1 00:00:00,880 --> 00:00:03,160 Speaker 1: Welcome to the Truth with Lisa Booth. We'll get to 2 00:00:03,160 --> 00:00:06,200 Speaker 1: the heart of the issues that matter to you. Today 3 00:00:06,200 --> 00:00:10,280 Speaker 1: we're talking Iran's nuclear clock. Is it ticking faster than ever? 4 00:00:11,200 --> 00:00:14,640 Speaker 1: I'll talk to Vice Admiral John W. Miller, he is 5 00:00:14,680 --> 00:00:17,600 Speaker 1: the ex commander of the Fifth Fleet and Naval Forces 6 00:00:17,640 --> 00:00:22,560 Speaker 1: Central Command. For a breakdown on all of this. Aron's breakout, timeline, 7 00:00:22,800 --> 00:00:27,200 Speaker 1: enrichment versus weaponization, intel gaps. What do we actually know? 8 00:00:28,200 --> 00:00:31,080 Speaker 1: Is President Trump working on deterrence or delay? And what 9 00:00:31,200 --> 00:00:35,720 Speaker 1: happens if and when talks don't work out? What's next 10 00:00:35,720 --> 00:00:39,160 Speaker 1: after that? What will President Trump do? What a real 11 00:00:39,280 --> 00:00:44,040 Speaker 1: deal actually means? So hard truth from a guy who 12 00:00:44,120 --> 00:00:47,080 Speaker 1: ran the show in the golf Stay tuned for Vice 13 00:00:47,120 --> 00:00:48,120 Speaker 1: Admiral John W. 14 00:00:48,200 --> 00:00:48,520 Speaker 2: Miller. 15 00:00:53,800 --> 00:00:56,400 Speaker 1: Well, Vice Admiral, it's great to have you on the show. 16 00:00:57,240 --> 00:00:59,600 Speaker 1: We've known each other for a while, as I've noted before, 17 00:00:59,640 --> 00:01:02,560 Speaker 1: and I've had one you are one of my best friends, dad, 18 00:01:02,680 --> 00:01:04,160 Speaker 1: So thanks for making the time star. 19 00:01:05,080 --> 00:01:07,119 Speaker 3: Thanks for having me Lisa, it's great to be with you. 20 00:01:07,440 --> 00:01:09,880 Speaker 1: You also happen to be an expert on Iran, so 21 00:01:09,920 --> 00:01:12,360 Speaker 1: it's that's hopeful. So I wanted to ask you, sir 22 00:01:12,480 --> 00:01:15,080 Speaker 1: how close. We've heard sort of different accounts for how 23 00:01:15,120 --> 00:01:19,440 Speaker 1: close Iran is to a nuclear weapon. What is the 24 00:01:19,440 --> 00:01:21,520 Speaker 1: real breakout timeline from your perspective? 25 00:01:21,920 --> 00:01:25,040 Speaker 3: Well, a little bit of it depends on how we 26 00:01:25,160 --> 00:01:30,000 Speaker 3: define breakout. And so here's some things that we know. 27 00:01:30,120 --> 00:01:37,280 Speaker 3: We know they had about six hundred programs of sixty 28 00:01:37,319 --> 00:01:44,080 Speaker 3: percent enriched material, and once you enriched uranium passed about 29 00:01:44,120 --> 00:01:47,600 Speaker 3: five percent, there is no other use for it other 30 00:01:47,680 --> 00:01:51,120 Speaker 3: than to use it in a weapons program and as 31 00:01:51,160 --> 00:01:54,800 Speaker 3: a nuclear weapon. And the way you enrich uranium, if 32 00:01:54,840 --> 00:01:58,040 Speaker 3: you get to sixty percent purity, it's just a few 33 00:01:58,160 --> 00:02:01,000 Speaker 3: short steps to get to the ninety percent that you 34 00:02:01,120 --> 00:02:03,640 Speaker 3: need for a weapon. So we know that they have 35 00:02:03,840 --> 00:02:08,320 Speaker 3: material that's close. Now we're not entirely sure what happened 36 00:02:08,360 --> 00:02:11,760 Speaker 3: to that material in the June midnighte Hammer attacks. It 37 00:02:11,800 --> 00:02:16,040 Speaker 3: is probably safely tucked away underneath a large pile of 38 00:02:16,120 --> 00:02:18,720 Speaker 3: rubble somewhere where they can't get at it, but that's 39 00:02:18,800 --> 00:02:22,679 Speaker 3: not for sure. Now, what we I have pretty good 40 00:02:22,680 --> 00:02:25,600 Speaker 3: confidence in is that they don't have an ability to 41 00:02:26,080 --> 00:02:28,519 Speaker 3: do that last bit of enrichment that takes it from 42 00:02:28,560 --> 00:02:32,280 Speaker 3: sixty percent to ninety percent. Weapons great to put into 43 00:02:32,320 --> 00:02:36,760 Speaker 3: a bomb, and so it's I think important for us 44 00:02:36,800 --> 00:02:40,840 Speaker 3: to be concerned about their ability to under rather austere 45 00:02:41,040 --> 00:02:44,600 Speaker 3: circumstances produce some kind of a nuclear weapon in a 46 00:02:44,680 --> 00:02:47,720 Speaker 3: relatively short period of time and then find a way 47 00:02:47,760 --> 00:02:50,640 Speaker 3: to deliver that. And this would not be a nuclear 48 00:02:50,680 --> 00:02:54,000 Speaker 3: weapon in terms of how we think of them when 49 00:02:54,000 --> 00:02:56,480 Speaker 3: you see these explosions from the tests that we did 50 00:02:56,480 --> 00:02:59,240 Speaker 3: in the past. It would be an imperfect weapon, but 51 00:02:59,280 --> 00:03:01,680 Speaker 3: it would be a large It could have a large yield, 52 00:03:01,760 --> 00:03:04,480 Speaker 3: and of course it would have the radiation that's associated 53 00:03:04,480 --> 00:03:07,200 Speaker 3: with it. So it's really difficult to say how close 54 00:03:07,280 --> 00:03:10,480 Speaker 3: they are. But they still have, you know, some sort 55 00:03:10,520 --> 00:03:14,240 Speaker 3: of rogue ability perhaps to finish the enrichment and put 56 00:03:14,320 --> 00:03:17,560 Speaker 3: something together, which is why it's important to keep after 57 00:03:18,480 --> 00:03:21,680 Speaker 3: their program and to get some clarity and surety on 58 00:03:21,840 --> 00:03:24,240 Speaker 3: what they have where it's at. How do we get 59 00:03:24,240 --> 00:03:25,080 Speaker 3: it out of the country? 60 00:03:25,160 --> 00:03:28,280 Speaker 1: You know, how effective? You know, obviously when we drop 61 00:03:28,360 --> 00:03:31,440 Speaker 1: the bunk or busting bombs not too long ago, how 62 00:03:31,480 --> 00:03:34,600 Speaker 1: effective was that? Was it effective? If we're worried that 63 00:03:34,639 --> 00:03:35,680 Speaker 1: they're this close. 64 00:03:36,000 --> 00:03:39,520 Speaker 3: I think it was was a very effective strike and 65 00:03:39,520 --> 00:03:42,480 Speaker 3: it accomplished the things that we set it out to 66 00:03:42,560 --> 00:03:46,240 Speaker 3: accomplish and that, you know, the Chairman laid out, was 67 00:03:46,440 --> 00:03:49,240 Speaker 3: within the realm of possibility in terms of our capability. 68 00:03:49,280 --> 00:03:50,960 Speaker 3: So I think it was very successful in that regard. 69 00:03:51,120 --> 00:03:56,720 Speaker 3: So they're not in these secret underground facilities any longer 70 00:03:56,880 --> 00:04:01,400 Speaker 3: enriching uranium and getting themselves closer and closer to a 71 00:04:01,400 --> 00:04:04,600 Speaker 3: point where they have a highly enriched uranium that's ready 72 00:04:04,600 --> 00:04:07,680 Speaker 3: for a nuclear bomb. But there is some material that 73 00:04:07,720 --> 00:04:10,880 Speaker 3: they did have on hand, and I think that's where 74 00:04:11,480 --> 00:04:15,080 Speaker 3: really our efforts are focus is on finding that. And 75 00:04:15,120 --> 00:04:19,560 Speaker 3: it may be that it's you know, underground in Fourdeaux 76 00:04:19,839 --> 00:04:22,960 Speaker 3: or some other place and won't ever see the light 77 00:04:23,000 --> 00:04:25,520 Speaker 3: of day again if we don't do anything at all, 78 00:04:25,560 --> 00:04:28,039 Speaker 3: But we don't know that for certain, and so it 79 00:04:28,040 --> 00:04:30,560 Speaker 3: would be nice to have better visibility into that. But 80 00:04:31,160 --> 00:04:34,320 Speaker 3: in terms of what they had as a Richmond program 81 00:04:34,760 --> 00:04:38,360 Speaker 3: before the strike and what they have today, it was 82 00:04:38,440 --> 00:04:40,000 Speaker 3: a completely effective strike. 83 00:04:41,040 --> 00:04:45,039 Speaker 1: Are they closer or further away today than before the 84 00:04:45,120 --> 00:04:48,159 Speaker 1: United States pulled out of the GCPOA. 85 00:04:47,640 --> 00:04:49,720 Speaker 3: Well, I think they're further away because they've lost the 86 00:04:49,720 --> 00:04:54,720 Speaker 3: infrastructure that that that they would use to be able 87 00:04:54,760 --> 00:04:57,719 Speaker 3: to finish the enrichment into and to finally turn that 88 00:04:57,800 --> 00:05:01,040 Speaker 3: into a weapon. At the same time, since we don't 89 00:05:01,080 --> 00:05:04,120 Speaker 3: know exactly where this material is at, we don't know 90 00:05:04,279 --> 00:05:07,560 Speaker 3: if they if they've got an ability someplace that we're 91 00:05:07,560 --> 00:05:11,000 Speaker 3: not aware of, where they can finish the enrichment. We 92 00:05:11,160 --> 00:05:14,400 Speaker 3: just don't know, and we don't know if they have 93 00:05:14,560 --> 00:05:17,919 Speaker 3: access to the material or if it's part of the 94 00:05:18,000 --> 00:05:21,520 Speaker 3: rubble that's left over from the strike. And so it's 95 00:05:21,520 --> 00:05:25,080 Speaker 3: the uncertainty more than anything else. The odds are good 96 00:05:24,680 --> 00:05:28,680 Speaker 3: that we've set the program back by much more than 97 00:05:28,920 --> 00:05:31,520 Speaker 3: just a year, but we don't know for certain and 98 00:05:31,560 --> 00:05:34,880 Speaker 3: I think with something like this, as much certainty as 99 00:05:34,920 --> 00:05:37,720 Speaker 3: we can have it would be useful to have it. 100 00:05:38,160 --> 00:05:40,559 Speaker 3: And how do we get that certainty, Well, that comes 101 00:05:40,600 --> 00:05:45,160 Speaker 3: with the right deal in terms of the nuclear weapons 102 00:05:45,160 --> 00:05:47,800 Speaker 3: program in Iran, which means they've got to agree to 103 00:05:47,839 --> 00:05:51,320 Speaker 3: give up this material and that they have, and they've 104 00:05:51,360 --> 00:05:53,200 Speaker 3: got to be able to account for it. They've got 105 00:05:53,279 --> 00:05:57,320 Speaker 3: to be able to allow whatever is negotiating the treaty 106 00:05:57,360 --> 00:06:01,360 Speaker 3: in terms of verification to take place. Verification. If you 107 00:06:01,440 --> 00:06:04,840 Speaker 3: remember back from JCP, what was a real issue. Not 108 00:06:04,880 --> 00:06:08,279 Speaker 3: only did we not have good verification standards built into 109 00:06:08,320 --> 00:06:14,280 Speaker 3: the agreement, the Iranians were very reluctant to actually allow 110 00:06:14,440 --> 00:06:17,960 Speaker 3: the access and verification that they had agreed to, and 111 00:06:18,040 --> 00:06:21,040 Speaker 3: so we're going to have to have a strong verification 112 00:06:21,120 --> 00:06:23,960 Speaker 3: protocol and the Iranians are going to have to follow that. 113 00:06:24,160 --> 00:06:26,120 Speaker 3: So those are the kind of things that we ought 114 00:06:26,120 --> 00:06:28,800 Speaker 3: to be looking for in an agreement where they agree 115 00:06:28,800 --> 00:06:31,440 Speaker 3: to turn over the material, they're not going to stockpile material, 116 00:06:31,920 --> 00:06:34,640 Speaker 3: they agree to suspend enrichment, they're not going to enrich 117 00:06:34,720 --> 00:06:39,040 Speaker 3: further material, and they agree to a verification protocol that 118 00:06:39,120 --> 00:06:40,200 Speaker 3: we find acceptable. 119 00:06:40,680 --> 00:06:43,200 Speaker 1: You know, but Iran is publicly stating that it will 120 00:06:43,200 --> 00:06:47,240 Speaker 1: not give up uranium enrichment. President Trump said that's a 121 00:06:47,240 --> 00:06:50,560 Speaker 1: non negotiable. I mean, those are two pretty hard lines. 122 00:06:50,680 --> 00:06:53,000 Speaker 1: So is Ron just toying with us? Are they just 123 00:06:53,040 --> 00:06:57,480 Speaker 1: buying time in these negotiations? Is it worth negotiating right now? 124 00:06:57,839 --> 00:06:59,400 Speaker 1: How do you see it when you've got these two 125 00:06:59,480 --> 00:07:01,360 Speaker 1: very hard lines that are polar opposites. 126 00:07:01,920 --> 00:07:04,880 Speaker 3: I see it a little bit, maybe more simply and 127 00:07:04,920 --> 00:07:07,680 Speaker 3: clearly than I did in the past. If you go 128 00:07:07,800 --> 00:07:11,640 Speaker 3: back to before Midnight Hammer, we were at a similar 129 00:07:11,680 --> 00:07:15,000 Speaker 3: crossroad in terms of the negotiations, where the Iranians said, 130 00:07:15,400 --> 00:07:17,080 Speaker 3: this is as far as we're going to go, We're 131 00:07:17,080 --> 00:07:19,760 Speaker 3: going to go no further. That wasn't acceptable to the 132 00:07:19,880 --> 00:07:24,600 Speaker 3: United States, and the response was Operation Midnight Hammer. So 133 00:07:24,880 --> 00:07:28,320 Speaker 3: I think the Iranians, who would negotiate the nuclear deal 134 00:07:28,440 --> 00:07:31,200 Speaker 3: for the next twenty years, given the opportunity, I think 135 00:07:31,240 --> 00:07:33,480 Speaker 3: they have to have a better understanding that they are 136 00:07:33,480 --> 00:07:37,800 Speaker 3: once again on the timeline and when the timeline has 137 00:07:37,880 --> 00:07:40,600 Speaker 3: expired in the mind of the president, the response is 138 00:07:40,600 --> 00:07:44,280 Speaker 3: not going to be a different kind of negotiating tactic. 139 00:07:44,840 --> 00:07:47,760 Speaker 3: The response is not going to be a plea to 140 00:07:48,280 --> 00:07:51,640 Speaker 3: the European Union to jump in into help. It's not 141 00:07:51,720 --> 00:07:54,160 Speaker 3: going to be an outreach to the Chinese and the 142 00:07:54,240 --> 00:07:57,240 Speaker 3: Russians to see what they can do. The outreach is 143 00:07:57,760 --> 00:07:59,920 Speaker 3: the result of it is going to be another attack 144 00:08:00,040 --> 00:08:02,880 Speaker 3: by the United States on their nuclear weapons program, or 145 00:08:02,880 --> 00:08:06,280 Speaker 3: the remnants of their nuclear weapons program, so that we 146 00:08:06,360 --> 00:08:11,240 Speaker 3: can be more sure that they can't reconstitute something out 147 00:08:11,280 --> 00:08:13,280 Speaker 3: of the rubble that currently exists. 148 00:08:13,760 --> 00:08:17,280 Speaker 1: Doran's also facing a lot of internal pressure. We've seen 149 00:08:17,520 --> 00:08:22,320 Speaker 1: protests across the nation and calls to topple the regime. 150 00:08:23,320 --> 00:08:25,760 Speaker 2: Does that put pressure on the. 151 00:08:25,720 --> 00:08:29,480 Speaker 1: Regime to negotiate or does it make the regime more 152 00:08:29,680 --> 00:08:35,640 Speaker 1: reckless and more apt to lash out and behave more incoherently. 153 00:08:36,200 --> 00:08:39,439 Speaker 3: That's a great question, and it gets to a great point. 154 00:08:39,760 --> 00:08:44,040 Speaker 3: And really what we've seen historically over the last almost 155 00:08:44,040 --> 00:08:46,480 Speaker 3: half century now that the regime has been in power 156 00:08:47,320 --> 00:08:51,200 Speaker 3: is when they feel threatened, the more threatened they feel, 157 00:08:51,400 --> 00:08:55,480 Speaker 3: the more reckless they become. And someone once described it 158 00:08:56,000 --> 00:09:01,239 Speaker 3: that the Iranian response to maximum pressure is maximum resistance, 159 00:09:01,320 --> 00:09:06,079 Speaker 3: and that really does sort of define the Iranian approach 160 00:09:06,200 --> 00:09:09,600 Speaker 3: to doing business. So they are under a lot of 161 00:09:09,640 --> 00:09:14,480 Speaker 3: pressure really on every front. When you look at the 162 00:09:14,520 --> 00:09:18,280 Speaker 3: global picture, Iran as a country that is entirely without 163 00:09:18,320 --> 00:09:23,600 Speaker 3: an ally they have a very transitory relationship, a transactional 164 00:09:23,640 --> 00:09:26,680 Speaker 3: relationship with the Russians and with the Chinese, and other 165 00:09:26,760 --> 00:09:27,360 Speaker 3: than that. 166 00:09:27,200 --> 00:09:27,360 Speaker 1: They. 167 00:09:28,840 --> 00:09:31,800 Speaker 3: And perhaps the North Koreans. Other than that, they have 168 00:09:31,920 --> 00:09:34,160 Speaker 3: no one they can even turn to that they might 169 00:09:34,200 --> 00:09:39,760 Speaker 3: be able to call a friend. They're surrounded virtually by 170 00:09:39,960 --> 00:09:45,040 Speaker 3: enemies of their own making. They have a terrible economy. 171 00:09:45,320 --> 00:09:48,520 Speaker 3: It's in part, in a large part the result of 172 00:09:49,080 --> 00:09:53,920 Speaker 3: decades of very debilitating sanctions. They've got a water crisis. 173 00:09:53,960 --> 00:09:56,080 Speaker 3: You don't hear that talked about much these days, but 174 00:09:56,760 --> 00:09:59,640 Speaker 3: they've been able to mismanage the water supply and Iran 175 00:09:59,679 --> 00:10:02,760 Speaker 3: for the last half century and are at a point 176 00:10:02,760 --> 00:10:05,480 Speaker 3: where they may eventually need to evacuate the city of 177 00:10:05,480 --> 00:10:08,200 Speaker 3: Tehran because they don't have enough water for the people. 178 00:10:09,000 --> 00:10:12,160 Speaker 3: So they have a number of problems. The response typically 179 00:10:12,360 --> 00:10:15,319 Speaker 3: to this kind of pressure on the regime has not 180 00:10:15,520 --> 00:10:19,960 Speaker 3: been to become more benevolent, not been to go out 181 00:10:20,000 --> 00:10:22,800 Speaker 3: to the world and say we could use some assistance, 182 00:10:22,840 --> 00:10:25,920 Speaker 3: we'd like to have better trade, and we're willing to 183 00:10:26,000 --> 00:10:29,560 Speaker 3: negotiate in good faith. That's just not what they've done, 184 00:10:29,640 --> 00:10:32,160 Speaker 3: and they're not doing that today. And I don't see 185 00:10:32,200 --> 00:10:35,080 Speaker 3: the regime ever getting to a point where they begin 186 00:10:35,160 --> 00:10:39,400 Speaker 3: to behave like a responsible nation in the community of nations. 187 00:10:40,200 --> 00:10:43,360 Speaker 3: Remember General Mattis once said Iran has to decide whether 188 00:10:43,400 --> 00:10:46,280 Speaker 3: they're going to be a revolution or a country, and 189 00:10:46,440 --> 00:10:49,880 Speaker 3: I still think that that's true today. 190 00:10:49,920 --> 00:10:51,840 Speaker 1: Also said have a plan to kill everyone you meet, 191 00:10:52,000 --> 00:10:54,319 Speaker 1: so that's always right. 192 00:10:54,360 --> 00:10:55,959 Speaker 2: Didn't say something like that. 193 00:10:55,720 --> 00:10:57,800 Speaker 3: He dad say something like that, But I've met him 194 00:10:57,840 --> 00:11:00,240 Speaker 3: and he's a wonderful man. They had a great leader. 195 00:11:00,360 --> 00:11:02,400 Speaker 2: Yeah, but you probably had a plan to kill you. 196 00:11:02,760 --> 00:11:06,720 Speaker 1: With a lot a little scary going to meetings with him, 197 00:11:06,760 --> 00:11:07,320 Speaker 1: I guess. 198 00:11:09,000 --> 00:11:12,880 Speaker 2: But how do you think the regime sees President Trump. 199 00:11:13,480 --> 00:11:16,400 Speaker 3: I think they have a pretty good understanding of what 200 00:11:16,520 --> 00:11:20,480 Speaker 3: President Trump is like, and they've had a chance. You know, 201 00:11:20,520 --> 00:11:23,600 Speaker 3: they got a chance to see him in his first 202 00:11:23,720 --> 00:11:29,320 Speaker 3: administration and understand where he was coming from with the 203 00:11:29,360 --> 00:11:31,920 Speaker 3: Iran problem set and where he wanted to go. There 204 00:11:32,000 --> 00:11:34,840 Speaker 3: was some outreach on the part of the Trump administration 205 00:11:34,920 --> 00:11:37,599 Speaker 3: the first one to actually get a good deal that 206 00:11:38,280 --> 00:11:41,439 Speaker 3: we would have been satisfied with and likely the Iranians 207 00:11:41,440 --> 00:11:43,800 Speaker 3: would have been satisfied with him. They didn't make the deal. 208 00:11:43,920 --> 00:11:47,320 Speaker 3: They've seen him in his second administration where if they're 209 00:11:47,320 --> 00:11:48,960 Speaker 3: not going to make a deal, then he's going to 210 00:11:49,000 --> 00:11:52,880 Speaker 3: take action. So I think they understand that, But that 211 00:11:52,920 --> 00:11:56,679 Speaker 3: doesn't necessarily mean like it would for most people. If 212 00:11:56,720 --> 00:11:58,760 Speaker 3: you and I were in the position of the regime, 213 00:11:59,280 --> 00:12:01,280 Speaker 3: I think we'd be looking at how we can make 214 00:12:01,320 --> 00:12:05,280 Speaker 3: a deal that keeps the United States from attacking the 215 00:12:05,360 --> 00:12:09,240 Speaker 3: nuclear program in Iran again and maybe some other things 216 00:12:09,240 --> 00:12:11,960 Speaker 3: in Iran as well, and how can they reduce some 217 00:12:12,080 --> 00:12:15,439 Speaker 3: of the pressure on the regime by negotiating with the administration. 218 00:12:15,720 --> 00:12:18,120 Speaker 3: We just don't see them doing that. So I think 219 00:12:18,160 --> 00:12:21,120 Speaker 3: intellectually they can understand it. They just don't seem to 220 00:12:21,160 --> 00:12:22,840 Speaker 3: be able to get to a point where they're willing 221 00:12:22,880 --> 00:12:26,200 Speaker 3: to say, Okay, well we'll negotiate here, and we're going 222 00:12:26,280 --> 00:12:28,880 Speaker 3: to get something, probably not everything we want, but something 223 00:12:29,080 --> 00:12:31,200 Speaker 3: going to reduce some of the pressure that's on the 224 00:12:31,240 --> 00:12:34,280 Speaker 3: regime and some of the pressure that's on the economy, 225 00:12:34,640 --> 00:12:37,400 Speaker 3: which would give them a little bit better footing at home. 226 00:12:37,840 --> 00:12:39,160 Speaker 2: Quick break more on Iran. 227 00:12:39,280 --> 00:12:41,160 Speaker 1: If you like what you're hearing, please share on social 228 00:12:41,200 --> 00:12:46,320 Speaker 1: media or send it to your family and friends. You know, 229 00:12:46,360 --> 00:12:50,760 Speaker 1: if Ran is unwilling to reach a compromise that the 230 00:12:50,800 --> 00:12:56,000 Speaker 1: Trump administration deems worthy and acceptable, what happens next, Well. 231 00:12:55,840 --> 00:12:58,080 Speaker 3: There's a number of things that can happen, and it 232 00:12:58,120 --> 00:13:01,720 Speaker 3: could be something as simple as a strike that's designed 233 00:13:01,920 --> 00:13:04,800 Speaker 3: just to put more pressure on the regime. So that's 234 00:13:04,800 --> 00:13:08,000 Speaker 3: a strike that might be relatively limited in scope. It 235 00:13:08,040 --> 00:13:11,600 Speaker 3: would focus likely on the nuclear problem set, if you will, 236 00:13:11,679 --> 00:13:13,439 Speaker 3: so parts of that that we want to have a 237 00:13:13,520 --> 00:13:17,120 Speaker 3: little bit more clarity over the condition of it by 238 00:13:17,200 --> 00:13:21,880 Speaker 3: ensuring that it's still difficult to get at or nearly 239 00:13:21,920 --> 00:13:25,840 Speaker 3: impossible to get at. It likely would include their ballistic missile, 240 00:13:25,880 --> 00:13:29,679 Speaker 3: their missile facilities, or missile production facilities or storage facilities. 241 00:13:29,840 --> 00:13:33,720 Speaker 3: Missiles are really the way that the Iranian regime now 242 00:13:33,760 --> 00:13:38,280 Speaker 3: can defend itself from external aggression of any kind from anyone, 243 00:13:38,480 --> 00:13:42,000 Speaker 3: because their air defenses have been largely destroyed and haven't 244 00:13:42,000 --> 00:13:46,640 Speaker 3: been rebuilt. They've tried to rebuild their missile production facilities, 245 00:13:46,679 --> 00:13:49,720 Speaker 3: their launch facilities, and so they will likely be some 246 00:13:49,840 --> 00:13:54,160 Speaker 3: targeting into them. It's likely that some of the regime 247 00:13:54,280 --> 00:13:57,880 Speaker 3: leadership would be part of a limited strike, and that 248 00:13:57,920 --> 00:14:02,000 Speaker 3: doesn't have to be a decapitation strike, although that's a possibility, 249 00:14:02,160 --> 00:14:04,560 Speaker 3: it doesn't have to be that. It's the ability of 250 00:14:05,040 --> 00:14:09,240 Speaker 3: the IRGC and the Bazige forces to command and control 251 00:14:09,280 --> 00:14:13,560 Speaker 3: their own forces, which then produces a little bit of 252 00:14:13,960 --> 00:14:17,400 Speaker 3: wiggle room for the protesters in Iran. If you make 253 00:14:17,440 --> 00:14:21,240 Speaker 3: it more difficult for the Iranian government, particularly the IRGC, 254 00:14:21,880 --> 00:14:25,680 Speaker 3: to operate against its own own people and to kill them, 255 00:14:25,760 --> 00:14:28,360 Speaker 3: which as you know, they've been doing in quantity of late. 256 00:14:28,520 --> 00:14:30,480 Speaker 3: So those are the kind of things I think you 257 00:14:30,520 --> 00:14:33,560 Speaker 3: would see as a pressure strike, and then it could 258 00:14:33,560 --> 00:14:37,160 Speaker 3: expand to their impact the Iranian's ability to wage war 259 00:14:37,200 --> 00:14:41,360 Speaker 3: of any kind, and it could be strikes that are 260 00:14:41,520 --> 00:14:45,040 Speaker 3: large enough and persistent enough that they would lend to 261 00:14:45,280 --> 00:14:48,640 Speaker 3: the effort to eventually force regime change. 262 00:14:49,480 --> 00:14:55,160 Speaker 1: Do any countries come to Iran's defense in that scenario, I. 263 00:14:55,120 --> 00:14:57,400 Speaker 3: Don't think so. If you look at who might come 264 00:14:57,440 --> 00:15:01,280 Speaker 3: to their defense, you know they got a kindred soul 265 00:15:01,440 --> 00:15:04,120 Speaker 3: in the North Korean government, but I don't think that 266 00:15:04,160 --> 00:15:06,880 Speaker 3: the North Koreans are in any position to come to 267 00:15:06,920 --> 00:15:10,920 Speaker 3: the defense of Iran. What kind of excess capability the 268 00:15:10,920 --> 00:15:13,560 Speaker 3: North Koreans might feel that they have is being used 269 00:15:13,640 --> 00:15:16,920 Speaker 3: up today in Ukraine and support of the Russians. I 270 00:15:16,960 --> 00:15:19,200 Speaker 3: don't see the Russians being supportive. They were not at 271 00:15:19,200 --> 00:15:22,400 Speaker 3: all supportive during the Twelve Day War, and I wouldn't 272 00:15:22,440 --> 00:15:25,040 Speaker 3: expect them to be supportive of any further effort. And 273 00:15:25,120 --> 00:15:28,120 Speaker 3: I certainly wouldn't expect the Chinese to become directly involved. 274 00:15:28,520 --> 00:15:31,520 Speaker 2: Well that's good to hear. Well it's interesting too, I assume. 275 00:15:31,920 --> 00:15:34,280 Speaker 1: You know, because it was interesting because you know a 276 00:15:34,320 --> 00:15:37,200 Speaker 1: lot of these other Middle Eastern countries were encouraging President 277 00:15:37,280 --> 00:15:38,760 Speaker 1: Trump to negotiate. 278 00:15:39,080 --> 00:15:40,640 Speaker 2: How do you think Israel sees it? 279 00:15:40,840 --> 00:15:43,520 Speaker 1: I assume they probably would rather the rest be dropping 280 00:15:43,560 --> 00:15:47,280 Speaker 1: more bombs or do you think they support negotiation as well. 281 00:15:47,840 --> 00:15:48,080 Speaker 2: Well. 282 00:15:48,560 --> 00:15:51,360 Speaker 3: Israel, like any country, is at the end of the day, 283 00:15:52,000 --> 00:15:54,680 Speaker 3: the responsibility of the government is to do what's in 284 00:15:54,720 --> 00:15:57,120 Speaker 3: the best interests of the country and of the people, 285 00:15:57,680 --> 00:16:00,440 Speaker 3: and that's where I think the Israelis have and that's 286 00:16:00,440 --> 00:16:03,600 Speaker 3: where they are today. They know that the Iranians pose 287 00:16:03,680 --> 00:16:06,560 Speaker 3: an existential threat to their existence. The Iranians have been 288 00:16:06,680 --> 00:16:09,440 Speaker 3: very clear about the fact that they would like to 289 00:16:09,520 --> 00:16:14,000 Speaker 3: pose an existential threat to the ability of Israel to 290 00:16:14,080 --> 00:16:17,720 Speaker 3: continue to exist, and so I think that they favor 291 00:16:17,880 --> 00:16:20,440 Speaker 3: the various strike options that are available to us as 292 00:16:20,560 --> 00:16:22,520 Speaker 3: much as we can we think we can possibly do. 293 00:16:22,600 --> 00:16:24,440 Speaker 3: I think the Israelis would be in favor of a 294 00:16:24,520 --> 00:16:27,080 Speaker 3: support of of I think it's interesting and important to 295 00:16:27,160 --> 00:16:30,320 Speaker 3: understand where the Gulf countries are coming from. And it's 296 00:16:30,400 --> 00:16:33,480 Speaker 3: not that they wouldn't like to see a different regime 297 00:16:34,160 --> 00:16:37,880 Speaker 3: in Iran, because I think they're against the regime. They 298 00:16:38,000 --> 00:16:42,040 Speaker 3: understand the regime as a destabilizing factor throughout the region, 299 00:16:42,200 --> 00:16:47,760 Speaker 3: and so the activities of their proxies has Bolahamas, who 300 00:16:47,840 --> 00:16:51,320 Speaker 3: these other proxies in places like the eastern province of 301 00:16:51,360 --> 00:16:57,360 Speaker 3: Saudi Arabia in Bahrain, up in Kuwait that antagonize the 302 00:16:57,400 --> 00:17:01,360 Speaker 3: Shia populations and cause the Shia pop relations to riot 303 00:17:01,560 --> 00:17:04,040 Speaker 3: or to plant bombs, to creat instability in their own 304 00:17:04,080 --> 00:17:08,960 Speaker 3: region in the countries, So regionally, they're concerned about what 305 00:17:09,000 --> 00:17:11,840 Speaker 3: i Ran does, but they're also concerned about what an 306 00:17:11,840 --> 00:17:16,200 Speaker 3: Iran where the regime is collapsing, actually looks like, and 307 00:17:16,920 --> 00:17:20,920 Speaker 3: how much instability that you would find during regime collapse 308 00:17:21,000 --> 00:17:25,359 Speaker 3: in the inside of Iran spills out into the rest 309 00:17:25,359 --> 00:17:28,240 Speaker 3: of the Golf And so that's to the commerce that's 310 00:17:28,280 --> 00:17:30,840 Speaker 3: in the Gulf, which is the petroleum products that come 311 00:17:30,880 --> 00:17:33,720 Speaker 3: out as well as the goods and services that come in. 312 00:17:35,280 --> 00:17:39,199 Speaker 3: But also it's the Shia populations that are prevalent in 313 00:17:39,320 --> 00:17:44,720 Speaker 3: a number of the GCC countries that stand to be 314 00:17:44,920 --> 00:17:50,040 Speaker 3: antagonized by a failing regime. And so I think from 315 00:17:50,960 --> 00:17:54,960 Speaker 3: a regional stability standpoint, that's the concern that Golf countries 316 00:17:55,000 --> 00:17:57,040 Speaker 3: have and they have to live with that in a 317 00:17:57,080 --> 00:18:00,439 Speaker 3: way that the Israelis don't, which might explain that the 318 00:18:00,520 --> 00:18:04,800 Speaker 3: different approach that each of those two entities are looking 319 00:18:04,840 --> 00:18:05,960 Speaker 3: to make to the problem. 320 00:18:06,800 --> 00:18:09,040 Speaker 1: And then before we go, how do you think President 321 00:18:09,080 --> 00:18:12,760 Speaker 1: Trump has done so far and navigating or on. 322 00:18:13,280 --> 00:18:15,560 Speaker 3: I'll tell you, I think he's done a very good job, 323 00:18:15,600 --> 00:18:19,000 Speaker 3: a brilliant job. I'm very supportive of how he's handled 324 00:18:19,000 --> 00:18:25,040 Speaker 3: the Iran issue during this term in office. Where I'm 325 00:18:25,080 --> 00:18:29,040 Speaker 3: hopeful is that we continue to keep this problem in 326 00:18:29,040 --> 00:18:32,800 Speaker 3: front of us and something that we're not going to 327 00:18:32,920 --> 00:18:36,880 Speaker 3: let just fester and sit over time. You know, there's 328 00:18:36,960 --> 00:18:41,960 Speaker 3: opportunity here to come out of the current crisis situation 329 00:18:42,119 --> 00:18:46,119 Speaker 3: that we're in within Iran that's a better neighbor regionally 330 00:18:46,400 --> 00:18:49,080 Speaker 3: and as a better neighbor globally. You know, the Iranian 331 00:18:49,280 --> 00:18:52,320 Speaker 3: population has a lot to offer. They're well educated, they've 332 00:18:52,320 --> 00:18:56,720 Speaker 3: got a beautiful culture, they have enormous resources within the country, 333 00:18:57,520 --> 00:19:00,280 Speaker 3: and so there, you know, the ability for Iran to 334 00:19:00,400 --> 00:19:04,920 Speaker 3: become a good partner in the region with the Arab 335 00:19:05,000 --> 00:19:07,399 Speaker 3: Gulf States and for the rest of the world in 336 00:19:07,520 --> 00:19:11,960 Speaker 3: terms of the global economy certainly is there. And it 337 00:19:12,000 --> 00:19:14,280 Speaker 3: would be very helpful if we could get to that 338 00:19:14,520 --> 00:19:18,000 Speaker 3: in the next year, so that we're not looking at 339 00:19:18,040 --> 00:19:20,959 Speaker 3: twenty twenty eight or twenty twenty nine or twenty thirty 340 00:19:21,320 --> 00:19:24,600 Speaker 3: and wondering what we're going to do about Iran, as 341 00:19:24,640 --> 00:19:27,760 Speaker 3: we have for you know, since nineteen seventy nine. 342 00:19:28,119 --> 00:19:29,240 Speaker 2: Vice Admiral John Miller. 343 00:19:29,359 --> 00:19:32,320 Speaker 1: Thanks for making the time, Fozzy, I appreciate you pleasure 344 00:19:32,400 --> 00:19:33,280 Speaker 1: have a great daily Sir. 345 00:19:33,840 --> 00:19:36,480 Speaker 2: That was Vice Admiral John W. Miller. Appreciate him for 346 00:19:36,520 --> 00:19:37,720 Speaker 2: taking the time to come on the show. 347 00:19:37,800 --> 00:19:40,800 Speaker 1: Appreciate you guys at home for listening every Tuesday and Thursday, 348 00:19:40,840 --> 00:19:43,000 Speaker 1: but you can listen throughout the week. Also want to 349 00:19:43,000 --> 00:19:45,359 Speaker 1: thank John Cassio and my producer for putting the show together. 350 00:19:45,520 --> 00:19:46,280 Speaker 2: Until next time.