Speaker 1: Col Zone Media.
Speaker 2: Hello everyone, and welcome to say it could happen here.
Speaker 2: My name is Dana al Kerd. I'm a writer, analyst,
Speaker 2: and researcher of Palestinian and Arab politics. I'm an associate
Speaker 2: professor of political science and a senior non resident fellow
Speaker 2: at the Arab Center Washington. What a wild time in
Speaker 2: the Middle East? Am I right? I mean not to
Speaker 2: be flippant. That's putting him mildly. Today before I recorded,
Speaker 2: Israel bombed the capital of Katar, Doha, in an assassination
Speaker 2: attempt against Tamas leadership. They bombed in a residential area
Speaker 2: in the middle of the city, surrounded by nursries, schools,
Speaker 2: businesses and you know people. I have a lot to
Speaker 2: say about Arab Israeli relations historically and what's happening on
Speaker 2: that front today and the sometimes shared interests of Arab
Speaker 2: regimes with the Israeli state. So stay tuned for a
Speaker 2: deep dive episode on that topic soon. Today I want
Speaker 2: to talk about the issue of Palestinian statehood. It's been
Speaker 2: in the news quite a bit these days. A number
Speaker 2: of different countries have expressed a willingness to recognize Palestine
Speaker 2: as a state. In July, for example, France announced it
Speaker 2: would recognize Palestinian statehood, and it was soon joined by
Speaker 2: a number of other countries, Canada, Malta, Belgium, the UK.
Speaker 2: Kir Starmer, the Prime Minister of the UK, actually made
Speaker 2: it into an explicit threat. Basically, we will recognize the
Speaker 2: state of Palestine if the Israelis don't agree to a ceasefire.
Speaker 2: I'd like to underscore the absurdity of that comment for
Speaker 2: a second, but we'll get back to that one. For
Speaker 2: all these countries, they say that they are recognizing Palestine
Speaker 2: as a state because they desire a two state solution.
Speaker 2: Their condition for recognizing Palestine as a state also includes
Speaker 2: Hamas being completely out of the picture quote demilitarized in
Speaker 2: the language of French President Macron. As NPR reported back
Speaker 2: in August first, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Karney also said
Speaker 2: that the Palestinian authority needs to hold elections in this scenario,
Speaker 2: but one that excludes Hamas. So all of these recent
Speaker 2: announcements are coalescing around the same conditions. I guess the
Speaker 2: big deal here is that these are major powers, France
Speaker 2: and the UK, who have veto power in the UN
Speaker 2: Security Council. For example. So the plan to recognize Palestinian
Speaker 2: statehood has gotten a lot of press and attention, But
Speaker 2: the thing is, one hundred and forty five countries already
Speaker 2: recognize Palestine as a state. Palestine was given observer status
Speaker 2: at the UN in twenty twelve, and the Palestinian authority
Speaker 2: has been working for quite some time to get more
Speaker 2: recognition internationally and to be able to use the international
Speaker 2: legal system to advocate for themselves. So what does this
Speaker 2: recognition actually mean a state that is occupied entirely by
Speaker 2: another and is currently undergoing ethnic cleansing at different levels
Speaker 2: of severity in all parts of its territories. What state
Speaker 2: is actually being recognized here? What does statehood mean in
Speaker 2: the context of occupation ethnic cleansing. It might help to
Speaker 2: go back to the Osclocords that were as signed by
Speaker 2: the Palistine Liberation Organization the PLO, and the State of Israel.
Speaker 2: This was the first time that Israel and the Palestinians
Speaker 2: agreed to something directly. A stipulation of the OSCLO Accords
Speaker 2: was mutual recognition, meaning Israel would recognize that the PLO
Speaker 2: was the representative of the Palestinian people, and the PLO
Speaker 2: would recognize Israel's right to exist. This was later criticized
Speaker 2: as uneven by Palstdian negotiators such as Hannan Ashtroi, because
Speaker 2: the PLO was already internationally recognized as the representative of
Speaker 2: the Palestinian people. So her argument more recently has been
Speaker 2: they accepted Israel's control for getting recognition in return. The
Speaker 2: US ambassador to Israel at the time, Daniel Kurtzer, concurred
Speaker 2: with that assessment, saying to The New York Times that
Speaker 2: the OSCLO agreement was full of holes. The mutual recognition
Speaker 2: was asymmetrical, and that was to hurt the Palestinian negotiating
Speaker 2: position for years to come. End quote. Nevertheless, the OSCLO
Speaker 2: Accords of nineteen ninety three are widely understood to be
Speaker 2: the attempt to bring about a two state solution of
Speaker 2: some kind, and it's been the framework that many international
Speaker 2: powers have paid lip service to ever since. By the way,
Speaker 2: September twenty twenty three marked the thirty year anniversary of
Speaker 2: the accords, we all know what happened October seventh, just
Speaker 2: a few days later. The thing is, the also framework
Speaker 2: didn't say two states. The ASCO Accords just said that
Speaker 2: they would continue negotiations on some eventual final framework. Now
Speaker 2: Palestinians wanted a state, of course, and Israelis were committing
Speaker 2: to negotiations. So the Palestinians were told to start building
Speaker 2: up a sort of state, a quasi state, in parts
Speaker 2: of the occupied territories, to start governing themselves in particular ways,
Speaker 2: and this was called the Palestinian National Authority. I talked
Speaker 2: about this at more length than the episode for it
Speaker 2: could happen here titled Palestine's Stolen Future, so if you're interested,
Speaker 2: you can listen to that one. The Alco Accords split
Speaker 2: the occupied territories into three parts A, B, and C,
Speaker 2: all of which remained under the Israeli occupation's control, but
Speaker 2: still there were some differences between them. In Area A,
Speaker 2: which is less than twenty percent of the land, that's
Speaker 2: where a lot of the urban centers are, the palisten
Speaker 2: And Authority was allowed to function, build and run institutions
Speaker 2: of governance. So if you go to Romalo, for example,
Speaker 2: you'll see big buildings with palstin And Authority insignia. An
Speaker 2: Area B, the palsten And Authority had partial access, and
Speaker 2: an Area C, which is the majority of the territories.
Speaker 2: The Palsten Authority was and continues to not be allowed
Speaker 2: to function, But the PA did use this as an
Speaker 2: opportunity to create the basis of a state, creating ministries,
Speaker 2: beginning of parliament, writing laws, and importantly creating security forces.
Speaker 2: Throughout all this, Israel maintained military control over the entire territory,
Speaker 2: and Israeli settlements continued to expand. So what the Israeli
Speaker 2: has got out of the Also Accords was they got
Speaker 2: out of providing certain services and they let Palestinians do
Speaker 2: that for themselves, but they didn't actually seed meaningful control
Speaker 2: over any part of the territory. Now it's important to
Speaker 2: pause here. An occupying force is obligated under international law
Speaker 2: to provide services to the population it occupies and to
Speaker 2: return the land to the sovereign the occupied people as
Speaker 2: soon as possible as The European Society of International Law
Speaker 2: notes quote the nineteen oh seven Hague Regulations, the nineteen
Speaker 2: forty nine Fourth Geneva Convention, and modern Body of international
Speaker 2: Human rights instruments contain a number of provisions which protect
Speaker 2: the lives, property, natural resources, institutions, civil life, fundamental human
Speaker 2: rights and latent sovereignty of the people under occupation, while
Speaker 2: curbing the security powers of the occupying power to those
Speaker 2: genuinely required to safely administer the occupation end quote. And
Speaker 2: if the occupier occupies indefinitely, then it's not really an
Speaker 2: occupation anymore, is it Again? As the European Society of
Speaker 2: International Law notes, the concept of prolonged occupation may well
Speaker 2: become illegal guise that masks a de facto colonial exercise
Speaker 2: and defeats the transient and exceptional nature which occupations are
Speaker 2: intended to be. End quote. But that is exactly what
Speaker 2: has continued before and after the ascol Cords. The ASCO
Speaker 2: Accords never ended, the occupation never gave back land to Palestinians.
Speaker 2: Alla did is stripped the occupier of its responsibility under
Speaker 2: the guise of working towards a two state solution. And really,
Speaker 2: anybody who has looked at what has transpired honestly would
Speaker 2: say that there has always been a mismatch between what
Speaker 2: the Israelis wanted and we're willing to give and what
Speaker 2: the Palestinians wanted, even to the degree of what both
Speaker 2: sides meant when they said state has always been mismatched.
Speaker 2: So I'll explain what I mean. Palestinians have always wanted
Speaker 2: a legitimate state. What does that mean. Well, a state
Speaker 2: has sovereignty, It has control over its own territory, it
Speaker 2: has the monopoly on the use of violence within its boundaries.
Speaker 2: That's the most basic definition of state sovereignty. Israel never
Speaker 2: intended for any of that. Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin, who
Speaker 2: signed the Oscil Accords, in his final address to the
Speaker 2: Kanesset before he was assassinated by a right wing Israeli
Speaker 2: clearly stated that what was on offer for the Palestinians
Speaker 2: was something quote less than a state. Yitzak Rabin was
Speaker 2: in the Labor Party. But again, if people are being honest,
Speaker 2: this is a bipartisan position Israel. Israeli political leaders have
Speaker 2: at best offered something less than a state, and at
Speaker 2: worst offered surrender or annihilation. I'm not being hyperbolic here. Besides,
Speaker 2: Motrich of the Religious Zionist Party, who is now the
Speaker 2: Finance Minister, has for years actively promoted his quote decisive Plan,
Speaker 2: which has become the policy of the state today. The
Speaker 2: plan proposes that one any Palestinian who is willing and
Speaker 2: able to relinquish the fulfillment of his national aspirations would
Speaker 2: be able to stay and live as an individual in
Speaker 2: the Jewish State, not as a citizen. And two, any
Speaker 2: Palestinian who is unwilling or unable to relinquish his national
Speaker 2: aspirations will receive assistance from them to immigrate to one
Speaker 2: of the Arab countries. So essentially, what he's saying is
Speaker 2: Palestinians have to either give up and be a subject
Speaker 2: or leave, surrender, or transfer. The US as a supposed
Speaker 2: mediator and third party has not really straight from that.
Speaker 2: Sovereignty has always been approximated with self governance from the
Speaker 2: United States perspective. Jared Kushner, for example, in his Peace
Speaker 2: to Prosperity plan, which was the lynchpin of Donald Trump's
Speaker 2: Israel Palestine proposer back in the first Trump administration, invokes
Speaker 2: the idea of sovereignty, only to insist that it should
Speaker 2: no longer be the crux of negotiations. According to the
Speaker 2: Trump administration quote, the notion that sovereignty is a static
Speaker 2: and consistently defined term has been an unnecessary stumbling block
Speaker 2: in past negotiations, and this amorphous concept is best put
Speaker 2: aside to focus on pragmatic and operational concerns. Ironically, the
Speaker 2: liberal version of a two state solution espoused by every
Speaker 2: democratic administration essentially envisions the same endpoint, a Palestinian entity
Speaker 2: demilitarized and subordinate to Israel's economic and security concerns. But
Speaker 2: Palestinians want a state. They want a state in the
Speaker 2: full meaning of the term, and that state has to
Speaker 2: be legitimate, not only internationally, but in the eyes of
Speaker 2: the Palestinian people. Political scientist Tanya Alberts argues that sovereignty
Speaker 2: is an identity of states. It's constituted by the norms
Speaker 2: of international society. States are recognized as sovereign if they
Speaker 2: achieve self determination for a group of people. The fact that,
Speaker 2: on rare occasions, the international system has refused to recognize
Speaker 2: certain political entities as states, specifically because they had violated
Speaker 2: the right of self determination, highlights how we now think
Speaker 2: of political authority. So, for example, the international community did
Speaker 2: not recognize Rhodesia as a state because it violated the
Speaker 2: self determination of the black majority in that country, even
Speaker 2: though white people in Rhodesia did exercise material control over
Speaker 2: that country. In other words, the state's right to sovereignty
Speaker 2: must flow from some sort of legitimacy. A state rules
Speaker 2: because society approves. This doesn't mean that every sovereign state
Speaker 2: is democratic, but simply that states derive their status from
Speaker 2: the citizens buy in, and because the state claims to
Speaker 2: represent the will of maybe a certain ethnic or civic identity,
Speaker 2: it's understood as an executor of the law in act
Speaker 2: acted by the people who are sovereign. So sovereignty, then
Speaker 2: should also be understood as the ability of people who
Speaker 2: consider themselves of that place to exercise control over a
Speaker 2: territory and have a say in its future. Populist movements,
Speaker 2: secessionist movements, and other movements that challenge a certain state
Speaker 2: sometimes claim popular sovereignty, legitimizing their assertions with reference to
Speaker 2: their historical legacy or continuity or indigenity, even in the
Speaker 2: absence of a representative state, and Palestinians are one such group.
Speaker 2: They've struggled not merely for the right to exist, but
Speaker 2: also for political control in state institutions that represent and
Speaker 2: uphold their national identity. And the legitimacy of their sovereignty
Speaker 2: claim stems not only from their long ties to the territory,
Speaker 2: but also from the fact that they have long conceived
Speaker 2: themselves as a nation, a nation that has never ceded
Speaker 2: its demand for a sovereign state with the promise of subjugation,
Speaker 2: subsistence or integration into another state. So, to make this
Speaker 2: very clear, Palestinians want the state that is sovereign. They
Speaker 2: certainly don't mean self governance. And Palestinians, after thirty years
Speaker 2: of OSLO that has only left them worse off, certainly
Speaker 2: don't want to go back to trying the same process again.
Speaker 2: So when these countries recognize Palestine as a state as
Speaker 2: a way of pretending to pressure for the two state solution,
Speaker 2: they're not saying anything about what happens to the territories
Speaker 2: that are currently being wiped out, like literally all of
Speaker 2: Gaza and even parts of the West Bank. They're not
Speaker 2: saying anything about Israeli settlements, They're not saying anything about reparations.
Speaker 2: And because of that, some Palestinians have argued that these
Speaker 2: statehood recognition things are a cynical ploy to distract from
Speaker 2: the inaction of these countries on addressing the genocide in Gaza,
Speaker 2: basically pretending to act without actually doing any. Palestinian analyst
Speaker 2: Mahin Robani said this to NPR recently. Quote In the end,
Speaker 2: simply recognizing Palestinian statehood is a low cost option. It
Speaker 2: may placate a domestic audience demanding action, while doing very
Speaker 2: little to actually change the situation on the ground end quote.
Speaker 2: Others have argued even further that not only are these
Speaker 2: declarations of recognition a cynical ploy to distract, but they
Speaker 2: may even be a sort of trap. Legal expert and
Speaker 2: professor nuraa At and international lawyer and professor Shadhamuri wrote
Speaker 2: for Jidelia on this, which I'll link in the show notes.
Speaker 2: They argue effectively that the best thing to come out
Speaker 2: of this is a challenge maybe to the US. Quote.
Speaker 2: The greatest promise of this renewed statehood bid, the most
Speaker 2: recent push being in twenty eleven twenty twelve, is a
Speaker 2: united front to challenge US and transigent support for Israel
Speaker 2: end quote. However, they also point out that quote states
Speaker 2: do not need to recognize Palestine to end the occupation,
Speaker 2: to end the genocide and advance Palestinian self determination. They
Speaker 2: argue that states quote need decisive will to impose arms
Speaker 2: and energy embargoes and trade with and investment in Israel
Speaker 2: unseated from the un hold Israeli war criminals and complicit
Speaker 2: corporations accountable in their national courts, and arrest Prime Minister
Speaker 2: Benjamin Nataniehu in compliance with the ICC's arrest warrant end quote.
Speaker 2: So the bit for statehood doesn't solve problems. It only
Speaker 2: gives states the fig leaf to actually delay solving problems.
Speaker 2: On top of that, it risks empowering illegitimate and corrupt
Speaker 2: Palestinian leadership in any future negotiations. I'm talking a leadership
Speaker 2: that includes Palestinian President Mahmud Abbas, who eighty percent of
Speaker 2: Palestinian's poll said they want him to resign, and an
Speaker 2: institution like the Palestinian Authority that only fifteen percent of
Speaker 2: Palestinians are satisfied with according to the latest polling as
Speaker 2: at that hamurin note quote. The terms of the High
Speaker 2: Level International Conference for the Peaceful Settlement of the Question
Speaker 2: of Palestine, convened in New York, led by France and
Speaker 2: the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia confirm these risks. The Palestinian
Speaker 2: Authority is glorified in at least seven clauses entrusted with
Speaker 2: governing the state, effectively paving the way for a police
Speaker 2: state alongside a settler colonial entity end quote. None of
Speaker 2: the talk of recognizing Palestine amid all of these conditions
Speaker 2: and stipulations ever say anything about the power imbalance between
Speaker 2: the two parties or address the root causes of conflict. Now.
Speaker 2: On the other hand, political scientist Paul Post, writing for
Speaker 2: a World Politics Review, says, quote, recognition isn't just theater.
Speaker 2: Recognition is a long standing legal institution that has the
Speaker 2: important function of identifying major actors in the international system.
Speaker 2: And for policymakers, recognition is the looseness in the rules
Speaker 2: that allows them to use recognition not only to identify actors,
Speaker 2: but also to express opinions about them or to secure
Speaker 2: concessions from them. So, from his perspective, these declarations of
Speaker 2: recognition are meaningful in some shape or form. Here's my take,
Speaker 2: statehood recognition is not meaningless. In fact, it's probably dangerous
Speaker 2: in this current moment, because what it's trying to do
Speaker 2: is to cement the conflict in its place. These countries
Speaker 2: recognizing Palestine want to hurry the current Palestinian leadership into
Speaker 2: accepting a state and name only that is not sovereign.
Speaker 2: They want to force the Israelis to the table to
Speaker 2: do that, and they want these conditions to become the
Speaker 2: precedent for future negotiations. And we see signs of this
Speaker 2: in other ways. For example, the international community and regional
Speaker 2: powers pressured Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbass into changing the rules
Speaker 2: of the PLO's internal governance in order to appoint a
Speaker 2: successor because they were afraid he was going to keel over,
Speaker 2: and he appointed a very unpopular figure named senranchech As,
Speaker 2: I wrote for The Guardian alongside palestiniancially an activist Pablo
Speaker 2: of Abbufom in May of this year. Abbas also expanded
Speaker 2: the Central Council of the PLO and appointed friendly people
Speaker 2: to it. All of this shows that the international community,
Speaker 2: in pressuring the Pasteinian leadership in these directions, has no
Speaker 2: interest in democratic buy in, in actually getting the buy
Speaker 2: in of the Palestinian people, really thinking that a legitimate
Speaker 2: negotiation would ever be sustainable under these circumstances. This state
Speaker 2: of affairs, these schemes where international powers try to ignore
Speaker 2: what the Palestinian people want yet again, is the reason
Speaker 2: Palestinians don't really have any hope in any solution. In
Speaker 2: polling on Onesday Tuesday, et cetera. Forty seven percent prefer
Speaker 2: the two state solution based on the nineteen sixty seven borders,
Speaker 2: fifteen percent prefer confederation between the two states, and fourteen
Speaker 2: percent of Palestinians prefer the establishment of a single state
Speaker 2: with equality between the two sides. Twenty four percent of
Speaker 2: Palestinians polled said that they did not know or did
Speaker 2: not want to answer. Also, when asked about the public's
Speaker 2: support or opposition to specific political measures to break the
Speaker 2: current political deadlock, sixty eight percent of Palestinians supported joining
Speaker 2: more international organizations, but still fifty percent supported resorting to
Speaker 2: unarmed popular resistance. Forty six percent supported a return to
Speaker 2: armed Intafaldo, and forty two percent supported the dissolution of
Speaker 2: the Palestinian authority. Twenty six percent supported abandoning the two
Speaker 2: state solution and demanding one state for Palstinians and Israelis.
Speaker 2: What this sort of polling shows is that Palestinians now
Speaker 2: understand very clearly that the international system is screwing them over,
Speaker 2: international law hasn't been able to help them, and that
Speaker 2: the solutions for a two state solution being proposed with
Speaker 2: all of these conditions won't ever actually get to two
Speaker 2: states and won't give them real sovereignty. The mass protests
Speaker 2: and actions that took place in twenty twenty one Palestinian
Speaker 2: activists called this the Unity Uprising or Intafalda, showed that
Speaker 2: this has always been about sovereignty. In the Unity Intafalda
Speaker 2: of twenty twenty one, Palstinian activists spoke of a shared
Speaker 2: struggle against Israel's continued erasure of Palestinians. Palestinians living under
Speaker 2: Israeli rule across the country, whether they had citizenship or
Speaker 2: they didn't, rejected the old style of politics. They rejected
Speaker 2: what they saw as artificial fragmentation and they insisted instead
Speaker 2: on their national identity and shared struggle. As a result,
Speaker 2: at that time we witnessed an extraordinary amount of organizing
Speaker 2: across the Green line, so in the territories and in Israel,
Speaker 2: with Palestinian citizens of Israel, and it was a way
Speaker 2: of reclaiming Palestinian sovereignty. The same activists in groups involved
Speaker 2: in the Jerusalem neighborhood of Shechharrah linked up with those
Speaker 2: organizing in Heifa and Uml Fahm. They built on these
Speaker 2: connections to launch campaigns over and over in Masafietta, the
Speaker 2: Knockub and much more. Sovereignty has always been an animating
Speaker 2: demand for Palestinians since before October seventh, and that's surely
Speaker 2: on everyone's minds now that the war on Gaza has
Speaker 2: extended this long. So the takeaway here is recognition isn't
Speaker 2: the solution. Statehood may not even be the solution, at
Speaker 2: least not in the terms they're offering. Sovereignty has always
Speaker 2: been what the demand is, and these pushes for recognition
Speaker 2: miss that point yet again. That's it for me. Thank
Speaker 2: you for listening to another Palestine episode, and I'll be
Speaker 2: back with more soon. Take care.
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