WEBVTT - Spoofing and Caller ID

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<v Speaker 1>Welcome to Tech Stuff, a production from I Heart Radio.

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<v Speaker 1>Hey there, and welcome to tech Stuff. I'm your host,

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<v Speaker 1>Jonathan Strickland. I'm an executive producer with I Heart Radio

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<v Speaker 1>and a love of all things tech. I say that

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<v Speaker 1>a lot, but then I always have to qualify it,

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<v Speaker 1>and this is gonna be another one of those episodes.

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<v Speaker 1>So today I thought I would talk a bit about

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<v Speaker 1>color I D, spoofing and robo calls. Mostly color I

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<v Speaker 1>D and spoofing robot calls, I think I'm gonna have

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<v Speaker 1>to say for another episode. But here in the United States,

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<v Speaker 1>the major telecommunications companies, those being Verizon, T Mobile, and

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<v Speaker 1>A T and T now have to work together to

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<v Speaker 1>fight spam calls due to a mandate from the Federal

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<v Speaker 1>Communications Commission or f c C. Now, the too long

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<v Speaker 1>Didn't Listen message behind this, as opposed to too long

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<v Speaker 1>Didn't Read is the goal is to eliminate spam robocalls

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<v Speaker 1>going to your phone, so that you don't act like

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<v Speaker 1>your phone is a bomb about to go off every

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<v Speaker 1>time it rings. But to understand why this is necessary

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<v Speaker 1>and how it all works, we have to go much deeper.

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<v Speaker 1>So if you, dear listener, are of a certain age,

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<v Speaker 1>you might remember a time when we didn't all carry

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<v Speaker 1>smartphones around with us all the time. You might even

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<v Speaker 1>remember a time before we even carried simple cell phones

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<v Speaker 1>with us. In fact, some of you might remember being

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<v Speaker 1>on a telephone handset that was tethered to a phone

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<v Speaker 1>that was mounted to the wall, or sitting on top

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<v Speaker 1>of an end table or something. And back in those days,

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<v Speaker 1>dear friends, if someone called you, you really had no

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<v Speaker 1>way of knowing who that someone was. I know, it's terrifying,

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<v Speaker 1>right the phone rings, and there's no way to know

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<v Speaker 1>who or what is on the other side. Could it

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<v Speaker 1>be Grandpa Joe and he's found a golden ticket. Could

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<v Speaker 1>it be the local food bank calling to see if

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<v Speaker 1>you'll volunteer this year. Could it be a wrong number?

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<v Speaker 1>The only way to find out was to answer the phone,

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<v Speaker 1>or if you were a fancy person, you might let

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<v Speaker 1>the call go to an answering machine. Side note. The

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<v Speaker 1>answering machine traces its history all the way back to

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<v Speaker 1>the nineteen thirties, but when I was growing up in

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<v Speaker 1>the seventies and eighties, they were still relatively uncommon from

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<v Speaker 1>most of the people I knew. But by the mid

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<v Speaker 1>eighties that that had totally changed, and we started seeing

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<v Speaker 1>commercials for like novelty answering machine outgoing messages I used

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<v Speaker 1>to be a thing. There was this incredible pressure to

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<v Speaker 1>create the perfect outgoing message to convey to those calling

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<v Speaker 1>that you had a personality. But I digress, let's get

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<v Speaker 1>back on track. Many answering machines would play incoming messages

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<v Speaker 1>out loud on a loudspeaker as someone was making the message,

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<v Speaker 1>which meant that you could use an answering machine to

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<v Speaker 1>screen your calls, and a lot of people did so.

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<v Speaker 1>If you had anxiety about answering the phone, you could

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<v Speaker 1>just wait for the answering machine to activate and then

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<v Speaker 1>see if the other person on the other end of

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<v Speaker 1>the call was going to wait around long enough to

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<v Speaker 1>actually leave a message after hearing You're hilarious and yet

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<v Speaker 1>incredibly effective outgoing message. Then, upon recognizing the voice, you

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<v Speaker 1>could choose to either interrupt the machine by picking up

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<v Speaker 1>the phone and having the call initiate, or just letting

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<v Speaker 1>it go. Simpler times really not that color I D

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<v Speaker 1>wasn't a thing back then. The foundation of color i

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<v Speaker 1>D technology has a history that dates back to the

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<v Speaker 1>late nineteen sixties and to really understand all this, we

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<v Speaker 1>should take get another step back and just talk about

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<v Speaker 1>phone calls in general, and we'll build from there. So

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<v Speaker 1>when Alexander Graham Bell made his first call, arguably not

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<v Speaker 1>the first call, but that's a story for another time,

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<v Speaker 1>it was a direct line from his station to that

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<v Speaker 1>of his assistant, Thomas Watts, and there was no need

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<v Speaker 1>to route that call anywhere. It was a straight road,

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<v Speaker 1>if you will, from one point to another. Now, let's

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<v Speaker 1>say we've got a group of four people and we

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<v Speaker 1>want to connect these four people with phone lines so

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<v Speaker 1>they can talk to each other on the phone. We

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<v Speaker 1>could do this directly as well. Right, A simple way

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<v Speaker 1>to draw this out would be just draw four points

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<v Speaker 1>as corners of a square. Uh. Those corners represent our

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<v Speaker 1>four phone friends, and we draw straight lines from each

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<v Speaker 1>point to each other point. So what you end up

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<v Speaker 1>with is a square with a couple of diagonal lines

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<v Speaker 1>crossing through the center, and boom, you've got your four

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<v Speaker 1>person network. Each person has a direct line to each

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<v Speaker 1>other person in the network. But as we try to

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<v Speaker 1>add more people to a system like this, we quickly

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<v Speaker 1>see the limitations that we face. Each new connection means

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<v Speaker 1>we have to establish cables between that person and every

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<v Speaker 1>other person on the network. This gets expensive and complicated

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<v Speaker 1>and messy and unsustainable. A phone network in which every

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<v Speaker 1>single person with a phone has a direct line with

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<v Speaker 1>every single other person with the phone is just impossible.

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<v Speaker 1>You wouldn't even be able to move around because of

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<v Speaker 1>all the cables everywhere, and so an important development in

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<v Speaker 1>the history of the telephone system was the creation of

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<v Speaker 1>the local exchange. The local exchange is a centralized point

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<v Speaker 1>that you dial into, and then the exchange could switch

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<v Speaker 1>on a connection between your line and the line of

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<v Speaker 1>whomever it was who wanted to call. So in the

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<v Speaker 1>early days of telephones, this was done with actual human

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<v Speaker 1>beings sitting at a switchboard and manually plugging cables into

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<v Speaker 1>complete calls from one person to another. So now rather

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<v Speaker 1>than having direct connections with every other phone in existence,

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<v Speaker 1>you really just needed a direct connection from your phone

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<v Speaker 1>to an exchange. This cuts way back on the amount

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<v Speaker 1>of cables that you needed in order to create a network. Now,

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<v Speaker 1>this works fine for local calls, like you know, within

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<v Speaker 1>a city, everyone can connect to that one local exchange,

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<v Speaker 1>But the word local gives us a hint that there

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<v Speaker 1>isn't one single exchange for every phone line out there. Now,

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<v Speaker 1>local exchanges will cover a specific region, but beyond that

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<v Speaker 1>you have other local exchanges. And to connect these exchanges together,

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<v Speaker 1>phone companies laid out what we're called trunk lines. These

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<v Speaker 1>are cables capable of carrying multiple phone signals simultaneously, which

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<v Speaker 1>is a good thing too. Otherwise a single long distance

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<v Speaker 1>call would prevent anyone else from making a similar sort

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<v Speaker 1>of call between you know, those two specific exchanges. The

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<v Speaker 1>networks grew organically, connecting to one another and forming what

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<v Speaker 1>we call the public switched Telephone network or p st N.

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<v Speaker 1>You could look at it as a sort of hierarchy

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<v Speaker 1>as more of the world built out phone systems. At

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<v Speaker 1>the very body him of this hierarchy, you had your

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<v Speaker 1>individual landline phones the stuff, and homes and offices and

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<v Speaker 1>phone booths and stuff like that. We used to have

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<v Speaker 1>these things called phone booths, Superman, which change in them

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<v Speaker 1>doesn't matter. One level up from this level, and you

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<v Speaker 1>have your local exchanges, right, These are the ones that

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<v Speaker 1>connect local calls to each other. And as I said,

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<v Speaker 1>in the old days, this was done with human operators

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<v Speaker 1>moving physical plugs into physical outlets to complete circuits and

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<v Speaker 1>switch on a phone call, but didn't take long before

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<v Speaker 1>the complexity of phone systems necessitated innovation to create automated

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<v Speaker 1>ways of handling this. One level up from local exchanges

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<v Speaker 1>are your trunk exchanges. The trunk exchange is to local exchanges,

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<v Speaker 1>as local exchanges are two individual land lines. The trunk

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<v Speaker 1>exchanges allow the various local exchanges within a country to

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<v Speaker 1>connect to one another. A level above the trunk exchanges,

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<v Speaker 1>you have international gateways, which interconnect the phone system of

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<v Speaker 1>one kind tree with other countries. Often you end up

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<v Speaker 1>having super long cables connecting these, including cables that run

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<v Speaker 1>under the ocean. You know, there's cables under the Atlantic

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<v Speaker 1>that connect Europe to North America, for example. All right,

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<v Speaker 1>so now let's get a bit more complicated by throwing

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<v Speaker 1>cellular phones into the mix. Cell phones communicate to sell towers,

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<v Speaker 1>which you can think of as being kind of similar

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<v Speaker 1>to the local exchange I was talking about earlier. So

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<v Speaker 1>cell towers are essentially antenna, and the cell phones communicate

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<v Speaker 1>with cell towers through electromagnetic radiation, specifically radiation that falls

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<v Speaker 1>into the microwave frequency range. But they're not the same

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<v Speaker 1>microwaves that we use to zap our popcorn and microwave ovens.

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<v Speaker 1>It's not that level of frequency. It's also a very

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<v Speaker 1>low wattage that we use for cell phones now. The

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<v Speaker 1>microwave acts as a carrier wave, and I've talked a

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<v Speaker 1>bit about carrier waves in the past with stuff like

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<v Speaker 1>radio signals. Each phone is using a slightly different frequency,

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<v Speaker 1>otherwise you would run into issues with phones interfering with

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<v Speaker 1>one another. All right, So cell phone towers are at

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<v Speaker 1>the heart of the cells that make up a service area.

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<v Speaker 1>One really clever thing about this approach is the handshake

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<v Speaker 1>that happens as you move across a region. So you

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<v Speaker 1>can be on a phone call and you can be

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<v Speaker 1>let's say, in a car, and you pass out of

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<v Speaker 1>the range of one cell phone or cell tower rather

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<v Speaker 1>and you enter into the range of another, and your

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<v Speaker 1>call continues on as if you had a solid connection

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<v Speaker 1>on a single cell tower the entire time. I'm gonna

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<v Speaker 1>leave it at that, because getting into the tech of

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<v Speaker 1>all that would really get us off course. This episode

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<v Speaker 1>would end up being like three hours long. But maybe

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<v Speaker 1>I'll do a full episode about how cell towers work.

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<v Speaker 1>It is really fascinating because they have to be very

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<v Speaker 1>careful with the frequencies they use in order to both

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<v Speaker 1>service everyone who's within range of a specific cell tower

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<v Speaker 1>and not interfere with anyone who's at a neighboring cell tower. Anyway,

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<v Speaker 1>Connecting the towers is the Mobile Telephone Switching Office or

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<v Speaker 1>mt s O. Each service provider has its own mpt

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<v Speaker 1>s O in regions, So if the person you're talking

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<v Speaker 1>with is in the same region, such as like in

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<v Speaker 1>the same city as you, and they happen to be

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<v Speaker 1>on the same carrier, one mt s O pretty much

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<v Speaker 1>handles everything. The call signals go through the cell towers

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<v Speaker 1>to one another through the m t s O, but

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<v Speaker 1>the calls are not made directly phone to phone. It's

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<v Speaker 1>not like your phone is acting like a radio directly

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<v Speaker 1>with the other phone. Now, if you're calling someone who's

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<v Speaker 1>on the other side of the country, it's a little

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<v Speaker 1>bit different. Typically, your call would go from your phone

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<v Speaker 1>to a cell tower, and from the cell tower to

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<v Speaker 1>the local mt s O of your carrier, then from

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<v Speaker 1>there to the p s t N that big public

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<v Speaker 1>switching telephone network, and that would then route your call

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<v Speaker 1>to the mt s O relevant to whomever it was

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<v Speaker 1>your calling on the other end. So even cell calls

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<v Speaker 1>can rely upon the old phone system. Getting back to

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<v Speaker 1>color I D. Back in the nineteen sixties, there was

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<v Speaker 1>an engineer named Theodore Paris Cavacos it still is, I mean,

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<v Speaker 1>he's still alive today. He developed a way to send

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<v Speaker 1>electronic data over telephone lines. In v he filed and

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<v Speaker 1>received a patent for a quote decoding and display apparatus

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<v Speaker 1>for groups of pulse trains end quote. This would become

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<v Speaker 1>the basis of color I D, in which the telephone

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<v Speaker 1>of the person making the call will send data relating

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<v Speaker 1>to the phone number of that originating call along with

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<v Speaker 1>the call itself, and a device on the other end

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<v Speaker 1>on the receiving end could get this information, decode it

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<v Speaker 1>and display the incoming phone number and thus identify the

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<v Speaker 1>incoming call. Other engineers around the same time period began

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<v Speaker 1>to develop similar technologies and approaches, and so the early

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<v Speaker 1>days of color I D are a bit muddled, as

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<v Speaker 1>there are numerous patents assigned to different inventors, some of

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<v Speaker 1>which acknowledged the existence of other inventions as prior art.

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<v Speaker 1>One of those inventors was Katsuo Hashimoto for a quote

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<v Speaker 1>Telephone Information displaying device end quote. The abstract of that

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<v Speaker 1>patent essentially lays out what we think of as color

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<v Speaker 1>I D. So I'm going to read to you the

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<v Speaker 1>abstract of this patent. Here he goes a calling parties

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<v Speaker 1>telephone number displaying device, in which, while the telephone set

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<v Speaker 1>of a subscriber is ringing in response to calling signals

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<v Speaker 1>from a telephone exchange office, the telephone number of a

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<v Speaker 1>calling party and information are displayed on digital display units

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<v Speaker 1>at high speed before lifting the handset. Accordingly, the subscriber

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<v Speaker 1>can determine whether or not he should answer the call

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<v Speaker 1>before picking up the handset. Thus his privacy can be

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<v Speaker 1>protected from a variety of telephone troubles such as wrong

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<v Speaker 1>number and nuisance calls. The display is maintained as it

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<v Speaker 1>is even if the handset is put back after the talk,

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<v Speaker 1>but it will be cleared automatically upon reception of the

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<v Speaker 1>next call to display the telephone number of the next

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<v Speaker 1>calling party. When the subscriber picks up the handset to

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<v Speaker 1>make a call, the internal circuit is automatically changed to

0:13:18.679 --> 0:13:23.079
<v Speaker 1>display a telephone number dialed by him. That's it. So

0:13:23.160 --> 0:13:26.439
<v Speaker 1>that patent pretty much explains that the invention would allow

0:13:26.440 --> 0:13:31.160
<v Speaker 1>telephones to send and receive signals between successive ringing signals.

0:13:31.160 --> 0:13:34.280
<v Speaker 1>So in other words, when the phone company isn't sending

0:13:34.280 --> 0:13:37.840
<v Speaker 1>the signal to make the receiving phone ring, it could

0:13:37.880 --> 0:13:41.880
<v Speaker 1>send the signal containing information about the origin of that call.

0:13:42.280 --> 0:13:45.360
<v Speaker 1>And that's why if you're using a landline and you

0:13:45.480 --> 0:13:48.160
<v Speaker 1>get a phone call with a system that had caller

0:13:48.240 --> 0:13:50.600
<v Speaker 1>I D, you would only see the I D stuff

0:13:50.640 --> 0:13:54.040
<v Speaker 1>pop up after the first ring happened. The method for

0:13:54.160 --> 0:13:58.400
<v Speaker 1>sending the information was a type of frequency modulation that's

0:13:58.520 --> 0:14:01.440
<v Speaker 1>changing the frequency of a signal in order to encode

0:14:01.480 --> 0:14:06.480
<v Speaker 1>information on it, called frequency shift keying or f s K.

0:14:07.040 --> 0:14:10.080
<v Speaker 1>Applying f s K to a carrier signal alters that

0:14:10.160 --> 0:14:12.600
<v Speaker 1>carrier signal in a way that can be interpreted on

0:14:12.640 --> 0:14:15.040
<v Speaker 1>the other side in some manner. So in the case

0:14:15.040 --> 0:14:17.880
<v Speaker 1>of color I D, that some manner is that the

0:14:17.880 --> 0:14:22.240
<v Speaker 1>transmitting side can encode the phone number in that carrier wave,

0:14:22.720 --> 0:14:26.280
<v Speaker 1>and the receiving side can decode that carrier wave and

0:14:26.320 --> 0:14:29.560
<v Speaker 1>get back at that number. FSK is used in lots

0:14:29.600 --> 0:14:32.960
<v Speaker 1>of applications, not just Color I D. But for our purposes,

0:14:33.160 --> 0:14:35.240
<v Speaker 1>it's just important that we know that this is the

0:14:35.280 --> 0:14:37.840
<v Speaker 1>methodology that the phone company is used to transmit the

0:14:37.840 --> 0:14:40.800
<v Speaker 1>info of Hey, this is the phone number that just

0:14:40.960 --> 0:14:43.760
<v Speaker 1>dialed you. But this wasn't going to be a service

0:14:43.800 --> 0:14:47.080
<v Speaker 1>that phone companies were going to throw in for free. No,

0:14:47.760 --> 0:14:50.160
<v Speaker 1>this would be something that companies would charge for on

0:14:50.280 --> 0:14:53.320
<v Speaker 1>top of the normal phone bill. Now, the story goes

0:14:53.360 --> 0:14:56.440
<v Speaker 1>that the phone companies at first planned to offer this

0:14:56.600 --> 0:14:59.680
<v Speaker 1>service as an audio one. So, in other words, you

0:14:59.680 --> 0:15:02.200
<v Speaker 1>could opt into this service and you would get a

0:15:02.280 --> 0:15:04.880
<v Speaker 1>verbal alert when you picked up the phone telling you

0:15:05.000 --> 0:15:09.360
<v Speaker 1>the phone number that the call originated from. UH. And

0:15:09.600 --> 0:15:11.920
<v Speaker 1>the phone companies were hoping to charge on a per

0:15:12.120 --> 0:15:15.360
<v Speaker 1>use basis, so every time you did this you get

0:15:15.440 --> 0:15:18.960
<v Speaker 1>charged a little amount. That's not how things eventually turned out.

0:15:19.560 --> 0:15:21.840
<v Speaker 1>We'll get into color I D a little bit more

0:15:21.920 --> 0:15:24.240
<v Speaker 1>after the break, and then we'll talk about the systems

0:15:24.280 --> 0:15:35.640
<v Speaker 1>that enable spoofing. But first let's take that quick break. So,

0:15:35.760 --> 0:15:38.960
<v Speaker 1>phone companies were licensing technologies to enable color I D

0:15:39.080 --> 0:15:41.600
<v Speaker 1>in the nineteen seventies, but it wasn't until the mid

0:15:41.680 --> 0:15:45.080
<v Speaker 1>nineteen eighties that we saw the first pilot program of

0:15:45.120 --> 0:15:48.160
<v Speaker 1>color I D here in the United States. That took

0:15:48.160 --> 0:15:53.400
<v Speaker 1>place in Orlando, Florida, where you know, the characters from

0:15:53.400 --> 0:15:56.240
<v Speaker 1>Book of Mormon really wanted to go, and that happened.

0:15:56.280 --> 0:16:00.920
<v Speaker 1>Back in four Bell South offered a service call touch Star,

0:16:01.160 --> 0:16:03.800
<v Speaker 1>and Color i D was one of the features that

0:16:03.840 --> 0:16:07.200
<v Speaker 1>you could opt into with Touch Star. It was called

0:16:07.280 --> 0:16:11.240
<v Speaker 1>Custom Local Area Signaling Service, but it would become known

0:16:11.400 --> 0:16:14.000
<v Speaker 1>as Color i D. Now, if you weren't around in

0:16:14.040 --> 0:16:16.600
<v Speaker 1>the nineteen eighties, you might be surprised to hear that

0:16:16.680 --> 0:16:19.320
<v Speaker 1>the emergence of color i D was viewed with suspicion

0:16:19.440 --> 0:16:23.200
<v Speaker 1>from multiple fronts. In the US. Politicians were asking if

0:16:23.240 --> 0:16:27.520
<v Speaker 1>perhaps Color i D would violate wire tapping laws, and

0:16:27.600 --> 0:16:30.600
<v Speaker 1>others were likening it to tracing a phone call, kind

0:16:30.600 --> 0:16:32.640
<v Speaker 1>of like what you see in movies, where you know,

0:16:32.680 --> 0:16:36.960
<v Speaker 1>the police are trying to track a specific criminal as

0:16:36.960 --> 0:16:39.600
<v Speaker 1>they talk on the phone. But in fact, it was

0:16:39.640 --> 0:16:42.720
<v Speaker 1>such a controversial subject that it took more than a

0:16:42.840 --> 0:16:46.240
<v Speaker 1>decade for all fifty states in the US to actually

0:16:46.280 --> 0:16:50.800
<v Speaker 1>adopt the technology. California held out the longest. California only

0:16:50.800 --> 0:16:54.680
<v Speaker 1>incorporated color i D in nineteen nine, six twelve years

0:16:54.760 --> 0:16:57.520
<v Speaker 1>after Orlando, Florida got in on it. And by the

0:16:57.560 --> 0:17:00.800
<v Speaker 1>mid nineties, there was another big con learned to think about,

0:17:00.840 --> 0:17:04.080
<v Speaker 1>and that was privacy. We weren't quite at the same

0:17:04.160 --> 0:17:06.560
<v Speaker 1>level that we are now, not by a long shot,

0:17:06.960 --> 0:17:11.399
<v Speaker 1>where the average medicine has generated tons of information about

0:17:11.400 --> 0:17:15.120
<v Speaker 1>themselves that can link back to them. But we were

0:17:15.359 --> 0:17:18.280
<v Speaker 1>entering into an era in which certain companies were building

0:17:18.280 --> 0:17:22.919
<v Speaker 1>out comprehensive databases about consumers, and so you started to

0:17:22.960 --> 0:17:28.200
<v Speaker 1>see companies building out profiles or even dossiers on people. Now,

0:17:28.320 --> 0:17:31.040
<v Speaker 1>if you want to be charitable, you could argue this

0:17:31.119 --> 0:17:35.520
<v Speaker 1>helped those companies serve their customers more effectively. But if

0:17:35.520 --> 0:17:37.919
<v Speaker 1>you want to be cynical, you could say that this

0:17:38.000 --> 0:17:41.359
<v Speaker 1>gave companies more information to leverage while trying to sell

0:17:41.400 --> 0:17:45.040
<v Speaker 1>goods or services to a potential customer. The truth is

0:17:45.160 --> 0:17:50.159
<v Speaker 1>probably somewhere in the middle. But what concerned privacy advocates

0:17:50.240 --> 0:17:53.840
<v Speaker 1>is that a business could theoretically rely on caller I D.

0:17:54.440 --> 0:17:56.639
<v Speaker 1>So if someone were to call in, let's say that

0:17:56.680 --> 0:18:00.439
<v Speaker 1>someone needs to talk to a customer service rep, then

0:18:00.680 --> 0:18:03.360
<v Speaker 1>that rep could do a reverse phone number, look up

0:18:03.520 --> 0:18:07.280
<v Speaker 1>on that call, and pull up a full profile of

0:18:07.320 --> 0:18:10.480
<v Speaker 1>the person calling. And there were a lot of privacy

0:18:10.480 --> 0:18:14.080
<v Speaker 1>implications that were concerning actually kind of seems quaint in

0:18:14.119 --> 0:18:16.520
<v Speaker 1>comparison to what we deal with today. At least if

0:18:16.560 --> 0:18:20.040
<v Speaker 1>you look into how private information gets handled these days.

0:18:20.800 --> 0:18:23.919
<v Speaker 1>For that reason, Telephone Company is introduced an option to

0:18:23.960 --> 0:18:28.120
<v Speaker 1>allow customers to opt into color I D blocking. Now,

0:18:28.160 --> 0:18:30.359
<v Speaker 1>if you did this, it meant that your number would

0:18:30.359 --> 0:18:34.040
<v Speaker 1>not be displayed when you called someone else. You were

0:18:34.080 --> 0:18:37.960
<v Speaker 1>effectively blacklisted for color I D. And so you know,

0:18:38.000 --> 0:18:40.399
<v Speaker 1>if I opted into this and I called you, you

0:18:40.440 --> 0:18:43.600
<v Speaker 1>would probably see some sort of message like color unknown

0:18:43.840 --> 0:18:48.120
<v Speaker 1>or something similar to that, which probably means you wouldn't

0:18:48.160 --> 0:18:51.200
<v Speaker 1>likely pick up my call. To be fair, you probably

0:18:51.200 --> 0:18:53.879
<v Speaker 1>wouldn't anyway, I'm kind of a drag to speak to

0:18:54.000 --> 0:18:57.399
<v Speaker 1>on the phone. It took time for attitudes around color

0:18:57.480 --> 0:19:00.520
<v Speaker 1>I D to change, but we did on viously see

0:19:00.560 --> 0:19:05.640
<v Speaker 1>that happen today For many people, including myself, we don't

0:19:05.680 --> 0:19:08.359
<v Speaker 1>pick up the phone if we don't recognize the number

0:19:08.440 --> 0:19:12.040
<v Speaker 1>that's displayed on our phone screen, and that means that

0:19:12.200 --> 0:19:14.919
<v Speaker 1>if the call comes up is unknown or something along

0:19:14.920 --> 0:19:18.280
<v Speaker 1>those lines, we're not likely to answer it. We'll probably

0:19:18.359 --> 0:19:20.879
<v Speaker 1>let it go to voicemail. In fact, these days, I

0:19:20.920 --> 0:19:23.760
<v Speaker 1>feel a sense of anxiety even if I do recognize

0:19:23.800 --> 0:19:26.800
<v Speaker 1>the number, which is weird because I was one of

0:19:26.800 --> 0:19:29.040
<v Speaker 1>those folks who back in the eighties and nineties. I

0:19:29.160 --> 0:19:32.000
<v Speaker 1>love to talk on the phone. Now it seems kind

0:19:32.040 --> 0:19:34.399
<v Speaker 1>of odd. I have a small group of friends and

0:19:34.440 --> 0:19:37.320
<v Speaker 1>family with whom I'll chat with on the phone, but

0:19:37.400 --> 0:19:41.600
<v Speaker 1>they are truly the exception and not the rule. Anyway,

0:19:41.800 --> 0:19:44.600
<v Speaker 1>Color I D made the transition from being viewed as

0:19:44.680 --> 0:19:49.200
<v Speaker 1>being invasive or creepy as to being necessary in order

0:19:49.240 --> 0:19:52.720
<v Speaker 1>to function as a human being in the modern technical age.

0:19:53.320 --> 0:19:56.040
<v Speaker 1>And there's a related thing I should talk about quickly

0:19:56.080 --> 0:19:59.120
<v Speaker 1>for folks in the United States, and that's the calling

0:19:59.280 --> 0:20:03.800
<v Speaker 1>name President Haitian. That's c NAP or Color Name Delivery,

0:20:03.840 --> 0:20:07.880
<v Speaker 1>that's c NAM systems. These are systems that can provide

0:20:07.920 --> 0:20:11.199
<v Speaker 1>a name to go with a phone number. So with

0:20:11.320 --> 0:20:14.240
<v Speaker 1>these systems, you don't just get a telephone number. You

0:20:14.320 --> 0:20:19.320
<v Speaker 1>get a person or business name that is associated with

0:20:19.400 --> 0:20:21.639
<v Speaker 1>that phone number. So here's how it works. In the

0:20:21.720 --> 0:20:24.879
<v Speaker 1>United States. I'd say we've got two people. We've got

0:20:25.000 --> 0:20:28.639
<v Speaker 1>Max and Chris. And Max is in New York and

0:20:28.760 --> 0:20:32.639
<v Speaker 1>Chris is in California. What's more, Max is a T

0:20:32.840 --> 0:20:36.000
<v Speaker 1>mobile customer and Chriss carrier is a T and T.

0:20:36.560 --> 0:20:39.600
<v Speaker 1>And both Max and Chris are using smartphones, so they're

0:20:39.600 --> 0:20:45.000
<v Speaker 1>on cellular networks. So Max calls Chris. Max's smartphone is

0:20:45.040 --> 0:20:49.399
<v Speaker 1>connected to a nearby cell tower, nearby T Mobile cell tower,

0:20:49.880 --> 0:20:52.960
<v Speaker 1>and that routes the call through T Mobiles MT s

0:20:53.000 --> 0:20:56.520
<v Speaker 1>O in that particular region, and the empty s O

0:20:56.680 --> 0:20:59.679
<v Speaker 1>then routes the call through the psd N, the Public

0:20:59.720 --> 0:21:04.080
<v Speaker 1>swim Ching Telephone network, and that then routes the call

0:21:04.240 --> 0:21:06.520
<v Speaker 1>to the A T and T M T s O

0:21:07.119 --> 0:21:10.280
<v Speaker 1>all the way out in California. That connects to a

0:21:10.359 --> 0:21:14.760
<v Speaker 1>cell tower that's in Chris's area, and it sends the

0:21:14.760 --> 0:21:18.359
<v Speaker 1>call to Chris's smartphone. Now it's at this stage, the

0:21:18.440 --> 0:21:21.080
<v Speaker 1>A T and T stage, where we see the system

0:21:21.240 --> 0:21:25.000
<v Speaker 1>call up the name. So, in other words, the name

0:21:25.080 --> 0:21:28.439
<v Speaker 1>look up is on the receiver's end. It doesn't originate

0:21:28.520 --> 0:21:32.439
<v Speaker 1>from the phone that's making the call. It's all down

0:21:32.480 --> 0:21:36.680
<v Speaker 1>to whichever carrier is in operation on the receiving end,

0:21:37.359 --> 0:21:41.160
<v Speaker 1>and A T and T sees that Max's phone number

0:21:41.200 --> 0:21:43.679
<v Speaker 1>is coming in, so it recognizes the number. But to

0:21:43.720 --> 0:21:48.120
<v Speaker 1>associate that number with Max as a person that requires

0:21:48.119 --> 0:21:50.560
<v Speaker 1>a database look up. And because Max is a T

0:21:50.760 --> 0:21:54.000
<v Speaker 1>Mobile customer not an a T and T customer, a

0:21:54.119 --> 0:21:56.520
<v Speaker 1>T and T technically has to pay a very small

0:21:56.640 --> 0:22:00.560
<v Speaker 1>fee called a dip fee to look up the information

0:22:00.600 --> 0:22:03.840
<v Speaker 1>and then to send that on to Chris. Then Chris

0:22:03.840 --> 0:22:07.639
<v Speaker 1>sees that Max is calling and picks up, or Chris

0:22:07.680 --> 0:22:10.399
<v Speaker 1>ghosts Max. I don't know what their friendship looks like,

0:22:10.480 --> 0:22:14.080
<v Speaker 1>to be honest, my point being that the name associated

0:22:14.080 --> 0:22:18.200
<v Speaker 1>with a phone number isn't magically connected to that number. Rather,

0:22:18.240 --> 0:22:21.760
<v Speaker 1>there are these massive databases of phone customers out there,

0:22:21.800 --> 0:22:25.520
<v Speaker 1>typically at the local level, and these databases match numbers

0:22:25.560 --> 0:22:29.280
<v Speaker 1>two names. There's no universal database out there that has

0:22:29.400 --> 0:22:32.480
<v Speaker 1>every name and every number, So phone companies have these

0:22:32.520 --> 0:22:35.880
<v Speaker 1>ongoing agreements to charge these small dip fees to dip

0:22:36.040 --> 0:22:40.600
<v Speaker 1>into the databases and retrieve relevant information. All right, So

0:22:40.640 --> 0:22:43.080
<v Speaker 1>that's Color I D and I think it's pretty easy

0:22:43.160 --> 0:22:46.159
<v Speaker 1>to understand from a high level how it works. But

0:22:46.240 --> 0:22:49.520
<v Speaker 1>then what about spoofing. Well, spoofing is a practice in

0:22:49.520 --> 0:22:52.119
<v Speaker 1>which the number that pops up on a color I

0:22:52.240 --> 0:22:56.040
<v Speaker 1>D system is not the same as the actual number

0:22:56.280 --> 0:22:59.840
<v Speaker 1>making the call, And there are legitimate reasons to do

0:23:00.040 --> 0:23:02.720
<v Speaker 1>this that have nothing to do with scams or crimes.

0:23:02.800 --> 0:23:06.840
<v Speaker 1>So spoofing as it stands is not illegal on its own.

0:23:07.480 --> 0:23:11.280
<v Speaker 1>It's only illegal if you're using spoofing to purposefully mislead

0:23:11.400 --> 0:23:14.960
<v Speaker 1>or scam people, then you can face a pretty big

0:23:15.000 --> 0:23:18.720
<v Speaker 1>fine in the United States. But spoofing is just a thing,

0:23:19.520 --> 0:23:21.880
<v Speaker 1>not illegal. So let me give you a scenario where

0:23:21.920 --> 0:23:25.719
<v Speaker 1>it's it's allowed. Let's say that you work at an

0:23:25.720 --> 0:23:28.679
<v Speaker 1>accounting firm and you're in charge of making some follow

0:23:28.760 --> 0:23:32.199
<v Speaker 1>up calls relating to a specific account. Now, you have

0:23:32.280 --> 0:23:36.000
<v Speaker 1>your own phone at your desk. But and your own

0:23:36.000 --> 0:23:38.600
<v Speaker 1>phone actually has its own extension, You can make calls

0:23:38.680 --> 0:23:42.959
<v Speaker 1>within your department, you know two, directly to your coworkers,

0:23:43.240 --> 0:23:46.560
<v Speaker 1>no problem. But chances are you would rather have your

0:23:46.640 --> 0:23:50.720
<v Speaker 1>outgoing calls, the ones you make outside of your company,

0:23:50.920 --> 0:23:53.680
<v Speaker 1>map not to your desks phone number, but to the

0:23:53.760 --> 0:23:57.240
<v Speaker 1>number for the accounting firm as a whole. That way,

0:23:57.280 --> 0:24:00.280
<v Speaker 1>anyone on the receiving end would see that it's a

0:24:00.320 --> 0:24:04.000
<v Speaker 1>call coming from this big accounting company, not some unknown

0:24:04.080 --> 0:24:07.200
<v Speaker 1>desk phone. You would need a way to replace your

0:24:07.320 --> 0:24:11.679
<v Speaker 1>desk phone's number with the overall company's phone number. This

0:24:11.760 --> 0:24:15.320
<v Speaker 1>happens all the time with big companies and doctor's offices

0:24:15.320 --> 0:24:17.399
<v Speaker 1>and stuff like that, So you can probably think of

0:24:17.480 --> 0:24:21.959
<v Speaker 1>lots of legitimate uses where the call going out seems

0:24:21.960 --> 0:24:25.240
<v Speaker 1>to be coming from a very large known entity rather

0:24:25.320 --> 0:24:30.639
<v Speaker 1>than an individual phone located within that entity. But to

0:24:30.680 --> 0:24:33.760
<v Speaker 1>make this happen, you have to have some sort of

0:24:33.760 --> 0:24:37.360
<v Speaker 1>technology that does the old switcherou with the phone numbers. Now,

0:24:37.359 --> 0:24:39.920
<v Speaker 1>as I mentioned earlier, color I D in the old

0:24:39.960 --> 0:24:44.760
<v Speaker 1>phone system involves using f s K or frequency shift keying,

0:24:45.200 --> 0:24:48.080
<v Speaker 1>to alter a carrier signal in a specific way to

0:24:48.200 --> 0:24:51.600
<v Speaker 1>transmit information about a phone number in between the signals

0:24:51.600 --> 0:24:55.200
<v Speaker 1>that cause the receiving phone to ring. And it turned

0:24:55.240 --> 0:24:57.320
<v Speaker 1>out that if you could figure out the f s

0:24:57.400 --> 0:25:00.440
<v Speaker 1>K process and build the right technology, you could build

0:25:00.440 --> 0:25:04.280
<v Speaker 1>out a system that would use FSK to transmit false information,

0:25:04.600 --> 0:25:07.439
<v Speaker 1>allowing you to mask the true originating number of a

0:25:07.480 --> 0:25:11.840
<v Speaker 1>call and substitute in something else will let you spoof

0:25:11.880 --> 0:25:15.320
<v Speaker 1>a phone number in other words, And this again was

0:25:15.320 --> 0:25:18.080
<v Speaker 1>was made on purpose eventually, like when once we got

0:25:18.080 --> 0:25:20.840
<v Speaker 1>to the point where we had big companies with these

0:25:20.920 --> 0:25:24.280
<v Speaker 1>kind of phone systems, it was sort of a necessity.

0:25:24.480 --> 0:25:27.480
<v Speaker 1>So it's not like this was an oversight or or

0:25:27.600 --> 0:25:33.080
<v Speaker 1>rather it wasn't a vulnerability. It ended up being an opportunity.

0:25:33.800 --> 0:25:36.640
<v Speaker 1>But if you wanted to take advantage of it, it

0:25:36.680 --> 0:25:40.160
<v Speaker 1>wasn't really easy to do. Back in the early two thousands,

0:25:40.200 --> 0:25:43.440
<v Speaker 1>for example, it was actually pretty challenging. With the right

0:25:43.520 --> 0:25:46.919
<v Speaker 1>hardware and software, and with a digital phone line, you

0:25:46.960 --> 0:25:50.120
<v Speaker 1>could manage it, but it was beyond most people. Some

0:25:50.200 --> 0:25:52.960
<v Speaker 1>big businesses used it for the purposes I mentioned earlier,

0:25:53.000 --> 0:25:55.840
<v Speaker 1>but that was kind of the extent of it. Now,

0:25:55.880 --> 0:25:58.600
<v Speaker 1>part of what makes this possible is a system called

0:25:58.640 --> 0:26:03.560
<v Speaker 1>a private branch exchange or p b X, So this

0:26:03.600 --> 0:26:07.159
<v Speaker 1>doesn't fit neatly into that hierarchy I mentioned earlier. A

0:26:07.240 --> 0:26:10.520
<v Speaker 1>p b X is a telephone system that's typically within

0:26:10.560 --> 0:26:14.480
<v Speaker 1>a really big organization, like a big business, And essentially

0:26:14.480 --> 0:26:17.879
<v Speaker 1>what it does is it allows for an internal telephone system,

0:26:18.080 --> 0:26:21.359
<v Speaker 1>that is, one that connects all the internal phones with

0:26:21.680 --> 0:26:25.080
<v Speaker 1>each other, but it keeps a limited number of external

0:26:25.119 --> 0:26:28.600
<v Speaker 1>phone lines that connect outward to the general you know,

0:26:28.680 --> 0:26:33.640
<v Speaker 1>public switching telephone network or PSTN. So let's say we're

0:26:33.640 --> 0:26:37.560
<v Speaker 1>looking at a corporation with like five thousand employees. Rather

0:26:37.600 --> 0:26:40.760
<v Speaker 1>than making sure every single employee has a direct phone

0:26:40.760 --> 0:26:44.040
<v Speaker 1>line to the outside world, the business chooses to set

0:26:44.119 --> 0:26:46.880
<v Speaker 1>up a p b X while there's a phone at

0:26:46.920 --> 0:26:50.439
<v Speaker 1>every employee's desk, and these phones can make direct calls

0:26:50.480 --> 0:26:54.200
<v Speaker 1>to one another within the businesses local network. To make

0:26:54.240 --> 0:26:57.000
<v Speaker 1>a call to the outside world, first, you might have

0:26:57.080 --> 0:26:59.919
<v Speaker 1>to do something like dial A nine and that actually

0:27:00.040 --> 0:27:03.480
<v Speaker 1>opens up one of the business is limited external phone lines.

0:27:03.760 --> 0:27:06.720
<v Speaker 1>So let's say that this particular business has one hundred

0:27:06.760 --> 0:27:09.720
<v Speaker 1>dedicated external phone lines, which sounds like a lot, but

0:27:10.119 --> 0:27:12.760
<v Speaker 1>it's way fewer than the five thousand you would need

0:27:12.880 --> 0:27:16.480
<v Speaker 1>for every single employee to have their own personal external line.

0:27:17.200 --> 0:27:20.080
<v Speaker 1>As long as fewer than one hundred employees are making

0:27:20.119 --> 0:27:23.119
<v Speaker 1>calls to the outside world at any given time, there's

0:27:23.119 --> 0:27:26.960
<v Speaker 1>not really a problem here. There are different flavors of

0:27:27.040 --> 0:27:29.600
<v Speaker 1>p b X, and they date back even to when

0:27:29.640 --> 0:27:33.439
<v Speaker 1>the phone system was purely running on analog signals and

0:27:33.480 --> 0:27:37.040
<v Speaker 1>there were no digital signal phone lines. Today, p b

0:27:37.240 --> 0:27:40.679
<v Speaker 1>X has include technologies like voice over Internet Protocol or

0:27:40.880 --> 0:27:45.280
<v Speaker 1>void an I p p b X or Internet Protocol.

0:27:45.480 --> 0:27:49.520
<v Speaker 1>Private branch exchange can sometimes include the ability to spoof

0:27:49.560 --> 0:27:52.600
<v Speaker 1>a phone number. It can be built into the system.

0:27:52.640 --> 0:27:56.200
<v Speaker 1>Sometimes it's got a very easy way to access and

0:27:56.240 --> 0:27:59.119
<v Speaker 1>make these changes. You'll just have like a little online

0:27:59.200 --> 0:28:02.160
<v Speaker 1>form and you can go in and you can select

0:28:02.359 --> 0:28:06.200
<v Speaker 1>what you want the outgoing call number to look like.

0:28:07.720 --> 0:28:11.720
<v Speaker 1>But you know, it's really handy if you want everything

0:28:11.760 --> 0:28:14.600
<v Speaker 1>to look like it's coming from a major office phone number.

0:28:14.600 --> 0:28:16.879
<v Speaker 1>But it's also opened up the opportunity to start a

0:28:16.880 --> 0:28:22.160
<v Speaker 1>new kind of fraudulent business. One early company that tried

0:28:22.240 --> 0:28:25.399
<v Speaker 1>to create a business out of spoofing was founded by

0:28:25.400 --> 0:28:28.920
<v Speaker 1>a dude named Jason Jepson, who launched a service called

0:28:29.080 --> 0:28:33.960
<v Speaker 1>Star thirty eight dot com. With Star thirty eight customers,

0:28:34.240 --> 0:28:37.159
<v Speaker 1>who from the beginning, we're supposed to be limited to

0:28:37.280 --> 0:28:43.200
<v Speaker 1>people like licensed private investigators, law enforcement and debt collectors,

0:28:43.760 --> 0:28:46.600
<v Speaker 1>would be allowed to pay a fee, and that would

0:28:46.680 --> 0:28:49.840
<v Speaker 1>let them make phone calls while disguising the phone number

0:28:50.040 --> 0:28:53.800
<v Speaker 1>that they were using as you know, something else. Now

0:28:55.120 --> 0:28:59.200
<v Speaker 1>that the thinking was that the average person isn't keen

0:28:59.280 --> 0:29:01.160
<v Speaker 1>to pick up the phone own if they happen to

0:29:01.200 --> 0:29:03.960
<v Speaker 1>know that there's a private investigator on the line or

0:29:04.040 --> 0:29:07.520
<v Speaker 1>a debt collection agency, you know, they would rather ghost

0:29:07.640 --> 0:29:11.400
<v Speaker 1>that call. So the thinking was, it sure would be

0:29:11.480 --> 0:29:15.360
<v Speaker 1>useful to be able to hide that information and convince

0:29:15.480 --> 0:29:18.520
<v Speaker 1>the person on the other end of that that line

0:29:18.840 --> 0:29:21.400
<v Speaker 1>to actually pick up the phone. So the best way

0:29:21.400 --> 0:29:24.320
<v Speaker 1>to do that is to hide who you are. Start

0:29:24.320 --> 0:29:27.480
<v Speaker 1>three eight dot Com didn't have a long and illustrious

0:29:27.520 --> 0:29:32.160
<v Speaker 1>history in its original form. Three days after he launched

0:29:32.280 --> 0:29:35.840
<v Speaker 1>the service, Jepson announced he was looking to sell the business.

0:29:36.120 --> 0:29:39.400
<v Speaker 1>He had received numerous threats and harassing calls and felt

0:29:39.480 --> 0:29:42.080
<v Speaker 1>it was just, you know, not the right line of

0:29:42.120 --> 0:29:46.200
<v Speaker 1>work for him. Other services like one called Camo Phone.

0:29:46.800 --> 0:29:51.200
<v Speaker 1>You know, like camouflage, but Camo Phone, those kind of surfaced,

0:29:51.240 --> 0:29:53.920
<v Speaker 1>and Star thirty eight actually did come back as a

0:29:54.080 --> 0:29:58.560
<v Speaker 1>service marketed as being exclusive to law enforcement agencies, and

0:29:59.200 --> 0:30:03.000
<v Speaker 1>that was really the beginning of spoofing. But when we

0:30:03.040 --> 0:30:06.320
<v Speaker 1>come back, we'll talk about how spoofing really proliferated as

0:30:06.400 --> 0:30:10.040
<v Speaker 1>VOIPE systems grew in popularity, and how the FCC is

0:30:10.120 --> 0:30:14.240
<v Speaker 1>responding to the issue today. But first let's take another

0:30:14.320 --> 0:30:25.520
<v Speaker 1>quick break. The emergence of voice over Internet protocol was

0:30:25.560 --> 0:30:29.520
<v Speaker 1>one of those truly disruptive technologies. In this case, it

0:30:29.560 --> 0:30:34.400
<v Speaker 1>was disrupting the telecommunications business that got you know, totally

0:30:34.720 --> 0:30:37.800
<v Speaker 1>turned on its head. Because of this, voice would allow

0:30:37.800 --> 0:30:40.560
<v Speaker 1>people to make phone calls using the Internet as the

0:30:40.600 --> 0:30:45.480
<v Speaker 1>transmission system, essentially bypassing the phone companies in the process

0:30:45.600 --> 0:30:48.680
<v Speaker 1>at least and on one end of the call, possibly

0:30:48.720 --> 0:30:52.160
<v Speaker 1>both voice phones can connect to one another. Over the

0:30:52.160 --> 0:30:54.840
<v Speaker 1>Internet and not even touch the phone system, at least

0:30:54.880 --> 0:30:58.320
<v Speaker 1>not the way that normal telephone calls do. But what

0:30:58.400 --> 0:31:00.400
<v Speaker 1>if someone were to use a voice of them to

0:31:00.480 --> 0:31:02.640
<v Speaker 1>call someone in a with a phone that's connected to

0:31:02.680 --> 0:31:06.680
<v Speaker 1>the old public Switching Telephone network or ps t N. Well,

0:31:07.360 --> 0:31:10.400
<v Speaker 1>any void call connecting to the ps t N has

0:31:10.440 --> 0:31:14.160
<v Speaker 1>to go through what's called a void gateway, which serves

0:31:14.160 --> 0:31:18.480
<v Speaker 1>as a bridge between the two systems. See voice traffic

0:31:18.560 --> 0:31:25.520
<v Speaker 1>over the Internet protocol. Uh. That that's using packet switching protocols.

0:31:25.560 --> 0:31:27.760
<v Speaker 1>That's what the Internet at large uses in order to

0:31:27.840 --> 0:31:32.360
<v Speaker 1>send data. It divides up files into packets of information

0:31:32.400 --> 0:31:34.640
<v Speaker 1>and then sends them across the network to be essentially

0:31:34.640 --> 0:31:38.640
<v Speaker 1>reassembled on the other side. But this is incompatible with

0:31:38.680 --> 0:31:42.240
<v Speaker 1>how phone calls are transmitted across the ps t N.

0:31:42.680 --> 0:31:46.200
<v Speaker 1>It's two totally different systems. So the gateway has to

0:31:46.440 --> 0:31:50.600
<v Speaker 1>decompress the digital packets from the voice call and turn

0:31:50.640 --> 0:31:54.640
<v Speaker 1>it into a digital signal that then can be converted

0:31:54.680 --> 0:31:57.480
<v Speaker 1>into an analog signal to cross the ps t N,

0:31:57.880 --> 0:32:00.960
<v Speaker 1>which is pretty wild, right. Eight ways also come in

0:32:01.000 --> 0:32:04.880
<v Speaker 1>different flavors. There are standalone gateways, uh, then there are

0:32:04.920 --> 0:32:08.840
<v Speaker 1>gateway functions that can be built into specific types of routers. Uh.

0:32:08.920 --> 0:32:11.120
<v Speaker 1>There's also the I p p b X that I

0:32:11.160 --> 0:32:15.080
<v Speaker 1>mentioned earlier. Those can act as gateways. The important part

0:32:15.160 --> 0:32:18.240
<v Speaker 1>for our discussion is that many of these voice services

0:32:18.280 --> 0:32:21.640
<v Speaker 1>allow users to take advantage of p b X features

0:32:22.080 --> 0:32:26.880
<v Speaker 1>that traditionally only big companies could use, including spoofing the

0:32:26.960 --> 0:32:33.120
<v Speaker 1>phone number. So as voice technology proliferated and as more

0:32:33.440 --> 0:32:37.480
<v Speaker 1>providers began to offer up spoofing services, including ones that

0:32:37.560 --> 0:32:40.600
<v Speaker 1>just they allow you to start up an account and

0:32:40.680 --> 0:32:43.600
<v Speaker 1>you pay a certain amount and then from that point

0:32:43.640 --> 0:32:46.800
<v Speaker 1>forward you get just have your account deducted whenever you're

0:32:46.800 --> 0:32:52.800
<v Speaker 1>making calls using spoofing. This kind of of technology really

0:32:52.840 --> 0:32:56.680
<v Speaker 1>allowed bad actors to see potential for spoofing numbers for

0:32:56.800 --> 0:33:00.720
<v Speaker 1>malicious purposes. The goal is always to convinced someone to

0:33:00.800 --> 0:33:03.200
<v Speaker 1>pick up the ding dang phone, and one of the

0:33:03.200 --> 0:33:08.880
<v Speaker 1>popular approaches centered around spoofing is to create a number

0:33:08.920 --> 0:33:11.920
<v Speaker 1>that is similar to the target number you're calling, so

0:33:11.960 --> 0:33:14.400
<v Speaker 1>in other words, trying to get something within the same

0:33:14.440 --> 0:33:17.920
<v Speaker 1>area code, maybe even the same phone prefix. I get

0:33:17.960 --> 0:33:22.640
<v Speaker 1>this all the time with with spoofed numbers. So the

0:33:22.680 --> 0:33:24.680
<v Speaker 1>idea is that if you see a number pop up

0:33:24.680 --> 0:33:27.080
<v Speaker 1>on caller I D. And it appears to be a

0:33:27.120 --> 0:33:30.520
<v Speaker 1>local number, You're more likely to pick up the phone

0:33:30.560 --> 0:33:33.080
<v Speaker 1>because you're more likely to feel that the person on

0:33:33.120 --> 0:33:35.600
<v Speaker 1>the other end of that call is someone you know,

0:33:36.080 --> 0:33:39.720
<v Speaker 1>or at least it's something relevant to you. Ask how

0:33:39.760 --> 0:33:43.000
<v Speaker 1>they get you, Well, it's one way. Another way is

0:33:43.040 --> 0:33:46.920
<v Speaker 1>to use databases of personal information to create spear phishing attempts,

0:33:47.320 --> 0:33:49.840
<v Speaker 1>though not every scammer goes to that kind of trouble,

0:33:50.240 --> 0:33:54.360
<v Speaker 1>but they could attempt to spoof specific numbers that you

0:33:54.440 --> 0:33:58.000
<v Speaker 1>might know, so you might think, oh, it's my auntie calling.

0:33:58.240 --> 0:34:00.360
<v Speaker 1>I wonder what's up, and you answer and you find

0:34:00.360 --> 0:34:03.320
<v Speaker 1>out it's not your auntie, it's a scammer. Uh. A

0:34:03.360 --> 0:34:06.440
<v Speaker 1>lot of these hackers and scammers just sort of cast

0:34:06.520 --> 0:34:09.120
<v Speaker 1>a very wide net to see if they catch anything.

0:34:09.840 --> 0:34:12.760
<v Speaker 1>If you pick up a phone that is a catch.

0:34:13.280 --> 0:34:16.200
<v Speaker 1>At that point, you might be prompted to say press

0:34:16.200 --> 0:34:18.759
<v Speaker 1>a number in response to a specific direction, you know,

0:34:18.880 --> 0:34:23.600
<v Speaker 1>like press two to speak with a representative. Don't do it,

0:34:23.600 --> 0:34:26.640
<v Speaker 1>it's a bad idea. A lot of these are actually

0:34:26.719 --> 0:34:29.400
<v Speaker 1>worked into systems where if you do a button press,

0:34:29.880 --> 0:34:34.640
<v Speaker 1>it gets interpreted as an authorization for a charge, and

0:34:34.960 --> 0:34:37.399
<v Speaker 1>the scammers are making money off of this, and you're

0:34:37.400 --> 0:34:40.279
<v Speaker 1>getting charged through your phone company and you get these,

0:34:40.680 --> 0:34:44.439
<v Speaker 1>you know, fraudulent charges on your account, So don't fall

0:34:44.600 --> 0:34:50.120
<v Speaker 1>for that. Um Uh, this is essentially illegal. I mean,

0:34:50.160 --> 0:34:52.760
<v Speaker 1>it is illegal, but it doesn't stop people from doing

0:34:52.760 --> 0:34:55.760
<v Speaker 1>it because it's kind of hard to catch them. Uh.

0:34:55.800 --> 0:34:58.160
<v Speaker 1>You might also get someone who's on the other end

0:34:58.200 --> 0:35:00.520
<v Speaker 1>of the call and they're looking to get valuable information

0:35:00.560 --> 0:35:03.719
<v Speaker 1>from you, like a bank account number or something. Obviously,

0:35:04.280 --> 0:35:06.680
<v Speaker 1>is a bad idea to engage in this sort of stuff.

0:35:06.880 --> 0:35:09.839
<v Speaker 1>In fact, it's bad enough that some phone companies and

0:35:09.920 --> 0:35:12.279
<v Speaker 1>the f c C have argued that if you don't

0:35:12.320 --> 0:35:16.160
<v Speaker 1>recognize a number, don't answer it. Think about that for

0:35:16.200 --> 0:35:21.080
<v Speaker 1>a moment. This you have companies like phone companies, their

0:35:21.120 --> 0:35:25.920
<v Speaker 1>business is charging customers for this inner connectivity, this ability

0:35:25.960 --> 0:35:29.359
<v Speaker 1>to have communication channels open. And then they're saying, by

0:35:29.400 --> 0:35:31.440
<v Speaker 1>the way, if you don't recognize the number, don't use

0:35:31.440 --> 0:35:34.640
<v Speaker 1>our services, which we are charging you for. It's kind

0:35:34.680 --> 0:35:38.680
<v Speaker 1>of wild, right, because you would think, if this is

0:35:38.719 --> 0:35:41.279
<v Speaker 1>that big of a problem, surely there has to be

0:35:41.360 --> 0:35:46.240
<v Speaker 1>some measure you can take to kind of curtail this problem.

0:35:46.280 --> 0:35:48.239
<v Speaker 1>Because what you're telling me, right, now is that your

0:35:48.280 --> 0:35:50.960
<v Speaker 1>service isn't good enough for me to rely upon all

0:35:51.000 --> 0:35:53.920
<v Speaker 1>the time because there are people who are leveraging it

0:35:54.280 --> 0:35:56.640
<v Speaker 1>to try and take advantage of me. That's not a

0:35:56.719 --> 0:36:01.480
<v Speaker 1>great marketing message right now. The use of numbers that

0:36:01.560 --> 0:36:05.680
<v Speaker 1>are similar to your own typically gets called neighbor spoofing

0:36:05.840 --> 0:36:10.399
<v Speaker 1>or neighborhood spoofing, and it's a pretty irritating tactic. Uh.

0:36:10.480 --> 0:36:14.120
<v Speaker 1>It's also possible that someone could spoof your phone number

0:36:14.360 --> 0:36:17.839
<v Speaker 1>while they are calling someone else. So for them, it's

0:36:17.840 --> 0:36:19.799
<v Speaker 1>going to come up on color I D that you're

0:36:19.880 --> 0:36:22.000
<v Speaker 1>the person making the call. Right, it's gonna be your

0:36:22.080 --> 0:36:24.719
<v Speaker 1>phone number, even though you're not the one doing it.

0:36:24.719 --> 0:36:28.160
<v Speaker 1>It's because it's been spoofed. So the question is what

0:36:28.200 --> 0:36:32.239
<v Speaker 1>do you do if that happens to you. You are

0:36:32.280 --> 0:36:35.640
<v Speaker 1>not going to like the answer, because there's not much

0:36:35.719 --> 0:36:39.240
<v Speaker 1>you can do other than try to explain to anyone

0:36:39.280 --> 0:36:42.240
<v Speaker 1>who's calling you up angry that you're making these calls

0:36:42.800 --> 0:36:44.759
<v Speaker 1>that you're not the one making the calls that are

0:36:44.840 --> 0:36:49.280
<v Speaker 1>upsetting them. That's kind of difficult to get across because

0:36:49.280 --> 0:36:51.080
<v Speaker 1>people are looking at their color I D and saying, no,

0:36:51.200 --> 0:36:53.319
<v Speaker 1>I see on my I D that you are the

0:36:53.360 --> 0:36:56.080
<v Speaker 1>one calling me. I'm telling you to stop and your

0:36:56.320 --> 0:36:59.080
<v Speaker 1>might Meanwhile you're trying to say no, no, I promise

0:36:59.160 --> 0:37:03.200
<v Speaker 1>it's not me. Someone is spoofing my phone number. Depending

0:37:03.239 --> 0:37:04.920
<v Speaker 1>upon the person on the other end of the line,

0:37:05.760 --> 0:37:07.920
<v Speaker 1>they might not have any idea of what that means

0:37:08.080 --> 0:37:10.759
<v Speaker 1>or even know that that's possible. Now, I've had this

0:37:10.880 --> 0:37:14.239
<v Speaker 1>happened to me in the past, however, not on my

0:37:14.360 --> 0:37:18.719
<v Speaker 1>personal phone. So many years ago, I was working at

0:37:18.719 --> 0:37:23.040
<v Speaker 1>a consulting firm and I was getting calls from a

0:37:23.120 --> 0:37:26.319
<v Speaker 1>woman who was angry that I was calling her and

0:37:26.360 --> 0:37:29.760
<v Speaker 1>I was making these crazy machine noises into her phone.

0:37:30.120 --> 0:37:32.799
<v Speaker 1>Now I figured out that what was happening was that

0:37:32.960 --> 0:37:37.120
<v Speaker 1>some fax machine was calling her landline as if it

0:37:37.160 --> 0:37:40.759
<v Speaker 1>were another fax machine, and since her phone is not

0:37:41.160 --> 0:37:45.120
<v Speaker 1>a fax machine, she was just getting that garbled electronic

0:37:45.560 --> 0:37:48.839
<v Speaker 1>mass of sounds whenever she picked up the receiver. And

0:37:48.880 --> 0:37:51.960
<v Speaker 1>she said that the number that was associated on color

0:37:52.040 --> 0:37:54.960
<v Speaker 1>I D belonged to the company I worked for. So

0:37:55.080 --> 0:37:57.879
<v Speaker 1>I had her read me the number, and sure enough,

0:37:58.560 --> 0:38:02.439
<v Speaker 1>it was our offices main phone number, but it wasn't

0:38:02.440 --> 0:38:04.640
<v Speaker 1>our facts number. It wasn't the number for the fax

0:38:04.800 --> 0:38:07.759
<v Speaker 1>machine we had. And I even went over to our

0:38:07.840 --> 0:38:12.000
<v Speaker 1>fax machine, and I used a report to generate a

0:38:12.040 --> 0:38:14.840
<v Speaker 1>report that told me about all the outgoing calls that

0:38:14.880 --> 0:38:18.160
<v Speaker 1>had been made, every single facts that had been sent.

0:38:18.560 --> 0:38:21.600
<v Speaker 1>And this was in a day where we still facts

0:38:22.239 --> 0:38:25.880
<v Speaker 1>occasionally anyway, And I checked it against this woman's number,

0:38:25.880 --> 0:38:29.839
<v Speaker 1>and I saw there was no call from our fax

0:38:30.000 --> 0:38:32.920
<v Speaker 1>machine going out to her number. There was nothing coming

0:38:32.920 --> 0:38:36.040
<v Speaker 1>out from our office that was going to her. But

0:38:36.160 --> 0:38:40.160
<v Speaker 1>it appeared as though someone had been spoofing our offices

0:38:40.200 --> 0:38:43.480
<v Speaker 1>phone number for facts no less, and was sending out

0:38:43.520 --> 0:38:47.120
<v Speaker 1>stuff to people like this woman. And there wasn't anything

0:38:47.160 --> 0:38:49.520
<v Speaker 1>I could do about it, because we had nothing to

0:38:49.600 --> 0:38:51.839
<v Speaker 1>do with the situation in the first place. We were

0:38:51.920 --> 0:38:55.479
<v Speaker 1>victims just as she was. Someone else had picked our

0:38:55.640 --> 0:38:58.680
<v Speaker 1>number to use a mask for some reason, and because

0:38:58.760 --> 0:39:01.680
<v Speaker 1>the voice system they were using allowed for this kind

0:39:01.680 --> 0:39:04.160
<v Speaker 1>of thing, there was really no way for us to

0:39:04.239 --> 0:39:07.400
<v Speaker 1>even know who was doing it, much less stop them.

0:39:07.440 --> 0:39:09.400
<v Speaker 1>It was frustrating for the woman, and it was not

0:39:09.560 --> 0:39:13.000
<v Speaker 1>super great for me either, because I genuinely wanted to

0:39:13.040 --> 0:39:16.239
<v Speaker 1>help her. I don't want anyone to be, you know,

0:39:16.320 --> 0:39:19.879
<v Speaker 1>aggravated and harassed in this way, and that really stinks, right,

0:39:19.920 --> 0:39:22.360
<v Speaker 1>I mean, if someone makes use of your number and

0:39:22.400 --> 0:39:26.000
<v Speaker 1>then harasses another person. You could be left holding the

0:39:26.040 --> 0:39:29.799
<v Speaker 1>bag and your defenses it wasn't me. Someone spoofed my

0:39:29.840 --> 0:39:32.920
<v Speaker 1>phone number. That is pretty hard to prove to someone

0:39:33.000 --> 0:39:35.799
<v Speaker 1>unless you can actually show them that your phone did

0:39:35.840 --> 0:39:38.840
<v Speaker 1>not make those outgoing calls by just showing them a

0:39:38.920 --> 0:39:41.960
<v Speaker 1>record of every call you've made over you know, whatever

0:39:42.080 --> 0:39:45.560
<v Speaker 1>length of time. But more frequently we find ourselves on

0:39:45.640 --> 0:39:48.320
<v Speaker 1>the receiving end of these calls, which I guess we

0:39:48.320 --> 0:39:51.239
<v Speaker 1>should be thankful for because it's irritating, but not as

0:39:51.280 --> 0:39:55.400
<v Speaker 1>irritating as being blamed for them. And the frequency of

0:39:55.440 --> 0:39:57.480
<v Speaker 1>these calls have picked up the pace over the years.

0:39:57.480 --> 0:39:59.920
<v Speaker 1>Now twenty twenty was actually a bit of an outlier.

0:40:00.120 --> 0:40:04.520
<v Speaker 1>We saw a dip and spoofed robo calls in but

0:40:04.719 --> 0:40:08.720
<v Speaker 1>in June there were more than four billion robo calls.

0:40:09.040 --> 0:40:10.959
<v Speaker 1>So it's not like that's a problem that's gonna go away.

0:40:10.960 --> 0:40:13.800
<v Speaker 1>I mean, that's nearly a hundred fifty million robo calls

0:40:14.000 --> 0:40:18.960
<v Speaker 1>per day. That being said, the FCC and major phone

0:40:19.000 --> 0:40:22.080
<v Speaker 1>carriers are trying to fight back a bit. The f

0:40:22.200 --> 0:40:25.720
<v Speaker 1>c C passed a mandate, actually Congress passed the law

0:40:26.040 --> 0:40:29.520
<v Speaker 1>that requires all the major carriers in the US, those

0:40:29.560 --> 0:40:32.720
<v Speaker 1>being A, T and T, Verizon Anti Mobile, to comply

0:40:32.800 --> 0:40:35.600
<v Speaker 1>with the rule that requires them to incorporate a technology

0:40:35.680 --> 0:40:41.960
<v Speaker 1>called stir slash shaken, which is very James Bondish, you know. Now.

0:40:41.960 --> 0:40:45.239
<v Speaker 1>The idea behind this is that stir slash shaken is

0:40:45.239 --> 0:40:48.200
<v Speaker 1>supposed to verify that a number that pops up on

0:40:48.280 --> 0:40:51.920
<v Speaker 1>Color I D is in fact the number that belongs

0:40:52.000 --> 0:40:54.080
<v Speaker 1>to the line that's making that phone call in the

0:40:54.080 --> 0:40:58.320
<v Speaker 1>first place. In other words, it's supposed to help detect spoofing.

0:40:58.760 --> 0:41:01.120
<v Speaker 1>It would mean that phone company as could filter calls

0:41:01.160 --> 0:41:04.280
<v Speaker 1>and potentially block some of them, or at least label

0:41:04.360 --> 0:41:07.759
<v Speaker 1>them as spam before they get to your your phone. Now,

0:41:07.800 --> 0:41:10.640
<v Speaker 1>those three carriers have said that they have all enabled

0:41:10.680 --> 0:41:14.200
<v Speaker 1>this technology on their own networks, which is good because

0:41:14.200 --> 0:41:19.040
<v Speaker 1>the deadline for doing so was this past June. To

0:41:19.120 --> 0:41:22.920
<v Speaker 1>be precise, Smaller regional carriers in the United States currently

0:41:22.920 --> 0:41:27.360
<v Speaker 1>have a deadline of June three to implement this technology,

0:41:27.360 --> 0:41:31.279
<v Speaker 1>though that could change. The FCC might step up that deadline.

0:41:32.200 --> 0:41:35.799
<v Speaker 1>So what's going on with this technology? Well, first let's

0:41:35.800 --> 0:41:39.360
<v Speaker 1>talk about what these names stand for. Though I suspect

0:41:39.960 --> 0:41:43.400
<v Speaker 1>there's some backronym shenanigans going on here. That is that

0:41:44.200 --> 0:41:45.919
<v Speaker 1>you know, they came up with the names and then

0:41:45.960 --> 0:41:47.880
<v Speaker 1>tried to figure out what they stood for, as opposed

0:41:47.880 --> 0:41:51.600
<v Speaker 1>to the other way around. Anyway, STIR stands for Secure

0:41:51.760 --> 0:41:59.719
<v Speaker 1>Telephony Identity revisited and SHAKEN stands for secure handling of

0:41:59.760 --> 0:42:04.480
<v Speaker 1>a sorted information using tokens. So the Ken part of

0:42:04.480 --> 0:42:09.000
<v Speaker 1>SHAKEN comes from tokens. And you cannot convince me that

0:42:09.080 --> 0:42:14.880
<v Speaker 1>this wasn't some crazy backronym thing. Anyway, these two technologies

0:42:15.120 --> 0:42:18.719
<v Speaker 1>work in tandem. SHAKEN is honestly just sort of a

0:42:19.320 --> 0:42:21.839
<v Speaker 1>broader thing. We'll get to it. So STIR comes out

0:42:21.920 --> 0:42:24.520
<v Speaker 1>of a working group of the organization i e. T

0:42:24.680 --> 0:42:28.680
<v Speaker 1>F that stands for Internet Engineering Task Force. The group

0:42:28.760 --> 0:42:31.960
<v Speaker 1>figured out a way to append digital signatures on a

0:42:32.040 --> 0:42:35.439
<v Speaker 1>call as a means of authenticating that a call comes

0:42:35.440 --> 0:42:39.400
<v Speaker 1>from a specific phone number for real zes. SHAKEN refers

0:42:39.400 --> 0:42:42.440
<v Speaker 1>to the standards that service providers are supposed to follow

0:42:42.800 --> 0:42:47.400
<v Speaker 1>while they're deploying STIR in their networks. So SHAKEN really is,

0:42:47.719 --> 0:42:52.759
<v Speaker 1>here's how you use this technology that is STIR. The

0:42:52.800 --> 0:42:58.480
<v Speaker 1>protocols give three levels of attestation that carriers can assign

0:42:58.760 --> 0:43:01.239
<v Speaker 1>to a call or serve providers, I think is how

0:43:01.280 --> 0:43:03.480
<v Speaker 1>they were. The service providers can assign to a call,

0:43:03.800 --> 0:43:08.480
<v Speaker 1>so full attestation means that the service provider has a

0:43:08.520 --> 0:43:12.520
<v Speaker 1>call originating out of their service and they say that

0:43:12.520 --> 0:43:15.040
<v Speaker 1>that call is in fact coming from a number that

0:43:15.160 --> 0:43:19.000
<v Speaker 1>this particular customer is authorized to use, so in other words,

0:43:19.520 --> 0:43:24.040
<v Speaker 1>it's legit. Then you have partial atestation, and that means

0:43:24.080 --> 0:43:27.560
<v Speaker 1>that the carrier has authenticated the customer making the call.

0:43:27.600 --> 0:43:30.160
<v Speaker 1>They're saying, we know who is making the call. However,

0:43:30.280 --> 0:43:33.719
<v Speaker 1>we cannot verify that this customer is actually authorized to

0:43:33.920 --> 0:43:37.360
<v Speaker 1>use the number in question. Then there's gateway at a

0:43:37.400 --> 0:43:41.360
<v Speaker 1>station means that the service provider can authenticate where it

0:43:41.440 --> 0:43:45.239
<v Speaker 1>received a call, but can't authenticate the source, can't say

0:43:45.320 --> 0:43:49.279
<v Speaker 1>who for certain sent it. The information is meant to

0:43:49.280 --> 0:43:52.680
<v Speaker 1>be shared between carriers, so that one carrier can essentially

0:43:52.680 --> 0:43:55.640
<v Speaker 1>say to another, hey, here's this call that needs to

0:43:55.680 --> 0:43:58.640
<v Speaker 1>go over your network to get to your customer, But

0:43:58.680 --> 0:44:01.359
<v Speaker 1>I totes can't verify that the call is legit, so

0:44:01.440 --> 0:44:04.600
<v Speaker 1>it maybe suss just a heads up, and then your

0:44:04.719 --> 0:44:08.560
<v Speaker 1>carrier might block the call or appenda label, alerting you

0:44:08.719 --> 0:44:11.920
<v Speaker 1>the d customer that the call could be spam. The

0:44:11.960 --> 0:44:14.319
<v Speaker 1>way this works in practice is you've got someone making

0:44:14.320 --> 0:44:18.160
<v Speaker 1>a call. Let's say it's Scuzzy scumbag who's posing as

0:44:18.160 --> 0:44:21.200
<v Speaker 1>a member of the Internal Revenue Service, but Scuzzy really

0:44:21.239 --> 0:44:24.440
<v Speaker 1>just wants to phish personal information out of you. Scuzzy

0:44:24.480 --> 0:44:27.600
<v Speaker 1>picks up the phone or more likely uses an automated

0:44:27.680 --> 0:44:32.080
<v Speaker 1>robo dialer and calls your number and spoofs their own

0:44:32.160 --> 0:44:34.279
<v Speaker 1>number in the process to make it seem as if

0:44:34.280 --> 0:44:37.479
<v Speaker 1>it's the I r S calling you. The call goes

0:44:37.520 --> 0:44:41.480
<v Speaker 1>out over scuzzies service provider, whomever that may be. The

0:44:41.520 --> 0:44:44.239
<v Speaker 1>service provider takes a look at the originating number and

0:44:44.280 --> 0:44:46.560
<v Speaker 1>the source of the call to determine what level of

0:44:46.640 --> 0:44:51.400
<v Speaker 1>attestation to assign to that call. Then it makes use

0:44:51.440 --> 0:44:55.080
<v Speaker 1>of an authentication service to create a digital certificate that

0:44:55.200 --> 0:44:59.799
<v Speaker 1>holds onto this information, then passes both the call and

0:45:00.120 --> 0:45:03.880
<v Speaker 1>the certificate on so that it ultimately ends at the

0:45:04.040 --> 0:45:09.000
<v Speaker 1>terminating service provider. This would be whatever service provider you use.

0:45:09.160 --> 0:45:10.840
<v Speaker 1>So let's say it's like a T and T, So

0:45:10.920 --> 0:45:13.640
<v Speaker 1>now it gets sent to a T and T. So

0:45:13.960 --> 0:45:17.040
<v Speaker 1>a T and T. Your service provider, upon receiving this

0:45:17.239 --> 0:45:21.200
<v Speaker 1>signal and digital certificate, sends the certificate to a verification

0:45:21.239 --> 0:45:24.480
<v Speaker 1>service which attempts to verify if the originating source of

0:45:24.520 --> 0:45:28.680
<v Speaker 1>the call is authorized to make calls from that number

0:45:28.960 --> 0:45:32.080
<v Speaker 1>it claims to be calling from. Then it returns this

0:45:32.160 --> 0:45:35.080
<v Speaker 1>information to a T and T and then a T

0:45:35.160 --> 0:45:37.920
<v Speaker 1>and T can either block the call or label it

0:45:38.080 --> 0:45:41.440
<v Speaker 1>or pass it on to you. So this approach is

0:45:41.480 --> 0:45:44.160
<v Speaker 1>not like a catch all for all robo calls and

0:45:44.200 --> 0:45:46.920
<v Speaker 1>spam or even for spoofing. It's not going to put

0:45:46.920 --> 0:45:49.200
<v Speaker 1>an end to it, but it is meant to help

0:45:49.239 --> 0:45:53.680
<v Speaker 1>cut back on those practices. There are other companies trying

0:45:53.719 --> 0:45:57.080
<v Speaker 1>to address this issue in other ways. There are companies

0:45:57.120 --> 0:46:01.040
<v Speaker 1>that have blocking services that you can use, there's the

0:46:01.120 --> 0:46:03.560
<v Speaker 1>Do Not Call registry that you can be part of,

0:46:04.080 --> 0:46:07.480
<v Speaker 1>and then companies like Verizon are trying something different. Like

0:46:07.600 --> 0:46:11.040
<v Speaker 1>Verizon has introduced an updated call filter app that will

0:46:11.040 --> 0:46:14.480
<v Speaker 1>send suspected spam calls that appear to have phone numbers

0:46:14.560 --> 0:46:17.760
<v Speaker 1>from your area straight to voicemail. So, in other words,

0:46:18.600 --> 0:46:22.839
<v Speaker 1>those neighborhoods spoofing calls would never even make your phone ring,

0:46:22.880 --> 0:46:25.480
<v Speaker 1>it would go straight to your voicemail. Of course, this

0:46:25.520 --> 0:46:28.120
<v Speaker 1>means that if there is someone from your region who

0:46:28.200 --> 0:46:30.759
<v Speaker 1>is actually trying to call you, for real z s,

0:46:31.560 --> 0:46:34.680
<v Speaker 1>they might end up going straight to voicemail too. Now

0:46:34.719 --> 0:46:38.839
<v Speaker 1>you can go into the apps filter settings and turn

0:46:38.920 --> 0:46:42.319
<v Speaker 1>those off for specific numbers, so it's not like, you know,

0:46:42.840 --> 0:46:44.960
<v Speaker 1>it's an all or nothing, but it does mean that

0:46:45.200 --> 0:46:47.560
<v Speaker 1>at least in some cases, there might be more hands

0:46:47.600 --> 0:46:51.160
<v Speaker 1>on work for the consumer to get everything to work

0:46:51.160 --> 0:46:55.920
<v Speaker 1>out properly. Now, I think we will continue to see

0:46:56.680 --> 0:47:00.360
<v Speaker 1>companies and governments really try to crack down on this

0:47:00.560 --> 0:47:04.160
<v Speaker 1>practice because it's so irritating. Like the people in charge

0:47:04.600 --> 0:47:08.880
<v Speaker 1>don't like it either, right, Politicians do not like robo

0:47:08.960 --> 0:47:12.520
<v Speaker 1>calls and spam because it affects them too, and so

0:47:12.719 --> 0:47:16.600
<v Speaker 1>we're likely to see more strides taken to try and

0:47:16.880 --> 0:47:19.799
<v Speaker 1>combat it. At the same time, we'll see the people

0:47:19.840 --> 0:47:22.280
<v Speaker 1>who are making use of it try and find ways

0:47:22.320 --> 0:47:24.880
<v Speaker 1>around the system. So it's going to be a c

0:47:25.040 --> 0:47:28.839
<v Speaker 1>saw kind of approach, and it's certainly an irritating one.

0:47:28.920 --> 0:47:32.920
<v Speaker 1>So if like me, you treat your phone like it's

0:47:32.960 --> 0:47:35.560
<v Speaker 1>a way to send email and text and that's it,

0:47:35.719 --> 0:47:37.960
<v Speaker 1>or maybe occasionally, you know, look at pictures of cats,

0:47:39.040 --> 0:47:43.399
<v Speaker 1>then you're in good company. Because this approach of robo

0:47:43.480 --> 0:47:47.640
<v Speaker 1>calls and spoofing has really created a an environment of

0:47:47.800 --> 0:47:52.000
<v Speaker 1>distrust with our communication devices, so much so that the

0:47:52.080 --> 0:47:56.600
<v Speaker 1>companies in charge of providing those services are saying, yeah,

0:47:56.880 --> 0:47:59.400
<v Speaker 1>kind of stinks, dotting it and saying like, yeah, you

0:47:59.400 --> 0:48:03.279
<v Speaker 1>should probably not pick up the phone. And again, they're

0:48:03.280 --> 0:48:06.239
<v Speaker 1>the ones providing the service to allow you to get

0:48:06.320 --> 0:48:10.359
<v Speaker 1>calls in the first place. It's not great, but that's

0:48:10.440 --> 0:48:13.319
<v Speaker 1>kind of you know how technology can be, right, It's

0:48:13.640 --> 0:48:17.080
<v Speaker 1>we can create these amazing tools that open up incredible

0:48:17.160 --> 0:48:20.759
<v Speaker 1>potential possibilities. But it also means that people who are

0:48:20.800 --> 0:48:24.280
<v Speaker 1>looking at the system from a different perspective may find

0:48:24.320 --> 0:48:28.480
<v Speaker 1>ways to twist it to benefit themselves at the expense

0:48:28.520 --> 0:48:31.640
<v Speaker 1>of the rest of us, which again kind of stinks.

0:48:32.440 --> 0:48:34.879
<v Speaker 1>So yeah, this is one of those topics where while

0:48:34.920 --> 0:48:37.920
<v Speaker 1>I say I love all things tech, I don't love spoofing.

0:48:38.400 --> 0:48:43.319
<v Speaker 1>I think it's uh. At best, it's misleading, and at

0:48:43.360 --> 0:48:50.160
<v Speaker 1>worst it is it is a predating upon vulnerable populations,

0:48:50.160 --> 0:48:53.480
<v Speaker 1>which I don't think is cool at all. But that

0:48:53.520 --> 0:48:56.760
<v Speaker 1>wraps up this episode. If you have suggestions for topics

0:48:56.760 --> 0:48:59.400
<v Speaker 1>I should cover in future episodes of tech Stuff, reach

0:48:59.440 --> 0:49:01.360
<v Speaker 1>out to me. The best way to do that is

0:49:01.360 --> 0:49:03.920
<v Speaker 1>over on Twitter. The handle for the show is text Stuff,

0:49:04.239 --> 0:49:08.720
<v Speaker 1>H s W and I'll talk to you again really soon.

0:49:09.480 --> 0:49:16.560
<v Speaker 1>Y tex Stuff is an I Heart Radio production. For

0:49:16.640 --> 0:49:19.600
<v Speaker 1>more podcasts from my Heart Radio, visit the i heart

0:49:19.680 --> 0:49:22.879
<v Speaker 1>Radio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to your

0:49:22.920 --> 0:49:23.600
<v Speaker 1>favorite shows.