Speaker 1: This is Gavin Newsom, and this is Richard Haas. Richard,
Speaker 1: thank you so much for taking the time to come on,
Speaker 1: particularly at a remarkable time in world history, particularly in
Speaker 1: history unfolding in the Middle East. Today. President Trump seemed
Speaker 1: to have a day that he's been looking forward to
Speaker 1: for years and years and years, pushing NATO to move
Speaker 1: from two percent to five percent. What was your takeaway
Speaker 1: from this NATO summit, at least the first day, and
Speaker 1: just Trump deserve I think a lot of praise and
Speaker 1: for an accomplishment here.
Speaker 2: I would argue President Trump, well, first of all, Gavin,
Speaker 2: good to be with you.
Speaker 3: Thank you.
Speaker 2: Look, I would argue President Trump deserves credit for spurring
Speaker 2: the Europeans to do what they ought to have done
Speaker 2: years before.
Speaker 3: They ought to be.
Speaker 2: Putting forward a larger share of the effort for what's
Speaker 2: a common defense.
Speaker 3: I was just as an aside.
Speaker 2: I would say, much more important to me than whether
Speaker 2: the Europeans spend three percent or two and a half
Speaker 2: or four and a half is how they spend it.
Speaker 3: And I'd actually say something you'd probably agree with.
Speaker 2: In public policy, how you spend money is almost always
Speaker 2: more important than how much you spend and The problem
Speaker 2: with European defense is not just that they spend too little,
Speaker 2: but each country pretty much determines how it spends its
Speaker 2: defense euros, so the whole ends up being less than
Speaker 2: the sum of its parts. So I would be pushing
Speaker 2: if I were advising the president, I would say, yeah,
Speaker 2: push them to do more, but secondly, also push them
Speaker 2: in a sense to become more European, rather than country
Speaker 2: by country by country, which is the way they often
Speaker 2: go about it.
Speaker 3: But I think that part is good. Less good is
Speaker 3: I think he's introduced some.
Speaker 2: Doubts into the reliability of the United States and what
Speaker 2: you might call the automatic quality of Article five America's
Speaker 2: willingness to go to bat for Europe. And obviously there's
Speaker 2: also some fairly significant differences about how to handle the
Speaker 2: most immediate threat, which is Russia and the war in Ukraine.
Speaker 2: So I think it's a mixed bag. But yes, it's
Speaker 2: good to see the Europeans essentially getting pushed to do more.
Speaker 1: And it's interesting just as you unpack and I appreciate
Speaker 1: how you spend and where you spend. It was interesting
Speaker 1: just looking at some of the details that their direct
Speaker 1: spend in support of Ukraine would be considered as part
Speaker 1: of that contribution as it relates to that breakdown of
Speaker 1: five percent. It was also, though interesting to see the
Speaker 1: breakdown within the countries. Obviously Germany looking to move quicker
Speaker 1: by twenty twenty nine with close to seventy percent increase
Speaker 1: in their domestic defense spending, and then Spain, who was
Speaker 1: called to help by the President today, looking not necessarily
Speaker 1: to reach that numerica. Does that mean much to you
Speaker 1: or is that just that's just noise?
Speaker 2: Most interesting part of that is Germany less what Germany
Speaker 2: is prepared to do in defense, though doing more as welcome,
Speaker 2: but Germany has changed its laws and essentially now is
Speaker 2: able to raise serious debt, which was something that modern
Speaker 2: Germany had an allergy to because of the whole Weimar experience.
Speaker 3: And the fact that.
Speaker 2: Germany now can really go into the markets and raise
Speaker 2: that gives them far more capacity to potentially grow their
Speaker 2: economies as well as to contribute to national security. And
Speaker 2: then even go so far as to say the most
Speaker 2: interesting figure in Europe right now is the new Chancellor
Speaker 2: of Germany. And even though he had a rough start
Speaker 2: and getting confirmed and so forth by his parliament, I
Speaker 2: actually think the Chancellor Mertz is in a position to
Speaker 2: in some ways have Germany stake out the leadership position
Speaker 2: in Europe, something that historically since World War Two Germany
Speaker 2: has been reticent.
Speaker 3: To do so.
Speaker 2: Would I would watch that space, particularly since the French,
Speaker 2: the British and others are so gridlocked domestically. I think
Speaker 2: Germany now occup the critical position.
Speaker 1: When you referenced the Article five sort of you know,
Speaker 1: I think the president when he was flying over there
Speaker 1: was some ambiguity once again sort of creating some doubt
Speaker 1: and anxiety. He seemed to shift tone a little bit
Speaker 1: when he landed, But that is just that on again,
Speaker 1: off again relationship to the Article five. Is that what
Speaker 1: you're referring to as sort of a lack of certainty
Speaker 1: and confidence in the president?
Speaker 3: Yeah.
Speaker 2: For those who haven't read the NATO treaty recently, Article
Speaker 2: five is the core of the agreement. We're essentially an
Speaker 2: attack on one who is considered to be an attack
Speaker 2: on all. Curiously, it's only been invoked once in NATO's
Speaker 2: entire history, and that was on behalf of the United
Speaker 2: States after.
Speaker 3: Nine to eleven.
Speaker 2: But alliances depend upon predictability and reliability and dependability and
Speaker 2: I would argue that President Trump has introduced a significant
Speaker 2: degree of uncertainty into that, which I think is counterproductive.
Speaker 2: He would argue, perhaps it was necessary to get the
Speaker 2: beans to do more. I would have said, well, probably
Speaker 2: there's better ways to do that. But that's where we are,
Speaker 2: and to the extent Russia sensus, there's uncertainty there putin
Speaker 2: who as we've seen in Ukraine, can be risk frunt
Speaker 2: it might be more likely to take risks. So I
Speaker 2: always believe that the best way to deter is through certainty.
Speaker 2: So your friends know you'll be there for them, and
Speaker 2: just as important, your enemies know you'll be there for
Speaker 2: your friends. So I would like for President Trump, as
Speaker 2: the days and weeks and months unfold, to look for
Speaker 2: opportunities to make clear that whatever our differences are with
Speaker 2: Europe over their level of defense effort, we see it
Speaker 2: as an our interest to be there with them.
Speaker 3: You're here.
Speaker 1: What in terms of the actual bombing itself, and I
Speaker 1: think my most objective standards, it was a success. Whether
Speaker 1: or not these sites were quote unquote obliterated, that's a
Speaker 1: separate conversation. Is that your assessment that this was a success,
Speaker 1: that in the spirit of what you just said. Around
Speaker 1: some certain that the President wasn't bluffing in terms of
Speaker 1: wanting to get diplomatic deal done. They appeared not to
Speaker 1: want to move in that direction, so then he asserted
Speaker 1: himself militarily.
Speaker 3: I think it was the right thing to do.
Speaker 2: For years, we've been playing this game with the Iranians
Speaker 2: where they were enriching uranium far far, far beyond levels
Speaker 2: anybody would need to generate electricity, so we all knew
Speaker 2: what this was about to put into place. The were
Speaker 2: prerequisites for a nuclear weapons program. I also understood we
Speaker 2: couldn't allow Iron to get on the threshold, much less
Speaker 2: have nuclear weapons. We made that mistake. I would argue
Speaker 2: with North Korea, we don't want to have it now
Speaker 2: in this part of the world, because if Iron ever
Speaker 2: got nuclear weapons, not only would they act more aggressively
Speaker 2: imposed potentially an existential threat to Israel. But you know,
Speaker 2: and I know, the Saudis, the Egyptians, the Turks and
Speaker 2: others would follow suits. And the only thing worse than
Speaker 2: the Middle East we've known is the Middle East I
Speaker 2: just described. So I think what Israel and then the
Speaker 2: United States did was it was warrant it. We'll see
Speaker 2: what the results are. Whatever the Iran, whatever happened, the
Speaker 2: Iranian program was not obliterated. Elements of their program I
Speaker 2: expect will have survived the attacks on the three sides.
Speaker 3: More important, I don't know.
Speaker 2: You don't know, probably the president doesn't know what amount
Speaker 2: of uranium or number of centrifuges and so forth are
Speaker 2: under some roof of some warehouse and some other part
Speaker 2: of Iran. I actually think going forward, Devin, we have
Speaker 2: got to assume just the opposite to the Iranian program
Speaker 2: was not obliterating, but elements of that program exist. And
Speaker 2: what's worrisome to me, I'll be honest with you. I
Speaker 2: would think that a lot of Iranian leaders have said, Hey,
Speaker 2: this never would have happened. Had we had nuclear weapons,
Speaker 2: we could have deterred the Israelis in the Americas. So
Speaker 2: I worry that going forward, I think their determination to
Speaker 2: develop nuclear weapons might, if anything, be even greater.
Speaker 1: Well, you know, I want to just pick up on
Speaker 1: that point because that's an interesting observation and an important one.
Speaker 1: And we'll get to North Korea as well in a second.
Speaker 1: Because your reference goes back to the opportunity the United
Speaker 1: States had under the Clinton administration to take out their
Speaker 1: program before it proliferated. But I want to talk a
Speaker 1: little bit about the Non Proliferation Treaty. People have brought
Speaker 1: that up since the nineteen seventies. I think two hundred
Speaker 1: countries were signatories to that, including Iran. There were a
Speaker 1: number of countries that have developed nuclear programs that were
Speaker 1: not original signers to that. Obviously Korea and Israel in
Speaker 1: the extent they have a nuclear program quote unquote, but
Speaker 1: certainly India and Pakistan. But those countries as a consequence,
Speaker 1: would make the claim you just made that they've been
Speaker 1: they've had that deterrent. Now Iran assumed that they would
Speaker 1: not be bombed, I presume under the terms of the
Speaker 1: Non Proliferation Treaty. Does that put it risk the entire
Speaker 1: notion of the non Proliferation Treaty? What's just occurred.
Speaker 3: So let me give you a slightly convoluted answered.
Speaker 2: The Non Proliferation Treaty is only a small piece of
Speaker 2: the effort against non proliferation. I don't think it's a
Speaker 2: wildly successful piece in many ways because.
Speaker 3: It really is a gentleman's agreement.
Speaker 2: We declare what facilities we're doing, certain types of research
Speaker 2: or engineering in and then the inspectors come look at them.
Speaker 2: Inspectors can't look at places that are not known. So
Speaker 2: the entire treaty in that sense is based upon a
Speaker 2: degree of faith that I tend not to have. North
Speaker 2: Korea withdrew from the treaty and there was no particular
Speaker 2: penalty or anything for them having done so. It turns
Speaker 2: out the most important non proliferation tool out there is
Speaker 2: not the Treaty.
Speaker 3: It's called America's alliances.
Speaker 2: By giving countries the confidence that we are there for them,
Speaker 2: they don't need to become self sufficient, and the biggest
Speaker 2: way to accelerate proliferation will be, for example, the South
Speaker 2: Koreans or others come to have doubts about their relationships
Speaker 2: with US. So don't get me wrong, I'm not saying
Speaker 2: the Non Proliferation Treaty doesn't have some utility, and I
Speaker 2: think in particular the inspection provisions can be useful.
Speaker 3: But we shouldn't exaggerate.
Speaker 2: Uh, it's impact that Iran I would think was going
Speaker 2: to do is going to do what it wants regardless
Speaker 2: of its obligations under the street.
Speaker 1: So back to what you were saying, I mean, so
Speaker 1: just let's speculate what goes happens going forward. Obviously, this
Speaker 1: notion of resim change, people sort of pull back a
Speaker 1: little bit, or least it appears the President's pulled back.
Speaker 1: I don't know if BB is pulled back on the
Speaker 1: notion of regime change. But what won't change is their pursuit,
Speaker 1: presumably of a nuclear weapon. As you note, we don't
Speaker 1: know that the program was quote unquote obliterated. Even if
Speaker 1: the physical sites may have been, we don't know where
Speaker 1: this enriched uranium is and centrifugius you imagine. Now your
Speaker 1: concern is now what that they accelerate that program with
Speaker 1: the darkness, meaning without any international inspectors.
Speaker 3: That's my concern.
Speaker 2: It might not be their immediate priority, which I think
Speaker 2: is to shore up the regime. But at some point
Speaker 2: I do think reconstituting a program will become a priority,
Speaker 2: which means, by the way, the day may come where Israel,
Speaker 2: the United States needs to once again use military force
Speaker 2: if we discover some activity going on in the Iranians
Speaker 2: won't voluntarily give it up. It's not normal that problems
Speaker 2: get solved. When I was the head of the Council
Speaker 2: on Foreign Relations, I used to discourage the Fellows from
Speaker 2: using the words solved or solution, because it's just the
Speaker 2: way history works. So I don't believe whatever it is
Speaker 2: we accomplished the other day, however much we accomplished, it
Speaker 2: didn't solve the problem. It may have reduced it, it may
Speaker 2: have set back the Iranian program, but that'll pop up again.
Speaker 3: It's by the way you mentioned regime change.
Speaker 2: It's one of the reasons that people, I think are
Speaker 2: attracted to the idea. If you can't solve the Iranian
Speaker 2: problem through military force or through diplomacy, then people say,
Speaker 2: what's left, Well, let's get a benign government. And I
Speaker 2: think that's why there's so much interest in regime change.
Speaker 2: The problem is it's easier to talk about it than
Speaker 2: bring it about. I don't see the prerequisites in place
Speaker 2: for it, and in any case, you can't base your
Speaker 2: policy on it. People don't like it when I say this,
Speaker 2: but it's a wish more than a strategy. If it
Speaker 2: were to happen. I think it brings problems but obvious
Speaker 2: benefits with it. But we just can't count on it.
Speaker 2: And no president can give the order to so to say,
Speaker 2: Secretary of Defense or State and say, get me regime
Speaker 2: change and Iran they wouldn't have then the tools to
Speaker 2: necessarily carry.
Speaker 1: It out when it comes to just issues of trust,
Speaker 1: and you know, I think one of the questions that
Speaker 1: I get and I ask myself all the time, I
Speaker 1: feel like, for most of my adult life, I've been
Speaker 1: hearing baby net Yao say they're just months away, a
Speaker 1: year away from having weapons, great nuclear weapons, and you know,
Speaker 1: a certain point you just stop believing it. But you're assessed,
Speaker 1: you know, your own objective assessment. This time did appear
Speaker 1: to be different, that they were getting closer and actually
Speaker 1: appeared to be within a matter of months in a
Speaker 1: position where potentially we had a weapons grade weapon coming
Speaker 1: out of Iran? Is that accurate?
Speaker 2: Pretty much? Look, this was a gathering threat. It wasn't
Speaker 2: an imminent threat. It was a gathering threat. And the
Speaker 2: question is how close Now we know they had done
Speaker 2: most of the enrichment work they need to do to
Speaker 2: get it uranium enriched a plus or minus sixty percent,
Speaker 2: that's not just sixty percent of the effort, that's actually
Speaker 2: closer than ninety percent of the effort. For reasons of
Speaker 2: physics that I couldn't explain because I don't understand them
Speaker 2: well enough, but I think I'm right there. Well, we
Speaker 2: don't know is how close they were on some of
Speaker 2: the other things, the actual fabrication of explosive devices, the
Speaker 2: bomb and so forth. And there was the Israelis, believe
Speaker 2: the economists published some very interesting stuff about it, that
Speaker 2: they had made some breakthroughs, they had had some secret
Speaker 2: program amas and so forth. And I think we have
Speaker 2: to be tolerant, just like after nine to eleven we
Speaker 2: were less willing to run certain risks, say about what
Speaker 2: Iraq could do. And this is not a justification for
Speaker 2: the Iraq war. I was against it, but just I
Speaker 2: understand some of the thinking. I think Israel after October
Speaker 2: seventh had less tolerance of running certain risks in their case.
Speaker 2: So I just think the combination of a change mentality
Speaker 2: in Israel, the evisceration of groups like Isbella, which couldn't
Speaker 2: really attack Israel anymore, and this new intelligence would suggested, however,
Speaker 2: far along the Iranians or they were farther along.
Speaker 3: And I think for.
Speaker 2: All those reasons, the Israelis decided to act and we
Speaker 2: came in behind.
Speaker 1: Does this keep BB in power for another extended period
Speaker 1: of time.
Speaker 2: Well, he's got roughly what sixteen seventeen months to run
Speaker 2: before he has to. I think the elections are scheduled
Speaker 2: for October of next year.
Speaker 3: It certainly helps them.
Speaker 2: Israel, as know, is deeply divided about issues on democracy, Gaza,
Speaker 2: what have you, whether the religious can be drafted and
Speaker 2: so forth. They are not divided on Iran left and right,
Speaker 2: hawk and dove. There aren't a lot of doves in
Speaker 2: Israel when it comes to rod. So it clearly helps BB.
Speaker 2: It changes the conversation a little, but it brings Israel together.
Speaker 2: It's seen as an accomplishment, and he has. He has
Speaker 2: changed in many ways israel strategic reality, given the change
Speaker 2: in Syria, is Bulah, the weakening of a mosqu Whatever
Speaker 2: you think, however critical people watching this might be of
Speaker 2: what Israel's done and how it's done it in Gaza,
Speaker 2: the reality is that BB nets and Yahoo in the
Speaker 2: last what eighteen months, has dramatically reduced the external threat
Speaker 2: to Israel.