1 00:00:01,120 --> 00:00:04,600 Speaker 1: Welcome to Stuff you Should Know from how Stuff Works 2 00:00:04,600 --> 00:00:13,720 Speaker 1: dot Com. Hey, and welcome to the podcast. I'm Josh Clark. 3 00:00:13,760 --> 00:00:16,680 Speaker 1: There's Charles W. Chuck Bryant. We've got guest producer Matt 4 00:00:16,760 --> 00:00:21,400 Speaker 1: over here that makes this Stuff you Should Know Sunshine Edition. 5 00:00:22,239 --> 00:00:26,520 Speaker 1: The storms are gone. Well. Plus they say sunshine is 6 00:00:26,560 --> 00:00:30,000 Speaker 1: the greatest disaffectmant that really Yeah, you shine a light 7 00:00:30,240 --> 00:00:34,400 Speaker 1: in the dark corners and it reveals truth, gotcha. Plus 8 00:00:34,520 --> 00:00:38,159 Speaker 1: you know people are less shady in the sunlight. So 9 00:00:38,240 --> 00:00:41,440 Speaker 1: this is part episode two of our recording session of 10 00:00:42,440 --> 00:00:47,720 Speaker 1: uh Freshly being without Power Irma going through Atlanta dead cats. 11 00:00:48,520 --> 00:00:52,680 Speaker 1: All right, and I'm going on vacation. Oh good, tomorrow good. 12 00:00:53,240 --> 00:00:56,200 Speaker 1: So if anyone wants to meet me at the Isle 13 00:00:56,200 --> 00:01:00,760 Speaker 1: of Palm, South Carolina, build a time machine, right, go 14 00:01:00,840 --> 00:01:04,120 Speaker 1: back a few weeks and you'll find me drinking Gin 15 00:01:04,160 --> 00:01:08,759 Speaker 1: and Tonics on the beach. Nice songs, child, Oh really, Wow, 16 00:01:08,840 --> 00:01:15,240 Speaker 1: you're vacationing vacation, not frustratingly running around trying to get 17 00:01:15,280 --> 00:01:19,000 Speaker 1: sand out of sunscreen off a small child. That's a 18 00:01:19,040 --> 00:01:22,960 Speaker 1: losing proposition. Yeah, man, can't wait. Good, We'll enjoy yourself. 19 00:01:23,080 --> 00:01:25,480 Speaker 1: We were originally going to Folly Beach, but it was damaged. 20 00:01:26,120 --> 00:01:29,760 Speaker 1: The house was, but this one was not, so they 21 00:01:29,800 --> 00:01:32,360 Speaker 1: moved us. I've never been to island Palm is it 22 00:01:32,360 --> 00:01:36,360 Speaker 1: shaped like a palm like in Dubai. No, it's just 23 00:01:36,440 --> 00:01:40,119 Speaker 1: one of Charleston's. Uh. I don't know what they call him, 24 00:01:40,160 --> 00:01:43,399 Speaker 1: low country border islands. Maybe that's what they call him. 25 00:01:43,400 --> 00:01:47,720 Speaker 1: Now right next to Sullivan's Island and James Island and 26 00:01:47,720 --> 00:01:50,640 Speaker 1: Folly Beach are all kind of right there, great area. 27 00:01:50,920 --> 00:01:54,640 Speaker 1: Charleston's amazing. Yeah, we're gonna go in for dinner and 28 00:01:54,680 --> 00:01:56,920 Speaker 1: stuff and trying to throw a little money at their economy. 29 00:01:56,960 --> 00:01:59,760 Speaker 1: But I think they had some really bad flooding. So 30 00:02:00,440 --> 00:02:02,840 Speaker 1: everyone all right there. I thinks like three or six 31 00:02:02,880 --> 00:02:07,720 Speaker 1: ft storm surge that was there on the outskirts. They 32 00:02:07,720 --> 00:02:09,880 Speaker 1: were not even in the past in the end. Not 33 00:02:09,960 --> 00:02:13,120 Speaker 1: good stuff, not good. Well, I'm glad Charleston made it, 34 00:02:13,160 --> 00:02:15,600 Speaker 1: and I'm glad you're going to Charleston. Man, I can't wait. 35 00:02:15,639 --> 00:02:19,560 Speaker 1: I'm gonna eat so much seafood. Yeah, alright, so Chuck, 36 00:02:19,800 --> 00:02:24,560 Speaker 1: as I was saying, sunshine is the greatest disinfectant. Let's hope. Um, 37 00:02:24,600 --> 00:02:28,960 Speaker 1: there's actually something called Sunshine Week. Have you heard about that. No, 38 00:02:29,600 --> 00:02:33,840 Speaker 1: it's a week that celebrates openness in government. It's as 39 00:02:33,919 --> 00:02:36,960 Speaker 1: simple as that. It's the Reporter's Committee for Freedom of 40 00:02:36,960 --> 00:02:40,640 Speaker 1: the Press. It's their thing, and they're trying to shine 41 00:02:40,639 --> 00:02:44,040 Speaker 1: a light on the idea of shining a light on government, right, 42 00:02:44,120 --> 00:02:48,600 Speaker 1: and that existed until this year. It's still right. No. Actually, 43 00:02:48,600 --> 00:02:51,800 Speaker 1: it's funny like the last guy gets a lot of 44 00:02:52,880 --> 00:02:57,120 Speaker 1: credit and praise for being open, but in retrospect, supposedly 45 00:02:57,160 --> 00:03:00,840 Speaker 1: it was very much a lot of smoking mirrors. Yeah, yeah, 46 00:03:00,880 --> 00:03:04,200 Speaker 1: there was. It was not a very open administration either. Well, 47 00:03:04,200 --> 00:03:08,639 Speaker 1: you know what they say, politics is politics? Who says that? 48 00:03:08,880 --> 00:03:13,120 Speaker 1: Is that? I love palm saying yeah the politics? Politics? 49 00:03:13,480 --> 00:03:18,160 Speaker 1: Have another crawfish past the frog wrest? Is there a 50 00:03:18,200 --> 00:03:23,079 Speaker 1: frog in that? No, that's just like a low country boil. Yeah, 51 00:03:23,080 --> 00:03:26,480 Speaker 1: I love low country boil. I'm gonna make that. I 52 00:03:26,520 --> 00:03:28,440 Speaker 1: think you should my own self. I think you should 53 00:03:28,440 --> 00:03:31,959 Speaker 1: bring something back here for me. Yeah, I don't know 54 00:03:32,000 --> 00:03:35,880 Speaker 1: if I guess it would keep. It depends, you know. 55 00:03:35,960 --> 00:03:37,680 Speaker 1: I want to be like, here's a week old frog 56 00:03:37,720 --> 00:03:42,520 Speaker 1: morps to I'd probably still eat it. I know you would. So. Um, 57 00:03:42,680 --> 00:03:47,400 Speaker 1: the idea of of government giving up its secrets. Right, 58 00:03:47,920 --> 00:03:52,400 Speaker 1: it's actually fairly new here in the States. Um, there's 59 00:03:52,520 --> 00:03:56,200 Speaker 1: a a time not too long ago where if you 60 00:03:56,440 --> 00:04:01,160 Speaker 1: wanted classified information or any information for um, the federal government, 61 00:04:02,160 --> 00:04:05,839 Speaker 1: they you had really no way to ask for it. 62 00:04:06,480 --> 00:04:08,560 Speaker 1: And even if you could figure out who to ask 63 00:04:08,960 --> 00:04:12,240 Speaker 1: for it from, they would say no. And then you 64 00:04:12,280 --> 00:04:15,720 Speaker 1: would you'd say, well, what next, nothing next, man, go 65 00:04:15,840 --> 00:04:19,240 Speaker 1: back to sleep. Citizen, that was your role to just 66 00:04:19,279 --> 00:04:24,000 Speaker 1: shut up and stop asking questions. And thankfully for those 67 00:04:24,120 --> 00:04:27,400 Speaker 1: of us who believe that government should be way more 68 00:04:27,480 --> 00:04:30,640 Speaker 1: transparent than it is. Uh, there was a guy named 69 00:04:30,880 --> 00:04:35,280 Speaker 1: Representative John Moss from California. He was a congressman back 70 00:04:35,320 --> 00:04:41,120 Speaker 1: in the sixties, and he became concerned that, um, not Congress, 71 00:04:41,160 --> 00:04:44,919 Speaker 1: but the federal government, the executive branch, was getting a 72 00:04:44,960 --> 00:04:50,880 Speaker 1: little too opaque. And specifically, there was a report that 73 00:04:50,920 --> 00:04:54,320 Speaker 1: he asked for that concerned, UM, the firing of some 74 00:04:54,440 --> 00:05:00,160 Speaker 1: civil servants, ostensibly because their loyalty to the administration had 75 00:05:00,200 --> 00:05:03,719 Speaker 1: been questioned, and so they got fired, and he wanted 76 00:05:03,760 --> 00:05:07,000 Speaker 1: to look into it, and the federal agency he requested 77 00:05:07,000 --> 00:05:10,599 Speaker 1: the documents from said no. And he was a congressman, 78 00:05:10,680 --> 00:05:15,320 Speaker 1: yes he was, So he said, I'll be back, yeah, 79 00:05:15,440 --> 00:05:19,600 Speaker 1: Arnold style. And then this was but thirteen or so 80 00:05:20,080 --> 00:05:25,520 Speaker 1: years after UM, the American Society of Newspaper Editors published 81 00:05:25,520 --> 00:05:30,240 Speaker 1: a study about secrecy in the government and basically said 82 00:05:30,279 --> 00:05:34,920 Speaker 1: what you said, which is citizens have no access to records, 83 00:05:35,240 --> 00:05:39,400 Speaker 1: no recourse if they're denied records. That was the nine three. 84 00:05:39,480 --> 00:05:42,440 Speaker 1: Kind of surprising to me. It was that early that 85 00:05:42,520 --> 00:05:45,320 Speaker 1: they were kind of ringing the bell for this. But 86 00:05:45,400 --> 00:05:49,480 Speaker 1: I think the Cold War, like almost immediately the development 87 00:05:49,480 --> 00:05:55,520 Speaker 1: of the bomb and the Cold War really drove this, 88 00:05:55,520 --> 00:05:59,919 Speaker 1: this desire to keep everything secret, and the federal government, 89 00:06:00,120 --> 00:06:04,520 Speaker 1: the executive branch, keeps everything secret by classifying everything. There's 90 00:06:04,560 --> 00:06:08,480 Speaker 1: this kind of mentality that is classify everything when in doubt, 91 00:06:08,880 --> 00:06:13,440 Speaker 1: classify it because not only does it it it obscures 92 00:06:13,480 --> 00:06:16,359 Speaker 1: what you're doing from say, like your enemy, it also 93 00:06:16,440 --> 00:06:19,280 Speaker 1: obscures what you're doing from your citizen right, so you 94 00:06:19,320 --> 00:06:21,800 Speaker 1: can't be questioned, you can't be criticized, you can't be 95 00:06:21,839 --> 00:06:25,320 Speaker 1: exposed as incompetent. If no one knows what you're doing, 96 00:06:25,720 --> 00:06:30,000 Speaker 1: they can't see that if you're doing it poorly, and 97 00:06:30,080 --> 00:06:32,279 Speaker 1: that they could actually do it better, or know somebody 98 00:06:32,279 --> 00:06:34,080 Speaker 1: who could do it better, or it could elect somebody 99 00:06:34,120 --> 00:06:37,279 Speaker 1: who could do it better. And as the way that 100 00:06:37,320 --> 00:06:39,720 Speaker 1: you do that is to just classify everything, keep it 101 00:06:39,800 --> 00:06:42,520 Speaker 1: a secret. Yeah. I've always had the feeling that if 102 00:06:42,520 --> 00:06:46,080 Speaker 1: the federal government in the United States had its drugs, 103 00:06:47,080 --> 00:06:51,159 Speaker 1: they would operate in complete isolated secrecy. Yeah. Well they're 104 00:06:51,200 --> 00:06:57,160 Speaker 1: trying like you wouldn't even have press conferences, right, Like 105 00:06:57,200 --> 00:06:59,919 Speaker 1: they would just shut it down and say don't don't you. 106 00:07:00,040 --> 00:07:02,839 Speaker 1: Let's worry about anything we have it coverage. Just go 107 00:07:02,920 --> 00:07:07,880 Speaker 1: about your day, go about your business. Uh So Moss 108 00:07:07,920 --> 00:07:13,600 Speaker 1: went to uh fellow Democratic President Phil Democrat President Lyndon 109 00:07:13,680 --> 00:07:17,160 Speaker 1: Johnson and said, you know, I think we uh should 110 00:07:17,720 --> 00:07:20,000 Speaker 1: change the way we're doing things here, and Johnson said, 111 00:07:20,080 --> 00:07:23,280 Speaker 1: I don't know about that. That's pretty good, John Johnson. 112 00:07:23,320 --> 00:07:29,120 Speaker 1: We should. He's very interesting, Uh, I think, conflicted dude. 113 00:07:29,840 --> 00:07:31,880 Speaker 1: We should do a show on him at some point, 114 00:07:32,760 --> 00:07:37,880 Speaker 1: very ambitious domestic policies like he wanted to be FDR 115 00:07:38,440 --> 00:07:41,560 Speaker 1: like the Second Coming, didn't know a lot about foreign policy. 116 00:07:42,360 --> 00:07:47,720 Speaker 1: Oh that's not good. No, he's a very interesting dude. Anyway, 117 00:07:47,840 --> 00:07:50,120 Speaker 1: He's a domestic He was a domestic guy. Had I 118 00:07:50,160 --> 00:07:54,240 Speaker 1: never realized that he didn't know about was not his specialty. 119 00:07:55,920 --> 00:07:57,920 Speaker 1: I think he wanted to do great things for this country, 120 00:07:58,560 --> 00:08:01,760 Speaker 1: um in his heart right, but uh, I don't know. 121 00:08:01,760 --> 00:08:04,800 Speaker 1: It's interesting. I think ever since I saw the Cranston 122 00:08:04,880 --> 00:08:08,120 Speaker 1: play in New York. What's it called all the Way? 123 00:08:08,240 --> 00:08:10,640 Speaker 1: I think, and they made it too. I didn't see 124 00:08:10,640 --> 00:08:12,720 Speaker 1: the movie version, but I saw the play all the Way. 125 00:08:12,800 --> 00:08:15,120 Speaker 1: That's what's called I think. So I think that's like 126 00:08:15,160 --> 00:08:20,280 Speaker 1: a tawdry John Ritter film or something like that. That's 127 00:08:20,360 --> 00:08:25,880 Speaker 1: let's go all the way? Okay, uh oh man, I 128 00:08:25,920 --> 00:08:29,200 Speaker 1: missed John Ritter, sure he was the best. Uh So anyway, 129 00:08:29,280 --> 00:08:32,760 Speaker 1: Johnson said, I don't know about that. All the all 130 00:08:32,800 --> 00:08:35,920 Speaker 1: the federal departments and agency said, I definitely don't know 131 00:08:35,960 --> 00:08:39,600 Speaker 1: about that. Bad idea, but it was the bell had 132 00:08:39,600 --> 00:08:44,320 Speaker 1: been wrong in the House. And this is something that 133 00:08:44,679 --> 00:08:48,000 Speaker 1: is kind of fun to look back on when these days, 134 00:08:49,320 --> 00:08:51,280 Speaker 1: how things are, how they are, how divisive they are. 135 00:08:51,679 --> 00:08:53,480 Speaker 1: Back in the House about a three hundred and seven 136 00:08:53,520 --> 00:08:57,000 Speaker 1: to zero to pass the Moss Freedom of Information Act, 137 00:08:57,000 --> 00:09:00,600 Speaker 1: the fo I A and UH John and signed it, 138 00:09:00,720 --> 00:09:03,719 Speaker 1: and uh didn't have a big press conference when he 139 00:09:03,760 --> 00:09:06,679 Speaker 1: signed it, like they do a lot of big laws 140 00:09:06,679 --> 00:09:10,800 Speaker 1: and bills. He signed it in secrecy. Yeah, he did, like, oh, 141 00:09:10,880 --> 00:09:12,560 Speaker 1: we'll sign it, but maybe people don't know about it. 142 00:09:12,640 --> 00:09:14,400 Speaker 1: I won't go we don't have to we have to 143 00:09:14,440 --> 00:09:16,760 Speaker 1: go around shooting our mouths off about it. But he 144 00:09:16,800 --> 00:09:18,160 Speaker 1: did say, no one should be able to pull the 145 00:09:18,160 --> 00:09:22,280 Speaker 1: curtains of secrecy around decisions which can be revealed without 146 00:09:22,280 --> 00:09:25,240 Speaker 1: injury to the public interest. I signed this measure with 147 00:09:25,280 --> 00:09:27,640 Speaker 1: a deep sense of pride that the United States is 148 00:09:27,679 --> 00:09:32,000 Speaker 1: an open society. Uh, but no one heard that, right, 149 00:09:33,200 --> 00:09:36,079 Speaker 1: the doors are shut, correct? So yeah, he signed it 150 00:09:36,080 --> 00:09:39,200 Speaker 1: in secrecy, which is a little weird, and also opened 151 00:09:39,240 --> 00:09:42,600 Speaker 1: the door for like, you know that that second part 152 00:09:42,600 --> 00:09:46,080 Speaker 1: of the first sentences decisions which can be revealed without 153 00:09:46,080 --> 00:09:49,400 Speaker 1: injury to the public interest, there's a big caveat attached 154 00:09:49,480 --> 00:09:53,360 Speaker 1: to that openness, right exactly. Don't forget we have ways 155 00:09:53,360 --> 00:09:56,000 Speaker 1: around this. Yeah. Um, And you said that it was 156 00:09:56,080 --> 00:10:00,559 Speaker 1: hardening to hear that Congress unanimously passed the four Act, right, 157 00:10:00,960 --> 00:10:03,600 Speaker 1: a little bit, right, This is what it is. This 158 00:10:03,640 --> 00:10:06,599 Speaker 1: is not the only time Congress has come together unanimously 159 00:10:07,080 --> 00:10:10,040 Speaker 1: in defense of FOIA. In two thousand four, team, which 160 00:10:10,040 --> 00:10:14,920 Speaker 1: we'll talk about later, they did with John Bayner as 161 00:10:15,000 --> 00:10:18,800 Speaker 1: the um at the helm of the House in Obama 162 00:10:18,880 --> 00:10:22,880 Speaker 1: in the White House, and that the Congress divided as 163 00:10:22,920 --> 00:10:26,319 Speaker 1: much as it's ever been. The House came together unanimously 164 00:10:26,960 --> 00:10:30,920 Speaker 1: in in for this Foya Act or Amendment A. There 165 00:10:31,000 --> 00:10:34,760 Speaker 1: was also a time when Gerald Ford was president where 166 00:10:34,840 --> 00:10:38,160 Speaker 1: Congress overrode a veto of his as far as FOYA. 167 00:10:38,240 --> 00:10:41,400 Speaker 1: So FOIA is this one thing because for for those 168 00:10:41,440 --> 00:10:46,000 Speaker 1: of you who don't know, it only pertains to documents 169 00:10:46,080 --> 00:10:50,440 Speaker 1: in the control of the executive branch of the federal government, 170 00:10:51,320 --> 00:10:53,720 Speaker 1: just the executive branch, just the White House. So any 171 00:10:53,760 --> 00:10:59,360 Speaker 1: secrets the president's administration is keeping, that's what it's pertaining to. Okay. 172 00:10:59,440 --> 00:11:03,080 Speaker 1: So Congress very frequently comes together and it's like, no, 173 00:11:03,360 --> 00:11:07,480 Speaker 1: we want you to share this information with everybody, including us, 174 00:11:08,320 --> 00:11:10,640 Speaker 1: and they look like the good guys too for coming 175 00:11:10,640 --> 00:11:13,920 Speaker 1: to the aid for open and honest and transparent government. 176 00:11:14,120 --> 00:11:16,800 Speaker 1: And just to clarify, Chuck, like, it's not just like 177 00:11:16,840 --> 00:11:21,320 Speaker 1: the White House. There's tons of agencies, federal agencies that 178 00:11:21,360 --> 00:11:24,920 Speaker 1: fall under the executive branch, including like the FBI or 179 00:11:24,960 --> 00:11:29,280 Speaker 1: the CDC or the UM. There just basically any agency, 180 00:11:29,480 --> 00:11:33,240 Speaker 1: if any federal agencies probably under the purview of the 181 00:11:32,640 --> 00:11:36,640 Speaker 1: the executive branch, so therefore FOYA would apply to it 182 00:11:36,679 --> 00:11:40,120 Speaker 1: as well. That's very nice to point that out, because 183 00:11:40,160 --> 00:11:46,800 Speaker 1: you confused even me off. Sorry about that. Uh So this, uh, 184 00:11:46,840 --> 00:11:49,199 Speaker 1: I think this this bears reading this quote. There's a 185 00:11:49,240 --> 00:11:54,679 Speaker 1: journalist named John Wiener or Winer who he um tried 186 00:11:54,720 --> 00:11:58,720 Speaker 1: for fourteen years to get John Lennon's FBI files through 187 00:11:58,880 --> 00:12:04,559 Speaker 1: f o i A quests, and he very succinctly wrote this, 188 00:12:04,840 --> 00:12:06,680 Speaker 1: and it kind of sums it up to me. The 189 00:12:06,679 --> 00:12:10,400 Speaker 1: basic issue was that government officials everywhere like secrecy by 190 00:12:10,480 --> 00:12:12,960 Speaker 1: keeping the public from learning what they have done, they 191 00:12:12,960 --> 00:12:16,319 Speaker 1: hope to avoid criticism, hinder the opposition, and maintain power 192 00:12:16,360 --> 00:12:20,440 Speaker 1: over citizens. And they're elected representatives. Classified files and official 193 00:12:20,480 --> 00:12:23,840 Speaker 1: secrets lie at the heart of the modern government bureaucracy. 194 00:12:23,960 --> 00:12:26,800 Speaker 1: Of such a hard time with that word. It's almost impossible, 195 00:12:26,920 --> 00:12:30,400 Speaker 1: is spell to I don't even try, uh and permit 196 00:12:30,600 --> 00:12:34,520 Speaker 1: the under undemocratic use of power to go unrecognized and 197 00:12:34,559 --> 00:12:37,480 Speaker 1: unchallenged by citizens. And he was just trying to get 198 00:12:37,520 --> 00:12:41,240 Speaker 1: John Lennon's files. That's how riled the peacock. You know, 199 00:12:41,480 --> 00:12:43,360 Speaker 1: you don't want to rale up a journalists, but that's 200 00:12:43,360 --> 00:12:46,520 Speaker 1: who this pertains to for the most part, I should 201 00:12:46,559 --> 00:12:48,960 Speaker 1: say not entirely, but yeah, for the most part is 202 00:12:48,960 --> 00:12:52,040 Speaker 1: accurate journalists. Journalists are the ones who are supposed to 203 00:12:52,080 --> 00:12:55,560 Speaker 1: be reporting on the goings on of the government, especially 204 00:12:55,600 --> 00:13:00,480 Speaker 1: when it comes to exposing wrongdoing, corruption, waste, all this off. 205 00:13:00,520 --> 00:13:03,080 Speaker 1: That's one of the main roles of the media, right yea, 206 00:13:03,160 --> 00:13:06,679 Speaker 1: journalists and more and more now activists, thankfully, citizen activists right. 207 00:13:06,720 --> 00:13:09,000 Speaker 1: And one of the reasons why citizen activists have gotten 208 00:13:09,000 --> 00:13:13,280 Speaker 1: in on this is because the journalists aren't doing it enough. Yeah. Um, 209 00:13:13,320 --> 00:13:18,240 Speaker 1: but the early on the journalists were largely in support 210 00:13:18,360 --> 00:13:21,719 Speaker 1: of FOYA. The Congress was like, sure, why not, it 211 00:13:21,720 --> 00:13:24,040 Speaker 1: will probably make the president who we don't like, look bad. 212 00:13:24,760 --> 00:13:30,240 Speaker 1: And um. Now we have as of the sixty six Act, 213 00:13:30,559 --> 00:13:36,080 Speaker 1: the Freedom of Information Act, right yeah, which officially, uh, 214 00:13:36,320 --> 00:13:38,560 Speaker 1: I mean, people know what this is. This is the 215 00:13:38,559 --> 00:13:42,200 Speaker 1: ability of a of a citizen of the world. Very 216 00:13:42,240 --> 00:13:44,240 Speaker 1: important there. You don't have to just be an American 217 00:13:44,240 --> 00:13:48,760 Speaker 1: citizen to request records of an executive branch like you said, 218 00:13:48,800 --> 00:13:52,880 Speaker 1: government agency. Uh. And along with that Act originally nineteen 219 00:13:52,960 --> 00:13:55,880 Speaker 1: sixty six said these are available to the public with 220 00:13:56,000 --> 00:14:00,400 Speaker 1: nine exemptions, which will go over later. Um that protect 221 00:14:00,480 --> 00:14:04,440 Speaker 1: the agency under certain circumstances. And if you were denied, 222 00:14:04,480 --> 00:14:07,120 Speaker 1: there is also now a process in place to appeal 223 00:14:07,160 --> 00:14:10,319 Speaker 1: that denied right. Very important and so when LBJ signed 224 00:14:10,360 --> 00:14:13,400 Speaker 1: it into law, it was basically like, yeah, I guess 225 00:14:13,440 --> 00:14:15,200 Speaker 1: just go along with it, but if you don't feel 226 00:14:15,240 --> 00:14:18,319 Speaker 1: like it, you don't have to write right. Um. That's 227 00:14:18,360 --> 00:14:21,040 Speaker 1: kind of went for a while, Yeah until Watergate. The 228 00:14:21,080 --> 00:14:25,880 Speaker 1: Watergate scandal really change people's relationship with government big time. 229 00:14:26,040 --> 00:14:28,800 Speaker 1: That changed government's relationship to government. Yeah. And one of 230 00:14:28,800 --> 00:14:30,920 Speaker 1: the things that happened was there was an update to 231 00:14:31,080 --> 00:14:35,200 Speaker 1: FOYA and a strengthening of FOYA UM so that there 232 00:14:35,200 --> 00:14:38,480 Speaker 1: were like greater sanctions if you didn't follow through on 233 00:14:38,480 --> 00:14:43,760 Speaker 1: on supplying the requested information. It was harder to just 234 00:14:43,800 --> 00:14:46,640 Speaker 1: say no to deny it. Yeah, they had a specific 235 00:14:46,680 --> 00:14:49,280 Speaker 1: time frame finally, like you couldn't just say yeah, we'll 236 00:14:49,320 --> 00:14:53,480 Speaker 1: get to it, right. So, Uh, Congress puts uh this 237 00:14:53,800 --> 00:14:57,800 Speaker 1: FOI amendments or updates on Gerald Ford's desk to sign, 238 00:14:58,600 --> 00:15:01,520 Speaker 1: and uh, He's like now, well he looked around the 239 00:15:01,600 --> 00:15:04,000 Speaker 1: room and said what should I do? Right? And the 240 00:15:04,120 --> 00:15:06,680 Speaker 1: two people that piped up where Donald ROMs felt his 241 00:15:06,800 --> 00:15:10,920 Speaker 1: chief of staff and Antonin Scalia, who was the chief 242 00:15:11,000 --> 00:15:14,720 Speaker 1: legal counsel for the Justice Department, and they both said, 243 00:15:15,120 --> 00:15:17,760 Speaker 1: don't sign it. Yeah. And apparently at least this article 244 00:15:17,800 --> 00:15:21,600 Speaker 1: says that Rumsfeld early on was a supporter of FOI right, 245 00:15:21,640 --> 00:15:27,200 Speaker 1: I think in the very easily manipulated version. Yeah. But 246 00:15:27,320 --> 00:15:31,520 Speaker 1: when it when it came time to right, he said no, 247 00:15:31,800 --> 00:15:36,640 Speaker 1: don't And so Ford argued that it was unconstitutional, and 248 00:15:36,680 --> 00:15:40,120 Speaker 1: Congress said, you're wrong, and we're overriding your v two. 249 00:15:40,840 --> 00:15:45,560 Speaker 1: That does not happened. Yeah, you say too too, that 250 00:15:45,760 --> 00:15:48,520 Speaker 1: doesn't happen very often that a veto is overridden. I 251 00:15:48,600 --> 00:15:52,320 Speaker 1: don't have ever done one on vitos should because I 252 00:15:52,360 --> 00:15:54,920 Speaker 1: have no idea how often it happens. But I guarantee 253 00:15:54,920 --> 00:15:58,520 Speaker 1: you it's not often. All right, So let's take a break. Um, 254 00:15:59,000 --> 00:16:01,640 Speaker 1: we're just getting heat it up here on this one. Uh. 255 00:16:01,720 --> 00:16:04,160 Speaker 1: And as you'll see in the coming segments for your 256 00:16:04,320 --> 00:16:07,120 Speaker 1: changes gets more teeth and less teeth over the years, 257 00:16:07,120 --> 00:16:09,440 Speaker 1: depending on whose office. And we'll be right back with 258 00:16:09,600 --> 00:16:37,040 Speaker 1: Ronald Reagan. All right, Ronnie, he's here. That's so, like 259 00:16:37,120 --> 00:16:41,760 Speaker 1: I promised, over the years, Foia has um had more 260 00:16:41,760 --> 00:16:46,080 Speaker 1: teeth and less teeth depending on who is running the show. Um, 261 00:16:46,120 --> 00:16:48,760 Speaker 1: probably not so. Surprisingly, when Ronald Reagan got into office 262 00:16:48,800 --> 00:16:53,960 Speaker 1: in two or in nineteen two, he created he made 263 00:16:54,000 --> 00:16:57,160 Speaker 1: it much tougher to uh, to get information, made it 264 00:16:57,200 --> 00:17:02,240 Speaker 1: easier for agencies to withhold stuff. Um, Bill Clinton comes along, 265 00:17:02,880 --> 00:17:05,159 Speaker 1: relaxes things, right, it kind of goes like that in 266 00:17:05,200 --> 00:17:08,520 Speaker 1: our country. Well, Reagan also one of his things was, um, 267 00:17:08,640 --> 00:17:14,760 Speaker 1: he definitely helps spearhead that classify everything mentality under his administration, Yeah, 268 00:17:14,840 --> 00:17:19,840 Speaker 1: he said print, he said, manufacturer as many classified rubber 269 00:17:19,880 --> 00:17:23,199 Speaker 1: stamps as you can. Every office needs about a hundred 270 00:17:23,200 --> 00:17:26,080 Speaker 1: of them. And I think, especially during the Cold War, 271 00:17:26,359 --> 00:17:30,160 Speaker 1: the Soviets served as a real boogeyman for keeping citizens 272 00:17:30,680 --> 00:17:33,560 Speaker 1: in the dark. We don't want the Rooskies to find out. 273 00:17:33,600 --> 00:17:36,399 Speaker 1: So no, yeah, we we don't trust you with this 274 00:17:36,480 --> 00:17:38,920 Speaker 1: because you might hand it over to the Rooskies. Yeah, 275 00:17:39,160 --> 00:17:41,760 Speaker 1: that was what they say. And they said Rooskys too, 276 00:17:42,560 --> 00:17:45,399 Speaker 1: they did so. Like I said, Clinton comes wrong along. 277 00:17:45,480 --> 00:17:48,800 Speaker 1: And there were a few, um, a few big events 278 00:17:48,840 --> 00:17:51,119 Speaker 1: in his administration. But hold and think about it. When 279 00:17:51,200 --> 00:17:54,920 Speaker 1: Clinton comes along, no more uss are well true, Yeah, 280 00:17:55,040 --> 00:18:01,800 Speaker 1: no more boogeyman. Right, good times, man, let's part. Uh 281 00:18:02,000 --> 00:18:04,119 Speaker 1: did you like? Yeah, that was good. It was not 282 00:18:05,040 --> 00:18:08,840 Speaker 1: I think together we do the perfect book. Glinton um 283 00:18:08,960 --> 00:18:11,359 Speaker 1: he during an administration had a bunch of big um 284 00:18:12,200 --> 00:18:15,760 Speaker 1: but had a big impact on FOYA. We're calling it 285 00:18:15,800 --> 00:18:18,840 Speaker 1: for you, right, Yeah, Freedom of Information Act. It's a 286 00:18:18,880 --> 00:18:22,160 Speaker 1: perfect acronym because it takes all words into account for you. Yeah, 287 00:18:22,160 --> 00:18:25,239 Speaker 1: and it's not fake. No, one just like cooked up 288 00:18:25,280 --> 00:18:26,600 Speaker 1: some weird word to throw in there to make it 289 00:18:26,640 --> 00:18:32,400 Speaker 1: a word. So the release an archiving of Cold War 290 00:18:32,560 --> 00:18:36,119 Speaker 1: previously classified Cold War documents was a big one. And 291 00:18:36,160 --> 00:18:41,160 Speaker 1: then a really big see change is when Clinton said, 292 00:18:41,800 --> 00:18:45,679 Speaker 1: you know, get with it and digitize all this stuff, 293 00:18:46,160 --> 00:18:49,000 Speaker 1: like this is the future. We don't need everything on paper. 294 00:18:49,040 --> 00:18:53,840 Speaker 1: Documents make it easier, uh to file and store the stuff. 295 00:18:53,840 --> 00:18:57,320 Speaker 1: He and make it easier to distribute this stuff under 296 00:18:57,359 --> 00:19:01,879 Speaker 1: FOY And it was and also uh they extended that timeline. 297 00:19:02,000 --> 00:19:04,240 Speaker 1: I don't think we initially said it was ten days. Yeah, 298 00:19:04,280 --> 00:19:06,640 Speaker 1: you had ten days to respond to a fourier request 299 00:19:06,760 --> 00:19:13,600 Speaker 1: as a forficer um and then that was extended to 300 00:19:13,640 --> 00:19:16,840 Speaker 1: twenty days. Although it says in here that that wasn't 301 00:19:16,880 --> 00:19:18,480 Speaker 1: so much of a big deal. Just gave him a 302 00:19:18,480 --> 00:19:22,320 Speaker 1: little more time. Basically no, because an agency that's not 303 00:19:22,760 --> 00:19:27,399 Speaker 1: frequently contacted for FOY information and is not running a backlog, 304 00:19:27,640 --> 00:19:29,280 Speaker 1: it is probably going to do it in about ten 305 00:19:29,359 --> 00:19:33,119 Speaker 1: days anyway, right, An agency that is running a backlog 306 00:19:33,440 --> 00:19:35,680 Speaker 1: is still not going to get in touch with you 307 00:19:35,840 --> 00:19:38,160 Speaker 1: within ten days or twenty days. So it really had 308 00:19:38,200 --> 00:19:41,119 Speaker 1: no effect, but it is on the book still to 309 00:19:41,200 --> 00:19:43,960 Speaker 1: this day. They have twenty days to respond to you 310 00:19:44,280 --> 00:19:49,120 Speaker 1: before you can appeal their lack of response. So UM 311 00:19:49,200 --> 00:19:52,399 Speaker 1: George Bush H George W. Bush comes along, of course, 312 00:19:52,560 --> 00:19:56,679 Speaker 1: and UH titans restrictions again. After September eleven. That was 313 00:19:56,800 --> 00:20:00,960 Speaker 1: the perfect time to tighten the belt on FOY UH 314 00:20:01,000 --> 00:20:05,160 Speaker 1: again because the boogeyman is back USA Patriot Act. So 315 00:20:06,040 --> 00:20:09,200 Speaker 1: after September eleven, UM he ordered or you know, the 316 00:20:09,240 --> 00:20:14,000 Speaker 1: administration ordered thousands of documents and data removed from websites 317 00:20:14,040 --> 00:20:18,919 Speaker 1: agency websites, things like airport UH safety data, things like 318 00:20:19,000 --> 00:20:22,359 Speaker 1: pipeline maps, environmental data. I gotta tell you I don't 319 00:20:22,480 --> 00:20:26,840 Speaker 1: disagree with all of that. This is a double edged sword, 320 00:20:26,960 --> 00:20:30,080 Speaker 1: you know, this, this this topic itself is to unpack 321 00:20:30,160 --> 00:20:33,240 Speaker 1: this thing fully Like it's hard to make an argument 322 00:20:33,240 --> 00:20:36,680 Speaker 1: for full transparency or full secrecy. Sure, Yeah, I don't 323 00:20:36,720 --> 00:20:39,359 Speaker 1: think I would argue for full transparency. I think just 324 00:20:39,520 --> 00:20:43,240 Speaker 1: by definition we would have to get so far away 325 00:20:43,320 --> 00:20:48,040 Speaker 1: from being like the world's police and doving like military everywhere, 326 00:20:48,359 --> 00:20:52,280 Speaker 1: and like being interventionist and adventuroust and all just basically 327 00:20:52,280 --> 00:20:55,919 Speaker 1: completely changed the complexion of the modern United States. To 328 00:20:56,119 --> 00:20:58,720 Speaker 1: be able to be fully transparent, you can't. And even 329 00:20:58,760 --> 00:21:01,280 Speaker 1: then it might be kind of like Norway can be 330 00:21:01,320 --> 00:21:04,560 Speaker 1: fully transparent, but even still, like can they like maybe 331 00:21:04,560 --> 00:21:07,640 Speaker 1: somebody be like, well, I'm I want to practice being 332 00:21:07,680 --> 00:21:10,320 Speaker 1: a terrorist, So I'm gonna start on Norway because they 333 00:21:10,359 --> 00:21:14,119 Speaker 1: publish all their pipeline information. Yeah, so maybe I'll just 334 00:21:14,160 --> 00:21:16,119 Speaker 1: go see what happens when I blow that up. Or 335 00:21:16,200 --> 00:21:18,960 Speaker 1: the great wooden shoes scandal of the U was that 336 00:21:19,040 --> 00:21:22,560 Speaker 1: Norway or the Netherlands. I don't think they wear wooden 337 00:21:22,600 --> 00:21:25,159 Speaker 1: shoes in Norway. Oh, I just I just think they 338 00:21:25,200 --> 00:21:27,160 Speaker 1: all wear wooden shoes all over the place. They don't. 339 00:21:28,600 --> 00:21:31,119 Speaker 1: We have listeners there, man, they're gonna hear you, I know, 340 00:21:31,200 --> 00:21:35,679 Speaker 1: but they know we're kidding, right, I don't know the 341 00:21:35,720 --> 00:21:40,200 Speaker 1: Australians thought we were serious about drinking fosters down there, really, Yeah, 342 00:21:40,200 --> 00:21:42,080 Speaker 1: didn't you see how many emails we got there were 343 00:21:42,119 --> 00:21:45,000 Speaker 1: like gently correcting us that no one actually really drinks 344 00:21:45,040 --> 00:21:51,840 Speaker 1: fosters in Australia's um. Bush Also what he made a 345 00:21:51,880 --> 00:21:54,560 Speaker 1: move to do was limit access to records of former presidents, 346 00:21:55,240 --> 00:21:59,160 Speaker 1: which was sort of a big move. UM. And then 347 00:21:59,520 --> 00:22:03,399 Speaker 1: in the Intelligence Authorization Act of two thousand two wanted 348 00:22:03,400 --> 00:22:12,600 Speaker 1: to limit requests by foreign governments or international organizations. So again, okay, 349 00:22:13,040 --> 00:22:14,960 Speaker 1: I don't really disagree with all of it. One of 350 00:22:14,960 --> 00:22:18,280 Speaker 1: the only things that Bush did too was UM he 351 00:22:18,720 --> 00:22:25,920 Speaker 1: expanded who could get cheap or free access to for you? Yeah, UM, journalists. 352 00:22:26,320 --> 00:22:29,520 Speaker 1: I think as part of the UM Watergate expansion or 353 00:22:29,600 --> 00:22:35,840 Speaker 1: maybe the Clinton expansion, journalists were offered um, expedited and cheap, 354 00:22:35,960 --> 00:22:40,120 Speaker 1: if not free for you UM requests. Yeah, we should 355 00:22:40,119 --> 00:22:43,560 Speaker 1: point out you have to pay for this stuff. No 356 00:22:43,800 --> 00:22:46,480 Speaker 1: journalists get a break. They say that, and apparently there's 357 00:22:46,520 --> 00:22:49,959 Speaker 1: not a there's not a standard fee. It's just that 358 00:22:50,080 --> 00:22:53,600 Speaker 1: as part of the law, an agency can recover costs 359 00:22:53,680 --> 00:22:58,560 Speaker 1: associated directly associated with the search, right, UM, So it 360 00:22:58,600 --> 00:23:01,640 Speaker 1: could be eleven dollars an hour, it could be two 361 00:23:01,680 --> 00:23:06,640 Speaker 1: hundred dollars an hour. Depending journalists get faster expedited service 362 00:23:07,040 --> 00:23:10,520 Speaker 1: as paper at least, and then they get their fees 363 00:23:10,560 --> 00:23:12,800 Speaker 1: waved or else pay a reduced fee. And then what 364 00:23:12,920 --> 00:23:16,520 Speaker 1: Bush did with the changes to FOYA under his watch 365 00:23:16,600 --> 00:23:21,239 Speaker 1: were UM to expand who qualifies as a journalists. It 366 00:23:21,280 --> 00:23:26,639 Speaker 1: now included independent investigative journalists bloggers UM, and then public 367 00:23:26,680 --> 00:23:29,640 Speaker 1: interest groups. Apparently it always been included in that too. 368 00:23:29,840 --> 00:23:33,160 Speaker 1: I just like thinking of w saying the word blogger, 369 00:23:33,880 --> 00:23:35,480 Speaker 1: like I get the feeling that he didn't even know 370 00:23:35,520 --> 00:23:39,919 Speaker 1: what that was. Intelligence. He just always struck me as like, 371 00:23:42,240 --> 00:23:44,520 Speaker 1: I know he got made fun of for intelligence, but 372 00:23:45,480 --> 00:23:47,600 Speaker 1: I don't think it's because of intelligence. I think he's 373 00:23:47,720 --> 00:23:49,800 Speaker 1: the dude though that would sit down at a computer 374 00:23:50,400 --> 00:23:51,760 Speaker 1: and just kind of be like, how how do I 375 00:23:51,800 --> 00:23:56,639 Speaker 1: work this thing? You know, just sort of old school roots. 376 00:23:56,720 --> 00:24:00,919 Speaker 1: He he didn't know what a blogger was. Maybe come on, 377 00:24:01,440 --> 00:24:05,240 Speaker 1: maybe not or a vlogger. I agree with you, he 378 00:24:05,280 --> 00:24:07,920 Speaker 1: definitely didn't know it a vlogger or at any rate. 379 00:24:07,960 --> 00:24:11,040 Speaker 1: It was the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act. It 380 00:24:11,080 --> 00:24:13,800 Speaker 1: was a good thing that UM and of course Harry 381 00:24:13,800 --> 00:24:16,560 Speaker 1: Reid is who introduced the bill. But UM, see that's 382 00:24:16,560 --> 00:24:18,920 Speaker 1: what I'm saying. Congress is like, we don't like this president. 383 00:24:18,920 --> 00:24:21,840 Speaker 1: We're gonna make them look bad and force a foy 384 00:24:22,080 --> 00:24:24,639 Speaker 1: some new Foya stuff on him. And then all it 385 00:24:24,680 --> 00:24:27,840 Speaker 1: does is just point the point. It shines a light 386 00:24:27,920 --> 00:24:31,120 Speaker 1: on just how secretive the government is. And then Congress 387 00:24:31,160 --> 00:24:34,800 Speaker 1: looks good by trying to pull pull back the curtains. 388 00:24:35,520 --> 00:24:39,560 Speaker 1: That's right. Then Obama gets on his h But hold on, 389 00:24:39,560 --> 00:24:42,000 Speaker 1: I'm sorry, but that's not to say that even if 390 00:24:42,000 --> 00:24:44,360 Speaker 1: Congress is doing it cynically, that it's a bad thing. 391 00:24:45,320 --> 00:24:48,960 Speaker 1: It's actually a very good thing. Yes, it's just I 392 00:24:49,000 --> 00:24:51,760 Speaker 1: don't think that Congress is riding to the rescue of 393 00:24:51,800 --> 00:24:55,000 Speaker 1: the American people. I think that their motive is probably 394 00:24:55,000 --> 00:24:56,800 Speaker 1: to make the president look bad. Yeah, I hear you. 395 00:24:57,480 --> 00:24:59,879 Speaker 1: So then Obama mounts his horse and rides into the 396 00:25:00,000 --> 00:25:04,239 Speaker 1: White House. Um. Not great would that have been if 397 00:25:04,240 --> 00:25:08,600 Speaker 1: he literally did that like Ronald Reagan? You probably did? Um. 398 00:25:08,640 --> 00:25:12,040 Speaker 1: In two thousand nine, he very first day in office, 399 00:25:12,560 --> 00:25:14,480 Speaker 1: he said, here's a memo, We're going to be the 400 00:25:14,520 --> 00:25:25,520 Speaker 1: most transparent government that's in American history. And everyone went, yes, 401 00:25:25,720 --> 00:25:28,800 Speaker 1: that's awesome, and he went you think people bought that? 402 00:25:29,280 --> 00:25:31,640 Speaker 1: He's like, oh my gosh, they did. Yeah, he said 403 00:25:31,640 --> 00:25:34,280 Speaker 1: that he wanted to die. He wrote a memo, like 404 00:25:34,320 --> 00:25:36,600 Speaker 1: you said, the first day in off very first day, 405 00:25:36,920 --> 00:25:40,679 Speaker 1: and he said that federal agencies agencies should adopt a 406 00:25:40,760 --> 00:25:47,000 Speaker 1: presumption in favor of disclosure, so lean toward releasing it 407 00:25:47,119 --> 00:25:49,919 Speaker 1: rather than against it, which is a big difference. And 408 00:25:49,960 --> 00:25:52,960 Speaker 1: he actually had Eric Holder, Um who was running the 409 00:25:53,040 --> 00:25:55,280 Speaker 1: d o J for him. I guess that makes him 410 00:25:55,280 --> 00:25:58,760 Speaker 1: as an attorney general, right, Eric Holder was Attorney general 411 00:25:58,760 --> 00:26:03,560 Speaker 1: Whenney and he said, figure out how to codify this, 412 00:26:04,200 --> 00:26:08,080 Speaker 1: and he did. They came up with UM guidelines for 413 00:26:08,160 --> 00:26:12,199 Speaker 1: the federal agencies to become more transparent. Yeah, and a 414 00:26:12,200 --> 00:26:16,320 Speaker 1: lot of it this that wasn't two thousand nine By 415 00:26:16,359 --> 00:26:20,520 Speaker 1: the time rolled around. The exact opposite was going on. Yeah. 416 00:26:20,560 --> 00:26:23,000 Speaker 1: Two thousands and sixteen is when the Foyer Improvement Act 417 00:26:23,080 --> 00:26:27,359 Speaker 1: was was put through and UM foisted onto Obama. Yeah, 418 00:26:27,400 --> 00:26:31,880 Speaker 1: this was the one that supposedly just kind of reinstated 419 00:26:31,880 --> 00:26:33,679 Speaker 1: a lot of what it was supposed to do to 420 00:26:33,720 --> 00:26:36,920 Speaker 1: begin with that had been shirked over the years from 421 00:26:36,920 --> 00:26:41,200 Speaker 1: what I understand, Yeah, Um, it was also an attempt 422 00:26:41,280 --> 00:26:47,280 Speaker 1: to take that codified presumption of disc of disclosure UM 423 00:26:47,440 --> 00:26:50,359 Speaker 1: that the DJ come up with and put it into law, 424 00:26:50,880 --> 00:26:53,840 Speaker 1: like make it part of the Foyer Act. And a 425 00:26:54,040 --> 00:27:00,679 Speaker 1: FOIA request revealed lobbying by the Obama administration, tense lobbying 426 00:27:00,760 --> 00:27:06,399 Speaker 1: by the Obama administration to prevent that that that codification, 427 00:27:06,480 --> 00:27:09,840 Speaker 1: that that an administration had come up with, to prevent 428 00:27:09,920 --> 00:27:12,840 Speaker 1: that from becoming part of FOIL law. And at the 429 00:27:12,880 --> 00:27:15,119 Speaker 1: same time they're talking about how they're the most transparent 430 00:27:15,119 --> 00:27:19,600 Speaker 1: administration ever, but they're also behind the scenes lobbying against it. Um. 431 00:27:19,720 --> 00:27:22,600 Speaker 1: And the thing that caught everyone's attention, or at least 432 00:27:22,600 --> 00:27:25,199 Speaker 1: the people who filed these Foyer requests to get this 433 00:27:25,280 --> 00:27:30,360 Speaker 1: information UM, is that in two thousand fourteen, Congress, well, 434 00:27:30,400 --> 00:27:34,960 Speaker 1: the House passed a bill that had this in it 435 00:27:35,880 --> 00:27:40,080 Speaker 1: four d and ten to nothing, unanimously passed it, and 436 00:27:40,119 --> 00:27:42,040 Speaker 1: then it was never brought up for a final vote. 437 00:27:42,119 --> 00:27:44,080 Speaker 1: John Bayner never called for a final vote, was just 438 00:27:44,200 --> 00:27:47,879 Speaker 1: allowed to die. That's pretty suspicious. So when they finally 439 00:27:47,880 --> 00:27:49,399 Speaker 1: got to the bottom of it, they saw that the 440 00:27:49,480 --> 00:27:52,440 Speaker 1: d o J and the Obama administration and then later 441 00:27:52,480 --> 00:27:55,639 Speaker 1: on the FTC, the Trade Commission, and the Securities and 442 00:27:55,720 --> 00:28:00,000 Speaker 1: Exchange Commission, we're all very much lobbying against the expand 443 00:28:00,000 --> 00:28:02,960 Speaker 1: mentioned because one of the things that um that it 444 00:28:03,000 --> 00:28:06,840 Speaker 1: serves as an exemption to FOY requests is anything that 445 00:28:06,880 --> 00:28:09,160 Speaker 1: has to do with the financial system or the agencies 446 00:28:09,160 --> 00:28:11,879 Speaker 1: that regulate them. So the FTC and the SEC can 447 00:28:11,920 --> 00:28:14,479 Speaker 1: do whatever they want and keep all their documents secret 448 00:28:14,800 --> 00:28:16,840 Speaker 1: and no one can do anything about it. Well, the 449 00:28:17,280 --> 00:28:19,760 Speaker 1: two thousand and sixteen four Act would have expanded that, 450 00:28:20,000 --> 00:28:26,280 Speaker 1: but that got lobbied out. It is quite disheartening. I 451 00:28:26,320 --> 00:28:29,280 Speaker 1: mean it's but yeah, like the Obama administration being the 452 00:28:29,280 --> 00:28:32,840 Speaker 1: most transparent administration of all time is just such bullocks. 453 00:28:32,880 --> 00:28:36,240 Speaker 1: It's just completely untrue. And yet it's it's a myth 454 00:28:36,359 --> 00:28:39,840 Speaker 1: that that was perpetuated by that administration that still stands today. 455 00:28:40,240 --> 00:28:43,560 Speaker 1: They used the Espionage Act more than all the other 456 00:28:43,600 --> 00:28:47,680 Speaker 1: presidents before them combined since the Espionage Act was was created, 457 00:28:47,680 --> 00:28:51,000 Speaker 1: and I think the beginning of the twentieth century um 458 00:28:51,240 --> 00:28:56,800 Speaker 1: to to prosecute journalists sources. You just didn't go after 459 00:28:56,880 --> 00:29:00,400 Speaker 1: journalists or their sources. The Obama administration was the first 460 00:29:00,400 --> 00:29:02,160 Speaker 1: one to do that. So there's a lot wrong with 461 00:29:02,200 --> 00:29:05,480 Speaker 1: the idea that was the most transparent. Ever. Should we 462 00:29:05,520 --> 00:29:09,719 Speaker 1: take a break, I think all right, we will be 463 00:29:09,720 --> 00:29:12,320 Speaker 1: back in boy it's still like we're still feel like 464 00:29:12,360 --> 00:29:14,320 Speaker 1: we're heating up here. I got a lot to cover. 465 00:29:14,880 --> 00:29:17,080 Speaker 1: We'll be back with how you can file one of 466 00:29:17,120 --> 00:29:40,160 Speaker 1: these things right for this Alright, So, as said before, 467 00:29:40,720 --> 00:29:43,080 Speaker 1: you can be a foreign national, you can be US citizen, 468 00:29:43,480 --> 00:29:46,520 Speaker 1: if you want to file a FOIA request. You can 469 00:29:46,520 --> 00:29:50,160 Speaker 1: be a corporation, can be a news outlet. Uh most 470 00:29:50,320 --> 00:29:53,800 Speaker 1: well probably most times your journalists. Uh and we already 471 00:29:53,840 --> 00:29:57,040 Speaker 1: kind of went over the fees. But um, what you 472 00:29:57,120 --> 00:30:01,280 Speaker 1: do is if you want to request documents, yeah, just 473 00:30:01,320 --> 00:30:03,479 Speaker 1: fill this out and triplicate, get it back to US 474 00:30:04,160 --> 00:30:08,960 Speaker 1: UH to request documents, you appeal um too directly to 475 00:30:09,120 --> 00:30:11,600 Speaker 1: that agency that holds the documents. Well that's just for 476 00:30:11,680 --> 00:30:14,760 Speaker 1: your own so you don't waste time. Well yeah, you 477 00:30:14,760 --> 00:30:16,640 Speaker 1: want to find out who to send it to. Yeah, 478 00:30:16,720 --> 00:30:19,479 Speaker 1: and um no, I think you legally have to go 479 00:30:19,560 --> 00:30:21,800 Speaker 1: to that agency and to the through the FOI office, 480 00:30:22,400 --> 00:30:24,360 Speaker 1: and then you have to do both. I'm not mistaken, 481 00:30:24,640 --> 00:30:27,320 Speaker 1: maybe not, but it's a good idea. Well, each agency 482 00:30:27,440 --> 00:30:31,960 Speaker 1: has its own FOY office, right Okay, So uh, well 483 00:30:32,040 --> 00:30:34,640 Speaker 1: yeah that that bears pointing out, like that's part of 484 00:30:34,720 --> 00:30:37,200 Speaker 1: the FOI Act and all the improvements over the years 485 00:30:37,280 --> 00:30:40,840 Speaker 1: is there is somebody at every office that heads us up, 486 00:30:41,400 --> 00:30:43,640 Speaker 1: at least one person, and it's it's got to be 487 00:30:43,720 --> 00:30:47,320 Speaker 1: on their website. There's got to be clear directions on 488 00:30:47,360 --> 00:30:49,320 Speaker 1: how to do this right. And most of the federal 489 00:30:49,360 --> 00:30:52,600 Speaker 1: agencies will have a very easy form that you can 490 00:30:52,600 --> 00:30:56,080 Speaker 1: fill out on there for you, the easy forma what 491 00:30:58,680 --> 00:31:00,320 Speaker 1: what what did we do to your face? Only that 492 00:31:00,360 --> 00:31:02,560 Speaker 1: you want to know exactly? Um, that you just fill 493 00:31:02,560 --> 00:31:05,400 Speaker 1: out these different fields and and you can submit a 494 00:31:05,440 --> 00:31:10,080 Speaker 1: FOIA request like that. Yeah, depending on what you're after, 495 00:31:10,840 --> 00:31:13,200 Speaker 1: we'll determine how long this takes or if you get 496 00:31:13,240 --> 00:31:16,320 Speaker 1: a response at all. Initially, Uh, they say it's first come, 497 00:31:16,360 --> 00:31:19,920 Speaker 1: first serve. Uh. If you're depends on what you're looking 498 00:31:19,920 --> 00:31:22,440 Speaker 1: for and who the agency is. Quite honestly, if you're 499 00:31:22,880 --> 00:31:26,800 Speaker 1: looking for a few pages of a document from the 500 00:31:26,840 --> 00:31:29,920 Speaker 1: Forestry Service, you might get that thing turned around pretty quick. 501 00:31:30,000 --> 00:31:32,040 Speaker 1: They will bring it to your house that day if 502 00:31:32,080 --> 00:31:34,040 Speaker 1: you were looking at you with a smile and then 503 00:31:34,000 --> 00:31:38,920 Speaker 1: a little rather little horse away. Everyone's riding horses. Um. 504 00:31:38,960 --> 00:31:42,640 Speaker 1: If you're looking for six hundred pages from the CIA, 505 00:31:43,240 --> 00:31:47,959 Speaker 1: good luck, It'll take a little while. You will undoubtedly 506 00:31:48,080 --> 00:31:51,400 Speaker 1: end up in federal court probably finally complaint. Yeah, because 507 00:31:51,400 --> 00:31:56,120 Speaker 1: in that case, FOI requests very frequently turned into Foyer lawsuits. 508 00:31:57,520 --> 00:32:02,080 Speaker 1: It just happens, umsonal No, not at all, But that 509 00:32:02,160 --> 00:32:05,600 Speaker 1: does suck when it does happen, because that gets a 510 00:32:05,680 --> 00:32:10,200 Speaker 1: lot more expensive. Yeah. This one reporter, Charles Orstein, tried 511 00:32:10,240 --> 00:32:12,920 Speaker 1: to appeal the Department of Defense for a story he 512 00:32:12,960 --> 00:32:16,120 Speaker 1: was doing on drug companies paying doctors. Took three and 513 00:32:16,120 --> 00:32:19,480 Speaker 1: a half years to get the final verdict, which was 514 00:32:19,480 --> 00:32:23,160 Speaker 1: a denial. Yeah, so how about that. So here's the process. 515 00:32:23,200 --> 00:32:27,360 Speaker 1: You file a Foyer request, You wait twenty days, hopefully 516 00:32:27,360 --> 00:32:30,080 Speaker 1: within that time they respond to you. If they don't 517 00:32:30,080 --> 00:32:34,400 Speaker 1: respond to you, you can appeal based on their lack 518 00:32:34,440 --> 00:32:36,560 Speaker 1: of response, or if they respond to you and say no, 519 00:32:37,000 --> 00:32:41,280 Speaker 1: you can appeal the denial after twenty days. Following that, 520 00:32:42,080 --> 00:32:44,560 Speaker 1: you can then go take it to federal court. And 521 00:32:44,600 --> 00:32:47,520 Speaker 1: you can also, and this gets a little funny, Uh, 522 00:32:47,600 --> 00:32:51,600 Speaker 1: you can also file a Foyer request about your Foyer requests. Yeah, 523 00:32:51,640 --> 00:32:54,080 Speaker 1: if it was denied. If it was denied, and then 524 00:32:54,160 --> 00:32:56,280 Speaker 1: that's when this one reporter is like, that's where it 525 00:32:56,280 --> 00:32:59,520 Speaker 1: gets really depressing when you see sort of the beckheind 526 00:32:59,520 --> 00:33:03,120 Speaker 1: the curtain process of this stuff, right. So there there, 527 00:33:03,160 --> 00:33:07,479 Speaker 1: we came across some tips from George Washington University's National 528 00:33:07,520 --> 00:33:12,520 Speaker 1: Security Archive for filing for your requests. Yeah there, It's 529 00:33:12,560 --> 00:33:15,200 Speaker 1: pretty straightforward, but it's good to know. Like one of 530 00:33:15,240 --> 00:33:18,480 Speaker 1: the ones that stood out to me was like, don't 531 00:33:19,120 --> 00:33:23,320 Speaker 1: don't be an aggressive jerk to the FOY officer. In 532 00:33:23,360 --> 00:33:26,120 Speaker 1: a lot of cases, the FOY officer might even see 533 00:33:26,160 --> 00:33:29,120 Speaker 1: things your way, but they might be the only person 534 00:33:29,280 --> 00:33:32,040 Speaker 1: at their agency who does. They might work at an 535 00:33:32,080 --> 00:33:36,040 Speaker 1: agency who thinks that FOYA is stupid and UM is 536 00:33:36,120 --> 00:33:39,080 Speaker 1: a threaten to national security, and they have to go 537 00:33:39,320 --> 00:33:42,320 Speaker 1: and convince their colleagues who they have to work with, 538 00:33:42,720 --> 00:33:45,840 Speaker 1: to give them those files to give to you. And 539 00:33:45,920 --> 00:33:48,680 Speaker 1: it's They're probably not the most popular person at their 540 00:33:48,760 --> 00:33:52,800 Speaker 1: their office, so ticking them off if not the best idea. 541 00:33:52,840 --> 00:33:56,479 Speaker 1: So treat them with courtesy, with respect, be direct, don't 542 00:33:56,520 --> 00:34:01,440 Speaker 1: include tons of supporting UM in information and emails. Do 543 00:34:01,480 --> 00:34:03,520 Speaker 1: you want to give them as much information as you 544 00:34:03,560 --> 00:34:06,760 Speaker 1: can but succinct. Yeah, And you also don't want your 545 00:34:06,800 --> 00:34:09,799 Speaker 1: request to be too broad. Although I think there's a 546 00:34:09,800 --> 00:34:12,840 Speaker 1: lot of FOIA journalists who would disagree with this, But 547 00:34:12,880 --> 00:34:16,719 Speaker 1: apparently the broader your request, the more difficult it makes, it, 548 00:34:16,800 --> 00:34:19,759 Speaker 1: the more likely it is to be denied and say 549 00:34:19,840 --> 00:34:22,279 Speaker 1: this is what I'm looking for specifically. Yeah, and the 550 00:34:22,320 --> 00:34:25,360 Speaker 1: more likely it is to um overlap with other agencies, 551 00:34:25,400 --> 00:34:28,920 Speaker 1: which is just going to complicate things further. Um They say, 552 00:34:29,000 --> 00:34:30,960 Speaker 1: don't include a lot of narratives, even if you think 553 00:34:31,000 --> 00:34:34,000 Speaker 1: your story is important, like like if you if you 554 00:34:34,040 --> 00:34:37,400 Speaker 1: send a request that starts with dear sir, I'm an 555 00:34:37,440 --> 00:34:41,799 Speaker 1: anarchist from Boise, Idaho, and I think whatever when I 556 00:34:41,840 --> 00:34:45,759 Speaker 1: was a boy not not a good way to get started. Right. 557 00:34:46,000 --> 00:34:48,000 Speaker 1: Leave out some of those details. Try and be succinct, 558 00:34:48,080 --> 00:34:49,279 Speaker 1: try and be to the point. A lot of this 559 00:34:49,360 --> 00:34:51,840 Speaker 1: is common sense stuff. Well a lot of it is. 560 00:34:52,000 --> 00:34:53,840 Speaker 1: One of the common sense things that I would not 561 00:34:53,960 --> 00:34:57,040 Speaker 1: have thought to to do first is to look to 562 00:34:57,040 --> 00:34:59,640 Speaker 1: see if this information is already out there. That is 563 00:34:59,760 --> 00:35:02,040 Speaker 1: hu huge, and I would not have thought that either. 564 00:35:02,120 --> 00:35:07,319 Speaker 1: There's a lot of declassified information that exists a lot 565 00:35:07,360 --> 00:35:09,560 Speaker 1: of time on these agency websites. They have it a 566 00:35:09,600 --> 00:35:11,960 Speaker 1: lot of times. I mean it saysn't here, and this 567 00:35:12,040 --> 00:35:15,920 Speaker 1: is very true. I've done it. Congress has a just 568 00:35:16,360 --> 00:35:20,920 Speaker 1: tons and tons of material about public policy, online that 569 00:35:21,000 --> 00:35:24,520 Speaker 1: you can find, so it might already be out there you. UM, 570 00:35:24,640 --> 00:35:27,320 Speaker 1: you can also contact, like if there's a public interest 571 00:35:27,320 --> 00:35:31,240 Speaker 1: group or something like that that's focused on your topic, 572 00:35:31,520 --> 00:35:34,640 Speaker 1: they might have access to it. I read that, UM 573 00:35:34,760 --> 00:35:39,120 Speaker 1: an article about a woman in Oregon who um the 574 00:35:39,200 --> 00:35:41,279 Speaker 1: intercept wrote an article and I can't I think it's 575 00:35:41,320 --> 00:35:44,319 Speaker 1: called the Poison Papers or something. This woman has been 576 00:35:44,320 --> 00:35:46,640 Speaker 1: fighting chemical companies because of what they were doing in 577 00:35:46,680 --> 00:35:51,440 Speaker 1: her backyard for decades and has like a hundred thousand 578 00:35:51,480 --> 00:35:55,719 Speaker 1: pages of internal documents and memos and stuff from lawsuits 579 00:35:56,120 --> 00:36:00,560 Speaker 1: that they're now scanning and digitizing and putting onto the web. Um. 580 00:36:00,600 --> 00:36:03,799 Speaker 1: But UM, she would be a great person to go 581 00:36:03,880 --> 00:36:07,440 Speaker 1: to for those specific art for those YEA, for those sources, 582 00:36:07,560 --> 00:36:10,080 Speaker 1: I bet you. At this point, unless it's something very 583 00:36:10,120 --> 00:36:14,560 Speaker 1: specifically related to you personally or your family, someone has 584 00:36:14,600 --> 00:36:19,120 Speaker 1: probably either asked about it and gotten it and it exists, 585 00:36:19,239 --> 00:36:22,160 Speaker 1: or asked and been denied. Yeah. And the other thing 586 00:36:22,239 --> 00:36:25,560 Speaker 1: is apparently I think the two thou sixteen amendments UM 587 00:36:25,760 --> 00:36:30,640 Speaker 1: said that you if if a document has been requested 588 00:36:30,640 --> 00:36:33,160 Speaker 1: three or more times, they have to release it to 589 00:36:33,200 --> 00:36:35,799 Speaker 1: the public, like it's just released after that and then 590 00:36:35,920 --> 00:36:39,480 Speaker 1: some UM agencies will maintain a fo your reading room 591 00:36:39,520 --> 00:36:41,520 Speaker 1: on their site which will have all the documents that 592 00:36:41,560 --> 00:36:43,959 Speaker 1: have been publicly released through for you. Yeah. I thought 593 00:36:43,960 --> 00:36:46,960 Speaker 1: three was a pretty heartening number. Actually, I could have 594 00:36:48,280 --> 00:36:49,880 Speaker 1: if it would have said three hundred, I would not 595 00:36:49,920 --> 00:36:52,080 Speaker 1: have been surprised. So the fact that said three, I 596 00:36:52,160 --> 00:36:55,200 Speaker 1: was like, all right, that's legit. It's a magic number. 597 00:36:56,160 --> 00:36:59,920 Speaker 1: So there's a lot of um, a lot of loophole 598 00:37:00,080 --> 00:37:02,680 Speaker 1: to this, right, Oh yeah, And I mean also you've 599 00:37:02,680 --> 00:37:04,880 Speaker 1: got to step back here and think about what you're doing, Like, 600 00:37:04,960 --> 00:37:08,000 Speaker 1: you are asking someone in the government to do research 601 00:37:08,080 --> 00:37:10,879 Speaker 1: for you that you could probably do better if only 602 00:37:10,920 --> 00:37:13,520 Speaker 1: you had the access to the stuff that they had access. 603 00:37:14,120 --> 00:37:15,480 Speaker 1: And the whole reason you're having to ask them in 604 00:37:15,520 --> 00:37:19,040 Speaker 1: the first place is because the government is unjustly keeping 605 00:37:19,080 --> 00:37:21,480 Speaker 1: things in secret that it shouldn't be. Yeah, it's a 606 00:37:21,520 --> 00:37:24,880 Speaker 1: little or welling in to say the least. It is okay, 607 00:37:25,120 --> 00:37:27,759 Speaker 1: but there's a lot of loopholes associated with this that 608 00:37:27,800 --> 00:37:32,719 Speaker 1: will keep government agency from from approving your request every time. Yeah, 609 00:37:32,719 --> 00:37:34,520 Speaker 1: And the first thing they point out in our article, 610 00:37:34,560 --> 00:37:39,040 Speaker 1: which is bears repeating, is you are asking for something 611 00:37:39,320 --> 00:37:42,520 Speaker 1: you were not guaranteed anything. This is a request that 612 00:37:42,560 --> 00:37:45,960 Speaker 1: you're submitting things that you definitely cannot do or get 613 00:37:46,400 --> 00:37:52,960 Speaker 1: physical objects, uh, like you can't request uh like evidence 614 00:37:53,000 --> 00:37:55,239 Speaker 1: from the JFK shooting to be sent to your house, 615 00:37:55,320 --> 00:37:59,640 Speaker 1: send me the magic poet. Uh. Private information about an individual, 616 00:38:00,040 --> 00:38:02,560 Speaker 1: which gets so hinky. That's over the years they've gone 617 00:38:02,560 --> 00:38:06,279 Speaker 1: back and forth on uh really at the basis of it. 618 00:38:06,320 --> 00:38:08,760 Speaker 1: And we'll get to uh these some of these landmark 619 00:38:08,800 --> 00:38:11,480 Speaker 1: court rulings that decided these things. But whether or not 620 00:38:11,880 --> 00:38:16,920 Speaker 1: the public interest outweighs privacy rights, which is a big thing. Uh. 621 00:38:16,960 --> 00:38:20,839 Speaker 1: And then information that's covered under the nine exemptions that 622 00:38:21,360 --> 00:38:22,960 Speaker 1: I think we kind of have to read through these, right, 623 00:38:23,040 --> 00:38:25,799 Speaker 1: I think, all right, go ahead. The first one is 624 00:38:25,840 --> 00:38:30,759 Speaker 1: any information that's classified for national security purposes. Okay, pretty straightforward. Uh. 625 00:38:30,840 --> 00:38:33,040 Speaker 1: And then you've got records that are only about an 626 00:38:33,120 --> 00:38:36,759 Speaker 1: agency's personnel, rules and practices. I did not get that one, 627 00:38:37,320 --> 00:38:40,359 Speaker 1: which makes it seem super shady to me, probably so 628 00:38:41,200 --> 00:38:45,440 Speaker 1: like no, no break room rules, see a break room rules? 629 00:38:44,880 --> 00:38:46,799 Speaker 1: Shall what are you doing in the break room? I 630 00:38:46,800 --> 00:38:49,719 Speaker 1: hadn't even thought about that. Clean up your coffee? Uh. 631 00:38:49,760 --> 00:38:52,680 Speaker 1: Information that's prohibited from being released because of another statute 632 00:38:53,560 --> 00:38:55,960 Speaker 1: that just seems like a very long way of saying 633 00:38:56,200 --> 00:39:00,360 Speaker 1: kind of anything we'd think of um doc mints that 634 00:39:00,400 --> 00:39:03,480 Speaker 1: protect trade secrets or contain information that could damage a 635 00:39:03,480 --> 00:39:07,239 Speaker 1: company's business, Like you can't petition Coca Cola for their 636 00:39:07,280 --> 00:39:10,759 Speaker 1: secret formula or you know, anything that would show that 637 00:39:10,800 --> 00:39:13,560 Speaker 1: the telecoms were working with the n s A for 638 00:39:13,640 --> 00:39:17,000 Speaker 1: the Prism project or something like, and that Coca Cola obviously, 639 00:39:17,080 --> 00:39:20,760 Speaker 1: but petition the government for Coca Cola. UM number five 640 00:39:20,880 --> 00:39:24,279 Speaker 1: is the most used one. Apparently, it's so frequently used. 641 00:39:24,280 --> 00:39:27,360 Speaker 1: It's called the I'm withholding because I want to clause. 642 00:39:28,160 --> 00:39:33,880 Speaker 1: It's it's basically any any documents that contain personal opinions, recommendations, 643 00:39:33,960 --> 00:39:38,719 Speaker 1: or conclusionments, right, And it's it's ostensibly meant to protect 644 00:39:39,480 --> 00:39:45,640 Speaker 1: legal documents, so attorney client privilege, and to promote a 645 00:39:45,000 --> 00:39:50,040 Speaker 1: m a tone of frankness among inner agency and intra 646 00:39:50,239 --> 00:39:55,239 Speaker 1: agency communications. Basically, if you are emailing your colleague and 647 00:39:55,280 --> 00:39:59,120 Speaker 1: you're worried about somebody reading it on the outside, you're 648 00:39:59,160 --> 00:40:01,080 Speaker 1: not gonna be as open and frank. And it's kind 649 00:40:01,080 --> 00:40:05,880 Speaker 1: of freeze free speech within the agency. It's so broad, 650 00:40:06,040 --> 00:40:09,920 Speaker 1: so vague and everything falls under it that UM A 651 00:40:10,440 --> 00:40:14,799 Speaker 1: number five is is the exemption most frequently used. Like 652 00:40:14,920 --> 00:40:20,040 Speaker 1: all they really needed is number five. Basically, UM personal 653 00:40:20,160 --> 00:40:24,239 Speaker 1: privacy UM things like social security numbers, phone numbers, addresses, 654 00:40:25,000 --> 00:40:27,960 Speaker 1: stuff like that. UM. Law enforcement documents that could interfere 655 00:40:28,000 --> 00:40:32,080 Speaker 1: with law enforcement deprived person of the fair trial invasion 656 00:40:32,080 --> 00:40:37,120 Speaker 1: of privacy again reveal identities of confidential sources, law enforcement techniques, 657 00:40:37,440 --> 00:40:42,080 Speaker 1: or procedures for investigations or prosecutions, or anything that endangers 658 00:40:42,080 --> 00:40:45,319 Speaker 1: that person's life or safety. Uh, this one is the 659 00:40:45,360 --> 00:40:48,880 Speaker 1: one that drives me up the wall. Information related to 660 00:40:48,960 --> 00:40:53,440 Speaker 1: agencies that are responsible for regulating financial institutions see previous 661 00:40:53,560 --> 00:40:57,960 Speaker 1: rant right. Documents that protect information related to geological or 662 00:40:57,960 --> 00:41:02,279 Speaker 1: geophysical data, including maps, makes sense to me that one does. 663 00:41:02,800 --> 00:41:05,360 Speaker 1: So those are the nine. I don't know if those 664 00:41:05,480 --> 00:41:07,400 Speaker 1: I mean there are originally nine. Are those the original 665 00:41:07,520 --> 00:41:09,239 Speaker 1: nine or those just been tweaked over the years. I 666 00:41:09,320 --> 00:41:11,799 Speaker 1: believe those are the original nine and they're still in use. 667 00:41:12,400 --> 00:41:16,520 Speaker 1: All right. So UM, there's this really good point made 668 00:41:16,560 --> 00:41:21,600 Speaker 1: by a journalist named Philip eel ile E I l Um, 669 00:41:21,640 --> 00:41:25,920 Speaker 1: and he says that if you are a an editor 670 00:41:26,719 --> 00:41:30,240 Speaker 1: who is being approached for the story about how another 671 00:41:30,320 --> 00:41:34,759 Speaker 1: journalist is being stonewalled in their foyer request that you 672 00:41:34,880 --> 00:41:37,439 Speaker 1: kind of have an obligation to tell other people about 673 00:41:37,480 --> 00:41:40,399 Speaker 1: it because if you don't, he says, quote, you're not 674 00:41:40,600 --> 00:41:44,120 Speaker 1: being neutral, you're helping the government keep taxpayers in the dark. 675 00:41:45,080 --> 00:41:47,800 Speaker 1: And so that combined with you know, going up against 676 00:41:47,840 --> 00:41:51,000 Speaker 1: the government and then a light being shined on it 677 00:41:51,080 --> 00:41:54,680 Speaker 1: when the government doesn't cooperate and follow the letter of 678 00:41:54,719 --> 00:41:57,200 Speaker 1: the law just means like you might as well not 679 00:41:57,400 --> 00:42:00,719 Speaker 1: have for you that it's just basically a roll of 680 00:42:00,760 --> 00:42:02,600 Speaker 1: the dice whether you're going to get it or not, 681 00:42:02,760 --> 00:42:07,480 Speaker 1: rather than predictable under the terms of the law. Right, 682 00:42:07,560 --> 00:42:10,600 Speaker 1: So don't don't file a FO your request get denied 683 00:42:10,680 --> 00:42:13,279 Speaker 1: and then just say all right, right, or if you 684 00:42:13,320 --> 00:42:17,879 Speaker 1: go to another publication and you're at that publication, don't 685 00:42:17,920 --> 00:42:19,960 Speaker 1: just be like this is boring, no one cares about that. 686 00:42:20,239 --> 00:42:22,399 Speaker 1: You need to write about it. People need to talk 687 00:42:22,400 --> 00:42:25,440 Speaker 1: about it. And if if stonewalling is going on, from 688 00:42:25,520 --> 00:42:27,879 Speaker 1: FO your requests all right. So we promised a couple 689 00:42:27,920 --> 00:42:31,319 Speaker 1: of landmark court rulings. Um, this first one is good 690 00:42:31,440 --> 00:42:36,520 Speaker 1: ninety six philipp E v. The c I A. I 691 00:42:36,560 --> 00:42:38,319 Speaker 1: think usually when you're v. The C I A, we 692 00:42:38,360 --> 00:42:41,840 Speaker 1: know which way that's gonna work, right, probably not in 693 00:42:41,840 --> 00:42:45,080 Speaker 1: Philippe's favor. Uh. And that's what happened in this case. 694 00:42:45,160 --> 00:42:47,720 Speaker 1: So this was the very famous everyone's heard the phrase 695 00:42:48,360 --> 00:42:50,719 Speaker 1: we can neither confirm nor deny the existence or non 696 00:42:50,719 --> 00:42:54,520 Speaker 1: existence of X. This is where that came from. Uh. 697 00:42:54,600 --> 00:42:58,480 Speaker 1: And the original case was the UH there was a 698 00:42:58,560 --> 00:43:00,799 Speaker 1: Soviet submarine sunk off the coat sot Hawaii, and the 699 00:43:00,800 --> 00:43:03,440 Speaker 1: CIA said, who should we partner with to build a 700 00:43:03,440 --> 00:43:06,640 Speaker 1: ship to go look for this thing? Howard Hughes, of course, 701 00:43:06,719 --> 00:43:08,840 Speaker 1: we need to do an episode just on that. On 702 00:43:08,880 --> 00:43:13,400 Speaker 1: Howard Hughes that, yeah, totally uh. And that ship was 703 00:43:13,440 --> 00:43:17,120 Speaker 1: called the Glomar Explorer and UM to salvage the submarine. 704 00:43:17,160 --> 00:43:20,000 Speaker 1: So there was a rolling Stone reporter file the Foyer request, 705 00:43:20,680 --> 00:43:24,279 Speaker 1: and the CIA very famously said, we cannot confirm. Uh. 706 00:43:24,480 --> 00:43:27,520 Speaker 1: We refused to confirm or deny any such a document. 707 00:43:27,600 --> 00:43:30,279 Speaker 1: And he went, what does that even mean? Like no 708 00:43:30,320 --> 00:43:33,759 Speaker 1: one's ever ever even said that before? And the CIA went, Hey, 709 00:43:34,120 --> 00:43:38,719 Speaker 1: nice work. I think we flu mixed everybody did, uh, 710 00:43:38,719 --> 00:43:40,759 Speaker 1: And it did work. So eventually it went to federal 711 00:43:40,800 --> 00:43:44,160 Speaker 1: appeals Court and they said CIA wins uh. And now 712 00:43:44,239 --> 00:43:46,919 Speaker 1: that is known as the Glomar response that you hear 713 00:43:47,040 --> 00:43:50,719 Speaker 1: over and over and over. That's where it's origin. Like 714 00:43:50,920 --> 00:43:54,760 Speaker 1: pretty neat. Um. There's another one that was pretty big. 715 00:43:55,520 --> 00:44:02,080 Speaker 1: It actually came into play pretty quickly after it was ruled, 716 00:44:02,120 --> 00:44:05,439 Speaker 1: I guess so. Two thousand and sixteen, the US Court 717 00:44:05,440 --> 00:44:09,280 Speaker 1: of Appeals said that if you have work related federal 718 00:44:09,360 --> 00:44:13,160 Speaker 1: agency emails and a personal account, you can't get around 719 00:44:13,160 --> 00:44:15,600 Speaker 1: a Foyer request. Who would do that? And that was 720 00:44:15,760 --> 00:44:20,840 Speaker 1: used for a long time, including most famously by Hillary Clinton, 721 00:44:21,480 --> 00:44:25,239 Speaker 1: who um, her whole email scandal came out of a 722 00:44:25,239 --> 00:44:28,640 Speaker 1: Foyer request. There were a whole bunch of people who 723 00:44:28,640 --> 00:44:32,200 Speaker 1: had filed Foyer requests dating as far back as two 724 00:44:32,239 --> 00:44:36,520 Speaker 1: thousand twelve. I think the Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics 725 00:44:36,520 --> 00:44:40,680 Speaker 1: in Washington crew filed one of the first ones UM, 726 00:44:40,760 --> 00:44:43,120 Speaker 1: and the State Department just kept losing them or said 727 00:44:43,120 --> 00:44:45,960 Speaker 1: they weren't aware of any four requests or whatever. And 728 00:44:46,280 --> 00:44:50,040 Speaker 1: then a Foyer reporter, he's a self styled Foyer terrorist, 729 00:44:50,080 --> 00:44:55,400 Speaker 1: I believe, addresses himself. I think so. UM. Jason Leopold 730 00:44:55,800 --> 00:45:01,040 Speaker 1: filed a Foyer request UM for Clinton stuff as well, 731 00:45:01,080 --> 00:45:03,400 Speaker 1: and then was in talks I believe with the State 732 00:45:03,400 --> 00:45:07,319 Speaker 1: Department for getting that for your request fulfilled, and it 733 00:45:07,760 --> 00:45:13,520 Speaker 1: led to the existence of Clinton's server in her home 734 00:45:13,960 --> 00:45:16,960 Speaker 1: that she was keeping State Department secrets on or using 735 00:45:17,000 --> 00:45:19,919 Speaker 1: for State Department official email. He eventually had a sue 736 00:45:19,960 --> 00:45:23,120 Speaker 1: I think even oh yeah, yeah, right, almost out of 737 00:45:23,120 --> 00:45:26,600 Speaker 1: the gate. Um. But that's a That's another point too, 738 00:45:26,680 --> 00:45:28,800 Speaker 1: is that, like again, a lot of these things quickly 739 00:45:28,880 --> 00:45:33,520 Speaker 1: become foil lawsuits. Which if you're a journalist with a 740 00:45:33,520 --> 00:45:36,560 Speaker 1: big organization that's willing to spend money on foil lawsuits, 741 00:45:36,680 --> 00:45:39,200 Speaker 1: that's great. But if you're just an independent journalist or 742 00:45:39,239 --> 00:45:42,359 Speaker 1: a responsible citizens group or something like that, you might 743 00:45:42,400 --> 00:45:45,640 Speaker 1: not have the money to go to court. And the 744 00:45:45,719 --> 00:45:48,080 Speaker 1: government knows that. So a lot of a lot of 745 00:45:48,080 --> 00:45:52,160 Speaker 1: Foyer requests just die upon denial because the person doesn't 746 00:45:52,160 --> 00:45:55,319 Speaker 1: have the resources to take the government to court over it. Yeah, 747 00:45:55,400 --> 00:46:00,880 Speaker 1: Jason Leopold bears mentioning for sure, because he is uh, 748 00:46:00,960 --> 00:46:05,440 Speaker 1: he's Mr Foya, Dr Foya. Um. He has probably filed 749 00:46:05,480 --> 00:46:09,120 Speaker 1: more fo your lawsuits than anyone. In fact, it says 750 00:46:09,160 --> 00:46:12,520 Speaker 1: so um, anyone more more than anyone except for The 751 00:46:12,520 --> 00:46:14,839 Speaker 1: New York Times. Over the years in the fifteen years. 752 00:46:14,840 --> 00:46:18,400 Speaker 1: He's been the entire New York Times. Yeah. Uh. And 753 00:46:18,400 --> 00:46:20,480 Speaker 1: he worked for Advice for many, many years and now 754 00:46:20,480 --> 00:46:23,800 Speaker 1: works for BuzzFeed. And um was inducted into the National 755 00:46:23,840 --> 00:46:26,960 Speaker 1: Freedom of Information Hall of Fame, which I've never heard of. 756 00:46:27,360 --> 00:46:33,399 Speaker 1: But that's adorable. And he's the one who, ah, well, 757 00:46:33,400 --> 00:46:36,560 Speaker 1: he sued for Clinton's emails. He Um, he's the one 758 00:46:36,560 --> 00:46:39,919 Speaker 1: that got information on Guantanamo. He's the one that got 759 00:46:40,000 --> 00:46:45,160 Speaker 1: information on U n s A and and Snowdon Snowdon's revelations. Yeah, 760 00:46:45,200 --> 00:46:48,120 Speaker 1: he has like a knack for thinking of what to 761 00:46:48,239 --> 00:46:51,319 Speaker 1: ask for. So like he asked for the drafts of 762 00:46:51,400 --> 00:46:56,160 Speaker 1: the talking points for the n s A after this 763 00:46:56,920 --> 00:46:59,800 Speaker 1: emails or the Snowden revelations came through, Which is to 764 00:46:59,800 --> 00:47:02,799 Speaker 1: say he's a great researcher. He's a great researcher's mind. 765 00:47:03,040 --> 00:47:05,440 Speaker 1: He's about as good as they come as far as 766 00:47:05,480 --> 00:47:10,239 Speaker 1: researchers go. Yeah, we should put him on staff. I'm 767 00:47:10,239 --> 00:47:13,399 Speaker 1: sure he'd take us up on it right away. We'd 768 00:47:13,400 --> 00:47:17,440 Speaker 1: be like, we need to look into crayons. You got 769 00:47:17,480 --> 00:47:19,799 Speaker 1: anything else? Nope? Okay, Well, if you want to know 770 00:47:19,840 --> 00:47:23,480 Speaker 1: more about FO, you you know what, send a FO 771 00:47:23,560 --> 00:47:26,920 Speaker 1: your request that's the best way to get acquainted. Figure 772 00:47:26,960 --> 00:47:28,640 Speaker 1: it out, go do it, let us know how it 773 00:47:28,680 --> 00:47:32,680 Speaker 1: turned out. Uh, since I said for your request in 774 00:47:32,719 --> 00:47:37,520 Speaker 1: there somewhere, it's time for listener mail. I think this 775 00:47:37,640 --> 00:47:41,520 Speaker 1: is anonymous. I never heard back from this this person, 776 00:47:42,320 --> 00:47:45,520 Speaker 1: but it's a good one because we got a legit 777 00:47:46,600 --> 00:47:53,040 Speaker 1: um psychopath. Yeah, I think this one's probably anonymous. Yeah. Sorry, 778 00:47:53,080 --> 00:47:55,800 Speaker 1: I'm just looking to see now did not You're back? Um? 779 00:47:55,880 --> 00:47:59,400 Speaker 1: Hello guys, love your show. Um. I've always wanted a 780 00:47:59,400 --> 00:48:02,600 Speaker 1: reason to write, but I'm endlessly learning and entertained by 781 00:48:02,600 --> 00:48:04,239 Speaker 1: your show. I felt compelled to write as a high 782 00:48:04,239 --> 00:48:09,440 Speaker 1: functioning psychopath. I found a young age after many lock 783 00:48:09,560 --> 00:48:13,719 Speaker 1: up fires, block ups, fires, arrest trouble, et cetera. I 784 00:48:13,760 --> 00:48:17,080 Speaker 1: know I didn't act or react like normis or normal people. 785 00:48:17,360 --> 00:48:19,040 Speaker 1: I realized at thirteen I had to learn to play 786 00:48:19,120 --> 00:48:21,520 Speaker 1: nice with others I would be locked up. Became a 787 00:48:21,520 --> 00:48:24,880 Speaker 1: student of human behavior. Cry when other's cry, show shocked 788 00:48:24,880 --> 00:48:27,960 Speaker 1: when others do. I'm a successful, in good family man. Uh, 789 00:48:28,080 --> 00:48:30,440 Speaker 1: father of two college age kids, one of which is 790 00:48:30,480 --> 00:48:33,839 Speaker 1: a psychopath. And that was a very odd conversation. Yes, 791 00:48:33,880 --> 00:48:36,440 Speaker 1: something is missing in my brain, though I don't count 792 00:48:36,480 --> 00:48:40,480 Speaker 1: this as bad. I've been in so many emergency situations, avalanches, 793 00:48:40,880 --> 00:48:44,600 Speaker 1: swift water rescue, medical emergencies. I've heard people say the 794 00:48:44,600 --> 00:48:47,719 Speaker 1: training takes over and it feels more like taking off 795 00:48:47,719 --> 00:48:51,560 Speaker 1: the mask. Norm's panic and run. I just hit the switch. 796 00:48:52,000 --> 00:48:54,120 Speaker 1: I do agree, however, that people like this should be 797 00:48:54,440 --> 00:48:57,399 Speaker 1: avoided if at all possible, especially if they haven't learned 798 00:48:57,440 --> 00:49:01,439 Speaker 1: to play well with others. It's a little scared recent. Uh, 799 00:49:01,480 --> 00:49:03,799 Speaker 1: some of us on the spectrum are safe and dare 800 00:49:03,840 --> 00:49:06,279 Speaker 1: I say necessary, some of us can learn and care 801 00:49:06,360 --> 00:49:09,319 Speaker 1: and learn to care and feel. I have learned through 802 00:49:09,400 --> 00:49:12,920 Speaker 1: much trouble and strife that I can care through twenty 803 00:49:13,000 --> 00:49:20,000 Speaker 1: years of A and N A so very interesting revealing email. Yeah, 804 00:49:20,440 --> 00:49:23,319 Speaker 1: it sounds like a pretty thrilling life too. Yeah. And 805 00:49:23,440 --> 00:49:27,680 Speaker 1: you know, we heard from another psychopath and I think 806 00:49:27,719 --> 00:49:30,360 Speaker 1: they've come to terms with the fact that their brain 807 00:49:30,600 --> 00:49:33,319 Speaker 1: is different. And I would still like to function in 808 00:49:33,320 --> 00:49:36,480 Speaker 1: the society, so I have learned to do so or 809 00:49:36,520 --> 00:49:39,120 Speaker 1: they'll lock me up, right, And we talked about the spectrum, 810 00:49:39,120 --> 00:49:41,960 Speaker 1: and you know, it's just fascinating to me. That was 811 00:49:42,000 --> 00:49:47,120 Speaker 1: a good episode. Yeah, despite our weird pronunciations. Well, thanks 812 00:49:47,120 --> 00:49:51,600 Speaker 1: a lot anonymous for writing in We appreciate you, um 813 00:49:51,680 --> 00:49:54,239 Speaker 1: and UH. If you want to get in touch with 814 00:49:54,280 --> 00:49:57,000 Speaker 1: this anonymous or otherwise, you can tweak to us at 815 00:49:57,120 --> 00:50:00,080 Speaker 1: s Y s K podcast. You can join us on 816 00:50:00,080 --> 00:50:02,239 Speaker 1: Facebook dot com slash Stuff you Should Know. You can 817 00:50:02,280 --> 00:50:04,480 Speaker 1: also hang out with Chuck on Facebook at Charles W. 818 00:50:04,640 --> 00:50:06,719 Speaker 1: Chuck Bryant. You can hang out with me on Twitter too, 819 00:50:06,800 --> 00:50:09,279 Speaker 1: by the way, at josh um Clark. Send us an 820 00:50:09,280 --> 00:50:12,080 Speaker 1: email this stuff podcast at how stuff Works dot com 821 00:50:12,120 --> 00:50:14,040 Speaker 1: and it's always hanging out with us at our home 822 00:50:14,080 --> 00:50:20,480 Speaker 1: on the web. Stuff you Should Know dot com. For 823 00:50:20,600 --> 00:50:22,920 Speaker 1: more on this and thousands of other topics, is that 824 00:50:23,000 --> 00:50:34,600 Speaker 1: how stuff Works dot com