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Speaker 1: From UFOs to psychic powers and government conspiracies. History is

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Speaker 1: riddled with unexplained events. You can turn back now or

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Speaker 1: learn this stuff they don't want you to know. A

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Speaker 1: production of iHeartRadio.

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Speaker 2: Hello, welcome back to the show. My name is Matt,

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Speaker 2: my name is Noah.

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Speaker 3: They call me Ben. We are joined as always with

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Speaker 3: our super producer Andrew Trey Force Howard. Most importantly, you

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Speaker 3: are you. You are here. That makes this the stuff

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Speaker 3: they don't want you to know. Tonight, folks, we are

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Speaker 3: following up on a conversation we had in a recent

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Speaker 3: Strange News program. As we have been discussing, and perhaps

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Speaker 3: you have been discussing, attacks in the ongoing conflict between

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Speaker 3: Hisbola and Israel have escalated as we record. Guys, I'm

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Speaker 3: sure we all saw this. Did you hear that the

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Speaker 3: Israeli military recently breached airport signals in Beirut just over

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Speaker 3: the weekend?

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Speaker 4: Yeah, just just that you know the headline of it.

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Speaker 4: But I'm sure that has implications beyond what's occurring to me.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, And there was a whole other large missile attack

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Speaker 2: that took out several high ranking members as well as

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Speaker 2: high ranking members of other organizations. That Israel sees as

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Speaker 2: an enemy.

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Speaker 3: As well as civilians. Yeah, and we are recording. We'll

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Speaker 3: talk about this in listener mail and strange news, but

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Speaker 3: we are recording amid a crisis level chlorine gas disaster

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Speaker 3: here in the Atlanta metro area.

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Speaker 5: Is that what you'd call an airborne toxic event? Isn't

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Speaker 5: that what that is?

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Speaker 2: Sure? Yeah, Okay, the air is bad. It actually is

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Speaker 2: sour and weirdly enough, guys, last time we were recording,

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Speaker 2: there was a hurricane bearing down on us. Yeah, and

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Speaker 2: now there's like a statewide chemical fire.

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Speaker 3: Yes. Yeah, an ill wind blows and I have to

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Speaker 3: stop texting you guys that sentence in group chat, but

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Speaker 3: I keep doing it.

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Speaker 4: The ill winds definitely did blow. We'll get into some

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Speaker 4: of the specifics of that in a bit.

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Speaker 2: That's what I say just before freaking wind.

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Speaker 3: I love you man. The pattern here with the Middle East,

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Speaker 3: a lot of people in the West only learn about

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Speaker 3: it through headlines or social media. However, make no mistake,

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Speaker 3: there is a larger escalation. It has sparked fears of

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Speaker 3: a wider conflict, leading some members of the public to

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Speaker 3: wonder whether we are yet again on the precipice of

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Speaker 3: a third World war, which is technically a question that

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Speaker 3: is on our minds and maybe a question for another evening,

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Speaker 3: because tonight we're exploring something that a lot of our

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Speaker 3: fellow conspiracy realists contacted us about in the wake of

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Speaker 3: the pager and walkie talkie attacks? Can you remotely explode

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Speaker 3: a mobile device? Did you guys get people writing to

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Speaker 3: you about this?

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Speaker 5: Yeah?

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Speaker 4: Since we did the segment on Strange News, it's certainly

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Speaker 4: been on my mind and on the minds of a

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Speaker 4: lot of folks that I've just been talking with in general,

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Speaker 4: and we've certainly seen some listeners writing in about it.

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Speaker 4: I mean, I think a lot of the questions that

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Speaker 4: we posed during that segment are going to be answered today,

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Speaker 4: which was fascinating to me.

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Speaker 2: Sure the I think the biggest thing that we've all

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Speaker 2: seen is just people feeling hesitant about their own devices, right.

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Speaker 3: Mm hmmm, yes? Am I safe? Is it okay for

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Speaker 3: me to listen to this show on my phone?

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Speaker 4: Should I maybe not listen to podcasts with my phone

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Speaker 4: under my pillow?

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Speaker 3: And we kid we did, but also check your battery

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Speaker 3: before continuing. This is our cold open. Here are the

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Speaker 3: facts all right, what's the providence of Hesbela in Israel?

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Speaker 3: Maybe we catch up on this. We mentioned it a

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Speaker 3: little bit in our Strange News program. We talked about

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Speaker 3: earlier precedents, but we didn't really talk about Hesbela as

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Speaker 3: an entity. And I want to give credit where it's due. Matt.

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Speaker 3: You made the very important point that Western society considers

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Speaker 3: Hesbela a terrorist organization and Middle Eastern society does not,

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Speaker 3: except for one country.

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Speaker 4: I mean, most people in that part of the world

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Speaker 4: consider it a political a very powerful political party, right,

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Speaker 4: or like a political faction.

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Speaker 2: Oh yeah, And it finds its origins in the nineteen eighties.

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Speaker 2: And and hesbal in particular grew from a fairly large,

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Speaker 2: a sizable population of Chiite Muslims that were existing there

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Speaker 2: in what the nineteen forties in Lebanon.

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Speaker 3: Yeah. Yeah, Historians still do not agree on exactly when

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Speaker 3: his Beelah became a distinct entity, but like you said,

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Speaker 3: somewhere in the nineteen eighties, think nineteen eighty two to

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Speaker 3: nineteen eighty five. And this happens because back in November

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Speaker 3: of nineteen forty three, Lebanon gained its independence quote unquote,

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Speaker 3: regained its independence from French colonial forces, and those forces

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Speaker 3: withdrew from the country in nineteen forty six. Lebanon is

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Speaker 3: a diverse country. It is not monolithic, and there is

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Speaker 3: a large proportion, a little north of thirty percent of

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Speaker 3: the population that identify as Chiite Muslims, and Hesbola originates

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Speaker 3: from that population. Look, we always hear in these history textbooks,

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Speaker 3: these very short and pat sentences about independence, right, oh,

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Speaker 3: seventeen seventy six, and the US was great from then

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Speaker 3: on or whatever. The nineteen forty three independence of Lebanon

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Speaker 3: triggered chaos. A lot of people in the Chiai population

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Speaker 3: are impoverished, they're forcibly relocated. There's a civil war in

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Speaker 3: the nineteen seventies, which I guarantee you most people in

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Speaker 3: the US don't learn about in public school. And then

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Speaker 3: there's assassinations, disappearances. These are inarguably evil things. They radicalize people.

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Speaker 3: And then you know other stuff happened as well.

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Speaker 2: Oh for sure. Just thinking about some context, guys, in

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Speaker 2: nineteen forty three, when Lebanon gained its independence from France.

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Speaker 2: In nineteen thirty nine to nineteen forty that's when France,

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Speaker 2: like Paris, is under attack by the Nazis. That's when

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Speaker 2: basically all the French forces are being pulled back to

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Speaker 2: its own country. And that's one of the main reasons, well,

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Speaker 2: it's one of a series of reasons that Lebanon ends

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Speaker 2: up getting its independence, which is just interesting to me

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Speaker 2: thinking about those larger movements right when there are large

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Speaker 2: swaths of the land at war with each other, but

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Speaker 2: maybe with different factions, kind of what we're seeing right

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Speaker 2: now with Hesbela Hamas with stuff going on right now

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Speaker 2: in Ethiopia. Just all of these places all over the world,

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Speaker 2: and it ends up being some of the same main

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Speaker 2: players that actually have troops or a military presence in

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Speaker 2: various parts of the world, and then they have to

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Speaker 2: pull back to move somewhere else ooo.

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Speaker 3: And then Iran has a revolution because they don't care

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Speaker 3: for the despotic Western back and then there's the Iran

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Speaker 3: Iraq War, and then there's the invasion of Lebanon by

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Speaker 3: Israel in nineteen eighty two. This all lends further gas

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Speaker 3: to the fire, and I love what you're saying. Nothing

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Speaker 3: occurs in a vacuum. We do know that the formation

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Speaker 3: of Isbela was publicly announced in nineteen eighty five by

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Speaker 3: a guy named Shikh Subito Fali, and this guy became

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Speaker 3: the first secretary general of the organization. Hebela is a

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Speaker 3: proxy of Iran functionally, and it is birthed by chaos,

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Speaker 3: and it shares many of the same goals as the

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Speaker 3: theocracy that funds at arms it.

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Speaker 4: Right, the eradication of Israel being first and foremost among

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Speaker 4: those goals. So with that in mind, Iran Hesbela and

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Speaker 4: Hamas are often seen as kind of fingers on the

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Speaker 4: same hand, tentacles of the same great Cuthulhu asque kind

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Speaker 4: of creature.

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Speaker 5: They have tentacles.

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Speaker 4: But before we go on, I think it's really important

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Speaker 4: to make an important note here that folks living in Iran, Israel,

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Speaker 4: and Palestine and Lebanon, many of whom are ideologically politically unconnected.

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Speaker 5: To these struggles.

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Speaker 4: These are innocent civilians on the ground and all of

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Speaker 4: these places who have struggled innumerable horrors in the wake

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Speaker 4: of all of the the elephants fighting, you know, crushing

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Speaker 4: the grass and all of that. Ben, I got to

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Speaker 4: throw it to you, because I mean, I think you

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Speaker 4: wrote such a beautiful summation of the kind of empathy

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Speaker 4: that we should exercise in not feeling the need to.

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Speaker 5: Create some sort of false equivalency here.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, this is the reason we are so fun at parties.

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Speaker 3: We point out unpleasant truths whenever you hear a reporter,

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Speaker 3: a politician, or demagogue talking about these places that you

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Speaker 3: have never visited as the So everyone in there is

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Speaker 3: marching lockstep with some ideology or some attack or some

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Speaker 3: wackado idea. It's time to pause and take a breath.

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Speaker 3: We have to remember these people are people just like you.

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Speaker 3: They want peace, they want their kids to do better

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Speaker 3: than they did. You know, they want food, they want shelter,

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Speaker 3: they want water, they want a safe place to poop like.

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Speaker 3: Humans are not super complicated. Humans in general are good,

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Speaker 3: and nations and terrorist groups are composed of people, but

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Speaker 3: the decisions of those organizations often do not reflect the

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Speaker 3: desires of the people living under the rule or the

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Speaker 3: auspice of those organizations. And you nailed it. No, the

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Speaker 3: old proverb is true. When elephants make war, it is

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Speaker 3: the grass that suffers. The innocent people tragically bear the

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Speaker 3: consequences of decisions, attacks, conflicts, and wars far beyond their control.

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Speaker 3: Let's go to it. We talked about a lot off air.

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Speaker 3: But in October twenty twenty three, Hamas launched a devastating

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Speaker 3: attack on the nation of Israel.

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Speaker 2: Yes, and you've heard about that. That was in the news.

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Speaker 2: That was where there were many many Israeli hostages that

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Speaker 2: were taken at a music festival as well as other

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Speaker 2: places there in Israel, and it just sparked this thing

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Speaker 2: that has been happening now since that day, where there's

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Speaker 2: retaliation occurring endless.

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Speaker 5: I mean it's yeah, I don't.

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Speaker 2: Even know how many people actually died, but the number

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Speaker 2: of let's say, Palestinians who have lost their homes and

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Speaker 2: been killed, especially just civilians, you can read about those numbers.

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Speaker 2: You can read about just the devastation that this one

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Speaker 2: attack on that day in October, what it's wrought.

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Speaker 4: Well, speaking of not dralling false equivalencies, I mean, at

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Speaker 4: this point, the number of Palestinian dead far out weigh

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Speaker 4: the number of Israeli dead.

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Speaker 5: Yeah.

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Speaker 2: And Hesbela as an organization, saw that and made the

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Speaker 2: political move and you know, raised a flag and said, hey,

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Speaker 2: we are in solidarity with the Palestinians, and they began

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Speaker 2: firing on Israeli outposts where they were operating, where Hesbela

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Speaker 2: was operating, so it all kind of sparked in that moment. Yeah,

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Speaker 2: Which isn't to say that there wasn't a huge past

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Speaker 2: of fighting between all of these groups, right, especially with

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Speaker 2: Israeli forces in Hesbela and Hamas and you know all

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Speaker 2: over varying places on the globe.

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Speaker 3: Oh my gosh, the beefs are in the Bible, you

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Speaker 3: know what I mean, It goes back a little while.

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Speaker 3: This is an excellent summation. Hisbela joins with as you said,

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Speaker 3: solidarity with the Palestinians by attacking military outposts in the

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Speaker 3: Golden Height in Suba farms, which are both under Israeli occupation.

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Speaker 3: Since then, there have been cross border military exchanges. If

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Speaker 3: you want to put a tie on it, make it

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Speaker 3: sound okay for the UN cross border military exchanges. They

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Speaker 3: have displaced entire communities of innocent people. The buildings are

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Speaker 3: wrecked in these towns, they are bombed out. The land

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Speaker 3: has been sown with salt. You can't grow stuff there.

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Speaker 3: There are ninety six thousand people in Israel, one hundred

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Speaker 3: and eleven thousand in Lebanon at the very least that

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Speaker 3: are documented being forcibly displaced as a result, and in

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Speaker 3: February of this year, twenty twenty four's we record, the

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Speaker 3: then secretary General of Hesbola Hassan Zala, instructed old members

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Speaker 3: of the organization to use dedicated pagers in place of

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Speaker 3: cell phones. He believed the calm structure of Hesbluff was compromised,

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Speaker 3: and he was correct, just not the way he had hoped.

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Speaker 3: He is dead as of September twenty seventh. Real monkey

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Speaker 3: past finger curls.

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Speaker 2: Oh for sure, and just for a tiny bit of

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Speaker 2: I'm sorry to get more context here, guys, but just

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Speaker 2: for a tiny bit more. If you're looking at the map,

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Speaker 2: the reason why we're talking about those cross border conflicts,

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Speaker 2: it's because Elebanon is just to the north along the Mediterranean,

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Speaker 2: see the coast there to Israel. So when we're talking about,

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Speaker 2: you know, being able to fire weapons across a border,

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Speaker 2: that is what's occurring.

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Speaker 3: That's a very important point, agreed. It's much closer of

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Speaker 3: a border than people might imagine. If you're from say

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Speaker 3: the United States, right mm hm our God forbid Canada,

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Speaker 3: shout out to our Canucks in the crowd. But most

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Speaker 3: people have smaller countries than you, guys.

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Speaker 5: True.

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Speaker 4: So now With all of that context behind us, let's

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Speaker 4: get to the kind of inciting event surrounding today's discussion.

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Speaker 4: On September seventeenth, thousands of people were injured and at

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Speaker 4: least nine individuals killed in Lebanon and Syria around two

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Speaker 4: thirty pm local time, when thousands of pagers held by

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Speaker 4: Hasbela members exploded nearly simultaneously in their pockets, in their hands,

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Speaker 4: and their bags. We've seen a lot of descriptions of

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Speaker 4: injuries to people's faces and eyes because they were like

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Speaker 4: looking at the pager, as we know, a little screen

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Speaker 4: on it when a message comes through. Pretty devastating and

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Speaker 4: scary stuff that yields a whole lot of questions. The

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Speaker 4: first question that it raised is who is to blame?

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Speaker 4: And of course has blood. Lebanon looked at the most

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Speaker 4: obvious candidate, which would be Israel. Very next day, on

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Speaker 4: September eighteenth, hundreds of like two way radios walkie talking.

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Speaker 3: Walkie talkie is a silly name.

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Speaker 5: It is. It's a fun thing to say, though. It's

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Speaker 5: a fun thing to say.

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Speaker 4: It's I guess it means you can do walk and

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Speaker 4: talk with I don't see, I don't see how they're

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Speaker 4: any different than a cell phone though, but they were

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Speaker 4: a pretty cell phone, you know.

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Speaker 3: Two way radio is probably the more buttoned up.

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Speaker 4: Well, there's a really great album by the French kind

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Speaker 4: of chill wave band Air called Talkie Walkie, which I

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Speaker 4: think is fun flippity flippity doda of.

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Speaker 3: That they've got in our supply chain.

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Speaker 5: First, Oh dude, we're getting there.

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Speaker 4: But yeah, so we go from pagers, there's two kinds

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Speaker 4: of you know, old school, more low tech devices, to

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Speaker 4: walkie talkies that also exploded, also in use by members

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Speaker 4: of Hesbela across Lebanon and Syria. So between these two attacks,

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Speaker 4: we are now dealing with forty two deaths, possibly more

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Speaker 4: to come as people succumb to horrific injuries, you know,

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Speaker 4: as a result of maybe looking at those pages as

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Speaker 4: they exploded whole lean those walkie talkies to their faces.

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Speaker 4: Not instant death, but horrific burns, injuries that they may

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Speaker 4: never recover from. At least twelve of the dead were civilians, unrelated,

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Speaker 4: unconnected to the actual runnings, the actual operations of Hespola

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Speaker 4: that includes children.

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Speaker 2: Well, yeah, a lot of it had to do with

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Speaker 2: proximity to the exploding pager and whoever was carrying it

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Speaker 2: or just wherever it was laid down. Right, And we've

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Speaker 2: seen the video of a lot of these incidents, or

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Speaker 2: at least several of these incidents where the explosion occurs

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Speaker 2: in a very crowded place with a bunch of just

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Speaker 2: other people going about their day, let's say, getting groceries

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Speaker 2: or something, or at a market. A pretty horrifying way

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Speaker 2: to strike at an enemy.

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Speaker 5: Right.

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Speaker 3: Yes, this will be portrayed by supporters as a breakthrough

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Speaker 3: and targeted assassination, but it comes with heavy collateral damage.

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Speaker 3: Hebella vowed to an exact revenge. Iran has stayed largely

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Speaker 3: silent in the public sphere, which is interesting and disturbing.

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Speaker 3: But when Hesbelah declared it would pursue retaliation, it raised

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Speaker 3: very serious worries about a full scale war in the

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Speaker 3: Middle East, just like the war between Israel and Hamas

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Speaker 3: continues in Gaza. As we discussed in our weekly Strange

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Speaker 3: News program, one of the immediate questions we received from

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Speaker 3: many of our fellow conspiracy realist was this, Hey, guys,

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Speaker 3: could my phone, slash, pager, slash, iPad, slash etc.

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Speaker 5: Be next dude in the Strange News segment. I mean

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Speaker 5: that was the first question that I had.

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Speaker 4: I mean, as you were kind of wrapping our heads around,

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Speaker 4: how is this even possible? Like, there's so many questions,

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Speaker 4: because if I'm not mistaken, I mean, this is the

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Speaker 4: sort of first of its kind attack, at least on

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Speaker 4: this scale, with this level of reporting around it.

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Speaker 3: Right, we established the precedent back in the nineties, but

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Speaker 3: now it's a question of scale. Can you remotely explode

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Speaker 3: a mobile device? Will pause for a word from our sponsors.

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Speaker 3: Here's where it gets crazy. Let's rip the band aid off. Yeah,

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Speaker 3: you can do it. You can remotely explode a mobile device,

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Speaker 3: but maybe not in the way people initially assumed.

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Speaker 4: Well, I think that's the thing that was kind of

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Speaker 4: perplexing all of us, is that we know that cell phones,

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Speaker 4: laptops that are powered by like these you know, chemically

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Speaker 4: derived sources of power can over time get distended and

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Speaker 4: have all kinds of problems and you know, create fires.

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Speaker 5: We'll get to some specific examples of that.

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Speaker 4: But the question then becomes, is this something that can

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Speaker 4: be triggered remotely? Can someone inject a piece of malicious

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Speaker 4: code into my iPhone that will cause the battery to

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Speaker 4: overheat and then melt my flesh in my pocket.

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Speaker 2: Well, that's the thought. I don't know if you guys

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Speaker 2: have seen any of the videos recently of Tesla's hanging

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Speaker 2: out in garages with all the flooding that's been happening,

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Speaker 2: and then they're just catching fire and burning down houses,

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Speaker 2: And it's because they've got super powerful batteries in there

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Speaker 2: and electrical systems that get some water in there, and

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Speaker 2: you've got problems.

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Speaker 4: What about those home batteries that people you know, I'm

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Speaker 4: talking about those Tesla home batteries. With a full flooding situation,

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Speaker 4: I could imagine that would cause devastation.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, and we've also seen videos of people who are

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Speaker 2: using like a vape pen or something right, and it

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Speaker 2: for some reason gets stuck on and the user is unaware,

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Speaker 2: and that battery just heats and heats and heats and

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Speaker 2: heats until it's untenable and causes a mild explosion. But

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Speaker 2: how the heck do you do that to one of

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Speaker 2: these devices?

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Speaker 3: Yeah, this is a concern a lot of people initially

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Speaker 3: fretted over, and I don't mean to diminish it. It

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Speaker 3: is a real concern. They were saying, well, what if

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Speaker 3: an intelligence agency leveraged an attack entirely through software, right,

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Speaker 3: what if a line of malicious code could overclock or

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Speaker 3: overheat a battery or a device or series of devices

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Speaker 3: such that they cause fire and explosion. Thankfully that part

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Speaker 3: is incorrect, but we do have to be again the

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Speaker 3: fun guys at the party, the fungi at the party.

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Speaker 3: Batteries can catch fire. How soon we forget the Samsung

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Speaker 3: debacle just a few years back, Remember that the Galaxy

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Speaker 3: Note seven in twenty sixteen just pop and smoke.

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Speaker 5: Yeah, and usually that results it in serious burns. You know.

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Speaker 4: It wasn't like an explosion in that sense like that

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Speaker 4: would kill somebody. It would, you know, maybe overheat in

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Speaker 4: their pocket and cause like a significant third third degree burns.

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Speaker 4: But I just wanted to point out too, it's not

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Speaker 4: to say that attacks can't happen via software alone. Yeah,

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Speaker 4: I mean, you can certainly infiltrate a network and perhaps

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Speaker 4: overclock a computer in a way that would cause it

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Speaker 4: to shut down or tweak out. But the level of

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Speaker 4: control that would be required that was exhibited here, that's

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Speaker 4: not I don't think within the realm of possibility for

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Speaker 4: someone to actually manipulate devices in such a way that

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Speaker 4: would cause this kind of explosion in and of itself.

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Speaker 5: But you can reak havoc remotely for sure.

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Speaker 2: Well, and even some of these devices just are slightly

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Speaker 2: defective in their manufacturing to where this condition can happen

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Speaker 2: more often. Do you guys remember iPhone fifteen pros iPhone

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Speaker 2: thirteen's They were also heating, like overheating and catching fire

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Speaker 2: simply because of their the way they were manufactured.

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Speaker 4: Can we talk a little bit about how those lithium

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Speaker 4: I own batteries work and what could lead to such

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Speaker 4: a situation that we're describing here.

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Speaker 3: Ah, yes, let's put on our house stuff works, question

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Speaker 3: mark shaped hat. Yeah, there we go. Let's gather around.

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Speaker 3: Let's gather around that ridiculous question mark shaped table.

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Speaker 4: It was literally like a removable rollaway ends table.

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Speaker 3: That's a truth.

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Speaker 2: I'm Marshall Brain, and that's how lithium I own batteries work.

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Speaker 5: That floated.

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Speaker 3: Oh he needs to get that PhD. I'm so tired

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Speaker 3: of call him mister brain instead of doctor brain. Marshall

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Speaker 3: Brain would be good. Professor brain be great. If you

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Speaker 3: get a PhD, you can be professor Bray. Also, this

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Speaker 3: guy's just the best, and he taught us a lot.

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Speaker 3: This is our martial brain how stuff works moment. Lithium

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Speaker 3: ion batteries, all right, they use a chemical reaction to

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Speaker 3: generate power. We don't have to get in the weeds

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Speaker 3: on this, but what you do need to know is

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Speaker 3: that chemical reactions are often, like intelligence, perishable. So as

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Speaker 3: a battery ages, the chemical cycle that it engages with

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Speaker 3: to create energy becomes imperfect. It's not running the same

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Speaker 3: sprint at the same speed. Sometimes it's not finishing the race.

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Speaker 3: When it doesn't do this correctly, when that reaction does

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Speaker 3: not complete, it can create gas. This is something the

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Speaker 3: Boften's call out gassing and Matt Nolan triforce and I

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Speaker 3: call battery far.

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Speaker 2: An ill wind this way plumes indeed something super wicked.

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Speaker 3: Yes, yes, and woo betide the odor of a battery,

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Speaker 3: a lithium ion battery that may encounter this. You will

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Speaker 3: see it. You may have seen it in your personal life.

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Speaker 3: There is an indication that things are not on the level.

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Speaker 3: The battery itself will physically swell because of the gas,

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Speaker 3: and if the internal layers of these lithium ion batteries

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Speaker 3: are not separated due to damage, or a manufacturing defect.

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Speaker 3: Then boom, you get the outcass, you get the swelling,

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Speaker 3: you get the fire. But you see the signs well

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Speaker 3: before the disaster occurs.

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Speaker 2: Typically, Yeah, full disclosure. My last work machine, we would

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Speaker 2: always joke off air, and I think we even talked

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Speaker 2: about it on here a couple of times. Yeah, the

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Speaker 2: large battery panel beneath my MacBook Pro was so distended

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Speaker 2: and a swelling so much, and my machine was overheating

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Speaker 2: so much with a fan we were trying to record it.

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Speaker 2: It's just like, I don't know if that's.

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Speaker 5: I think I can I think I give up.

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Speaker 2: Well, I had no idea how dangerous a situation that

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Speaker 2: was until I looked on some forums and just realized, oh,

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Speaker 2: my house could just burn up because of my work machine.

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Speaker 3: So yeah, especially if you leave it alone and plugged in, right, Yeah, yeah,

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Speaker 3: And this is this is a valid concern. And I

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Speaker 3: do remember, I do remember when we were God, look

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Speaker 3: at us, you guys, we were joking about Matt's laptop.

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Speaker 3: All I know, Well, we matrix dodged that. But it's

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Speaker 3: a valid concern because it leads us to our second point.

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Speaker 3: These fires that are caused by these lithium ion batteries.

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Speaker 3: They do not generate near the explosive force that we

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Speaker 3: see in the pager attacks.

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Speaker 4: No, yeah, I mean a lot of the lawsuits surrounding

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Speaker 4: the Samsung case that we talked about were because of.

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Speaker 5: Like serious burns.

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Speaker 4: Yep, because where do you keep those things, you know,

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Speaker 4: in your pocket or like God forbid it happens while

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Speaker 4: you're using it, but God forbid you actually make phone

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Speaker 4: calls and hold that monstrosity to your face.

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Speaker 5: Who are these people?

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Speaker 4: But no, it was certainly no kind of significant explosion

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Speaker 4: that would generate the kind of force that we saw

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Speaker 4: in these attacks.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, and as we mentioned earlier, you can see live

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Speaker 3: video of some of these pager detonations. They indicate a

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Speaker 3: much higher explosive force, a fatal explosive force. And in

436
00:27:48,520 --> 00:27:54,399
Speaker 3: this footage we witness terrifying moments someone with an affected pager.

437
00:27:54,720 --> 00:28:00,200
Speaker 3: They get a vibration notifying them of a message they take,

438
00:28:00,320 --> 00:28:02,440
Speaker 3: like you were saying, no, they take the pager from

439
00:28:02,480 --> 00:28:09,200
Speaker 3: their pocket, they look at the screen, and this is

440
00:28:10,160 --> 00:28:13,880
Speaker 3: a terrifying thing because another point we have to raise

441
00:28:13,960 --> 00:28:18,560
Speaker 3: here to the idea of malicious code. Pagers are low tech,

442
00:28:19,000 --> 00:28:23,000
Speaker 3: like we're saying earlier this is radio technology, this is

443
00:28:23,200 --> 00:28:27,359
Speaker 3: not cloud connected. There is not a way to send

444
00:28:27,560 --> 00:28:29,160
Speaker 3: malware necessarily.

445
00:28:30,160 --> 00:28:33,200
Speaker 4: Yeah, when we were talking about too, like this being

446
00:28:33,320 --> 00:28:36,240
Speaker 4: unprecedented whatever this scale, And of course in the Strangers

447
00:28:36,280 --> 00:28:39,040
Speaker 4: episode you mentioned Ben the precedent for this, it was

448
00:28:39,080 --> 00:28:42,920
Speaker 4: a cell phone attack back in the nineties, right, Yes,

449
00:28:43,520 --> 00:28:46,080
Speaker 4: But I gotta say this is also the kind of

450
00:28:46,160 --> 00:28:48,880
Speaker 4: thing that you'll certainly see in you know, spy movies

451
00:28:49,000 --> 00:28:52,240
Speaker 4: or in like espionage type situations where someone will wire

452
00:28:52,320 --> 00:28:55,000
Speaker 4: a bomb and there will be a transmitter on it

453
00:28:55,120 --> 00:28:57,720
Speaker 4: that is a cell phone, and like someone will dial

454
00:28:57,800 --> 00:28:59,920
Speaker 4: a number and that is what triggers the bomb.

455
00:29:00,240 --> 00:29:02,280
Speaker 5: So this is just kind of taking it a step further.

456
00:29:02,760 --> 00:29:05,760
Speaker 2: Well, I mean, yeah, that makes sense, right, because the

457
00:29:06,120 --> 00:29:10,520
Speaker 2: cell phone receiver that's a part of the detonation device

458
00:29:10,800 --> 00:29:14,760
Speaker 2: just needs to send an electrical signal to that device

459
00:29:14,840 --> 00:29:17,960
Speaker 2: to explode it. Right. But in this case, we're trying

460
00:29:17,960 --> 00:29:20,000
Speaker 2: to figure out if we can actually blow up the

461
00:29:20,560 --> 00:29:24,560
Speaker 2: you know, the manufactured device that everybody else has, and

462
00:29:25,560 --> 00:29:27,760
Speaker 2: if everybody you know, if you've got twenty people with

463
00:29:27,800 --> 00:29:31,000
Speaker 2: one of these devices and you can explode one of them,

464
00:29:31,440 --> 00:29:33,960
Speaker 2: what's the difference between that one and the other nineteen.

465
00:29:34,880 --> 00:29:37,680
Speaker 2: Because I want to get back to just this, this

466
00:29:37,840 --> 00:29:40,200
Speaker 2: low tech idea, because it's one of the primary reasons

467
00:29:40,240 --> 00:29:43,440
Speaker 2: has Blow was using these devices, right, they were low

468
00:29:43,520 --> 00:29:48,720
Speaker 2: tech because theoretically communications between these low tech devices would

469
00:29:48,760 --> 00:29:52,080
Speaker 2: be much harder to intercept by somebody who's watching them,

470
00:29:52,440 --> 00:29:56,720
Speaker 2: and they would be much harder to track somebody carrying

471
00:29:56,760 --> 00:29:58,280
Speaker 2: one of these low tech devices. Right.

472
00:29:58,640 --> 00:30:00,320
Speaker 5: You can clone them though, right.

473
00:30:00,440 --> 00:30:02,840
Speaker 4: Cloning a pager is a thing where you literally have

474
00:30:03,160 --> 00:30:06,400
Speaker 4: like a duplicate so when the original one gets a ping,

475
00:30:06,600 --> 00:30:07,440
Speaker 4: then you're cloned.

476
00:30:07,640 --> 00:30:09,760
Speaker 5: Duplicate gets it as well. Just just saying it's not

477
00:30:09,840 --> 00:30:10,520
Speaker 5: like impossible.

478
00:30:10,600 --> 00:30:12,960
Speaker 2: No, you're right, but it's not the same as being

479
00:30:12,960 --> 00:30:17,480
Speaker 2: able to turn a microphone on on a smartphone, right, or,

480
00:30:17,760 --> 00:30:20,560
Speaker 2: as you said, Ben, inject malicious code of some sort

481
00:30:20,680 --> 00:30:24,440
Speaker 2: into a smart machine that can then track somebody's location.

482
00:30:25,680 --> 00:30:25,920
Speaker 1: Yeah.

483
00:30:26,360 --> 00:30:31,000
Speaker 3: Yeah, Back to our emperor of how stuff works, Marshall.

484
00:30:31,040 --> 00:30:35,400
Speaker 3: Brain taught us that a pager is a small radio receiver. Right,

485
00:30:35,600 --> 00:30:38,560
Speaker 3: you carry it around your pocket. It's basically a radio.

486
00:30:39,680 --> 00:30:43,880
Speaker 3: It doesn't work the way most people imagine. Your device

487
00:30:44,080 --> 00:30:47,720
Speaker 3: has a personal number, a personal identifier of some sort.

488
00:30:47,880 --> 00:30:50,479
Speaker 3: Call it a code. Call it a phone number. Anyone

489
00:30:50,520 --> 00:30:53,520
Speaker 3: who wants to send you a message dials that code

490
00:30:53,840 --> 00:30:56,560
Speaker 3: and they have their message attached, you know, three eleven

491
00:30:56,840 --> 00:31:02,160
Speaker 3: nine to one one eight zero zero eight five boobs. Yeah,

492
00:31:02,400 --> 00:31:06,360
Speaker 3: and so this this, that's a reference earlier, I thinks,

493
00:31:06,640 --> 00:31:15,360
Speaker 3: oh boobs though, right, folks, I know, right, Just so this, uh,

494
00:31:15,720 --> 00:31:21,080
Speaker 3: this puts when people dial that, it puts the message

495
00:31:21,200 --> 00:31:24,800
Speaker 3: they are sending the signal they're sending through a switchboard

496
00:31:25,240 --> 00:31:31,120
Speaker 3: at a kind of centralized broadcast opportunity. And that broadcast

497
00:31:31,240 --> 00:31:34,160
Speaker 3: opportunity back in the day it might have been a person.

498
00:31:34,360 --> 00:31:37,440
Speaker 3: It's probably a machine or an algorithm. Now it sends

499
00:31:37,520 --> 00:31:41,600
Speaker 3: out that message just in a wide swath with all

500
00:31:41,920 --> 00:31:45,680
Speaker 3: the other messages. It is received just like a normal

501
00:31:45,840 --> 00:31:51,160
Speaker 3: radio broadcast, and it uses antennas to transmit the message. Further,

502
00:31:52,120 --> 00:31:56,000
Speaker 3: all of the pagers, all of these handheld radio devices

503
00:31:56,360 --> 00:32:02,760
Speaker 3: are constantly picking up every single radio message they receive.

504
00:32:03,520 --> 00:32:07,200
Speaker 3: You're only finding out about this that gets to you

505
00:32:08,120 --> 00:32:11,520
Speaker 3: because there's something in your device that says, oh, hey,

506
00:32:11,840 --> 00:32:17,640
Speaker 3: this one's for you know, triforce. Uh, here you go, boobs,

507
00:32:17,720 --> 00:32:22,840
Speaker 3: my guy boobs. And so it ignores all the other stuff.

508
00:32:22,920 --> 00:32:27,080
Speaker 3: But all the other stuff is happening is reaching that receiver,

509
00:32:27,640 --> 00:32:31,200
Speaker 3: and all of this can happen. To our earlier point,

510
00:32:32,200 --> 00:32:36,440
Speaker 3: all of this happens without an Internet connection. You need

511
00:32:36,600 --> 00:32:39,520
Speaker 3: no Wi Fi, you only need the radio. And this

512
00:32:39,760 --> 00:32:45,080
Speaker 3: leads us to conclude that battery malfunctions alone cannot explain

513
00:32:45,160 --> 00:32:49,240
Speaker 3: what happened. The explosive force, the nature of the technology,

514
00:32:49,560 --> 00:32:54,200
Speaker 3: the other factors at play, the social engineering, the opset compromise.

515
00:32:54,640 --> 00:32:57,960
Speaker 3: These demonstrate another conspiracy in the game.

516
00:32:58,280 --> 00:33:01,360
Speaker 4: Yea, if I remember correctly, if my brief stints as

517
00:33:01,440 --> 00:33:05,160
Speaker 4: a pager user, they take double A batteries. Most of

518
00:33:05,240 --> 00:33:08,000
Speaker 4: them they don't even have lithium ion batteries.

519
00:33:09,680 --> 00:33:13,800
Speaker 2: I believe the newer versions, the AR well, we'll get

520
00:33:13,800 --> 00:33:14,520
Speaker 2: to it, the AR.

521
00:33:16,280 --> 00:33:16,400
Speaker 5: Nine.

522
00:33:17,440 --> 00:33:21,520
Speaker 2: That version I believe did have a lithium ion battery

523
00:33:21,560 --> 00:33:21,760
Speaker 2: in it.

524
00:33:21,880 --> 00:33:23,920
Speaker 4: Because I remember the one I had the motorola, the

525
00:33:24,040 --> 00:33:26,280
Speaker 4: kind of clear one where you can see through it.

526
00:33:26,360 --> 00:33:28,960
Speaker 5: I think. Yet you literally had to change the batteries

527
00:33:29,000 --> 00:33:29,200
Speaker 5: on it.

528
00:33:30,040 --> 00:33:32,600
Speaker 3: It does have a lithium ion minus crank powered.

529
00:33:33,000 --> 00:33:36,200
Speaker 5: Nice. It's good in a jam, good in a jam.

530
00:33:36,920 --> 00:33:38,040
Speaker 3: So what did happen?

531
00:33:38,680 --> 00:33:38,800
Speaker 1: Right?

532
00:33:38,960 --> 00:33:42,960
Speaker 3: And Noel, you raise a tremendous point not all pagers

533
00:33:43,080 --> 00:33:49,880
Speaker 3: have the same power sources. The pagers in question were

534
00:33:50,000 --> 00:33:55,200
Speaker 3: made by a Taiwanese based company, or they were licensed

535
00:33:55,320 --> 00:33:59,480
Speaker 3: by a Taiwanese based company. You see the organization responsible

536
00:33:59,520 --> 00:34:03,800
Speaker 3: for the paige explosions, which is Israel. Let's just say

537
00:34:03,840 --> 00:34:07,520
Speaker 3: the quiet part out loud. They had to physically interact

538
00:34:07,680 --> 00:34:11,279
Speaker 3: with these devices at some point in the supply chain

539
00:34:11,480 --> 00:34:16,000
Speaker 3: before those pagers and those walkie talkies again, silly name

540
00:34:16,400 --> 00:34:21,239
Speaker 3: reached Hezbolah. Let's talk a little bit about the pagers specifically.

541
00:34:21,800 --> 00:34:26,279
Speaker 3: Gold Apollo is the company out of Taiwan, right, and

542
00:34:26,520 --> 00:34:32,160
Speaker 3: they licensed the manufacture of a model of pager called

543
00:34:32,320 --> 00:34:36,120
Speaker 3: AAR nine two four, And all of the pagers that

544
00:34:36,320 --> 00:34:40,879
Speaker 3: exploded in Lebanon and Syria were a R nine two

545
00:34:41,080 --> 00:34:41,960
Speaker 3: four models.

546
00:34:43,120 --> 00:34:46,600
Speaker 2: Yeah, but gold Apollo, because they were in this deal

547
00:34:47,120 --> 00:34:51,920
Speaker 2: licensing out their name their pager to another company, has

548
00:34:52,040 --> 00:34:55,760
Speaker 2: basically said, well, hey, it wasn't us. Those actually aren't

549
00:34:55,840 --> 00:34:58,520
Speaker 2: our pagers has our name on it, but we did

550
00:34:58,600 --> 00:35:01,960
Speaker 2: not manufacture them. Somebody else is at play here.

551
00:35:02,280 --> 00:35:03,799
Speaker 5: I did not know that was a thing.

552
00:35:03,960 --> 00:35:07,560
Speaker 4: Maybe I'm I'm naive or something, but like, does that

553
00:35:07,719 --> 00:35:11,440
Speaker 4: absolve you if you've you've you've licensed out or rented

554
00:35:11,480 --> 00:35:15,279
Speaker 4: out your name, your low, your your design, your trademark

555
00:35:15,960 --> 00:35:16,239
Speaker 4: kind of.

556
00:35:16,520 --> 00:35:20,040
Speaker 3: I mean, it depends if it's a manufacturing defect.

557
00:35:21,440 --> 00:35:25,040
Speaker 5: Because of the design that you've thesis made.

558
00:35:25,120 --> 00:35:28,279
Speaker 3: You're still culpable for. But licensing the thing is a

559
00:35:28,360 --> 00:35:30,799
Speaker 3: lot like tag and base, you know what I mean.

560
00:35:30,920 --> 00:35:33,400
Speaker 3: It's a lot like saying not it. And if we

561
00:35:33,520 --> 00:35:36,360
Speaker 3: go we mentioned this in Strange News, But if you

562
00:35:36,480 --> 00:35:42,040
Speaker 3: want to find, if you want to find the company

563
00:35:42,840 --> 00:35:46,680
Speaker 3: that is on the hook for providing these AR nine

564
00:35:46,760 --> 00:35:51,400
Speaker 3: two four model pagers licensed via gold Apollo in Taiwan,

565
00:35:51,960 --> 00:35:56,760
Speaker 3: you will find a fascinating will outfit called b AC

566
00:35:57,040 --> 00:36:01,680
Speaker 3: Consulting based out of Budapest, and they had a licensing

567
00:36:01,760 --> 00:36:06,600
Speaker 3: agreement with gold Apollo dating back to twenty twenty one.

568
00:36:08,080 --> 00:36:13,000
Speaker 2: Yeah, and this company makes alarm bells go off. And

569
00:36:13,160 --> 00:36:16,279
Speaker 2: then once you go through all of the information on it,

570
00:36:16,560 --> 00:36:18,160
Speaker 2: you can see it right in the face exactly what

571
00:36:18,280 --> 00:36:20,520
Speaker 2: this thing is. Should we go through it a little bit?

572
00:36:21,320 --> 00:36:23,640
Speaker 3: Oh yes we should, we must. Let's also give a

573
00:36:23,680 --> 00:36:26,920
Speaker 3: shout out to the founder of gold Apollo, su Chin

574
00:36:27,040 --> 00:36:32,000
Speaker 3: Kwan who later is it it's Wacket who's in some

575
00:36:32,200 --> 00:36:36,239
Speaker 3: interviews and says, Hey, you know, we didn't do this.

576
00:36:36,520 --> 00:36:40,000
Speaker 3: We just licensed this to this company that I've never

577
00:36:40,120 --> 00:36:42,200
Speaker 3: heard of. But they're out of Budapest.

578
00:36:42,600 --> 00:36:44,480
Speaker 5: And you know now that you ask me.

579
00:36:44,719 --> 00:36:48,280
Speaker 3: The weird thing is the money for the licensing agreement

580
00:36:49,120 --> 00:36:54,560
Speaker 3: originated in the Middle East, and then Taiwanese government officials

581
00:36:54,880 --> 00:36:58,640
Speaker 3: came through and said, yeah, hashtag not it, not us.

582
00:36:59,360 --> 00:37:01,440
Speaker 3: These pages were not made in Taiwan.

583
00:37:01,840 --> 00:37:04,719
Speaker 2: It's very weird. His quote to Ruters was quote, the

584
00:37:04,840 --> 00:37:08,759
Speaker 2: remittance was very strange, but.

585
00:37:08,840 --> 00:37:10,560
Speaker 5: We didn't like do anything of that, you know it

586
00:37:10,719 --> 00:37:12,680
Speaker 5: like take the cash. It's fine, what what are we

587
00:37:12,719 --> 00:37:14,480
Speaker 5: gonna do? Not take the money, of.

588
00:37:14,560 --> 00:37:17,520
Speaker 2: Course, But you know, seriously, credit to him as you're saying, Ben,

589
00:37:17,560 --> 00:37:20,040
Speaker 2: because he also said, we may not be a large company,

590
00:37:20,120 --> 00:37:23,360
Speaker 2: but we are a responsible one. This is very embarrassing,

591
00:37:23,480 --> 00:37:26,080
Speaker 2: and they're gonna like they are as a company trying

592
00:37:26,120 --> 00:37:27,600
Speaker 2: to figure out what exactly went down.

593
00:37:28,600 --> 00:37:30,120
Speaker 5: This is like the meme like that. I think you

594
00:37:30,160 --> 00:37:32,520
Speaker 5: should leave meme with the hot dog costume, like we've

595
00:37:32,560 --> 00:37:35,719
Speaker 5: got to find out who did this. Yes, I mean

596
00:37:35,800 --> 00:37:37,000
Speaker 5: this situation in general.

597
00:37:37,520 --> 00:37:40,839
Speaker 3: Yeah, agreed, that's a perfect comparison. Talk about a game

598
00:37:40,920 --> 00:37:43,480
Speaker 3: of hot potato do you guys remember hot potato? Did

599
00:37:43,520 --> 00:37:44,879
Speaker 3: you ever play hot potato.

600
00:37:44,680 --> 00:37:45,840
Speaker 5: With an actual hot potato?

601
00:37:46,080 --> 00:37:46,279
Speaker 3: Yeah?

602
00:37:46,480 --> 00:37:49,640
Speaker 5: It was really it was pretty dangerous. Actually a lot

603
00:37:49,680 --> 00:37:50,560
Speaker 5: of serious burns.

604
00:37:51,080 --> 00:37:53,200
Speaker 3: So let's talk about like we were saying, let's talk

605
00:37:53,200 --> 00:37:56,360
Speaker 3: about speaking to serious burns. Let's talk about our friends

606
00:37:56,400 --> 00:38:01,880
Speaker 3: in Budapeste b AC. They have a conulting CEO, not

607
00:38:02,040 --> 00:38:04,320
Speaker 3: a standing or urban it CEO.

608
00:38:04,719 --> 00:38:07,880
Speaker 2: Well, it is a consulting firm. It's BAC Consulting.

609
00:38:08,200 --> 00:38:10,520
Speaker 3: Right, But how do you have a consulting CEO for

610
00:38:10,640 --> 00:38:11,840
Speaker 3: a consulting firm.

611
00:38:13,080 --> 00:38:14,520
Speaker 2: It's just what It's just what they do.

612
00:38:14,920 --> 00:38:17,920
Speaker 4: They just that's their thing, is consulting that potatoes to

613
00:38:18,000 --> 00:38:19,759
Speaker 4: consult to get to consultants.

614
00:38:20,040 --> 00:38:22,040
Speaker 3: I'm just telling you, guys that potato is hot.

615
00:38:22,280 --> 00:38:25,799
Speaker 5: It's potato, especially when they're wrapped in like saran boy.

616
00:38:27,400 --> 00:38:31,200
Speaker 2: Yeah, so let's talk about this, that consulting CEO. Then

617
00:38:31,239 --> 00:38:35,000
Speaker 2: you found an amazing article called the Mystery Woman whose

618
00:38:35,040 --> 00:38:39,120
Speaker 2: company BAC Consulting is linked to exploding pagers. You can

619
00:38:39,160 --> 00:38:42,640
Speaker 2: find it right now. This consulting CEO's name is Christiana

620
00:38:43,360 --> 00:38:51,680
Speaker 2: barsonat Arcidiacono. I'm not how to say it. This person,

621
00:38:53,080 --> 00:38:55,239
Speaker 2: I'm gonna put it out here. The the article you

622
00:38:55,360 --> 00:38:59,200
Speaker 2: linked to uh cites her as a forty nine year

623
00:38:59,239 --> 00:39:00,920
Speaker 2: old Italian Hungarian.

624
00:39:00,800 --> 00:39:02,560
Speaker 3: Person like that selfie though, right.

625
00:39:02,920 --> 00:39:05,920
Speaker 2: Oh, Selfie's fantastic. But what I really like is the

626
00:39:06,320 --> 00:39:09,239
Speaker 2: new vocabulary word that I am armed with because the

627
00:39:09,280 --> 00:39:12,839
Speaker 2: writer of this article used it. Perry pathetic.

628
00:39:13,600 --> 00:39:16,799
Speaker 5: Yes, oh, she is kind of fetching.

629
00:39:17,120 --> 00:39:21,040
Speaker 2: Perry pathetic, which means traveling from place to place, in particular,

630
00:39:21,160 --> 00:39:25,320
Speaker 2: working or based in various places for relatively short periods.

631
00:39:26,800 --> 00:39:27,720
Speaker 5: It's like nomadic.

632
00:39:28,760 --> 00:39:30,279
Speaker 3: Dare we say consulting.

633
00:39:30,520 --> 00:39:34,480
Speaker 2: Oh yes, interesting, Okay, this is all matching up. Sounds good.

634
00:39:34,719 --> 00:39:36,560
Speaker 2: But what's so weird about this person?

635
00:39:38,560 --> 00:39:42,400
Speaker 3: Well? I guess it's the fact that this person and

636
00:39:42,840 --> 00:39:48,640
Speaker 3: on behalf of BAC denied all culpability with Eddie involvement

637
00:39:48,960 --> 00:39:57,319
Speaker 3: on the pager side, specifically in manufacturing BAC. And it's consulting.

638
00:39:57,680 --> 00:40:05,799
Speaker 3: CEO described themselves as trading intermediaries, as fixers, as licensers.

639
00:40:05,920 --> 00:40:09,120
Speaker 3: So you buy the license from Tawan, You buy the

640
00:40:09,239 --> 00:40:12,960
Speaker 3: license from Taiwan or Tawan, whatever you wish, and then

641
00:40:13,160 --> 00:40:18,120
Speaker 3: you sell the license somewhere else. The Hungarian government, interestingly enough,

642
00:40:18,360 --> 00:40:22,840
Speaker 3: comes in with cover fire and they say, look, this company,

643
00:40:23,680 --> 00:40:26,960
Speaker 3: they just trade stuff. They don't manufacture anything in Hungary.

644
00:40:27,800 --> 00:40:30,719
Speaker 4: Yeah, the spider man pointing at to one. Another meme

645
00:40:30,760 --> 00:40:33,640
Speaker 4: also comes telling me that potato is molten.

646
00:40:34,120 --> 00:40:35,840
Speaker 2: Guys, I'm gonna go back to the article. This is

647
00:40:35,880 --> 00:40:39,080
Speaker 2: why I find Christiana the consulting CEO so strange. I'm

648
00:40:39,080 --> 00:40:41,520
Speaker 2: gonna read a couple of quotes, and then I'm gonna

649
00:40:41,520 --> 00:40:45,200
Speaker 2: watch your face in particular Ben because and no offense, nol,

650
00:40:45,239 --> 00:40:49,399
Speaker 2: but watching Ben's face because of our discussions about front

651
00:40:49,480 --> 00:40:53,640
Speaker 2: companies and how intelligence agencies pick people up out of college.

652
00:40:53,680 --> 00:40:56,640
Speaker 2: So we're gonna we're gonna start here. Quote. In the

653
00:40:56,680 --> 00:40:59,640
Speaker 2: early two thousands, she earned her PhD in physics at

654
00:40:59,719 --> 00:41:03,439
Speaker 2: Universe Diversity College, London, but she appears to have left

655
00:41:03,560 --> 00:41:07,879
Speaker 2: without pursuing a scientific career. Okay, that's that's one. That's

656
00:41:07,920 --> 00:41:11,480
Speaker 2: count one for me. That's first. Next a resume she

657
00:41:11,600 --> 00:41:13,719
Speaker 2: used to get the job working for this other place

658
00:41:13,800 --> 00:41:19,200
Speaker 2: she worked for previously, references other postgraduate degrees in politics

659
00:41:19,480 --> 00:41:24,600
Speaker 2: and development MMM from the London School of Economics. Okay,

660
00:41:24,960 --> 00:41:27,319
Speaker 2: and then she goes on to describe in that CV

661
00:41:27,560 --> 00:41:32,520
Speaker 2: working for various NGOs throughout Europe, Africa and the Middle East.

662
00:41:33,120 --> 00:41:36,640
Speaker 3: Oh okay, this checks out, yeah fully, yeah, yeah.

663
00:41:37,280 --> 00:41:39,840
Speaker 2: It feels like somebody that you would you would pluck

664
00:41:39,960 --> 00:41:43,960
Speaker 2: early on in their scientific pursuit career, especially if they're

665
00:41:44,040 --> 00:41:48,120
Speaker 2: interested in any way in politics, and let's say nation building.

666
00:41:49,040 --> 00:41:52,040
Speaker 3: Sure, yeah, the people must be free, must they?

667
00:41:52,600 --> 00:41:53,120
Speaker 2: M hmm?

668
00:41:53,560 --> 00:41:58,000
Speaker 3: Yeah, I mean we also look, it's super shady. BAC

669
00:41:58,640 --> 00:42:02,759
Speaker 3: is super sketchy, and it turns out that it gets

670
00:42:02,880 --> 00:42:07,480
Speaker 3: curiouser and curiouser the further we go into the rabbit hole.

671
00:42:08,160 --> 00:42:11,080
Speaker 3: We also have to remember, look, we were talking about

672
00:42:11,120 --> 00:42:14,480
Speaker 3: this off air. It's obviously kind of a shell company.

673
00:42:14,640 --> 00:42:18,320
Speaker 3: We'll get to it, but the hand is often hidden.

674
00:42:18,920 --> 00:42:26,000
Speaker 3: The International Criminal Court does prosecute some post colonial societies,

675
00:42:26,560 --> 00:42:30,480
Speaker 3: but they have not once, not never gone after a

676
00:42:31,040 --> 00:42:34,959
Speaker 3: colonial society, nor held it accountable for actions that would

677
00:42:35,000 --> 00:42:39,040
Speaker 3: be described as terrorism if conducted by any post colonial

678
00:42:39,320 --> 00:42:44,239
Speaker 3: nation state. I yield by time. Let's talk about the

679
00:42:44,320 --> 00:42:48,560
Speaker 3: walkie talkies. God, what a silly name. Walkee talk What

680
00:42:48,640 --> 00:42:50,840
Speaker 3: do you call it? What's the better name? Two way radio?

681
00:42:51,200 --> 00:42:52,200
Speaker 5: Two way radio is good?

682
00:42:52,320 --> 00:42:54,200
Speaker 3: Yeah, that's poor grown up.

683
00:42:54,320 --> 00:42:56,359
Speaker 2: What was the phone that was? It was a very

684
00:42:56,400 --> 00:42:59,799
Speaker 2: popular phone that had the two Way radio Motorola two.

685
00:43:00,640 --> 00:43:03,319
Speaker 5: I'm quoting Jay z Okay, I know the one you're

686
00:43:03,320 --> 00:43:05,520
Speaker 5: talking about. It looked kind of like a sports radio

687
00:43:05,680 --> 00:43:07,880
Speaker 5: or something like that. Yeah, you get to take to

688
00:43:07,960 --> 00:43:08,279
Speaker 5: the beach.

689
00:43:08,640 --> 00:43:12,800
Speaker 2: You get the little chirp and a little little rubber

690
00:43:12,880 --> 00:43:13,880
Speaker 2: bumpers on the side.

691
00:43:14,440 --> 00:43:17,120
Speaker 3: Yeah yeah, yeah, because your because of your actions.

692
00:43:17,440 --> 00:43:20,760
Speaker 2: Right, Uh, this is diddy. What did you say? More oil?

693
00:43:20,960 --> 00:43:24,280
Speaker 4: No problem, guys, I went a cost Co run this weekend.

694
00:43:24,360 --> 00:43:27,040
Speaker 4: Can confirm cost cod does not carry baby oil.

695
00:43:27,120 --> 00:43:30,759
Speaker 3: I looked everywhere, Dude, you have to go to you know,

696
00:43:30,920 --> 00:43:33,560
Speaker 3: you have to go to the sketchy places. Now I

697
00:43:34,080 --> 00:43:38,920
Speaker 3: get a good price. Yeah yeah, oh cvs? Yeah, are

698
00:43:39,000 --> 00:43:43,680
Speaker 3: they like what is their business model? Are they like

699
00:43:43,800 --> 00:43:45,719
Speaker 3: a front for printing receipts?

700
00:43:47,640 --> 00:43:48,000
Speaker 5: Massive?

701
00:43:48,040 --> 00:43:49,000
Speaker 3: Why are they so long?

702
00:43:49,520 --> 00:43:51,879
Speaker 5: So much? Actually? What is all that extra text? Guys?

703
00:43:52,120 --> 00:43:54,120
Speaker 4: Really quickly though, if you want to be classy at

704
00:43:54,160 --> 00:43:57,440
Speaker 4: your freak out parties, freak parties, whatever, freak offs, why

705
00:43:57,520 --> 00:44:00,800
Speaker 4: is it a freak cough they call it? Yeah, Costco

706
00:44:00,840 --> 00:44:03,280
Speaker 4: has got some excellent deals on olive oil and bulk.

707
00:44:05,360 --> 00:44:07,640
Speaker 4: Can use it for your slip and slide situation and

708
00:44:07,760 --> 00:44:09,480
Speaker 4: then dip your bread in it when you're done.

709
00:44:09,600 --> 00:44:11,080
Speaker 2: May I recommend coconut oil?

710
00:44:11,480 --> 00:44:13,680
Speaker 3: M this guy finds.

711
00:44:16,360 --> 00:44:18,719
Speaker 2: So let's get back to the walkie talkies. We are

712
00:44:19,280 --> 00:44:22,800
Speaker 2: taking tangents galore today, guys, And I blame myself.

713
00:44:22,600 --> 00:44:26,400
Speaker 5: Matthew, No, no blame to be distributed, my friend, it's

714
00:44:26,440 --> 00:44:27,040
Speaker 5: a podcast.

715
00:44:27,880 --> 00:44:31,480
Speaker 2: Well, let's get back to the walkie talkies. Around five

716
00:44:31,600 --> 00:44:36,160
Speaker 2: pm local time on September eighteenth, that is, again, can't

717
00:44:36,200 --> 00:44:39,360
Speaker 2: stress this enough. The day after there was a huge

718
00:44:39,480 --> 00:44:44,240
Speaker 2: pager explosion across Lebanon and throughout the halls of Hesbola

719
00:44:44,600 --> 00:44:47,120
Speaker 2: and just in you know places where everybody else is.

720
00:44:48,000 --> 00:44:52,120
Speaker 2: There was another round of explosions. And these explosions again

721
00:44:52,320 --> 00:44:56,640
Speaker 2: had one thing in common. A single device, same manufacturer,

722
00:44:56,760 --> 00:44:57,399
Speaker 2: same make.

723
00:44:57,760 --> 00:45:03,839
Speaker 3: Does that make sense, Yes, the icom Ic V eight

724
00:45:04,000 --> 00:45:09,719
Speaker 3: two VHF walkie talkie or two way radio. And what's

725
00:45:10,080 --> 00:45:15,640
Speaker 3: fascinating here is that the company Icon that made these

726
00:45:16,360 --> 00:45:21,280
Speaker 3: waukee talkies they stopped manufacturing them back in twenty fourteen.

727
00:45:22,320 --> 00:45:25,359
Speaker 2: Hmmm, so somebody had a stockpile.

728
00:45:25,440 --> 00:45:28,120
Speaker 5: I guess is this what should call it? Like new

729
00:45:28,239 --> 00:45:28,920
Speaker 5: old stock?

730
00:45:29,560 --> 00:45:32,239
Speaker 2: Well, that's the interesting thing, right, Maybe they were in

731
00:45:32,360 --> 00:45:35,239
Speaker 2: a warehouse somewhere that's for a long time and then

732
00:45:35,320 --> 00:45:39,240
Speaker 2: they were you know, just distributed, you know, to HESBELA

733
00:45:39,320 --> 00:45:42,120
Speaker 2: members because somebody got a hold of a bunch of them.

734
00:45:42,360 --> 00:45:47,279
Speaker 2: The other option is somebody made these, like manufactured them

735
00:45:47,400 --> 00:45:49,480
Speaker 2: well after the company officially stopped doing it.

736
00:45:49,920 --> 00:45:52,600
Speaker 4: And is my understanding that this device was the company's

737
00:45:53,000 --> 00:45:57,520
Speaker 4: most counterfeited device, which is, like, you know something, the

738
00:45:57,640 --> 00:46:01,680
Speaker 4: results from industrial espionas so the model, according to an

739
00:46:01,680 --> 00:46:05,560
Speaker 4: official statement for I Believe, an internal memo indicated pay

740
00:46:05,640 --> 00:46:10,120
Speaker 4: it special attention to counterfeit ICV eighty, IC seven eighteen,

741
00:46:10,480 --> 00:46:13,480
Speaker 4: and ic V eighty two copies of these models are

742
00:46:13,600 --> 00:46:15,400
Speaker 4: floating in the market.

743
00:46:16,160 --> 00:46:21,640
Speaker 2: Right, So theoretically it wasn't It wasn't necessarily somebody got

744
00:46:21,680 --> 00:46:24,040
Speaker 2: a hold of the official models and then modified them.

745
00:46:24,160 --> 00:46:28,440
Speaker 2: Somebody may have manufactured their own versions of this particular model, because.

746
00:46:28,239 --> 00:46:30,719
Speaker 4: I mean, geez, they're already licensing out their plans and

747
00:46:31,360 --> 00:46:34,839
Speaker 4: branding to the highest bidder. I mean, when you think

748
00:46:34,840 --> 00:46:38,200
Speaker 4: about it, it's not beyond the realm of possibility that

749
00:46:38,280 --> 00:46:40,400
Speaker 4: those plans would just kind of end up floating around

750
00:46:40,560 --> 00:46:42,359
Speaker 4: and available to be sold off.

751
00:46:43,360 --> 00:46:48,319
Speaker 3: Well, the good news is, as of September thirtieth, when

752
00:46:48,400 --> 00:46:52,880
Speaker 3: we're recorded government officials from Japan assure us they are

753
00:46:52,960 --> 00:46:56,719
Speaker 3: investigating the case. Cool, that's so believe for them.

754
00:46:57,120 --> 00:46:59,520
Speaker 5: We got got our top guys on it. They're working

755
00:46:59,560 --> 00:46:59,919
Speaker 5: in shift.

756
00:47:00,560 --> 00:47:02,720
Speaker 2: We're gonna find these shell companies.

757
00:47:03,960 --> 00:47:05,520
Speaker 5: Said the guy in the hot toxuites.

758
00:47:07,160 --> 00:47:07,319
Speaker 2: Right.

759
00:47:08,719 --> 00:47:11,200
Speaker 3: So that's a let's go to an app break, because

760
00:47:11,239 --> 00:47:19,440
Speaker 3: we have to come back and talk about implications. We

761
00:47:19,520 --> 00:47:24,279
Speaker 3: have returned the most dangerous implication here orbits around not

762
00:47:24,520 --> 00:47:29,239
Speaker 3: malicious code, but around the idea of supply chain. If

763
00:47:29,280 --> 00:47:34,400
Speaker 3: you are listening to tonight's show, statistically you're probably listening

764
00:47:34,520 --> 00:47:37,960
Speaker 3: on a phone. It is also extremely likely that you

765
00:47:38,080 --> 00:47:42,520
Speaker 3: are not the target of asymmetric warfare. But again to

766
00:47:42,680 --> 00:47:46,520
Speaker 3: our earlier example about Matt's laptop and honestly our buddy

767
00:47:46,560 --> 00:47:49,800
Speaker 3: Dylan's laptop as well. If your phone battery is getting

768
00:47:49,840 --> 00:47:54,480
Speaker 3: out of shape, if your phone or your device is

769
00:47:54,680 --> 00:47:59,759
Speaker 3: physically distending, get it away from your family and your

770
00:47:59,840 --> 00:48:02,560
Speaker 3: life ones even the cat you don't like, Get it

771
00:48:02,640 --> 00:48:03,399
Speaker 3: away from the cat.

772
00:48:03,760 --> 00:48:06,719
Speaker 4: And it's happened to just about every Apple laptop I've

773
00:48:06,760 --> 00:48:08,759
Speaker 4: ever had. And you can actually get ahead of it

774
00:48:09,120 --> 00:48:12,000
Speaker 4: by right clicking or clicking in the kind of toolbar

775
00:48:12,160 --> 00:48:14,480
Speaker 4: up top and looking at your battery and it has

776
00:48:14,600 --> 00:48:17,960
Speaker 4: like a kind of a performance gauge, sort of a

777
00:48:18,080 --> 00:48:21,319
Speaker 4: plotted kind of graph, and you can see if you're

778
00:48:22,280 --> 00:48:23,960
Speaker 4: if your battery is getting a little long in the tooth.

779
00:48:24,160 --> 00:48:26,040
Speaker 4: And it's a bummer because so many of these companies,

780
00:48:26,080 --> 00:48:27,800
Speaker 4: the battery is like glued in. It's not like you

781
00:48:27,840 --> 00:48:30,080
Speaker 4: can just buy a new battery, which I think leads

782
00:48:30,080 --> 00:48:31,520
Speaker 4: a lot of people to kind of put it off.

783
00:48:33,120 --> 00:48:35,640
Speaker 2: Oh for sure. And you can also, Yeah, the check

784
00:48:35,680 --> 00:48:37,759
Speaker 2: in your battery health is not a bad idea. You

785
00:48:37,800 --> 00:48:41,040
Speaker 2: should definitely do that right now. Actually, while while you're

786
00:48:41,080 --> 00:48:41,920
Speaker 2: thinking about it, just.

787
00:48:42,000 --> 00:48:45,759
Speaker 4: Check it out, just yeah, just for fun, just check

788
00:48:45,760 --> 00:48:48,120
Speaker 4: it out, especially if you notice it like not holding

789
00:48:48,280 --> 00:48:50,799
Speaker 4: charge anymore or as long as it used to. Things

790
00:48:50,880 --> 00:48:53,000
Speaker 4: like that are a good indication that you might be

791
00:48:53,080 --> 00:48:56,200
Speaker 4: able to nip it in the bud. And oftentimes they

792
00:48:56,280 --> 00:48:58,400
Speaker 4: are kind of covered by warranty. I don't know, I

793
00:48:58,920 --> 00:48:59,800
Speaker 4: forget it depends.

794
00:49:00,160 --> 00:49:02,520
Speaker 2: Well, if you have an Apple device, they'll just encourage

795
00:49:02,520 --> 00:49:03,360
Speaker 2: you to buy the new.

796
00:49:03,280 --> 00:49:06,360
Speaker 4: Model, because true, that's called planned obso lessons. It's a

797
00:49:06,360 --> 00:49:07,520
Speaker 4: different kind of time bomb.

798
00:49:08,080 --> 00:49:08,239
Speaker 2: Right.

799
00:49:08,680 --> 00:49:08,919
Speaker 1: Yeah.

800
00:49:09,160 --> 00:49:12,400
Speaker 3: I took a sandboxed laptop to an Apple store because

801
00:49:12,760 --> 00:49:16,480
Speaker 3: I'm a genius, and I met the other geniuses at

802
00:49:16,520 --> 00:49:18,879
Speaker 3: the Mac store and they told me they don't take

803
00:49:18,920 --> 00:49:22,520
Speaker 3: care of quote unquote vintage hardware.

804
00:49:23,200 --> 00:49:24,239
Speaker 5: Yeah, suck my.

805
00:49:26,160 --> 00:49:28,160
Speaker 3: Well, I you know, you have to work your way

806
00:49:28,239 --> 00:49:29,960
Speaker 3: up to that, you know. I was still doing the

807
00:49:30,040 --> 00:49:33,000
Speaker 3: small talk. Sorry about the warranty.

808
00:49:33,080 --> 00:49:36,719
Speaker 5: First, as an Apple fan and not a fanboy, I

809
00:49:37,000 --> 00:49:38,080
Speaker 5: like Apple products.

810
00:49:38,280 --> 00:49:41,120
Speaker 3: You got to start it with like first, ask them

811
00:49:41,160 --> 00:49:42,480
Speaker 3: what's coming by the warrant.

812
00:49:42,600 --> 00:49:44,440
Speaker 4: I just I don't like them too part of their

813
00:49:44,600 --> 00:49:46,480
Speaker 4: I don't like that part of their business model at all.

814
00:49:46,560 --> 00:49:49,400
Speaker 4: And it's not exclusive to Apple, but they just they

815
00:49:49,440 --> 00:49:51,840
Speaker 4: seem to be one of the most egregious offenders.

816
00:49:51,880 --> 00:49:56,800
Speaker 3: All right, YEA, check out our episode on Planned Ops Lessons,

817
00:49:56,880 --> 00:50:01,960
Speaker 3: which is a very real conspiracy affecting everyone who buys

818
00:50:02,040 --> 00:50:05,800
Speaker 3: a thing in the case of pagers and walkie talkies

819
00:50:05,960 --> 00:50:10,200
Speaker 3: and asymmetric warfare. The implication remains, if we know it

820
00:50:10,360 --> 00:50:14,600
Speaker 3: is the supply chain, could it be possible to infiltrate

821
00:50:14,880 --> 00:50:19,680
Speaker 3: a supply chain of radio capable devices on mass If so,

822
00:50:20,480 --> 00:50:22,960
Speaker 3: why would you do it to what end? You know?

823
00:50:23,120 --> 00:50:26,600
Speaker 3: We could give you stats on how many people own

824
00:50:26,800 --> 00:50:30,120
Speaker 3: mobile phones across the globe We could give you even

825
00:50:30,160 --> 00:50:33,319
Speaker 3: some rough numbers on pagers, but those numbers are kind

826
00:50:33,320 --> 00:50:36,759
Speaker 3: of academic, because what you're really asking, the reason we're

827
00:50:36,800 --> 00:50:40,040
Speaker 3: listening together tonight is because we want to know whether

828
00:50:40,120 --> 00:50:43,120
Speaker 3: our loved ones are safe. We want to know if

829
00:50:43,160 --> 00:50:45,440
Speaker 3: the phone is going to blow up while we're listening

830
00:50:45,520 --> 00:50:46,080
Speaker 3: to the show.

831
00:50:47,320 --> 00:50:50,480
Speaker 4: You should be concerned, yeah, but not like so concerned

832
00:50:50,520 --> 00:50:53,600
Speaker 4: that you're like losing sleepover, because if you're listening to

833
00:50:53,760 --> 00:50:57,120
Speaker 4: this show, this is probably not something that is being

834
00:50:57,239 --> 00:50:58,160
Speaker 4: targeted at you.

835
00:50:58,800 --> 00:51:00,920
Speaker 5: YESU directly, right.

836
00:51:00,880 --> 00:51:05,160
Speaker 3: You specifically? Yeah, I mean, let's go to a great

837
00:51:05,280 --> 00:51:08,640
Speaker 3: article in the New York Times by Shira Frankel, ronen

838
00:51:08,719 --> 00:51:13,840
Speaker 3: Bergman and Wada Sad. They argue what we've been talking

839
00:51:13,880 --> 00:51:17,680
Speaker 3: about a little bit here. They argue that Israel ran

840
00:51:18,360 --> 00:51:22,200
Speaker 3: that consulting company out of Budapest as a front company,

841
00:51:22,560 --> 00:51:28,080
Speaker 3: and it was one of three shell outfits entirely created

842
00:51:28,840 --> 00:51:34,480
Speaker 3: to obfuscate, right, to hide the hand of intelligence agencies.

843
00:51:34,600 --> 00:51:40,200
Speaker 3: And to be fair, BAC did manufacture and sell ordinary,

844
00:51:41,280 --> 00:51:42,800
Speaker 3: non explosive pagers.

845
00:51:43,200 --> 00:51:45,879
Speaker 4: This is the consultants consultant, right as what we're talking

846
00:51:45,920 --> 00:51:48,360
Speaker 4: about the consultist of consultants.

847
00:51:48,840 --> 00:51:52,239
Speaker 5: Oh yes, amorphis of companies, like what do they do? Yeah?

848
00:51:52,320 --> 00:51:55,680
Speaker 3: Great? Note sorry, according to the government of Hungary, they

849
00:51:55,840 --> 00:51:59,480
Speaker 3: did not manufacture anything, right, they just license.

850
00:51:59,640 --> 00:52:01,120
Speaker 5: We don't really know what they do.

851
00:52:01,480 --> 00:52:03,759
Speaker 2: In fact, the money just goes from the Middle East

852
00:52:03,880 --> 00:52:06,680
Speaker 2: through that company back to the Middle East somewhere I'm

853
00:52:06,760 --> 00:52:08,520
Speaker 2: not sure where, and then it comes back but we

854
00:52:08,560 --> 00:52:09,240
Speaker 2: all get paid.

855
00:52:09,960 --> 00:52:13,320
Speaker 3: M Yeah, are you happy? I mean, like, like you

856
00:52:13,400 --> 00:52:19,839
Speaker 3: were saying, the the legitimate business is extant, there are

857
00:52:20,000 --> 00:52:22,600
Speaker 3: records of it. You have to have it though, You

858
00:52:22,800 --> 00:52:25,720
Speaker 3: have to have some sort of legitimate business.

859
00:52:26,120 --> 00:52:31,200
Speaker 2: Yeah, I mean think about that. If your target is Hesbola,

860
00:52:31,680 --> 00:52:34,480
Speaker 2: they're not going to come to some unknown company that

861
00:52:34,960 --> 00:52:38,160
Speaker 2: you know, just popped up out of nowhere and say, oh, sure,

862
00:52:38,320 --> 00:52:42,359
Speaker 2: we'll buy thousands of pagers from you, no problem. They're

863
00:52:42,360 --> 00:52:44,320
Speaker 2: going to look for a company to source that stuff

864
00:52:44,360 --> 00:52:48,959
Speaker 2: from that can be trusted, right, or theoretically trusted, which

865
00:52:49,160 --> 00:52:53,120
Speaker 2: it means it has to be a very long game,

866
00:52:53,200 --> 00:52:55,640
Speaker 2: a very patient, long game of infiltration.

867
00:52:56,080 --> 00:52:59,200
Speaker 4: And does it involve a mole, Like, does it involve

868
00:52:59,280 --> 00:53:04,759
Speaker 4: an insider that tipped off? How how I get the

869
00:53:04,840 --> 00:53:08,400
Speaker 4: middle man of it all? But like it's mind boggling.

870
00:53:08,640 --> 00:53:12,000
Speaker 5: The long game of it. Like you said, Matt, it's

871
00:53:12,080 --> 00:53:13,919
Speaker 5: kind of exciting and like messed up.

872
00:53:14,680 --> 00:53:16,840
Speaker 3: It's messed up. I mean, we talked about this a

873
00:53:16,920 --> 00:53:21,600
Speaker 3: little bit in the past. Some of the best businesses

874
00:53:22,040 --> 00:53:27,680
Speaker 3: in your neighborhood, folks, especially all right, especially in the US,

875
00:53:27,800 --> 00:53:30,480
Speaker 3: I'll say it, some of the best businesses in your

876
00:53:30,600 --> 00:53:33,600
Speaker 3: neck of the woods are gonna be front companies. You

877
00:53:33,719 --> 00:53:38,319
Speaker 3: walk into the abandoned pizza place, they're surprised that you're there.

878
00:53:39,400 --> 00:53:43,120
Speaker 3: They're astounded you're ordering a pizza. They take forever to

879
00:53:43,200 --> 00:53:45,640
Speaker 3: make it, and it's the best pizza you've had in

880
00:53:45,760 --> 00:53:49,080
Speaker 3: your life. Welcome to New Jersey, you know what I mean.

881
00:53:49,280 --> 00:53:53,920
Speaker 3: Like the front company thing is real. Like an example

882
00:53:54,000 --> 00:53:56,640
Speaker 3: would be, let's say you go to a dry cleaner,

883
00:53:57,040 --> 00:54:00,640
Speaker 3: and this dry cleaner gives you great deals all the time,

884
00:54:00,800 --> 00:54:04,560
Speaker 3: no questions asked. Is that cranberry? Is that blood? They

885
00:54:04,640 --> 00:54:08,360
Speaker 3: don't care. They'll just clean it and you return a

886
00:54:08,440 --> 00:54:11,960
Speaker 3: few items. They never raise a mess, they never make

887
00:54:12,040 --> 00:54:14,560
Speaker 3: a fuss about giving you a refund. And at some

888
00:54:14,640 --> 00:54:18,520
Speaker 3: point you ask, who are these guys making money? And

889
00:54:18,640 --> 00:54:22,360
Speaker 3: that's the question Hesbela should have asked about bac Whoops.

890
00:54:23,760 --> 00:54:26,800
Speaker 3: They start shipping these pages to Lebanon around the summer

891
00:54:26,920 --> 00:54:31,840
Speaker 3: twenty twenty two in small batches. But after, as we mentioned,

892
00:54:32,200 --> 00:54:36,680
Speaker 3: after the Secretary General of HESBOLA identifies cell phones as

893
00:54:36,800 --> 00:54:40,520
Speaker 3: opsect breach, they order more and more. All in all,

894
00:54:40,600 --> 00:54:44,560
Speaker 3: we're looking at something like five thousand separate pagers. And

895
00:54:44,719 --> 00:54:48,800
Speaker 3: as we described earlier just a few moments ago, this

896
00:54:49,040 --> 00:54:55,560
Speaker 3: teaches us that whomever was poisoning the well, they waited,

897
00:54:56,640 --> 00:54:58,719
Speaker 3: They let them get out there, and they could have

898
00:54:58,760 --> 00:54:59,920
Speaker 3: pushed the button at any time.

899
00:55:00,560 --> 00:55:02,400
Speaker 4: That's the thing though, I mean, it's like, you can

900
00:55:02,480 --> 00:55:07,440
Speaker 4: only really do this once, right before new security measures

901
00:55:07,480 --> 00:55:10,840
Speaker 4: get put in place, Before you know, the HESBLA leadership

902
00:55:10,960 --> 00:55:14,000
Speaker 4: is wise. They were already clearly very paranoid about the

903
00:55:14,080 --> 00:55:17,160
Speaker 4: types of communication devices they use, which is capitalized on.

904
00:55:17,600 --> 00:55:19,759
Speaker 4: But now the cats out of the bag and now

905
00:55:19,920 --> 00:55:22,080
Speaker 4: they're you can't really do it again. So do you

906
00:55:22,120 --> 00:55:26,120
Speaker 4: think they triggered it out of timing, like like because

907
00:55:26,120 --> 00:55:28,080
Speaker 4: they were ready, or do you think they were worried

908
00:55:28,080 --> 00:55:29,600
Speaker 4: about being exposed and they were just like, well, we

909
00:55:29,680 --> 00:55:33,520
Speaker 4: might as well get maximum impact for our investments.

910
00:55:33,040 --> 00:55:37,319
Speaker 5: In this operation. Yeah, I think so too.

911
00:55:37,719 --> 00:55:40,280
Speaker 4: Otherwise they would have done individuals maybe, and they wouldn't

912
00:55:40,320 --> 00:55:43,360
Speaker 4: have it wouldn't have let on, I don't think that.

913
00:55:43,760 --> 00:55:44,719
Speaker 3: Has all at once.

914
00:55:44,880 --> 00:55:45,319
Speaker 5: Mm hmm.

915
00:55:45,440 --> 00:55:46,359
Speaker 3: It's the only way it works.

916
00:55:46,960 --> 00:55:51,319
Speaker 2: It's a super compelling strategy to strike at an enemy

917
00:55:51,360 --> 00:55:54,680
Speaker 2: who is already using this technology on purpose, because this

918
00:55:54,880 --> 00:55:57,840
Speaker 2: group is so paranoid about a single cell phone in

919
00:55:57,920 --> 00:56:01,680
Speaker 2: a big meeting or communicating any any information across a

920
00:56:01,800 --> 00:56:05,680
Speaker 2: cell phone, because there's an awareness within that organization that

921
00:56:06,120 --> 00:56:09,320
Speaker 2: any of that information can be tapped, and you have

922
00:56:09,440 --> 00:56:12,360
Speaker 2: to assume it is tapped. So they move to this

923
00:56:12,560 --> 00:56:18,120
Speaker 2: low tech stuff. And now you've made that group completely, fully,

924
00:56:18,480 --> 00:56:21,400
Speaker 2: rightfully paranoid about the low tech that they can use

925
00:56:21,480 --> 00:56:25,200
Speaker 2: to communicate. So how the heck does that group communicate then,

926
00:56:25,680 --> 00:56:30,239
Speaker 2: to let's say, organize fighters to a particular location or

927
00:56:30,360 --> 00:56:32,800
Speaker 2: strategize about what's going to happen in the future.

928
00:56:34,239 --> 00:56:38,719
Speaker 3: Yeah, let's also let's also consider well, let's step back here,

929
00:56:38,880 --> 00:56:39,960
Speaker 3: because there are a couple of things.

930
00:56:40,239 --> 00:56:40,399
Speaker 5: Right.

931
00:56:40,560 --> 00:56:44,120
Speaker 3: First, we have to say, yes, each of these devices

932
00:56:44,600 --> 00:56:48,240
Speaker 3: functioned as a two way radio or as a pager.

933
00:56:48,960 --> 00:56:52,600
Speaker 3: The two important differences, going to the AOSH example of

934
00:56:52,719 --> 00:56:57,520
Speaker 3: the nineteen nineties are these. First, the pagers and the

935
00:56:57,760 --> 00:57:02,759
Speaker 3: walkie talkies they were monitored and then second at least

936
00:57:02,800 --> 00:57:06,640
Speaker 3: in the pagers. Each of these guys, jeez, little pager

937
00:57:06,719 --> 00:57:09,480
Speaker 3: guys had an extra bit of spice to the battery,

938
00:57:09,840 --> 00:57:14,600
Speaker 3: about three grams of an explosive called pente rythpertol tetra

939
00:57:14,680 --> 00:57:17,120
Speaker 3: nitrate street name pet in.

940
00:57:17,520 --> 00:57:18,320
Speaker 5: Some heavy pettin.

941
00:57:19,360 --> 00:57:22,040
Speaker 4: This is like it would almost look like an adhesive, right.

942
00:57:22,120 --> 00:57:25,480
Speaker 4: It can be applied like a in a thin band

943
00:57:25,680 --> 00:57:26,320
Speaker 4: almost right.

944
00:57:26,640 --> 00:57:29,560
Speaker 3: M hmm, yeah, you're absolutely right. It makes it very

945
00:57:29,680 --> 00:57:32,080
Speaker 3: difficult to detect. And if you want to be fun

946
00:57:32,120 --> 00:57:35,520
Speaker 3: at parties, you can tell your friends that pettin is

947
00:57:35,840 --> 00:57:40,480
Speaker 3: one of the prime to ingredients in something called semtex.

948
00:57:41,040 --> 00:57:44,200
Speaker 3: To be fair, pettin also can be used to treat

949
00:57:44,280 --> 00:57:45,440
Speaker 3: medical conditions.

950
00:57:47,360 --> 00:57:49,920
Speaker 2: I know semtex from my video game days where you

951
00:57:50,040 --> 00:57:52,040
Speaker 2: throw a sticky grenade right.

952
00:57:52,280 --> 00:57:56,040
Speaker 4: In, like like a splinter cell or Rainbow six or

953
00:57:56,280 --> 00:57:58,880
Speaker 4: the be Lops type games. But now the question that

954
00:57:59,000 --> 00:58:01,440
Speaker 4: I have though, is, Okay, so we've got this supply

955
00:58:01,600 --> 00:58:06,080
Speaker 4: chain interception and we've got this explosive material, how is

956
00:58:06,160 --> 00:58:08,520
Speaker 4: the detonation Like they still would have had to add

957
00:58:08,680 --> 00:58:13,120
Speaker 4: extra bits in order to control the detonation. It does

958
00:58:13,240 --> 00:58:15,640
Speaker 4: make me still wonder is there a way to remotely

959
00:58:15,720 --> 00:58:18,960
Speaker 4: overheat the battery that then causes the detonation because the

960
00:58:19,320 --> 00:58:23,520
Speaker 4: explosive stuff is on the battery, Like, maybe that's just

961
00:58:23,600 --> 00:58:24,280
Speaker 4: a catalysts.

962
00:58:24,800 --> 00:58:25,120
Speaker 5: I don't know.

963
00:58:25,280 --> 00:58:31,040
Speaker 3: I see what we're saying, and we don't have specific mechanics.

964
00:58:31,520 --> 00:58:35,000
Speaker 3: But what we can say is that a radio signal

965
00:58:35,720 --> 00:58:40,720
Speaker 3: goes out and the radio signal somehow triggers or ignites

966
00:58:41,000 --> 00:58:44,680
Speaker 3: the explosive And I know that's not quite answering the

967
00:58:44,760 --> 00:58:49,560
Speaker 3: question at this point. It would be difficult to answer that.

968
00:58:49,680 --> 00:58:52,680
Speaker 3: And perhaps you, fellow conspiracy realist, can help us in

969
00:58:52,800 --> 00:58:53,360
Speaker 3: that regard.

970
00:58:54,120 --> 00:58:57,680
Speaker 4: Would you, though, Ben, say that maybe we don't rule

971
00:58:57,760 --> 00:59:01,360
Speaker 4: out that someone could remotely overheat the battery, that then

972
00:59:01,640 --> 00:59:05,720
Speaker 4: that is the catalyst that causes the explosive strip to

973
00:59:05,840 --> 00:59:06,320
Speaker 4: go boom.

974
00:59:07,280 --> 00:59:10,480
Speaker 3: The issue with remotely overheating the battery is an issue

975
00:59:10,520 --> 00:59:15,760
Speaker 3: of timing, just like we referenced with THEE right right,

976
00:59:16,080 --> 00:59:20,320
Speaker 3: not near, not with the simultaneous nature that we're seeing here.

977
00:59:20,560 --> 00:59:25,640
Speaker 3: So someone compromised trojan horse the supply chain. We don't

978
00:59:25,680 --> 00:59:28,160
Speaker 3: know when it happened. We don't know when the batteries

979
00:59:28,240 --> 00:59:32,280
Speaker 3: got spicy, but we do know it'd be interesting to

980
00:59:32,920 --> 00:59:36,360
Speaker 3: look deeper into this and trace the manufacturers.

981
00:59:36,640 --> 00:59:38,480
Speaker 2: I just want to add this. I'm just seeing this

982
00:59:38,600 --> 00:59:38,880
Speaker 2: right now.

983
00:59:38,960 --> 00:59:39,160
Speaker 5: Guys.

984
00:59:39,200 --> 00:59:42,920
Speaker 2: It's saying pet N can be initiated by a laser.

985
00:59:43,880 --> 00:59:47,160
Speaker 2: That's very specific pulse from a laser. But there's no

986
00:59:47,280 --> 00:59:48,800
Speaker 2: way they got a laser into this.

987
00:59:49,240 --> 00:59:52,120
Speaker 4: That's my question was, like you know that you mentioned

988
00:59:52,160 --> 00:59:56,560
Speaker 4: how inconspicuous this explosive material is a page are small?

989
00:59:57,040 --> 00:59:58,880
Speaker 4: How are they going to get They got to fit

990
00:59:58,960 --> 01:00:01,600
Speaker 4: more stuff in there? If it's if there's a detonator.

991
01:00:01,680 --> 01:00:04,840
Speaker 4: I'm not an expert obviously and explosives or anything, but

992
01:00:05,400 --> 01:00:09,880
Speaker 4: typically a detonator device isn't like, isn't microscopic. It would

993
01:00:09,880 --> 01:00:12,840
Speaker 4: have to be extra stuff, extra guts put into the device.

994
01:00:13,320 --> 01:00:16,400
Speaker 3: Yeah. But also when you got your even your sea

995
01:00:16,480 --> 01:00:19,320
Speaker 3: through Motorola pager, did you open it up and look

996
01:00:19,360 --> 01:00:20,240
Speaker 3: at you You.

997
01:00:20,240 --> 01:00:22,120
Speaker 5: Don't know what those wires are? It just looks like, yeah,

998
01:00:22,160 --> 01:00:26,280
Speaker 5: it's it's technology, you know. Yeah, it's a good point.

999
01:00:26,440 --> 01:00:28,720
Speaker 4: It could be something as simple as a couple extra

1000
01:00:28,800 --> 01:00:29,760
Speaker 4: jumpers of some kind.

1001
01:00:29,840 --> 01:00:31,480
Speaker 5: Like you're you're right, it could be something there.

1002
01:00:31,680 --> 01:00:34,040
Speaker 3: I mean laser also to that point, is focused light,

1003
01:00:34,280 --> 01:00:37,120
Speaker 3: so how would you how would you put a beam

1004
01:00:37,240 --> 01:00:39,480
Speaker 3: that tight on everything at once.

1005
01:00:39,640 --> 01:00:41,720
Speaker 2: It would have to be an electrical charge that's like

1006
01:00:41,880 --> 01:00:45,240
Speaker 2: run from the battery to that thing in a specific way,

1007
01:00:45,320 --> 01:00:49,240
Speaker 2: that only gets activated when that particular signal gets sent.

1008
01:00:49,440 --> 01:00:51,760
Speaker 3: Right, Because you would you would need it to work

1009
01:00:52,200 --> 01:00:57,720
Speaker 3: for time, right, you would you? So what what they

1010
01:00:57,800 --> 01:01:02,040
Speaker 3: called it for a while in termsly was the button?

1011
01:01:02,960 --> 01:01:06,880
Speaker 3: And intelligence would ask or you know, they would crow

1012
01:01:06,920 --> 01:01:08,560
Speaker 3: a little bit about it, like when are we going

1013
01:01:08,640 --> 01:01:11,360
Speaker 3: to push the button? And I think they pushed the

1014
01:01:11,440 --> 01:01:15,560
Speaker 3: button because they got compromised or because they knew they

1015
01:01:15,600 --> 01:01:17,160
Speaker 3: were in a limited time window.

1016
01:01:17,560 --> 01:01:17,680
Speaker 5: Right.

1017
01:01:18,040 --> 01:01:25,160
Speaker 3: And I love what you're saying about the specificity of

1018
01:01:25,320 --> 01:01:29,360
Speaker 3: the signal that was transmitted. It had to be programmed in.

1019
01:01:29,880 --> 01:01:32,720
Speaker 3: It's like back when people figured out how to hack cars,

1020
01:01:33,200 --> 01:01:37,880
Speaker 3: you had to plug into the physical device at some point.

1021
01:01:38,520 --> 01:01:43,720
Speaker 3: Right now, cars these days, unfortunately, can be compromised with

1022
01:01:43,880 --> 01:01:48,640
Speaker 3: malicious code. But these pagers, again, it wasn't software. We

1023
01:01:48,760 --> 01:01:53,080
Speaker 3: don't know exactly where the supply chain intervention occurred. We

1024
01:01:53,200 --> 01:01:56,360
Speaker 3: got to look at the batteries. We have to see

1025
01:01:56,400 --> 01:02:00,760
Speaker 3: the involvement of the manufacturers. I guarantee you their people

1026
01:02:01,280 --> 01:02:05,320
Speaker 3: and entities tracing supply chains now, and they probably already

1027
01:02:05,400 --> 01:02:07,560
Speaker 3: know the answer. We'll see if it goes public. But

1028
01:02:08,800 --> 01:02:12,960
Speaker 3: all this together means that, yes, depending on how intelligence

1029
01:02:13,000 --> 01:02:17,520
Speaker 3: agencies consider you, there is a non zero possibility that

1030
01:02:17,600 --> 01:02:22,680
Speaker 3: your phone, iPad, pager, or radio might have something dangerous.

1031
01:02:23,040 --> 01:02:25,640
Speaker 3: We're not being alarmist. There are billions and billions of

1032
01:02:25,720 --> 01:02:28,240
Speaker 3: mobile devices all over the world. Most of them are

1033
01:02:28,320 --> 01:02:32,520
Speaker 3: servitors for various functions. If there was a way to

1034
01:02:32,680 --> 01:02:39,040
Speaker 3: sabotage the entire world, especially with code, it would be

1035
01:02:39,400 --> 01:02:47,120
Speaker 3: insufficient in reach and capability. Like you could theoretically make

1036
01:02:47,240 --> 01:02:52,720
Speaker 3: some bad you know, sail by Night software that overclocks

1037
01:02:52,760 --> 01:02:56,000
Speaker 3: a battery or overheats it, but you wouldn't be able

1038
01:02:56,080 --> 01:03:00,680
Speaker 3: to make those devices explode, and you wouldn't be able

1039
01:03:00,760 --> 01:03:02,439
Speaker 3: to make them explode at the same time.

1040
01:03:03,680 --> 01:03:08,520
Speaker 2: Yeah, just as a counterpoint, guys, imagine you're in one

1041
01:03:08,560 --> 01:03:12,080
Speaker 2: of these factories that is producing let's say iPhone fifteens,

1042
01:03:12,760 --> 01:03:17,160
Speaker 2: and there is adhesive used in the process to connect

1043
01:03:17,480 --> 01:03:20,800
Speaker 2: you know, whatever it is, whatever components to whatever other components,

1044
01:03:21,400 --> 01:03:25,080
Speaker 2: and somebody high up who has connections to a government

1045
01:03:25,920 --> 01:03:29,320
Speaker 2: decides to replace some of that adhesive with this other substance,

1046
01:03:29,480 --> 01:03:32,240
Speaker 2: and everyone who's actually putting together those phones has no

1047
01:03:32,440 --> 01:03:35,160
Speaker 2: idea that they are adding pettent or one of these

1048
01:03:35,200 --> 01:03:39,520
Speaker 2: other explosives to the devices, to all of them. And then,

1049
01:03:40,880 --> 01:03:43,640
Speaker 2: because we are our devices now in so many ways,

1050
01:03:43,720 --> 01:03:47,920
Speaker 2: unless you're extremely careful, you could have a list of

1051
01:03:48,040 --> 01:03:51,560
Speaker 2: people that you wanted to assassinate that are potentially political enemies.

1052
01:03:51,720 --> 01:03:53,880
Speaker 2: If they are you know, you're putting this in the

1053
01:03:54,000 --> 01:03:57,160
Speaker 2: highest level, like the most expensive phones, right, the ones

1054
01:03:57,200 --> 01:04:00,840
Speaker 2: that are the most secure or something. Oh then yeah,

1055
01:04:01,120 --> 01:04:03,720
Speaker 2: well yeah, well but what I mean is you could

1056
01:04:03,840 --> 01:04:08,200
Speaker 2: like the possib there, which is just creepy to me.

1057
01:04:08,480 --> 01:04:10,919
Speaker 5: I mean to that point, Matt. You know, in terms

1058
01:04:10,960 --> 01:04:13,720
Speaker 5: of you know, everyone being so tied to their phones.

1059
01:04:14,040 --> 01:04:18,520
Speaker 4: We know about assassination plots of political figures in the past,

1060
01:04:18,920 --> 01:04:22,320
Speaker 4: like what was it, Ben, I think it was Fidel Castro.

1061
01:04:22,480 --> 01:04:25,280
Speaker 4: There's like an exploding cigar, like there was you know,

1062
01:04:25,320 --> 01:04:28,120
Speaker 4: I mean, now, this is like the ultimate exploding cigar

1063
01:04:28,320 --> 01:04:29,400
Speaker 4: for everybody you know.

1064
01:04:30,720 --> 01:04:32,280
Speaker 3: And shout out to our friends at act me.

1065
01:04:33,200 --> 01:04:36,800
Speaker 4: Well, it seems silly, but the point of that was

1066
01:04:36,920 --> 01:04:39,920
Speaker 4: it was an object that you knew Fidel Castro was

1067
01:04:39,960 --> 01:04:42,880
Speaker 4: going to have close to him, such that if it

1068
01:04:42,960 --> 01:04:46,440
Speaker 4: were to explode, it would devastatingly injure him.

1069
01:04:46,760 --> 01:04:49,320
Speaker 5: Now we have these devices that no matter who you are,

1070
01:04:50,040 --> 01:04:51,920
Speaker 5: you're going to have one. Everyone relies on it.

1071
01:04:52,040 --> 01:04:54,560
Speaker 4: So it's like the diligence has got to just go

1072
01:04:54,720 --> 01:04:57,080
Speaker 4: up through the roof in terms of security protocols to

1073
01:04:57,160 --> 01:04:59,560
Speaker 4: monitor these. And I'm sure, like you know, presidents and

1074
01:05:00,000 --> 01:05:03,760
Speaker 4: loitical figures, they've got offline devices that are monitored by

1075
01:05:03,840 --> 01:05:06,760
Speaker 4: certain types of protocols. And you know about how you

1076
01:05:06,840 --> 01:05:09,680
Speaker 4: gotta wonder, like are they taking them apart? Are they

1077
01:05:09,920 --> 01:05:11,800
Speaker 4: like this seems new, I don't know.

1078
01:05:12,400 --> 01:05:15,520
Speaker 3: They are being taken apart in a lot of Western

1079
01:05:15,600 --> 01:05:18,920
Speaker 3: regimes and a lot of despotic regimes as well.

1080
01:05:19,160 --> 01:05:21,480
Speaker 5: Maybe more so because they're like more paranoid or I

1081
01:05:21,520 --> 01:05:21,800
Speaker 5: don't know.

1082
01:05:22,200 --> 01:05:25,440
Speaker 3: Yeah, but also, you know, North Koreas way fewer phones.

1083
01:05:25,840 --> 01:05:28,240
Speaker 3: It's just easier to check all of them. That's true,

1084
01:05:29,840 --> 01:05:34,400
Speaker 3: which sounds cold, but is true. That the example about

1085
01:05:34,480 --> 01:05:38,000
Speaker 3: infiltrating the supply chain to that earlier point, it is

1086
01:05:38,200 --> 01:05:46,800
Speaker 3: theoretically possible. The question is why and to what end? Right, Quibono,

1087
01:05:46,960 --> 01:05:50,040
Speaker 3: who does it benefit? You know the world is waiting

1088
01:05:50,560 --> 01:05:54,360
Speaker 3: right now thermo barrack bombs are being deployed in the

1089
01:05:54,400 --> 01:05:59,920
Speaker 3: Middle East, and just on a high level, folks, thermobaric

1090
01:06:00,040 --> 01:06:03,720
Speaker 3: bomb is sort of like if the if nuclear weaponry

1091
01:06:03,880 --> 01:06:08,000
Speaker 3: detonating is home run. This stuff is second base running

1092
01:06:08,080 --> 01:06:12,200
Speaker 3: towards shortstop. It's nasty, and they have been deployed.

1093
01:06:12,520 --> 01:06:14,439
Speaker 4: And you also have to wonder, I do at least

1094
01:06:14,560 --> 01:06:18,680
Speaker 4: like in order to get the actual Hesbula folks who

1095
01:06:18,760 --> 01:06:22,320
Speaker 4: are actually operating, running, you know, playing significant roles in

1096
01:06:22,440 --> 01:06:27,720
Speaker 4: that organization, how many quote unquote Hesbela adjacent people you know,

1097
01:06:28,440 --> 01:06:31,720
Speaker 4: got these devices as well, who actually had nothing to

1098
01:06:31,800 --> 01:06:34,240
Speaker 4: do with the organization, but just we're kind of swept

1099
01:06:34,320 --> 01:06:37,200
Speaker 4: up in the net of like we got to you know,

1100
01:06:37,920 --> 01:06:39,120
Speaker 4: break a lot of eggs to make.

1101
01:06:39,000 --> 01:06:39,800
Speaker 5: An omelet or whatever.

1102
01:06:40,200 --> 01:06:43,800
Speaker 2: I think it would be wrong if you thought these

1103
01:06:44,040 --> 01:06:47,160
Speaker 2: pagers in this long attack over this many, like to

1104
01:06:47,320 --> 01:06:50,960
Speaker 2: over two years, if there wasn't also on the ground

1105
01:06:51,040 --> 01:06:56,000
Speaker 2: surveillance of individuals, like on an individual level, of human

1106
01:06:56,080 --> 01:06:59,960
Speaker 2: beings entering and exiting locations and all kinds of stuff

1107
01:07:00,160 --> 01:07:04,480
Speaker 2: like that where people are gathering where these devices end up,

1108
01:07:04,880 --> 01:07:06,840
Speaker 2: you know, at certain times of day. I think this

1109
01:07:06,960 --> 01:07:11,120
Speaker 2: is a combination of a lot of surveillance and a

1110
01:07:11,240 --> 01:07:12,040
Speaker 2: targeted attack.

1111
01:07:12,880 --> 01:07:16,640
Speaker 3: So while we have some ability to separate fact from fiction,

1112
01:07:17,720 --> 01:07:20,360
Speaker 3: we don't have all the answers. But we hope we

1113
01:07:20,640 --> 01:07:25,080
Speaker 3: are exploring the correct questions right the beginning of the

1114
01:07:25,160 --> 01:07:29,200
Speaker 3: rabbit hole. Folks, this is an active story. There is

1115
01:07:29,320 --> 01:07:32,840
Speaker 3: currently no happy ever after in the Middle East, nor

1116
01:07:32,920 --> 01:07:35,880
Speaker 3: in Europe, nor in Africa, nor in the Americas, so

1117
01:07:36,160 --> 01:07:40,960
Speaker 3: long as the same entities built to guarantee safety engage

1118
01:07:41,000 --> 01:07:44,760
Speaker 3: in the same tactics as terrorists and during the course

1119
01:07:45,120 --> 01:07:48,600
Speaker 3: of our lives. Now, it's only going to become increasingly

1120
01:07:48,680 --> 01:07:54,120
Speaker 3: important to question what happily ever after means for nation states,

1121
01:07:54,520 --> 01:07:59,920
Speaker 3: for terrorist organizations, for moneyed interest, and what it happily

1122
01:08:00,080 --> 01:08:02,880
Speaker 3: ever after means for people on the ground. We can

1123
01:08:03,040 --> 01:08:06,040
Speaker 3: promise you this, We'll be here with you so long

1124
01:08:06,240 --> 01:08:08,840
Speaker 3: as there is stuff they don't want you to know,

1125
01:08:09,280 --> 01:08:12,680
Speaker 3: and we cannot wait to hear your thoughts. Guys, my

1126
01:08:12,840 --> 01:08:16,599
Speaker 3: spidery sense is going off. We've got some people who

1127
01:08:16,760 --> 01:08:20,560
Speaker 3: have been with us the entirety of tonight's episode and

1128
01:08:20,880 --> 01:08:26,840
Speaker 3: cannot wait to break down some theoretical hypothetical ways to

1129
01:08:27,000 --> 01:08:30,880
Speaker 3: trigger explosions through radio signals. How do they find us.

1130
01:08:30,840 --> 01:08:33,280
Speaker 4: No, Oh jeez, you can find us all over the internet.

1131
01:08:33,280 --> 01:08:35,080
Speaker 4: By by the way, this stuff is just such red

1132
01:08:35,160 --> 01:08:38,880
Speaker 4: meat because it's real, it's clear, and it's in the news,

1133
01:08:39,120 --> 01:08:41,880
Speaker 4: and we don't know all the facts yet, so it's like, well,

1134
01:08:42,120 --> 01:08:44,519
Speaker 4: our job here on the show is to report what

1135
01:08:44,680 --> 01:08:47,600
Speaker 4: we do know. There's so much room for conjecture and

1136
01:08:47,760 --> 01:08:50,080
Speaker 4: so much room for like, what's the next version of this?

1137
01:08:50,320 --> 01:08:52,920
Speaker 4: What is the escalation of this? Sorry, I just I'm

1138
01:08:52,960 --> 01:08:56,200
Speaker 4: blown away by guy. That's a horrible expression in this case,

1139
01:08:56,400 --> 01:08:59,599
Speaker 4: but it's mind boggling, and you can, in fact share

1140
01:08:59,720 --> 01:09:02,519
Speaker 4: your perspective on this, your ideas for what's next with

1141
01:09:02,720 --> 01:09:04,960
Speaker 4: us at the handle Conspiracy Stuff where we exist on

1142
01:09:05,479 --> 01:09:08,960
Speaker 4: x FKA, Twitter, on YouTube where we have video content

1143
01:09:09,040 --> 01:09:12,280
Speaker 4: for you to peruse and enjoy, as well as on Facebook.

1144
01:09:12,320 --> 01:09:14,080
Speaker 4: We have a Facebook group here's where it gets crazy,

1145
01:09:14,320 --> 01:09:17,639
Speaker 4: on Instagram and TikTok. However, we are Conspiracy Stuff Show.

1146
01:09:18,439 --> 01:09:22,879
Speaker 2: Hey, are you a federal agent that's infiltrated somebody's personal

1147
01:09:22,960 --> 01:09:25,320
Speaker 2: device by intercepting it before it got to them and

1148
01:09:25,400 --> 01:09:27,240
Speaker 2: putting some stuff in it? Call us and tell us

1149
01:09:27,280 --> 01:09:30,479
Speaker 2: how you did it. We'd love to know. Call one

1150
01:09:30,560 --> 01:09:34,439
Speaker 2: eight three three std WYTK. When you call in, give

1151
01:09:34,439 --> 01:09:37,080
Speaker 2: yourself a cool nickname and let us know if we

1152
01:09:37,120 --> 01:09:38,840
Speaker 2: can use your name and message on the air. We

1153
01:09:38,920 --> 01:09:40,519
Speaker 2: don't have to use it. You can tell us don't

1154
01:09:40,600 --> 01:09:42,240
Speaker 2: use it, and we still want to hear from you.

1155
01:09:42,760 --> 01:09:44,160
Speaker 2: If you've got more to say than can fit in

1156
01:09:44,240 --> 01:09:46,200
Speaker 2: that message, why not instead send us a good old

1157
01:09:46,280 --> 01:09:47,080
Speaker 2: fashioned email.

1158
01:09:47,280 --> 01:09:51,320
Speaker 3: We are the entities that read every piece of correspondence

1159
01:09:51,439 --> 01:09:55,519
Speaker 3: we receive. Be well aware, yet unafraid. Sometimes the void

1160
01:09:55,720 --> 01:09:59,600
Speaker 3: writes back, join us out here in the dark conspiracy

1161
01:10:00,000 --> 01:10:01,599
Speaker 3: at iHeartRadio dot com.

1162
01:10:21,400 --> 01:10:23,439
Speaker 2: Stuff they don't want you to know is a production

1163
01:10:23,600 --> 01:10:28,080
Speaker 2: of iHeartRadio. For more podcasts from iHeartRadio, visit the iHeartRadio app,

1164
01:10:28,200 --> 01:10:31,040
Speaker 2: Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to your favorite shows.