker 1>Zooie Wynn and mastering by Jason Gambrel and Martin Gonzalez.

0:24:40.636 --> 0:24:44.196
<v Speaker 1>Our showrunner is Sophie mckibbon. Our theme music is composed

0:24:44.196 --> 0:24:48.276
<v Speaker 1>by Luis gera special thanks to the Pushkin Brass, Malcolm Gladwell,

0:24:48.436 --> 0:24:52.476
<v Speaker 1>Jacob Weisberg, and Mia Loebell. I'm Noah Feldman. I also

0:24:52.476 --> 0:24:55.316
<v Speaker 1>write a regular column for Bloomberg Opinion, which you can

0:24:55.356 --> 0:24:59.796
<v Speaker 1>find at Bloomberg dot com slash Feldman. To discover Bloomberg's

0:24:59.796 --> 0:25:04.076
<v Speaker 1>original slate of podcasts, go to Bloomberg dot com slash podcasts.

0:25:04.716 --> 0:25:07.396
<v Speaker 1>And one last thing. I just wrote a book called

0:25:07.636 --> 0:25:10.596
<v Speaker 1>The Arab Winter a trag. I would be delighted if

0:25:10.596 --> 0:25:12.436
<v Speaker 1>you checked it out. You can always let me know

0:25:12.436 --> 0:25:15.116
<v Speaker 1>what you think on Twitter about this episode, or the book,

0:25:15.236 --> 0:25:18.996
<v Speaker 1>or anything else. My handle is Noah R. Feldman. This

0:25:19.276 --> 0:25:20.196
<v Speaker 1>is deep background