WEBVTT - What the TSA Has Planned for Us

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<v Speaker 1>All Zone media.

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<v Speaker 2>Hey everybody, Robert Evans here, Welcome back to It Could

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<v Speaker 2>Happen Here, a podcast about things falling apart and coping

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<v Speaker 2>with dystopia. And one of the first signs of our

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<v Speaker 2>dystopia coming to be was the establishment of the TSA

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<v Speaker 2>and the Department of Homeland Security more broadly, obviously DHS

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<v Speaker 2>much more problematic than just the TSA. We did a

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<v Speaker 2>couple of episodes on them with Behind the Bastards back

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<v Speaker 2>in the day. But you know, the TSA came to

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<v Speaker 2>be right after nine to eleven, and both its establishment,

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<v Speaker 2>you know, the seeming necessity of it, and the kind

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<v Speaker 2>of impositions into personal privacy that it made commonplace. We're

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<v Speaker 2>both harbingers of the very fucked up era we find

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<v Speaker 2>ourselves in now. And the TSA is an interesting law

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<v Speaker 2>enforcement agency to me from the perspective of a normal person.

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<v Speaker 2>I think they're kind of the least objectionable of our

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<v Speaker 2>federal law enforce spin agencies, right They at least, I

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<v Speaker 2>should say, of all of the cops that we have

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<v Speaker 2>in this country, they're the ones you're least likely to

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<v Speaker 2>have a serious problem with, right, Like, they're not real

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<v Speaker 2>cops in the way that most cops are. They don't

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<v Speaker 2>like ticket or arrest you generally, unless you're one of

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<v Speaker 2>the startling number of Americans who gets caught with a

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<v Speaker 2>loaded handgun trying to go through airport security. Mostly, and

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<v Speaker 2>I've flown way more often than I want to remember.

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<v Speaker 2>Mostly my experience with TSA agents is they check your ID,

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<v Speaker 2>you know, they stare at an X ray machine where

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<v Speaker 2>your shit goes through it. Sometimes they alert and swab

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<v Speaker 2>some stuff. But you know, for me, it's usually not

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<v Speaker 2>that big a deal. For most people, I know it's

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<v Speaker 2>not that big a deal obviously, you know, the degree

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<v Speaker 2>to which it's a problem is going to vary widely

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<v Speaker 2>depending on whether or not you're a white dude. But

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<v Speaker 2>that said, still less potential for things going horribly violently

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<v Speaker 2>wrong and with a lot of police interactions. So I'll

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<v Speaker 2>give them that. And it's interesting to me that kind

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<v Speaker 2>of given this fact, the TSA is so hated, not

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<v Speaker 2>by I think most Americans. I think we're all kind

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<v Speaker 2>of frustrated by them. We know, you know, they're not

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<v Speaker 2>great at their jobs. They get caught in tests, letting

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<v Speaker 2>shit through all the time. It's kind of a pain

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<v Speaker 2>in the butt. But there's a chunk of Americans who

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<v Speaker 2>fucking hate the TSA, and they hate it because of

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<v Speaker 2>how invasive it is. And it's a little weird if

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<v Speaker 2>you're a regular person, because going through airport security is

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<v Speaker 2>still less invasive than like applying for an apartment, which

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<v Speaker 2>a lot of people do more regularly than they fly,

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<v Speaker 2>or taking a trip to the DMV, which again a

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<v Speaker 2>lot of people do more regularly than they fly. But people,

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<v Speaker 2>you know, with money, upper middle class and rich people,

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<v Speaker 2>that's where you really get most of the hate from

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<v Speaker 2>the TSA. Now, obviously there's some from principled libertarians, and

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<v Speaker 2>I tend to think they have a point there, but

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<v Speaker 2>there's a lot of people who really hate the TSA

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<v Speaker 2>specifically because it's kind of the only law enforcement friction

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<v Speaker 2>they deal with on a day to day basis. You know,

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<v Speaker 2>they live in a neighbor hood where they're not getting

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<v Speaker 2>pulled over. You know, the cops their job is not

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<v Speaker 2>to fuck with the people who have money, So the

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<v Speaker 2>only time they're going to get padded down and deal

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<v Speaker 2>with that thing that is a pretty common experience for

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<v Speaker 2>Americans and a lot of cities is when they go

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<v Speaker 2>through the airport. When they fly, and they also fly

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<v Speaker 2>often because they have more money. So I find myself

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<v Speaker 2>in this interesting position when reporting on the TSA of

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<v Speaker 2>there's real abuses there, there's a lot of real threats there.

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<v Speaker 2>The fact that they do get so much up in

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<v Speaker 2>our business and that we've normalized it is an issue.

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<v Speaker 2>And at the same time, like I always know when

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<v Speaker 2>I do something like this, the people who get angriest

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<v Speaker 2>about whatever I write about the TSA are going to

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<v Speaker 2>be the worst pieces of shit in the country. So

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<v Speaker 2>it's a fun balancing act. Now, obviously, as I'm trying

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<v Speaker 2>not to gloss over, there are some really good reasons

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<v Speaker 2>to be pissed at the TSA, like this twenty fifteen

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<v Speaker 2>story from Denver of several agents who were caught running

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<v Speaker 2>a groping scam. Basically, one female crew member would point

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<v Speaker 2>out the men that she found attractive, and a colleague

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<v Speaker 2>would signal that person out for a pat down, and

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<v Speaker 2>they basically say, like, oh, it's alerting something around your

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<v Speaker 2>growing or inner thighs, so that like she could bottle them. Essentially,

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<v Speaker 2>Now these people got fired. The TSA went after them

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<v Speaker 2>when they got caught, but who knows how many people

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<v Speaker 2>they groped in the interim period. Video in twenty twenty

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<v Speaker 2>three caught TSA agents at Miami International Airport stealing from

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<v Speaker 2>passenger bags in the security lines. There's like footage of it. Obviously,

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<v Speaker 2>the people who do this are going to be very,

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<v Speaker 2>very stupid, because, like you know, as a tsagent, there's

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<v Speaker 2>cameras all over the place. You're in the fucking TSA,

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<v Speaker 2>and the video is just this guy like reaching his

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<v Speaker 2>hand into a bag pulling out cash. It's not hard

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<v Speaker 2>to find headlines that are similar though, going back about

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<v Speaker 2>as long as the TSA has existed, what interests me

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<v Speaker 2>more are the massive violations of privacy and the potential

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<v Speaker 2>involvement of the TSA and their normalization of those invasions

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<v Speaker 2>of privacy has in the expansion of the survey state.

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<v Speaker 2>So this year at CEES twenty twenty four, when we

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<v Speaker 2>found out the TSA had a booth and they were

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<v Speaker 2>there to talk about their new facial recognition scanners, Garrison

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<v Speaker 2>and I had to go check it out, and the

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<v Speaker 2>interview that we conducted is going to kind of be

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<v Speaker 2>the heart of this episode, but I wanted to get

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<v Speaker 2>over a little bit more of a preamble first, So

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<v Speaker 2>the TSA started testing facial recognition scanners on a voluntary

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<v Speaker 2>basis at sixteen domestic airports, and I think twenty twenty

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<v Speaker 2>two they expanded it to twenty five airports or so

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<v Speaker 2>last year twenty twenty three, they are in twenty seven now,

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<v Speaker 2>according to what we were told by a representative, and

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<v Speaker 2>the goal is for this technology to go nationwide. Obviously,

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<v Speaker 2>not everyone is thrilled with that idea. And I'm going

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<v Speaker 2>to quote from a June twenty twenty three article on

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<v Speaker 2>CBS News. Five US senators sent a letter demanding the

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<v Speaker 2>TSA halt the program. You don't have to compromise people's

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<v Speaker 2>biometric security in order to provide physical security at airports,

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<v Speaker 2>said Senor ed Marky. Pokowski, who is the TSA representative,

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<v Speaker 2>says he agrees with senators and that he wants to

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<v Speaker 2>protect privacy for every passenger. I want to deploy technology

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<v Speaker 2>that's accurate and doesn't disadvantage anybody. Privacy advocates worry about

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<v Speaker 2>the lack of regulations around facial recognition and its tendency

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<v Speaker 2>to be less accurate with people of color. Most images

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<v Speaker 2>are deleted after use, but some information is encrypted and retained.

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<v Speaker 2>For up to twenty four months as part of the

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<v Speaker 2>ongoing review of how the technology performs. What's left out

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<v Speaker 2>of that article is that the TSA is also allowed

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<v Speaker 2>to maintain biometric data taken from non citizens people entering

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<v Speaker 2>the country from foreign countries, migrants and the like, and

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<v Speaker 2>they're able to keep that and share it. It's kind

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<v Speaker 2>of unclear the extent of that, but they're not bound

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<v Speaker 2>by the same rules with those people that they are

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<v Speaker 2>for citizens. And there are other issues as well, as

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<v Speaker 2>we'll get into. So Garrison and I were with excited

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<v Speaker 2>to have a chance to chat with a TSA representative.

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<v Speaker 2>This guy was less excited to see us, and we

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<v Speaker 2>will get into that story, but before we do, it's

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<v Speaker 2>time for an ad break and we're back. So Garrison

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<v Speaker 2>and I show up at the CEES booth and it's

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<v Speaker 2>kind of a small one. You might imagine it's about

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<v Speaker 2>the size of like three normal office cubicles. Maybe there's

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<v Speaker 2>a couple of tables. There's like a little podium thing

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<v Speaker 2>in the front that's got their logo on it. They

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<v Speaker 2>have some stickers, including one that's like it's like peanut

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<v Speaker 2>butter is a liquid and it's a cartoon of peanut butter,

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<v Speaker 2>which I was informed when I commented on it by

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<v Speaker 2>one of the TSA people that yes, peanut butter is

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<v Speaker 2>a liquid, which is one of those things that it's

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<v Speaker 2>both absurd and also like, well, actually, I don't know

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<v Speaker 2>how else you'd categorize peanut butter if you're the TSA.

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<v Speaker 2>So I guess it's something I can't have much of

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<v Speaker 2>an issue with cream. But is a cream different from

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<v Speaker 2>a liquid? I don't know. That's for the philosopher to decide.

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<v Speaker 2>So Garrison and I come up to this booth and

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<v Speaker 2>there's a guy standing behind the pode. I mean, the

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<v Speaker 2>way stuff works at CEES is you have generally a

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<v Speaker 2>mix of actual officers from the company. Sometimes it'll be

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<v Speaker 2>like a CEO or an executive in the case of

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<v Speaker 2>a smaller company. Other times it'll be regular employees or

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<v Speaker 2>like engineers and stuff who can answer technical questions, and

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<v Speaker 2>then a bunch of Most of the people that you

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<v Speaker 2>talk to are like pr reps. I don't know who

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<v Speaker 2>the guy was that was at the booth when we

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<v Speaker 2>first showed up, because as soon as we said we

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<v Speaker 2>wanted to talk about their facial recognition cameras he saw

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<v Speaker 2>were media, and he instantly did the pr equivalent of

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<v Speaker 2>throwing his buddy on a grenade. He like backed off.

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<v Speaker 2>He was like, let me get something for you. He

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<v Speaker 2>pulled his coworker over and then he fucking vanished, And

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<v Speaker 2>I'm going to play you a little bit of audio

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<v Speaker 2>of that.

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<v Speaker 3>We're interested in what you have here in terms of

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<v Speaker 3>facial recognition.

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<v Speaker 4>It's the cat too right over there.

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<v Speaker 3>Yeah, yeah, absolutely, what are you saying because I know

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<v Speaker 3>right now, like if you've got pre check or oh gosh,

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<v Speaker 3>what's the other one the independent company.

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<v Speaker 4>That were live on a live interview?

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<v Speaker 3>Now, I thought, so, I mean he came up to

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<v Speaker 3>ask to talk to a TSA.

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<v Speaker 4>Okay, sure then yeah, sure, hang on just a second.

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<v Speaker 2>So the guy we found ourselves in front of was

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<v Speaker 2>our Carter Langston, who is actually the press secretary of

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<v Speaker 2>the TSA, and by god, I don't know if I've

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<v Speaker 2>ever seen a man less happy to see me. Eventually

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<v Speaker 2>we started talking, and I have to give Carter credit

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<v Speaker 2>for professionalism. His eyes said I despise you both on principle,

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<v Speaker 2>and I am enraged to be doing this, But his

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<v Speaker 2>voice remained calm, even and his responses were to be

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<v Speaker 2>quite honest, pretty polished.

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<v Speaker 3>I'm kind of interested in sort of how you see

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<v Speaker 3>this altering the way we do air travel over the

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<v Speaker 3>next five ten years, right because obviously, right now people

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<v Speaker 3>are using facial recognition if they have pre check or

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<v Speaker 3>they have I'm spacing the name, but you know the

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<v Speaker 3>independent company that does get you pass the line and

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<v Speaker 3>stuff like they do like facial recognition when you are

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<v Speaker 3>in the airport. Is this something that you see as

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<v Speaker 3>coming more broadly to like everybody going through security in the.

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<v Speaker 4>Future, eventually, eventually.

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<v Speaker 5>So right now it's at twenty seven participating airports, and

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<v Speaker 5>it's not at every single we call them travel.

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<v Speaker 4>Document Checker podiums.

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<v Speaker 5>It's not at every single checker Travel Document checkerdum TDC

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<v Speaker 5>for sure, but it is growing and becoming We're deploying

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<v Speaker 5>more and more as as funding becomes available for we're

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<v Speaker 5>using facial recognition to identify passengers. It's a significant.

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<v Speaker 4>Improvement over the.

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<v Speaker 5>Previous way we were identifying passengers, just with the human interaction,

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<v Speaker 5>looking at an high decredidential and looking at it based

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<v Speaker 5>on what that individual knows about the fifty states and

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<v Speaker 5>territories and how they could what their credentials look like

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<v Speaker 5>the technology actually takes that over and does a much

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<v Speaker 5>better job of evalidating the authenticity of that ID. And

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<v Speaker 5>then the facial recognition component with a picture still image,

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<v Speaker 5>taking a picture of the passenger standing in front of

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<v Speaker 5>the travel document checker podium and then matching that picture

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<v Speaker 5>of that person standing there live against the credential photo

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<v Speaker 5>and making the match that way, so we know that

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<v Speaker 5>the credential is valid, it's it's true, it's accurate. We

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<v Speaker 5>know that the person standing there is also the person

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<v Speaker 5>on the credential. We can verify the boarding status and

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<v Speaker 5>the screening status of that individual and can provide them

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<v Speaker 5>with where they should go next for their screening because

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<v Speaker 5>the officer is able to discern based on all of

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<v Speaker 5>the information provided at the back end of the monitor

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<v Speaker 5>that they reviewed.

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<v Speaker 4>They can see all of those.

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<v Speaker 5>Items have been checked, there's a boarding status, and there's

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<v Speaker 5>a screening status, and then just tells the passenger where

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<v Speaker 5>to go to follow up for screening.

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<v Speaker 3>So I'm interested in how someone how someone becomes basically

0:12:41.920 --> 0:12:45.040
<v Speaker 3>enrolled in this right because my assumption is at this point,

0:12:45.800 --> 0:12:48.240
<v Speaker 3>just the picture you get when you're getting your driver's

0:12:48.280 --> 0:12:51.320
<v Speaker 3>license or your state ID from the DMV is not

0:12:51.480 --> 0:12:55.200
<v Speaker 3>sufficient for a facial recognition system, right, simply having the

0:12:55.240 --> 0:12:57.760
<v Speaker 3>picture in the government space. You need to have somebody

0:12:58.040 --> 0:13:01.080
<v Speaker 3>to like get their face scaled and their irises scand

0:13:01.160 --> 0:13:02.640
<v Speaker 3>or something like that in order to have them in

0:13:02.679 --> 0:13:03.160
<v Speaker 3>the system.

0:13:03.240 --> 0:13:05.559
<v Speaker 4>Right, it's not in the system at all.

0:13:06.600 --> 0:13:10.439
<v Speaker 5>So with the way we're rolling these out at airports

0:13:10.440 --> 0:13:15.640
<v Speaker 5>and check blinds is once a passenger has been identified.

0:13:15.559 --> 0:13:16.320
<v Speaker 4>And that.

0:13:18.240 --> 0:13:22.800
<v Speaker 5>And goes into screening, all of the information that was

0:13:23.000 --> 0:13:28.480
<v Speaker 5>captured is gone. We don't store any of the pictures

0:13:28.559 --> 0:13:30.960
<v Speaker 5>participation right now, it's completely volatile.

0:13:31.920 --> 0:13:32.079
<v Speaker 3>UH.

0:13:32.120 --> 0:13:34.760
<v Speaker 4>Their signage right there at the.

0:13:34.600 --> 0:13:42.480
<v Speaker 5>Checker podium UH to indicate that passengers can opt out,

0:13:43.640 --> 0:13:46.839
<v Speaker 5>they don't have to participate it and all that. All

0:13:46.880 --> 0:13:51.360
<v Speaker 5>it happens at that point is the same officer will

0:13:51.720 --> 0:14:03.000
<v Speaker 5>UH will turn basically over to the alternative process, review

0:14:03.040 --> 0:14:08.319
<v Speaker 5>the ID, review the boarding pass and allow the passenger.

0:14:07.880 --> 0:14:10.199
<v Speaker 4>To continue too easy.

0:14:10.880 --> 0:14:13.360
<v Speaker 5>So if you don't lose their place in line, and

0:14:13.440 --> 0:14:17.720
<v Speaker 5>they don't, they're not delayed in any way from getting

0:14:17.760 --> 0:14:18.880
<v Speaker 5>screen But.

0:14:19.560 --> 0:14:22.000
<v Speaker 3>In terms of like the people who choose to use it, right,

0:14:22.120 --> 0:14:24.560
<v Speaker 3>So if you if you're in this system, is it

0:14:24.640 --> 0:14:27.680
<v Speaker 3>literally just comparing your face to the face on the

0:14:27.720 --> 0:14:30.160
<v Speaker 3>I D. You're not like enrolled separately the way you

0:14:30.240 --> 0:14:32.560
<v Speaker 3>are if you are in like pre check or somewhere.

0:14:33.040 --> 0:14:34.840
<v Speaker 4>Okay, No, it's not.

0:14:35.320 --> 0:14:40.680
<v Speaker 5>There's not a database associated mats and so no, that's

0:14:40.720 --> 0:14:45.800
<v Speaker 5>that's not our use. Now, some of the airlines have

0:14:45.960 --> 0:14:49.600
<v Speaker 5>partnered with us, they saw benefit in it, and they're

0:14:49.800 --> 0:14:56.320
<v Speaker 5>using similar technology for backdrop for their Frequent Flyer Miles

0:14:56.960 --> 0:15:03.560
<v Speaker 5>program participants. So that is there's a database associated with

0:15:03.640 --> 0:15:07.400
<v Speaker 5>that obviously, and so those.

0:15:07.200 --> 0:15:10.520
<v Speaker 4>Passengers are company.

0:15:12.440 --> 0:15:16.040
<v Speaker 5>Have an entirely different experience. But the way that we're

0:15:16.200 --> 0:15:21.240
<v Speaker 5>using it at the checkpoint, as I just said, for

0:15:21.360 --> 0:15:23.120
<v Speaker 5>identity verification.

0:15:23.280 --> 0:15:26.680
<v Speaker 2>God n you caught that right how he says participation

0:15:26.840 --> 0:15:30.560
<v Speaker 2>is voluntary right now. Well, I hadn't come across this

0:15:30.600 --> 0:15:33.600
<v Speaker 2>information at the time, but afterwards I read a fascinating

0:15:33.720 --> 0:15:38.080
<v Speaker 2>Washington Post article from last summer about Portland Senator Jeff Murkley.

0:15:38.440 --> 0:15:40.960
<v Speaker 2>Jeff Murkley says that when he was trying to make

0:15:41.000 --> 0:15:43.640
<v Speaker 2>a flight at Reagan International Airport, he was told that

0:15:43.640 --> 0:15:46.400
<v Speaker 2>if he didn't verify his ID via face scanner, he

0:15:46.440 --> 0:15:50.280
<v Speaker 2>would face a significant delay. Quote from the article. There

0:15:50.360 --> 0:15:52.840
<v Speaker 2>was no delay, the spokeswoman said the senator showed his

0:15:52.880 --> 0:15:55.600
<v Speaker 2>photo ID to the TSA agent in cleared security, so

0:15:55.640 --> 0:15:58.400
<v Speaker 2>basically he was lied to. Somebody lied and said, you're

0:15:58.440 --> 0:16:00.560
<v Speaker 2>going to if you don't want to like delayed and

0:16:00.560 --> 0:16:03.080
<v Speaker 2>maybe miss your flight, you have to submit to a

0:16:03.120 --> 0:16:05.720
<v Speaker 2>face scan, which is one of the things that privacy

0:16:05.760 --> 0:16:08.760
<v Speaker 2>advocates were worried about from the beginning. But you know what,

0:16:08.800 --> 0:16:12.280
<v Speaker 2>privacy advocates aren't worried about the products and services that

0:16:12.400 --> 0:16:27.920
<v Speaker 2>support this podcast and we're back, So I think when

0:16:27.960 --> 0:16:30.440
<v Speaker 2>it gets right down to it, the silliest part of

0:16:30.480 --> 0:16:32.640
<v Speaker 2>all of this to me is that the TSA isn't

0:16:32.640 --> 0:16:35.760
<v Speaker 2>even claiming they need to run faces through like some

0:16:35.920 --> 0:16:39.160
<v Speaker 2>futuristic database of terrorists, right like they want to scan

0:16:39.280 --> 0:16:41.200
<v Speaker 2>our faces so they know if this like bad guy

0:16:41.240 --> 0:16:44.160
<v Speaker 2>they're tracking is in the airport in disguised using a

0:16:44.200 --> 0:16:47.120
<v Speaker 2>fake passport or something that's not actually what it does.

0:16:47.640 --> 0:16:51.480
<v Speaker 2>Facial recognition the TSA is using right now at least

0:16:52.080 --> 0:16:54.520
<v Speaker 2>just takes the place of the TSA guy. You hand

0:16:54.560 --> 0:16:57.000
<v Speaker 2>your ID before you go put your shit in bins,

0:16:57.080 --> 0:16:59.640
<v Speaker 2>right like, you know, you go up and before you

0:16:59.680 --> 0:17:01.400
<v Speaker 2>can go take your stuff out of your bags and

0:17:01.400 --> 0:17:04.040
<v Speaker 2>put it in those bins. You hand a guy your license,

0:17:04.080 --> 0:17:06.560
<v Speaker 2>sometimes your license and boarding pass, he looks at it

0:17:06.600 --> 0:17:08.040
<v Speaker 2>in your face. If you wear at a mask, he

0:17:08.080 --> 0:17:09.840
<v Speaker 2>tolls you to take it down for a second and

0:17:09.880 --> 0:17:11.639
<v Speaker 2>then he lets you go in. Right, that's what the

0:17:11.720 --> 0:17:16.000
<v Speaker 2>facial recognition scanners are actually doing here. That Washington Post

0:17:16.080 --> 0:17:19.720
<v Speaker 2>article also cites an anti facial recognition activist, Tijuana Petty,

0:17:19.760 --> 0:17:21.840
<v Speaker 2>who says that she was told by a TSA agent

0:17:21.920 --> 0:17:26.120
<v Speaker 2>at the same airport, Reagan, that undergoing facial recognition scanning

0:17:26.280 --> 0:17:29.119
<v Speaker 2>was not optional. So people are already being told this

0:17:29.200 --> 0:17:32.400
<v Speaker 2>is a requirement. And obviously, as a spoiler for where

0:17:32.480 --> 0:17:36.720
<v Speaker 2>this goes, the bigger, deeper question is like how long

0:17:37.000 --> 0:17:38.320
<v Speaker 2>is that going to be the case?

0:17:38.640 --> 0:17:38.840
<v Speaker 4>Right?

0:17:39.560 --> 0:17:43.280
<v Speaker 2>So you know that's kind of the big concern, right,

0:17:43.440 --> 0:17:46.200
<v Speaker 2>is that they're saying it's optional now, it obviously won't

0:17:46.200 --> 0:17:48.040
<v Speaker 2>be forever, and some people are just going to be

0:17:48.080 --> 0:17:50.440
<v Speaker 2>told they don't have a choice, Like that's kind of bullying,

0:17:50.520 --> 0:17:53.440
<v Speaker 2>strong arming people, threatening that they'll miss their flight if

0:17:53.480 --> 0:17:56.240
<v Speaker 2>they don't submit to it, which makes me extra suspicious

0:17:56.240 --> 0:17:59.159
<v Speaker 2>about their data retention. Right, And that is the question

0:17:59.240 --> 0:18:02.680
<v Speaker 2>we asked as the interview went on, where is the TSAs?

0:18:02.760 --> 0:18:05.840
<v Speaker 2>But where is the TSA's biometric data or really, where

0:18:05.920 --> 0:18:10.040
<v Speaker 2>is passenger biometric data actually going to go once the

0:18:10.080 --> 0:18:11.040
<v Speaker 2>TSA has it?

0:18:11.520 --> 0:18:15.879
<v Speaker 6>In terms of the just information storage is there? I

0:18:15.920 --> 0:18:18.960
<v Speaker 6>know I've been seeing more of these like signs the

0:18:18.960 --> 0:18:22.320
<v Speaker 6>more that I travel. I do it decent traveling for

0:18:22.359 --> 0:18:24.920
<v Speaker 6>these for these sorts of systems. And I'm curious with

0:18:25.000 --> 0:18:29.080
<v Speaker 6>how this works for non US citizens if because I

0:18:29.080 --> 0:18:31.560
<v Speaker 6>know there's there's certain at least in some of the

0:18:31.560 --> 0:18:34.880
<v Speaker 6>technology that's being used by customers of border patrol. They

0:18:35.040 --> 0:18:38.439
<v Speaker 6>do store images captured of non US citizens for a

0:18:38.440 --> 0:18:39.240
<v Speaker 6>certain time period.

0:18:39.480 --> 0:18:40.640
<v Speaker 2>They do take pictures.

0:18:40.320 --> 0:18:43.000
<v Speaker 6>Of US citizens when entering the country, and lots of

0:18:43.320 --> 0:18:47.240
<v Speaker 6>lots of airports. Are are these two systems interacting at all?

0:18:47.359 --> 0:18:50.760
<v Speaker 6>Or is the TSA system and customers about customs and

0:18:50.800 --> 0:18:52.879
<v Speaker 6>voter patrol system more separated?

0:18:53.480 --> 0:18:56.000
<v Speaker 5>Well, first of all, I can't speak for Customs and

0:18:56.040 --> 0:19:00.679
<v Speaker 5>Border protection, but I can tell you that we're we

0:19:00.760 --> 0:19:04.040
<v Speaker 5>have two very different use cases. So their use case

0:19:04.119 --> 0:19:08.399
<v Speaker 5>is very much oriented in the customs arena, and then

0:19:08.560 --> 0:19:10.400
<v Speaker 5>ours is as I just.

0:19:10.480 --> 0:19:13.720
<v Speaker 4>Mentioned, at the checkpoint.

0:19:12.880 --> 0:19:19.320
<v Speaker 5>And solely for the identity verification and if an international

0:19:19.359 --> 0:19:23.720
<v Speaker 5>passenger comes in with a credential.

0:19:24.800 --> 0:19:26.800
<v Speaker 4>That identifies them.

0:19:27.160 --> 0:19:32.480
<v Speaker 5>Then the unit would obviously accept that credential.

0:19:33.040 --> 0:19:35.439
<v Speaker 4>It's a photo, it's a photo credential.

0:19:35.920 --> 0:19:39.679
<v Speaker 5>So again, all that the system would do is validay

0:19:40.320 --> 0:19:43.200
<v Speaker 5>that that person on that credential is also the same

0:19:43.240 --> 0:19:46.479
<v Speaker 5>person that's standing right there in front of the travel

0:19:46.520 --> 0:19:47.760
<v Speaker 5>document checker.

0:19:48.000 --> 0:19:50.840
<v Speaker 2>Okay, most of you are probably aware of this, but

0:19:50.880 --> 0:19:53.600
<v Speaker 2>the TSA actually does not have a good record of

0:19:53.640 --> 0:19:56.480
<v Speaker 2>protecting private data. Now this is not old Man Robert

0:19:56.560 --> 0:19:59.920
<v Speaker 2>being a libertarian, it's just documented history. The TSA INDI

0:20:00.359 --> 0:20:03.320
<v Speaker 2>claimed their full body scanners, which took what are essentially

0:20:03.400 --> 0:20:07.200
<v Speaker 2>naked pictures of passengers, never stored photos and couldn't transmit them.

0:20:07.440 --> 0:20:09.639
<v Speaker 2>But in twenty ten this was revealed to be a

0:20:09.880 --> 0:20:13.240
<v Speaker 2>lie when we gained access to documents that included technical

0:20:13.240 --> 0:20:17.840
<v Speaker 2>specifications and vendor contracts which indicated the TSA required vendors

0:20:17.880 --> 0:20:20.800
<v Speaker 2>of these scanners to provide equipment that can store and

0:20:20.840 --> 0:20:23.399
<v Speaker 2>send images of screen passengers. Now this was supposed to

0:20:23.400 --> 0:20:25.879
<v Speaker 2>only be in testing mode, but if it can store

0:20:26.000 --> 0:20:29.359
<v Speaker 2>and send images of screened passengers, it can store and

0:20:29.400 --> 0:20:33.240
<v Speaker 2>send images of screened passengers. In twenty twelve, a former

0:20:33.280 --> 0:20:36.760
<v Speaker 2>TSA agent accused his coworkers of saving nude body images

0:20:36.800 --> 0:20:39.639
<v Speaker 2>of passengers from the body scanner and making fun of

0:20:39.680 --> 0:20:42.440
<v Speaker 2>them in back rooms. He said that safeguards were put

0:20:42.480 --> 0:20:44.880
<v Speaker 2>in place to ensure the agents manning the scanners never

0:20:44.920 --> 0:20:47.600
<v Speaker 2>saw the people they were scanning outside of the scanner,

0:20:48.160 --> 0:20:52.240
<v Speaker 2>but that these policies were frequently violated. Basically, every privacy

0:20:52.280 --> 0:20:55.520
<v Speaker 2>policy they had was frequently violated by agents so that

0:20:55.560 --> 0:20:58.280
<v Speaker 2>they could make fun of people's dicks. Right, that's the story.

0:20:58.800 --> 0:21:02.000
<v Speaker 2>The TSA retired its old scanners the next year, replacing

0:21:02.040 --> 0:21:04.840
<v Speaker 2>them with a device that showed less detail and particularly

0:21:04.880 --> 0:21:08.359
<v Speaker 2>provided agents with less clear looks at people's dongs. In

0:21:08.400 --> 0:21:11.680
<v Speaker 2>twenty twenty one, a TSA agent in Minneapolis was accused

0:21:11.680 --> 0:21:14.280
<v Speaker 2>by airport police of taking dozens of photos of young

0:21:14.280 --> 0:21:17.720
<v Speaker 2>women going through flight screening. The TSA's record here, both

0:21:17.760 --> 0:21:20.199
<v Speaker 2>in terms of the agency itself and in terms of

0:21:20.200 --> 0:21:24.280
<v Speaker 2>its employees, is certainly not worse than numerous police departments

0:21:24.400 --> 0:21:27.000
<v Speaker 2>right or the FBI. This is something to keep in mind.

0:21:27.359 --> 0:21:30.840
<v Speaker 2>As frustrating as all this stuff is, literally every local

0:21:30.960 --> 0:21:35.720
<v Speaker 2>and city law enforcement agency has worse cases, and by gods,

0:21:35.720 --> 0:21:38.280
<v Speaker 2>so do the FEDS could make a case that as

0:21:38.280 --> 0:21:40.280
<v Speaker 2>frustrating as a lot of this is the TSA is

0:21:40.359 --> 0:21:42.399
<v Speaker 2>less of a threat to privacy than most other federal

0:21:42.480 --> 0:21:45.760
<v Speaker 2>law enforcement agencies. But that's beside the point. For one thing,

0:21:46.240 --> 0:21:50.200
<v Speaker 2>normalizing facial recognition technology in the airports is a step

0:21:50.240 --> 0:21:54.400
<v Speaker 2>towards normalizing it everywhere. The data that is gathered will

0:21:54.440 --> 0:21:58.600
<v Speaker 2>not always be deleted, and more to the point, there's

0:21:58.640 --> 0:22:00.359
<v Speaker 2>no way to know that the system isn't going to

0:22:00.400 --> 0:22:03.760
<v Speaker 2>expand in directions that we all find deeply uncomfortable as

0:22:03.800 --> 0:22:05.520
<v Speaker 2>it goes on. That's why you kind of have to

0:22:05.640 --> 0:22:08.240
<v Speaker 2>nip this stuff in the bud, especially since they're not

0:22:08.359 --> 0:22:12.200
<v Speaker 2>really promising extra security here. When you look at the

0:22:12.640 --> 0:22:14.480
<v Speaker 2>scandals of the TSA, a lot of it has to

0:22:14.520 --> 0:22:17.040
<v Speaker 2>do with the fact that they'll be getting tested by

0:22:17.040 --> 0:22:19.120
<v Speaker 2>some other law enforcement agency to see if they can

0:22:19.320 --> 0:22:22.400
<v Speaker 2>sneak shit through, right, and the TSAO let a bunch

0:22:22.400 --> 0:22:24.600
<v Speaker 2>of guns or a fake bomb or whatever through because

0:22:24.640 --> 0:22:28.040
<v Speaker 2>people aren't paying attention. Facial scanners aren't going to catch that,

0:22:28.080 --> 0:22:29.840
<v Speaker 2>and it's kind of unclear to me what they are

0:22:29.880 --> 0:22:33.720
<v Speaker 2>going to catch. My other bigger issue is that even

0:22:33.760 --> 0:22:36.960
<v Speaker 2>though they say they're going to throw away biometric data,

0:22:37.000 --> 0:22:38.840
<v Speaker 2>they're not going to keep it more than twenty four

0:22:38.880 --> 0:22:42.480
<v Speaker 2>hours outside of special situations, which they do kind of

0:22:42.560 --> 0:22:44.920
<v Speaker 2>leave themselves an end there. The fact that they say

0:22:44.920 --> 0:22:46.919
<v Speaker 2>they're deleting this stuff doesn't mean they are going to

0:22:46.960 --> 0:22:49.880
<v Speaker 2>delete that stuff. And I brought up this troubling history

0:22:49.920 --> 0:22:53.840
<v Speaker 2>of lack of respect for privacy, violations of privacy by

0:22:53.880 --> 0:22:56.639
<v Speaker 2>TSA agents in the past within the context of this

0:22:56.720 --> 0:23:00.280
<v Speaker 2>new system. And I want to play Carter's answer for you.

0:23:00.840 --> 0:23:04.440
<v Speaker 3>I am curious. You know there were a couple five

0:23:04.520 --> 0:23:07.680
<v Speaker 3>or six years a couple of cases stories that grew

0:23:07.760 --> 0:23:11.800
<v Speaker 3>up of pictures images of passengers who were on the

0:23:11.840 --> 0:23:15.960
<v Speaker 3>body scanners being shared, right like that's there were for

0:23:16.080 --> 0:23:19.760
<v Speaker 3>a couple of scandals about that. Had that influenced your

0:23:19.800 --> 0:23:22.960
<v Speaker 3>attitudes on the data attention policy that should exist for

0:23:23.520 --> 0:23:24.640
<v Speaker 3>the facial recognition of.

0:23:24.600 --> 0:23:31.120
<v Speaker 5>This So first tell you that we follow the National

0:23:31.160 --> 0:23:37.120
<v Speaker 5>Institute of National Institute of Standards and Technology their guidelines

0:23:37.320 --> 0:23:42.359
<v Speaker 5>and standards to a tu Not only that we publish

0:23:42.560 --> 0:23:51.720
<v Speaker 5>online our privacy impact assessments, so there are we're very

0:23:52.040 --> 0:23:56.760
<v Speaker 5>transparent in our use of this technology, how we're using it,

0:23:56.880 --> 0:24:01.000
<v Speaker 5>what we're using it for. And again it's completely voluntary.

0:24:01.600 --> 0:24:06.200
<v Speaker 5>Nothing is stored similar and it's simply.

0:24:09.040 --> 0:24:14.080
<v Speaker 4>Which is really the Lynch Transportation security Yeah, I mean

0:24:14.240 --> 0:24:16.639
<v Speaker 4>we've got to know that was and who.

0:24:16.520 --> 0:24:19.679
<v Speaker 5>We're Vegas going mind into the secure area of an

0:24:19.680 --> 0:24:23.080
<v Speaker 5>airpoilt is in fact it's a person that.

0:24:24.560 --> 0:24:24.960
<v Speaker 4>They say that.

0:24:26.200 --> 0:24:29.320
<v Speaker 2>So yeah, that's more or less how the conversation ended.

0:24:29.720 --> 0:24:32.480
<v Speaker 2>Carter was very happy to see us go, and I

0:24:32.520 --> 0:24:37.160
<v Speaker 2>don't think Garrison or I were particularly surprised by anything

0:24:37.200 --> 0:24:39.800
<v Speaker 2>we heard, but I did find it interesting that he

0:24:39.960 --> 0:24:42.639
<v Speaker 2>kind of confirmed the goal is eventually for this to

0:24:42.720 --> 0:24:45.119
<v Speaker 2>not just be everywhere, but be something that you can't

0:24:45.200 --> 0:24:49.040
<v Speaker 2>opt out of. And I do partly wonder how much

0:24:49.160 --> 0:24:52.800
<v Speaker 2>of that is them looking for a way to get

0:24:52.840 --> 0:24:55.040
<v Speaker 2>more data on people, maybe even to share to other

0:24:55.119 --> 0:24:58.320
<v Speaker 2>law enforcement agencies, and how much of that is kind

0:24:58.320 --> 0:25:01.240
<v Speaker 2>of the same reason all a lot of you know,

0:25:01.560 --> 0:25:05.560
<v Speaker 2>AI style technology and kind of facial recognition does sort

0:25:05.600 --> 0:25:07.359
<v Speaker 2>of fall under that umbrella. If you're going to have

0:25:07.400 --> 0:25:09.320
<v Speaker 2>a general intelligence, one thing it has to be able

0:25:09.320 --> 0:25:11.639
<v Speaker 2>to do is recognize people's faces. So it is a

0:25:11.680 --> 0:25:14.320
<v Speaker 2>piece of that and I think that, just like a

0:25:14.359 --> 0:25:17.200
<v Speaker 2>lot of other applications of that kind of technology, are

0:25:17.200 --> 0:25:21.240
<v Speaker 2>inevitably used to cut workforces. That's kind of probably the

0:25:21.320 --> 0:25:24.440
<v Speaker 2>chief thing the TSA is looking to use it to do. Right,

0:25:24.880 --> 0:25:26.840
<v Speaker 2>If you can replace the guy who has to look

0:25:26.880 --> 0:25:29.040
<v Speaker 2>at your idea, or at least most of them, with

0:25:29.080 --> 0:25:32.040
<v Speaker 2>facial recognition scanners that do the same thing, then you

0:25:32.080 --> 0:25:34.840
<v Speaker 2>can save on your budget. Right now. The downside of that,

0:25:34.920 --> 0:25:37.240
<v Speaker 2>maybe to us. The upside is it could be faster.

0:25:37.359 --> 0:25:39.720
<v Speaker 2>The downside, of course, is there's a really good chance

0:25:39.720 --> 0:25:42.320
<v Speaker 2>it won't be. The robot will be even more racist

0:25:42.320 --> 0:25:44.840
<v Speaker 2>than an ESA agent might be. You know, it's one

0:25:44.920 --> 0:25:47.080
<v Speaker 2>less chance to deal with a human with whom you

0:25:47.160 --> 0:25:50.160
<v Speaker 2>might be able to talk something through. Anyway. Well, I'll

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<v Speaker 2>see where this goes, but for today, this has been

0:25:52.880 --> 0:25:55.760
<v Speaker 2>it could happen here, and I have been Robert Evans.

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<v Speaker 1>It could happen here, as a production of cool Zone Media.

0:26:04.040 --> 0:26:06.720
<v Speaker 1>For more podcasts from cool Zone Media, visit our website

0:26:06.760 --> 0:26:09.880
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<v Speaker 1>find sources for It could Happen Here, updated monthly at

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<v Speaker 1>Coolzonmedia dot com slash sources. Thanks for listening,