1 00:00:01,480 --> 00:00:07,680 Speaker 1: Welcome to stuff you should know, a production of iHeartRadio. 2 00:00:11,760 --> 00:00:14,200 Speaker 2: Hey, and welcome to the podcast, don Josh, And there's 3 00:00:14,320 --> 00:00:16,439 Speaker 2: Chuck and Jerry's here too, And this is stuff you 4 00:00:16,480 --> 00:00:16,880 Speaker 2: should know. 5 00:00:19,440 --> 00:00:23,239 Speaker 1: The whoops addition, that's right. You know it's not a 6 00:00:23,280 --> 00:00:23,720 Speaker 1: woops though. 7 00:00:24,280 --> 00:00:27,000 Speaker 2: Oh, I can guess where this is going. 8 00:00:27,960 --> 00:00:29,040 Speaker 1: Stuff at sea voyage. 9 00:00:29,080 --> 00:00:32,440 Speaker 2: That's right. It's the most deliberate voyage ever created. 10 00:00:33,240 --> 00:00:35,080 Speaker 1: It's completely unaccidental. 11 00:00:35,159 --> 00:00:35,559 Speaker 2: That's right. 12 00:00:36,159 --> 00:00:41,559 Speaker 1: Five night adults only sailing trip and says, and we're 13 00:00:41,600 --> 00:00:44,520 Speaker 1: gonna be doing our live podcast from New York City 14 00:00:44,520 --> 00:00:46,800 Speaker 1: to Bermuda, not the whole way, just like one time. 15 00:00:47,360 --> 00:00:50,560 Speaker 2: Right. Yeah, there's gonna be other stuff too. We're gonna 16 00:00:50,560 --> 00:00:54,720 Speaker 2: be meeting and greeting, and I'm guessing there'll be other 17 00:00:55,240 --> 00:00:58,720 Speaker 2: opportunities to hang out with us maybe rather than yeah, 18 00:00:58,880 --> 00:00:59,920 Speaker 2: just the one meet and greet. 19 00:01:00,880 --> 00:01:04,280 Speaker 1: Yeah, for sure. This all goes down October second through 20 00:01:04,360 --> 00:01:08,600 Speaker 1: seventh of this year, aboard the Valiant Lady, and you 21 00:01:08,640 --> 00:01:11,640 Speaker 1: can go check everything out at virgin Voyages dot com. 22 00:01:11,640 --> 00:01:12,720 Speaker 1: Slash stuff. 23 00:01:13,120 --> 00:01:16,839 Speaker 2: Very nice, Chuck, let's see, so you want to start 24 00:01:16,880 --> 00:01:18,320 Speaker 2: talking about Three Mile Island. 25 00:01:19,760 --> 00:01:26,000 Speaker 1: Yeah, the nuclear I guess it's still the worst nuclear 26 00:01:26,080 --> 00:01:28,440 Speaker 1: disaster in American history, right. 27 00:01:29,040 --> 00:01:32,800 Speaker 2: Yeah, I can't think of anything worse. I mean, as 28 00:01:32,800 --> 00:01:37,920 Speaker 2: far as actual disasters go, it wasn't that bad. But 29 00:01:38,240 --> 00:01:40,959 Speaker 2: how close it came to being like a true Nobyl 30 00:01:41,080 --> 00:01:44,720 Speaker 2: level is kind of breath taking, actually. 31 00:01:45,160 --> 00:01:48,000 Speaker 1: Yeah, for sure. And this all went down when I 32 00:01:48,080 --> 00:01:51,880 Speaker 1: had just turned eight years old, yep, on March twenty eighth, 33 00:01:52,000 --> 00:01:53,080 Speaker 1: nineteen seventy nine. 34 00:01:53,640 --> 00:01:58,480 Speaker 2: Yeah, And really interestingly, just twelve days before this accident 35 00:01:58,560 --> 00:02:01,400 Speaker 2: happened at Three Mile Island, a movie called The China 36 00:02:01,440 --> 00:02:04,240 Speaker 2: Syndrome came out, Yeah, starring Michael. 37 00:02:03,960 --> 00:02:06,400 Speaker 1: Douglas, crazy timing, Yeah. 38 00:02:06,040 --> 00:02:10,520 Speaker 2: And Jane Fonda, which makes it even weirder because The 39 00:02:10,600 --> 00:02:12,919 Speaker 2: China Syndrome, if you've never seen it, it's pretty good movie. 40 00:02:12,919 --> 00:02:18,080 Speaker 2: I would say go watch it it. It was basically this. 41 00:02:18,720 --> 00:02:21,079 Speaker 2: It was essentially what happened, what happened to the movie 42 00:02:21,240 --> 00:02:24,320 Speaker 2: China Syndrome happened at Three Mile Island twelve days later. 43 00:02:24,400 --> 00:02:25,440 Speaker 2: It's really bizarre. 44 00:02:26,560 --> 00:02:31,359 Speaker 1: Yeah, And the term China syndrome comes from I don't 45 00:02:31,400 --> 00:02:32,880 Speaker 1: know if it's a term they still use, but I 46 00:02:32,919 --> 00:02:35,959 Speaker 1: guess it was a term back then for a reactor 47 00:02:36,000 --> 00:02:40,120 Speaker 1: melting down and melting all the way through to China. 48 00:02:40,320 --> 00:02:44,480 Speaker 2: Yeah, pretty folksy term for something as horrific as that. 49 00:02:45,360 --> 00:02:47,359 Speaker 1: Yeah, because you know, when you grow up in the seventies, 50 00:02:47,400 --> 00:02:50,320 Speaker 1: everyone knows if you dig deep enough, you will reach China. 51 00:02:50,360 --> 00:02:52,840 Speaker 2: Sure, I tried a couple of times and gave up 52 00:02:52,880 --> 00:02:54,240 Speaker 2: after a few hours. 53 00:02:54,720 --> 00:02:56,440 Speaker 1: Yeah, that was that was on the playground at least. 54 00:02:56,440 --> 00:03:00,240 Speaker 1: But yeah, this happened March twenty eight, seventy nine. When 55 00:03:00,280 --> 00:03:01,760 Speaker 1: you said it wasn't as bad as it could have been, 56 00:03:02,360 --> 00:03:05,640 Speaker 1: you're dead right, because that means there were no casualties 57 00:03:06,240 --> 00:03:10,480 Speaker 1: and they did avert completely that complete and total meltdown. 58 00:03:10,560 --> 00:03:15,359 Speaker 1: But there's a lot of sort of I guess, skepticism 59 00:03:15,400 --> 00:03:19,280 Speaker 1: still that like, hey, it was fine. There was the 60 00:03:19,360 --> 00:03:22,520 Speaker 1: air spine, and that everything around there is just spine 61 00:03:22,560 --> 00:03:24,200 Speaker 1: and nobody ever got sick because of this. 62 00:03:24,560 --> 00:03:26,920 Speaker 2: Yeah. And one reason that it does pay to be 63 00:03:26,960 --> 00:03:29,600 Speaker 2: skeptical of that, and you can't really blame people who are, 64 00:03:29,680 --> 00:03:32,160 Speaker 2: especially people who live in the area like in Middletown 65 00:03:32,240 --> 00:03:38,720 Speaker 2: or Pennsylvania, is that at the time, the atomic energy industry, 66 00:03:39,000 --> 00:03:42,440 Speaker 2: including the businesses that ran the place, the businesses that 67 00:03:42,520 --> 00:03:45,840 Speaker 2: built these places, the agencies that regulated it, all of 68 00:03:45,880 --> 00:03:51,960 Speaker 2: them had nothing but pollyanna ish optimistic views of all 69 00:03:52,000 --> 00:03:55,320 Speaker 2: of the amazing things that nuclear power could do and 70 00:03:55,560 --> 00:03:59,520 Speaker 2: how safe it was. Like they were diluted as a 71 00:03:59,520 --> 00:04:03,120 Speaker 2: group about the safety of nuclear power, and even throughout 72 00:04:03,160 --> 00:04:06,400 Speaker 2: this whole accident as it was unfolding, they were just like, no, 73 00:04:06,520 --> 00:04:08,400 Speaker 2: it's not that bad. Oh, it's a little worse than 74 00:04:08,400 --> 00:04:10,080 Speaker 2: we thought, but it's still not that bad. And it 75 00:04:10,120 --> 00:04:12,760 Speaker 2: just kept going and going like that. Every time something 76 00:04:12,800 --> 00:04:14,920 Speaker 2: new came out, they were like, oh, it's a little 77 00:04:14,960 --> 00:04:17,560 Speaker 2: worse than we thought. Finally, in the mid eighties they 78 00:04:17,560 --> 00:04:20,880 Speaker 2: were like, Okay, this was really bad. It took that 79 00:04:21,040 --> 00:04:23,279 Speaker 2: long for them to admit it because they were just 80 00:04:23,320 --> 00:04:26,040 Speaker 2: that optimistic about it. They couldn't believe that this could happen. 81 00:04:26,800 --> 00:04:29,080 Speaker 1: Yeah, for sure. And as we'll see, it was a 82 00:04:29,080 --> 00:04:34,560 Speaker 1: combination of human error and poor instrumentation and redundancies that 83 00:04:34,760 --> 00:04:37,640 Speaker 1: didn't work and stuff that I mean, it's crazy, like 84 00:04:37,680 --> 00:04:40,520 Speaker 1: some of the stuff I was almost ready to read, like, well, 85 00:04:40,520 --> 00:04:43,760 Speaker 1: and this thing just wasn't labeled correctly, and that never happened, 86 00:04:43,760 --> 00:04:46,719 Speaker 1: But it was getting a little absurd at some point 87 00:04:46,760 --> 00:04:48,320 Speaker 1: when you were looking at all the sort of things 88 00:04:48,360 --> 00:04:49,560 Speaker 1: that happened that led to. 89 00:04:49,520 --> 00:04:53,400 Speaker 2: This Yeah, totally agreed. Yeah, I think that was a 90 00:04:53,600 --> 00:04:57,159 Speaker 2: consequence of that over optimistic view too. 91 00:04:58,680 --> 00:05:02,080 Speaker 1: So should we start as Night Ranger did at four 92 00:05:02,120 --> 00:05:04,200 Speaker 1: in the morning without a warning? 93 00:05:04,760 --> 00:05:07,320 Speaker 2: Is that, Sister Christian? That's the only Night Rangier song 94 00:05:07,400 --> 00:05:07,599 Speaker 2: I know? 95 00:05:08,320 --> 00:05:10,000 Speaker 1: No, it's the song they have a song called four 96 00:05:10,040 --> 00:05:12,640 Speaker 1: in the morning. Oh, four in the morning came without 97 00:05:12,640 --> 00:05:15,479 Speaker 1: a warning, That's all I remember. But that's what happened. 98 00:05:16,320 --> 00:05:19,760 Speaker 1: There was a small mouth function in the secondary cool 99 00:05:20,400 --> 00:05:24,560 Speaker 1: cooling system, and there was a mechanical that they still 100 00:05:24,600 --> 00:05:27,200 Speaker 1: don't know if it was a mechanical or an electrical air. 101 00:05:27,960 --> 00:05:30,000 Speaker 1: And the long and short of it was the water 102 00:05:30,040 --> 00:05:33,760 Speaker 1: pump started sending water to the steam generators. And as 103 00:05:33,920 --> 00:05:36,920 Speaker 1: you know from listening, I mean, we've done episodes on 104 00:05:37,000 --> 00:05:42,120 Speaker 1: nuclear energy and on the one the meltdown in Japanshima, 105 00:05:42,400 --> 00:05:45,039 Speaker 1: like water and keeping that reactor core cool is the 106 00:05:45,080 --> 00:05:47,599 Speaker 1: whole key to keeping things safe. 107 00:05:47,839 --> 00:05:50,800 Speaker 2: Yeah, exactly, because once it starts heating, it's really tough 108 00:05:50,800 --> 00:05:52,760 Speaker 2: to get it cooled down again, and all sorts of 109 00:05:52,760 --> 00:05:55,880 Speaker 2: bad things happen when it overheats. And I think by 110 00:05:55,920 --> 00:06:00,960 Speaker 2: the time they had shut the system down, by the 111 00:06:01,000 --> 00:06:04,799 Speaker 2: time they finally intervened. It was at four thousand degrees 112 00:06:05,120 --> 00:06:09,200 Speaker 2: farent height, so a thousand degrees short of a total meltdown. 113 00:06:09,880 --> 00:06:12,440 Speaker 2: And just to kind of go into a little more 114 00:06:12,480 --> 00:06:16,840 Speaker 2: detail of exactly what happened, because you basically kind of 115 00:06:17,200 --> 00:06:21,800 Speaker 2: got the point across. There was a fault in I 116 00:06:21,839 --> 00:06:27,200 Speaker 2: think a mechanical or electrical part that kept the water 117 00:06:27,480 --> 00:06:31,080 Speaker 2: that you needed to cool all that stuff from flowing in. 118 00:06:31,600 --> 00:06:34,120 Speaker 2: That was the thing that kicked it all off. But 119 00:06:34,560 --> 00:06:40,240 Speaker 2: this nuclear reactor, the control panel was designed to sense 120 00:06:40,400 --> 00:06:42,839 Speaker 2: like when it started to overheat, and it did overheat 121 00:06:42,839 --> 00:06:45,599 Speaker 2: because there wasn't enough coolant, and it shut itself down 122 00:06:46,000 --> 00:06:50,400 Speaker 2: and everything with that was working properly. The control ruds 123 00:06:50,400 --> 00:06:52,880 Speaker 2: went in, nobody had to do anything. The system shut 124 00:06:52,920 --> 00:06:54,600 Speaker 2: itself down because it was overheating. 125 00:06:55,920 --> 00:07:00,279 Speaker 1: Right, So, so far, so good in a certain sense. Yeah, 126 00:07:00,839 --> 00:07:03,440 Speaker 1: but things really kind of went pear shaped after this. 127 00:07:03,560 --> 00:07:06,560 Speaker 1: As you used to say a lot, you don't say 128 00:07:06,560 --> 00:07:08,119 Speaker 1: that much anymore. I miss paar shaped. 129 00:07:08,279 --> 00:07:09,640 Speaker 2: I'll try to bring it back then. 130 00:07:09,680 --> 00:07:11,920 Speaker 1: I'm bringing it back. So they had to lower the 131 00:07:11,920 --> 00:07:16,760 Speaker 1: pressure in the system, so a pilot operated relief valve opened. 132 00:07:17,320 --> 00:07:19,520 Speaker 1: And that's great. This thing should have stayed open for 133 00:07:19,560 --> 00:07:21,960 Speaker 1: about ten seconds or so just to let a little 134 00:07:22,000 --> 00:07:26,520 Speaker 1: pressure out, and it was designed to close automatically when 135 00:07:26,520 --> 00:07:29,840 Speaker 1: it returned to normal. It did not close automatically. It 136 00:07:29,880 --> 00:07:32,440 Speaker 1: got stuck. But they didn't know it that it got stuck. 137 00:07:32,680 --> 00:07:34,600 Speaker 1: That was the big problem up front. 138 00:07:34,760 --> 00:07:37,320 Speaker 2: Yeah, and that caused another problem. So first of all, 139 00:07:37,320 --> 00:07:40,640 Speaker 2: remember it's overheated because there's not enough water. Now, the 140 00:07:40,680 --> 00:07:45,280 Speaker 2: pressure's lower in the whole reactor, and lower pressure means 141 00:07:45,320 --> 00:07:47,920 Speaker 2: that water will boil at a lower temperature. So the 142 00:07:47,960 --> 00:07:50,680 Speaker 2: water's boiling more and more, so you're losing more and 143 00:07:50,720 --> 00:07:53,920 Speaker 2: more and it's creating more and more steam. That's also 144 00:07:54,040 --> 00:07:57,600 Speaker 2: raising the temperature. That's another thing that the operator should 145 00:07:57,600 --> 00:07:59,720 Speaker 2: have noticed, right, or they did notice. They were like, oh, 146 00:08:00,000 --> 00:08:03,120 Speaker 2: I'm for sure, and the reactors really going up. But 147 00:08:03,240 --> 00:08:07,440 Speaker 2: they all generally agreed that it was just wrong. There 148 00:08:07,480 --> 00:08:11,640 Speaker 2: had been problems with that pilot operated relief valve for 149 00:08:11,720 --> 00:08:14,280 Speaker 2: apparently weeks, and they rather than fix it, they were 150 00:08:14,280 --> 00:08:16,920 Speaker 2: just falsifying the information and dealing with it like just 151 00:08:16,960 --> 00:08:18,200 Speaker 2: living with the problem. 152 00:08:18,960 --> 00:08:21,360 Speaker 1: Yeah, and we should point out that there were two 153 00:08:22,280 --> 00:08:27,160 Speaker 1: nuclear reactors there TMI not too much information, No, three 154 00:08:27,200 --> 00:08:30,840 Speaker 1: Mile Island one and three Mile Island two. They built 155 00:08:30,840 --> 00:08:34,040 Speaker 1: these things in nineteen sixty eight, and TMI one opened 156 00:08:34,040 --> 00:08:37,160 Speaker 1: in seventy four, and tm I two and seventy eight, 157 00:08:37,240 --> 00:08:39,320 Speaker 1: and TMI two, the one that had the issue here, 158 00:08:39,559 --> 00:08:43,360 Speaker 1: had only been open for three months I think, yeah, 159 00:08:43,440 --> 00:08:46,080 Speaker 1: just about three months when this accident occurred. So it 160 00:08:46,120 --> 00:08:49,160 Speaker 1: wasn't even online that long, and so it must have 161 00:08:49,160 --> 00:08:50,599 Speaker 1: had that leak. Kind of from the get go. 162 00:08:50,720 --> 00:08:53,800 Speaker 2: It sounds like, yeah, I think you're right, because yeah, 163 00:08:54,520 --> 00:08:57,320 Speaker 2: I must not have ever worked properly and they just 164 00:08:57,320 --> 00:08:58,760 Speaker 2: didn't really know it or care. 165 00:09:00,040 --> 00:09:02,600 Speaker 1: They already cut the ribbon too late. 166 00:09:03,400 --> 00:09:07,480 Speaker 2: Yeah, So the system again is like, guys, I'm going 167 00:09:07,520 --> 00:09:11,800 Speaker 2: to run another security safety thing. I'm going to I've 168 00:09:11,840 --> 00:09:14,040 Speaker 2: noticed that things are really starting to go pear shaped 169 00:09:14,440 --> 00:09:18,200 Speaker 2: in the reactor, and I'm going to start sending in 170 00:09:18,320 --> 00:09:22,760 Speaker 2: emergency cooling. So the system opened up its own valves 171 00:09:22,800 --> 00:09:26,320 Speaker 2: to let in emergency water flowing into the reactor try 172 00:09:26,360 --> 00:09:32,200 Speaker 2: to cool things down. That actually helped make things worse 173 00:09:32,240 --> 00:09:35,880 Speaker 2: to an extent, where like water kept like bubbling and 174 00:09:35,920 --> 00:09:38,440 Speaker 2: boiling and it was now spilling out of the open 175 00:09:38,520 --> 00:09:42,040 Speaker 2: relief valve out of the reactor, which is not good. 176 00:09:42,520 --> 00:09:46,000 Speaker 2: But it still would have helped keep things cool sooner. 177 00:09:46,679 --> 00:09:49,800 Speaker 2: The problem is the operators again were like, that shouldn't 178 00:09:49,800 --> 00:09:53,720 Speaker 2: be happening. The pressure seems fine in here, and now 179 00:09:53,720 --> 00:09:56,280 Speaker 2: there's water flowing in. We got to turn off these 180 00:09:56,320 --> 00:09:59,679 Speaker 2: emergency pumps. And they did. They turned off the emergency 181 00:09:59,679 --> 00:10:03,840 Speaker 2: pump and that was the final straw. The system was like, 182 00:10:03,920 --> 00:10:06,200 Speaker 2: I'm not helping anymore. You guys are on your own. 183 00:10:07,280 --> 00:10:10,480 Speaker 1: Yeah. So the water, the water level was dropping, which 184 00:10:10,520 --> 00:10:13,880 Speaker 1: is very key to keeping that thing you stable and cool, 185 00:10:14,520 --> 00:10:18,080 Speaker 1: and it actually exposed the reactor's core, the top of 186 00:10:18,120 --> 00:10:20,920 Speaker 1: that thing. Yeah, and once the core is exposed, that's 187 00:10:21,160 --> 00:10:25,480 Speaker 1: very very bad news that happened. I think everything started 188 00:10:25,520 --> 00:10:28,199 Speaker 1: at four a m. Night Ranger time, and then at 189 00:10:28,200 --> 00:10:32,760 Speaker 1: six am, this is two hours later. An operator finally 190 00:10:32,960 --> 00:10:35,720 Speaker 1: was like, wait a minute, that release valve that was 191 00:10:35,720 --> 00:10:39,640 Speaker 1: supposed to close automatically, looks like that thing didn't close. 192 00:10:40,280 --> 00:10:43,400 Speaker 1: So he ordered it to be closed off. But one 193 00:10:43,480 --> 00:10:47,040 Speaker 1: hundred thousand liters of coolant had already leaked out of 194 00:10:47,040 --> 00:10:48,000 Speaker 1: the system at this point. 195 00:10:48,080 --> 00:10:51,760 Speaker 2: Yeah, highly highly radioactive water just spilling out, and eventually 196 00:10:51,800 --> 00:10:55,480 Speaker 2: it was pumped out of the reactor containment of building 197 00:10:55,559 --> 00:10:59,720 Speaker 2: into other buildings. So that they were flooded with contaminated water. 198 00:10:59,760 --> 00:11:02,880 Speaker 2: It was quite a mess. So these guys have now 199 00:11:03,080 --> 00:11:06,200 Speaker 2: figured out the main issue. They've closed the relief valve. 200 00:11:06,480 --> 00:11:08,720 Speaker 2: Now they can put more coolant in, and they started 201 00:11:08,760 --> 00:11:11,400 Speaker 2: to do that. But you said that the top of 202 00:11:11,440 --> 00:11:15,120 Speaker 2: the reactor core is exposed. That is never supposed to happen. 203 00:11:15,559 --> 00:11:20,040 Speaker 2: That the core should never be exposed above water. And 204 00:11:20,320 --> 00:11:23,400 Speaker 2: because it had been now pumping cooling and was not 205 00:11:23,679 --> 00:11:27,280 Speaker 2: necessarily doing the trick, it certainly wasn't doing it fast enough. 206 00:11:27,760 --> 00:11:31,640 Speaker 2: And they realized about forty minutes after they figured out 207 00:11:31,640 --> 00:11:34,800 Speaker 2: that what the problem was that the core was really 208 00:11:34,840 --> 00:11:38,200 Speaker 2: screwed up. Because remember all this time, for those two hours, Chuck, 209 00:11:38,400 --> 00:11:41,480 Speaker 2: they were just like, oh, everything's fine. They thought their 210 00:11:41,520 --> 00:11:44,439 Speaker 2: instruments were messed up or that everything was working correctly. 211 00:11:44,760 --> 00:11:47,880 Speaker 2: And finally between six am and six point forty they're like, 212 00:11:48,160 --> 00:11:51,800 Speaker 2: this is really, really, really bad. And five minutes after 213 00:11:51,800 --> 00:11:55,840 Speaker 2: they figured that out, radiation alarms started ringing around the plant, 214 00:11:56,280 --> 00:11:58,640 Speaker 2: which if they didn't know it was bad before, those 215 00:11:58,760 --> 00:12:00,040 Speaker 2: alarms certainly. 216 00:12:01,240 --> 00:12:03,800 Speaker 1: Yeah. And then about eleven minutes later, and this is 217 00:12:03,800 --> 00:12:06,679 Speaker 1: almost seven o'clock, it was almost three hours later, they 218 00:12:06,760 --> 00:12:12,520 Speaker 1: finally declared a site emergency right after that happened. You know, 219 00:12:12,559 --> 00:12:15,720 Speaker 1: they tried to and you know, partially part part of 220 00:12:15,720 --> 00:12:18,280 Speaker 1: the problem here was due to the being in the 221 00:12:18,360 --> 00:12:21,160 Speaker 1: nineteen seventies and you can't get a hold of someone 222 00:12:21,360 --> 00:12:23,520 Speaker 1: via cell phone like in a moment's notice. That's where 223 00:12:23,559 --> 00:12:25,719 Speaker 1: this kind of comes into play. They tried to get 224 00:12:25,720 --> 00:12:29,559 Speaker 1: in touch with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission kind of immediately 225 00:12:29,960 --> 00:12:32,760 Speaker 1: they called. The office wasn't open yet, and so they 226 00:12:32,800 --> 00:12:35,120 Speaker 1: had what you know, these things still exist, but what 227 00:12:35,160 --> 00:12:36,360 Speaker 1: they used to have a lot more back in the 228 00:12:36,400 --> 00:12:39,000 Speaker 1: day is like an answering service. Like humans had answered 229 00:12:39,040 --> 00:12:43,480 Speaker 1: the phone and forward the call or call up the 230 00:12:43,520 --> 00:12:46,000 Speaker 1: doctor or whoever they need to call and say, hey, 231 00:12:46,040 --> 00:12:48,800 Speaker 1: I got I think what's probably a concerning message that 232 00:12:48,840 --> 00:12:51,200 Speaker 1: you probably need to get right away. So they tried 233 00:12:51,240 --> 00:12:53,079 Speaker 1: to do that. They tried to call the regional duty 234 00:12:53,120 --> 00:12:56,640 Speaker 1: officer at home, but they're like, no, he already left 235 00:12:56,640 --> 00:12:59,560 Speaker 1: for work. So this guy's in his car now, don't 236 00:12:59,559 --> 00:13:01,800 Speaker 1: didn't listen to the radio on his way to work. 237 00:13:02,160 --> 00:13:04,720 Speaker 2: He's listening to beautiful music on the AM dial. 238 00:13:05,480 --> 00:13:08,559 Speaker 1: He probably is. And the long and short of it 239 00:13:08,600 --> 00:13:11,360 Speaker 1: is it finally like I think it takes nearly forty 240 00:13:11,400 --> 00:13:16,320 Speaker 1: minutes to even finally make contact with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 241 00:13:16,320 --> 00:13:19,600 Speaker 1: and like time is crucial at this point, like every 242 00:13:19,640 --> 00:13:20,440 Speaker 1: second matters. 243 00:13:20,800 --> 00:13:22,920 Speaker 2: Yeah, And the reason why they really needed to get 244 00:13:22,920 --> 00:13:25,920 Speaker 2: in touch with the NRC is because they didn't know 245 00:13:25,960 --> 00:13:30,400 Speaker 2: what to do. They weren't really trained for a situation 246 00:13:30,679 --> 00:13:34,960 Speaker 2: like this. The NRC was the body that had this information. 247 00:13:35,120 --> 00:13:38,120 Speaker 2: They needed to figure out how to handle this. So 248 00:13:39,360 --> 00:13:43,840 Speaker 2: very quickly word starts to spread hits DC, the local 249 00:13:43,960 --> 00:13:47,839 Speaker 2: journalists start showing up. Eventually national journalists started showing up, 250 00:13:48,160 --> 00:13:50,760 Speaker 2: and by nine am, everybody knows that there's a big, 251 00:13:50,840 --> 00:13:55,000 Speaker 2: big problem at Three Mile Island. The problem was no 252 00:13:55,040 --> 00:13:58,000 Speaker 2: one knew how bad it was. Yeah, because on the 253 00:13:58,040 --> 00:14:00,600 Speaker 2: one hand, the first people that started dress saying things 254 00:14:00,800 --> 00:14:05,720 Speaker 2: was Metropolitan at Edison, the power company that ran and 255 00:14:05,760 --> 00:14:09,000 Speaker 2: I believe owned Three Mile Island, both TM one and two, 256 00:14:09,760 --> 00:14:13,040 Speaker 2: and they were just lying their faces off. They just 257 00:14:13,080 --> 00:14:15,560 Speaker 2: said whatever they thought what people wanted to hear, and 258 00:14:15,600 --> 00:14:18,559 Speaker 2: they would even do it in private, like the Governor 259 00:14:18,559 --> 00:14:22,560 Speaker 2: Dick Thornburg and the Lieutenant Governor William Scranton. They were 260 00:14:22,600 --> 00:14:26,440 Speaker 2: just lying to them about how like how not a 261 00:14:26,480 --> 00:14:29,960 Speaker 2: big deal. This was from the outset. So they proved 262 00:14:29,960 --> 00:14:32,160 Speaker 2: that they were just untrustworthy from the outset, and they 263 00:14:32,200 --> 00:14:34,840 Speaker 2: got quickly pushed aside as far as the people who 264 00:14:34,840 --> 00:14:38,280 Speaker 2: were really trying to handle this problem, when yeah, they 265 00:14:38,360 --> 00:14:40,240 Speaker 2: just they were like, you go stand over there, we'll 266 00:14:40,240 --> 00:14:41,400 Speaker 2: deal with you later. 267 00:14:42,000 --> 00:14:46,040 Speaker 1: For sure. They on the twenty eight they briefly considered 268 00:14:46,040 --> 00:14:48,560 Speaker 1: evacuating the area. This is SPEMA there on the scene now, 269 00:14:49,200 --> 00:14:51,320 Speaker 1: but they said no, and then the governor, like you 270 00:14:51,320 --> 00:14:56,120 Speaker 1: were saying, Governor Thornburg, he declined to evacuate again on 271 00:14:56,440 --> 00:15:00,360 Speaker 1: March twenty ninth because they're getting reports that there was 272 00:15:00,400 --> 00:15:04,840 Speaker 1: no radiation that had escaped and everything was like completely contained. Finally, 273 00:15:04,880 --> 00:15:07,720 Speaker 1: on March thirtieth, the governor got a report that said, 274 00:15:08,160 --> 00:15:11,400 Speaker 1: all right, well some radioactive gas has escaped the reactor. 275 00:15:12,120 --> 00:15:15,240 Speaker 1: So he said he makes an announcement like all right, 276 00:15:15,280 --> 00:15:19,560 Speaker 1: all pregnant women and preschool children need to evacuate and 277 00:15:19,640 --> 00:15:21,920 Speaker 1: like get out of the area. And that caused a 278 00:15:21,960 --> 00:15:22,800 Speaker 1: pretty big panic. 279 00:15:23,120 --> 00:15:25,760 Speaker 2: It did. I think one hundred and forty thousand people left. 280 00:15:26,640 --> 00:15:30,600 Speaker 2: Did you see the American experience of the PBS documentary 281 00:15:30,640 --> 00:15:33,480 Speaker 2: on this yeah, melt, It's called meltdown at three Mile Island. 282 00:15:33,760 --> 00:15:36,120 Speaker 2: So a lot of people were panicking and leaving, But 283 00:15:36,120 --> 00:15:37,920 Speaker 2: there were also a lot of people around there like 284 00:15:37,960 --> 00:15:41,200 Speaker 2: they can take my house out of my cold dead hands. 285 00:15:41,360 --> 00:15:42,160 Speaker 2: I'm not leaving. 286 00:15:42,560 --> 00:15:45,040 Speaker 1: Yeah, that always happens, right, Yeah. 287 00:15:44,560 --> 00:15:46,680 Speaker 2: But so there were people that stayed, but a lot 288 00:15:46,680 --> 00:15:49,240 Speaker 2: of people left because they were scared to death. No 289 00:15:49,240 --> 00:15:53,080 Speaker 2: one knew exactly how bad this was, and so I 290 00:15:53,120 --> 00:15:57,680 Speaker 2: think a lot of rumor and unsubstantiated stuff was really 291 00:15:57,720 --> 00:16:01,360 Speaker 2: spreading very quickly. At at the same time, there was 292 00:16:01,400 --> 00:16:03,720 Speaker 2: no one who really knew how bad it was that 293 00:16:03,800 --> 00:16:06,080 Speaker 2: could say that's not true. That's not true. I can 294 00:16:06,160 --> 00:16:09,480 Speaker 2: unequivocally say this is how bad it is. So you 295 00:16:09,600 --> 00:16:13,400 Speaker 2: really couldn't say, like, don't worry. It was you don't 296 00:16:13,400 --> 00:16:16,000 Speaker 2: think you should worry. We hope you don't have to worry. 297 00:16:16,000 --> 00:16:18,520 Speaker 2: But there was nothing that they could really reassure the 298 00:16:18,560 --> 00:16:19,840 Speaker 2: public with at this point. 299 00:16:20,640 --> 00:16:22,920 Speaker 1: Yeah for sure, all right, that feels like a great 300 00:16:22,960 --> 00:16:25,320 Speaker 1: time for a break, if you agree, I agree. 301 00:16:26,320 --> 00:16:26,440 Speaker 3: Uh. 302 00:16:26,800 --> 00:16:29,080 Speaker 1: So they are trying to get the thing cool down, 303 00:16:29,280 --> 00:16:31,880 Speaker 1: and then very quickly another problem would pop up, and 304 00:16:31,920 --> 00:16:33,880 Speaker 1: we're going to address that right after this. 305 00:16:54,160 --> 00:17:00,760 Speaker 3: Stop you know, stop, stop, stop you shouldn't you know? No, 306 00:17:01,320 --> 00:17:08,720 Speaker 3: stop you know stop stuff shouldn't know stuff you should know? 307 00:17:09,480 --> 00:17:12,160 Speaker 2: Okay, Chuck. So where we last left off, three Mile 308 00:17:12,240 --> 00:17:17,199 Speaker 2: Island TMI two reactor had reached a different shape of 309 00:17:17,240 --> 00:17:21,159 Speaker 2: a certain kind of fruit. Things were going badly in 310 00:17:21,240 --> 00:17:22,160 Speaker 2: other words. 311 00:17:21,840 --> 00:17:24,280 Speaker 1: Right not yes, it's bad, but I'm just glad you're 312 00:17:24,320 --> 00:17:24,920 Speaker 1: saying it again. 313 00:17:25,119 --> 00:17:27,600 Speaker 2: So it went, it went from bad to worse. Actually, 314 00:17:27,640 --> 00:17:31,000 Speaker 2: they're like, they wouldn't call it a meltdown. It took 315 00:17:31,119 --> 00:17:34,879 Speaker 2: years before they officially started calling this a meltdown. It 316 00:17:34,920 --> 00:17:36,960 Speaker 2: was an accident, it was a problem in issue, that 317 00:17:37,080 --> 00:17:40,359 Speaker 2: kind of thing. But on top of that the reactor 318 00:17:40,480 --> 00:17:45,000 Speaker 2: having huge problems. They now realized that there was a 319 00:17:45,080 --> 00:17:49,600 Speaker 2: hydrogen gas bubble that during this two three hours of 320 00:17:49,680 --> 00:17:53,800 Speaker 2: the accident had developed because it got so hot that 321 00:17:53,840 --> 00:17:59,520 Speaker 2: the zirconium tubes that held the fuel pellets it reacted 322 00:17:59,560 --> 00:18:02,480 Speaker 2: with the steam that was being generated and it actually 323 00:18:02,680 --> 00:18:06,080 Speaker 2: tore the water molecules into oxygen and hydrogen, and the 324 00:18:06,160 --> 00:18:09,280 Speaker 2: hydrogen just started to build up. Well, obviously, if you 325 00:18:09,320 --> 00:18:11,639 Speaker 2: listen to our Hindenberg episode, you know that a big 326 00:18:12,240 --> 00:18:16,160 Speaker 2: bunch of hydrogen gas in one place is very, very dangerous, 327 00:18:16,480 --> 00:18:19,159 Speaker 2: especially when it's in the middle of a nuclear reactor. 328 00:18:20,160 --> 00:18:24,240 Speaker 1: Yeah, so all of a sudden, there's this more concerning problem. 329 00:18:24,560 --> 00:18:26,640 Speaker 1: They're like, if this thing explodes, you know, if this 330 00:18:26,760 --> 00:18:31,680 Speaker 1: gas bubble explodes, it might rupture the actual building that 331 00:18:31,720 --> 00:18:34,200 Speaker 1: this thing is housed in. And we're in real trouble 332 00:18:34,200 --> 00:18:38,680 Speaker 1: if that happened. So from I think, well we should 333 00:18:38,720 --> 00:18:42,280 Speaker 1: say that the World Nuclear Association they say that that 334 00:18:42,359 --> 00:18:44,160 Speaker 1: never would have been possible. But of course they don't 335 00:18:44,200 --> 00:18:46,600 Speaker 1: know this at the time, and who knows if it 336 00:18:46,640 --> 00:18:49,359 Speaker 1: was possible or not. But from March thirtieth, this couple 337 00:18:49,359 --> 00:18:53,520 Speaker 1: of days later through April first, they managed to decrease 338 00:18:53,560 --> 00:18:56,960 Speaker 1: the size of that bubble by venting that thing out 339 00:18:57,000 --> 00:19:00,040 Speaker 1: and you know, basically kind of slowly just reducing the 340 00:19:00,080 --> 00:19:02,879 Speaker 1: size of the bubble. But this is also if you're venting, 341 00:19:03,080 --> 00:19:06,120 Speaker 1: you know, melting down. I guess I don't what you said. 342 00:19:06,160 --> 00:19:08,080 Speaker 1: It didn't called to meltdown, it's having a tantrum. I 343 00:19:08,080 --> 00:19:12,440 Speaker 1: guess you're releasing that stuff in like more radiation into 344 00:19:12,520 --> 00:19:13,880 Speaker 1: the environment by doing. 345 00:19:13,680 --> 00:19:18,359 Speaker 2: So, right, But they really had no choice essentially or 346 00:19:18,400 --> 00:19:21,840 Speaker 2: let the thing blow up, so they did. They managed 347 00:19:21,880 --> 00:19:25,760 Speaker 2: to get the bubble under control. And on April first, 348 00:19:25,840 --> 00:19:28,880 Speaker 2: Jimmy Carter, who was president at the time, I didn't 349 00:19:28,920 --> 00:19:31,639 Speaker 2: know this. He was a trained nuclear engineer, so he 350 00:19:31,760 --> 00:19:35,399 Speaker 2: was essentially the president to be in charge for this 351 00:19:35,480 --> 00:19:36,040 Speaker 2: to happen. 352 00:19:37,000 --> 00:19:42,040 Speaker 1: You knew that, Yeah, yeah, I knew from my visits 353 00:19:42,040 --> 00:19:43,959 Speaker 1: to the Carter Center and I read a book and 354 00:19:44,000 --> 00:19:46,280 Speaker 1: I've seen a documentary. He's one of my guys, one 355 00:19:46,280 --> 00:19:48,400 Speaker 1: of the smartest dudes we've ever had in the way. 356 00:19:48,480 --> 00:19:51,000 Speaker 2: Oh, I know. He was a fantastic president. It's a shame. 357 00:19:52,520 --> 00:19:55,080 Speaker 2: So he was president at the time, and he was like, 358 00:19:55,160 --> 00:19:57,720 Speaker 2: you know what, I'm going to come there. I'm going 359 00:19:57,760 --> 00:20:00,520 Speaker 2: to be shown touring the plant. Ros One's going to 360 00:20:00,560 --> 00:20:03,680 Speaker 2: come with me. That will reassure the public that it's fine, 361 00:20:03,680 --> 00:20:07,560 Speaker 2: it's under control. The problem was, according to that PBS documentary, 362 00:20:07,800 --> 00:20:11,040 Speaker 2: at the time, it was not a certainty that the 363 00:20:11,119 --> 00:20:14,760 Speaker 2: hydrogen bubble wasn't going to blow up while the president 364 00:20:14,840 --> 00:20:18,840 Speaker 2: was there. There are two dueling mathematicians who had conflicting 365 00:20:18,880 --> 00:20:21,320 Speaker 2: results about whether the bubble was going to blow up, 366 00:20:21,800 --> 00:20:24,439 Speaker 2: and so Jimmy Carter took a real risk. So did 367 00:20:24,520 --> 00:20:27,239 Speaker 2: Rosalind Carter by going there to tour the plant. They 368 00:20:27,280 --> 00:20:30,400 Speaker 2: had to wear yellow rubber boots because again there's really 369 00:20:30,480 --> 00:20:34,159 Speaker 2: highly contaminated radioactive water that had spilled out of the 370 00:20:34,200 --> 00:20:37,159 Speaker 2: coolant on the floor. It was a big deal, but 371 00:20:37,200 --> 00:20:40,000 Speaker 2: apparently it had the impact he was looking for and 372 00:20:40,040 --> 00:20:41,359 Speaker 2: the public started to calm down. 373 00:20:42,480 --> 00:20:45,080 Speaker 1: Yeah, I don't know if you could get if they 374 00:20:45,080 --> 00:20:47,520 Speaker 1: would let a president do that these days. 375 00:20:47,560 --> 00:20:51,159 Speaker 2: Yeah, it was the seventies. Man, what can happen? 376 00:20:51,760 --> 00:20:54,400 Speaker 1: It was, Yeah, just put on these booties. So he 377 00:20:54,600 --> 00:20:59,480 Speaker 1: obviously orders a committee to convene and investigate this thing. 378 00:21:00,320 --> 00:21:03,440 Speaker 1: It was ended up being called the Kimmeny Report because 379 00:21:03,440 --> 00:21:06,960 Speaker 1: it was led by Dartmouth College president John Kemeny, and 380 00:21:07,320 --> 00:21:10,800 Speaker 1: they the NRC ended up coming out of this not 381 00:21:10,920 --> 00:21:13,719 Speaker 1: looking so great. And we'll get to why as we go, 382 00:21:13,800 --> 00:21:18,119 Speaker 1: but they really took it on the chin. The training program, 383 00:21:18,160 --> 00:21:20,880 Speaker 1: like met ed was like, hey, we trained up our 384 00:21:20,920 --> 00:21:25,800 Speaker 1: guys as well as we were able to and to 385 00:21:25,880 --> 00:21:28,560 Speaker 1: meet your standards, Like, we did everything you told us 386 00:21:28,600 --> 00:21:31,199 Speaker 1: to do. All your requirements were met. It was the 387 00:21:31,320 --> 00:21:36,280 Speaker 1: NRC apparently, who like had lax requirements and you know 388 00:21:36,320 --> 00:21:39,000 Speaker 1: when it comes to like emergency training and stuff like that, 389 00:21:39,119 --> 00:21:40,440 Speaker 1: they were really ill prepared. 390 00:21:40,640 --> 00:21:44,560 Speaker 2: Yeah, these guys were fully trained, but their training hadn't 391 00:21:44,600 --> 00:21:47,160 Speaker 2: prepared them for that, and it was the NRC's fault. 392 00:21:47,359 --> 00:21:50,400 Speaker 2: The NRC showed that they weren't prepared to handle this either, 393 00:21:51,000 --> 00:21:53,560 Speaker 2: Like it was just really poor planning, again based on 394 00:21:54,000 --> 00:21:57,640 Speaker 2: over optimistic ideas about the safety of nuclear energy. Right, 395 00:21:58,040 --> 00:22:02,080 Speaker 2: So the NRC also conducted its own examination. They're like, yeah, 396 00:22:02,119 --> 00:22:05,600 Speaker 2: we should probably do a little better. There's a lot 397 00:22:05,640 --> 00:22:08,840 Speaker 2: of confusing stuff in training. I think there was this 398 00:22:08,880 --> 00:22:12,000 Speaker 2: one passage that said insert key into the control panel, 399 00:22:12,280 --> 00:22:14,840 Speaker 2: turn key to the left, break off the key in 400 00:22:14,920 --> 00:22:17,399 Speaker 2: the control panel, and eat what remains of the key. 401 00:22:17,920 --> 00:22:22,520 Speaker 2: That was part of the safety training. Anyway, they were like, 402 00:22:22,560 --> 00:22:25,240 Speaker 2: we also have to say though, it wasn't just us, 403 00:22:25,320 --> 00:22:27,600 Speaker 2: it wasn't just the operators, but the design of this 404 00:22:27,640 --> 00:22:30,080 Speaker 2: stuff is pretty nuts if you ask us. 405 00:22:31,040 --> 00:22:33,320 Speaker 1: So one of the big problems was why it took 406 00:22:33,359 --> 00:22:35,600 Speaker 1: so long to realize there was a problem, Like all 407 00:22:35,640 --> 00:22:37,960 Speaker 1: that time was going by when things were leaking out, 408 00:22:38,040 --> 00:22:42,840 Speaker 1: and you know, the NRC again took it on the chin. 409 00:22:42,920 --> 00:22:45,640 Speaker 1: They found that their training requirements weren't weren't good enough, 410 00:22:45,720 --> 00:22:50,320 Speaker 1: and that the operating procedures were confusing during an emergency 411 00:22:50,400 --> 00:22:53,080 Speaker 1: Like from what I gathered from the documentary and by 412 00:22:53,119 --> 00:22:56,119 Speaker 1: reading up on this, was that like they were trained 413 00:22:56,160 --> 00:22:59,560 Speaker 1: to run the place and like turn the keys and 414 00:22:59,600 --> 00:23:02,800 Speaker 1: push the buttons right, but if something went wrong, that's 415 00:23:02,840 --> 00:23:05,920 Speaker 1: where they really really failed to know what to do. 416 00:23:06,040 --> 00:23:09,160 Speaker 1: So they were at you know, while this emergency was unfolding, 417 00:23:09,640 --> 00:23:13,440 Speaker 1: they're misinterpreting data that's coming through, and they're making bad 418 00:23:13,480 --> 00:23:17,680 Speaker 1: decisions based on that. They you know, you mentioned earlier 419 00:23:17,680 --> 00:23:21,440 Speaker 1: that the water started boiling really violently that caused the 420 00:23:21,560 --> 00:23:25,239 Speaker 1: coolant pumps to shake really hard, and they thought they 421 00:23:25,240 --> 00:23:27,160 Speaker 1: didn't know that's what that was. They thought they were 422 00:23:27,200 --> 00:23:29,760 Speaker 1: overfilling and the things were shaking because it had too 423 00:23:29,800 --> 00:23:32,320 Speaker 1: much coolant in there, and that the pumps you know, 424 00:23:32,320 --> 00:23:35,000 Speaker 1: were going to be damaged because of that. So you know, 425 00:23:35,160 --> 00:23:36,920 Speaker 1: just to not even know that, like, hey, by the way, 426 00:23:36,920 --> 00:23:39,639 Speaker 1: if this thing really starts boiling hard, the pipes might shake, 427 00:23:40,000 --> 00:23:41,920 Speaker 1: Like they didn't even know that could happen. 428 00:23:41,720 --> 00:23:44,440 Speaker 2: Right, Exactly like you said, they were trained to operate 429 00:23:44,480 --> 00:23:49,160 Speaker 2: it basically. One other thing to say about the system, too, 430 00:23:49,320 --> 00:23:51,520 Speaker 2: is in that documentary, I think the guy who wrote 431 00:23:51,520 --> 00:23:53,479 Speaker 2: the China Syndrome, he was interviewed a lot in it. 432 00:23:54,200 --> 00:23:56,399 Speaker 2: He was saying that, like, if they had done nothing, 433 00:23:56,960 --> 00:24:01,040 Speaker 2: the system would have taken care of itself from the outset. Interesting, 434 00:24:01,080 --> 00:24:04,359 Speaker 2: it was when they intervened those two times that threw 435 00:24:04,480 --> 00:24:09,879 Speaker 2: that safety sequence off. And so it really truly was 436 00:24:10,359 --> 00:24:13,280 Speaker 2: a combination of all sorts of different stuff, the complexity 437 00:24:13,280 --> 00:24:19,600 Speaker 2: of the system, human error, malfunctions, poor planning. And there's 438 00:24:19,640 --> 00:24:23,760 Speaker 2: a sociologist named Charles Perrow who calls this a normal accident, 439 00:24:23,800 --> 00:24:27,879 Speaker 2: which is basically an accident that is essentially inevitable because 440 00:24:27,960 --> 00:24:34,280 Speaker 2: it's accidentally designed into the complex system. Somehow, somewhere, all 441 00:24:34,320 --> 00:24:37,160 Speaker 2: these things are going to come together and cause an accident. 442 00:24:37,440 --> 00:24:39,400 Speaker 2: That's what happened at Three Mile Island. 443 00:24:40,359 --> 00:24:44,320 Speaker 1: Yeah, if you're waiting for your Homer Simpson moment, wait 444 00:24:44,400 --> 00:24:47,560 Speaker 1: no further. Because one of the things they found when 445 00:24:47,560 --> 00:24:50,560 Speaker 1: they did, you know, the big investigation, was that there 446 00:24:50,600 --> 00:24:53,520 Speaker 1: was an operator there that had a large belly sounded 447 00:24:53,560 --> 00:24:55,800 Speaker 1: like I had a big beer gut, Yeah, and his 448 00:24:55,840 --> 00:24:58,840 Speaker 1: beer gut was blocking the view of some of the 449 00:24:58,880 --> 00:25:03,080 Speaker 1: panel indicators and like they literally didn't see these things 450 00:25:03,119 --> 00:25:06,800 Speaker 1: because of Homer Simpsons standing there in the way. There 451 00:25:06,800 --> 00:25:09,280 Speaker 1: was a printer, a computer printer that malfunctioned that was 452 00:25:09,280 --> 00:25:12,560 Speaker 1: recording like real time data that got jammed for ninety minutes. 453 00:25:13,840 --> 00:25:17,560 Speaker 1: Just the communication with like wearing face respirators and masks 454 00:25:17,600 --> 00:25:22,359 Speaker 1: and all that stuff. Like they just weren't able to talk, 455 00:25:22,960 --> 00:25:25,440 Speaker 1: you know, in an effective manner while this is all 456 00:25:25,440 --> 00:25:25,920 Speaker 1: going down. 457 00:25:26,000 --> 00:25:28,479 Speaker 2: Yeah, and that computer printer that was giving them that 458 00:25:28,520 --> 00:25:31,199 Speaker 2: real time information being jammed for ninety minutes meant that 459 00:25:31,240 --> 00:25:33,960 Speaker 2: the data they were working from was ninety minutes old 460 00:25:34,400 --> 00:25:37,320 Speaker 2: in the middle of a meltdown. So like these guys 461 00:25:37,400 --> 00:25:41,919 Speaker 2: really just had no genuine clue what was actually going on. 462 00:25:42,440 --> 00:25:45,120 Speaker 2: They didn't even seem to suspect anything was going on, 463 00:25:45,240 --> 00:25:47,760 Speaker 2: in part because of that ninety minute old data they 464 00:25:47,760 --> 00:25:48,679 Speaker 2: were working from. 465 00:25:49,800 --> 00:25:53,960 Speaker 1: Yeah. So if it wasn't bad enough already, there are 466 00:25:53,960 --> 00:25:57,399 Speaker 1: two more big factors. Yeah, And just how sort of 467 00:25:57,480 --> 00:26:00,399 Speaker 1: janky this thing seemed to be laid out. The control 468 00:26:00,480 --> 00:26:02,879 Speaker 1: room didn't have any direct measurements of the water, like 469 00:26:02,920 --> 00:26:05,359 Speaker 1: we kept talking, you know earlier in Act one about 470 00:26:05,880 --> 00:26:07,800 Speaker 1: you know, the water levels, and they didn't you know, 471 00:26:07,840 --> 00:26:09,480 Speaker 1: they thought it was filling up too much, so they 472 00:26:09,520 --> 00:26:12,400 Speaker 1: shut the water off. But they this was all happening 473 00:26:12,440 --> 00:26:16,480 Speaker 1: because it didn't have just direct measurements of the water level, 474 00:26:16,600 --> 00:26:18,879 Speaker 1: so they didn't even know they were guessing at how 475 00:26:18,920 --> 00:26:22,440 Speaker 1: much water was in the system. And then the second one, 476 00:26:22,480 --> 00:26:28,440 Speaker 1: big one was that automatic release valve has an indicator 477 00:26:28,520 --> 00:26:31,359 Speaker 1: light in the control room. It shows, you know, it 478 00:26:31,400 --> 00:26:33,440 Speaker 1: was supposed to close automatically, but I think you can 479 00:26:33,440 --> 00:26:36,440 Speaker 1: also order it to close, and eventually they they tried 480 00:26:36,480 --> 00:26:40,359 Speaker 1: to order it to close, but it doesn't actually show 481 00:26:40,400 --> 00:26:43,360 Speaker 1: whether it's closed or not. The indicator lit up when 482 00:26:43,359 --> 00:26:46,840 Speaker 1: it was ordered to close, not confirming that it was. 483 00:26:46,840 --> 00:26:49,560 Speaker 2: Closed, right, But they took it like that. They took 484 00:26:49,560 --> 00:26:51,159 Speaker 2: it to mean like, oh, well the lights on the 485 00:26:51,200 --> 00:26:52,840 Speaker 2: things closed, Yeah. 486 00:26:52,720 --> 00:26:55,840 Speaker 1: Asked the guy with the big belly blocking the screen exactly. 487 00:26:55,960 --> 00:26:58,919 Speaker 2: So I mean, like that's a just nuts that, like 488 00:26:59,000 --> 00:27:02,920 Speaker 2: all of this was happening, just the sequence of events. 489 00:27:03,080 --> 00:27:04,960 Speaker 2: I mean, if you if you went back and did 490 00:27:05,000 --> 00:27:08,160 Speaker 2: it all again, surely it couldn't possibly follow the same 491 00:27:08,280 --> 00:27:12,720 Speaker 2: steps because it was just so intertwined with all these 492 00:27:12,720 --> 00:27:13,959 Speaker 2: different weird things. 493 00:27:14,080 --> 00:27:14,760 Speaker 1: Oh for sure. 494 00:27:16,160 --> 00:27:17,960 Speaker 2: So there's a lot of you want to talk about 495 00:27:17,960 --> 00:27:20,119 Speaker 2: the radiation that may or may not have been. 496 00:27:20,000 --> 00:27:23,360 Speaker 1: Released, yeah, because I mean that's one of the biggest 497 00:27:24,000 --> 00:27:26,200 Speaker 1: obviously issues at hand is like how much of this 498 00:27:26,240 --> 00:27:30,960 Speaker 1: stuff is getting out to the local community in Pennsylvania. 499 00:27:30,119 --> 00:27:32,560 Speaker 2: Right, Yeah, And like you said, to get rid of 500 00:27:32,560 --> 00:27:36,720 Speaker 2: the hydrogen bubble, they definitely vented radioactive gas into the air. 501 00:27:37,359 --> 00:27:39,840 Speaker 2: That's just there's just no two ways around it. They 502 00:27:39,920 --> 00:27:42,119 Speaker 2: also had to do that a couple more times during 503 00:27:42,119 --> 00:27:47,080 Speaker 2: the cleanup, as we'll see. But the EPA, the NRC, 504 00:27:47,400 --> 00:27:53,720 Speaker 2: Pennsylvania itself, the Union of Concerned Scientists, just countless different organizations, 505 00:27:53,760 --> 00:27:58,600 Speaker 2: including non governmental organizations, have conducted all sorts of studies. 506 00:27:58,640 --> 00:28:01,200 Speaker 2: People have done meta now all seas of these studies. 507 00:28:01,560 --> 00:28:06,080 Speaker 2: Three Mile Island is a very very heavily studied area 508 00:28:06,200 --> 00:28:10,640 Speaker 2: to find out exactly what happened. And essentially almost everybody 509 00:28:10,720 --> 00:28:14,480 Speaker 2: agrees that there was not enough of a radioactive or 510 00:28:14,520 --> 00:28:18,840 Speaker 2: release to actually affect human health or the environment. And 511 00:28:18,880 --> 00:28:21,080 Speaker 2: it seems to be one of those times where it 512 00:28:21,200 --> 00:28:24,679 Speaker 2: actually is true. I can barely get it out, but 513 00:28:24,800 --> 00:28:26,120 Speaker 2: I think they might be right. 514 00:28:26,520 --> 00:28:28,720 Speaker 1: Yeah, I mean they claimed that there was like the 515 00:28:28,840 --> 00:28:32,600 Speaker 1: radiation was about the estimated levels of a like a 516 00:28:32,680 --> 00:28:36,000 Speaker 1: chest X ray. The Department of Energy said it had 517 00:28:36,040 --> 00:28:40,800 Speaker 1: negligible effects on public health and the environment. I guess 518 00:28:40,800 --> 00:28:44,240 Speaker 1: we'll end up talking about the lawsuits later, but because 519 00:28:44,280 --> 00:28:47,080 Speaker 1: there obviously would be some But you know, there were 520 00:28:47,160 --> 00:28:52,440 Speaker 1: some interesting things, like I think the forty three percent 521 00:28:52,480 --> 00:28:55,600 Speaker 1: increase in infant deaths in the area around the time 522 00:28:55,800 --> 00:28:58,480 Speaker 1: of the accident. There was a study in ninety seven 523 00:28:58,480 --> 00:29:02,480 Speaker 1: that found increased cancer rates in area. There was a 524 00:29:02,520 --> 00:29:05,920 Speaker 1: twenty seventeen study that found a correlation between thyroid cancer 525 00:29:06,280 --> 00:29:09,040 Speaker 1: and living in that region. But in each of these studies, 526 00:29:09,080 --> 00:29:11,680 Speaker 1: and in each of these cases, they're like, well, you 527 00:29:11,720 --> 00:29:15,000 Speaker 1: can't absolutely prove that was the absolute cause. 528 00:29:15,480 --> 00:29:18,680 Speaker 2: Yeah, and these were these studies are few and far between. 529 00:29:18,720 --> 00:29:21,080 Speaker 2: Most of the other studies are like, I didn't turn 530 00:29:21,200 --> 00:29:27,120 Speaker 2: up any statistically significant correlation even right. I saw that 531 00:29:27,160 --> 00:29:30,760 Speaker 2: the highest exposure during cleanup, with a peak in nineteen 532 00:29:30,800 --> 00:29:34,720 Speaker 2: eighty nine was point nine to eight rims and that 533 00:29:34,920 --> 00:29:38,400 Speaker 2: is a tenth of a chest X ray, and that 534 00:29:38,640 --> 00:29:42,560 Speaker 2: on site, the EPA found on site, So at the 535 00:29:42,560 --> 00:29:46,680 Speaker 2: Three Mile Island reactor, the radiation that in the environment 536 00:29:46,960 --> 00:29:49,240 Speaker 2: was what you would get from flying on an airplane 537 00:29:49,280 --> 00:29:52,840 Speaker 2: per hour. Yeah, so it really does seem like there 538 00:29:52,960 --> 00:29:56,440 Speaker 2: was just not that much of an exposure. Again, I'm 539 00:29:56,520 --> 00:29:58,560 Speaker 2: quite sure if you go to Three Mile Island and 540 00:29:58,560 --> 00:30:01,400 Speaker 2: talk to some of the older resid evidence. They will 541 00:30:01,400 --> 00:30:05,400 Speaker 2: tell you otherwise, because a lot of people reported, especially 542 00:30:05,480 --> 00:30:11,200 Speaker 2: right afterward, that they were suffering from vomiting, nausea, hair loss, rashes, 543 00:30:11,880 --> 00:30:14,920 Speaker 2: and I'm sure that people just have dismissed them over 544 00:30:14,920 --> 00:30:17,719 Speaker 2: the years as like that's placebo effect or no cebo 545 00:30:17,760 --> 00:30:20,040 Speaker 2: effect or something like that. So I mean, if you 546 00:30:20,120 --> 00:30:24,400 Speaker 2: believe that your you know, wife or husband or mom 547 00:30:24,520 --> 00:30:27,360 Speaker 2: or dad or kid died of cancer because of this 548 00:30:27,480 --> 00:30:30,880 Speaker 2: nuclear accident, and everybody's telling you like, no, it's it's fine, 549 00:30:30,880 --> 00:30:35,520 Speaker 2: You're you're hysterical overreacting, I can't imagine not being deeply 550 00:30:35,600 --> 00:30:36,920 Speaker 2: bitter about that. Yeah. 551 00:30:36,960 --> 00:30:41,040 Speaker 1: Of course, speaking of deeply bitter, I think that triggered 552 00:30:41,040 --> 00:30:44,360 Speaker 1: another ad break. Oh okay, and we'll be back to 553 00:30:44,360 --> 00:30:46,200 Speaker 1: finish up on three Mile Island right after this. 554 00:31:06,640 --> 00:31:15,080 Speaker 3: Stop you know, stop stoop stock shouldn't know. No, stop 555 00:31:15,480 --> 00:31:21,200 Speaker 3: you know, stop stop Stock shouldn't know stop you should know. 556 00:31:21,920 --> 00:31:26,240 Speaker 1: All right, So they had resolved this bubble issue and 557 00:31:26,400 --> 00:31:29,120 Speaker 1: they got to cool this thing down, and that's really 558 00:31:29,200 --> 00:31:31,880 Speaker 1: the main thing that reactor cored that had been exposed. 559 00:31:31,920 --> 00:31:34,440 Speaker 1: Like everything is super hot. So they first things first, 560 00:31:34,480 --> 00:31:36,000 Speaker 1: they really just need to get it cooled down. So 561 00:31:36,040 --> 00:31:39,840 Speaker 1: they worked on that for a while. Finally, on April 562 00:31:39,840 --> 00:31:42,040 Speaker 1: twenty seventh, I guess this is almost a month later, 563 00:31:42,560 --> 00:31:44,880 Speaker 1: they said that it was in cold shutdown. They had 564 00:31:44,920 --> 00:31:47,760 Speaker 1: reached that point where water was less than one hundred 565 00:31:47,800 --> 00:31:52,000 Speaker 1: degrees celsius at atmospheric pressure, and so they could start 566 00:31:52,080 --> 00:31:55,040 Speaker 1: clean up. And that was it for tm I two. 567 00:31:55,080 --> 00:31:57,080 Speaker 1: That thing shut down and did not reopen. 568 00:31:57,520 --> 00:32:01,080 Speaker 2: No, it didn't. Three months of energy production and that's it. 569 00:32:01,080 --> 00:32:07,040 Speaker 2: It's crazy, and it is still actually technically under cleanup today. 570 00:32:08,760 --> 00:32:12,480 Speaker 2: The cleanup efforts started pretty much right out of the gate. 571 00:32:12,560 --> 00:32:14,840 Speaker 2: I think it was in nineteen seventy nine that they 572 00:32:14,880 --> 00:32:17,960 Speaker 2: first started, but I'm sure the first couple of years 573 00:32:18,000 --> 00:32:20,920 Speaker 2: were like, Okay, what are we going to do. Part 574 00:32:20,960 --> 00:32:23,280 Speaker 2: of the problem was is they couldn't see into the reactor. 575 00:32:23,320 --> 00:32:25,719 Speaker 2: They couldn't tell with what kind of a problem they 576 00:32:25,720 --> 00:32:29,160 Speaker 2: were dealing with. And it wasn't until the eighties that 577 00:32:29,760 --> 00:32:33,440 Speaker 2: they started getting actual video confirmation. They put like video 578 00:32:33,480 --> 00:32:36,320 Speaker 2: cameras in to the reactor and saw that the core 579 00:32:36,400 --> 00:32:39,840 Speaker 2: had partially melted down, and that not only that chuck 580 00:32:41,800 --> 00:32:46,840 Speaker 2: the nuclear fuel, the uranium had molten uranium had melted 581 00:32:47,240 --> 00:32:49,880 Speaker 2: down into the bottom of what's called the vessel, the 582 00:32:49,920 --> 00:32:54,800 Speaker 2: container vessel. The basically the last thing between the the 583 00:32:55,520 --> 00:32:59,160 Speaker 2: uranium molten uranium in China is this vessel, and it 584 00:32:59,240 --> 00:33:02,080 Speaker 2: actually had not been expected to be able to stand 585 00:33:02,520 --> 00:33:06,120 Speaker 2: up to something like that, and just by pure luck 586 00:33:06,280 --> 00:33:09,840 Speaker 2: it did. It did not leak, but it definitely could 587 00:33:09,880 --> 00:33:13,080 Speaker 2: have and had that happened, it would have been catastrophic 588 00:33:13,120 --> 00:33:16,959 Speaker 2: had it gotten out. So three cheers to the containment vessel. 589 00:33:17,480 --> 00:33:21,080 Speaker 1: Yeah, for sure. The cleanup I think they Yeah, they 590 00:33:21,080 --> 00:33:25,360 Speaker 1: started in seventy nine and eleven years later. By ninety 591 00:33:25,600 --> 00:33:29,680 Speaker 1: was when that whole first phase was done. They had 592 00:33:30,040 --> 00:33:32,880 Speaker 1: like most of the nuclear fuel had been removed by 593 00:33:32,880 --> 00:33:35,040 Speaker 1: that point and about one hundred and fifty tons of 594 00:33:35,120 --> 00:33:39,480 Speaker 1: radioactive materials. I feel like we talked about this kind 595 00:33:39,480 --> 00:33:43,080 Speaker 1: of disposal before in other episodees. Yeah, it may have 596 00:33:43,160 --> 00:33:45,760 Speaker 1: been the disaster in Japan, or maybe it was just 597 00:33:45,800 --> 00:33:48,480 Speaker 1: one on nuclear like bearing nuclear waste. 598 00:33:48,640 --> 00:33:51,280 Speaker 2: Yeah, it was within I think it was twenty twenty five. 599 00:33:51,320 --> 00:33:52,920 Speaker 2: It was a good one. But we talked about that 600 00:33:53,320 --> 00:33:55,600 Speaker 2: place in Washington, the Handford Nuclear Site. 601 00:33:55,720 --> 00:33:58,200 Speaker 1: Yeah, well, this stuff or at the time at least 602 00:33:58,520 --> 00:34:02,480 Speaker 1: they went to the National Engineering Laboratory in Idaho for storage. 603 00:34:03,680 --> 00:34:05,160 Speaker 1: But then you still had all that water. You had 604 00:34:05,200 --> 00:34:10,080 Speaker 1: about two and a quarter million gallons of bad water. 605 00:34:11,040 --> 00:34:13,839 Speaker 1: That took another few years, so that wasn't fully cleaned 606 00:34:13,880 --> 00:34:17,719 Speaker 1: up until nineteen ninety three. You had to evaporate that stuff. 607 00:34:17,680 --> 00:34:20,279 Speaker 2: Right, which means you got gas on your hands, radioactive 608 00:34:20,280 --> 00:34:25,080 Speaker 2: gas again, And that's where those further exposures happened throughout 609 00:34:25,120 --> 00:34:28,160 Speaker 2: the eighties. I think nineteen eighty two and nineteen eighty 610 00:34:28,239 --> 00:34:30,160 Speaker 2: nine were the worst, but even then they were less 611 00:34:30,160 --> 00:34:33,120 Speaker 2: than a millirem of exposure, which again is about a 612 00:34:33,160 --> 00:34:35,920 Speaker 2: tenth of a chest X ray. Right. Yeah, So finally 613 00:34:36,000 --> 00:34:42,160 Speaker 2: the cleanup of TMI two is completed in nineteen ninety three, 614 00:34:42,640 --> 00:34:45,319 Speaker 2: but even that is still, like I said, it's still 615 00:34:45,320 --> 00:34:48,719 Speaker 2: ongoing because they were just like, we got ninety nine 616 00:34:48,840 --> 00:34:52,280 Speaker 2: percent of the nuclear fuel out out of the reactor, 617 00:34:52,560 --> 00:34:55,160 Speaker 2: isn't that amazing. We're just gonna call it done now. 618 00:34:56,040 --> 00:34:58,920 Speaker 2: And so there's still one percent left and there's a 619 00:34:59,000 --> 00:35:03,080 Speaker 2: company called tm MY two Solutions that is currently cleaning 620 00:35:03,200 --> 00:35:06,719 Speaker 2: up that remaining one percent of fuel from the reactor. 621 00:35:07,480 --> 00:35:10,160 Speaker 1: Yeah, they're solutions based, that's what they do, Josh. 622 00:35:10,239 --> 00:35:12,600 Speaker 2: They are and I was like, wait a minute, they 623 00:35:12,640 --> 00:35:16,960 Speaker 2: own TMI two. Why would somebody buy a reactor so 624 00:35:17,000 --> 00:35:19,759 Speaker 2: that you can pay to clean it up? And it 625 00:35:19,840 --> 00:35:22,400 Speaker 2: turns out there was a bunch of not even taxpayer 626 00:35:22,520 --> 00:35:28,800 Speaker 2: ratepayer money that Metropolitan ED had basically added to people's bills, 627 00:35:28,920 --> 00:35:31,920 Speaker 2: is like a tax set aside to pay for cleanup. 628 00:35:32,160 --> 00:35:34,160 Speaker 2: And I think there was something like a billion dollars 629 00:35:34,160 --> 00:35:37,920 Speaker 2: of that left. And I guess that TMI two Solutions 630 00:35:38,040 --> 00:35:41,560 Speaker 2: was going has been receiving that for cleaning it up. 631 00:35:41,960 --> 00:35:44,680 Speaker 1: Yeah, I mean that when they were protesting met ED, 632 00:35:45,239 --> 00:35:47,359 Speaker 1: they had signs that said, first you try to kill us, 633 00:35:47,360 --> 00:35:51,840 Speaker 1: then you want to bill us. Yeah. This kicked off 634 00:35:52,160 --> 00:35:55,359 Speaker 1: a lot of I mean, this nuclear energy was at 635 00:35:55,360 --> 00:35:59,560 Speaker 1: a probably all time public low. Obviously after Three Mile Island, 636 00:36:00,040 --> 00:36:02,120 Speaker 1: like things were kind humming along, and then people really 637 00:36:02,200 --> 00:36:05,160 Speaker 1: really turned against it. There were a lot of protests. 638 00:36:05,560 --> 00:36:07,480 Speaker 1: You know, when Jane Fonda shows up that you're in 639 00:36:07,480 --> 00:36:10,080 Speaker 1: big trouble, and she and her husband at the time, 640 00:36:10,400 --> 00:36:14,880 Speaker 1: Tom Hayden, did just that. It did lead to I 641 00:36:14,880 --> 00:36:17,320 Speaker 1: mean silver linings. It led to one of the great 642 00:36:17,520 --> 00:36:21,640 Speaker 1: concerts of all time, the Bruce Springsteen No Nuke's Concert 643 00:36:21,640 --> 00:36:26,200 Speaker 1: at Madison Square Garden in nineteen seventy nine brought you know, 644 00:36:26,280 --> 00:36:29,200 Speaker 1: musicians banded together and for the Musicians United for Safe 645 00:36:29,280 --> 00:36:33,000 Speaker 1: Energy MUSE and they just released that in twenty twenty one. 646 00:36:33,600 --> 00:36:35,840 Speaker 1: And I just want to say, I know you're probably 647 00:36:35,880 --> 00:36:37,560 Speaker 1: not a big Springsteen guy, but if you're a fan 648 00:36:38,360 --> 00:36:43,480 Speaker 1: of the Boss, watch, don't just listen to it. Watch 649 00:36:43,600 --> 00:36:46,640 Speaker 1: the concert film of the No Nuke Show, and it 650 00:36:46,719 --> 00:36:51,799 Speaker 1: is peak, peak Bruce Springsteen Unbelievable. 651 00:36:51,040 --> 00:36:53,120 Speaker 2: Show nineteen seventy nine. 652 00:36:53,480 --> 00:36:55,880 Speaker 1: Yeah, it's incredible because it's before Born in the USA 653 00:36:55,960 --> 00:36:58,160 Speaker 1: and all that, so before he was in state Earl, 654 00:36:58,239 --> 00:37:00,440 Speaker 1: I guess this is MSG, but before where he was 655 00:37:00,480 --> 00:37:03,839 Speaker 1: at like that level of huge, but right after Born 656 00:37:03,840 --> 00:37:05,480 Speaker 1: to Run in darkness on the edge of town, he 657 00:37:05,560 --> 00:37:07,399 Speaker 1: was still young and hungry, and it's just like, it's 658 00:37:07,400 --> 00:37:08,839 Speaker 1: an incredible, incredible show. 659 00:37:09,160 --> 00:37:09,840 Speaker 2: That's awesome. 660 00:37:10,160 --> 00:37:10,560 Speaker 1: Yeah. 661 00:37:10,680 --> 00:37:12,800 Speaker 2: I have a Bruce Springsteen anecdote if you want. 662 00:37:12,640 --> 00:37:14,480 Speaker 1: To hear it, sure, let's hear it. 663 00:37:15,160 --> 00:37:18,520 Speaker 2: Backstage one of our Bell House shows, I was meeting 664 00:37:18,560 --> 00:37:21,560 Speaker 2: the boyfriend of one of my friends, and he was 665 00:37:21,640 --> 00:37:24,480 Speaker 2: from Jersey and he was telling me this story about 666 00:37:24,480 --> 00:37:27,040 Speaker 2: how he and his friends were at a pool once 667 00:37:27,120 --> 00:37:30,400 Speaker 2: and he looked over and he's like, and there was Bruce, 668 00:37:30,640 --> 00:37:33,680 Speaker 2: And I went Willis and this guy look I was 669 00:37:33,760 --> 00:37:37,600 Speaker 2: serious too, the look of just like contempt that fell 670 00:37:37,640 --> 00:37:39,799 Speaker 2: over this guy's face for a second before he could 671 00:37:39,800 --> 00:37:44,200 Speaker 2: regain himself. He was like, no Springsteen. I was like, oh, okay, 672 00:37:44,880 --> 00:37:47,760 Speaker 2: it's like I feel equally about the both. 673 00:37:47,960 --> 00:37:50,200 Speaker 1: You know, at least you didn't say box Lightner. 674 00:37:52,560 --> 00:37:57,080 Speaker 2: That would have been really so much better. Oh boy, keep. 675 00:37:56,960 --> 00:37:58,719 Speaker 1: That one in your hip pocket. If anyone ever just 676 00:37:58,760 --> 00:38:00,960 Speaker 1: throws out a Bruce story again, a box lightner. 677 00:38:01,360 --> 00:38:03,880 Speaker 2: Okay, you got it, buddy. He was on V, wasn't he? 678 00:38:04,480 --> 00:38:07,400 Speaker 1: Uh sure, I don't know. I don't remember. He was scared, 679 00:38:07,680 --> 00:38:10,320 Speaker 1: true as king, okay, scare them? Or was he in tron? No, 680 00:38:10,360 --> 00:38:12,120 Speaker 1: he wasn't in tron. That was That was a different guy. 681 00:38:12,400 --> 00:38:13,400 Speaker 2: That was Jeff Bridges. 682 00:38:14,120 --> 00:38:14,400 Speaker 3: Yeah. 683 00:38:14,440 --> 00:38:16,480 Speaker 1: But the other guy, the main guy. 684 00:38:17,000 --> 00:38:18,120 Speaker 2: That was Bruce Springsteen. 685 00:38:18,600 --> 00:38:23,600 Speaker 1: No, who am I thinking of? Never mind, we got 686 00:38:23,600 --> 00:38:24,960 Speaker 1: to finish this. When people are going to be so 687 00:38:25,000 --> 00:38:25,359 Speaker 1: mad at. 688 00:38:25,280 --> 00:38:28,080 Speaker 2: Us, they're all right, sorry, sorry everybody. The Nuclear Regulatory 689 00:38:28,080 --> 00:38:29,800 Speaker 2: Commission's going to send us a letter. 690 00:38:29,840 --> 00:38:32,520 Speaker 1: I know, uh so not because of a lawsuit that 691 00:38:32,560 --> 00:38:36,319 Speaker 1: we're filing, but people certainly did. There was the fact 692 00:38:36,360 --> 00:38:39,120 Speaker 1: that they falsified those leak test results that you talked 693 00:38:39,160 --> 00:38:43,120 Speaker 1: about without fixing stuff, and they issued a report to 694 00:38:43,200 --> 00:38:46,439 Speaker 1: the Department of Justice. In November of nineteen eighty three, 695 00:38:46,920 --> 00:38:50,320 Speaker 1: they indicted met Ed for that falsification of the leaks, 696 00:38:50,640 --> 00:38:54,040 Speaker 1: where they had to pay a huge fine of forty 697 00:38:54,040 --> 00:38:55,000 Speaker 1: five thousand dollars. 698 00:38:56,000 --> 00:38:58,319 Speaker 2: Yeah, and you're like, okay, well, this was nineteen eighty 699 00:38:58,320 --> 00:39:00,799 Speaker 2: four dollars. How much is it today? Still just one 700 00:39:00,840 --> 00:39:03,000 Speaker 2: hundred and forty thousand dollars today. 701 00:39:02,920 --> 00:39:05,760 Speaker 1: For falsifying leaks of nuclear material? 702 00:39:06,080 --> 00:39:09,279 Speaker 2: Yeah, for sure and just being general jerks during the 703 00:39:09,320 --> 00:39:11,080 Speaker 2: whole you know, crisis. 704 00:39:11,280 --> 00:39:11,680 Speaker 1: Yeah. 705 00:39:11,719 --> 00:39:13,880 Speaker 2: But they were like, okay, well, we're also going to 706 00:39:13,920 --> 00:39:17,440 Speaker 2: help set up a fund for the Pennsylvania EPA to 707 00:39:17,520 --> 00:39:20,640 Speaker 2: take care of this area for years to come. We're 708 00:39:20,680 --> 00:39:24,120 Speaker 2: going to give it one million dollars. Again, you're like, okay, 709 00:39:24,120 --> 00:39:26,520 Speaker 2: it's nineteen eighty four dollars. No, just three point one 710 00:39:26,560 --> 00:39:32,800 Speaker 2: million dollars. So all told, I think ED officially paid 711 00:39:32,840 --> 00:39:35,640 Speaker 2: out something like three less than three and a half million. 712 00:39:36,200 --> 00:39:38,799 Speaker 2: There's a group called Three Mile Island Alert. They're a 713 00:39:38,840 --> 00:39:43,120 Speaker 2: nonprofit that is essentially watchdogs about three Mile Island, and 714 00:39:43,160 --> 00:39:46,080 Speaker 2: I don't think that they feel very good about Metropolitan ED. 715 00:39:46,560 --> 00:39:50,320 Speaker 2: But they say that the ED is paid out lots 716 00:39:50,360 --> 00:39:55,160 Speaker 2: more than that in civil and personal injury lawsuits to settle. 717 00:39:54,800 --> 00:39:58,640 Speaker 1: Those, yeah, settling them. Because that was in nineteen ninety six, 718 00:39:59,640 --> 00:40:02,840 Speaker 1: there were I think a couple of thousand active cases 719 00:40:03,520 --> 00:40:07,839 Speaker 1: for like, you know, exposure obviously to the radiation, and 720 00:40:07,920 --> 00:40:10,120 Speaker 1: a judge said, all right, let me pick ten of 721 00:40:10,160 --> 00:40:12,839 Speaker 1: these and try them as a group as a test 722 00:40:12,880 --> 00:40:15,520 Speaker 1: case to see if we, you know, if there's merit 723 00:40:15,520 --> 00:40:18,600 Speaker 1: to the whole thing. And the judge ruled against the planeiffs, 724 00:40:19,360 --> 00:40:21,720 Speaker 1: you know, citing what I would I talked about earlier, 725 00:40:21,800 --> 00:40:24,680 Speaker 1: like you can't there's not enough evidence to side a 726 00:40:24,800 --> 00:40:28,319 Speaker 1: direct link between the cancer that you have and the 727 00:40:28,400 --> 00:40:31,200 Speaker 1: radiation that you may or may not have endured. 728 00:40:31,719 --> 00:40:35,719 Speaker 2: Right. So this is one of those I think instances 729 00:40:35,760 --> 00:40:41,240 Speaker 2: why that I'm convinced because there's just so many different 730 00:40:41,400 --> 00:40:44,000 Speaker 2: people and groups of people from all different sectors of 731 00:40:44,040 --> 00:40:46,840 Speaker 2: our society who have looked at this and said, it 732 00:40:46,920 --> 00:40:49,720 Speaker 2: actually wasn't as bad. Right, it could have been really bad, 733 00:40:49,880 --> 00:40:52,799 Speaker 2: but it's not as bad as people fear, Right, That's 734 00:40:52,840 --> 00:40:55,760 Speaker 2: why I buy into the idea that it wasn't that bad. 735 00:40:56,280 --> 00:41:00,279 Speaker 2: That's not to say that there weren't people who acted 736 00:41:00,280 --> 00:41:02,880 Speaker 2: as whistleblowers. And in particular, if you saw a Netflix 737 00:41:02,920 --> 00:41:08,920 Speaker 2: documentary called Meltdown Golan three Mile Island, there was a 738 00:41:08,960 --> 00:41:11,680 Speaker 2: whistleblower named Rick Parks who was a supervisor in the 739 00:41:11,719 --> 00:41:15,400 Speaker 2: cleanup crew during the eighties, and he blew the whistle 740 00:41:15,440 --> 00:41:19,200 Speaker 2: because he was saying they were using this crane that 741 00:41:19,280 --> 00:41:23,520 Speaker 2: was in the reactor to basically dismantle the reactor afterward, 742 00:41:23,600 --> 00:41:26,239 Speaker 2: even though it had gone through the meltdown. Seemed very 743 00:41:26,360 --> 00:41:28,520 Speaker 2: unsafe to me. I didn't like how they were testing it. 744 00:41:29,760 --> 00:41:33,480 Speaker 2: So if like throughout the eighties cleanup of Three Mile Island, 745 00:41:33,520 --> 00:41:37,560 Speaker 2: that's the most scandalous thing a whistleblower comes up with, 746 00:41:37,719 --> 00:41:40,600 Speaker 2: it seems like it's about as on the up and 747 00:41:40,680 --> 00:41:42,040 Speaker 2: up as something like this can be. 748 00:41:42,760 --> 00:41:46,879 Speaker 1: Yeah, he claimed in that documentary that they like retaliated 749 00:41:46,880 --> 00:41:49,200 Speaker 1: against them and that someone planted drugs in his car 750 00:41:49,800 --> 00:41:53,880 Speaker 1: during a random drug inspection. There are other people that 751 00:41:53,880 --> 00:41:56,360 Speaker 1: have come out and said, hey, that documentary is little misleading. 752 00:41:57,360 --> 00:42:00,760 Speaker 1: He did raise concerns about that crane, but they didn't 753 00:42:00,800 --> 00:42:03,319 Speaker 1: ignore them. He just didn't agree with how they handled it, 754 00:42:03,840 --> 00:42:06,279 Speaker 1: and just take that documentary with a grain of salt. 755 00:42:06,320 --> 00:42:11,120 Speaker 2: Basically, Yeah, so there were I think, like you said, 756 00:42:11,239 --> 00:42:13,759 Speaker 2: nuclear power was just humming along and then it just 757 00:42:14,000 --> 00:42:18,120 Speaker 2: nosedived after Three Mile Island. And I think there were 758 00:42:18,160 --> 00:42:22,560 Speaker 2: fifty one plan nuclear reactors that were canceled in the 759 00:42:22,640 --> 00:42:27,400 Speaker 2: United States alone, like this had global repercussions between nineteen 760 00:42:27,480 --> 00:42:30,600 Speaker 2: eighty and nineteen eighty four, fifty one of them were canceled. 761 00:42:32,040 --> 00:42:34,480 Speaker 2: I think I saw in the end of the documentary 762 00:42:34,520 --> 00:42:37,960 Speaker 2: that was in nineteen ninety nine they said zero new 763 00:42:38,000 --> 00:42:41,000 Speaker 2: ones have been ordered since Three Mile Island. I saw 764 00:42:41,280 --> 00:42:46,320 Speaker 2: ae hundred had been potentially, but regardless, the upshot is 765 00:42:46,680 --> 00:42:50,120 Speaker 2: the reason why nuclear energy is not widespread, especially in 766 00:42:50,200 --> 00:42:52,840 Speaker 2: the United States, is because of Three Mile Island almost 767 00:42:52,840 --> 00:42:53,880 Speaker 2: one hundred percent. 768 00:42:54,160 --> 00:42:58,200 Speaker 1: Yeah, for sure. Kind of Strangely, a couple of years ago, 769 00:42:58,280 --> 00:43:02,560 Speaker 1: Microsoft signed a twenty year deal to purchase power from 770 00:43:02,719 --> 00:43:06,600 Speaker 1: TMI one, starting a couple of years from Mount twenty 771 00:43:06,600 --> 00:43:09,160 Speaker 1: twenty eight, and it was like, that's weird. Why is 772 00:43:09,200 --> 00:43:12,399 Speaker 1: Microsoft buying a bunch of power, Like, oh, they're using 773 00:43:12,440 --> 00:43:16,200 Speaker 1: power generated from that to fuel the data centers for AI. 774 00:43:16,400 --> 00:43:18,640 Speaker 2: Yeah, which I think we talked about that in the 775 00:43:18,719 --> 00:43:22,680 Speaker 2: Data Centers episode and the Getting rid of nuclear waste episode. 776 00:43:22,840 --> 00:43:25,480 Speaker 1: Yeah, it feels kind of like a full circle moment. 777 00:43:25,480 --> 00:43:28,840 Speaker 2: For sure, so let's leave it at that. Huh yeah, sure, 778 00:43:29,239 --> 00:43:31,520 Speaker 2: all right, Well we came full circle, which means we 779 00:43:31,600 --> 00:43:35,680 Speaker 2: automatically triggered listener mail even though we have no indicator 780 00:43:35,760 --> 00:43:37,000 Speaker 2: light to tell us as much. 781 00:43:39,960 --> 00:43:44,839 Speaker 1: That's right. Hey, guys, this is from Nathan from Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Guy, 782 00:43:45,640 --> 00:43:48,560 Speaker 1: I'm a former academic who never lost a love of learning. 783 00:43:49,400 --> 00:43:51,680 Speaker 1: Your show's both old new brighton my daily commutes with 784 00:43:51,680 --> 00:43:55,480 Speaker 1: fresh knowledge and open curiosity that genuinely warms my heart. 785 00:43:55,719 --> 00:43:56,040 Speaker 2: Nice. 786 00:43:56,080 --> 00:44:00,520 Speaker 1: But that's a very nice setup for a correction. Correction 787 00:44:00,520 --> 00:44:02,719 Speaker 1: on Thomas Hobbs. Guys, he didn't actually assume that all 788 00:44:02,880 --> 00:44:05,160 Speaker 1: or and this is from our Humanism episode, by the way, 789 00:44:05,920 --> 00:44:08,319 Speaker 1: Hobbs didn't actually assume that all or even most people 790 00:44:08,360 --> 00:44:11,640 Speaker 1: are inherently bad. Instead, he argued that some people will 791 00:44:11,680 --> 00:44:14,319 Speaker 1: do bad things sometimes, and that the rest of us 792 00:44:14,360 --> 00:44:17,960 Speaker 1: cannot know who win or where. Hobbs will point out 793 00:44:17,960 --> 00:44:20,240 Speaker 1: that we lock our houses at night, and our cars 794 00:44:20,239 --> 00:44:22,000 Speaker 1: and parking garages, and we do this, even though we 795 00:44:22,000 --> 00:44:25,600 Speaker 1: have laws, courts and police officers. It's not about human evil. 796 00:44:25,640 --> 00:44:29,919 Speaker 1: It's about rational caution in an uncertain world. And there's 797 00:44:29,960 --> 00:44:33,040 Speaker 1: a little bonus here, guys. Hobbes lived an absolutely wild life. 798 00:44:33,800 --> 00:44:36,720 Speaker 1: He was ascribed for Francis Bacon. He met Galileo in Italy. 799 00:44:37,120 --> 00:44:40,160 Speaker 1: He tutored the future King Charles the Second in math, 800 00:44:40,200 --> 00:44:43,239 Speaker 1: and spent years and heated its disagreements with Descartes through 801 00:44:43,239 --> 00:44:46,120 Speaker 1: the mail. In fact, a few years after Hobbs died, 802 00:44:46,560 --> 00:44:49,879 Speaker 1: Oxford University held a public book burning that included his work. 803 00:44:50,800 --> 00:44:55,080 Speaker 1: That spectacle prompted John Locke to leave Oxford, hide his manuscripts, 804 00:44:55,280 --> 00:44:56,920 Speaker 1: and flee to Holland for five years. 805 00:44:57,560 --> 00:44:57,960 Speaker 2: That'll do. 806 00:44:58,520 --> 00:45:01,600 Speaker 1: Yeah, that's Nathan from Pitts. I always loved the extra info. 807 00:45:02,080 --> 00:45:03,880 Speaker 2: Oh I do too, And thank you for sending us 808 00:45:03,920 --> 00:45:07,080 Speaker 2: straight on Hobbs too. We didn't mean to misrepresent him, yeah, 809 00:45:07,080 --> 00:45:11,160 Speaker 2: for sure, because he can sick the Leviathan on us. 810 00:45:11,680 --> 00:45:12,360 Speaker 1: If we don't want that. 811 00:45:13,400 --> 00:45:15,680 Speaker 2: If you want to be like Nathan from Pittsburgh and 812 00:45:15,719 --> 00:45:17,839 Speaker 2: send us a cool email like he did, and maybe 813 00:45:17,840 --> 00:45:20,200 Speaker 2: even butter us up first. We like that kind of thing. 814 00:45:20,760 --> 00:45:26,120 Speaker 2: You can send it to stuff podcast at iHeartRadio dot com. 815 00:45:27,880 --> 00:45:30,759 Speaker 1: Stuff you Should Know is a production of iHeartRadio. For 816 00:45:30,880 --> 00:45:35,040 Speaker 1: more podcasts my heart Radio, visit the iHeartRadio app, Apple podcasts, 817 00:45:35,160 --> 00:45:37,000 Speaker 1: or wherever you listen to your favorite shows.