Speaker 1: Hi, I'm Ethan Natalman, and this is Psychoactive, a production
Speaker 1: of I Heart Radio and Protozoa Pictures. Psychoactive is the
Speaker 1: show where we talk about all things drugs. But any
Speaker 1: views expressed here do not represent those of I Heart Media,
Speaker 1: Protozoa Pictures, or their executives and employees. Indeed, Heed, as
Speaker 1: an inveterate contrarian, I can tell you they may not
Speaker 1: even represent my own. And nothing contained in this show
Speaker 1: should be used as medical advice or encouragement to use
Speaker 1: any type of drugs. Hello, Psychoactive listeners. Today we're going
Speaker 1: to talk about the drug problem and drug policies in
Speaker 1: a particular country. Probably no other country in the world
Speaker 1: has had such a fluid and counterintuitive history of rugs
Speaker 1: as Iran. So my guest today is a professor Maziar Gabi.
Speaker 1: We crossed paths a few months ago in Mexico City
Speaker 1: at the conference of the Society of Alcohol and Droyg
Speaker 1: Historians UH. He's a distinguished professor or lecturer at the
Speaker 1: University of Exeter in the UK now where he heads
Speaker 1: the Center of Persian and Iranian Studies. He wrote a
Speaker 1: book about drugs and politics and Iran and it's a
Speaker 1: fantastic description of what's happened, especially during the years since
Speaker 1: Iran became the Islamic Republic with the revolution in nineteen
Speaker 1: seventy nine. So Masira, thank you ever so much for
Speaker 1: joining me on Psychoactive. Hi Don and hi to everyone.
Speaker 1: It's a pleasure to be here. What I want to
Speaker 1: say is I've been fascinated by Iran. Really, I think
Speaker 1: early two thousand, Maziar and almost out of the blue,
Speaker 1: the government in Iran and the Minister of Justice basically
Speaker 1: issued a fatua. If I have these facts right, declare
Speaker 1: that method on maintenance and needle exchange, We're okay under
Speaker 1: Islamic law. And I just found that fast. I remember
Speaker 1: I was at a conference at International Harmoniament conference, I
Speaker 1: think it was in in Northern Ireland, Belfast in two
Speaker 1: thousand five, and remember standing up as part of my
Speaker 1: speech there and talking about the fact that that I
Speaker 1: had told Iran it just issued a thought was saying
Speaker 1: that all of this was okay, and that meanwhile, our own,
Speaker 1: quote unquote I had told the United States would not
Speaker 1: do something differently. So that's what initially caught my attention
Speaker 1: on this thing. But at the same time, Iran has
Speaker 1: been a country that's been highly repressive. It's had the
Speaker 1: death penalty for drug offenses, It's had huge, you know,
Speaker 1: battles with narco traffickers. So let me just start off
Speaker 1: by asking you the question what got you interested in
Speaker 1: looking in this drug issue in Iran. You know, I
Speaker 1: was a student in my late twenties and I was
Speaker 1: doing fieldwork in Iran for other purposes, and I noticed that,
Speaker 1: you know, all around me and everyone I met basically,
Speaker 1: and also lots of organizations on the ground were active
Speaker 1: in the field of drug policy and drug treatment. And
Speaker 1: I started looking for potential articles that could inform me
Speaker 1: a bit more, and I saw nothing, basically, and so
Speaker 1: I decided basically to take the case of drugs both
Speaker 1: historically and in terms of you know, like real life
Speaker 1: and life world. There's a case study and they spent
Speaker 1: about seven eight years on the subject, and I'm still
Speaker 1: working on it and collaborating on it. One thing that's
Speaker 1: been striking about Iran is that, really, since the end
Speaker 1: of the war with Iraq in the late eighties, the
Speaker 1: drug issue seems to have been the number one issue
Speaker 1: in public opinion, at least in terms of social issues,
Speaker 1: um almost continuously for decades. I mean, tell me if
Speaker 1: that's accurate. First of all, but I can also see
Speaker 1: why this is such a fascinating issue, why I must
Speaker 1: have been curious that there was so little writing about
Speaker 1: it give and how important it's been in Iranian politics
Speaker 1: and culture. Absolutely, of course during the eighties. You know,
Speaker 1: Iran had been through so much in just less than
Speaker 1: a decade. Basically, we had the revolution in nineteen seventy nine,
Speaker 1: with all that a revolution means, you know, it's not
Speaker 1: simply an event, it's just a dramatic, profound change in
Speaker 1: people's life and in the way people imagine the futures
Speaker 1: as well. In the war, you know, a brutal war basically,
Speaker 1: you know, one of the war that was fought basically
Speaker 1: in the same way that First World War and Second
Speaker 1: World War we fought, so you know, trenches and you
Speaker 1: know this kind of stuff. But at the same time,
Speaker 1: I should actually sort I mentioned that while all of
Speaker 1: this was happening, the drug issue and was still at
Speaker 1: the very sort of core of political issues and political
Speaker 1: concerns for their and in government right after the revolution.
Speaker 1: I mean, I just can't recall a statement by the
Speaker 1: late Ayatollahomany, you know, the leader of the revolution and
Speaker 1: the supreme leader of Iran in the eighties, that he
Speaker 1: said that we have to fight the war on two fronts.
Speaker 1: The first front we all know about it, it's the
Speaker 1: war against Iraq an Iraqi aggression. But the second front,
Speaker 1: which was not at all less important, was the war
Speaker 1: against dragon addiction. So this is just to give you
Speaker 1: a sense of how entrenched it was with the political
Speaker 1: history of revolution in Iran and also the way basically
Speaker 1: it made me understand that it was a topic that
Speaker 1: had deep roots in the post revolutionary history of Iran
Speaker 1: and so it really needed to be discussed with all
Speaker 1: your attention. Now, if we bring it down to the
Speaker 1: drug issue, one of the things that Iran has in
Speaker 1: common with other countries, especially in Asia, is opium has
Speaker 1: been part of its history for thousands of years. And
Speaker 1: if you jump to the present right now, um my understanding.
Speaker 1: We all of times think about the US is having
Speaker 1: one of the biggest opia problems in the world, but
Speaker 1: if you look per capita, Iran and Pakistan and Afghanistan
Speaker 1: are probably the three countries with the highest per capita
Speaker 1: opium use and addiction rates by my opius, I say,
Speaker 1: opium and heroin and other you know opiates um in
Speaker 1: the world. So MASI are Now I've sort of provided
Speaker 1: this broader context. I mean, what more can you tell
Speaker 1: us then about sort of the Iran special relationship with
Speaker 1: opium going back historically, you know, opium has had a
Speaker 1: very important historical role in both Iran's economy and in
Speaker 1: Iranian social sort of traditions and social life. From the
Speaker 1: late nineteenth century, the Iranian economy and I can culture
Speaker 1: shifts towards the cultivation of the poppy. That was connected
Speaker 1: also to the sort of increased demands for copy related products,
Speaker 1: particularly opium, across the world. And that shifting agricultural production
Speaker 1: has profound effects on on the way Iranian if you
Speaker 1: want to shift to capitalism happens, you know, with capital accommodation,
Speaker 1: with new cash crops, you know, instead of uh, you know,
Speaker 1: food crops. For a country which up to you know,
Speaker 1: a century ago, it was mostly agricultural and producing food
Speaker 1: for his own consumption, that was a massive, massive change
Speaker 1: which had its own effects of course on the rising
Speaker 1: opium consumption on the vast scale that you know, we
Speaker 1: witness of course from the early twentieth century with people
Speaker 1: oftimes failed to realize is that opium is integrated into
Speaker 1: many societies in some respects, almost like alcohol. I mean,
Speaker 1: you have the United States in the late nineteenth century
Speaker 1: far more people using um opius in various forms than
Speaker 1: is the case today. It's in you know, loud and
Speaker 1: m liquid. Opius has used as you know, this is
Speaker 1: the day before they had aspirin or penicillan, so when
Speaker 1: they had bad sanitation. So opium is really sort of
Speaker 1: a universal pain reliever throughout much of the world. Now,
Speaker 1: what you see happening in I think Southwest Asia and
Speaker 1: but also in Southeast Asia is that it's also very
Speaker 1: commonly used, not just among lower class but among upper class.
Speaker 1: It's seen as not just being something that's a soporific,
Speaker 1: but sometimes they can be a stimulant um. You know,
Speaker 1: it's not just you know, sort of opium dens but
Speaker 1: high end almost like cocktail lounge versions of these things.
Speaker 1: And you see this in China, you see it in
Speaker 1: parts of India, obviously, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran. You see it
Speaker 1: among the Chinese minorities in Southeast Asia, but in the
Speaker 1: Iran do you think it goes even deeper than it
Speaker 1: does in the neighboring countries of like sat Pakistan and
Speaker 1: Afghanistan and elsewhere. This is really interesting question. Um. Perhaps
Speaker 1: in the run um opium culture really sort of became
Speaker 1: a social practice that characterized really sort of the higher
Speaker 1: lead as well as the middle class and the lower class,
Speaker 1: but of course in different forms and different qualities of
Speaker 1: products being consumed. And this is particularly true when we
Speaker 1: speak about the sort of pre revolutionary period, I mean
Speaker 1: certain parts of around uh, the whole social life really
Speaker 1: turned around meeting, drinking tea, smoking opition. And this was
Speaker 1: mostly done in private settings at home of well of people,
Speaker 1: which had you know, specific quarters and rooms where open
Speaker 1: was consumed smoked mostly through a specific type of pipe
Speaker 1: which in i run is called four. It's a valiation
Speaker 1: of a Chinese pipe. It's very peculiar to Iran and
Speaker 1: and also quite interesting and esthetically I would say pleasing
Speaker 1: when you when you look at it, I mean you
Speaker 1: know it's a pipe and the head of which is
Speaker 1: in the shape of a poppy. Uh and uh. And
Speaker 1: and of course that many of course valiations and precious
Speaker 1: ones of course have inscribed poetic versus and poetical lines,
Speaker 1: which shows you how deeply ingrained opium consumption, particularly opum smoking,
Speaker 1: had become by the turn of the twentieth century. It
Speaker 1: is true that opium has always more or less been
Speaker 1: part of social life in Iran and also the practice
Speaker 1: of self care and medical care in premodern times, but
Speaker 1: prior to the twentieth century it was mostly eaten in
Speaker 1: the forms of pills actually, you know, and Iran still now.
Speaker 1: When someone is really uh, sort of a local and speaks,
Speaker 1: you know, with ease in public, people can always make
Speaker 1: a comment say, oh, he's a talio key, which in
Speaker 1: person means he's an opium music, because you know, maintaining
Speaker 1: calm and lucidity of thought while being in front of
Speaker 1: the public is not easy. I mean, we may say
Speaker 1: that the equivalent of this is, you know, some people
Speaker 1: use so called smart drugs, you know, pharmaceutical products that
Speaker 1: help them to maintain concentration and think faster when they
Speaker 1: need to deliver speeching in public. I mean, you know,
Speaker 1: prior to the revolution, I mean, there was widespread acceptance
Speaker 1: even even in quarters of government, regarding opium use. Of course,
Speaker 1: this is shifting and has shifted. I mean over the
Speaker 1: course of the twentieth century, uh, you know, mostly by
Speaker 1: adopting westernized ideas of consumption and entertainment. You know, so
Speaker 1: alcohol has become a less sort of stigmatized so do product,
Speaker 1: whereas drugs such as opium among the younger generation is
Speaker 1: seen as something that really belongs to another era and
Speaker 1: it's more stigmatized. I would say, So it is much
Speaker 1: more you sort of common to see someone drinking nowadays,
Speaker 1: in especially in the in the larger urban centers than
Speaker 1: smoking opium among you know, new generations of it. Well,
Speaker 1: let me askee this because visu, the alcohol, I mean,
Speaker 1: alcohol is traditionally Haram. It's prohibited in Islamic culture. And
Speaker 1: you say, unlike say East Asia, where societies have alcohol
Speaker 1: and they have opium, in Iran you have a place
Speaker 1: where opium and I guess cannabis for that matter, are
Speaker 1: not Haran. They're not you know, technically forbidden under Islamic law.
Speaker 1: But alcohol is. And is there something about the prohibition
Speaker 1: on alcohol that actually gives opium a more a sort
Speaker 1: of added special value. And it's in Islamic society and
Speaker 1: an Iranian society. The fact is that really what happens
Speaker 1: after nineteen seventy nine, with the revolution, is that Romany
Speaker 1: declares opium to be around, and that was embraced more
Speaker 1: or less by the rest of the clergy. It is
Speaker 1: interesting because with the Islamization, you know, if you want
Speaker 1: of governance and government, the distinction between religion and sort
Speaker 1: of public law is blurred, and therefore what is forbidden
Speaker 1: in you know, in the legal order of the country.
Speaker 1: In that case, like all drugs, including opium, cocaine and whatever,
Speaker 1: they all become forbidden also for religion. So actually the
Speaker 1: country of what we would normally think that religion sort
Speaker 1: of imposes, you know, it's decreased upon public life. It's
Speaker 1: it's the adoption of you know, the international sort of
Speaker 1: anti narcotic discourse that makes religious leaders to to ban
Speaker 1: religious to cree I mean by by by basically declaring
Speaker 1: a fatwa religious decree and and calling opium and other
Speaker 1: substances as around. So nowadays most of the clergy would
Speaker 1: have no doubt in saying that in Islam all narcotic
Speaker 1: substances and all illicit drugs are also around. But what
Speaker 1: you said is interesting because prior to this sort of
Speaker 1: moment of embraced by very religious leaders of of of
Speaker 1: sort of drug prohibition opium and cannabis, but mostly opium
Speaker 1: was seen as less problematic, more indigenous than alcoholic beverages.
Speaker 1: So and that of course has had an effect on
Speaker 1: how people generally and the general population perceived the substance.
Speaker 1: But it is also it is itself also sort of
Speaker 1: showing that these substances were widespread, whereas alcohol in general,
Speaker 1: fire the mid twenty cent tree was not really readily
Speaker 1: available across the country. So it may have been available
Speaker 1: in major cities, but you know, most people wouldn't drink.
Speaker 1: There is a sort of a tradition of kind of
Speaker 1: homebrew of beer or other sorts of things throughout the
Speaker 1: throughout Iran in rural areas. Of course, yeah, that these
Speaker 1: traditions mostly connected also to minorities. So you know, Armenian
Speaker 1: and Jewish minorities in Iran, which were you know, rather
Speaker 1: large groups up to the twentieth century had the right,
Speaker 1: the legal right to brew and particular to produce wine.
Speaker 1: But also some Iranian producers. But I would say that
Speaker 1: it was less common for rural communities to drink the time,
Speaker 1: and drinking was mostly I wouldn't say exclusively but mostly
Speaker 1: a practice carried out by by you know, sort of
Speaker 1: upper classes m h. Whereas open was classless. You know.
Speaker 1: Now there is a fascinating phase ease in Iranian drug
Speaker 1: policy in the seventies which I want to raise in
Speaker 1: part because I was in part shocked that I did
Speaker 1: not know about it. I've talked in past episodes, as
Speaker 1: in Psychoactive, about what happens in the first half of
Speaker 1: the twentieth century when the global drug prohibition regime is
Speaker 1: emerging in you know, with the US playing a powerful
Speaker 1: proselytizing role, but other government's active as well, and they're
Speaker 1: and it's focused really on opium and opium control of
Speaker 1: conventions in the first nineteen o nine opium control of
Speaker 1: conventions and the subsequent conventions. And as a result, what
Speaker 1: happens both in Southwest Asia and Southeast Asia is that
Speaker 1: opium control systems are set up, registration systems where people,
Speaker 1: generally the elderly in Southeast Asia is oftentimes the Chinese
Speaker 1: minorities can basically register, not unlike registering for say, a
Speaker 1: method on program, and then get their opium in clinics
Speaker 1: or pharmacies. And the system is tax and it becomes
Speaker 1: a fairly orderly way of dealing with opium, and a
Speaker 1: somewhat more regulated way in both Southwest Asia and Southeast Asia.
Speaker 1: But then the kind of you know, prohibitionist mentality in
Speaker 1: the US results in that thing being shut down. Now,
Speaker 1: what happens in the middle of the twentieth century, um
Speaker 1: is that most of these opium monopoly opium control systems
Speaker 1: get shut down under pressure from the US, from the
Speaker 1: League of Nations, from the United Nations. So that you
Speaker 1: get to the nineteen fifties and sixties, and basically there
Speaker 1: are essentially, as far as I know, no such opium
Speaker 1: maintenance systems in existence. And then out of the blue,
Speaker 1: at least from where I'm looking, the Shah in nineteen
Speaker 1: sixty nine or seventy decides to reinitiate this program. And
Speaker 1: so by the middle late seventies you now have Iran,
Speaker 1: as I think, the only country in the world within
Speaker 1: opium maintenance regular story system like the ones that existed
Speaker 1: earlier in the century two thou people registered. So I mean,
Speaker 1: I it's reading about this in your book, mus I mean,
Speaker 1: how does this happen? Why does this happen? Why does
Speaker 1: the Shah who is so keen for close relationships with
Speaker 1: the you know, the US and so keen on modernization.
Speaker 1: How did and why does that happen at that time? Yeah,
Speaker 1: that's the question I have asked myself as well. And
Speaker 1: I mean the response I come up with, I hope
Speaker 1: is exhaustive, is that it was a sort of combination
Speaker 1: of events and of situations. Basically, you know, first of all,
Speaker 1: something that comes as a surprise, often he's not a
Speaker 1: surprise because when we look back at the history of
Speaker 1: drug policy in Iran and the approach that sort of
Speaker 1: successive Iranian governments had during the twentieth century visa the opium,
Speaker 1: I noticed at least that there were examples of an
Speaker 1: interest in maintenance policies on opium already early in the
Speaker 1: twentieth century. This was right after the first convention of
Speaker 1: open control in nineteen o nine. In nineteen twelve, but
Speaker 1: of course I ran you know, from then onwards starts
Speaker 1: to basically restrict the sort of approachated test towards opium.
Speaker 1: By nineteen sixty nine, after fourteen years of restrict militarized
Speaker 1: eradication of the poppy and opium economy in Iran, they
Speaker 1: shall decides as you said, to introduce this sort of
Speaker 1: regulated market and medicalized program of open distribution. This happens
Speaker 1: basically because while I RUN had prohibited opening production and
Speaker 1: public cultivation from nineteen fifty five onwards, Afghanistan and Turkey
Speaker 1: kept producing large amounts of opium and opium, much of
Speaker 1: it you know, enter the Run illegally, and Iran having had,
Speaker 1: you know, throughout twentieth century a large population of opium
Speaker 1: and herron uses, and particularly from nineties and fifty seven
Speaker 1: herron appeared in I RUN, so quite early on actually
Speaker 1: in terms of herring culture, the shah and and the
Speaker 1: entourage of course of the shah Uh, in order to
Speaker 1: put pressure on American allies, but mostly and And and
Speaker 1: the United States in particular, decided to go back to
Speaker 1: a regulated, medicalized program, which basically would cut the link
Speaker 1: between Afghan opium and opiate producers and Iranian criminal organizations
Speaker 1: distributing illicit opium inside Iran, and the state would basically
Speaker 1: took over the opium economy. And what is interesting is
Speaker 1: that so we would expect that with the regulated market
Speaker 1: for the opium, you know, supervised by medical professionals, the
Speaker 1: approach towards drug offenses might be milder, you know, more lenient,
Speaker 1: but what happens is quite the country. We have a regulated,
Speaker 1: you know, state monopoly of opium, and the state actually
Speaker 1: applies the death penalty against drug traffickers. What is the
Speaker 1: rational behind this, I mean, in the rational in my view,
Speaker 1: is that really the path of the state, and the
Speaker 1: Shah wanted to make sure that since now opium is
Speaker 1: in the interests of the state, it's you know, it's
Speaker 1: part of the state economy. They have no competitors and
Speaker 1: elicit criminal organizations basically do not increased prices in order
Speaker 1: to compete with the legal economy of opium. And as
Speaker 1: I understand it, the market was sort of half older
Speaker 1: people over the age of sixty who had sort of
Speaker 1: more liberal access to the opium, and then a whole
Speaker 1: the other half of the where people were younger who
Speaker 1: could get it, you know, basically recommend it by a doctor,
Speaker 1: not unlike the way that medical marijuana has been recommended
Speaker 1: by doctors in the US, where it could be used
Speaker 1: for pain or even for I guess, treating addiction. I mean,
Speaker 1: do I have that right from what I read in
Speaker 1: your book exactly exactly, so you know, over sixty people
Speaker 1: could just go and and get their basically ratio of
Speaker 1: opium easily from a pharmacy, and people under sixty needed
Speaker 1: you know, a GP, a doctor, a physician to prescribe
Speaker 1: you know them opium, and and the reasons for prescription
Speaker 1: were the most different. I mean, you know, it could
Speaker 1: be from you know, I have a chronic dependence to opium,
Speaker 1: so I need opium and that was sufficient. Or I
Speaker 1: have back pain, I have a headache, I have you know,
Speaker 1: stomach problems. And there was really a long list of
Speaker 1: potential reasons for which you could be prescribed opium. Mm hmm.
Speaker 1: So why is he run the only country in the
Speaker 1: world to do this? I mean, other countries have powerful
Speaker 1: traditions that you know, going back hundreds of not thousands
Speaker 1: of years of opium use in Southwest Asia, Southern Asia,
Speaker 1: and Southeast Asia, but none of them do it. I mean,
Speaker 1: to the extent that you've looked at other countries in
Speaker 1: the world, you have any idea why Iran was alone
Speaker 1: in doing this in the seventies. It's really a good question.
Speaker 1: I mean, it's often easier to say why someone does
Speaker 1: something rather than why they don't do it. But I guess,
Speaker 1: I guess, you know, the sort of growing sort of
Speaker 1: assertiveness of past of Iran in the seventies is surely
Speaker 1: I think in case, I mean, in my view, from
Speaker 1: the cases absent foreign pressure, particularly US pressure on drug
Speaker 1: control have been really really influential in the shaping of policy,
Speaker 1: especially following the fifties. So after the Second World War.
Speaker 1: On the other hand, I may say that, you know,
Speaker 1: Iran had a large portion of the population that consumed opium.
Speaker 1: Without this habits becoming a manifest problem, something that you know,
Speaker 1: would cause a sort of moral outrage in the public.
Speaker 1: I'm sure there are other cases in which in which
Speaker 1: there has been widespread use of opium without you know,
Speaker 1: what some people you know, called moral panic. But but
Speaker 1: in general, I you know, if you go beyond opium
Speaker 1: and look at coca and cocaine. You know, countries in
Speaker 1: Latin America nowadays are trying to move towards a regulated market.
Speaker 1: I mean, of course, Latin America being too close to
Speaker 1: the northern neighbor to the US makes things very difficult.
Speaker 1: But you know, the interest and and sort of division
Speaker 1: is there putting it into place. Sometimes it is really
Speaker 1: costly and in a way. I mean, Bolivia and Peru
Speaker 1: do stand out as being somewhat unique in maintaining the
Speaker 1: legal status of coca. I mean, right from the beginning,
Speaker 1: they make it clear that they're signing out international conventions,
Speaker 1: but they have a special p which to be abow
Speaker 1: to do this, which it seems that none of the
Speaker 1: countries that had opium as their core traditional uh sort
Speaker 1: of psychotropic psychoactive plant product, we're able to do early on.
Speaker 1: I think, I mean, it's I think this is an
Speaker 1: excellent point. I mean, the fact is that although opium
Speaker 1: has always had a place in the cultural life of
Speaker 1: Iran and other countries where you know, open is important India, China, Afghanistan, Pakistan,
Speaker 1: I mean you and many other places including Turkey, it
Speaker 1: never became an uncontested substance. I mean, what I mean
Speaker 1: is that with modernization, with the establishment of the sort
Speaker 1: of modern nation state across the world. You know, we're
Speaker 1: talking about the late nineteenth century, early tenth century, open
Speaker 1: was contentious because part of the population and part of
Speaker 1: the elites so as undermining the efforts to basically create
Speaker 1: a modern nation that was not indulging in you know,
Speaker 1: sort of unproductive habit and and and and of course
Speaker 1: part of the elites were also consuming opium, so you
Speaker 1: know there were different debates around around what to do
Speaker 1: with these substances. I mean, Iran itself, you know, has
Speaker 1: had long, long debates since the nineteenth century about what
Speaker 1: to do with opium, whether to ban it, not to
Speaker 1: ban it, and these debates actually predated, you know, many
Speaker 1: of the drug policy debates that we you know, we've
Speaker 1: been looking at starting from early twentieth century. So because
Speaker 1: the substance is indigenous to around and has been part
Speaker 1: of the cultural and political life, you know, the opinions
Speaker 1: are divergent, but you know, at different moments and different
Speaker 1: sort of political conditions, you know, specific groups had the
Speaker 1: upper hand. You know, some times where the prohibsionists sometimes
Speaker 1: we're not the prohibsionist. Again, let's let's the first shot.
Speaker 1: You know, he established a modern state in ninety five.
Speaker 1: You know, he was about to establish a republic of course,
Speaker 1: because he was a military leader, you know, so he
Speaker 1: was he was a soldier, so you know, there was
Speaker 1: no reason for him to establish a monarchy. But then
Speaker 1: under foreign pressure, republics were seen as more unruly and
Speaker 1: Le's culptable. You know, he was persuaded to establish a monarchy.
Speaker 1: And you know, as a soldier, you know, he really
Speaker 1: believed in you know, more than his ideas of nation
Speaker 1: building through the army and development programs. But you know,
Speaker 1: also as in Iranian you know, he had developed the
Speaker 1: habit of smoking opium. This was quite ambiguous, you know
Speaker 1: for someone who you know, was westernizing Iran. So you know,
Speaker 1: from then onwards, really, you know, opium had this ambiguous
Speaker 1: place in Iranian politics. And and sometimes the policy is
Speaker 1: put in place where not really representative of of the
Speaker 1: cultural practice or even of the ideas of people in
Speaker 1: power unless so people you know, like we're part of,
Speaker 1: you know, sort of ordinary social groups. We'll be talking
Speaker 1: more after we hear this ad. You know, I remember
Speaker 1: I meant seventy nine and I was twenty two. I
Speaker 1: was graduating from college, And I mean the Iranian revolution
Speaker 1: that shot is out i Atollah many returns, the establishment
Speaker 1: of what appeared to us as a the theocratic dictatorship
Speaker 1: in the Iran and and people you know, they're you know,
Speaker 1: both political dissidents but also drug users and drug dealers
Speaker 1: are being executed or tordtured or in prison. So that
Speaker 1: period of the nineteen eighties, Um, I mean, obviously there's
Speaker 1: this major war, you know, launched by Sodom Hussein that
Speaker 1: drags on throughout the eighties and like a half a
Speaker 1: million people die, most of the Iranian So this is
Speaker 1: amazing drain on Iran. But at the same time, Um,
Speaker 1: there is this war on drugs going on. And I
Speaker 1: think there's a line you're using your book. I don't
Speaker 1: know if you're quoting somebody else or if it's yours,
Speaker 1: but you say, the prohibition of drugs and alcohol became
Speaker 1: a new religion. So this period, this first decade under
Speaker 1: Howmany and where the current Ayatollah how many how Many
Speaker 1: was at that point was the president in the eighties,
Speaker 1: I mean, is it all about just shutting down everything,
Speaker 1: being as doctrinaire, as religious as possible. And is this
Speaker 1: a period in the last forty years when there is
Speaker 1: a sort of more religiously driven drug policy which then
Speaker 1: really morphs into something quite different thereafter. Yeah, I mean
Speaker 1: the line you met ancient his mind. I'm very happy
Speaker 1: about that line because in the way I actually believe that,
Speaker 1: you know, prohibitionist regime throughout the world are quite religiously driven,
Speaker 1: I mean in their sort of dogmatism. But yes, with
Speaker 1: the Islamic Revolution, really with drugs entered the political realm,
Speaker 1: you know, openly, and you know they association with drugs
Speaker 1: are seen as country revolutionary and that means you know,
Speaker 1: punished with you know what is often the punishment of
Speaker 1: people being seen as country revolutionary, which is you know,
Speaker 1: through revolutionary courts and with very harsh punishments, you know,
Speaker 1: including the death sentence sold Holly, which was the first
Speaker 1: public prosecutor of the Islamic Republic in nineteen seventy nine,
Speaker 1: nine eighty. This is so somehow forgotten from the annals
Speaker 1: of history. When he was appointed first public prosecutor, he
Speaker 1: was also appointed at the same time the first head
Speaker 1: of Anti Narcotics of the Islamic Republic. So the two
Speaker 1: appointments went hand in hand because of course, you know,
Speaker 1: political repression and repression of narcotics were seen as you know,
Speaker 1: absolutely connected to each other, and often political opponents and
Speaker 1: people connected to the Patavi state and pat La vi elite.
Speaker 1: We're seen also as either indulging in a drug consumption
Speaker 1: or involved in law skate transnational drug trafficking. This sort
Speaker 1: of framework of treatment of addiction and the sort of
Speaker 1: medicalized policy for opium uses is disbanded immediately after the revolution,
Speaker 1: but the political leadership provides a six month period two
Speaker 1: people who were on the program to kick their habit, basically,
Speaker 1: that's what they say, and they provide them with the
Speaker 1: opium prescription. But they decide, and this is a clear
Speaker 1: ideological decision on behalf of the new revolutionary government to
Speaker 1: import opium from India rather than using opium from poppy
Speaker 1: fields in Iran, just to make sure that the message
Speaker 1: is clear, they will not tolerate the popular economy in
Speaker 1: Iran whatsoever. So clearly, the particularly the first two years
Speaker 1: after the revolution is the most sort of prohibitionist of all.
Speaker 1: It is also instrumental, you know, after revolution, having very
Speaker 1: harsh punishments for something that's was more or less widespread
Speaker 1: prior was very instrumental to put people in jail, opponents
Speaker 1: in jail, or people who were like not useful, and
Speaker 1: and of course, I mean, you know, all sorts of
Speaker 1: terrible stories going on with you know, people using drugs
Speaker 1: in those years, and I refer to some of these
Speaker 1: in my book. These are also you know, sort of
Speaker 1: common knowledge and Run, and it's written in Run as well.
Speaker 1: I mean that, you know, the treatment of drug uses
Speaker 1: following the revolution wasn't really particularly you know, sort of
Speaker 1: laudable or you know, right, I mean, it's I mean,
Speaker 1: it's harsh punishment, it's public shaming, all of the sort
Speaker 1: of primitive approaches that we sort of look compound with contempt.
Speaker 1: I think even there at the day, I mean there
Speaker 1: was even some negative reaction from members of the Iranian public,
Speaker 1: I mean even legitimate sources who saw some of what
Speaker 1: kal Kali was doing is antithetical to some core Islamic principles,
Speaker 1: right absolutely. I mean, you know what is interesting, and
Speaker 1: this is I think quite sort of I knew, I
Speaker 1: guess to for an audience that is not really sort
Speaker 1: of perhaps interested in the in Iran or you know,
Speaker 1: follows news about Irun mostly from newspapers and online outlets,
Speaker 1: that the debate within Iran, even during the height of
Speaker 1: the revolution, has always been quite diverse. I mean, the
Speaker 1: you know, always multiple lines of criticism have existed within
Speaker 1: the history of the Islamic Republic, but also multiple lines
Speaker 1: of repression. Of course, that that needs to be said.
Speaker 1: People criticize really I mean, perhaps it is useful to
Speaker 1: know that today I told, really is not someone who
Speaker 1: celebrated in Iran. Quite the contrary. He's seen as a
Speaker 1: as a tragic, shameful or somehow character of the revolution,
Speaker 1: but he basically represents the harshest face of that revolution.
Speaker 1: I mean himself. I mean I read his diaries and
Speaker 1: his autobiography. When appointed the head of the Anti Narcotics Bureau,
Speaker 1: he said that he was aware that this will leave
Speaker 1: you know, a terrible, a terrible legacy for himself in history.
Speaker 1: He was aware, you know that the position and the situation,
Speaker 1: the revolution situation, uh would be violent, and this would
Speaker 1: of course mean that you know, his legacy in history
Speaker 1: would be associated to the violence of disease. So when
Speaker 1: we get to the late nineteen eighties, I mean, there's
Speaker 1: obviously this period of the drug war in the first
Speaker 1: decade of the Islamic regime um. But at the same time,
Speaker 1: heroin uses increasing, and you know, there's a phenomens beginning
Speaker 1: to happen throughout other parts developing world. You know, also
Speaker 1: in East Agea, which has very you know, very harsh
Speaker 1: views on drugs, but you have the beginnings of concerns
Speaker 1: about the spread of HIV AIDS among drug users. You
Speaker 1: had the beginning have talk among health officials and civil
Speaker 1: society groups. And this happens not just an Iran, but
Speaker 1: other places about whether they need to adopt some of
Speaker 1: the measures in the in the West, like needle exchange,
Speaker 1: like method on maintenance. But what's distinctive about Iran is
Speaker 1: that when this gets going, it gets going on a
Speaker 1: level and a magnitude that is unparalleled virtually anywhere else
Speaker 1: in the world. I mean, I remember being in Malaysia
Speaker 1: and nearly two thousands and there was a little couple
Speaker 1: a couple of small needle exchange programs in the big
Speaker 1: cities in the beginning of methanol programing. Has something similar
Speaker 1: going on in in in Vietnam, something similar Indonesia. You
Speaker 1: had parts of India that have been repressed at beginning
Speaker 1: to embrace these sorts of things. Um, I mean, China
Speaker 1: starts to get into in a bigger way, also in
Speaker 1: the context of a very you know, harsh drug policy.
Speaker 1: But I'd say apart from China, Iran is the one
Speaker 1: that embraces this in a way. And you know, beginning
Speaker 1: in the nineteen nineties and certainly when you it into
Speaker 1: the arts, unlike really anywhere else in the world. And
Speaker 1: so what explains that? Is it a magnitude the problem
Speaker 1: or a spirit of pragmatism or what do you say?
Speaker 1: Thanks for this question. I mean it really makes me
Speaker 1: think as well. While I'm speaking to a certain extent,
Speaker 1: I think that is something you know, which is inherent
Speaker 1: in revolutionary regimes, that they are prone to extreme policies,
Speaker 1: of course in the immediate aftermath and afterlife of the revolution.
Speaker 1: But at the same time they are always always sort
Speaker 1: of capable of of change and dynamism in post intervention,
Speaker 1: contrary to you know, other states to school countries you know,
Speaker 1: where revolutions have not happened. I mean, what happens in
Speaker 1: Iran is again a conjuncture, I guess. You know. Of course,
Speaker 1: on the one hand, uh, there is an undeniable public
Speaker 1: health problem. You know, this is you know, basically in
Speaker 1: HIV epidemic which starts in prison, which affects regions, the
Speaker 1: entire regions. I mean, these are regions mostly affected by
Speaker 1: the Iran Iraq War, which itself actually, you know, it's
Speaker 1: quite it's quite interesting because you see how the sort
Speaker 1: of deep, deep effect conflict leaves it stains, you know,
Speaker 1: on on on on the health of the wider population
Speaker 1: even decade a decade after that. So we're talking about
Speaker 1: the western regions of around that having initially an HIV epidemic,
Speaker 1: which then moves the general population. You know, it starts
Speaker 1: from injecting drug uses incarcerated and then moves to their wives,
Speaker 1: their families, their children, and so on and so forth.
Speaker 1: So when you look at other elements of the Muslim world,
Speaker 1: you don't see that flexibility there much more like the US.
Speaker 1: And what I'm curious about, I mean, I mean in
Speaker 1: the Arab world, I mean, you see almost very little
Speaker 1: in the way of progressive drug policies, and it's very
Speaker 1: difficult getting harm reduction going. And um, if you look um,
Speaker 1: you know in Muslim you know, countries like Indonesia, I mean,
Speaker 1: little bits, but very difficult to get it going. And
Speaker 1: what I wonder how much of this has to do
Speaker 1: with the fact that Iran is primarily as she Sa
Speaker 1: religion as opposed to Soony, is there is there a
Speaker 1: greater flexibility in the Shia perspectives on dealing with these
Speaker 1: issues that allowed this to happen, Or is it you
Speaker 1: think primarily other elements. I mean, I personally think that
Speaker 1: this sort of shea element might have some influence in
Speaker 1: terms of the flexibility of interpretation that is given to
Speaker 1: religious tourists, but it's not a sort of determining fact.
Speaker 1: I mean the other issues I think that I have
Speaker 1: influenced this, and part of it has to do with
Speaker 1: Iran's history of experiment action in drug policy. And this
Speaker 1: goes during the Islamic Revolution, during the Islamic Republic Empire,
Speaker 1: Islamic Revolution, so you know, the last hundred years of
Speaker 1: drug policy experimentation and the activism of social groups and
Speaker 1: even political elites that have been keen in looking at
Speaker 1: alternative policies, not only in the field of drugs, but
Speaker 1: in other fields of public health and social policy. You know,
Speaker 1: I can make few examples. For instance, perhaps one example
Speaker 1: that my interest people listening is that from the late
Speaker 1: eighties onwards, Iran has a state sanctioned, state provided program
Speaker 1: for sex reassignment. So that means that if you you know,
Speaker 1: if people want to change their gender, and you know,
Speaker 1: and from men to women or woman to men, the
Speaker 1: Iranian uh public authorities prob I support for that in
Speaker 1: terms of financial support as well as psychological and health support.
Speaker 1: Is this unique in the Islamic world? But in terms
Speaker 1: of drug policy, I see, I think that, you know,
Speaker 1: she a jurisprudence enabled flexibility in terms of finding a
Speaker 1: solution that is that can be basically seen as legitimate.
Speaker 1: So that would be the case in Sunny jurisprudence. Is
Speaker 1: that right? The fact is that in Suna jurisprudence there
Speaker 1: is not a clear jurisprudential order. There are different schools
Speaker 1: of taught and schools of interpretation, but the role of
Speaker 1: the jurists is less prominent than in she Islam. In
Speaker 1: she Islam, every sort of every person has to during
Speaker 1: his life basically to follow a living jurists and as
Speaker 1: long as this person is alive, his interpretation of the law,
Speaker 1: which is connected also to everyday matters, very much like
Speaker 1: in Judaism. You know, can I do this or can
Speaker 1: I live? You know, as with someone who's doing this
Speaker 1: as a neighbor or things like that. Sometimes very trivial matters.
Speaker 1: I can refer to this person to basically explain me
Speaker 1: what is the correct religious behavior? Well, you know, if
Speaker 1: I can mention something is that we did the study
Speaker 1: a few years ago in which we contacted the sort
Speaker 1: of leading religious jurists in the shil world, and we
Speaker 1: asked them whether they're, you know, proven that scientific research
Speaker 1: confirms that marianna has a medical benefit for people using it.
Speaker 1: Would you be fine with, you know, a government approving
Speaker 1: a medical marianna program, a medical cannabis program. And almost
Speaker 1: all of them agreed with this assertion. None of them said, no,
Speaker 1: marianna is always and regardless of any situation, illegal or around.
Speaker 1: They all said, if there is proven medical evidence, of
Speaker 1: course a Muslim can consume marijuana for health benefits, very
Speaker 1: clearly and very shortly. So the fact is that she
Speaker 1: had jurious prudence claims to be always updated with the
Speaker 1: world of today, as it is also intalmoodic Judaism. Of course,
Speaker 1: the fact is that, you know, why do you have
Speaker 1: rabbis interpreting the law constantly? Because the things of the
Speaker 1: world change and changing situation require changing interpretations. Of course,
Speaker 1: within a very conservative framework. Doesn't mean, you know, there's
Speaker 1: a sudden change in you know, like food processing, and
Speaker 1: you know a rabbi says, no, you know, you can
Speaker 1: eat this on Saturday. You know that's not not gonna happen,
Speaker 1: and the same as in she Adjurius prudence, of course.
Speaker 1: But what I mean is when that that specific cultural, social,
Speaker 1: and political conditions in which, for instance, cannabis might be
Speaker 1: seen as ptomatically useful within the I running context, for instance,
Speaker 1: or for that matter, opium, it is not unlikely to
Speaker 1: think that there would be a religious fatua a decree
Speaker 1: that will legitimize the use of it. But it was
Speaker 1: the most I realize I'm working, I have so much
Speaker 1: talk about we're gonna be running out of time. So
Speaker 1: one thing that's to an Iran that is common what
Speaker 1: you see in other places is that part of what
Speaker 1: gets harm reduction going in the late eighties and nineties,
Speaker 1: both what you're talking about the United States, we're talking
Speaker 1: about Europe, or in a later period developing world, it's
Speaker 1: basically has some combination of kind of activists harm reduction
Speaker 1: activists of sort of courageous physicians, of people in public
Speaker 1: health circles who are aware of what's going on in
Speaker 1: the nationally who see the threat of HIV eights taking
Speaker 1: off both in the broader society or in prisons. And
Speaker 1: it seems to me that also happens in Iran, and
Speaker 1: you have some heroic characters. I had a little bit
Speaker 1: of contact with them in past years. One Bijon I
Speaker 1: don't know how to pronounce his last name, and then
Speaker 1: and then the two doctor brothers to say a little
Speaker 1: bit about something, the role that they play and who
Speaker 1: their allies are, and really getting harm reduction going and
Speaker 1: ultimately embraced by some of the more theocratic leaders within Iran. Yeah,
Speaker 1: I mean the sertain harm reduction is is the multilayered one.
Speaker 1: So they were different actors, some of whom, of course
Speaker 1: you met, but there were many others as well. Some
Speaker 1: of them, you know, operated below the radar, as I
Speaker 1: say in my books. Some of them were within the
Speaker 1: government teams itself, you know. So you had policymakers and
Speaker 1: lawmakers that were persuaded that, of course, at the time
Speaker 1: they existing laws were really harming public health for the
Speaker 1: general population, not only for drug use. So they embraced
Speaker 1: harm reduction basically, as one of my interlocutives said, lights off,
Speaker 1: so like driving lights off. So they started implementing, you know,
Speaker 1: sort of programs. This is early two thousand's, so a
Speaker 1: few years before I run legalizes harm reduction in two
Speaker 1: thousand five, and so you have this sort of alliance
Speaker 1: between people in government and geo's so civic society groups
Speaker 1: and drug uses sort of pressure groups and the epidemic,
Speaker 1: which is the contextual event that kind of puts pressure
Speaker 1: on everyone. And at the same time you also had
Speaker 1: ahead of judiciary and he was he was an Ayatolla himself,
Speaker 1: who who very conservative, you know, not prone to you know,
Speaker 1: sort of liberalizing ideas or things like that. He's convinced
Speaker 1: after a few meetings with high ranking people in the
Speaker 1: in the public institutions to adopt harm reduction. I mean,
Speaker 1: there was sort of negotiations between those who were working
Speaker 1: on the ground and implementing sort of informal harm reduction
Speaker 1: policies and interventions and people in government who basically conveyed
Speaker 1: the ideas and the practices that were put in place
Speaker 1: to those who could actually you know, change the law.
Speaker 1: But I think the even more extraordinary event is not
Speaker 1: simply a the run adopted harm reduction, but it's the
Speaker 1: scale of the programs that were adopted. So in the
Speaker 1: method of you know, a few years, I mean by
Speaker 1: two thousand tents, So in five years, Iran adopted method
Speaker 1: on maintenance programs, and then introduced needle exchange programs, and
Speaker 1: then later introduced opium tincture which is basically delivative of opium,
Speaker 1: so that the actually illicit drug and two hundreds of
Speaker 1: thousands of people, you know, the methodon program in Iran,
Speaker 1: together with the programorphine program, which is slightly smaller, you know,
Speaker 1: may have more than a million. I mean, if you
Speaker 1: think about it, more than a million. I mean out
Speaker 1: of a population of eighty three million, you're talking about
Speaker 1: more than one and a hundred. I mean, the analogy
Speaker 1: the United States would be is if three and a
Speaker 1: half million people were on method Honor brupern orphane, which
Speaker 1: you know, we're nowhere close to that. I mean, it's
Speaker 1: a fraction of as so far as I'm aware. So
Speaker 1: you're talking about a magnitude both of illicit drug you know,
Speaker 1: addiction with regarding opioids, as well as treatment that probably
Speaker 1: is number one in the world. It is I think,
Speaker 1: you know, I'm not you know, sort of super keen
Speaker 1: and quantitative approaches, but I guess you know, if you
Speaker 1: look at it in terms of ration be compared across
Speaker 1: the world, I would be surprised if there's any other
Speaker 1: country that has such a huge scope of substitution programs,
Speaker 1: and we might just you know, add that besides these
Speaker 1: sort of vibrant, you know to harm reduction and maintenance
Speaker 1: program that around put in place, there was an explosion
Speaker 1: of addiction treatment facilities, which of course it's much more
Speaker 1: contentious than the harm reduction one because it is unregulated.
Speaker 1: But it means that you know, a large portion of
Speaker 1: the population and basically every single family in the country
Speaker 1: is either touched directly or indirectly by you know, the
Speaker 1: drug the drug issue. Let's take a break here and
Speaker 1: go to an egg. So let me ask you about
Speaker 1: There's two moments you describe in the book a sort
Speaker 1: of shocks to the system. And the first one is
Speaker 1: when the Tally Body leadership I think it's two thousand,
Speaker 1: a year or two before the war in Afghanistan in
Speaker 1: nine eleven UM basically declares that it's going to eradicate
Speaker 1: opium in Afghanistan and more or less succeeds for a year.
Speaker 1: And obviously, at this point Iran is perhaps the biggest
Speaker 1: market for Afghani opium in the world. So there's suddenly
Speaker 1: a major shortage in Iran. Prices going up, availability going down.
Speaker 1: What impact does that have on not just the Iranian
Speaker 1: drug problem but Iradian governmental thinking about how to deal
Speaker 1: with the drug problem. Yeah, and again I think, yeah,
Speaker 1: that that was like really incredible moment. I think, you know,
Speaker 1: in Afghan history and you know in global drug history,
Speaker 1: the Taliban put the band the first time basically Afghanistan
Speaker 1: managers to eradicate the poppy. We don't know whether that
Speaker 1: was an expedient to increase the prices or it was
Speaker 1: actually done, uh, to eradicate the poppy from from the country.
Speaker 1: But in ir and there is you know, widespread panic
Speaker 1: with the country having let's say on top of one
Speaker 1: or two million opium uses. It meant that, you know,
Speaker 1: lack of supply. It didn't mean that people would give
Speaker 1: up the habit. It meant that people would adopt more
Speaker 1: dangerous drug using behaviors, mostly shifting from opium to heroin
Speaker 1: or to adulterated substances. And that's what exactly happened actually
Speaker 1: in in the ear two thousand, some of the running
Speaker 1: officials at that time started contemplating introducing poplic cultivation in
Speaker 1: Iran to bring exactly exactly by basically saying, okay, you know,
Speaker 1: the situation is this. You know, the afghan is not
Speaker 1: gonna send us opum anymore, and our people will need
Speaker 1: opium because you know, we have a large part of
Speaker 1: the population who uses it on a daily basis, and
Speaker 1: we need to provide them with that. It's either recalled
Speaker 1: debate the poppy or introduced method. These were the two options.
Speaker 1: This was quite outspoken and to set an extent actually
Speaker 1: radical reformer within public institutions. And there was also I
Speaker 1: think you describe a brief consideration of offering to Afghanistan
Speaker 1: to buy their opium crossing and use that to supply Yeah,
Speaker 1: and that doesn't where obviously, of course it didn't get
Speaker 1: anywhere also because it ran in Afghanistan. So the Islamic
Speaker 1: Republic has been probably the staunchest enemy of the Taliban regime.
Speaker 1: You know, while in the eighties, you know, the US
Speaker 1: was supporting the Taliban against the Soviets, Iran was fighting them,
Speaker 1: and then they came very close to you know, a
Speaker 1: sort of hot war situation in the nineties. M Now
Speaker 1: you describe a second shock to the system ten years later,
Speaker 1: right when basically I think it's when when the sort
Speaker 1: of populist, authoritarian minded president Ahmadinejad Um is re elected
Speaker 1: in a controversial election, and there's the Green movement, and
Speaker 1: then there's a crackdown, and you describe a sort of
Speaker 1: growing demoralization happening. Not I mean it already precedes that,
Speaker 1: but even gets escalated as a result. And you see
Speaker 1: major change is happening in a ranging society, a big
Speaker 1: drop in the birth rate, the age of marriage increasing,
Speaker 1: premarital sex going up tenfold, increase in in sexually transmitted
Speaker 1: diseases UM. At the same time, you know, there had
Speaker 1: been a growing kind of modern population happening in may
Speaker 1: Ran that was hooked into consumers and all this sort
Speaker 1: of thing. So you have this other kind of broader
Speaker 1: cultural shock. But in the midst of this, this populist
Speaker 1: leader Um, who you know in the US has seen
Speaker 1: in a very very negative light because of many of
Speaker 1: his international policies and declarations. Nonetheless, kind of doubles down
Speaker 1: on harm reduction. I mean, he steps into the shoes
Speaker 1: of a previous president Khatami, who had been a reform
Speaker 1: minded one who was sort of helped move this stuff forward.
Speaker 1: But what you would have might have expected Ahmadinajad as
Speaker 1: a more populist authoritarian figure to do and cracking down.
Speaker 1: He does the opposite. And is that basically just because
Speaker 1: the problem is so monumental? Is it because he has
Speaker 1: the support of the religious authorities and of Amy. What's
Speaker 1: going on with that? Yeah? I think, you know, sort
Speaker 1: of coming to power of ahmadina Jad is a very
Speaker 1: interesting moment in modern Iran. In history and as a
Speaker 1: political figure. He's probably the least understood of old uh
Speaker 1: and the and the most difficult to understand. I mean,
Speaker 1: of course, a clear populist before populism became the rule
Speaker 1: around the world, I mean in contemporary times, very very
Speaker 1: radical in his public speaking, but also completely unorthodox, including
Speaker 1: for a run. You know, let's remember the ahmadina Ja
Speaker 1: compared to his pre the celtsors. He was not a
Speaker 1: religious figure. He was not a cleric. The most Iranian
Speaker 1: presidents have been coming from the clerical establishment. He was,
Speaker 1: you know, an ordinary man, an engineer, was elected on
Speaker 1: the populist platform with very religious, extreme religious ideas. But
Speaker 1: because of his heterodoxy really in politics and religion, he
Speaker 1: was not really scared to adopt positions that were at
Speaker 1: odds with the religious establishment or with you know, with
Speaker 1: the political establishment of world uh. For him, the harm
Speaker 1: reduction issue didn't really represent the problem, but rather an opportunity.
Speaker 1: What happened in those years is that harm reduction is expanded,
Speaker 1: maintenance programs are expanded, the private sector jumps in and
Speaker 1: provides the majority of method and substitution programs in Iran,
Speaker 1: and there is the whole world of treatment of addiction
Speaker 1: that explodes. As the said earlier, partly also you know,
Speaker 1: supported by ahmadinejab himself, who you know attended narcotics anonymous meetings,
Speaker 1: you know they you know, he was very much outspoken
Speaker 1: about the need of treating addiction in Iran. Well, it's
Speaker 1: also dramatic contrast with if you look at say kal
Speaker 1: Khali in the early years of the revolution early eighties,
Speaker 1: who is all about shaming drug users. You describe a
Speaker 1: scene where where Akhmadenija actually is in a stadium of
Speaker 1: twenty thousand former drug users and describing himself as their
Speaker 1: brother who is committed to their recovery. So I mean,
Speaker 1: that was, I mean, really quite something. Although it's also
Speaker 1: interesting because there's a period also I don't know if
Speaker 1: it's when he becomes president. But some of the pioneers
Speaker 1: of harm reduction who were more outspoken, so I mentioned
Speaker 1: before the brothers Kami Areas Alayi. I'm not sure if
Speaker 1: we're not going to name right or Bijan Nasermanesh Right,
Speaker 1: those guys and some of others like them, they are
Speaker 1: either forced to flee the country or there are rested,
Speaker 1: they're sent to prison. Um. They're the ones who are
Speaker 1: kind of more out there, They're a little more connected
Speaker 1: with the West, and so there's a sense of kind
Speaker 1: of um suppressing. UM. I don't and I don't know
Speaker 1: the exact stories in these cases, but I really kind
Speaker 1: of you know, the pioneers being really knocked down and
Speaker 1: really hurt badly, while at the same time the government's
Speaker 1: embracing the policies that they had pioneered. Absolutely. I mean,
Speaker 1: you know, there is no doubt that these years, I
Speaker 1: mean the years uh during which Ahmadina that comes to power,
Speaker 1: you know, witness and secretization of of civil society groups,
Speaker 1: particularly those groups that have a connection with the West
Speaker 1: and the United States in particular. So all sort of
Speaker 1: drug policy reforments, harm reduction is that had been you know,
Speaker 1: sort of establishing networks of collaboration and support with the
Speaker 1: outside world are put under pressure on the scrutiny. There
Speaker 1: is absolute distrust towards foreign governments, Western governments particularly, and
Speaker 1: so people who had connections with the outside world, you know,
Speaker 1: they decide to leave or you know, they go to
Speaker 1: jail and then they leave, which is the case of
Speaker 1: the people you mentioned and you know, of course, and
Speaker 1: that's been the story since then. You know, most sort
Speaker 1: of social activists working on contentious issues, not all you know,
Speaker 1: harm reduction is went to jail, and some of the
Speaker 1: most connected to the outside world. You know, we're affected.
Speaker 1: The field and in Iran is very very vibrant and active,
Speaker 1: and the number of organizations is expanding. And some of
Speaker 1: these people left, but many remained and you know kept working.
Speaker 1: Of course, the conditions changed as well, and so they
Speaker 1: were careful not to kind of pass the red lines.
Speaker 1: The problem is no the red men, right must you
Speaker 1: mentioned before narcotics anonymous and that must be surprising to
Speaker 1: our audience because you know, reading your book, I mean
Speaker 1: arconics anonymous and even some alcoholics anonymous chapters emerging Iran.
Speaker 1: You know, the clerical authorities are initially wary and suspicious
Speaker 1: of them, but ultimately embrace them. And you described Narcotics
Speaker 1: Anonymous becoming one of the largest kind of non governmental
Speaker 1: organizations solicite organizations in the country and having an associated
Speaker 1: nonprofit that becomes enormously influential. So part of my question
Speaker 1: is to explain how and why Narcotics Anonymous emerges to
Speaker 1: be perhaps the bigger in Iran anywhere else in the world.
Speaker 1: And then secondly, how much of this is connected, um
Speaker 1: to you know, the growing use of meth amphetamine. And
Speaker 1: then obviously there's I really I'm throwing a third thing
Speaker 1: here at you because we're running out of time and
Speaker 1: there's so much here. The dramatic growth in these treatment camps,
Speaker 1: which you see also in East Asia of hundreds of
Speaker 1: thousands of people sit being sent to quad like prison
Speaker 1: like environments. Um many of them private, some of them
Speaker 1: government run, which are not prisons but are sort of
Speaker 1: prisons where people are expected to get clean quote unquote
Speaker 1: before they can get out. So a whole bunch right there.
Speaker 1: But pick them off whether you want to sart off
Speaker 1: with the Narcotics Anonymous question or the next question, which
Speaker 1: everyone you think makes more sense. So the ruse of
Speaker 1: narcotic anonymous is spectacular and completely surprising as many of
Speaker 1: the events that kind of happened in the history of
Speaker 1: drugs in i Run. I believe that, you know, something
Speaker 1: exceptional happened. They're basically a sort of coalescing of synergies.
Speaker 1: Narcotics Anonymous basically established in Irun at the end of
Speaker 1: the nineties, and so this is a period of course
Speaker 1: of great changes in in the sort of world of
Speaker 1: drugs in Irun. You know, uh, you know, we're talking
Speaker 1: about the post war period. As we mentioned earlier, people
Speaker 1: can going back from the front having lots of substance
Speaker 1: abuse problems and not finding much support in the sort
Speaker 1: of civil society organizations that at the time we're not
Speaker 1: still that active or in the public health sector, and
Speaker 1: so the self health groups emerge as a way to
Speaker 1: sub define the identity of people with substance abuse problems
Speaker 1: in Iran without being stigmatized. Initially, the government is very suspicious,
Speaker 1: mostly because of course naconics anonymous have this sort of
Speaker 1: confession style which is seen, as you know, derived from
Speaker 1: Catholyticism in the in the view of the Iranian sort
Speaker 1: of religious leaders mostly but then eventually through negotiations and
Speaker 1: an understanding of the role that Narcotics Anonymous can have
Speaker 1: within the system of intervention on addiction. It is fully
Speaker 1: embraced and the number of sort of meetings is really incredible.
Speaker 1: I mean, it's my current project actually deals with with
Speaker 1: Narcotics Anonymous, and I can tell you that, you know,
Speaker 1: like the whole thing has been ranized and has become
Speaker 1: a different thing from Narcotics Anonymous elsewhere, mostly because the
Speaker 1: people participating bring their own cultural baggage and the cold
Speaker 1: cultural understanding of the world and of addiction. So it
Speaker 1: is not really an exclusively related to the rise of methamphetamines. Actually,
Speaker 1: I would say that, you know, many of the people
Speaker 1: coming to the meetings of Narcotics Anonymous have a background
Speaker 1: in opium or heroin abuse. Most methamphetamine users tend not
Speaker 1: to attend any meetings. There are other groups that compete
Speaker 1: with any by the way, and they are not probably
Speaker 1: as popular, but they are there. They're very much active.
Speaker 1: So it's a whole world that of Narcotics Anonymous, and
Speaker 1: it's you know, cultural reach goes beyond the issue of addiction.
Speaker 1: And you can see that you know, iran and films
Speaker 1: and cinema refers to you know, the issue of narcotics anonymous. Uh,
Speaker 1: you know, it's it's becoming a thing I can tell you.
Speaker 1: And this connects also to your last question about churchment sentence.
Speaker 1: And most of these treatment centers adopt a sort of
Speaker 1: twelve step program and so they are sort of under
Speaker 1: the patronage of an a Iran. The phenomenon is huge.
Speaker 1: It's difficult to speak about it in in in in
Speaker 1: simple terms or just by you know, giving you a
Speaker 1: paragraph of response, because you have all sorts of treatment facilities,
Speaker 1: from the ones you mentioned which adopt very violent and
Speaker 1: ruthless sort of interventions to uh, you know, sort of
Speaker 1: compassionate sort of help for reenter interventions. But what is
Speaker 1: sort of probably interesting to know is that these treatment
Speaker 1: centers have come to occupy a social place in ordinary
Speaker 1: life in Iran. And so the sort of sentence, oh,
Speaker 1: I'll take you to the camp. The camp is the
Speaker 1: word for the treatment center in person. Camp like the
Speaker 1: English camp, but you know, with the positive meaning if
Speaker 1: you want, has become ordinarily in everyday language. So you know,
Speaker 1: just to give you an idea of how you know,
Speaker 1: this phenomenon is central to today's life. So as you
Speaker 1: get to the end of the book, you describe a
Speaker 1: period I think it's around sixteen where there's even conversations
Speaker 1: going on about things like opening up a safe injection
Speaker 1: site in Tehran, maybe a heroin maintenance program, some consideration
Speaker 1: of further decriminalization of possession, even discussions of maybe trying
Speaker 1: to legally regulate the opium and cannabis cultivation and distribution. First,
Speaker 1: it was remarkable that those conversations are happening, and I'm
Speaker 1: wondering um mazier to bring it up to date, and
Speaker 1: especially given the election last year of a quite conservative
Speaker 1: president in Iran, what's happening now? Are any of these
Speaker 1: things moving forward? Have some of them actually happened or
Speaker 1: things in a much more quieter or more repressive phase
Speaker 1: right now. The thing is that sort of I was
Speaker 1: expecting some change, or perhaps I was hopeful. That's from
Speaker 1: the date of publication of my book two thousand nineteen. Today,
Speaker 1: you know, we would have had probably the first safe
Speaker 1: injection room and that didn't happen, but the proposals have
Speaker 1: been moved to an assessment stage, so you know, perhaps
Speaker 1: it would take another couple of years, five years who knows,
Speaker 1: depending on you know, also how the world politics develops,
Speaker 1: and that affects a lot of dissipation in Iran. Not
Speaker 1: an easy time. I would say safe injection might be
Speaker 1: might be introduced, more artful about herroing so to prescription programs.
Speaker 1: But they did this sort of election of vacy to
Speaker 1: the presidency. It gives even more influence to the whole
Speaker 1: judiciary security apparatus in Iran. That means that in a way,
Speaker 1: those who were always skeptical about drug policy reform are
Speaker 1: in charge. It is not necessarily a negative thing because
Speaker 1: we have seen in history of drug policy that often
Speaker 1: it is conservative governments, you know that take the bolder
Speaker 1: action simply because it's harder to criticize them or to
Speaker 1: accuse them of being you know, soft on crime or
Speaker 1: soft on drugs. But so far there is little interest
Speaker 1: and the sort of main focus has been that of
Speaker 1: living addiction treatment sentence to interview more broadly and to
Speaker 1: go through sort of self have groups and what they
Speaker 1: call detoxification programs, so you know, non pharmaceutical interventions. Mm hmm. Well, masire, listening,
Speaker 1: I so much appreciate your taking the time to have
Speaker 1: this conversation. With me and for our audience. Your book
Speaker 1: is truly fascinating and I think for I think probably
Speaker 1: of all the episodes I've done, this has to be
Speaker 1: perhaps one of the most eye opening for even people
Speaker 1: are quite knowledgeable about drug policy around the world. So
Speaker 1: thank you for your scholarship and thank you for this conversation.
Speaker 1: Pleasure to talk to your Hope to see you soon. Yes,
Speaker 1: I hope so too. If you're enjoying Psychoactive, please tell
Speaker 1: your friends about it, or you can write us a
Speaker 1: review at Apple Podcasts or wherever you get your podcasts.
Speaker 1: We love to hear from our listeners. If you'd like
Speaker 1: to share your own stories, comments, and ideas, then leave
Speaker 1: us a message at one eight three three seven seven
Speaker 1: nine sixty that's eight three three psycho zero, or you
Speaker 1: can email us at Psychoactive at protozoa dot com, or
Speaker 1: find me on Twitter at Ethan Natalman. You can also
Speaker 1: find contact information in our show notes. Psychoactive is a
Speaker 1: production of I Heart Radio and Protozoa Pictures. It's hosted
Speaker 1: by me Ethan Naedelman. It's produced by Noam Osband and
Speaker 1: Josh Stain. The executive producers are Dylan Golden Ari Handel,
Speaker 1: Elizabeth Geesus and Darren Aronofsky from Protozoma Pictures, Alex Williams
Speaker 1: and Matt Frederick from My Heart Radio, and me Ethan Nadelman.
Speaker 1: Our music is by Ari Blucien and a special thanks
Speaker 1: to A. Brios F. Bianca Grimshaw and Robert BP. Next
Speaker 1: week I'll be talking about the issue of psychedelics law,
Speaker 1: especially the issue of patents and intellectual property with Graham Petenik,
Speaker 1: perhaps the leading attorneys specializing in this area, and sort
Speaker 1: of my thesis for starting my firm was that there
Speaker 1: were ways for smaller inventors to get involved with the
Speaker 1: patent system and to also use the patent system to
Speaker 1: keep off a company like a mon Santo or a
Speaker 1: Philip Morris from entering the cannabis space and sort of
Speaker 1: taking it over and dominating it. And so taking that
Speaker 1: kind of thinking through to the psychedelic space. I think
Speaker 1: that was part of the kind of fortune that let
Speaker 1: me see that there were these issues around pulocybin patenting
Speaker 1: for instance. Um, perhaps a bit earlier than you know,
Speaker 1: maybe some others did subscribe to Cycleactive now see it,
Speaker 1: don't miss it.