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Speaker 1: This is Bloomberg Law with June Grosseo from Bloomberg Radio.

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Speaker 1: It's a pretty bad deal. So the core issue here

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Speaker 1: was that Live Nation and a ticketmaster when they merged

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Speaker 1: a few years back, they became so powerful that they

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Speaker 1: were able to raise ticket prices.

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Speaker 2: Republican and Democratic attorneys general are among those who are

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Speaker 2: not happy with the Justice Department's sudden mid trial settlement

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Speaker 2: of its landmark anti trust case against Live Nation. North

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Speaker 2: Carolina Attorney General Jeff Jackson says it's a bad deal

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Speaker 2: that keeps Live Nations monopoly in place.

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Speaker 1: The vast majority of the ages who started on this

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Speaker 1: lawsuit are going to stay on this lawsuit. That's Republicans

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Speaker 1: and Democrats, a couple dozen of us from across the country.

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Speaker 1: We're working out the timeline, but we've told Life Nation

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Speaker 1: they can expect to see us back in court very soon.

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Speaker 2: Perhaps as soon as Monday, if settlement talks ordered by

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Speaker 2: the federal trial judge go nowhere. Joining me is anti

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Speaker 2: trust law expert Harry First, a professor at NYU Law School. Harry,

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Speaker 2: let's start with the trial judge's reaction to this surprise

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Speaker 2: settlement of the Justice Department with Live Nation. The judge

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Speaker 2: scolded everyone at a hearing on Tuesday. He said the

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Speaker 2: DOJ's lack of transparency about its settlement negotiations was mind

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Speaker 2: boggling and that the party's conduct here strains the bounds

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Speaker 2: of acceptable conduct. I mean, four days into the trial,

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Speaker 2: the secrecy, what's up?

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Speaker 3: Well, these are great questions. You know, we can speculate.

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Speaker 3: I'm glad to speculate, but we don't know for sure.

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Speaker 3: Here's my guess. My guess is the trial staff. They

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Speaker 3: have really top people trying this case. My guess is

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Speaker 3: they were blindsided. My guess is that they were not

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Speaker 3: involved in this settlement.

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Speaker 4: Just to guess.

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Speaker 3: These are real long serving professionals, both in and out

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Speaker 3: of the Justice Department. I think that this was done

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Speaker 3: above them. That's a guess. And the term sheet I've

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Speaker 3: never seen. This is the crazy term sheet. What is

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Speaker 3: this a deal? The term sheet is signed by the

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Speaker 3: acting Assistant Attorney General, not by anyone on the trial staff.

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Speaker 3: And for this to become a what's called a consent

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Speaker 3: decree that the judge enters, it's got to look a

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Speaker 3: little more formal than this. So whether they'll sign it

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Speaker 3: or not, I think would be a good question, and

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Speaker 3: I don't know. I think that's to look forward to

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Speaker 3: and blaming the states, I would be close to certain

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Speaker 3: that the States were completely out of the loop on this.

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Speaker 3: I think everyone was concerned that this case was going

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Speaker 3: to be sold out, and I mean sold out in

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Speaker 3: the literal sense that this was a political deal. And

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Speaker 3: you know, whether it's actual money changing hands or just

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Speaker 3: straight lobbying that this is another example of you know,

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Speaker 3: something happening like that, and you know, people were watching

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Speaker 3: this case to see if was ever going to go

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Speaker 3: to trial, you know, whether it would be settled out

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Speaker 3: before with exactly the thing that we see, which is

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Speaker 3: that Live Nation doesn't have to give up Ticketmaster.

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Speaker 2: The settlement doesn't address the main relief sought in the case,

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Speaker 2: which is which is Live Nations selling its Ticketmaster subsidiary.

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Speaker 2: I mean that was that the center of the case.

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Speaker 2: So what does the public get from this settlement?

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Speaker 3: A little bit older and deeper in debt. Wasn't that

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Speaker 3: the song? I don't think the public interest is served

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Speaker 3: by I think public gets very much. There may be

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Speaker 3: some money, who knows how much the states have to

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Speaker 3: agree to it. There's some pullback it wasn't clear who

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Speaker 3: owns what in these arenas. I don't know exactly. They

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Speaker 3: were negotiating the terms, you know, Sunday night before this

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Speaker 3: term sheet was released, so it really isn't isn't clear,

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Speaker 3: and if they have to, you know, go back on

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Speaker 3: some of the contracts, the exclusivity. The problem is not

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Speaker 3: in the formal contracts. The problem is in the economics

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Speaker 3: of this business and tying the ticket sellers to the talent.

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Speaker 3: I mean, that's what it is. And you're not going

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Speaker 3: to solve it by saying, excuse me, don't insist on

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Speaker 3: a contract. That's where they started out in twenty ten.

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Speaker 3: It never worked, it never will work. So it's just

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Speaker 3: really not something to advance the public interest. The second

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Speaker 3: part is some access to ticket Master's API so some

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Speaker 3: other ticketing company can do something. They actually tried this before,

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Speaker 3: that was part of the twenty ten settlement and one

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Speaker 3: of the things that happened is the company supposed to

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Speaker 3: give it access to it didn't want it. I mean,

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Speaker 3: it's just it's failed. Failed, and it fails because venues

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Speaker 3: will not want to offend Live Nation by using a

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Speaker 3: different ticketing company. And Live Nation has said it they

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Speaker 3: said in testimony. They said, you know, we're going to

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Speaker 3: make the choice that makes us the most money. Guess

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Speaker 3: what you know. So it's sad, but overlaying it is

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Speaker 3: this question of political influence, which has been the song

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Speaker 3: of anti trust from the beginning, and here we are again.

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Speaker 2: I think thirty nine state attorneys general are also part

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Speaker 2: of the case, and twenty seven states in DC asks

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Speaker 2: for a mistrial and also for sixty days so that

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Speaker 2: their attorneys can try to get up to speed to

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Speaker 2: try the case. Because the Justice Department was the lead

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Speaker 2: on the case. So the judge didn't rule on the

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Speaker 2: mistrial motion, but he required the top officials to stay

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Speaker 2: in the court house for the rest of the week

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Speaker 2: and try to hammer out a deal. I mean, what

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Speaker 2: are the chances of a deal zero to.

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Speaker 1: What?

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Speaker 3: Well, you never knowing these things. I mean, the states

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Speaker 3: are now in a tough spot. They were sitting there

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Speaker 3: watching the trial. They knew that this could blow up

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Speaker 3: at any point. I don't think they're surprised in that sense.

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Speaker 3: But of course there's a difference between sitting there watching

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Speaker 3: the trial and stepping you know, up there and trying

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Speaker 3: the cases before a jury. I don't know how it goes.

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Speaker 3: When you know, you can see why they'd want to mistrial,

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Speaker 3: not want to have to come before the jury without

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Speaker 3: the Justice Department there and say Hi, we're your new friends.

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Speaker 3: You remember those those other folks.

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Speaker 4: Do you explain this?

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Speaker 3: I don't know how that exactly that would work. This

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Speaker 3: is really weird. There have been cases well, one case

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Speaker 3: in which I'm familiar is the Microsoft case where states

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Speaker 3: and the federal government tried the case together and then

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Speaker 3: the Justice Department settled with Microsoft, but not all the

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Speaker 3: states did, and they continued to litigate the remedy but

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Speaker 3: not you know, whether there's a liability, so it's still

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Speaker 3: a little different. Didn't go so well for them, so

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Speaker 3: it's hard. They're in a hard position.

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Speaker 1: You know.

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Speaker 3: Maybe they can eke out some more something from Live Nation,

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Speaker 3: although I bet they don't. And you know, they either

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Speaker 3: are going to have to join the settlement or go

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Speaker 3: it alone. I think the judge is not going to

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Speaker 3: be too happy about a mistrial and starting over again.

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Speaker 3: And the only reason to do it, well, there are

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Speaker 3: two reasons. One is to get good law made, is

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Speaker 3: to get a verdict against Live Nation, and Ticketmaster will

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Speaker 3: help in some other private litigation, maybe not so much help,

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Speaker 3: but a little. And the second is that relief to

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Speaker 3: get to vestiture and you know, maybe they can make

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Speaker 3: the case if they've got the right experts, and that

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Speaker 3: this is the only way to solve this problem than

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Speaker 3: to have competition in ticketing, is to change the incentives

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Speaker 3: of the parties in this industry if.

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Speaker 2: You talk about you know, politics and the politics of

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Speaker 2: the states. For example, New York Attorney General Letitia James

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Speaker 2: has said that at least twenty five states in DC

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Speaker 2: are going to continue with the trial. The idea of

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Speaker 2: this suit is also popular with the public because buying

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Speaker 2: concert tickets has become a luxury item. Every time you

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Speaker 2: go to buy tickets on ticket Master, it seems like

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Speaker 2: the prices have climbed yet again. So what do the

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Speaker 2: states have to lose by going forward with the trial.

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Speaker 3: Well, part of the answer is that the remedy of

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Speaker 3: splitting them apart will not, you know, the day after

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Speaker 3: produce lower ticket prices. It's a market process, and you

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Speaker 3: hope that new companies will enter the ticketing business particularly

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Speaker 3: and bring some competition there. But you know, Taylor Swift

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Speaker 3: concerts are still going to be really expensive and there'll

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Speaker 3: still be resale markets and so it's a slow fix.

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Speaker 3: So yes, it looks attractive from the point of view

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Speaker 3: of the States and you know, pushing on and being

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Speaker 3: the public interest, but it is a longer term public interest.

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Speaker 3: So maybe there's some quick fix or something. Everybody who

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Speaker 3: bought a Taylor Swift ticket gets free out, but I

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Speaker 3: don't know, you know, get some money, so maybe they'll

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Speaker 3: increase the money in the pot. There's a lot of

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Speaker 3: money here.

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Speaker 2: So when the judge rejected the request and said that

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Speaker 2: if the parties truly want to settle, a deal could

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Speaker 2: be made within the week, and the Innaus attorney for

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Speaker 2: Live Nations, Dan Wall, said, I've done this for forty

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Speaker 2: five years and there's zero chance we get this done

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Speaker 2: by Friday. And the judge said, not with that attitude.

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Speaker 4: I love that.

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Speaker 3: That was great. Yeah, Dan Wall is very sure of himself.

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Speaker 3: Let's say, but the States have now apparently hired a

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Speaker 3: very very successful anti trust trial lawyer, Jeffrey Kessler. It's

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Speaker 3: a smart, sharp move, so they're not looking to you know,

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Speaker 3: just vanish, but they are up against a difficult tactical

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Speaker 3: position here, and they have to be sure that they

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Speaker 3: really want to go ahead and push for divestiture. It's

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Speaker 3: not impossible, but the States don't generally do so well

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Speaker 3: once they've been deserted by the Justice Department. There are

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Speaker 3: past cases, not always, but it's hard now. You know,

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Speaker 3: they need the experts, the economists, industry experts, and the

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Speaker 3: you know, they need a top lawyer. I guess they

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Speaker 3: have good lawyers in the house, but they've hired, you know,

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Speaker 3: a guy who could go up against Dan wall if there's.

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Speaker 2: No settlement of the judge says the trial's going to

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Speaker 2: restart on Monday with the same jury. It seems very

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Speaker 2: difficult for the States to just pick up now if

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Speaker 2: the judge doesn't give them more time. Okay, on Monday,

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Speaker 2: we're in court when you know, we haven't been prepping

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Speaker 2: the witnesses. We haven't been doing this.

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Speaker 4: Yeah, I don't know.

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Speaker 3: I don't know how actively involved they've been in trial

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Speaker 3: prep or how much is it always an underlying tension

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Speaker 3: between the States and the Feds even when they're trying

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Speaker 3: cases together. You know, playing with your friends doesn't always

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Speaker 3: go smoothly, even if you're good friends. But my guess

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Speaker 3: also is that the professionals on the staff. The trial

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Speaker 3: staff will not be the roadblocks, but the front office.

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Speaker 3: Who knows what they'll do with the witnesses they've got

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Speaker 3: and the information they've got, and how hard they'll make

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Speaker 3: it for the states. I don't know. To add one

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Speaker 3: other thing in there. In February, the head of the

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Speaker 3: any Trust Division was fired.

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Speaker 2: I was going to ask you about that. You know

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Speaker 2: where the anti trust division is going in trump second administration.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, Well, the speculation was, my speculation was that she

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Speaker 3: was told that she was going to have to settle

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Speaker 3: this case and she refused. This really is speculation. I

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Speaker 3: haven't read any reporting about it. In the grand scheme

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Speaker 3: of things, this barely caused a ripple, you know, in

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Speaker 3: the world. So the reporting was that she was fired,

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Speaker 3: not that she quit, you know. So all of this

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Speaker 3: sort of fits together in light of some other things

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Speaker 3: that have happened in antitrust as well as of course

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Speaker 3: the broader world.

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Speaker 2: I mean, the judge can always reject the settlement, right, So.

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Speaker 3: There's a legal process for the settlement itself. They have

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Speaker 3: to file what's called a competitive impact statement. They have

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Speaker 3: to let it open for public comment for a period

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Speaker 3: of time. Then there's a hearing before the judge. It's

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Speaker 3: called a Tonny Act, and the judge has to approve

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Speaker 3: the settlement as in the public interest. Now that, as

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Speaker 3: it's been interpreted over to time, does not give the judge,

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Speaker 3: you know, the broadest power to say this is a

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Speaker 3: crappy settlement, forget it, I want you to try this case.

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Speaker 3: But the judge does have some power and this will

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Speaker 3: certainly provoke a lot of public comment, and that's a

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Speaker 3: process that will go forward while the case is being tried. Apparently,

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Speaker 3: I mean there, I forget the exact time, but it's

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Speaker 3: say thirty or sixty days for comment that this has

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Speaker 3: to be put into a formal decree, yes, and the

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Speaker 3: judge has to eventually review it and approve it, and

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Speaker 3: then it can be appealed. Actually, so we're not at

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Speaker 3: the end of this process.

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Speaker 2: What do you make of the judge telling the attorneys

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Speaker 2: for a live nation the government, you know, this is it.

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Speaker 2: You can't go back on this.

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Speaker 3: Now, well, because you know, the second step in this

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Speaker 3: could be that the Justice Department moves to dismiss its complaint,

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Speaker 3: doesn't even go through the formal process. You know, we've

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Speaker 3: seen that where the Justice Department just says bye, we

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Speaker 3: haven't seen it in any trust cases because the anti

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Speaker 3: trust professionals really don't want to see a case where

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Speaker 3: parties promise to do something but it's not backed up

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Speaker 3: with the court decree. This consent decree. So I don't

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Speaker 3: really predict it here unless she's I've been pretty bad

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Speaker 3: at predicting things, so don't help me to to this.

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Speaker 2: I don't know about that. I'll also look back at

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Speaker 2: your score. Also, under this agreement, the government could sue

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Speaker 2: them again.

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Speaker 3: So as it's written, you know, this is not you know,

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Speaker 3: we're forever done. It's hard to know what to make

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Speaker 3: of that. I mean, the government has actually they did

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Speaker 3: sue in twenty ten when Ticketmaster acquired Live Nation and

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Speaker 3: entered into a consent decree. They re up the consent

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Speaker 3: decree in twenty nineteen where they threatened to sue again.

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Speaker 3: And then this is a suit with a different legal

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Speaker 3: theory that they out in twenty twenty four. So the

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Speaker 3: standard rule is the government is not stopped from, you know,

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Speaker 3: unless they've signed a piece of paper, from bringing a

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Speaker 3: new suit. So the answer to that is, yes, they

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Speaker 3: could bring another suit. I mean, in a way, it's

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Speaker 3: cold comfort we've now had from twenty ten to you know,

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Speaker 3: twenty twenty six. This monopoly. It's you know, they've made

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Speaker 3: a lot of money off of this. Thank you very much.

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Speaker 3: We could eventually sue them at some point.

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Speaker 2: When this settlement is actually turning out to be more

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Speaker 2: interesting than the trial in some ways. Thanks so much,

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Speaker 2: Harry for your insights. That's Professor Harry First of NYU

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Speaker 2: Law School. Prediction market platforms have soared in popularity in

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Speaker 2: recent years, testing legal and regulatory norms like never before,

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Speaker 2: although most have drawn a line at one category, direct

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Speaker 2: wagers on war. In fact, betting on war is prohibit

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Speaker 2: in the United States, as is insider trading. Despite that,

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Speaker 2: it seems to be flourishing on Polymarket, one of the

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Speaker 2: world's largest prediction markets, whose main exchange operates offshore and

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Speaker 2: outside the oversight of US regulators and now blockchain analysts

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Speaker 2: have flagged suspicious activity and lawmakers are calling for a crackdown.

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Speaker 5: Why.

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Speaker 2: The day before the US and Israel launched an attack

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Speaker 2: on Iran, there was a surge in big bets on

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Speaker 2: poly Market that correctly predicted the strike would happen. The

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Speaker 2: next day, bubble Map's Paris based company that tracks data

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Speaker 2: on crypto transactions, identified what it called six suspected insiders

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Speaker 2: who made a one point two million dollar wager that

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Speaker 2: correctly predicted the US would strike Iran. Joining me is

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Speaker 2: business law professor Eric Tally of Columbia Law School. He's

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Speaker 2: the co host of the Beyond Unprecedented podcast. Eric tell

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Speaker 2: us about the bets on Polymarket that are causing concern.

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Speaker 4: Yeah.

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Speaker 5: So, Polymarket is one of two major event driven contract

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Speaker 5: websites that people use that are basically prediction market, you know,

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Speaker 5: sort of platforms. And both Polymarket and Calshi had various

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Speaker 5: types of events, including events that might occur in Iran,

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Speaker 5: and many of those pertained to the continued integrity of

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Speaker 5: the Ayatola Kamenese regime in Iran and whether it would

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Speaker 5: still be you know, in power, say by the end

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Speaker 5: of February or by the end of the first week

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Speaker 5: of March. And these are essentially binary bets, you know,

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Speaker 5: they call them contracts, but they're essentially bets where you

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Speaker 5: can bet on yes or bet on no. And it

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Speaker 5: became pretty apparent in the hours before the Israeli and

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Speaker 5: US strike on Iran that ended up killing both Iotola

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Speaker 5: Khameni and many other senior members of the Iranian government

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Speaker 5: that there had been a lot of activity that was

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Speaker 5: essentially betting against the continuing viability of the how many

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Speaker 5: government passed in some future date. The interesting part about

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Speaker 5: this June is that while there were a lot of

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Speaker 5: bets that were being placed on this most were small

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Speaker 5: scale and kind of went on both sides of the transaction.

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Speaker 5: But there were some really big ones that got placed

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Speaker 5: literally within hours of the bombing, that were all betting

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Speaker 5: against the Iyatola's fate, and all of them at least

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Speaker 5: purportedly paid out. That gave rise, unsurprisingly to a pretty

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Speaker 5: significant kerfuffle about who created these brand new accounts, why

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Speaker 5: were they placing hundreds of thousands, even millions of dollars

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Speaker 5: in betting on this particular event when these accounts hadn't

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Speaker 5: made any bets before.

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Speaker 2: And which is a company that tracks data on crypto transactions,

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Speaker 2: identified what it called six suspected insiders who made one

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Speaker 2: point two million dollars in wagers that the US would

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Speaker 2: strike Iran Senator Chris Murphy was one of the people

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Speaker 2: who said, you know, it's insane that this is legal,

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Speaker 2: and he said that the unusual betting suggested that even

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Speaker 2: decision makers might have had a stake in the outcome,

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Speaker 2: which the White House denied. But insider trading look.

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Speaker 5: So a couple of points to pick apart in that statement.

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Speaker 5: The first has to do with is this in fact

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Speaker 5: legal or not legal?

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Speaker 4: Now?

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Speaker 5: You know, because prediction markets are new in the US,

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Speaker 5: there's still a battle raging about how exactly these contracts

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Speaker 5: get classified. I think most people think that they are

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Speaker 5: a type of derivative contract.

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Speaker 4: That's kind of my belief as well.

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Speaker 5: They tend to have a lot of the look and

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Speaker 5: feel of a lot of other call options, put options,

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Speaker 5: various exotic options that you can buy and sell on

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Speaker 5: the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. And so those are in fact,

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Speaker 5: to the extent that they are derivative contracts. They are

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Speaker 5: in fact regulated by the Commodities Future Trading Commission or

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Speaker 5: a CFTC, and that commission has a pretty robust insider

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Speaker 5: trading prohibition that we can talk a little bit about.

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Speaker 4: The specifics of.

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Speaker 5: But I think that the Senator, all due respect, might

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Speaker 5: be leaping to conclusions to say that this wasn't prohibited

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Speaker 5: by law. In addition, there are a lot of state

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Speaker 5: laws that might also sweep in to prohibit this type

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Speaker 5: of inside trading that can also.

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Speaker 4: Have criminal implications.

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Speaker 5: So, irrespective of current bills pending in Congress, this is

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Speaker 5: definitely something that I would expect that CFTC lawyers might

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Speaker 5: be kicking the tires off as to who did it.

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Speaker 5: We still don't really know. We don't know who the

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Speaker 5: owners of these accounts were. And you know, the fact

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Speaker 5: of the matter is this could range from anyone from

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Speaker 5: senior decision makers in the process in the room of

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Speaker 5: making these decisions, to potentially mid level staffers or even

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Speaker 5: White House interns who were asked to run papers back

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Speaker 5: and forth. One thing is kind of interesting, June, is

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Speaker 5: that you know, I don't know whether you have a

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Speaker 5: polymarket or calshy account.

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Speaker 2: Absolutely not.

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Speaker 5: Yeah, I'm just gonna say that there is a definite

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Speaker 5: generational skew on who has these accounts.

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Speaker 4: I have them.

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Speaker 5: But the only reason that I have these accounts is

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Speaker 5: that I teach finance to twenty four year olds and

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Speaker 5: they all have them, and so I have to kind

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Speaker 5: of get inside their head to figure out, you know,

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Speaker 5: how I'm going to present the material. So I would say, yeah,

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Speaker 5: it's certainly possible that senior leadership in the Trump administration

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Speaker 5: White House was engaged in some of this trading, but

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Speaker 5: I wouldn't be surprised if a twenty four year old

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Speaker 5: intern wasn't. Also, you know, asked to shuffle some papers

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Speaker 5: back and forth, put two and two together, and then

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Speaker 5: got on Calshi and you know, borrowed a bunch of

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Speaker 5: money to make a one directional bet.

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Speaker 2: The CFTC has the authority to investigate this, but Michael Sellig,

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Speaker 2: the chair, came out in February saying that he sees

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Speaker 2: the platforms as a way for society to channel the

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Speaker 2: wisdom of crowds for useful information, offering a check on

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Speaker 2: news media and other gatekeepers. And earlier this year the

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Speaker 2: CFTC withdrew a Biden era effort to prevent Calshie from

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Speaker 2: accepting bets on the outcome of sports events and political elections. So, first,

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Speaker 2: does the CFTC have the authority here to look into this?

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Speaker 2: And second are they likely to?

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Speaker 5: Yeah, it's a fine point, and maybe backing up a

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Speaker 5: little bit, one of the things that I have to

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Speaker 5: you know, impress upon my law students is that formal

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Speaker 5: legal differences don't always add up into substantive differences. So,

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Speaker 5: you know, one thing that I asked my students is

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Speaker 5: what's the difference between gambling, insurance, and buying and trading securities?

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Speaker 5: And many valiantly attempts to distinguish them, but the fact

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Speaker 5: of the matter is, June, they are all kind of

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Speaker 5: the same type of a thing. They're regulated very differently,

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Speaker 5: and so the boundaries of where one ends and one

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Speaker 5: begins it's really important from a legal perspective, but you know,

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Speaker 5: really the biggest difference between you know, insurance, gambling and

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Speaker 5: securities trading is how exciting is the thing that you're

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Speaker 5: trading on, and gambling is probably more more exciting than

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Speaker 5: any of them. The other thing, though, that is important

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Speaker 5: to keep in mind is that while the CFTC you

402
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Speaker 5: know spokesperson certainly has a point to say that prediction

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Speaker 5: markets are an important tool for marshaling the wisdom of

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Speaker 5: the crowd, there are at least two important caveats to that.

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Speaker 5: The first caveat is that if one allowed pretty much

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Speaker 5: unbridled insider trading in these circumstances, then you and I,

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Speaker 5: as people who don't have access to that type of

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00:24:02,800 --> 00:24:06,280
Speaker 5: inside information are going to get wise to it pretty soon,

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Speaker 5: and we're going to realize that any bet that we

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Speaker 5: make on Calshi or polymarket, there's a good chance we're

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Speaker 5: going to be on the losing side of it because

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00:24:14,560 --> 00:24:16,800
Speaker 5: we don't have as much information as the person that

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00:24:16,840 --> 00:24:20,439
Speaker 5: we are essentially trading with on that platform. And so

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Speaker 5: one of the big conundrums with inside information and trying

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00:24:24,720 --> 00:24:27,440
Speaker 5: to see how quickly we can get it infused into

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Speaker 5: the market is that if you basically say we're just

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Speaker 5: taking the breaks off completely, that can have a feedback

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Speaker 5: effect of causing all the uninformed people to say, I'm

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Speaker 5: just going to sit this dance out. I don't trust

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Speaker 5: these markets, and I'm not going to provide liquidity and

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Speaker 5: depth to these markets. So that's one thing to worry

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Speaker 5: about that even if you believe this idea that the

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Speaker 5: wisdom of crowds is really really important for things like

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Speaker 5: price discovery, and I do believe that, that doesn't necessarily

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Speaker 5: imply that you should basically take all the break breaks

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Speaker 5: off of insider trading, because it can undermine that very

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00:25:03,359 --> 00:25:06,560
Speaker 5: market itself. The second thing that is probably worth keeping

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Speaker 5: in mind is that there are bets and there are bets. Right,

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Speaker 5: So if you and I were to make a bet

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Speaker 5: about I don't know Friday's temperature at noon in Botswana,

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00:25:17,359 --> 00:25:20,680
Speaker 5: that's something that you know, there will be a temperature reading,

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Speaker 5: it will probably be trustworthy, and there is nothing that

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Speaker 5: you or I could do to influence the nature of

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Speaker 5: that outcome. On the other hand, if we are betting

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Speaker 5: on whether you know, the Yankees pitcher is next going

436
00:25:35,040 --> 00:25:37,920
Speaker 5: to throw a ball or a strike, or a curveball

437
00:25:38,119 --> 00:25:42,760
Speaker 5: or a fastball, and that picture himself is in you know,

438
00:25:42,880 --> 00:25:45,560
Speaker 5: contact with folks who are making those sorts of bets,

439
00:25:45,840 --> 00:25:50,720
Speaker 5: that's a highly manipulable decision, and there the wisdom of

440
00:25:50,800 --> 00:25:53,840
Speaker 5: crowds is almost self defeating. As soon as the wisdom

441
00:25:53,880 --> 00:25:57,120
Speaker 5: of crowds points in one direction are hypothetical, Yankees pitcher

442
00:25:57,200 --> 00:25:58,800
Speaker 5: is going to have an incentive to pitch in the

443
00:25:58,800 --> 00:26:01,840
Speaker 5: other direction to make money off of it. So they're

444
00:26:01,880 --> 00:26:05,320
Speaker 5: in situations where the thing that is being bet upon,

445
00:26:05,840 --> 00:26:08,280
Speaker 5: you know, is basically under the control of someone who

446
00:26:08,359 --> 00:26:11,879
Speaker 5: is either participating in those markets or has connections to

447
00:26:11,920 --> 00:26:14,760
Speaker 5: people that are participating in that market. They're you know,

448
00:26:15,040 --> 00:26:18,760
Speaker 5: I think people lose trust in these markets almost immediately,

449
00:26:18,800 --> 00:26:21,840
Speaker 5: and they don't actually even serve this idea of aggregating

450
00:26:22,240 --> 00:26:23,720
Speaker 5: preferences and beliefs in a.

451
00:26:23,800 --> 00:26:24,880
Speaker 4: Very effective way.

452
00:26:25,240 --> 00:26:27,600
Speaker 5: And so you know, where do we put things like

453
00:26:27,880 --> 00:26:31,080
Speaker 5: bombing of Iran? You know, that's kind of kind of

454
00:26:31,080 --> 00:26:33,520
Speaker 5: in the middle. It's a big decision. You and I

455
00:26:33,560 --> 00:26:37,520
Speaker 5: probably don't have an awful lot of influence over it,

456
00:26:37,880 --> 00:26:39,720
Speaker 5: but there may be a lot of people who either

457
00:26:39,800 --> 00:26:42,040
Speaker 5: know about it and want to go out and make

458
00:26:42,240 --> 00:26:46,240
Speaker 5: approximately infinity dollars off of the markets here, or you know,

459
00:26:46,280 --> 00:26:49,080
Speaker 5: are the decision makers in this area, which which creates

460
00:26:49,119 --> 00:26:51,600
Speaker 5: a second problem, right, which is that as soon as

461
00:26:51,600 --> 00:26:54,120
Speaker 5: they see money to be made by a particular decision.

462
00:26:54,359 --> 00:26:56,520
Speaker 5: You know, if they're engaged in these markets, do they

463
00:26:56,520 --> 00:26:59,159
Speaker 5: have an incentive to change their decision so as to

464
00:26:59,160 --> 00:26:59,959
Speaker 5: be able to cash out.

465
00:27:00,680 --> 00:27:04,720
Speaker 2: Just straighten one thing out for me. The CFTC does

466
00:27:04,840 --> 00:27:08,760
Speaker 2: prohibit these prediction markets from listing markets related to war

467
00:27:09,280 --> 00:27:09,840
Speaker 2: right now.

468
00:27:09,880 --> 00:27:16,280
Speaker 5: There is a prohibition in US trading on various types

469
00:27:16,520 --> 00:27:20,680
Speaker 5: of extremely sort of political type of events. But it's

470
00:27:21,000 --> 00:27:24,680
Speaker 5: very hazy, and so sometimes you know, something on the periphery,

471
00:27:24,880 --> 00:27:28,359
Speaker 5: like you know, will this administration be around in four months?

472
00:27:28,640 --> 00:27:30,480
Speaker 5: That's going to be something that gets wrapped up in

473
00:27:31,040 --> 00:27:33,680
Speaker 5: war as well. And so, you know, I think that

474
00:27:33,720 --> 00:27:36,040
Speaker 5: we're in the middle of this kind of process where

475
00:27:36,280 --> 00:27:39,120
Speaker 5: these platforms are trying to figure out, you know, what

476
00:27:39,200 --> 00:27:42,280
Speaker 5: can we allow and what should we disallow on these

477
00:27:42,320 --> 00:27:46,719
Speaker 5: platforms in ways that make people both participate and trust

478
00:27:46,760 --> 00:27:49,960
Speaker 5: these platforms as not basically being a suckers.

479
00:27:49,520 --> 00:27:51,680
Speaker 4: Play for people that don't have inside information.

480
00:27:52,480 --> 00:27:54,480
Speaker 5: And that's going to be very much in Calshing's and

481
00:27:54,520 --> 00:27:58,080
Speaker 5: polymarkets interests to try to try to do that, but

482
00:27:58,119 --> 00:27:59,800
Speaker 5: they're hardly ever going to be able to get it.

483
00:28:00,640 --> 00:28:04,080
Speaker 5: And a lot of times, you know, the underlying nature

484
00:28:04,200 --> 00:28:07,440
Speaker 5: of these of these securities bet if you will, are

485
00:28:07,520 --> 00:28:10,000
Speaker 5: essentially going to be around the fringes of what you know,

486
00:28:10,119 --> 00:28:13,600
Speaker 5: the designers of Calci and Polymarket are capable of anticipating

487
00:28:13,600 --> 00:28:14,160
Speaker 5: in advance.

488
00:28:14,600 --> 00:28:19,320
Speaker 2: Calhi faced backlash over a multimillion dollar market on whether

489
00:28:19,600 --> 00:28:24,040
Speaker 2: Commania would be ousted, and they actually issued refunds on

490
00:28:24,119 --> 00:28:29,040
Speaker 2: the market citing regulations barring wagers on death. Yeah, so

491
00:28:29,080 --> 00:28:30,719
Speaker 2: they self regulated.

492
00:28:31,600 --> 00:28:34,240
Speaker 5: They sort of self regulated, and you know, I think

493
00:28:34,280 --> 00:28:37,639
Speaker 5: that there is you know, in some ways because a

494
00:28:37,680 --> 00:28:40,479
Speaker 5: lot of these bets were very very one sided. Calshi

495
00:28:40,600 --> 00:28:43,800
Speaker 5: actually you know, faced possibly a little bit of exposure

496
00:28:43,880 --> 00:28:45,920
Speaker 5: on this as well, and so I think, you know,

497
00:28:46,000 --> 00:28:48,440
Speaker 5: some people are trying to say, was this Calshi basically

498
00:28:48,440 --> 00:28:52,320
Speaker 5: trying to cover their own backsides, or were they legitimately

499
00:28:52,400 --> 00:28:57,720
Speaker 5: trying to enforce a prohibition on various types of effectively

500
00:28:57,760 --> 00:29:01,400
Speaker 5: what becomes wagering at the form level, you know, where

501
00:29:01,440 --> 00:29:03,840
Speaker 5: they ended up sort of coming down was this sort

502
00:29:03,840 --> 00:29:06,840
Speaker 5: of I think a little bit of a messy distinction

503
00:29:07,120 --> 00:29:09,400
Speaker 5: between you know, were they going to pay off at all?

504
00:29:09,480 --> 00:29:11,080
Speaker 5: And if they were, were they going to pay off

505
00:29:11,080 --> 00:29:13,800
Speaker 5: only a portion of the wager that was put down?

506
00:29:14,600 --> 00:29:16,480
Speaker 5: And you know, I think that you know, created a

507
00:29:16,520 --> 00:29:19,360
Speaker 5: lot of ire amongst their clients who felt, you know,

508
00:29:19,400 --> 00:29:21,880
Speaker 5: maybe some of them honestly were you know, making a

509
00:29:21,920 --> 00:29:24,520
Speaker 5: wager in a direction that paid off and they didn't

510
00:29:24,560 --> 00:29:27,320
Speaker 5: have any inside information on and suddenly they were getting

511
00:29:27,320 --> 00:29:29,760
Speaker 5: short changed on it by the same token.

512
00:29:30,160 --> 00:29:34,000
Speaker 4: You know, these platforms absolutely have an incentive not to

513
00:29:34,040 --> 00:29:37,360
Speaker 4: develop a reputation as being kind of the place where

514
00:29:37,360 --> 00:29:38,840
Speaker 4: suckers go to lose their money.

515
00:29:39,400 --> 00:29:43,680
Speaker 2: Coming up next, what about possible prosecutions? This is Bloomberg.

516
00:29:46,120 --> 00:29:49,160
Speaker 2: I've been talking to Columbia Law School professor Eric Talley

517
00:29:49,600 --> 00:29:54,000
Speaker 2: about the controversy over Bett's placed on the prediction market

518
00:29:54,080 --> 00:30:00,400
Speaker 2: platform Polymarket, correctly predicting the US strike on Iran. So Liebruary,

519
00:30:00,840 --> 00:30:05,600
Speaker 2: Israeli authorities arrested several people and charged to a civilian

520
00:30:05,640 --> 00:30:10,200
Speaker 2: and a military reservist with using classified information to place

521
00:30:10,280 --> 00:30:14,560
Speaker 2: bets on Polymarket. Anyone in the US who used classified

522
00:30:14,680 --> 00:30:17,800
Speaker 2: information to place a bet, I mean it would be

523
00:30:17,920 --> 00:30:22,880
Speaker 2: subject to criminal prosecution. Right Is anybody looking into that?

524
00:30:23,000 --> 00:30:25,600
Speaker 2: Is there an agency besides the CFTC.

525
00:30:26,480 --> 00:30:29,440
Speaker 5: I'm pretty positive there are some state attorneys general that

526
00:30:29,480 --> 00:30:31,920
Speaker 5: are looking at this as well. One of the things

527
00:30:31,920 --> 00:30:34,000
Speaker 5: that's kind of interesting about this June is that it

528
00:30:34,040 --> 00:30:37,040
Speaker 5: gets a little bit into the details of how insider

529
00:30:37,120 --> 00:30:39,960
Speaker 5: trading law works, and there are a couple of theories

530
00:30:40,000 --> 00:30:42,200
Speaker 5: behind it, but the one that would most likely apply

531
00:30:42,680 --> 00:30:47,120
Speaker 5: to this situation is something that lawyers call the misappropriation theory,

532
00:30:47,440 --> 00:30:51,920
Speaker 5: and what it basically means is if my employer or

533
00:30:52,080 --> 00:30:54,680
Speaker 5: someone with whom I have some kind of a relationship

534
00:30:54,680 --> 00:31:00,040
Speaker 5: of trust and confidence reveals inside information to me that

535
00:31:00,160 --> 00:31:04,920
Speaker 5: is gonna happen with either the stated or implied a

536
00:31:04,960 --> 00:31:07,120
Speaker 5: restriction that I have to keep that confidential. So if

537
00:31:07,160 --> 00:31:09,800
Speaker 5: I go out and trade on it, then I have

538
00:31:09,960 --> 00:31:14,400
Speaker 5: breached that confidentiality, and that is effectively what triggers a

539
00:31:14,400 --> 00:31:17,960
Speaker 5: lot of criminal and civil liability for insider trading, the

540
00:31:17,960 --> 00:31:22,320
Speaker 5: fact that I've misappropriated, I've violated this order or this

541
00:31:22,400 --> 00:31:25,680
Speaker 5: command of confidentiality that came from the source, maybe it's

542
00:31:25,720 --> 00:31:28,360
Speaker 5: my employer or someone else. But the thing it's always

543
00:31:28,360 --> 00:31:31,040
Speaker 5: been weird about this theory, and that applies also in

544
00:31:31,640 --> 00:31:36,040
Speaker 5: the derivatives context, is that it hinges very very critically

545
00:31:36,560 --> 00:31:41,400
Speaker 5: on what does your employer permit and not permit, right,

546
00:31:41,480 --> 00:31:44,600
Speaker 5: And so you could, in principle, have an employer who

547
00:31:44,640 --> 00:31:48,160
Speaker 5: develops a lot of confidential information and their inside employee

548
00:31:48,160 --> 00:31:51,840
Speaker 5: policies say, you know what, rather than paying you salaries,

549
00:31:51,880 --> 00:31:54,040
Speaker 5: we're just going to let you trade rampantly on this

550
00:31:54,120 --> 00:31:57,560
Speaker 5: inside information. And the third parties, the third party suckers

551
00:31:57,600 --> 00:31:59,640
Speaker 5: who trade with these informed folks, they have no idea

552
00:31:59,760 --> 00:32:02,000
Speaker 5: even who they're trading with or what the inside policy

553
00:32:02,120 --> 00:32:04,720
Speaker 5: is of the employer. But that's going to have a

554
00:32:04,840 --> 00:32:08,240
Speaker 5: huge effect on whether there will be civil or criminal liability,

555
00:32:08,480 --> 00:32:11,640
Speaker 5: whether there was such a prohibition. So you transport this

556
00:32:11,760 --> 00:32:16,360
Speaker 5: over to the administration in which clearly for classified information

557
00:32:16,480 --> 00:32:21,440
Speaker 5: there's both an implicit and an explicit prohibition on, you know,

558
00:32:21,720 --> 00:32:24,520
Speaker 5: trying to make money off of your own private knowledge

559
00:32:24,520 --> 00:32:28,520
Speaker 5: of classified information. On the other hand, as we learned

560
00:32:29,120 --> 00:32:34,240
Speaker 5: from the first Trump administration's you know, classified documents Gate, right,

561
00:32:34,320 --> 00:32:37,600
Speaker 5: there's a big question about, well, what constitutes classified and

562
00:32:37,640 --> 00:32:40,760
Speaker 5: not classified and who gets to determine when something is

563
00:32:40,800 --> 00:32:46,160
Speaker 5: suddenly classified or declassified and when? And President Trump basically

564
00:32:46,200 --> 00:32:49,400
Speaker 5: made the claim on behalf of himself that as he

565
00:32:49,480 --> 00:32:51,440
Speaker 5: spirited these documents out of the White House at the

566
00:32:51,520 --> 00:32:56,360
Speaker 5: end of his first administration, he basically declared, possibly to

567
00:32:56,520 --> 00:32:59,760
Speaker 5: himself or possibly in passing, that they're all declassified now

568
00:33:00,000 --> 00:33:04,640
Speaker 5: therefore he doesn't have any liability. So query whether I

569
00:33:04,640 --> 00:33:08,920
Speaker 5: don't know some some staffer, employee or you know, person

570
00:33:09,080 --> 00:33:12,800
Speaker 5: higher up in the administration was placing some of these bets.

571
00:33:13,160 --> 00:33:16,360
Speaker 5: The way that it would trigger, you know, most directly

572
00:33:17,080 --> 00:33:20,600
Speaker 5: inside of trading prohibitions is because they were classified. If

573
00:33:20,680 --> 00:33:22,920
Speaker 5: you know, President Trump said, oh, no, I de classified

574
00:33:22,920 --> 00:33:25,880
Speaker 5: that in a meeting, that I did it orally, But

575
00:33:25,920 --> 00:33:26,640
Speaker 5: it's totally fine.

576
00:33:27,240 --> 00:33:28,960
Speaker 4: Who knows what's going to happen there now?

577
00:33:29,120 --> 00:33:31,840
Speaker 5: Having said that that doesn't necessarily take these folks off

578
00:33:31,920 --> 00:33:34,120
Speaker 5: the hook for state level offenses, and there are some

579
00:33:34,200 --> 00:33:37,440
Speaker 5: state level offenses that easily could be applied here. California

580
00:33:37,440 --> 00:33:41,920
Speaker 5: and New York have pretty rigorous prohibitions on inside trading transactions.

581
00:33:42,080 --> 00:33:46,440
Speaker 5: There are also various other types of provisions out there,

582
00:33:46,480 --> 00:33:49,400
Speaker 5: the wire fraud acts, the computer fraud and abuse acts

583
00:33:49,680 --> 00:33:53,680
Speaker 5: that might also kind of play a peripheral role in

584
00:33:53,760 --> 00:33:57,440
Speaker 5: this context. You know, at the federal level, that's only

585
00:33:57,480 --> 00:33:59,400
Speaker 5: going to be as strong as the stomach of the

586
00:33:59,440 --> 00:34:02,840
Speaker 5: federal prosecutors who are going to bring these cases. And

587
00:34:02,880 --> 00:34:05,320
Speaker 5: if they've gotten a command from on high that they

588
00:34:05,360 --> 00:34:07,560
Speaker 5: shouldn't bring any of them, then I think we're going

589
00:34:07,600 --> 00:34:09,800
Speaker 5: to be largely going to be left up to state

590
00:34:10,160 --> 00:34:11,040
Speaker 5: attorneys general.

591
00:34:11,480 --> 00:34:16,000
Speaker 2: Are they difficult to investigate because the main prediction platform

592
00:34:16,160 --> 00:34:21,120
Speaker 2: operates offshore, the bets are placed on the blockchain, the

593
00:34:21,160 --> 00:34:25,080
Speaker 2: identities of the accounts making the trades are anonymous. I mean,

594
00:34:25,200 --> 00:34:27,680
Speaker 2: let's say state attorneys general, would it be difficult for

595
00:34:27,719 --> 00:34:29,840
Speaker 2: them to get through all those layers?

596
00:34:30,640 --> 00:34:33,840
Speaker 5: Yeah, this has always been a difficult thing in investigating

597
00:34:33,880 --> 00:34:36,640
Speaker 5: trades made on the blockchain. Compared to ten years ago,

598
00:34:36,719 --> 00:34:39,239
Speaker 5: it's much easier to trace who, you know, the identity

599
00:34:39,280 --> 00:34:40,560
Speaker 5: of who was making these trades.

600
00:34:40,760 --> 00:34:41,560
Speaker 4: You know, where was this.

601
00:34:41,560 --> 00:34:45,040
Speaker 5: Wallet created, Who did the creation of this wallet. It's

602
00:34:45,040 --> 00:34:48,000
Speaker 5: possible to get that information. LIVA would rest on subpoena

603
00:34:48,040 --> 00:34:51,879
Speaker 5: power that might have to be applied extra territorially right

604
00:34:51,920 --> 00:34:55,040
Speaker 5: outside the country, because ice companies are based in Ireland

605
00:34:55,120 --> 00:34:58,520
Speaker 5: or England or Europe and so forth. So that creates

606
00:34:58,560 --> 00:35:03,680
Speaker 5: a stumbling block, not one that is necessarily insurmountable. I

607
00:35:03,719 --> 00:35:09,040
Speaker 5: could certainly imagine various regulators inside the EU or the

608
00:35:09,160 --> 00:35:13,400
Speaker 5: UK being equally worried about the use of prediction markets

609
00:35:13,400 --> 00:35:17,640
Speaker 5: for insider trading, and being perfectly willing to assist a

610
00:35:17,719 --> 00:35:20,520
Speaker 5: request from say the New York State Attorney General or

611
00:35:20,520 --> 00:35:23,920
Speaker 5: the California State Attorney General for some of that information,

612
00:35:24,080 --> 00:35:25,880
Speaker 5: or at least to say, yeah, we were willing to

613
00:35:26,840 --> 00:35:29,360
Speaker 5: serve your subpoena in Europe.

614
00:35:30,000 --> 00:35:32,040
Speaker 2: So, finally, Eric, what do you think about You know,

615
00:35:32,080 --> 00:35:36,080
Speaker 2: you talked about bills, and yesterday Senator Adam Schiff, Democrat

616
00:35:36,080 --> 00:35:41,080
Speaker 2: of California, introduced legislation seeking to explicitly ban any entity

617
00:35:41,160 --> 00:35:44,600
Speaker 2: regulated by the CFTC from listing a contract that involves

618
00:35:44,680 --> 00:35:49,200
Speaker 2: relates to a references terrorism, assassination, war or death. I mean,

619
00:35:49,239 --> 00:35:51,759
Speaker 2: what do you think about these bills? Long chances they

620
00:35:51,800 --> 00:35:54,879
Speaker 2: go through, But if they did, I think it's.

621
00:35:54,800 --> 00:35:57,480
Speaker 5: A valued attempt by center shif. I think there's a

622
00:35:57,560 --> 00:36:00,440
Speaker 5: couple things that are going to be challenged for it.

623
00:36:00,880 --> 00:36:03,879
Speaker 5: So thing one is that if you take a look

624
00:36:03,920 --> 00:36:07,279
Speaker 5: at that distinction that we talked about earlier between you know,

625
00:36:07,320 --> 00:36:11,200
Speaker 5: events that no one has much control over practically versus

626
00:36:11,239 --> 00:36:15,640
Speaker 5: events that that you know, decision makers do have control over.

627
00:36:16,120 --> 00:36:17,160
Speaker 4: You know, these things sit.

628
00:36:17,239 --> 00:36:20,880
Speaker 5: Right in the middle, right, terrorist events, war, you know,

629
00:36:21,400 --> 00:36:25,120
Speaker 5: in a lot of circumstances, those are completely extraneous events

630
00:36:25,160 --> 00:36:28,160
Speaker 5: to a lot of participants in these markets. And these

631
00:36:28,200 --> 00:36:31,239
Speaker 5: markets June are also you know, potentially helpful ways to

632
00:36:31,320 --> 00:36:33,719
Speaker 5: hedge various types of risk that you might bear. Right,

633
00:36:33,800 --> 00:36:36,719
Speaker 5: if you're running, I don't know, a wholesale operation that

634
00:36:36,840 --> 00:36:41,040
Speaker 5: requires shipping things through the strait of horror moves and

635
00:36:41,040 --> 00:36:43,600
Speaker 5: and you're quite worried that war is basically going to

636
00:36:43,640 --> 00:36:47,239
Speaker 5: shut down your business, you know, having some type of

637
00:36:47,280 --> 00:36:50,759
Speaker 5: insurance or a more exciting version of insurance, right, taking

638
00:36:50,760 --> 00:36:54,239
Speaker 5: a position in these in these prediction markets might be

639
00:36:54,640 --> 00:36:57,760
Speaker 5: a particularly good way to to try to hedge those risks.

640
00:36:57,960 --> 00:37:00,000
Speaker 5: So on some level, you know, is this just gonna

641
00:37:00,280 --> 00:37:04,440
Speaker 5: push things back into insurance markets that may be less

642
00:37:04,480 --> 00:37:08,120
Speaker 5: competitive than having more choices out there, So, you know,

643
00:37:08,160 --> 00:37:10,520
Speaker 5: I think that's gonna be, you know, potentially a problem.

644
00:37:10,560 --> 00:37:12,800
Speaker 5: I think another one is, you know, we're exactly do

645
00:37:12,840 --> 00:37:15,680
Speaker 5: you set the boundaries things like terrorism and war affect

646
00:37:15,719 --> 00:37:18,880
Speaker 5: a lot of other things that don't at least optically

647
00:37:18,960 --> 00:37:21,799
Speaker 5: look like their terrorism and war. Right, Like, you know,

648
00:37:21,960 --> 00:37:25,399
Speaker 5: does a prediction market contract that says, you know, we're

649
00:37:25,400 --> 00:37:28,319
Speaker 5: making predictions on how many ships are going to pass

650
00:37:28,360 --> 00:37:30,440
Speaker 5: through the strait of horror moves? Is it going to

651
00:37:30,520 --> 00:37:32,680
Speaker 5: be more than a hundred or less than one hundred,

652
00:37:32,840 --> 00:37:35,400
Speaker 5: you know a day in the month of April. Is

653
00:37:35,440 --> 00:37:38,640
Speaker 5: that a war contract? Or is that a shipping contract?

654
00:37:38,760 --> 00:37:38,960
Speaker 4: Right?

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00:37:39,280 --> 00:37:42,080
Speaker 5: And you know, on some level it could be both.

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Speaker 5: And so I envision a lot a lot of sort

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Speaker 5: of boundary marking that's going to be heavily freighted, and

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00:37:48,600 --> 00:37:50,600
Speaker 5: there's easy it's going to be easy to spot things

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Speaker 5: that ended up on the permitted side of the boundary

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Speaker 5: that pretty much look and walk and talk and act

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Speaker 5: as though they're a bet on war or terrorism, a lot.

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Speaker 2: More to come with these platforms. Thanks so much.

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Speaker 4: Eric.

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Speaker 2: That's Professor Eric Tally of Columbia Law School. His podcast

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Speaker 2: is called Beyond Unprecedented. And that's it for this edition

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Speaker 2: of The Bloomberg Law Show. Remember you can always get

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Speaker 2: the latest legal news on our Bloomberg Law podcasts. You

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00:38:17,600 --> 00:38:21,680
Speaker 2: can find them on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, and at www

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Speaker 2: dot Bloomberg dot com slash podcast Slash Law, And remember

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Speaker 2: to tune into The Bloomberg Law Show every weeknight at

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Speaker 2: ten pm Wall Street Time. I'm June Grosso and you're

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Speaker 2: listening to Bloomberg