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Speaker 1: From UFOs to psychic powers and government conspiracies. History is

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Speaker 1: riddled with unexplained events. You can turn back now or

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Speaker 1: learn the stuff they don't want you to know. A

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Speaker 1: production of I Heart Brading. Hello, welcome back to the show.

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Speaker 1: My name is Matt. Our colleague nol is feeling under

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Speaker 1: the weather, but he will be back soon. They called

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Speaker 1: me Ben. We're joined as always with our super producer

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Speaker 1: Paul Mission controlled decond. Most importantly, you are you, You

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Speaker 1: are here, and that makes this the stuff they don't

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Speaker 1: want you to know. With the help of the biggest

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Speaker 1: celebrity on our show, Paul's dog Osoo, we are doing

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Speaker 1: one of our favorite things in the entirety of stuff

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Speaker 1: they don't want you to know, and it is sharing

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Speaker 1: your stories with your fellow listeners. Uh, this is gonna

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Speaker 1: be a listener mail segment that I awkwardly described to

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Speaker 1: Matt and Paul as whoops, all voicemails. So we've we've

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Speaker 1: got some that we we've got something that we want

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Speaker 1: to spend particular attention on in our first half. We're

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Speaker 1: gonna we're gonna talk about your mind and the ability

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Speaker 1: to perhaps affect the passage of the clouds. We're also

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Speaker 1: going to talk about a situation that is hypothetical for

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Speaker 1: many people, but unfortunately was not hypothetical for a friend

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Speaker 1: of ours. And we are also towards the end, we're

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Speaker 1: just gonna We're gonna freestyle a little. We're gonna play

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Speaker 1: as many voicemails as we can, the ones that really

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Speaker 1: stuck out to us and hopefully stick out to you. Uh,

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Speaker 1: without further ado, Matt, what say you? Why don't we

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Speaker 1: set this this first message up by calling it a

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Speaker 1: what would you do? Situation? That's right, this scenario is

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Speaker 1: brought to you by l Ron, not that one. This

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Speaker 1: one here. He cos, Hey, what's up? Guys? Love your show,

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Speaker 1: listen to it for a long time. UM My name

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Speaker 1: is We're gonna go with Leron. I had something happened

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Speaker 1: to be related to your shot Spotter episode, at least

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Speaker 1: a little bit. The other day. I go into a

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Speaker 1: restaurant bar with some friends and while we're in there,

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Speaker 1: I gonna use the restroom, walk in, go into a stall,

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Speaker 1: sit down, and besides the call and like, the toilet

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Speaker 1: paper holder is a loaded gun. It's kind of crazy

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Speaker 1: to find something like this is a loaded nine millimeter

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Speaker 1: Cinema automatic crystal. What do you do in that situation?

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Speaker 1: And obviously the quick answer is, oh, we take it,

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Speaker 1: we unloaded, and then we take it to somebody and

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Speaker 1: turn it in a deal with that. Sure, sure, right,

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Speaker 1: that's fine. But in my situation, I actually made some

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Speaker 1: mistakes A long time go, had addiction issues which led

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Speaker 1: to me committing a crime, not a serious one of

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Speaker 1: the serious enough that I'm not allowed to have a

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Speaker 1: gun anymore. What do you do in that situation? Do

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Speaker 1: you grab that gun and take it to a cop?

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Speaker 1: What if the gun was using the crime? And here

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Speaker 1: you are a criminal quote unquote, because you are for

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Speaker 1: life giving a gun to a cop. And also that

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Speaker 1: interaction was a cop. It's complicated, and what if let's

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Speaker 1: just say it's not me, what if it says someone else.

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Speaker 1: They might be terrified to approach a cop of a

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Speaker 1: loaded gun just to give it to them. So I'm

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Speaker 1: only saying this and I'm only calling him because I

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Speaker 1: just like you guys to think this through, like how

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Speaker 1: would you handle this situation? And I thought it was

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Speaker 1: an interesting scenario for me. I did give it to

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Speaker 1: a cop. It was kind of complex. I had to

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Speaker 1: be very careful about how I approached the situation, because

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Speaker 1: obviously the same restaurant has kids, they could go and

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Speaker 1: find a loaded gun. And also this comes back to

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Speaker 1: the whole concealed carry issue. How do you like, how

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Speaker 1: do you leave a gun in a bathroom loaded? Obviously

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Speaker 1: the person was drunk and obviously that's super illegal and

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Speaker 1: less again the gun was from a crime. Anyway, guys,

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Speaker 1: thank you for the time. I just thought this was

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Speaker 1: kind of a good thought experiment, like, how would you

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Speaker 1: handle the situation? Maybe fun to talk about. Keep up

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Speaker 1: the great work. I love your show. Hopefully talk soon. Right, Well,

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Speaker 1: there we go. There's the scenario, walk into a restroom

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Speaker 1: within a restaurant and find a gun. What do you do, Ben,

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Speaker 1: what is your initial reaction to that scenario? Don't touch it,

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Speaker 1: don't touch a fingerprint? Fingerprints uh would be key, etcetera. Right,

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Speaker 1: do your best touch it? That's obvious. Um, I I

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Speaker 1: suspect first off, you handle this uh wonderfully at a

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Speaker 1: great personal risk to yourself because you you are right.

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Speaker 1: And I think one of the most important things we

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Speaker 1: could say is addiction is a real thing. If you

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Speaker 1: were struggling with addiction, um, you know it takes a

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Speaker 1: great deal of personal strength to get to the other side.

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Speaker 1: So there is you know it should be immensely proud

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Speaker 1: and we have immense respect for you for doing so. Um,

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Speaker 1: this is not necessarily a hypothetical for me, Matt, So

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Speaker 1: I'm more interested in your take before I ted talk

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Speaker 1: or whatever. Oh wow, it's not a hypothetical for you, okay,

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Speaker 1: all right, wow, um okay, So I'll just tell you

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Speaker 1: instinctually the way I first thought about this when I

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Speaker 1: listened to this message from l roun Um. My thought was,

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Speaker 1: and and I don't know why, but it was to

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Speaker 1: clear the gun, see if it if it has if

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Speaker 1: it is in fact loaded, right, check that and then

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Speaker 1: if it is load, take out the magazine, clear the

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Speaker 1: chamber so that it's safe for anybody who might show

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Speaker 1: up on the scene, right and safe for me, depending

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Speaker 1: on who shows up on the scene and what mind

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Speaker 1: state they're in. Every firearm as though it is loaded

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Speaker 1: at all times. But then I thought, not everybody knows

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Speaker 1: how to clear a weapon, and what if you did

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Speaker 1: it improperly right, and like, there's potential for that weapon

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Speaker 1: to go off any time you're handling it or touching it.

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Speaker 1: And then I started thinking about the fingerprints issue and

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Speaker 1: if it really was like used in the commission of

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Speaker 1: a crime. But as I started going down that rabbit hole,

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Speaker 1: then this just became more and more and more and

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Speaker 1: more complicated to me. And it really is like, do

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Speaker 1: you do you walk away from that weapon at all?

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Speaker 1: Once you know there is a weapon at a scene

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Speaker 1: that is in a public space, Like what like what

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Speaker 1: is the radius that you allow yourself to get away

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Speaker 1: from that weapon since you know it's there? And I

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Speaker 1: don't think it's very I don't think you go very

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Speaker 1: far away from it, or I don't think you should

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Speaker 1: if you're a responsible person. Do you think right? Is it?

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Speaker 1: Is it a situation where you say, well, I'm going

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Speaker 1: to text someone who's with me and say come here

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Speaker 1: or call them right someone sitting at the booth with you, Uh,

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Speaker 1: if they're the kind of person that you can trust

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Speaker 1: to keep an eye on that situation or go alert someone.

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Speaker 1: Is it a situation where you open up the restroom

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Speaker 1: door and try to just yell for an employee, drawing

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Speaker 1: even more attention to the you know, to the free

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Speaker 1: that's going down, or is it um? Is it something

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Speaker 1: where you know in In some situations here, especially in

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Speaker 1: the west, the southwest, UH and the southeast of the

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Speaker 1: US in particular, oftentimes people will take the firearm and

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Speaker 1: just take especially if they're at a bar. It happens,

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Speaker 1: you're not alone. All this happened too many people. This

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Speaker 1: is not my situation, but it's happened to many people,

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Speaker 1: where they'll just take the take the firearm, and then

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Speaker 1: take it to the bartender and say, will you put

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Speaker 1: this in the lost and found You know what I mean?

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Speaker 1: Who left their gun in the exactly just so yeah,

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Speaker 1: and and this um so, it does become it does

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Speaker 1: become complicated because you have to there are too many unknowns,

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Speaker 1: too many variables. It could be something as simple as

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Speaker 1: someone who said I have to you know, someone who

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Speaker 1: said I have to, like I have to drop a

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Speaker 1: hot mixtape, do a number two, and I want to

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Speaker 1: put my firearms somewhere, and then they forgot and they left, right.

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Speaker 1: People are very good at losing things. Human beings lose

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Speaker 1: stuff all the time. How many people lost their like

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Speaker 1: what we we've been talking for maybe maybe a couple

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Speaker 1: of minutes, uh, not even ten minutes. In ten minutes,

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Speaker 1: how many people in this country just left their passport somewhere,

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Speaker 1: that one of the most important documents they own. You know,

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Speaker 1: it's not necessarily criminal. You're right. How many times have

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Speaker 1: you lost just your wallet or your keys or something

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Speaker 1: just misplaced them, especially if you're busy doing something else

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Speaker 1: and it's an object that you always have on you,

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Speaker 1: You're just so used to it being on you. You're

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Speaker 1: so used to be used to it being there. If

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Speaker 1: you put it somewhere just you know, for a moment

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Speaker 1: to get something done, your brain may just forget that

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Speaker 1: that thing occurred. And if you're it really depends on

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Speaker 1: how familiar you are with firearms and how often you carry,

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Speaker 1: like let's see how often you open carry or concealed carry,

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Speaker 1: because it may just become so commonplace. The way I

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Speaker 1: carry my gun, I place it down when I use

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Speaker 1: the restroom because it's a necessity for me to remove

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Speaker 1: my gun to use the restroom where where it is right.

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Speaker 1: You don't stay strapped, you don't keep it pointed at

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Speaker 1: the stall doors. No one's gonna, oh gosh, no, But

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Speaker 1: I see what you're saying. You're yeah, I think we're

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Speaker 1: of the same mind people, can you we absolutely normalize

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Speaker 1: things like a lot of folks do the check right. Um,

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Speaker 1: you know, it's the thing that Catholic kids used to remember,

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Speaker 1: the move where the spectacles, testicles watch whatever. Yeah, while

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Speaker 1: I watched. But the one of the things, at least

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Speaker 1: when I've been in these situations to remember, if you

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Speaker 1: find a Rando firearm, Um, it does need to be moved,

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Speaker 1: it does need to go somewhere. But and this is

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Speaker 1: just one paranoid entity his opinion. Any time you are

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Speaker 1: interacting with that without a witness, without a second pair

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Speaker 1: of eyes, then you are potentially opening yourself up to

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Speaker 1: some very uncool things. So like L. Rond you refer

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Speaker 1: to you refer to this as complicated, and it is. Uh,

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Speaker 1: and thank goodness, uh, the law didn't try to jam

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Speaker 1: you up or something. You know, what if like what

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Speaker 1: if you touch the gun? What if you touch the

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Speaker 1: fim you pick it up without a glove, without any

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Speaker 1: like you know, probably the closest thing you would grab

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Speaker 1: his paper towels, right, something like that, some kind of

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Speaker 1: paper product. Will you pick it up? Your fingerprints are

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Speaker 1: on it and you realize it doesn't have a serial number, Well,

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Speaker 1: it's not a good look. Even if your intentions are good.

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Speaker 1: You know. Now it's now you are inherently in some

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Speaker 1: way involved. You were going to lose time at the

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Speaker 1: very least, you're gonna lose time because, um, because law

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Speaker 1: enforcement is gonna want to know every single detail about

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Speaker 1: how you found a dirty gun. Yeah. Well, and and

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Speaker 1: let's say you do that, you take that action to

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Speaker 1: actually touch the weapon, even if you use a paper towel,

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Speaker 1: even if you had latex gloves just on you for

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Speaker 1: some reason and you picked the gun up, you could

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Speaker 1: still be contaminating potential evidence on that firearm if it

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Speaker 1: was used in a crime. Right, So what I want

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Speaker 1: to do really quickly is just give you three places

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Speaker 1: where you can learn more about this and where this

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Speaker 1: was kind of answered pretty succinctly for me. And the

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Speaker 1: first places on a website called American Concealed, and it's

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Speaker 1: an article titled what do you do if you find

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Speaker 1: a gun? In this article, it notes that several people

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Speaker 1: have had commented on their site that yes, I have

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Speaker 1: accidentally left my firearm in a bathroom's stall, in particular

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Speaker 1: because of this thing that we're describing here. You remove

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Speaker 1: the weapon from your holster to use the restroom, you

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Speaker 1: forget that you did that and you walk out. Um.

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Speaker 1: They you know, they recommend a lot of things, and

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Speaker 1: they're really speaking to an audience of people that is

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Speaker 1: familiar with guns, right, So they're they're showing you, or

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Speaker 1: they're describing to you the best way to do this

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Speaker 1: and then to get it to perhaps a police officer

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Speaker 1: or to someone who can then report it to a

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Speaker 1: police officer. I probably for someone not familiar with guns,

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Speaker 1: I would not recommend any really, not anything they say

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Speaker 1: on that side, but I would not recommend using that

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Speaker 1: site as your source. This has some baseline now prerequisites,

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Speaker 1: right to know how to handle a firearms safely, to

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Speaker 1: know how to discharge clear a gun. Right. Um, yeah,

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Speaker 1: I see what you're saying that the I'm not surprised

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Speaker 1: that some of the spaces exactly what I what I

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Speaker 1: would have said. I don't know, mm hmm. I mean

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Speaker 1: it is so situationally dependent. I'm I feel like if

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Speaker 1: you take a photo of it, for instance, in in situ,

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Speaker 1: in location, then you need to make sure that you're

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Speaker 1: also immediately following on some other steps. So the l

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Speaker 1: ron situation, right is different. This isn't this isn't a

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Speaker 1: vacant apartment building. You know, it's not a it's not

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Speaker 1: a squat house. It's not like a place where I

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Speaker 1: used to hang out my graffiti days or something with

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Speaker 1: crap on the wall and literal crap on the floor.

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Speaker 1: This is a family restaurant. So what a pickle if

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Speaker 1: you leave right? Even if you just take the time

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Speaker 1: to walk to the host station or or the bar

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Speaker 1: or the kitchen line, if you don't have line of

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Speaker 1: sight on that door, who's to say that a nine

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Speaker 1: year old might not just wander in and say, oh,

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Speaker 1: best Christmas ever? Right like this? Yeah, I'm doing worst case,

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Speaker 1: but I interjected, What's well, you're right, that's where where

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Speaker 1: my mind goes to ben Another place you can look

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Speaker 1: there is a subreddit about dumpster diving titled slash art

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Speaker 1: slash dumpster diving, And on here there's a quick thread

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Speaker 1: you found a gun? What now? And on here you

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Speaker 1: also have some pretty good advice. Again, some of it

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Speaker 1: is just like, uh, supposing that you were going to

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Speaker 1: actually touch the weapon. And that's this is where I'm

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Speaker 1: gonna put it kind of a stop to that. I

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Speaker 1: I think, no matter what who you are, no matter

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Speaker 1: how familiar you are with firearms, no matter what your

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Speaker 1: criminal history is, if you've got one or any at all.

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Speaker 1: I think this is the correct procedure because it comes

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Speaker 1: directly from a very high ranking law enforcement officer in

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Speaker 1: a part of Georgia where I've lived. Spoke with this

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Speaker 1: person through email and on the phone today. I'm gonna

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Speaker 1: give you exactly what I asked this person and exactly

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Speaker 1: how they responded. Okay, I said, what is the correct

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Speaker 1: procedure for a civilian if they find an unattended firearm

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Speaker 1: in a public space? And I said, I think the

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Speaker 1: obvious answer is to report the firearm to local law

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Speaker 1: enforcement as quickly as possible. But how to go about

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Speaker 1: it safely for both the officer and the civilian seems

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Speaker 1: like it could get complicated. This person responded, The best

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Speaker 1: course of action is to call nine one one from

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Speaker 1: where you're From where you are so that moment you

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Speaker 1: have eyes on the firearm, dial nine one one then

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Speaker 1: and request an officer to be dispatched to collect the weapon.

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Speaker 1: You can specify that it's not a an emergency, but

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Speaker 1: there is a appears to be a live weapon and

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Speaker 1: you need it to be taken right. I asked, are

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Speaker 1: you if you're familiar with firearms, should you clear the weapon?

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Speaker 1: Answer was no. I asked if you should refrain entirely

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Speaker 1: from touching the weapon in case it was used in

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Speaker 1: the commission of a crime. They said, if at all possible,

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Speaker 1: do not touch the weapon. Stay nearby so no one

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Speaker 1: else touches it as well. Again, that's like more an

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Speaker 1: evidence collection for this thing, potential evidence collection. I asked,

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Speaker 1: if the weapon is found in a place easily accessible

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Speaker 1: to children, should you move the weapon to a secure location. Again,

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Speaker 1: the answer here is the best course of action is

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Speaker 1: not to touch the weapon, remove the children from the

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Speaker 1: area if possible, and wait for law enforcement. Which seems

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Speaker 1: like you know, so those are the official answers, right, Uh,

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Speaker 1: they're they're not official. I wasn't allowed to give you

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Speaker 1: guys like who this person was and what an organization

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Speaker 1: they represent or at least they're a part of. But

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Speaker 1: that is some a very high ranking person in a

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Speaker 1: real law enforcement agency. UM, I don't know. I think

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Speaker 1: that's probably what you should do. Or if you're not

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Speaker 1: comfortable calling nine one one, if someone you know or

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Speaker 1: someone with you who's comfortable, or maybe a bystander who

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Speaker 1: is also there, maybe have them call to report it.

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Speaker 1: I mean, I don't know about that too, because they're

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Speaker 1: gonna get grilled on how they found it. You know.

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Speaker 1: That's that's the thing, like what if you do if

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Speaker 1: you for one reason or another, can't be can't be

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Speaker 1: speaking with twelve you know, or whatever street name you

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Speaker 1: want to use for law enforcement. Uh. There is something

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Speaker 1: else though that I think this last point I want

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Speaker 1: to make here. If you people are not stupid, for

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Speaker 1: the most part, given the opportunity to really think about

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Speaker 1: what's going on, people are extraordinarily intelligent. So if you

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Speaker 1: find a gun just sitting on the top of a commode,

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Speaker 1: sitting on the tank or something, then it's less likely

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Speaker 1: that someone used it in a crime and said, you know,

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Speaker 1: here's the perfect place. That T G I Fridays they

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Speaker 1: have such a terrible reputation because the cheese stick controversy

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Speaker 1: that there never no cops are even gonna come here.

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Speaker 1: That hey, that was just the licensing thing. The frozen

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Speaker 1: t G. I Friday's quote Mozzarelli stics that you can

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Speaker 1: find at your local grocery store are not the ones

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Speaker 1: that t G A. T G. I. Friday's makes in

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Speaker 1: their restaurants. They got to you. I can't believe it.

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Speaker 1: Of all the organizations, that's the one that compromised our show.

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Speaker 1: I knew it, not with a bang, but with a whimper. Anyway,

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Speaker 1: now the well t s Eliott there, but the following

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Speaker 1: on that, the natural responses and look for We have

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Speaker 1: people listening who have had to live on the streets

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Speaker 1: before for one reason or another, right, and there's no

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Speaker 1: judgment there. But you know that if you find a firearm,

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Speaker 1: a serviceable usable firearm in a place like a sewer

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Speaker 1: or like a dumpster or some other place where the

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Speaker 1: normal person, the normal sieve is not supposed to be

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Speaker 1: look gain, then that's probably hot. Not saying it as

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Speaker 1: bodies on it, but it may have been. The odds

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Speaker 1: are higher than zero that it was that it was

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Speaker 1: used in in something you know, um, so please please

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Speaker 1: just just be safe and know that there are a

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Speaker 1: lot of people who accidentally find themselves embroiled in events,

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Speaker 1: perhaps unfairly because they were not thinking through the implications.

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Speaker 1: So I want again thank Lron's here for for being

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Speaker 1: fully aware, for doing the right thing, for thinking through it,

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Speaker 1: and uh with without having more details, you know your

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Speaker 1: mileage may vary, but as long as you can essentially

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Speaker 1: establish a chain of command there a chain of an

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Speaker 1: evidentiary chain right, a chain of um owners ship and custody,

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00:21:01,240 --> 00:21:06,520
Speaker 1: then you will hopefully be okay, even if it's something

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Speaker 1: as simple as telling the restaurant tour restaurants staff, you know,

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Speaker 1: I found this firearm, don't fire it in the middle

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Speaker 1: of the lobby and say who left this in the

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Speaker 1: sh I love that phrase. Um, you can you can

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Speaker 1: tell them. Look, I don't want to be involved. Here's

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Speaker 1: the thing, I found it. But when you say that,

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Speaker 1: you have to know that if pushed, the restaurant staff

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00:21:37,160 --> 00:21:39,399
Speaker 1: is going to give every detail they have about you

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Speaker 1: as well. It's a real pickle, and it's a great question,

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Speaker 1: you know, Matt. I'd love to hear other people's responses,

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Speaker 1: because I know that we're not the only folks who

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Speaker 1: have found themselves in a non hypothetical version of this

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Speaker 1: absolutely right to us conspiracy at I Heart radio dot

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Speaker 1: com also called one three three std w y t K.

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Speaker 1: Thank you again. L Ron will be right back with

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Speaker 1: more listener mail, and we have returned thanks to a

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Speaker 1: sponsorship from our pal Kate Bush. No I'm kidding. This

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Speaker 1: is gonna be something different. This is a lovely message

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00:22:26,720 --> 00:22:33,560
Speaker 1: we received from our pal Grady and Matt. You actually, uh,

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Speaker 1: this one really spoke to me. You spoke with Grady directly.

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Speaker 1: So let's let's go ahead and play this lovely little

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00:22:41,520 --> 00:22:45,480
Speaker 1: message and then let's dive in. Hey, guys, um, I've

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Speaker 1: called a couple of times, but I wanted to discuss

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Speaker 1: something interesting that I've been practicing and that I have

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Speaker 1: also encouraged my friends to practice. And we have all

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Speaker 1: had success in this, which to me and I'll get

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Speaker 1: into this, but it speaks to the true potential that

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Speaker 1: humans have within them. And I don't know if you

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Speaker 1: guys have discussed this topic before, but it's a practice

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Speaker 1: called cloud busting. And I practiced at this for a while,

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Speaker 1: you know, I couldn't find my process, and then once

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Speaker 1: I did, I realized that I could bust. I could

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Speaker 1: make any cloud of my choosing disappear, white, puffy, gigantic

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Speaker 1: clouds disappear. So I call one of my best friends.

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Speaker 1: I tell him about my success with this, and he

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Speaker 1: has an open mind, but he's like, I gotta try

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Speaker 1: this for myself. Sure enough, I get a call that

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Speaker 1: night saying, me and my girlfriend went outside in the

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Speaker 1: clouds recovering in the moon, and I looked at her

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Speaker 1: and told her, we're going to bring the moon out.

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Speaker 1: So my best one of my best friends, and his

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Speaker 1: girlfriend held hands and keep in mind, the clouds were

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Speaker 1: covering the entire sky and they were able to dissipate

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Speaker 1: the this gigantic cloud and bring the moon out. In short,

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Speaker 1: I know I'm coming to my time limit here. I

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Speaker 1: would like you to do some maybe do some research

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Speaker 1: into this and just share it with people, because any

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Speaker 1: person can do this by focusing their intention on a

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Speaker 1: certain cloud, finding their process, which can be different for

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Speaker 1: certain people. But it just shows the incredible power that

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Speaker 1: we have as human beings that we don't that not

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Speaker 1: everybody realizes in each and every one of them. So

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Speaker 1: that's all, guys. I just thought it was a really

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00:25:03,040 --> 00:25:05,359
Speaker 1: cool thing that maybe you know, bring up on one

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00:25:05,400 --> 00:25:08,000
Speaker 1: of your shows one of these days. But love what

396
00:25:08,080 --> 00:25:12,520
Speaker 1: you guys do. Amazing stuff. Um, I love you guys.

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Speaker 1: Take good care of yourselves. Um loving the book too, Okay,

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00:25:17,160 --> 00:25:22,520
Speaker 1: take care boom, thank you Grady? What ticking all the

399
00:25:22,600 --> 00:25:26,959
Speaker 1: boxes on on a good voicemail? I don't have to

400
00:25:27,400 --> 00:25:29,240
Speaker 1: you don't have to say you love this show. That

401
00:25:29,320 --> 00:25:34,760
Speaker 1: will not influence our choice on what what we're fortunate

402
00:25:34,840 --> 00:25:39,280
Speaker 1: enough to air. But um, greedy, greedy, your message really

403
00:25:39,440 --> 00:25:42,280
Speaker 1: struck a chord with me. I suspect with you as well, Matt,

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00:25:42,400 --> 00:25:46,879
Speaker 1: because we have done a lot of episodes on or

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00:25:46,920 --> 00:25:49,639
Speaker 1: We've done a significant amount of episodes both in the

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00:25:49,760 --> 00:25:53,520
Speaker 1: video and audio realm on the idea of cloud bursting

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00:25:53,800 --> 00:26:01,880
Speaker 1: or cloud busting and matt initial reaction and first I've

408
00:26:01,880 --> 00:26:03,720
Speaker 1: got to get it from you man that people want

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00:26:03,720 --> 00:26:07,119
Speaker 1: to hear it. Did you try this as a kid, Yeah,

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00:26:07,160 --> 00:26:09,479
Speaker 1: but see it was a vape term back then, like

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00:26:09,560 --> 00:26:15,240
Speaker 1: busting some clouds, you know. No, I'm just I did

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00:26:15,280 --> 00:26:19,560
Speaker 1: try this. It was more it was never about bursting

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00:26:19,600 --> 00:26:22,200
Speaker 1: the clouds or anything when I was a kid. It

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00:26:22,240 --> 00:26:26,800
Speaker 1: was just more watching the clouds change and evolved, as

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00:26:27,000 --> 00:26:29,800
Speaker 1: you know, into different shapes and animals and things, right

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00:26:29,800 --> 00:26:33,879
Speaker 1: as they kind of change shape, because clouds do change

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00:26:33,920 --> 00:26:38,639
Speaker 1: shape as they travel and grow and dissipate. Uh. I

418
00:26:38,680 --> 00:26:40,760
Speaker 1: remember learning about this for the first time when we

419
00:26:40,760 --> 00:26:49,359
Speaker 1: were covering Oregon energy and and attempts to actually create

420
00:26:49,400 --> 00:26:53,919
Speaker 1: physical structures that would house a particular type of energy

421
00:26:54,200 --> 00:26:56,639
Speaker 1: that could then be aimed and used to do this

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00:26:56,840 --> 00:27:01,520
Speaker 1: same process. But I didn't know you could basically, I guess,

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00:27:01,560 --> 00:27:05,439
Speaker 1: meditate in a way or just focus intention to do

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00:27:05,520 --> 00:27:09,520
Speaker 1: the same thing. Yeah, the idea of su bring him

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00:27:09,600 --> 00:27:13,400
Speaker 1: some excellent stuff here, man. So the idea of busting

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00:27:13,640 --> 00:27:17,960
Speaker 1: a cloud with the power of one's mind, right, it's

427
00:27:18,000 --> 00:27:24,040
Speaker 1: a It exists in a roughly similar school of thought

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00:27:24,160 --> 00:27:27,920
Speaker 1: to the belief in rainmakers, the idea that if one

429
00:27:28,560 --> 00:27:37,480
Speaker 1: concentrates with the right techniques, one can generate storms, right,

430
00:27:37,680 --> 00:27:42,000
Speaker 1: generate moisture and uh, this is a huge part of

431
00:27:42,880 --> 00:27:48,480
Speaker 1: um North American folklore and discourse and existed way before

432
00:27:48,960 --> 00:27:51,720
Speaker 1: Europeans wherever on the scene. You know what I mean.

433
00:27:53,080 --> 00:27:56,280
Speaker 1: The oh gosh, there's a couple of things to unpack here.

434
00:27:56,320 --> 00:27:59,680
Speaker 1: So Wilhelm Reich, you know him, you'll love him. B

435
00:27:59,800 --> 00:28:03,119
Speaker 1: B See once called him the man who thought orgasms

436
00:28:03,119 --> 00:28:05,800
Speaker 1: could save the world, which you'll have to check out

437
00:28:05,840 --> 00:28:07,880
Speaker 1: our episodes to get what we're talking about. But it's

438
00:28:07,880 --> 00:28:12,399
Speaker 1: about it's all about that orgon energy. Maybe, um he

439
00:28:12,640 --> 00:28:18,119
Speaker 1: saw he was a doctor and a psychoanalyst right active

440
00:28:18,640 --> 00:28:22,480
Speaker 1: all the way up to ninete when he died and

441
00:28:23,160 --> 00:28:27,320
Speaker 1: He believed that he had found a universal energy that

442
00:28:27,359 --> 00:28:31,680
Speaker 1: could be focused, that could be channeled to create any

443
00:28:31,840 --> 00:28:38,400
Speaker 1: number of observable physical effects, and he had a lot

444
00:28:38,440 --> 00:28:42,000
Speaker 1: of followers. One of the things like I read about

445
00:28:42,040 --> 00:28:45,640
Speaker 1: this guy, it was different in a different life before

446
00:28:45,640 --> 00:28:48,200
Speaker 1: I ever thought I would be doing podcast stuff on air.

447
00:28:48,520 --> 00:28:50,360
Speaker 1: And the thing that got always stood out to me

448
00:28:50,400 --> 00:28:52,560
Speaker 1: about the story and to you as well, I imagine,

449
00:28:53,000 --> 00:29:01,760
Speaker 1: is that upon his death he was entangled with the FBI,

450
00:29:01,840 --> 00:29:04,640
Speaker 1: have been arrested by the FBI. A lot of his

451
00:29:04,840 --> 00:29:11,280
Speaker 1: work was destroyed, right, He was profiled UM because they

452
00:29:11,400 --> 00:29:15,640
Speaker 1: accused him of being a communist, a subversive, all this stuff.

453
00:29:16,520 --> 00:29:20,280
Speaker 1: He was once listed as a key figure on the

454
00:29:20,400 --> 00:29:24,520
Speaker 1: Enemy Alien Control Unit. So whatever he's doing, for one

455
00:29:24,560 --> 00:29:27,720
Speaker 1: reason or another, Uncle Sam did surveil him, and that

456
00:29:27,840 --> 00:29:34,000
Speaker 1: lent a lot of accidental credibility to his theories, which

457
00:29:34,040 --> 00:29:39,320
Speaker 1: remained controversial and widely rejected by academia today. However, there

458
00:29:39,400 --> 00:29:43,880
Speaker 1: still is UM. There's still is an active group of UM.

459
00:29:43,920 --> 00:29:48,440
Speaker 1: There's an active institution, the right institute, I believe. So anyhow,

460
00:29:49,080 --> 00:29:51,560
Speaker 1: he built this machine that you were talking about, and

461
00:29:51,600 --> 00:29:54,920
Speaker 1: if you look at the machine, the first thing I

462
00:29:54,960 --> 00:29:59,160
Speaker 1: think we should say is keep an open mind, you know,

463
00:29:59,640 --> 00:30:02,520
Speaker 1: keep open the entire topic. The first thing you have

464
00:30:02,600 --> 00:30:06,120
Speaker 1: to do is keep it keep just keep that, keep

465
00:30:06,160 --> 00:30:11,040
Speaker 1: the barn doors of consciousness open. Uh, send the critical

466
00:30:11,080 --> 00:30:13,160
Speaker 1: thinking out on a field trip for a little bit

467
00:30:13,600 --> 00:30:17,720
Speaker 1: and just play what if? So, Matt, you've seen pictures

468
00:30:17,960 --> 00:30:23,480
Speaker 1: of the Reich cloud Buster. He designed a thing that

469
00:30:23,560 --> 00:30:28,800
Speaker 1: he said could produce rain by manipulating this orgone energy

470
00:30:28,840 --> 00:30:32,000
Speaker 1: which he felt was ambient already in the atmosphere and

471
00:30:32,040 --> 00:30:35,960
Speaker 1: in every human being, similar to almost similar to Mediclarean's

472
00:30:36,120 --> 00:30:40,200
Speaker 1: honestly for Star Star Wars fans. But how would you

473
00:30:40,240 --> 00:30:45,160
Speaker 1: describe this cloud buster? Well? Which one do you mean?

474
00:30:45,280 --> 00:30:48,120
Speaker 1: I know the one that I've seen from the video

475
00:30:48,200 --> 00:30:51,440
Speaker 1: series we made on this. It looks like a series

476
00:30:51,520 --> 00:30:57,000
Speaker 1: of tubes almost that are pointed, almost turret like or

477
00:30:57,040 --> 00:31:02,080
Speaker 1: anti aircraft gun like to me, which sense, and it

478
00:31:02,160 --> 00:31:06,520
Speaker 1: appears to aim. That's what like focuses and aims the

479
00:31:06,640 --> 00:31:09,920
Speaker 1: organ energy. What I don't understand is are the bits

480
00:31:10,200 --> 00:31:14,400
Speaker 1: that it's actually attached to, because if I'm recalling correctly,

481
00:31:14,560 --> 00:31:17,840
Speaker 1: it had something to do with crystals to actually store

482
00:31:17,960 --> 00:31:21,800
Speaker 1: the energy. Is that wrong, right? Metal fillings, crystals, and

483
00:31:21,840 --> 00:31:27,000
Speaker 1: then a series of flexible metal hoses, right uh. And

484
00:31:27,040 --> 00:31:29,600
Speaker 1: the ideas you aim it at some point in the sky.

485
00:31:29,840 --> 00:31:34,280
Speaker 1: The anti aircraft comparison is really apt. Uh. You aim

486
00:31:34,320 --> 00:31:37,680
Speaker 1: at at some point in the sky, and it's weirdly

487
00:31:37,720 --> 00:31:40,800
Speaker 1: calls it a cloud buster because his goal is to

488
00:31:41,160 --> 00:31:46,440
Speaker 1: generate clouds to become a rainmaker. Right um. The idea

489
00:31:46,680 --> 00:31:53,160
Speaker 1: of dispersing clouds with the power of one's mind. For Reich,

490
00:31:53,280 --> 00:31:56,640
Speaker 1: that would be a different um. That would be a

491
00:31:56,720 --> 00:32:00,960
Speaker 1: kind of different application of Oregon energy. UM to others.

492
00:32:01,080 --> 00:32:04,680
Speaker 1: If you're just loosely defining this in the pantheon of

493
00:32:05,680 --> 00:32:11,160
Speaker 1: uh psychic powers, this would be a form of telekinesis, right,

494
00:32:11,320 --> 00:32:17,520
Speaker 1: atmospheric level telekinesis. And if you do, you can try

495
00:32:17,560 --> 00:32:20,360
Speaker 1: this at home. You will not be harmed, you know,

496
00:32:20,520 --> 00:32:23,680
Speaker 1: use common sense. But if you are lucky enough to

497
00:32:23,760 --> 00:32:26,880
Speaker 1: live in a place that has moderately good weather and

498
00:32:27,080 --> 00:32:31,600
Speaker 1: uh Dixie chicks wide open space somewhere nearby, find a

499
00:32:31,680 --> 00:32:36,600
Speaker 1: nice day, a day when there are cumulus clouds. Cumulus

500
00:32:36,600 --> 00:32:38,840
Speaker 1: clouds are the ones that look kind of flat on

501
00:32:38,880 --> 00:32:43,000
Speaker 1: the bottom and got that big cotton candy puff. You know,

502
00:32:43,280 --> 00:32:48,640
Speaker 1: they sail like bricotine like ships across the sky. Go

503
00:32:48,840 --> 00:32:53,040
Speaker 1: there and stare, pick one, stare you can. This is

504
00:32:53,080 --> 00:32:56,680
Speaker 1: a great meditative exercise. You can picture what it looks like.

505
00:32:56,720 --> 00:33:01,240
Speaker 1: Because humans are great pattern recognizers. You can and concentrate

506
00:33:01,520 --> 00:33:08,440
Speaker 1: on your mind dispersing it and if you concentrate long enough,

507
00:33:09,160 --> 00:33:13,200
Speaker 1: the cloud will move and disperse. The question is correlation

508
00:33:13,320 --> 00:33:18,160
Speaker 1: or causation? You know what I mean? Um, they're like,

509
00:33:18,560 --> 00:33:22,160
Speaker 1: there's a great there's an article by Jesse Ferrell over

510
00:33:22,200 --> 00:33:26,440
Speaker 1: at a place called acuweather dot com who raises the

511
00:33:26,520 --> 00:33:31,080
Speaker 1: point of um observation here, and the point of observation

512
00:33:31,280 --> 00:33:33,880
Speaker 1: is is this I guess the best way to do it.

513
00:33:33,960 --> 00:33:37,800
Speaker 1: We talked about this with U a p Right, most people,

514
00:33:39,320 --> 00:33:44,960
Speaker 1: most people cannot identify a specific craft in the air. Right.

515
00:33:45,320 --> 00:33:47,760
Speaker 1: You can see something and you can say that's a plane.

516
00:33:48,560 --> 00:33:51,520
Speaker 1: And if someone says, oh cool, what generation and what

517
00:33:51,640 --> 00:33:55,840
Speaker 1: type and who made it? You will just say, you know,

518
00:33:56,360 --> 00:34:01,560
Speaker 1: it's it's relatively rare. Um And even experience pilots, even

519
00:34:01,600 --> 00:34:07,440
Speaker 1: experienced aerospace engineers, might have a tough time seen discerning

520
00:34:07,520 --> 00:34:10,800
Speaker 1: a specific type of plane from the ground. A better

521
00:34:10,840 --> 00:34:14,239
Speaker 1: example would be have you ever seen have you ever

522
00:34:14,280 --> 00:34:17,160
Speaker 1: stood next to a traffic light when it's on the ground,

523
00:34:17,640 --> 00:34:20,400
Speaker 1: when you're not looking at it from your car. Wait,

524
00:34:21,120 --> 00:34:27,520
Speaker 1: so the red, yellow, and green ones just yeah, they're

525
00:34:27,560 --> 00:34:31,759
Speaker 1: bigger than you think because you're used to seeing them

526
00:34:31,800 --> 00:34:38,000
Speaker 1: further away. Right, I would also pose it, and I've

527
00:34:38,000 --> 00:34:43,240
Speaker 1: certainly done this. Uh many people I suspect spend time

528
00:34:43,719 --> 00:34:47,719
Speaker 1: focusing on a red light and turning a green, you know,

529
00:34:47,960 --> 00:34:51,920
Speaker 1: with the power of my mind. Uh, how many times

530
00:34:51,920 --> 00:34:54,640
Speaker 1: I've done that with like a soda can or something

531
00:34:54,680 --> 00:34:58,640
Speaker 1: where I just stare at it way too long. I

532
00:34:58,719 --> 00:35:01,319
Speaker 1: still do it. I used to I and I feel

533
00:35:01,320 --> 00:35:03,600
Speaker 1: like that's a beautiful thing. I will walk into a

534
00:35:03,640 --> 00:35:06,520
Speaker 1: place as automatic doors and I like to wave my

535
00:35:06,600 --> 00:35:09,520
Speaker 1: hand like magneto, you know what I mean, Jane Gray

536
00:35:09,880 --> 00:35:14,080
Speaker 1: and uh and this is not look, this is not

537
00:35:14,239 --> 00:35:16,319
Speaker 1: dismissive of this. I want to get the actu weather

538
00:35:16,360 --> 00:35:20,359
Speaker 1: thing first, and then let's um, let's unpack a little

539
00:35:20,360 --> 00:35:24,440
Speaker 1: bit more because there is more to the story, right. Uh. So, first,

540
00:35:24,960 --> 00:35:31,000
Speaker 1: our pal Jesse Farrell over at accu weather explains the

541
00:35:31,040 --> 00:35:35,080
Speaker 1: cloud busting phenomenon this way. Again, We've established if you

542
00:35:35,160 --> 00:35:39,400
Speaker 1: go out there and you look, you observe a cloud

543
00:35:39,920 --> 00:35:43,640
Speaker 1: long enough, you will see it move, you will see

544
00:35:43,640 --> 00:35:49,759
Speaker 1: it disperse. Jesse Farrell and other meteorologists say this is

545
00:35:49,800 --> 00:35:53,600
Speaker 1: because the atmosphere up there is it simply looks more

546
00:35:53,840 --> 00:35:57,880
Speaker 1: stable than it actually is from our vantage point, the

547
00:35:57,960 --> 00:36:00,759
Speaker 1: same way that a traffic light looks smaller than it is,

548
00:36:01,120 --> 00:36:03,960
Speaker 1: right the same way it's tough to tell the exact

549
00:36:04,160 --> 00:36:09,360
Speaker 1: model of a plane. So the atmosphere up there is

550
00:36:09,520 --> 00:36:14,800
Speaker 1: very windy, it's chaotic, and these puffy, beautiful cumulus clouds

551
00:36:15,640 --> 00:36:20,239
Speaker 1: are temporary. You when you're looking at a clear sky,

552
00:36:20,360 --> 00:36:23,879
Speaker 1: what you're not seeing is the swirls of temperature, right,

553
00:36:24,400 --> 00:36:30,319
Speaker 1: the battling differentials of humidity, injury interacting with each other.

554
00:36:30,800 --> 00:36:33,960
Speaker 1: And Ferrell describes these clouds like a leaf on a

555
00:36:34,120 --> 00:36:38,560
Speaker 1: stream or their bubbles in a stream, because they're so fragile,

556
00:36:38,600 --> 00:36:42,839
Speaker 1: so they don't last super long. The clouds that last

557
00:36:42,920 --> 00:36:45,440
Speaker 1: the longest, the ones you really want to try to

558
00:36:45,480 --> 00:36:50,080
Speaker 1: bust up if you're deploying atmospheric telekinesis, would be things

559
00:36:50,080 --> 00:36:53,719
Speaker 1: like thunderstorms. They've just got they've got more stuff going on,

560
00:36:53,920 --> 00:36:56,520
Speaker 1: you know what I mean. They're more interesting characters if

561
00:36:56,560 --> 00:36:59,759
Speaker 1: you're writing for the sky well, or if you're in

562
00:36:59,800 --> 00:37:03,280
Speaker 1: the US you know, the western side of the US.

563
00:37:03,719 --> 00:37:07,120
Speaker 1: You want to make those like as many as possibly

564
00:37:08,880 --> 00:37:13,040
Speaker 1: or what if? Okay, serious clouds I love. I love

565
00:37:13,080 --> 00:37:17,120
Speaker 1: studying clouds. A serious clouds are the whispy guys, you know,

566
00:37:17,280 --> 00:37:21,520
Speaker 1: the little smearie looking guys, and they are much higher

567
00:37:21,600 --> 00:37:28,200
Speaker 1: in the atmosphere because they have less content. Really, you know,

568
00:37:28,320 --> 00:37:31,439
Speaker 1: the more water you get, the lower you get, right, uh,

569
00:37:31,520 --> 00:37:35,319
Speaker 1: And so those are those are gonna last longer. They

570
00:37:35,360 --> 00:37:39,080
Speaker 1: might seem harder to bust with your mind. But with

571
00:37:39,080 --> 00:37:42,760
Speaker 1: with all this um in mind, I have to ask,

572
00:37:44,320 --> 00:37:49,680
Speaker 1: uh not, does that explanation from from meteorologists does that

573
00:37:49,760 --> 00:37:53,200
Speaker 1: satisfy what you're thinking? Like, because essentially what they're saying is,

574
00:37:53,800 --> 00:37:56,600
Speaker 1: since the atmosphere is dynamic and it's always moving and

575
00:37:57,040 --> 00:38:00,680
Speaker 1: all things are ephemeral, you're going to stare at a

576
00:38:00,719 --> 00:38:03,600
Speaker 1: cloud until it goes away, And it might be easy

577
00:38:03,680 --> 00:38:08,440
Speaker 1: to think that you created that. Yes, I wholeheartedly agree

578
00:38:08,520 --> 00:38:13,240
Speaker 1: with that scientifically, because the scientific process would take place

579
00:38:13,280 --> 00:38:16,480
Speaker 1: of that dissipation um if you gave it the time.

580
00:38:17,080 --> 00:38:21,960
Speaker 1: I would say that it's not quite what Grady is saying.

581
00:38:22,480 --> 00:38:25,960
Speaker 1: So let's get into Grady's process right after a quick

582
00:38:26,000 --> 00:38:35,799
Speaker 1: word from our sponsor and we're back. Let's jump into

583
00:38:35,840 --> 00:38:41,520
Speaker 1: that cloud busting process from Grady. Grady says, um, well,

584
00:38:41,560 --> 00:38:43,560
Speaker 1: I did ask him if he needed orgon and he said,

585
00:38:43,640 --> 00:38:52,360
Speaker 1: I mean who doesn't for extra points? That's a quote. Um.

586
00:38:52,480 --> 00:38:56,680
Speaker 1: So then I just asked about the process and Grady said, um,

587
00:38:56,719 --> 00:38:59,520
Speaker 1: you just focus your intent on a puffy cloud that

588
00:38:59,600 --> 00:39:03,480
Speaker 1: wouldn't dissipate quickly. So he's already taking to account that

589
00:39:03,560 --> 00:39:05,960
Speaker 1: the cloud is going to dissipate at some point, but

590
00:39:06,400 --> 00:39:10,680
Speaker 1: he's saying target one that at least to your understanding

591
00:39:10,760 --> 00:39:13,040
Speaker 1: or the way you're judging that cloud, it's not going

592
00:39:13,080 --> 00:39:18,080
Speaker 1: to quickly dissipate. Observable, He says, be sure to be

593
00:39:18,120 --> 00:39:22,120
Speaker 1: busting a cloud that won't fake you out, because he'sn't.

594
00:39:22,160 --> 00:39:25,319
Speaker 1: He again saying it may fake you out in that

595
00:39:25,400 --> 00:39:30,200
Speaker 1: it will just dissipate, and you'd think, oh, I did that, okay.

596
00:39:30,719 --> 00:39:34,240
Speaker 1: He says he tried for the longest time, just using

597
00:39:34,280 --> 00:39:38,600
Speaker 1: his intention at first, and that just in his mind

598
00:39:38,680 --> 00:39:41,440
Speaker 1: that was just you know, staring at a cloud and

599
00:39:41,640 --> 00:39:44,839
Speaker 1: in his mind thinking that cloud will no longer be there, right,

600
00:39:45,080 --> 00:39:48,759
Speaker 1: this cloud will dissipate. He got really frustrated because it

601
00:39:48,840 --> 00:39:52,160
Speaker 1: wasn't working. He got really really frustrated, but he didn't stop,

602
00:39:52,160 --> 00:39:55,760
Speaker 1: he didn't give up. He was able to find a process.

603
00:39:55,800 --> 00:39:58,960
Speaker 1: He says that kind of sounds goofy when you hear it,

604
00:39:59,520 --> 00:40:03,200
Speaker 1: but it's it's worked for him numerous times. Ben, Do

605
00:40:03,239 --> 00:40:07,240
Speaker 1: you want to describe what he says? Yeah? So Grady says,

606
00:40:07,960 --> 00:40:14,439
Speaker 1: you take a deep belly breath deep, take your time,

607
00:40:14,680 --> 00:40:18,960
Speaker 1: and you blow at the cloud while saying the word

608
00:40:19,360 --> 00:40:23,719
Speaker 1: goodbye in your head, having that is your mantra goodbye,

609
00:40:24,400 --> 00:40:27,920
Speaker 1: and then soften your gaze around the cloud, similar to

610
00:40:27,920 --> 00:40:31,040
Speaker 1: like looking like at the old magic eye posters. I

611
00:40:31,040 --> 00:40:34,720
Speaker 1: almost think, uh, and soften your gaze around the cloud.

612
00:40:35,680 --> 00:40:37,960
Speaker 1: And he says, this is almost like I was able

613
00:40:38,000 --> 00:40:41,720
Speaker 1: to trick my psychic muscle into making the clouds start

614
00:40:41,880 --> 00:40:45,960
Speaker 1: to dissipate. And then he has some more detail about

615
00:40:46,000 --> 00:40:48,920
Speaker 1: this something else that happened the first time you tried it?

616
00:40:49,120 --> 00:40:51,959
Speaker 1: Oh yeah, he said, it's it's really weird been because

617
00:40:51,960 --> 00:40:55,200
Speaker 1: it feels like it matches up with what's his name

618
00:40:55,320 --> 00:40:57,960
Speaker 1: dude who does the close encounters of the fifth kind

619
00:40:58,840 --> 00:41:01,000
Speaker 1: um guy we talked to on the show while ago,

620
00:41:01,200 --> 00:41:05,640
Speaker 1: Stephen Stephen Greer, who uses meditation and intention to summon

621
00:41:05,880 --> 00:41:09,240
Speaker 1: UFO encounters. It kind of reminds me of that because

622
00:41:09,280 --> 00:41:12,520
Speaker 1: Grady said he saw an orb flying over him that

623
00:41:12,560 --> 00:41:15,880
Speaker 1: first day when he was able to successfully bust a cloud.

624
00:41:16,800 --> 00:41:18,759
Speaker 1: Just sounds so dirty, but it's not. It's just you're

625
00:41:19,200 --> 00:41:22,040
Speaker 1: making a cloud dissipate. I don't know why busting a

626
00:41:22,040 --> 00:41:26,600
Speaker 1: cloud sounds dirty to me. I think it's busting just

627
00:41:26,600 --> 00:41:29,440
Speaker 1: busting in. Generally, you could say busting anything. You know,

628
00:41:29,560 --> 00:41:31,960
Speaker 1: I'm about to bust the Florida over here. It still

629
00:41:32,000 --> 00:41:35,600
Speaker 1: sounds weird. Sorry, I feel like I've been twelve years

630
00:41:35,600 --> 00:41:39,600
Speaker 1: old on these episodes lately. All right, here we go.

631
00:41:40,680 --> 00:41:43,600
Speaker 1: But Grady does say that the process may be different

632
00:41:43,640 --> 00:41:47,000
Speaker 1: for everyone. That's just what's worked for him. He did

633
00:41:47,680 --> 00:41:50,080
Speaker 1: get his friend, is one of his best friends, to

634
00:41:50,120 --> 00:41:53,760
Speaker 1: try it with that person's girlfriend, and they did seem

635
00:41:53,800 --> 00:41:56,200
Speaker 1: to be able to use that same process and make

636
00:41:56,239 --> 00:42:00,839
Speaker 1: it happen. Grady's advice to all of us is, if

637
00:42:00,840 --> 00:42:04,400
Speaker 1: this particular process isn't working for you, that he's the

638
00:42:04,440 --> 00:42:08,640
Speaker 1: Grady is outlined here, just to try experimenting with it, right,

639
00:42:08,880 --> 00:42:12,680
Speaker 1: which which lines up with the idea of intention. You know,

640
00:42:12,800 --> 00:42:16,439
Speaker 1: this reminds me of when we when we spoke with

641
00:42:16,640 --> 00:42:22,280
Speaker 1: our good pal Cody. Uh. They are practitioner of chaos magic,

642
00:42:22,560 --> 00:42:25,720
Speaker 1: and they said, as some beautiful things to say about

643
00:42:25,760 --> 00:42:28,560
Speaker 1: the idea of magic, which on this show we consider

644
00:42:28,640 --> 00:42:33,360
Speaker 1: weaponized psychology. They said, it's really the intention one lends

645
00:42:33,440 --> 00:42:37,239
Speaker 1: to a thing, the importance one attributes to it in

646
00:42:37,440 --> 00:42:42,040
Speaker 1: one's mind. Uh. And you know, I think, Matt and

647
00:42:42,120 --> 00:42:44,239
Speaker 1: Grady and all the rest of us, I think one

648
00:42:44,280 --> 00:42:47,719
Speaker 1: of the best ways to approach stuff like this is

649
00:42:47,840 --> 00:42:52,920
Speaker 1: to think through how we could best create parameters for

650
00:42:53,080 --> 00:42:56,720
Speaker 1: reproducible experiment. And I love that you're doing this, Grady

651
00:42:56,760 --> 00:43:00,919
Speaker 1: by by going to someone else and saying, hey, you

652
00:43:01,000 --> 00:43:03,640
Speaker 1: try it right, let me case test, let me see

653
00:43:03,680 --> 00:43:07,160
Speaker 1: what else happens here. So, for instance, I need your

654
00:43:07,200 --> 00:43:10,319
Speaker 1: help with this map. For instance, if we are if

655
00:43:10,360 --> 00:43:16,160
Speaker 1: we're building an observable, reproducible experiment to see whether the

656
00:43:16,239 --> 00:43:22,279
Speaker 1: human mind can dissipate clouds in the atmosphere, then we

657
00:43:22,320 --> 00:43:24,960
Speaker 1: would need as many things as possible to be the

658
00:43:25,080 --> 00:43:30,839
Speaker 1: same except for the people. Right. So ideally we'd want well,

659
00:43:30,880 --> 00:43:35,320
Speaker 1: we want the same couple of different locations, right. Um,

660
00:43:35,400 --> 00:43:38,680
Speaker 1: in case there was something wonky and unique to one location.

661
00:43:38,800 --> 00:43:41,440
Speaker 1: We want a couple of different locations where we know

662
00:43:41,560 --> 00:43:45,200
Speaker 1: there are there's a reliable population of clouds. We would

663
00:43:45,239 --> 00:43:50,640
Speaker 1: want to know observable the time that they form and dissipate,

664
00:43:50,719 --> 00:43:53,319
Speaker 1: like what that time span is. We'd want some real

665
00:43:53,360 --> 00:43:59,160
Speaker 1: time monitoring atmospheric conditions, right, I am. We're fun at parties, folks,

666
00:43:59,160 --> 00:44:02,799
Speaker 1: we promise, And then we would want um and we'd

667
00:44:02,880 --> 00:44:07,160
Speaker 1: want different people, right, And it's very difficult to control

668
00:44:07,200 --> 00:44:09,719
Speaker 1: for psychology, But I think maybe the big thing is

669
00:44:10,120 --> 00:44:12,120
Speaker 1: we want to set up an experiment that gives us

670
00:44:12,160 --> 00:44:18,120
Speaker 1: the timeline the lifespan of ah cumulo nimbus cloud or

671
00:44:18,160 --> 00:44:22,520
Speaker 1: a cumulus cloud, and then we would want to see

672
00:44:22,960 --> 00:44:27,360
Speaker 1: if observation interferes with that timeline. Or we could do

673
00:44:27,400 --> 00:44:29,799
Speaker 1: another thing where you take a place that always has

674
00:44:30,400 --> 00:44:33,279
Speaker 1: gray clouds and see if someone can think a hole

675
00:44:33,400 --> 00:44:36,560
Speaker 1: through it. Right, a very specifical like, hey, we're going

676
00:44:36,600 --> 00:44:39,000
Speaker 1: to bring the moon out kind of thing and see

677
00:44:39,000 --> 00:44:41,359
Speaker 1: if multiple people can do that or one person could

678
00:44:41,360 --> 00:44:45,920
Speaker 1: do it multiple times, or or is observation of the

679
00:44:45,960 --> 00:44:49,719
Speaker 1: clouds quote unquote natural lifespan? Is that like when you

680
00:44:49,760 --> 00:44:51,840
Speaker 1: try to see if light is a particle or a

681
00:44:51,880 --> 00:44:54,920
Speaker 1: wave is the near fact of applying human consciousness to

682
00:44:55,000 --> 00:45:00,719
Speaker 1: it already exchange like, you know, messing up the experiment? Okay,

683
00:45:00,760 --> 00:45:03,560
Speaker 1: what happens if you focus on the wrong cloud and

684
00:45:03,600 --> 00:45:11,640
Speaker 1: instead it's a gene jacket? Huh? Remember that lear that movie? Nope, anyone,

685
00:45:13,120 --> 00:45:15,880
Speaker 1: what a great film? Don't don't don't focus your intention

686
00:45:15,920 --> 00:45:19,200
Speaker 1: on one of those things we have learned. Thanks, Peel.

687
00:45:20,560 --> 00:45:23,359
Speaker 1: What what I mean? You know? And and should we

688
00:45:23,440 --> 00:45:27,400
Speaker 1: be busting clouds? What have they done? You know what

689
00:45:27,440 --> 00:45:33,480
Speaker 1: I mean? But I think I think we've got the

690
00:45:33,560 --> 00:45:36,440
Speaker 1: lines that we could do right, Like these are things

691
00:45:36,480 --> 00:45:40,040
Speaker 1: we could do or someone could do, uh to to

692
00:45:40,200 --> 00:45:43,839
Speaker 1: really explore this experiment. And I just I know Matt,

693
00:45:43,920 --> 00:45:47,920
Speaker 1: I know both of us. Both of us don't really

694
00:45:48,160 --> 00:45:51,520
Speaker 1: enjoy it when folks dismiss something out of hands. So

695
00:45:51,560 --> 00:45:55,160
Speaker 1: that's why we're careful to say, Okay, how could we

696
00:45:55,200 --> 00:45:57,640
Speaker 1: get our heads around this question right? How could we

697
00:45:58,600 --> 00:46:02,960
Speaker 1: see this experiment in action? What? What are the current

698
00:46:03,280 --> 00:46:06,839
Speaker 1: um accepted scientific explanations? What else is out there? That's

699
00:46:06,840 --> 00:46:09,560
Speaker 1: the exciting stuff? And I want I want to hear

700
00:46:09,600 --> 00:46:14,200
Speaker 1: more people, uh more people's cloud busting stories or if

701
00:46:14,200 --> 00:46:17,239
Speaker 1: there is anybody who is a practicing dowser or a

702
00:46:17,360 --> 00:46:21,560
Speaker 1: rainmaker or something like that that would be amazing to hear. Um,

703
00:46:21,680 --> 00:46:24,799
Speaker 1: we did a dowsing episode, didn't we year's back. I

704
00:46:24,800 --> 00:46:29,560
Speaker 1: think we brought up dowsing on the video. Maybe maybe

705
00:46:29,640 --> 00:46:32,319
Speaker 1: maybe we do it in a yeah, okay, no, no,

706
00:46:32,360 --> 00:46:35,640
Speaker 1: we've given ourselves some homework. Uh and thank you great.

707
00:46:35,719 --> 00:46:38,160
Speaker 1: I think I think now we Uh, maybe we wrap

708
00:46:38,239 --> 00:46:42,359
Speaker 1: up the episode by delivering on our promise. We wanted

709
00:46:42,360 --> 00:46:45,319
Speaker 1: to play some more voicemails. Uh, and we may not

710
00:46:45,360 --> 00:46:48,120
Speaker 1: be able to dive super deep into all of them,

711
00:46:48,160 --> 00:46:51,879
Speaker 1: but uh, folks, credit where it's due. Credit is very

712
00:46:51,920 --> 00:46:55,840
Speaker 1: important to me. Our own Matt Frederick, one and only

713
00:46:56,200 --> 00:47:00,000
Speaker 1: Mr Matt Frederick has been a beast on these voicemails.

714
00:46:59,840 --> 00:47:05,080
Speaker 1: And Matt, you found, uh, you found some very interesting stories. Oh. Yes,

715
00:47:05,120 --> 00:47:08,760
Speaker 1: this message comes to us from I think she calls

716
00:47:08,760 --> 00:47:12,840
Speaker 1: herself oswoman. I think that's what I'm hearing. It's sometimes

717
00:47:12,920 --> 00:47:16,799
Speaker 1: a little difficult to understand like the code name of

718
00:47:16,840 --> 00:47:19,000
Speaker 1: someone when I'm going through these. I believe that's what

719
00:47:19,040 --> 00:47:23,600
Speaker 1: her name is. And she's responding to a listener mail

720
00:47:24,040 --> 00:47:26,839
Speaker 1: message that we got from Tone, who was discussing this

721
00:47:26,880 --> 00:47:31,080
Speaker 1: weird modem noise or the tone, that's what we called him, Tone,

722
00:47:31,400 --> 00:47:36,840
Speaker 1: and she just has some interesting insight. Let's say on

723
00:47:36,880 --> 00:47:42,160
Speaker 1: a similar situation. Hi, guys, this is ODS woman in Idaho.

724
00:47:42,200 --> 00:47:47,560
Speaker 1: I have a message for Tone. Okay, Um, I too

725
00:47:47,719 --> 00:47:54,160
Speaker 1: heard something weird on my wireless late one night. I

726
00:47:54,200 --> 00:47:57,399
Speaker 1: was not on my PlayStation infects on my computer when

727
00:47:57,520 --> 00:48:04,160
Speaker 1: something my computer got hacked. That's almost impossible because I'm

728
00:48:04,200 --> 00:48:08,000
Speaker 1: a Microsoft engineer with a high level of security clearance,

729
00:48:08,040 --> 00:48:12,760
Speaker 1: so I keep all of my products at top top, top,

730
00:48:12,920 --> 00:48:18,040
Speaker 1: VPN top everything. Finally, my computer is going off and

731
00:48:19,080 --> 00:48:22,319
Speaker 1: I it's not only my computer, it's my phone, it's

732
00:48:22,320 --> 00:48:27,160
Speaker 1: a couple other things. Well, I called century Link immediately

733
00:48:27,800 --> 00:48:31,879
Speaker 1: and they traced it. They traced the IP address and

734
00:48:31,960 --> 00:48:36,359
Speaker 1: we found it was a guy living in my neighborhood,

735
00:48:36,880 --> 00:48:42,160
Speaker 1: I will say my town, who had brought home a

736
00:48:42,200 --> 00:48:51,040
Speaker 1: little black box from a three letter affiliation UM and

737
00:48:51,320 --> 00:48:54,480
Speaker 1: he was playing with it, UM seeing if he could

738
00:48:54,560 --> 00:48:56,880
Speaker 1: hack into things do things like this. And this was

739
00:48:57,000 --> 00:49:00,319
Speaker 1: right near when those oil platforms got hacked. Then some

740
00:49:00,400 --> 00:49:04,760
Speaker 1: other things got hacked. Well, apparently this little black box

741
00:49:05,239 --> 00:49:07,719
Speaker 1: that's just what I'm gonna call it, was used in

742
00:49:07,760 --> 00:49:12,399
Speaker 1: a lot of hacking situations overseas, and this guy thought

743
00:49:12,400 --> 00:49:17,160
Speaker 1: it would be real cute to bring it home from work. Um,

744
00:49:17,280 --> 00:49:20,880
Speaker 1: my advice to tone is getting upan get a really

745
00:49:20,920 --> 00:49:24,520
Speaker 1: good one, gegnored, get something, get somebody on the phone.

746
00:49:24,920 --> 00:49:31,880
Speaker 1: If you begin, call your company, call immediately, customer service,

747
00:49:32,760 --> 00:49:38,680
Speaker 1: get some help. Because I didn't like it, I let

748
00:49:38,719 --> 00:49:41,320
Speaker 1: this guy's supervisor know that I had a secret of

749
00:49:41,360 --> 00:49:46,200
Speaker 1: better Clarency, that I was pissed. I was kicked. And

750
00:49:47,239 --> 00:49:55,120
Speaker 1: so my advice is, somebody is missing around, somebody's trying

751
00:49:55,120 --> 00:50:00,360
Speaker 1: to see what you're doing. Somebody's yeah, they're there, there's trying,

752
00:50:00,640 --> 00:50:04,440
Speaker 1: They're trying to get in. So, uh, my advice is,

753
00:50:05,120 --> 00:50:07,960
Speaker 1: don't mess with this, get a VPN and if you

754
00:50:08,000 --> 00:50:11,719
Speaker 1: ever hear it again, call your provider and tell them

755
00:50:11,760 --> 00:50:16,200
Speaker 1: that you have been hated in a major serious way,

756
00:50:16,560 --> 00:50:18,360
Speaker 1: and then they need to get some people out to

757
00:50:18,440 --> 00:50:22,200
Speaker 1: help you. So this is this is massive. This is

758
00:50:22,239 --> 00:50:25,759
Speaker 1: someone with experience, who is who was speaking about the

759
00:50:25,760 --> 00:50:30,840
Speaker 1: stuff at full disclosure. Uh. Several VPN services have sponsored

760
00:50:30,840 --> 00:50:34,440
Speaker 1: this show in the past, including Nord VPN. UM. I

761
00:50:34,520 --> 00:50:39,879
Speaker 1: do think Nord is. I do think nord is pretty solid. Um.

762
00:50:40,000 --> 00:50:44,560
Speaker 1: But also but Also, I think this is great advice

763
00:50:44,600 --> 00:50:47,600
Speaker 1: in general, you know, especially if you were listening, if

764
00:50:47,600 --> 00:50:50,799
Speaker 1: you're listening to our show in a part of the

765
00:50:50,840 --> 00:50:56,640
Speaker 1: world where, um, the current regimes may be more oppressive,

766
00:50:57,040 --> 00:51:00,640
Speaker 1: maybe more. I saw iron on you and you already

767
00:51:00,640 --> 00:51:03,400
Speaker 1: have a VPN. If you're lucky enough to live in

768
00:51:03,440 --> 00:51:06,640
Speaker 1: a democratic society or one that purports to be one,

769
00:51:07,120 --> 00:51:10,359
Speaker 1: then you should probably still have a VPN. And Matt,

770
00:51:10,480 --> 00:51:12,840
Speaker 1: I know that's something you and I are lock stup about.

771
00:51:12,960 --> 00:51:17,040
Speaker 1: Oh yeah, Ben, totally vp N all the way, all day,

772
00:51:17,040 --> 00:51:21,800
Speaker 1: every country. Just be in every country at all times. Yeah, yeah,

773
00:51:22,040 --> 00:51:24,520
Speaker 1: this is the I wish I could have a VPN

774
00:51:24,600 --> 00:51:28,160
Speaker 1: for where I'm physically at walking around like analog. You know,

775
00:51:28,640 --> 00:51:32,160
Speaker 1: who's that at the publix? Some guy from Switzerland. Uh

776
00:51:33,920 --> 00:51:36,600
Speaker 1: that's a terrible joke. But uh but yeah, we want

777
00:51:36,640 --> 00:51:39,440
Speaker 1: to air this response. I think we have time for

778
00:51:39,800 --> 00:51:42,640
Speaker 1: what do you think? Maybe one or two more? Sure,

779
00:51:42,920 --> 00:51:45,720
Speaker 1: And for our last voicemail, let's jump to a message

780
00:51:45,719 --> 00:51:50,160
Speaker 1: we received from Sergeant Williams, who I spoke to as well.

781
00:51:50,200 --> 00:51:53,800
Speaker 1: Sergeant Williams is an awesome human being. Let us hear

782
00:51:53,840 --> 00:51:57,680
Speaker 1: this message. Sergeant Williams here again. Um, I'm not trying

783
00:51:57,680 --> 00:52:01,040
Speaker 1: to bug you guys. I'm kind of kind of utilize

784
00:52:01,080 --> 00:52:07,520
Speaker 1: you guys as my like private research group. But like, um,

785
00:52:07,560 --> 00:52:10,000
Speaker 1: here's here's the thing. So at the end of World

786
00:52:10,000 --> 00:52:13,680
Speaker 1: War Two with Project paper Clip and all that stuff,

787
00:52:14,680 --> 00:52:17,319
Speaker 1: don't worry, I'm not like a conspiracy I'm not like

788
00:52:17,360 --> 00:52:19,600
Speaker 1: trying to do conspiracy. But I think about this for

789
00:52:19,640 --> 00:52:22,600
Speaker 1: a second. So at that time, the United States was

790
00:52:22,600 --> 00:52:24,720
Speaker 1: against the Nazis, right, and then all of a sudden

791
00:52:24,760 --> 00:52:27,480
Speaker 1: we got a bunch of Nazis. We brought them into

792
00:52:27,520 --> 00:52:30,680
Speaker 1: the space program, we bought them into high level positions

793
00:52:30,719 --> 00:52:36,160
Speaker 1: like um our intelligence agencies. We based it on the

794
00:52:36,239 --> 00:52:39,960
Speaker 1: Nazi intelligence agencies. Actually we listened to their top agent

795
00:52:40,360 --> 00:52:44,799
Speaker 1: right to learn about that. So and then that's when

796
00:52:44,800 --> 00:52:49,279
Speaker 1: all those experiments started, the LSD, the the you know,

797
00:52:49,440 --> 00:52:53,520
Speaker 1: Tuskegee experiments, all that crap that occurred. That happened after

798
00:52:53,760 --> 00:52:57,360
Speaker 1: they came over and we put them in charge. And

799
00:52:57,440 --> 00:53:00,400
Speaker 1: I'm thinking, dude, the Nazis didn't really lose, they just

800
00:53:00,440 --> 00:53:04,440
Speaker 1: can't kind of came over and transitioned into the United States.

801
00:53:06,239 --> 00:53:09,760
Speaker 1: So if you guys could look into that and figure

802
00:53:09,760 --> 00:53:13,880
Speaker 1: it out, that'd be cool. That's all. I know it's weird,

803
00:53:14,760 --> 00:53:19,680
Speaker 1: but anyway, I love the show, loved the book. I

804
00:53:19,760 --> 00:53:21,960
Speaker 1: bought two copies. I mean I bought the book and

805
00:53:22,000 --> 00:53:25,360
Speaker 1: then I bought the audio book. But um, anyway, I

806
00:53:25,400 --> 00:53:30,400
Speaker 1: love you guys. Man, all right, take it easy. Oh man, Oh,

807
00:53:30,400 --> 00:53:32,400
Speaker 1: this is not okay. I don't know. I don't know

808
00:53:32,440 --> 00:53:34,880
Speaker 1: if Mission Control is going to let that fly. While

809
00:53:34,920 --> 00:53:37,760
Speaker 1: we were playing that message, Matt, there's a part where

810
00:53:37,880 --> 00:53:41,000
Speaker 1: where where Sarger you were saying, you know, I'm not

811
00:53:41,080 --> 00:53:42,839
Speaker 1: a conspiracy guy or anything, you know, I was like,

812
00:53:42,960 --> 00:53:47,640
Speaker 1: I am, because you're absolutely right. One thing a lot

813
00:53:47,640 --> 00:53:50,239
Speaker 1: of people in this country, in the United States rather

814
00:53:50,800 --> 00:53:54,680
Speaker 1: are not aware of is that the powers that be

815
00:53:54,800 --> 00:53:58,120
Speaker 1: in the US in the lead up to World War Two,

816
00:53:58,400 --> 00:54:02,080
Speaker 1: many of them were huge fan ends of Nazi ideals.

817
00:54:02,520 --> 00:54:07,400
Speaker 1: Nazis learned a lot about eugenics from stuff grown on

818
00:54:07,440 --> 00:54:13,320
Speaker 1: American shores, from horrific experiments and policies in the United States,

819
00:54:13,680 --> 00:54:18,200
Speaker 1: and the idea that the US modeled UH some modern

820
00:54:18,320 --> 00:54:24,480
Speaker 1: iterations of intelligence, both in methods and an organization from

821
00:54:24,800 --> 00:54:28,320
Speaker 1: UH scientists that they had scooped away or from officials

822
00:54:28,360 --> 00:54:31,920
Speaker 1: they had scooped away. Makes sense to me honestly, because

823
00:54:31,960 --> 00:54:36,080
Speaker 1: God knows, the rocket technology was modeled in a similar iteration, right,

824
00:54:36,160 --> 00:54:40,200
Speaker 1: applying a similar process. Now, the thing is um. For

825
00:54:40,239 --> 00:54:42,719
Speaker 1: some of the stuff from the Access Powers, like the

826
00:54:42,760 --> 00:54:45,560
Speaker 1: horrors of Unit seven thirty one in Japan or something.

827
00:54:46,000 --> 00:54:49,120
Speaker 1: The science they were doing had some value, but it

828
00:54:49,239 --> 00:54:52,640
Speaker 1: is actually really bad science. It didn't hold up to

829
00:54:52,719 --> 00:54:58,439
Speaker 1: a lot of rigors. Right. But the idea of organizational innovation, right,

830
00:54:58,520 --> 00:55:02,600
Speaker 1: the idea of creating cells of networks and stuff. Um,

831
00:55:03,160 --> 00:55:10,280
Speaker 1: you see tactics that work applied across countries, across cultures,

832
00:55:10,320 --> 00:55:14,440
Speaker 1: across time, like assassination, you know, or like French fries.

833
00:55:14,800 --> 00:55:17,920
Speaker 1: There's not one restaurant that owns French fries. They just

834
00:55:18,040 --> 00:55:21,600
Speaker 1: know French fries work for their intended purpose. And I

835
00:55:21,640 --> 00:55:24,440
Speaker 1: know that's a really messed up comparison. I'm sorry, but

836
00:55:24,480 --> 00:55:27,239
Speaker 1: I mean, I'm just this one. This one speaks to

837
00:55:27,280 --> 00:55:32,040
Speaker 1: me because you know that I and some like minded

838
00:55:32,120 --> 00:55:35,640
Speaker 1: dare I say co conspirators are working on a story

839
00:55:36,239 --> 00:55:41,800
Speaker 1: coming out January February. I can't remember about um about

840
00:55:41,880 --> 00:55:46,000
Speaker 1: this period of time, the interwar years in the United States.

841
00:55:46,000 --> 00:55:48,839
Speaker 1: It's a story that doesn't often get told to the

842
00:55:48,880 --> 00:55:51,520
Speaker 1: detriment of the West, and I would argue the world.

843
00:55:51,640 --> 00:55:56,480
Speaker 1: But but what it does, can we say it will

844
00:55:56,520 --> 00:56:00,799
Speaker 1: be it will be a name. We can say it later.

845
00:56:01,560 --> 00:56:04,680
Speaker 1: But yeah, yeah, but hopefully people will enjoy it. Worked

846
00:56:04,680 --> 00:56:08,359
Speaker 1: hard on it UM. But this this brings me to um.

847
00:56:08,880 --> 00:56:11,840
Speaker 1: I'm talking so much man like when you hear Sergeant

848
00:56:11,840 --> 00:56:20,000
Speaker 1: Williams say, um, essentially, why aren't more people talking about what?

849
00:56:20,000 --> 00:56:23,839
Speaker 1: What the US? What Uncle Sam in particular garnered from

850
00:56:23,880 --> 00:56:28,680
Speaker 1: that regime in Germany? What's your initial reaction? My fascination

851
00:56:28,760 --> 00:56:34,040
Speaker 1: goes directly to the intelligence aspect of it UM, simply

852
00:56:34,080 --> 00:56:37,880
Speaker 1: because I was fully aware after our research into the

853
00:56:37,960 --> 00:56:42,720
Speaker 1: aerospace field here in the United States and the forming

854
00:56:42,760 --> 00:56:46,040
Speaker 1: of basically all a lot of our technology, all of

855
00:56:46,040 --> 00:56:49,320
Speaker 1: our technology, you know, going to thinking about Huntsville, Alabama

856
00:56:49,400 --> 00:56:54,160
Speaker 1: and Wornever on Brown and all of that. Uh, I

857
00:56:54,200 --> 00:56:56,719
Speaker 1: knew that. I understood that. I think a lot of

858
00:56:56,719 --> 00:57:02,040
Speaker 1: people widely understand that the intelligence goal inside I'm not

859
00:57:02,160 --> 00:57:06,000
Speaker 1: aware of and I can't even confirm right now from

860
00:57:06,080 --> 00:57:08,359
Speaker 1: you know, any research of my own. So I want

861
00:57:08,400 --> 00:57:11,600
Speaker 1: to look into that further for sure. Yeah, I'm gonna.

862
00:57:11,719 --> 00:57:16,360
Speaker 1: I'm I think we can both rank it as if

863
00:57:16,400 --> 00:57:20,240
Speaker 1: not proven, we can rank it as plausible sadly again,

864
00:57:20,320 --> 00:57:24,280
Speaker 1: because methods that work will be applied in other in

865
00:57:24,360 --> 00:57:27,840
Speaker 1: other fields, right where wherever they can grant an edge

866
00:57:27,880 --> 00:57:31,920
Speaker 1: or an insight. And we know that in the world

867
00:57:31,960 --> 00:57:36,560
Speaker 1: of intelligence, Like don't let the movies fool you, folks,

868
00:57:36,680 --> 00:57:40,960
Speaker 1: the idea of sleeper agents, especially in an age of surveillance,

869
00:57:41,560 --> 00:57:45,080
Speaker 1: they're an endangered species. It's pretty tough to pull off.

870
00:57:45,120 --> 00:57:48,960
Speaker 1: It's pretty easy for them to get burned. Um, and

871
00:57:49,000 --> 00:57:52,439
Speaker 1: there's not a way to welcome back now, not realistically,

872
00:57:53,600 --> 00:57:59,240
Speaker 1: but the idea of taking tried and true methods and

873
00:57:59,280 --> 00:58:04,479
Speaker 1: applying them in intelligences um, more about listening. Right, So

874
00:58:04,760 --> 00:58:07,240
Speaker 1: if you can get access to people who are on

875
00:58:07,280 --> 00:58:10,400
Speaker 1: the inside and say, hey, this is how we did

876
00:58:10,520 --> 00:58:16,200
Speaker 1: stuff right, this is how our kitchen worked, then you

877
00:58:16,240 --> 00:58:22,280
Speaker 1: would be um, you would only be competent in applying

878
00:58:22,320 --> 00:58:26,200
Speaker 1: those methods to your own kitchen, your own restaurants. So

879
00:58:26,920 --> 00:58:33,720
Speaker 1: a convection of it, isn't that the same thing? Oh

880
00:58:33,800 --> 00:58:37,680
Speaker 1: this is your miss plus okay, okay, yeah, yeah, yeah,

881
00:58:37,920 --> 00:58:41,880
Speaker 1: all right, oh little su Vi, let's try that. Um.

882
00:58:41,960 --> 00:58:45,560
Speaker 1: And it doesn't even have to be necessarily a kitchen analogy.

883
00:58:45,640 --> 00:58:50,680
Speaker 1: Think of it in the world of manufacturing, right, that's

884
00:58:50,680 --> 00:58:54,920
Speaker 1: why people, that's why people hire folks from different companies.

885
00:58:55,320 --> 00:58:59,880
Speaker 1: You know, Oh, this is how you handle uh, this

886
00:59:00,000 --> 00:59:02,960
Speaker 1: how you handle axles and struts, right, or this is

887
00:59:03,080 --> 00:59:08,120
Speaker 1: your eco boost technology, whatever proprietary name you put on it.

888
00:59:08,280 --> 00:59:11,560
Speaker 1: Let me learn more, right, take me into your factory

889
00:59:11,800 --> 00:59:14,680
Speaker 1: and I'll use those lessons in my own. So this,

890
00:59:15,120 --> 00:59:22,000
Speaker 1: unfortunately does make sense. And for anyone who notes how

891
00:59:22,480 --> 00:59:27,640
Speaker 1: unethical that is, right, how you you are quite possibly

892
00:59:27,760 --> 00:59:30,880
Speaker 1: giving a pass to war criminals, which did happen. The

893
00:59:31,000 --> 00:59:35,280
Speaker 1: US absolutely did that, so did South American countries. If

894
00:59:35,360 --> 00:59:38,360
Speaker 1: you When we think of that, we have to also

895
00:59:38,440 --> 00:59:43,560
Speaker 1: think of the opposite. What if they didn't take that

896
00:59:43,680 --> 00:59:47,280
Speaker 1: opportunity to collect that intelligence, to take those lessons learned

897
00:59:47,280 --> 00:59:51,200
Speaker 1: and improve their methods. It's very dark, very dangerous stuff,

898
00:59:51,360 --> 00:59:54,080
Speaker 1: but it's a great question. So Matt, I say that

899
00:59:54,480 --> 00:59:57,479
Speaker 1: it's time for us to call it a day and

900
00:59:58,000 --> 01:00:00,440
Speaker 1: dig in. I think we've got some homework. Man, We've

901
01:00:00,480 --> 01:00:03,880
Speaker 1: got uh you know this this week, just in strange

902
01:00:03,920 --> 01:00:07,200
Speaker 1: news and listener mail, we ran into some things that

903
01:00:07,280 --> 01:00:13,440
Speaker 1: are amazing rabbit holes. We're gonna cloud bust all the

904
01:00:13,480 --> 01:00:21,280
Speaker 1: pistols in public bathrooms while investigating the our neighbors little

905
01:00:21,320 --> 01:00:26,280
Speaker 1: black boxes. Yes, yes, not uh, And we're going to

906
01:00:26,440 --> 01:00:29,920
Speaker 1: do that all with the help of a U, some

907
01:00:30,040 --> 01:00:33,720
Speaker 1: friends at a at a little building in Atlanta that

908
01:00:33,800 --> 01:00:38,880
Speaker 1: we cannot call the Chinese police station. And uh, we're

909
01:00:38,920 --> 01:00:43,320
Speaker 1: doing it all to stop a another coup in Germany,

910
01:00:43,360 --> 01:00:47,280
Speaker 1: et cetera. So that's our show. Thank you, as always

911
01:00:47,280 --> 01:00:50,160
Speaker 1: so much for tuning in. This has been our whoops

912
01:00:50,240 --> 01:00:53,880
Speaker 1: all voicemails listeners segment, listener mail segment. We're going to

913
01:00:54,000 --> 01:00:57,440
Speaker 1: have more on the way, keep them coming. We cannot

914
01:00:57,440 --> 01:01:02,800
Speaker 1: wait to hear from you. Thin Acebook, YouTube, Instagram, all

915
01:01:02,880 --> 01:01:05,760
Speaker 1: the hits, all the hits, and if you don't sip

916
01:01:05,880 --> 01:01:09,760
Speaker 1: the social needs, if you want to talk to us directly,

917
01:01:10,360 --> 01:01:12,880
Speaker 1: maybe get a call from Matt, maybe maybe even me

918
01:01:13,320 --> 01:01:16,320
Speaker 1: and maybe I'll maybe I'll cross that rubicon. Uh, then

919
01:01:16,360 --> 01:01:18,560
Speaker 1: why not give us a phone call. Our number is

920
01:01:18,640 --> 01:01:22,600
Speaker 1: one eight three three st d w y t K.

921
01:01:23,400 --> 01:01:26,479
Speaker 1: When you call in, give yourself a nickname and say

922
01:01:26,520 --> 01:01:29,640
Speaker 1: whatever you want. At the end of the three minutes

923
01:01:29,680 --> 01:01:32,600
Speaker 1: that you're allotted per voice mail, Please let us know

924
01:01:32,640 --> 01:01:34,600
Speaker 1: if we can use your name and voice on one

925
01:01:34,600 --> 01:01:38,160
Speaker 1: of our listener mail episodes. Those are really the only rules.

926
01:01:38,640 --> 01:01:40,000
Speaker 1: If you got more to say they can fit in

927
01:01:40,040 --> 01:01:42,640
Speaker 1: that three minutes, why not instead send us a good

928
01:01:42,640 --> 01:01:46,520
Speaker 1: old fashioned email. We are conspiracy at i heart radio

929
01:01:46,720 --> 01:02:07,720
Speaker 1: dot com bus points for puns, m m hm. Stuff

930
01:02:07,720 --> 01:02:09,640
Speaker 1: they don't want you to know. Is a production of

931
01:02:09,680 --> 01:02:12,640
Speaker 1: I heart Radio. For more podcasts from my heart Radio,

932
01:02:12,800 --> 01:02:15,640
Speaker 1: visit the i heart Radio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever

933
01:02:15,720 --> 01:02:17,000
Speaker 1: you listen to your favorite shows.