1 00:00:04,200 --> 00:00:07,560 Speaker 1: Get in tests with technology with tech Stuff from stuff 2 00:00:07,560 --> 00:00:14,000 Speaker 1: works dot com. Hey there, and welcome to tech Stuff. 3 00:00:14,080 --> 00:00:17,360 Speaker 1: I am your host, Jonathan Strickland, and I am thinking 4 00:00:17,440 --> 00:00:20,959 Speaker 1: this amount of enthusiasm and energy because I've been in 5 00:00:21,040 --> 00:00:24,720 Speaker 1: the booth with Ben Boland for nearly two hours. Oh 6 00:00:24,960 --> 00:00:29,360 Speaker 1: what a time we're having, buddy. Yeah. We recorded this 7 00:00:29,520 --> 00:00:33,839 Speaker 1: epic episode about electronic voting machines and then talked about 8 00:00:34,040 --> 00:00:40,400 Speaker 1: confidence in political systems, which ties very closely in with 9 00:00:40,520 --> 00:00:42,919 Speaker 1: the topic of electronic voting machines. If you can't have 10 00:00:43,000 --> 00:00:46,320 Speaker 1: confidence in the outcome of an election, then really the 11 00:00:46,360 --> 00:00:49,560 Speaker 1: whole system starts to crumble. And we cast our votes 12 00:00:49,800 --> 00:00:53,000 Speaker 1: during this uh at the close of our conversation, we 13 00:00:53,120 --> 00:00:56,720 Speaker 1: cast our votes, and we decided democratically that this would 14 00:00:56,760 --> 00:00:59,480 Speaker 1: be better as a two part series than a single 15 00:01:00,080 --> 00:01:05,200 Speaker 1: bic length episode that would have stretched the patience of 16 00:01:05,240 --> 00:01:10,880 Speaker 1: the most uh most forgiving of listeners. Now we have 17 00:01:11,040 --> 00:01:12,880 Speaker 1: broken it up into two parts, so what you are 18 00:01:12,920 --> 00:01:16,520 Speaker 1: about to hear is the conclusion of that two parts. Also, 19 00:01:16,600 --> 00:01:18,200 Speaker 1: I should add that when we get to the end 20 00:01:18,400 --> 00:01:22,120 Speaker 1: and we sign off, we did not know at that 21 00:01:22,200 --> 00:01:23,800 Speaker 1: point that it was going to be a two parter, 22 00:01:24,120 --> 00:01:27,119 Speaker 1: so we actually have already recorded the end of the 23 00:01:27,160 --> 00:01:29,800 Speaker 1: episode that I'm recording the beginning of now, and yes, 24 00:01:29,880 --> 00:01:33,680 Speaker 1: time travel does confuse me. So let's just segue in 25 00:01:33,760 --> 00:01:36,520 Speaker 1: to part two of how electronic voting machines are going 26 00:01:36,560 --> 00:01:40,240 Speaker 1: to ruin everything. Remember we mentioned that in two thousand two, 27 00:01:40,240 --> 00:01:42,240 Speaker 1: that's when they started to appear on the scene. That's 28 00:01:42,240 --> 00:01:45,680 Speaker 1: when Georgia. Actually they started to appear before two thousand two, 29 00:01:45,720 --> 00:01:47,600 Speaker 1: but two thousand two is when Georgia became the first 30 00:01:47,640 --> 00:01:51,559 Speaker 1: state to have just the electronic voting machines out there 31 00:01:51,600 --> 00:01:56,120 Speaker 1: in the polling places. Um, many of those machines have 32 00:01:56,240 --> 00:01:59,120 Speaker 1: not been updated since, and almost all of them are 33 00:01:59,200 --> 00:02:02,440 Speaker 1: running on her vision of Windows XP, which hasn't been 34 00:02:02,520 --> 00:02:06,840 Speaker 1: updated since April two thousan fourteen. So that means any 35 00:02:06,920 --> 00:02:10,239 Speaker 1: security vulnerability that has been discovered since two thousand and 36 00:02:10,280 --> 00:02:13,720 Speaker 1: fourteen is still there. Chances are some of the ones 37 00:02:13,800 --> 00:02:16,799 Speaker 1: before two thousand fourteen are still there because I bet 38 00:02:16,800 --> 00:02:19,600 Speaker 1: a lot of those machines have never received a patch. 39 00:02:20,120 --> 00:02:23,760 Speaker 1: Right there, just these big, these machines that are being 40 00:02:23,800 --> 00:02:27,320 Speaker 1: overseen by the government, and uh, you know it, Chances 41 00:02:27,360 --> 00:02:29,960 Speaker 1: are a lot of them are unpatched. So there's a 42 00:02:29,960 --> 00:02:32,519 Speaker 1: lot of potential for people to tamper. And not only that, 43 00:02:33,160 --> 00:02:36,600 Speaker 1: you know, I mentioned the idea of either unconsciously or 44 00:02:36,600 --> 00:02:41,000 Speaker 1: purposefully inserting a bias. That's a real concern too, right, 45 00:02:41,040 --> 00:02:45,320 Speaker 1: because private companies are the ones designing these machines, they 46 00:02:45,360 --> 00:02:51,359 Speaker 1: do so with using proprietary software that is not visible 47 00:02:51,440 --> 00:02:56,000 Speaker 1: to the general public. Nor is it uh what's what's word, 48 00:02:56,040 --> 00:02:59,840 Speaker 1: nor is it in any way compelled to answer to 49 00:03:00,000 --> 00:03:03,560 Speaker 1: the general public, Like the public doesn't have a the 50 00:03:03,960 --> 00:03:09,280 Speaker 1: quote unquote capital p public doesn't have a vote regarding 51 00:03:09,400 --> 00:03:13,440 Speaker 1: which companies run these machines. You look at this and 52 00:03:13,960 --> 00:03:17,720 Speaker 1: you see that everyone says, well, we can't reveal our 53 00:03:17,760 --> 00:03:21,640 Speaker 1: code because if we did, uh, then our competitors would 54 00:03:21,639 --> 00:03:23,560 Speaker 1: see how we do things, and then we can't compete 55 00:03:23,560 --> 00:03:27,640 Speaker 1: in the marketplace anymore. And so meanwhile you've got security 56 00:03:27,639 --> 00:03:30,600 Speaker 1: experts saying this should all be open source. And the 57 00:03:30,639 --> 00:03:32,760 Speaker 1: reason it should be open source is so that the 58 00:03:32,800 --> 00:03:36,080 Speaker 1: community at large would have the opportunity to look at 59 00:03:36,080 --> 00:03:39,920 Speaker 1: the code and see if there are any vulnerabilities, and 60 00:03:39,960 --> 00:03:42,920 Speaker 1: if so, make sure that those get patched before you 61 00:03:42,920 --> 00:03:44,680 Speaker 1: get to a point where the code is being put 62 00:03:44,760 --> 00:03:49,559 Speaker 1: into play in an actual election. So that those vulnerabilities 63 00:03:49,600 --> 00:03:52,920 Speaker 1: can't be exploited because if something is proprietary and someone 64 00:03:52,960 --> 00:03:56,720 Speaker 1: figures out an exploit to that software, then it's all 65 00:03:56,720 --> 00:03:59,320 Speaker 1: behind closed doors. There's no way to address it, and 66 00:03:59,640 --> 00:04:03,040 Speaker 1: you up with a huge problem. But but beyond that, 67 00:04:03,800 --> 00:04:06,360 Speaker 1: you have companies that could insert a bias into the 68 00:04:06,400 --> 00:04:10,080 Speaker 1: programming itself. And this kind of stems from an interesting 69 00:04:10,080 --> 00:04:14,320 Speaker 1: story that happened in the early two thousand's. So two 70 00:04:14,360 --> 00:04:18,600 Speaker 1: thousand three, Walden Wally O'Dell and I'm not making up 71 00:04:18,640 --> 00:04:21,320 Speaker 1: the nickname Wally, that is what he would go by. 72 00:04:21,800 --> 00:04:26,719 Speaker 1: Wally O'Dell was at that time the CEO and chairman 73 00:04:26,839 --> 00:04:29,240 Speaker 1: of die Bald. Now di Bald is best known for 74 00:04:29,400 --> 00:04:34,080 Speaker 1: making a t M S. But Dival yeah, well, they 75 00:04:34,120 --> 00:04:37,800 Speaker 1: also for a while made electronic voting machines. There was 76 00:04:37,800 --> 00:04:41,600 Speaker 1: a subsidiary called Diebold Election Systems, which the company has 77 00:04:41,600 --> 00:04:46,080 Speaker 1: since divested itself of that particular property. But Diebold Election 78 00:04:46,120 --> 00:04:49,200 Speaker 1: Systems made a lot of electronic voting machines and die Bald, 79 00:04:49,200 --> 00:04:53,800 Speaker 1: by the way, is headquartered in Ohio, a very important 80 00:04:53,920 --> 00:04:58,880 Speaker 1: state in national elections here in the United States States. 81 00:04:59,600 --> 00:05:02,560 Speaker 1: It up swinging some meeting swing states for you know, 82 00:05:02,720 --> 00:05:05,000 Speaker 1: there's probably I've got some listeners who are outside the US. 83 00:05:05,080 --> 00:05:06,720 Speaker 1: You may have heard the term swing state, and you 84 00:05:06,760 --> 00:05:09,920 Speaker 1: don't know what that means. So the way elections work 85 00:05:09,960 --> 00:05:13,120 Speaker 1: in the US, you know, you've got your major two 86 00:05:13,160 --> 00:05:17,080 Speaker 1: party system, and nine percent of the time that's the 87 00:05:17,240 --> 00:05:19,839 Speaker 1: those are the only parties that really make an impact. 88 00:05:20,080 --> 00:05:22,840 Speaker 1: So you've got your Republicans and your Democrats, and you've 89 00:05:22,880 --> 00:05:25,920 Speaker 1: got a lot of states that that lean toward one 90 00:05:26,120 --> 00:05:28,920 Speaker 1: or the other, and it is almost unheard of for 91 00:05:29,000 --> 00:05:32,880 Speaker 1: them to support a candidate of the opposite party. Sure, 92 00:05:32,960 --> 00:05:37,040 Speaker 1: like uh for one example of this would be UH 93 00:05:37,040 --> 00:05:43,040 Speaker 1: state like Utah would be legendarily not voting Democratic, in 94 00:05:43,080 --> 00:05:47,240 Speaker 1: a state like Vermont would be legendarily not voting Republicans. Right, 95 00:05:47,240 --> 00:05:50,000 Speaker 1: So it would be an incredibly strange set of circumstances 96 00:05:50,000 --> 00:05:53,120 Speaker 1: to see one of these states support a candidate of 97 00:05:53,200 --> 00:05:56,359 Speaker 1: the opposite party that it tends to support. So for 98 00:05:56,400 --> 00:05:59,599 Speaker 1: the most part, we just assume those electors in the 99 00:05:59,600 --> 00:06:05,320 Speaker 1: elector oral College will support the traditional candidates that those 100 00:06:05,360 --> 00:06:08,640 Speaker 1: states would support. But there's some states that could go 101 00:06:09,520 --> 00:06:13,160 Speaker 1: either way. They could swing towards the Republican side one 102 00:06:13,200 --> 00:06:16,400 Speaker 1: election and swing towards the Democratic side and another Florida 103 00:06:16,760 --> 00:06:22,520 Speaker 1: Florida Pennsylvania. So the the electors in these states, uh, 104 00:06:22,560 --> 00:06:24,839 Speaker 1: it may be that they are the ones that are 105 00:06:24,920 --> 00:06:28,279 Speaker 1: chosen are the ones for Republican uh in one one 106 00:06:28,279 --> 00:06:32,000 Speaker 1: election our Democrat and another election. So Ohio is one 107 00:06:32,000 --> 00:06:34,760 Speaker 1: of those states, which means it's incredibly valuable, right. It 108 00:06:34,800 --> 00:06:37,680 Speaker 1: means it's a battleground state. You want to win that 109 00:06:37,800 --> 00:06:42,520 Speaker 1: state because you know you've got your your foundation that's 110 00:06:42,520 --> 00:06:47,320 Speaker 1: almost guaranteed. Nothing's ever a guarantee, but it's almost a guarantee. 111 00:06:48,000 --> 00:06:50,479 Speaker 1: And uh so you need to really concentrate on the 112 00:06:50,520 --> 00:06:53,200 Speaker 1: states where you have the potential to flip it so 113 00:06:53,320 --> 00:06:56,279 Speaker 1: it's on your side and not your opponents side. Well, 114 00:06:56,320 --> 00:06:59,479 Speaker 1: Ohio is one of those states. Die Bald has its 115 00:06:59,520 --> 00:07:04,520 Speaker 1: headquarters in Ohio, and Wally, the CEO of Diebold at 116 00:07:04,560 --> 00:07:10,720 Speaker 1: that time, wrote a letter where he was uh committing 117 00:07:10,800 --> 00:07:14,320 Speaker 1: himself to quote helping Ohio deliver its electoral votes to 118 00:07:14,360 --> 00:07:18,080 Speaker 1: the president end quote, president being George W. Bush at 119 00:07:18,120 --> 00:07:24,600 Speaker 1: that time Sook, the CEO of a company that makes 120 00:07:24,720 --> 00:07:28,280 Speaker 1: voting machine saying he's committed to delivering Ohio's electoral votes 121 00:07:28,320 --> 00:07:31,920 Speaker 1: to the president. Now, the company was quick to say, hey, 122 00:07:32,160 --> 00:07:37,000 Speaker 1: he's not talking about using our products to push the 123 00:07:37,040 --> 00:07:41,800 Speaker 1: elections personal fundraiser donor right, he's talking about campaigning. And 124 00:07:42,000 --> 00:07:43,960 Speaker 1: but a lot of people said, hey, isn't there a 125 00:07:44,000 --> 00:07:47,280 Speaker 1: conflict of interests if you've got the head of a 126 00:07:47,320 --> 00:07:51,960 Speaker 1: company making the voting technology that people depend upon also 127 00:07:52,200 --> 00:07:57,040 Speaker 1: openly supporting a specific candidate in the race. It's very 128 00:07:57,080 --> 00:08:01,080 Speaker 1: It's very close to a member of the Supreme Court 129 00:08:01,520 --> 00:08:04,640 Speaker 1: saying like, I will do anything I can to get 130 00:08:04,640 --> 00:08:09,200 Speaker 1: you elected, George, and then and then saying, oh, fiddle 131 00:08:09,280 --> 00:08:12,160 Speaker 1: D D. We don't have time to recount the votes 132 00:08:12,200 --> 00:08:15,240 Speaker 1: from Florida. We look, there's some things that are more 133 00:08:15,280 --> 00:08:18,600 Speaker 1: important than making absolutely certain that the people's vote was 134 00:08:19,240 --> 00:08:25,080 Speaker 1: reflected in the actual election. Like reasons. I just like 135 00:08:25,160 --> 00:08:27,360 Speaker 1: saying fiddle D D. But I don't think the Supremes 136 00:08:27,400 --> 00:08:32,440 Speaker 1: say that, But you're raised. I referred to them as 137 00:08:33,760 --> 00:08:37,559 Speaker 1: I like that John robertson the Supremes. So many wonderful 138 00:08:37,679 --> 00:08:40,719 Speaker 1: visions going through my head right now. Oh man, you 139 00:08:40,760 --> 00:08:43,200 Speaker 1: should have seen the comedy show we did with that 140 00:08:43,360 --> 00:08:47,400 Speaker 1: with that sketch presently well, but anyway that at that 141 00:08:47,440 --> 00:08:50,800 Speaker 1: point inside, like what you're saying is really important here 142 00:08:50,880 --> 00:08:54,280 Speaker 1: because let's assume if we were to take Wally at 143 00:08:54,320 --> 00:09:00,800 Speaker 1: his word, then even with that, a PR firm would 144 00:09:00,800 --> 00:09:04,760 Speaker 1: say the optics look bad. So when you when you 145 00:09:04,840 --> 00:09:08,080 Speaker 1: make those sorts of statements, you have to be very conscious, 146 00:09:08,559 --> 00:09:11,600 Speaker 1: conscious of what is going to happen. This is, uh, 147 00:09:11,679 --> 00:09:15,040 Speaker 1: this is an environment wherein let's see what year was this, 148 00:09:15,080 --> 00:09:17,240 Speaker 1: two thousand three, right, two thousand three was when you 149 00:09:17,280 --> 00:09:19,920 Speaker 1: wrote the letter. Thousand four was the election. So people 150 00:09:19,920 --> 00:09:24,520 Speaker 1: are already very sore off of the two thousand election, 151 00:09:24,960 --> 00:09:29,360 Speaker 1: and we have seen an accelerating distrust in the American 152 00:09:29,400 --> 00:09:35,600 Speaker 1: political system or sometime you know, and this this thing 153 00:09:35,760 --> 00:09:40,079 Speaker 1: is just making it, exacerbating it. And I think in 154 00:09:40,200 --> 00:09:41,960 Speaker 1: one of the Wired pieces I read it might have 155 00:09:42,040 --> 00:09:45,079 Speaker 1: even been the one you just referenced. Uh there, the 156 00:09:45,160 --> 00:09:47,960 Speaker 1: author of the piece made a really great point, which 157 00:09:48,000 --> 00:09:52,000 Speaker 1: was that you don't need any case of tampering or bias. 158 00:09:52,160 --> 00:09:56,320 Speaker 1: It doesn't have to exist, but the possibility of it 159 00:09:56,720 --> 00:10:00,640 Speaker 1: of it existing is enough to cause turmoil. Right, you 160 00:10:00,640 --> 00:10:04,800 Speaker 1: can cause real world turmoil just from the possibility of 161 00:10:04,800 --> 00:10:08,840 Speaker 1: this being a thing without any evidence of it actually happening. 162 00:10:09,000 --> 00:10:12,400 Speaker 1: So you don't need to have evidence of someone purposefully 163 00:10:12,480 --> 00:10:14,680 Speaker 1: trying to rig the system in order for people to 164 00:10:14,800 --> 00:10:18,240 Speaker 1: not trust the system. As long as it's clear that 165 00:10:18,440 --> 00:10:21,720 Speaker 1: it's a possibility. That's enough to have people say like, well, 166 00:10:21,760 --> 00:10:24,400 Speaker 1: how can I trust anything? How can I trust the results? 167 00:10:24,480 --> 00:10:27,680 Speaker 1: Because you know you're telling me there's no evidence, But 168 00:10:27,720 --> 00:10:31,440 Speaker 1: how do I know there's no evidence? I know it's possible. Twice, 169 00:10:32,120 --> 00:10:36,160 Speaker 1: you can't get fooled agein Yeah, thanks, it's a that's 170 00:10:36,200 --> 00:10:37,920 Speaker 1: a that's a great quote that I'm not gonna make 171 00:10:37,960 --> 00:10:40,040 Speaker 1: any fun of. All right, So then we've got the 172 00:10:40,160 --> 00:10:42,679 Speaker 1: fear of hackers. We've got the fear of bias from 173 00:10:42,760 --> 00:10:46,679 Speaker 1: the standpoint of the manufacturers of the voting machines themselves, 174 00:10:46,880 --> 00:10:48,880 Speaker 1: and then we got the fear of hackers third parties 175 00:10:48,920 --> 00:10:52,600 Speaker 1: that want to rig the results or prevent people from voting. 176 00:10:52,880 --> 00:10:59,360 Speaker 1: Completely possible, absolutely, completely possible, because again, these systems are 177 00:10:59,360 --> 00:11:02,599 Speaker 1: not terribly cure. Um. Now you've got a couple of 178 00:11:02,600 --> 00:11:05,400 Speaker 1: different arguments about this. Right, You've got people who support 179 00:11:05,480 --> 00:11:10,640 Speaker 1: d r s and they say, listen, hacking trying to 180 00:11:10,720 --> 00:11:14,079 Speaker 1: trying to affect politics on a national level here in 181 00:11:14,080 --> 00:11:18,439 Speaker 1: the United States is a fool's errand for multiple reasons, 182 00:11:18,440 --> 00:11:21,160 Speaker 1: and a big one is that we have so many 183 00:11:21,200 --> 00:11:25,439 Speaker 1: different types of electronic voting machines out there, and they 184 00:11:25,480 --> 00:11:28,559 Speaker 1: are proprietary. They don't all work on the same software, 185 00:11:28,960 --> 00:11:32,680 Speaker 1: so you can't develop a universal approach to affect all 186 00:11:32,760 --> 00:11:36,080 Speaker 1: the machines. Now, if the entire United States, if all 187 00:11:36,120 --> 00:11:39,560 Speaker 1: of us use the exact same kind of machine across 188 00:11:39,640 --> 00:11:43,320 Speaker 1: all the states and the territories, then that could be 189 00:11:43,720 --> 00:11:47,880 Speaker 1: a potential vulnerability. If in fact they were also connected 190 00:11:47,920 --> 00:11:51,120 Speaker 1: to like the Internet, right, you would have an amazing 191 00:11:51,160 --> 00:11:53,640 Speaker 1: target because you think, well, if I developed the right 192 00:11:53,679 --> 00:11:56,760 Speaker 1: kind of software, I can affect every single vote cast 193 00:11:56,840 --> 00:11:59,280 Speaker 1: in the United States. But that's not the reality of 194 00:11:59,280 --> 00:12:02,120 Speaker 1: our situation. We have all these different types of machines, 195 00:12:02,360 --> 00:12:04,280 Speaker 1: some of which are connected to the Internet, some of 196 00:12:04,320 --> 00:12:08,400 Speaker 1: which aren't. You have running on different types of software, 197 00:12:08,440 --> 00:12:11,880 Speaker 1: so you cannot create that one size fits all approach 198 00:12:11,960 --> 00:12:14,400 Speaker 1: to affecting all of them. That being said, you could 199 00:12:14,400 --> 00:12:18,520 Speaker 1: still affect specific ones, like you could target specific regions 200 00:12:18,600 --> 00:12:23,080 Speaker 1: that you think are particularly important and and try to 201 00:12:23,160 --> 00:12:28,200 Speaker 1: affect voting that way. But in fact, critics say that 202 00:12:28,760 --> 00:12:32,760 Speaker 1: because the return on investment is so high, it's an 203 00:12:32,800 --> 00:12:36,360 Speaker 1: incredibly tempting target for hackers. Like you might say, yeah, 204 00:12:36,400 --> 00:12:38,880 Speaker 1: it's a lot of work, but look at the outcome. 205 00:12:38,960 --> 00:12:42,439 Speaker 1: The outcome is the effect of a national election. It's 206 00:12:42,440 --> 00:12:45,240 Speaker 1: it's harder to have a bigger set of stakes than that. 207 00:12:46,240 --> 00:12:50,360 Speaker 1: So you can say like, yeah, it's hard, but the 208 00:12:50,360 --> 00:12:54,240 Speaker 1: the goal is so huge that justifies the hard work 209 00:12:54,559 --> 00:13:06,000 Speaker 1: on the part of the hackers. Here's the thing. Yeah, 210 00:13:06,440 --> 00:13:10,360 Speaker 1: you don't have to be like the Liam Neeson taken 211 00:13:10,559 --> 00:13:14,560 Speaker 1: level of hacker. You don't have to be anonymous or 212 00:13:15,080 --> 00:13:17,680 Speaker 1: you know, some faction set operations. You don't have to 213 00:13:17,679 --> 00:13:21,000 Speaker 1: have a particular set of skills. Yeah, exactly, And that 214 00:13:21,080 --> 00:13:23,760 Speaker 1: was that was not very bad. I've had a little 215 00:13:24,120 --> 00:13:27,960 Speaker 1: thing stuck in my teeth, that's all. But but yeah, 216 00:13:28,000 --> 00:13:33,680 Speaker 1: you you don't have to be some amazing savant hacker 217 00:13:34,760 --> 00:13:40,280 Speaker 1: with these crazy credentials and qualifications. You don't even have 218 00:13:40,360 --> 00:13:43,480 Speaker 1: to be states a state sponsored hacker, like a you 219 00:13:43,480 --> 00:13:48,160 Speaker 1: know from the Chinese military, right, No, you can if 220 00:13:48,160 --> 00:13:50,920 Speaker 1: you're talking about systems runing on Windows XP that haven't 221 00:13:50,920 --> 00:13:55,280 Speaker 1: been patched in two years at the very at best, 222 00:13:55,559 --> 00:13:57,880 Speaker 1: they haven't been patched in two years. At worst, it's 223 00:13:57,880 --> 00:14:01,360 Speaker 1: been much longer than that. Uh, And if there is 224 00:14:01,400 --> 00:14:04,240 Speaker 1: a way to access the machines, either over the Internet 225 00:14:04,360 --> 00:14:08,560 Speaker 1: or through physical contact with the machines. It's entirely possible 226 00:14:08,640 --> 00:14:12,880 Speaker 1: for someone to use code developed by somebody else and 227 00:14:12,920 --> 00:14:18,760 Speaker 1: infect that machine. So yeah, so the diminutive term for 228 00:14:18,920 --> 00:14:22,280 Speaker 1: these people, uh and my friend Shannon hates this term 229 00:14:22,360 --> 00:14:25,560 Speaker 1: would be script kitties. Script kitties meaning a type of 230 00:14:25,600 --> 00:14:30,440 Speaker 1: person who uh profits off of malicious code. But they 231 00:14:30,480 --> 00:14:33,520 Speaker 1: didn't develop the code themselves. They went to some place 232 00:14:34,280 --> 00:14:38,320 Speaker 1: that where that code is available. They either purchase the 233 00:14:38,360 --> 00:14:40,760 Speaker 1: code or they download the code for free, depending upon 234 00:14:40,800 --> 00:14:43,800 Speaker 1: the place that they're going to, and then they deploy 235 00:14:43,920 --> 00:14:47,400 Speaker 1: that code. And in some cases the code is pretty 236 00:14:47,440 --> 00:14:49,960 Speaker 1: much automated. It does everything for you. You just have 237 00:14:50,040 --> 00:14:51,520 Speaker 1: to be the one. You just have to be able 238 00:14:51,520 --> 00:14:55,200 Speaker 1: to deploy it somehow right, and you don't have to 239 00:14:55,240 --> 00:14:58,040 Speaker 1: have any knowledge of how it works. All you need 240 00:14:58,080 --> 00:15:00,080 Speaker 1: to do is just make sure the code gets the 241 00:15:00,120 --> 00:15:03,120 Speaker 1: machine that you wanted to get on in the right direction. Yeah. 242 00:15:03,120 --> 00:15:05,320 Speaker 1: So imagine that you've got a thumb drive with this 243 00:15:05,400 --> 00:15:07,800 Speaker 1: code and it's in a file, so it will auto 244 00:15:07,880 --> 00:15:11,040 Speaker 1: execute once it connects to a USB drive on a machine. 245 00:15:11,560 --> 00:15:13,800 Speaker 1: You come out to a voting machine that happens at 246 00:15:13,880 --> 00:15:16,800 Speaker 1: USB drive, which would be a terrible idea. I'm not 247 00:15:16,840 --> 00:15:19,560 Speaker 1: even suggesting that there are electronic voting machines that have 248 00:15:19,720 --> 00:15:22,320 Speaker 1: USB ports. I don't know if there are. If there are, 249 00:15:22,400 --> 00:15:25,480 Speaker 1: that's a terrible idea. You plug in the thumb drive 250 00:15:26,360 --> 00:15:29,480 Speaker 1: automatically executes runs the malicious code that has become part 251 00:15:29,520 --> 00:15:32,880 Speaker 1: of the voting machines programming from that point forward, and 252 00:15:32,920 --> 00:15:36,360 Speaker 1: you can no longer trust the results generates. Uh, that 253 00:15:36,520 --> 00:15:39,800 Speaker 1: is entirely possible, assuming that, again, you have some way 254 00:15:39,800 --> 00:15:43,600 Speaker 1: of of injecting the code into the machine. So if 255 00:15:43,640 --> 00:15:47,720 Speaker 1: you do have that possibility, that would be bad um. 256 00:15:48,680 --> 00:15:52,760 Speaker 1: And also you don't even necessarily have to set out 257 00:15:52,760 --> 00:15:55,360 Speaker 1: to change votes, right like that, that's the way we 258 00:15:55,400 --> 00:15:57,240 Speaker 1: mostly think of it. Like again, going back to the 259 00:15:57,240 --> 00:16:00,680 Speaker 1: Reagan Carter example, we would think, oh, well, they programmed 260 00:16:00,680 --> 00:16:02,640 Speaker 1: it so that it took that Reagan vote and flipped 261 00:16:02,640 --> 00:16:06,400 Speaker 1: it to Carter. You could also just try and overload 262 00:16:06,880 --> 00:16:09,920 Speaker 1: the voting machine so that no votes could be cast 263 00:16:09,960 --> 00:16:12,680 Speaker 1: on it at all. You can take it down. Yeah, 264 00:16:12,800 --> 00:16:15,600 Speaker 1: you're just taking down the machine you just wanted to 265 00:16:15,600 --> 00:16:19,440 Speaker 1: to crash and be unrecoverable. And then you you really 266 00:16:19,480 --> 00:16:23,120 Speaker 1: impact that the ability for people to cast votes. If 267 00:16:23,120 --> 00:16:26,600 Speaker 1: you do that in enough places that have very particular 268 00:16:27,960 --> 00:16:31,840 Speaker 1: political leanings, you can affect the outcome of an election 269 00:16:32,120 --> 00:16:35,080 Speaker 1: simply because the people who wanted to vote were physically 270 00:16:35,160 --> 00:16:38,920 Speaker 1: unable to do so. And unless you make special allowances 271 00:16:38,960 --> 00:16:44,200 Speaker 1: for that, then those those votes will never happen. Uh. 272 00:16:44,240 --> 00:16:48,480 Speaker 1: So that's kind of ugly too. Um. And also finally, 273 00:16:48,680 --> 00:16:51,600 Speaker 1: uh turns out a lot of the results are unencrypted, 274 00:16:51,720 --> 00:16:56,560 Speaker 1: which is crazy to me, Which is bizarre. Yeah, it 275 00:16:56,760 --> 00:17:00,280 Speaker 1: doesn't make any sense. Votes recorded in plain t next 276 00:17:00,480 --> 00:17:04,040 Speaker 1: in a file where you're not you haven't even encrypted 277 00:17:04,200 --> 00:17:08,879 Speaker 1: the results, so there's no protection there. Like if someone 278 00:17:08,960 --> 00:17:12,320 Speaker 1: does get access to that data somehow, no matter you know, 279 00:17:12,359 --> 00:17:17,080 Speaker 1: whatever methodology you might need, they can make changes. And 280 00:17:17,480 --> 00:17:21,720 Speaker 1: you know, this is not just theoretical. And the state 281 00:17:21,720 --> 00:17:24,600 Speaker 1: of Virginia de certified hundreds of wind vote e v 282 00:17:24,920 --> 00:17:28,760 Speaker 1: m s because they were insecure and according to the officials, 283 00:17:29,240 --> 00:17:33,879 Speaker 1: you could change the votes in these wind vote machines 284 00:17:34,520 --> 00:17:38,240 Speaker 1: undetected if you were anywhere within a half mile radius 285 00:17:38,240 --> 00:17:41,920 Speaker 1: of the machine, even if you weren't like a knowledgeable 286 00:17:41,920 --> 00:17:43,400 Speaker 1: hack like you don't want to have to get out 287 00:17:43,440 --> 00:17:51,080 Speaker 1: of the car it's like Pokemon Go, but for election. Yeah. Um, 288 00:17:51,119 --> 00:17:54,440 Speaker 1: that's crazy. Now. I should also add that according to 289 00:17:54,520 --> 00:17:57,080 Speaker 1: the Wired article where I've pulled that from, uh, they 290 00:17:57,119 --> 00:18:01,399 Speaker 1: never found any evidence that someone had tampered with the votes, 291 00:18:01,760 --> 00:18:04,160 Speaker 1: but they did discover that the vulnerability was there, which 292 00:18:04,160 --> 00:18:06,760 Speaker 1: meant that there was always the possibility someone could tamper 293 00:18:06,840 --> 00:18:09,960 Speaker 1: with the votes, which is why they were de certified. Um. Luckily, 294 00:18:10,480 --> 00:18:14,040 Speaker 1: at least according to the officials, it doesn't look like 295 00:18:14,080 --> 00:18:17,119 Speaker 1: anyone actually managed to do that or took the time 296 00:18:17,160 --> 00:18:21,360 Speaker 1: to do that, but that's that's a possibility that has 297 00:18:21,400 --> 00:18:24,680 Speaker 1: to be addressed, right um. And that kind of brings 298 00:18:24,720 --> 00:18:28,280 Speaker 1: us up to the hacking threat. So I don't know 299 00:18:28,320 --> 00:18:30,200 Speaker 1: if you guys have been paying attention here in the 300 00:18:30,240 --> 00:18:35,159 Speaker 1: United States. Earlier in hackers gained access to the Democratic 301 00:18:35,280 --> 00:18:38,320 Speaker 1: National Convention databases and they stole a whole bunch of 302 00:18:38,359 --> 00:18:42,080 Speaker 1: emails and files, more than twenty thousand of them, and 303 00:18:42,240 --> 00:18:44,600 Speaker 1: UH a lot of them were released by wiki leaks. 304 00:18:45,080 --> 00:18:47,399 Speaker 1: Around twenty thousand were released by wiki leaks, but that 305 00:18:47,480 --> 00:18:50,520 Speaker 1: doesn't mean that that's all of them. And there were 306 00:18:50,520 --> 00:18:53,040 Speaker 1: a lot of questions like who the heck hacked into 307 00:18:53,080 --> 00:18:56,600 Speaker 1: the d N C. Yeah, and we were pointing out 308 00:18:56,640 --> 00:19:01,640 Speaker 1: a specific country, and that country is Russia. Thank you, 309 00:19:01,960 --> 00:19:08,080 Speaker 1: but but it's okay, yeah, all right, Well, so here's 310 00:19:08,160 --> 00:19:11,560 Speaker 1: here's one of the things that makes this an interesting story. 311 00:19:11,680 --> 00:19:15,600 Speaker 1: And into some degree the reports of it remind me 312 00:19:15,760 --> 00:19:20,000 Speaker 1: a little bit of the famous Sony hack, right where 313 00:19:20,000 --> 00:19:23,960 Speaker 1: they talking about North Korea being and you and I 314 00:19:24,040 --> 00:19:27,600 Speaker 1: explored that together as well. So one of the big 315 00:19:27,680 --> 00:19:33,200 Speaker 1: questions is to what end, to what what value would 316 00:19:34,280 --> 00:19:40,960 Speaker 1: Russia's state sponsored hacking branch, which does exist, what what 317 00:19:41,080 --> 00:19:47,720 Speaker 1: value would it see in interfering on such a minimal 318 00:19:47,840 --> 00:19:50,919 Speaker 1: level at this point? Is this a buy in for blackmail? 319 00:19:51,240 --> 00:19:56,280 Speaker 1: Further down the line, is this to discredit something? Because 320 00:19:56,440 --> 00:20:03,640 Speaker 1: the d n C is a domestic facing organization, so 321 00:20:03,680 --> 00:20:07,720 Speaker 1: it's a lot, it's much more. Um, it's entirely different 322 00:20:07,760 --> 00:20:11,399 Speaker 1: animal in comparison to something like a State Department server 323 00:20:11,920 --> 00:20:14,760 Speaker 1: which would have stuff about Russia. Yeah, yeah, any of 324 00:20:14,800 --> 00:20:19,000 Speaker 1: those things like c I A are you know that 325 00:20:19,040 --> 00:20:21,399 Speaker 1: would be another or n s A right, like the 326 00:20:21,720 --> 00:20:23,840 Speaker 1: targets that you would think of if you wanted to 327 00:20:23,880 --> 00:20:27,159 Speaker 1: gather a lot of intelligence. Yeah, And so the issue 328 00:20:27,240 --> 00:20:29,960 Speaker 1: here initially, I I don't know about you. But initially 329 00:20:29,960 --> 00:20:33,200 Speaker 1: I was skeptical because I thought this, all this bear 330 00:20:33,280 --> 00:20:38,840 Speaker 1: poking that's going on now is not gonna it's not. Yeah, yeah, 331 00:20:38,880 --> 00:20:41,639 Speaker 1: it's not. It's not gonna it's not gonna pay off. 332 00:20:41,680 --> 00:20:46,040 Speaker 1: Because there is a reason that the Putin government has 333 00:20:46,040 --> 00:20:48,679 Speaker 1: been in power for as long as it has, and 334 00:20:48,760 --> 00:20:52,800 Speaker 1: it's it's because you know, this this government is seen. 335 00:20:52,840 --> 00:20:57,960 Speaker 1: American presidents come and go, and they have a maybe 336 00:20:58,000 --> 00:21:01,879 Speaker 1: a longer horizon politically sure when they contemplate these things. 337 00:21:02,440 --> 00:21:05,840 Speaker 1: So I it's strange to see what appears to be 338 00:21:05,880 --> 00:21:09,359 Speaker 1: harmless rhetoric trotted out against them. However, I had to 339 00:21:09,400 --> 00:21:14,400 Speaker 1: rethink my skepticism on this when more than one security 340 00:21:14,440 --> 00:21:19,320 Speaker 1: firm came out saying evidence indicates it's probably these guys. Yeah. 341 00:21:19,400 --> 00:21:24,840 Speaker 1: As it turns out, a security firm immediately, pretty much 342 00:21:25,359 --> 00:21:29,320 Speaker 1: shortly after the leak was was made public, said that 343 00:21:29,880 --> 00:21:34,000 Speaker 1: the signs were pointing towards a Russian actor. Um that 344 00:21:34,080 --> 00:21:38,280 Speaker 1: the methodologies and software used were the same that had 345 00:21:38,320 --> 00:21:42,399 Speaker 1: been employed by Russian state sponsored hacking groups in the past. 346 00:21:43,080 --> 00:21:46,040 Speaker 1: And uh, there are some folks who said, I don't 347 00:21:46,040 --> 00:21:47,840 Speaker 1: I'm you know, I don't think so. In fact, one 348 00:21:48,000 --> 00:21:53,919 Speaker 1: um jusipher two point Oh hacker came out and said, no, no, no, 349 00:21:54,080 --> 00:21:55,879 Speaker 1: it was me. I'm a lone wolf. I did it. 350 00:21:56,040 --> 00:21:58,320 Speaker 1: It wasn't. I was the one who stole all that 351 00:21:58,400 --> 00:22:01,879 Speaker 1: and gave it over to Wickilli and uh, although they 352 00:22:01,920 --> 00:22:04,840 Speaker 1: also claimed that he was Romanian or he or she 353 00:22:05,200 --> 00:22:08,119 Speaker 1: the hacker claimed that he or she was Romanian, but 354 00:22:08,200 --> 00:22:11,480 Speaker 1: then when people were trying to communicate with him or 355 00:22:11,520 --> 00:22:16,280 Speaker 1: her in Romanian, UH, the responses did not seem particularly coherent, 356 00:22:16,880 --> 00:22:19,040 Speaker 1: which seems to give the lie that they are in 357 00:22:19,080 --> 00:22:24,600 Speaker 1: fact Romanian. But other security firms ended up corroborating the 358 00:22:24,640 --> 00:22:27,719 Speaker 1: findings of the first one. They said, yeah, the the 359 00:22:27,760 --> 00:22:30,080 Speaker 1: exploits that were used, the malware that was used is 360 00:22:30,119 --> 00:22:33,000 Speaker 1: identical to the type of malware that has been used 361 00:22:33,000 --> 00:22:36,679 Speaker 1: by this Russian hacking group. It is exactly the m 362 00:22:36,680 --> 00:22:39,960 Speaker 1: O that we've seen in other cases, including a case 363 00:22:40,040 --> 00:22:47,160 Speaker 1: that involved the German parliament in so UH, either it's 364 00:22:47,680 --> 00:22:51,560 Speaker 1: again another Russian hacking group, or it's someone who learned 365 00:22:51,560 --> 00:22:54,800 Speaker 1: everything they know from a Russian hacking group because it 366 00:22:54,840 --> 00:22:59,480 Speaker 1: was identical in nature. So why would Russia want to interfere? 367 00:22:59,560 --> 00:23:02,479 Speaker 1: Interfere with the DNC? And I think the most distinct 368 00:23:02,480 --> 00:23:07,160 Speaker 1: way of putting that is that Pewton doesn't like Clinton. Huh. 369 00:23:07,680 --> 00:23:09,560 Speaker 1: Kind of kind of what it boils down to is 370 00:23:09,600 --> 00:23:15,240 Speaker 1: that Pewton uh and would not want Clinton and the 371 00:23:15,240 --> 00:23:19,840 Speaker 1: White House. Yeah. Also as an active secretary of State 372 00:23:19,960 --> 00:23:24,920 Speaker 1: at times when NATO and NATO and Russia as well 373 00:23:24,960 --> 00:23:30,800 Speaker 1: as its allies were engaged in geopolitical tensions that sparked 374 00:23:30,800 --> 00:23:34,680 Speaker 1: into Right now, there's an ongoing proxy war in Syria 375 00:23:35,359 --> 00:23:38,199 Speaker 1: and it's between Russia and between the US. No, of 376 00:23:38,200 --> 00:23:42,400 Speaker 1: course it's not being reported that way or marketed that way, 377 00:23:42,440 --> 00:23:47,840 Speaker 1: but unless you're reading any media outside of the US 378 00:23:47,960 --> 00:23:50,480 Speaker 1: or right, in which case everyone says Russia who backs 379 00:23:50,520 --> 00:23:53,959 Speaker 1: the Syrian government, and the US that backs the rebels, like, 380 00:23:54,560 --> 00:23:57,719 Speaker 1: and that goes across political spectrum. I'm glad you pointed 381 00:23:57,760 --> 00:24:01,679 Speaker 1: that out. So you know, a very very um historically 382 00:24:01,680 --> 00:24:07,480 Speaker 1: conservative papers of note in England, like like the magazine 383 00:24:07,520 --> 00:24:11,320 Speaker 1: The Economist or the much more liberal paper The Independent, 384 00:24:11,640 --> 00:24:14,960 Speaker 1: will both pretty much say what it is. It's just 385 00:24:15,080 --> 00:24:18,240 Speaker 1: we don't talk about it here on CNN. Uh. There 386 00:24:18,480 --> 00:24:21,560 Speaker 1: is there is an antagonistic thing, So I would say 387 00:24:21,600 --> 00:24:26,000 Speaker 1: there's probably resentment or concern about having a commander of 388 00:24:26,080 --> 00:24:30,879 Speaker 1: chief who knows all the state departments skeletons and including 389 00:24:30,920 --> 00:24:35,679 Speaker 1: the Russian ones. And then additionally, and there always has 390 00:24:35,720 --> 00:24:38,760 Speaker 1: to be a question when there's this level of nepotism 391 00:24:38,800 --> 00:24:41,760 Speaker 1: in American politics, where the because we had the son 392 00:24:41,800 --> 00:24:45,240 Speaker 1: of a former president become president somehow in a meritocracy, 393 00:24:45,560 --> 00:24:49,359 Speaker 1: and then multiple right right, multiple times, and then having 394 00:24:49,400 --> 00:24:54,240 Speaker 1: them the spouse of a former president be in the 395 00:24:54,320 --> 00:24:57,080 Speaker 1: running for president. What's really crazy is if you ever 396 00:24:57,080 --> 00:24:59,480 Speaker 1: see a family tree of all the presidents and see 397 00:24:59,480 --> 00:25:03,000 Speaker 1: how much except for that one, there's like one guy. Yeah, 398 00:25:03,040 --> 00:25:06,399 Speaker 1: but everyone is pretty much everyone else's cousin at at most. 399 00:25:07,119 --> 00:25:10,520 Speaker 1: And there's an interesting mathematical aspect to that because if 400 00:25:10,560 --> 00:25:14,199 Speaker 1: you go for far enough out or the further you go, 401 00:25:14,320 --> 00:25:18,520 Speaker 1: the more people you're related to, Like I've probably you're 402 00:25:18,560 --> 00:25:22,880 Speaker 1: probably sixteen cousins with someone that would completely it would 403 00:25:22,880 --> 00:25:26,520 Speaker 1: completely baffle you. Yeah, and so that I mean, that's true, 404 00:25:26,560 --> 00:25:30,320 Speaker 1: but I could see that it. I could see the 405 00:25:30,400 --> 00:25:38,880 Speaker 1: Russian government having that kind of concern. But also funding wise, uh, 406 00:25:39,000 --> 00:25:42,000 Speaker 1: funding wise, and infrastructural wise, they're pretty strapped for cash 407 00:25:42,160 --> 00:25:48,280 Speaker 1: right now and strapped for manpower as well. So it's 408 00:25:48,320 --> 00:25:50,920 Speaker 1: a question of how well equipped they are as well 409 00:25:50,960 --> 00:25:54,240 Speaker 1: as how motivated they are. And and let's also point 410 00:25:54,280 --> 00:25:56,760 Speaker 1: out that hacking the d n C is different than 411 00:25:56,800 --> 00:26:00,040 Speaker 1: hacking an election, because, like I said earlier, with the 412 00:26:00,080 --> 00:26:03,000 Speaker 1: electronic voting machines, you have all these different targets, with 413 00:26:03,000 --> 00:26:05,879 Speaker 1: all these different softwares, Whereas hacking the d n C 414 00:26:06,680 --> 00:26:10,320 Speaker 1: means focusing on a single target, not looking at a 415 00:26:10,359 --> 00:26:15,040 Speaker 1: bunch of different targets across the United States. So that 416 00:26:15,320 --> 00:26:18,520 Speaker 1: requires less of an investment. I mean, it's still, you know, 417 00:26:18,600 --> 00:26:22,440 Speaker 1: obviously requires a great deal deal of work in order 418 00:26:22,520 --> 00:26:27,040 Speaker 1: to find to create a vulnerability or to exploit a vulnerability, 419 00:26:27,240 --> 00:26:29,560 Speaker 1: But it's different than having to target a whole bunch 420 00:26:29,560 --> 00:26:31,760 Speaker 1: of different machines. But it has raised the question A 421 00:26:31,760 --> 00:26:34,880 Speaker 1: lot of people have asked, well, if they hacked the DNC, 422 00:26:35,480 --> 00:26:41,560 Speaker 1: could Russia also interfere with the actual election of six uh? 423 00:26:41,160 --> 00:26:44,080 Speaker 1: And and Wired's Brian Barrett, who wrote one of the 424 00:26:44,160 --> 00:26:47,680 Speaker 1: articles I read for this episode, specifically says he does 425 00:26:47,720 --> 00:26:51,760 Speaker 1: not think so, UH, mostly because if in fact Russia 426 00:26:51,840 --> 00:26:54,879 Speaker 1: wanted to interfere with the election, it would not have 427 00:26:55,040 --> 00:27:00,399 Speaker 1: also targeted the DNC database and hacked UH into it 428 00:27:00,440 --> 00:27:05,280 Speaker 1: because once everyone finds out about that, then you are 429 00:27:05,320 --> 00:27:10,000 Speaker 1: on high alert for the election. Uh. And so if 430 00:27:10,040 --> 00:27:12,240 Speaker 1: you wanted to hack the election, you would not want 431 00:27:12,240 --> 00:27:15,879 Speaker 1: people to know that you were capable of doing something 432 00:27:15,920 --> 00:27:19,400 Speaker 1: on that scale before you did it. You don't want 433 00:27:19,400 --> 00:27:21,680 Speaker 1: to You don't don't monologue in front of James Bond 434 00:27:21,720 --> 00:27:25,399 Speaker 1: before you push the button exactly exactly. And it's not 435 00:27:25,560 --> 00:27:28,720 Speaker 1: their first time at the geopolitical rodeo. So they've done 436 00:27:28,760 --> 00:27:31,800 Speaker 1: this if. Yeah, they're they're old hands at UH. And 437 00:27:31,920 --> 00:27:34,240 Speaker 1: as as is the United States. I'm not giving the 438 00:27:34,359 --> 00:27:39,440 Speaker 1: US a Passah, We've got any major player in geopolitics. 439 00:27:39,600 --> 00:27:42,679 Speaker 1: There's some dark stuff going on, which in regimes the 440 00:27:42,720 --> 00:27:46,480 Speaker 1: way that people named Chad change cargo pants. Right, So 441 00:27:48,480 --> 00:27:52,119 Speaker 1: probably Russia is not gonna be UH involved. And plus 442 00:27:52,400 --> 00:27:55,600 Speaker 1: again it would it would require a much broader attack 443 00:27:56,760 --> 00:27:59,240 Speaker 1: that would require multiple strategies and where for you to 444 00:27:59,240 --> 00:28:03,240 Speaker 1: play it out. So but the fact that the possibility 445 00:28:03,240 --> 00:28:08,400 Speaker 1: has been raised again creates uncertainty among the US public 446 00:28:08,600 --> 00:28:13,920 Speaker 1: and that alone is enough to cause uh a lack 447 00:28:13,960 --> 00:28:17,560 Speaker 1: of confidence and results. Right, we've already seen I mean 448 00:28:18,080 --> 00:28:20,879 Speaker 1: Trump has even said, like I expect there's gonna be 449 00:28:20,920 --> 00:28:23,679 Speaker 1: a lot of tampering involved in this uh in this 450 00:28:23,800 --> 00:28:27,720 Speaker 1: election already bringing into question the results which haven't happened yet. 451 00:28:28,440 --> 00:28:31,240 Speaker 1: It's like he's it's like he's already said, we can't 452 00:28:31,320 --> 00:28:34,680 Speaker 1: trust what the results will say, and we haven't even 453 00:28:34,680 --> 00:28:42,160 Speaker 1: gone into the voting booths. So what do we think? 454 00:28:42,160 --> 00:28:46,560 Speaker 1: How do we wrap this all? Uh? Well, first we 455 00:28:46,560 --> 00:28:49,960 Speaker 1: should remember that while in Georgia it's hard, it's easy 456 00:28:50,040 --> 00:28:53,880 Speaker 1: for us to forget we're in the minority. Not everyone 457 00:28:54,040 --> 00:28:56,800 Speaker 1: is using an electronic voting machine to cast their vote. 458 00:28:56,840 --> 00:29:01,640 Speaker 1: In fact, according to uh Um Pamela Smith of Verified Voting, 459 00:29:02,040 --> 00:29:05,120 Speaker 1: about the nation will vote on some form of paper 460 00:29:05,160 --> 00:29:08,480 Speaker 1: ballot in the two thousand and sixteen election, only us 461 00:29:08,560 --> 00:29:12,880 Speaker 1: using other methods. So there's not some maniacal corporate super 462 00:29:13,000 --> 00:29:18,040 Speaker 1: villain who's out to rig the election across the nation 463 00:29:18,280 --> 00:29:22,440 Speaker 1: for the Clinton campaign, the Trump campaign, or Gary Busey. 464 00:29:22,880 --> 00:29:25,880 Speaker 1: Right right, Gary Busey can try and infect as many 465 00:29:25,880 --> 00:29:28,560 Speaker 1: computers as he wants, but, as it turns out, unless 466 00:29:28,600 --> 00:29:32,080 Speaker 1: he's figured out away to replace all the choices on 467 00:29:32,120 --> 00:29:34,920 Speaker 1: the paper ballot with Gary Busey, which would be amazing. 468 00:29:36,240 --> 00:29:39,120 Speaker 1: I kind of want to see an official ballot that just, 469 00:29:39,160 --> 00:29:43,000 Speaker 1: says Gary Busey, as all the different options like including 470 00:29:43,080 --> 00:29:48,240 Speaker 1: including the resolutions that are exactly unless he's able to 471 00:29:48,280 --> 00:29:51,000 Speaker 1: do that, then it's not going to have that big 472 00:29:51,040 --> 00:29:53,920 Speaker 1: of a scale of impact. So so this is also 473 00:29:54,680 --> 00:29:58,400 Speaker 1: some of that fear, uncertainty and doubt right Like, on 474 00:29:58,440 --> 00:30:01,200 Speaker 1: the one hand, yes, these just thems are not as 475 00:30:01,240 --> 00:30:04,400 Speaker 1: secure as they should be. They aren't encrypting data, which 476 00:30:04,440 --> 00:30:07,720 Speaker 1: they should be, or at least not all of them are. Um, 477 00:30:07,880 --> 00:30:11,480 Speaker 1: they not all of them have paper trails. Even the 478 00:30:11,520 --> 00:30:14,000 Speaker 1: ones that do have paper trails may not the state 479 00:30:14,280 --> 00:30:18,080 Speaker 1: may not require a post election audit, which they absolutely 480 00:30:18,320 --> 00:30:21,720 Speaker 1: lee should. Also, the paper trails may not be voter verifiable, 481 00:30:21,760 --> 00:30:25,560 Speaker 1: which they absolutely should be. So that we can be well, 482 00:30:25,560 --> 00:30:28,800 Speaker 1: so that we can have confidence that the results announced 483 00:30:28,960 --> 00:30:33,240 Speaker 1: are in fact reflective of the actual choices that people made, 484 00:30:33,720 --> 00:30:38,160 Speaker 1: whether it's in favor of your candidate or against your candidate. 485 00:30:38,560 --> 00:30:42,440 Speaker 1: You want to know that the results that happened we're 486 00:30:42,440 --> 00:30:47,160 Speaker 1: real and not reflective of someone else's machea Vellian plan 487 00:30:47,880 --> 00:30:50,960 Speaker 1: to put put a specific person in power, or specific 488 00:30:50,960 --> 00:30:54,640 Speaker 1: group in power, or specific set of laws into play. 489 00:30:54,840 --> 00:30:57,880 Speaker 1: You want to feel like the process works and in 490 00:30:58,000 --> 00:31:00,640 Speaker 1: order to do that, you need this verifiable voter trail, 491 00:31:00,720 --> 00:31:03,240 Speaker 1: You need to have these post election audits, and not 492 00:31:03,320 --> 00:31:09,959 Speaker 1: everywhere has that ability or option. So now that's one thing. Um. 493 00:31:10,000 --> 00:31:16,280 Speaker 1: Another thing to remember is that, uh, it's hard to 494 00:31:16,360 --> 00:31:19,880 Speaker 1: get these systems up to date and at that level 495 00:31:19,920 --> 00:31:23,640 Speaker 1: where we could be confident in their results because again, 496 00:31:23,680 --> 00:31:29,840 Speaker 1: it costs money, and it's politically difficult to convince groups 497 00:31:29,880 --> 00:31:34,880 Speaker 1: to spend that money, specifically to upgrade election equipment. Keeping 498 00:31:34,920 --> 00:31:36,880 Speaker 1: in mind that this is stuff that's used only a 499 00:31:36,880 --> 00:31:40,080 Speaker 1: couple of times a year at most, right, Like you 500 00:31:40,160 --> 00:31:42,280 Speaker 1: might have to if you are very active in your 501 00:31:42,280 --> 00:31:44,880 Speaker 1: local community, you may be voting maybe a couple of 502 00:31:44,920 --> 00:31:48,840 Speaker 1: times per year, depending upon how things are run in 503 00:31:48,880 --> 00:31:52,920 Speaker 1: your area. Uh, some people only come out to vote 504 00:31:52,920 --> 00:31:55,160 Speaker 1: for the presidential elections. They don't vote for any of 505 00:31:55,200 --> 00:31:58,160 Speaker 1: the other ones. And so it's hard to justify, like 506 00:31:58,280 --> 00:32:02,520 Speaker 1: you're gonna spend X billion dollars this year for equipment 507 00:32:02,520 --> 00:32:04,440 Speaker 1: that you're gonna be able to use maybe in two 508 00:32:04,480 --> 00:32:08,440 Speaker 1: elections before you need to like to general elections, before 509 00:32:08,480 --> 00:32:11,000 Speaker 1: you need to upgrade the equipment. Again, and there's that 510 00:32:11,080 --> 00:32:16,160 Speaker 1: great argument about open sourcing. Yes, the software exactly, so 511 00:32:16,400 --> 00:32:22,160 Speaker 1: I mean, I think I would love to see more transparency, 512 00:32:22,400 --> 00:32:25,400 Speaker 1: both on that open source approach, so people can make 513 00:32:25,440 --> 00:32:29,960 Speaker 1: sure there's no inherent bias in the code, again, conscious 514 00:32:30,160 --> 00:32:33,440 Speaker 1: or not, because there are times where people can insert 515 00:32:33,480 --> 00:32:35,880 Speaker 1: of by us without even thinking they are right like that, 516 00:32:35,880 --> 00:32:38,400 Speaker 1: that just happens because we're human. You don't have to 517 00:32:38,440 --> 00:32:41,040 Speaker 1: be making a conscious decision to be a jerk to 518 00:32:41,200 --> 00:32:44,360 Speaker 1: create bias. Yeah, and there's also there's also a perception 519 00:32:44,440 --> 00:32:48,520 Speaker 1: problem that comes out post event, which is, you know, 520 00:32:48,680 --> 00:32:53,720 Speaker 1: humans are intensely tribalistic. Yeah, it's we're not particularly fact 521 00:32:53,800 --> 00:32:58,480 Speaker 1: based creatures, unfortunately, and because we were, we evolved to 522 00:32:58,560 --> 00:33:04,240 Speaker 1: live off of per options. So what what inevitably happens 523 00:33:04,960 --> 00:33:07,120 Speaker 1: is no matter what side of the political aisle you 524 00:33:07,200 --> 00:33:11,880 Speaker 1: find yourself kicking it on the people who feel that 525 00:33:11,920 --> 00:33:15,080 Speaker 1: their candidate has one or when a candidate wins, the 526 00:33:15,120 --> 00:33:20,520 Speaker 1: supporters will say, the system works. These people who object 527 00:33:20,600 --> 00:33:25,280 Speaker 1: to my candidate are just total Yeah, just sour grapes, 528 00:33:25,400 --> 00:33:29,160 Speaker 1: these nincompoops. They don't understand. And of course I would 529 00:33:29,160 --> 00:33:35,200 Speaker 1: be I would be a dignified, a dignified dissenting voice 530 00:33:35,680 --> 00:33:39,000 Speaker 1: if I, you know, if I didn't pick the obviously 531 00:33:39,040 --> 00:33:41,840 Speaker 1: the best candidate, which if the other candidate had one, 532 00:33:41,920 --> 00:33:44,160 Speaker 1: which they didn't, but if they had, then I would 533 00:33:44,160 --> 00:33:47,840 Speaker 1: have been a gracious loser. However, in the alternative, in 534 00:33:47,880 --> 00:33:51,040 Speaker 1: the alternative university, schrod Injur's cat this for a second, 535 00:33:51,680 --> 00:33:55,239 Speaker 1: what what would happen if the same people lost? They 536 00:33:55,240 --> 00:34:01,000 Speaker 1: would say, well, the systems was rigged from the beginning. 537 00:34:01,080 --> 00:34:03,720 Speaker 1: It was rigged because the media. The media reported things 538 00:34:03,760 --> 00:34:07,880 Speaker 1: in such a way as to minimize the the opponents 539 00:34:08,280 --> 00:34:12,880 Speaker 1: flaws and maximize my candidates flaws which didn't even really exist. 540 00:34:12,880 --> 00:34:16,680 Speaker 1: They manufactured flaws and then they maximize them and etcetera, etcetera. 541 00:34:17,080 --> 00:34:19,120 Speaker 1: And this this is like a natural sort of thing 542 00:34:19,160 --> 00:34:21,760 Speaker 1: that happens. We're not trying to vilify anyone in particular 543 00:34:21,920 --> 00:34:24,520 Speaker 1: or any political party, to be honest, We've already seen 544 00:34:24,560 --> 00:34:27,399 Speaker 1: it here in the US this year, just through the primaries. 545 00:34:27,920 --> 00:34:32,440 Speaker 1: Primaries happened. You saw people who were like progressives, who 546 00:34:32,440 --> 00:34:39,439 Speaker 1: were supporting Bernie Sanders refusing to believe that Clinton had 547 00:34:39,480 --> 00:34:43,960 Speaker 1: won the primary. Um now there's another, uh, there's another 548 00:34:43,960 --> 00:34:48,360 Speaker 1: wali Adell situation there. However, Yes, where you had the 549 00:34:48,360 --> 00:34:53,920 Speaker 1: the chairwoman of the Democratic Convention who in some of 550 00:34:53,960 --> 00:34:59,239 Speaker 1: those leaked messages that Wiki Leaks released. Uh, it was 551 00:34:59,280 --> 00:35:04,080 Speaker 1: clear that she was favoring She she personally favored Clinton 552 00:35:04,120 --> 00:35:08,960 Speaker 1: over Sanders. Whether that actually ever had any effect beyond 553 00:35:09,080 --> 00:35:13,160 Speaker 1: her personal beliefs is less clear. In fact, the evidence 554 00:35:13,200 --> 00:35:18,160 Speaker 1: doesn't really support that there was like a a concentrated 555 00:35:18,200 --> 00:35:22,440 Speaker 1: effort to diminish Sanders to a point where he would 556 00:35:22,800 --> 00:35:25,960 Speaker 1: be he would not be allowed to be a candidate. Um. 557 00:35:26,000 --> 00:35:27,959 Speaker 1: That doesn't mean that it didn't happen. It just means 558 00:35:27,960 --> 00:35:30,400 Speaker 1: that there wasn't like a smoking gun from that Wiki 559 00:35:30,480 --> 00:35:33,880 Speaker 1: Leaks release. Yeah. But again, just like a PR company 560 00:35:33,920 --> 00:35:37,360 Speaker 1: would say, Debbie Wasserman Schultz, who was the head of 561 00:35:37,400 --> 00:35:39,680 Speaker 1: that who was the head of the convention at the time, 562 00:35:40,080 --> 00:35:45,319 Speaker 1: did right and vociferously supported uh, the Clinton campaign. So 563 00:35:45,560 --> 00:35:50,160 Speaker 1: whether or not there was any um shenaniganry. Yeah, I 564 00:35:50,680 --> 00:35:53,799 Speaker 1: just barely stumbled through that word. Whether or not there was, 565 00:35:54,960 --> 00:35:58,120 Speaker 1: The fact of the matter is that it it increases 566 00:35:58,480 --> 00:36:02,319 Speaker 1: uh distrust and you're an uncertainty you said earlier, Right, 567 00:36:02,360 --> 00:36:06,240 Speaker 1: so you get this lack of confidence in the system. Uh. 568 00:36:06,280 --> 00:36:08,239 Speaker 1: And obviously that's not the direction we want to move in. 569 00:36:08,320 --> 00:36:11,200 Speaker 1: We want to move in a direction where everyone is 570 00:36:11,520 --> 00:36:15,000 Speaker 1: at least confident that their voices being heard. It may 571 00:36:15,040 --> 00:36:18,160 Speaker 1: turn out that their voice does isn't powerful enough to 572 00:36:18,239 --> 00:36:22,000 Speaker 1: make the change they want, which is frustrating obviously, but 573 00:36:22,160 --> 00:36:24,800 Speaker 1: less so than feeling like you are being ignored or 574 00:36:24,880 --> 00:36:29,239 Speaker 1: purposefully silenced. Right, you don't want that at all. But 575 00:36:29,440 --> 00:36:34,080 Speaker 1: so is the direct democracy really an answer, because if 576 00:36:34,120 --> 00:36:38,480 Speaker 1: we define direct democracy as well, let's see, for example, 577 00:36:39,400 --> 00:36:44,880 Speaker 1: one of the best arguments against direct democracy, anyone with 578 00:36:45,000 --> 00:36:48,640 Speaker 1: anyone within internet connection can go on there and say 579 00:36:48,680 --> 00:36:51,239 Speaker 1: whatever they want. And now we're starting to see the 580 00:36:51,280 --> 00:36:56,520 Speaker 1: priorities of a massive people without some kind of structure 581 00:36:56,760 --> 00:37:01,680 Speaker 1: to their interaction. Well, uh I, I'm really in favor 582 00:37:01,920 --> 00:37:05,880 Speaker 1: of um approaching this from a plurality standpoint, where at 583 00:37:05,960 --> 00:37:09,600 Speaker 1: least in most areas of government, where you make sure 584 00:37:10,560 --> 00:37:15,080 Speaker 1: that the representatives of government reflect the levels of support 585 00:37:15,440 --> 00:37:18,440 Speaker 1: in the general population. So instead instead of it being 586 00:37:18,520 --> 00:37:24,680 Speaker 1: like every single position is determined by a majority, if 587 00:37:24,719 --> 00:37:27,200 Speaker 1: you have a plurality, then you say, all right, well, 588 00:37:27,360 --> 00:37:31,680 Speaker 1: x percentage of Congress must be made up of this 589 00:37:31,760 --> 00:37:37,520 Speaker 1: party because that reflects the the American voters. And then 590 00:37:37,520 --> 00:37:40,720 Speaker 1: this why percentage must be of this other party because 591 00:37:40,760 --> 00:37:44,200 Speaker 1: that represents and then these independents also won this amount, 592 00:37:44,239 --> 00:37:46,399 Speaker 1: so they should take up these seats. But that would 593 00:37:46,400 --> 00:37:48,960 Speaker 1: be a totally different approach to government than the way 594 00:37:48,960 --> 00:37:52,279 Speaker 1: the United States is structured. They could get complicated. Yeah 595 00:37:52,320 --> 00:37:56,800 Speaker 1: we go who from where? From what? This is already complicated. 596 00:37:56,600 --> 00:37:59,439 Speaker 1: Could plug some stuff real quick. Absolutely all right. So, 597 00:38:00,880 --> 00:38:02,680 Speaker 1: first off, thank you so much for having me on, 598 00:38:02,760 --> 00:38:06,040 Speaker 1: and ladies and gentlemen, uh of the jury, I almost 599 00:38:06,040 --> 00:38:09,600 Speaker 1: said of the podcast jury, thank you so thank you 600 00:38:09,640 --> 00:38:13,279 Speaker 1: so much for checking out this episode. If you're interested 601 00:38:13,480 --> 00:38:16,759 Speaker 1: in this. In this process, um, Jonathan and I have 602 00:38:17,000 --> 00:38:22,080 Speaker 1: looked at some other some other tech related conspiracy theories, 603 00:38:22,120 --> 00:38:27,240 Speaker 1: including that Sony hack, and you've been on several episodes together. 604 00:38:27,560 --> 00:38:30,239 Speaker 1: So you can find all of those in either one 605 00:38:30,280 --> 00:38:36,480 Speaker 1: of our various internet uh presences. There are videos or 606 00:38:36,520 --> 00:38:40,560 Speaker 1: a podcasts or you know, sometimes the mad scribblings on 607 00:38:40,600 --> 00:38:45,360 Speaker 1: a blog somewhere, yes, yes, uh, the whispers of the 608 00:38:45,400 --> 00:38:49,000 Speaker 1: whispers of a a person passing you buy on a 609 00:38:49,080 --> 00:38:52,160 Speaker 1: moonless night at the crossroads. Occasionally you'll just be in 610 00:38:52,200 --> 00:38:55,400 Speaker 1: the woods and you'll hear the sound of a baby laughing, 611 00:38:55,440 --> 00:38:58,720 Speaker 1: and if you listen very carefully, just before the blair 612 00:38:58,760 --> 00:39:05,200 Speaker 1: Witch gets you will here at any rate, right, yes, Uh, 613 00:39:05,239 --> 00:39:08,759 Speaker 1: that's uh, that's how we met. So there's another There 614 00:39:08,760 --> 00:39:10,480 Speaker 1: are another couple of things that I think would be 615 00:39:10,560 --> 00:39:12,719 Speaker 1: worth your time to check out if you're interested in 616 00:39:12,800 --> 00:39:16,239 Speaker 1: this subject that's specifically applied to uh, the U S. 617 00:39:16,320 --> 00:39:19,680 Speaker 1: Voting system and stuff. They want you to know. Has 618 00:39:19,680 --> 00:39:21,959 Speaker 1: a couple of videos about this. We have one about 619 00:39:21,960 --> 00:39:24,880 Speaker 1: the Federal Election Commission, one that's a grab bag of 620 00:39:24,880 --> 00:39:28,600 Speaker 1: political conspiracies for sixteen and then one thing called five 621 00:39:28,640 --> 00:39:31,920 Speaker 1: things you should Know about primary elections. So do check 622 00:39:31,960 --> 00:39:34,600 Speaker 1: those out. They are free on the internet. Well, I 623 00:39:34,600 --> 00:39:36,640 Speaker 1: mean are free, you know, assuming that you have an 624 00:39:36,680 --> 00:39:40,320 Speaker 1: Internet connection, right, Yeah, the content is free. The manner 625 00:39:40,440 --> 00:39:45,080 Speaker 1: of transmission may be uh somewhat less, so depending on 626 00:39:45,120 --> 00:39:47,319 Speaker 1: whether or not you're at the local library. And I 627 00:39:47,360 --> 00:39:51,080 Speaker 1: wonder this is maybe a forward thinking question that you know. 628 00:39:51,160 --> 00:39:54,720 Speaker 1: Jonathan has another show called Forward Thinking because the Future 629 00:39:54,760 --> 00:39:56,359 Speaker 1: of voting. So go ahead and hit me. Yeah, it's 630 00:39:56,360 --> 00:39:59,920 Speaker 1: a future Uh, it's a future facing show about the 631 00:40:00,040 --> 00:40:04,200 Speaker 1: volution of tech. Did you did you touch on anything 632 00:40:04,200 --> 00:40:09,600 Speaker 1: about machine consciousness or artificial intelligence and voting a couple 633 00:40:09,600 --> 00:40:12,200 Speaker 1: of times? Actually we did an episode specifically about what 634 00:40:12,239 --> 00:40:14,400 Speaker 1: it would be like to have a robot as president? 635 00:40:14,440 --> 00:40:16,640 Speaker 1: Would you ever want a future where a robot could 636 00:40:16,680 --> 00:40:19,480 Speaker 1: be president? Uh? The idea being that if you had 637 00:40:19,640 --> 00:40:24,480 Speaker 1: a truly impartial, artificially intelligent creature that would be able 638 00:40:24,520 --> 00:40:29,000 Speaker 1: to make choices that are the greatest benefit and the 639 00:40:29,080 --> 00:40:33,520 Speaker 1: least detriment to the population. Would you want to do that? 640 00:40:33,719 --> 00:40:36,719 Speaker 1: Or do you think humanity is absolutely essential in order 641 00:40:36,760 --> 00:40:39,080 Speaker 1: for you to have a leader? We did an episode 642 00:40:39,080 --> 00:40:41,840 Speaker 1: about that. We also did an episode about the future 643 00:40:41,880 --> 00:40:45,279 Speaker 1: of voting and some of the pitfalls, including things like 644 00:40:45,320 --> 00:40:49,080 Speaker 1: machine intelligence, uh in the future. That one was not 645 00:40:49,160 --> 00:40:52,239 Speaker 1: too long ago that that published, probably was about a 646 00:40:52,320 --> 00:40:55,799 Speaker 1: month or two ago maybe, So, Yeah, we've got some 647 00:40:55,840 --> 00:41:00,680 Speaker 1: stuff that we've talked about. I personally think that there 648 00:41:00,680 --> 00:41:04,160 Speaker 1: are a lot of problems we need to solve in 649 00:41:04,200 --> 00:41:08,760 Speaker 1: the immediate future that uh, some of which would would 650 00:41:08,800 --> 00:41:12,960 Speaker 1: avoid the machine learning artificial intelligence question for quite some 651 00:41:13,000 --> 00:41:16,000 Speaker 1: time because, um, like there there have been people who 652 00:41:16,040 --> 00:41:18,439 Speaker 1: have asked, well, what about the possibility of voting via 653 00:41:18,480 --> 00:41:22,000 Speaker 1: the internet? The idea being that if you could vote 654 00:41:22,040 --> 00:41:26,759 Speaker 1: via in an internet, you could drive up voter participation dramatically. 655 00:41:26,800 --> 00:41:32,200 Speaker 1: You've the more you reduce the investment required to participate, 656 00:41:33,040 --> 00:41:36,520 Speaker 1: the more people will participate. That's the idea, right, So 657 00:41:36,880 --> 00:41:38,960 Speaker 1: if you make it less of a chore to vote, 658 00:41:39,040 --> 00:41:41,600 Speaker 1: more people will vote because that that's one of those 659 00:41:41,640 --> 00:41:44,640 Speaker 1: ongoing narratives in the United States, right, that's such a small, 660 00:41:44,920 --> 00:41:48,440 Speaker 1: relatively small percentage of our population actually participates in the process, 661 00:41:49,120 --> 00:41:52,760 Speaker 1: particularly if it's not a presidential election, then those numbers 662 00:41:52,760 --> 00:41:55,439 Speaker 1: plumb it. Yeah, I think though, I think that people 663 00:41:55,640 --> 00:41:57,919 Speaker 1: should I know this is controversial, but I think people 664 00:41:57,920 --> 00:42:00,719 Speaker 1: should be required to vote. I think should be part 665 00:42:00,840 --> 00:42:04,480 Speaker 1: of the stuff you have to do, and there's not 666 00:42:05,480 --> 00:42:08,240 Speaker 1: there's not very much stuff you have to do. Uh, 667 00:42:08,280 --> 00:42:12,240 Speaker 1: if you were born here to be a citizen's service, 668 00:42:12,280 --> 00:42:15,680 Speaker 1: there's actually way more stuff that you aren't supposed to do. 669 00:42:16,440 --> 00:42:19,680 Speaker 1: There's a much bigger list of do not. But I 670 00:42:20,040 --> 00:42:24,880 Speaker 1: think it's While it's controversial, it's a good system to 671 00:42:24,960 --> 00:42:29,719 Speaker 1: consider because then we will see all of the people who, 672 00:42:29,800 --> 00:42:31,839 Speaker 1: for one reason or another, we're not able to get 673 00:42:31,840 --> 00:42:34,640 Speaker 1: time off to vote. We're not able to get which 674 00:42:34,640 --> 00:42:37,480 Speaker 1: is which is, by the way, illegal. You are supposed 675 00:42:37,480 --> 00:42:39,480 Speaker 1: to be your employer is supposed to allow you the 676 00:42:39,480 --> 00:42:41,840 Speaker 1: time to vote. That's it's illegal. In theory, it's a 677 00:42:41,880 --> 00:42:45,799 Speaker 1: legal in theory and practice, it is much different, right. Yeah, 678 00:42:45,840 --> 00:42:48,279 Speaker 1: I mean again, just like we were talking about with 679 00:42:48,280 --> 00:42:51,520 Speaker 1: the electronic voting machines. Ideally it works one way, in 680 00:42:51,600 --> 00:42:54,719 Speaker 1: reality it may work a totally different way. There are 681 00:42:54,960 --> 00:42:58,319 Speaker 1: countries that have compulsory voting. Because often when you see 682 00:42:58,360 --> 00:43:00,759 Speaker 1: the United States the voting number is the percentage of 683 00:43:00,800 --> 00:43:04,560 Speaker 1: people participating, it'll be compared against other nations and say, look, 684 00:43:04,600 --> 00:43:07,440 Speaker 1: how terrible the US turnout is compared to these countries. 685 00:43:07,480 --> 00:43:09,719 Speaker 1: And then you start looking like, yeah, but four of 686 00:43:09,719 --> 00:43:13,680 Speaker 1: those countries you listed require everyone to vote. So therefore, 687 00:43:13,800 --> 00:43:15,320 Speaker 1: first of all, that none of them are at a 688 00:43:16,120 --> 00:43:20,480 Speaker 1: so someone slacken. And secondly, that's not fair to to 689 00:43:20,719 --> 00:43:23,840 Speaker 1: hold up a country that doesn't have compulsory voting against 690 00:43:23,880 --> 00:43:27,160 Speaker 1: ones that do. Um. I don't know that I whoever 691 00:43:27,239 --> 00:43:29,640 Speaker 1: go with compulsory I kind of I kind of feel you, 692 00:43:29,880 --> 00:43:32,880 Speaker 1: I mean, I kind of I want I want to 693 00:43:32,920 --> 00:43:36,480 Speaker 1: see more people involved in it, whether it's but I 694 00:43:36,520 --> 00:43:41,920 Speaker 1: also don't know the reasons behind people not voting. Right, 695 00:43:42,000 --> 00:43:46,799 Speaker 1: If they're not voting because there is an uh A 696 00:43:46,920 --> 00:43:50,680 Speaker 1: hardship on them in order to participate in the system, 697 00:43:50,719 --> 00:43:53,000 Speaker 1: It's not like I can blame them, right, if there's 698 00:43:53,080 --> 00:43:56,319 Speaker 1: some form of hardship, whether it's economic or it's just 699 00:43:56,440 --> 00:43:58,239 Speaker 1: you know, practical, like how do I get to the 700 00:43:58,320 --> 00:44:02,080 Speaker 1: voting station, whatever it may be. I have a lot 701 00:44:02,160 --> 00:44:04,360 Speaker 1: of sympathy for those people. And I even have sympathy 702 00:44:04,360 --> 00:44:08,120 Speaker 1: for people who have lost confidence in the system and 703 00:44:08,160 --> 00:44:10,399 Speaker 1: the reason they don't vote is because they feel like 704 00:44:11,280 --> 00:44:14,960 Speaker 1: their vote doesn't really have um an impact. And I 705 00:44:16,600 --> 00:44:19,719 Speaker 1: can certainly see, especially based upon the rhetoric that you 706 00:44:19,760 --> 00:44:24,040 Speaker 1: tend to be subjected to in the election seasons, how 707 00:44:24,080 --> 00:44:28,000 Speaker 1: you can get disillusioned and sad, and therefore you're like, 708 00:44:28,040 --> 00:44:33,880 Speaker 1: I kind of just want to disappear until this is over. UM. 709 00:44:33,920 --> 00:44:38,360 Speaker 1: Although this every time there's an election, it's really important, 710 00:44:38,920 --> 00:44:42,000 Speaker 1: very very important, including at the local level, maybe especially 711 00:44:42,040 --> 00:44:44,799 Speaker 1: at the local level. UM. Here in the US, we 712 00:44:44,880 --> 00:44:48,080 Speaker 1: give a lot of attention to the presidential elections. Truth 713 00:44:48,120 --> 00:44:51,040 Speaker 1: to be known, your local elections are going to have 714 00:44:51,120 --> 00:44:53,479 Speaker 1: a much larger impact on your day to day life 715 00:44:53,480 --> 00:44:58,880 Speaker 1: than your national ones. UM. But obviously that's not the 716 00:44:58,880 --> 00:45:01,880 Speaker 1: big story. You're looking at. Who who's who's sitting on 717 00:45:01,960 --> 00:45:05,280 Speaker 1: the on the throne. I'm sorry in the oval office. 718 00:45:06,280 --> 00:45:08,120 Speaker 1: I'm a royalist, so I have a little bit of 719 00:45:08,160 --> 00:45:11,880 Speaker 1: a different view on things. Um, I'm not really a royalist. 720 00:45:12,960 --> 00:45:15,920 Speaker 1: So well that that was a great discussion about it. 721 00:45:15,920 --> 00:45:19,160 Speaker 1: Obviously we got a little philosophical and um, you know, 722 00:45:19,239 --> 00:45:24,000 Speaker 1: I don't want anyone to base their political opinion on 723 00:45:24,040 --> 00:45:26,160 Speaker 1: anything I say. I think it's very important for you 724 00:45:26,200 --> 00:45:28,880 Speaker 1: to form your own even if I fully disagree with it. 725 00:45:28,920 --> 00:45:32,360 Speaker 1: I respect the fact that you guys have a political opinion. 726 00:45:32,800 --> 00:45:36,280 Speaker 1: So I'm not trying to sway anyone to my side. Um, 727 00:45:36,320 --> 00:45:38,960 Speaker 1: which is good because your side is crazy. My side 728 00:45:39,120 --> 00:45:44,560 Speaker 1: votes Reagan. Uh in this election. Yeah, he's he's he's 729 00:45:44,560 --> 00:45:47,839 Speaker 1: passed on and yet I write it in. Also, by 730 00:45:47,880 --> 00:45:49,279 Speaker 1: the way, you may not be able to write in 731 00:45:50,200 --> 00:45:54,840 Speaker 1: a president presidential candidate. Not all states allow it. I 732 00:45:54,880 --> 00:45:57,560 Speaker 1: think it's like forty seven states allow it, so there's 733 00:45:57,600 --> 00:46:00,760 Speaker 1: like three that do not. Something like that probably happened 734 00:46:00,800 --> 00:46:03,479 Speaker 1: somebody was screwing around too much with what they thought 735 00:46:03,560 --> 00:46:05,799 Speaker 1: was a great bit, and they were like, guys, we 736 00:46:05,920 --> 00:46:11,960 Speaker 1: cannot make we cannot make the pink panther the state senator, 737 00:46:12,080 --> 00:46:15,200 Speaker 1: or build a cat, or build a cat. Bloom County 738 00:46:15,200 --> 00:46:18,520 Speaker 1: has run the presidential candidacy quite a few times. Right, yeah, 739 00:46:18,600 --> 00:46:22,040 Speaker 1: so uh, maybe it's just the joke gone wrong. But 740 00:46:22,120 --> 00:46:24,720 Speaker 1: if you're in one of the vast majority of states 741 00:46:24,760 --> 00:46:28,120 Speaker 1: and you want to write a vote in the civic 742 00:46:28,480 --> 00:46:32,640 Speaker 1: citeca right as a citizen of the United States, some 743 00:46:32,680 --> 00:46:37,080 Speaker 1: would argue your moral responsibility depends on your on your 744 00:46:37,400 --> 00:46:40,799 Speaker 1: perspective on the candidates, I suppose, But at any rate, 745 00:46:41,160 --> 00:46:43,239 Speaker 1: there you go. See. At any rate, that's how you 746 00:46:43,239 --> 00:46:45,880 Speaker 1: know it's me when you hear that voice in the woods. 747 00:46:46,840 --> 00:46:49,320 Speaker 1: Thank you again, Ben for being on the show. Guys, 748 00:46:49,400 --> 00:46:52,520 Speaker 1: if you have any questions or comments or suggestions for 749 00:46:52,600 --> 00:46:54,879 Speaker 1: future episodes, maybe a guest to have on the show, 750 00:46:54,920 --> 00:46:58,000 Speaker 1: anything like that, send me a message the email addresses 751 00:46:58,000 --> 00:47:01,000 Speaker 1: tech Stuff at how stuff works dot com, or drop 752 00:47:01,040 --> 00:47:02,880 Speaker 1: me a line on Facebook or Twitter to handle it. 753 00:47:02,960 --> 00:47:05,520 Speaker 1: Both of those is tech Stuff hs W and I 754 00:47:05,560 --> 00:47:14,799 Speaker 1: will talk to you again really soon for more on 755 00:47:14,880 --> 00:47:17,319 Speaker 1: this and thousands of other topics. Is it how stuff 756 00:47:17,360 --> 00:47:27,840 Speaker 1: Works dot com.