WEBVTT - TechStuff Classic: The Sony Pictures Entertainment Hack

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<v Speaker 1>Welcome to tech Stuff, a production from I Heart Radio.

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<v Speaker 1>Hey there, and welcome to tech Stuff. I'm your host,

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<v Speaker 1>Jonathan Strickland. I'm an executive producer with iHeart Radio and

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<v Speaker 1>I love all things tech. This time for a tech

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<v Speaker 1>Stuff classic episode. This episode originally published on January two

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<v Speaker 1>thousand fifteen. It is titled the Sony Pictures Entertainment Hack,

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<v Speaker 1>which I have talked about more recently in a few podcasts.

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<v Speaker 1>Because the repercussions of that of that attack extended far

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<v Speaker 1>beyond just Sony Pictures ended up having a big impact

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<v Speaker 1>on multiple streams of media, and uh, I thought it

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<v Speaker 1>would be interesting to go back now. We keep in

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<v Speaker 1>mind this episode aired a couple of months after the

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<v Speaker 1>hack actually happened, so we had limited information. But when

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<v Speaker 1>we come back at the end, I'll talk a little

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<v Speaker 1>bit more about some other stuff we know. But first

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<v Speaker 1>let's sit back and listen to this classic episode. Ben

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<v Speaker 1>also had me on his show Stuff They Don't Want

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<v Speaker 1>You To Know, to talk about today's topic, the Sony Hack,

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<v Speaker 1>And at the time when we were recording, it was

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<v Speaker 1>still in December and the story was still unfolding. In fact,

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<v Speaker 1>you could say that's still unfolding now, although the news

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<v Speaker 1>has certainly slowed down significantly since the end of December,

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<v Speaker 1>but we ended up talking about the story as far

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<v Speaker 1>as we could at that point and even made some

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<v Speaker 1>predictions of our own, some some theories of our own. So, uh,

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<v Speaker 1>in order to return the favor, Ben's joined me for

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<v Speaker 1>this episode so that we can revisit that topic, talk

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<v Speaker 1>about the Sony hack, maybe talk a little bit about

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<v Speaker 1>some of the information that came out after we had

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<v Speaker 1>already recorded the episode, and uh, just kind of explain

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<v Speaker 1>what happened and how it's different from some of the

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<v Speaker 1>other big stories we've heard, Like you know, all the

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<v Speaker 1>stories about the Sony PlayStation network and the Xbox Live

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<v Speaker 1>network getting brought down, those were done through direct denial

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<v Speaker 1>of service attacks or distributed denial of service attacks, I

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<v Speaker 1>should say. So they were distributed denial of service attacks,

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<v Speaker 1>which is really a brute force way of shutting up

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<v Speaker 1>a server, completely different in comparison to the original Sony hacks,

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<v Speaker 1>wherein the various films were downloaded. But before we go

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<v Speaker 1>inting further, I just have to say I really appreciate

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<v Speaker 1>what you're saying here, Jonathan. I'm blushing. Thank God, I

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<v Speaker 1>grew this beard out so you can see it and

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<v Speaker 1>thank God as an audio podcast. But this is not

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<v Speaker 1>entirely all truism on my part. I come here also

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<v Speaker 1>as a representative of my co host Matt Frederick. Um.

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<v Speaker 1>We had such a great time doing this two part

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<v Speaker 1>episode on Sony for Stuff they Want, you know, and

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<v Speaker 1>we we actually went back and listened to it because

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<v Speaker 1>we liked some of the jokes that the three of

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<v Speaker 1>us were doing. But we really wanted another crack at

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<v Speaker 1>this just because other information is emerged and listeners out there,

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<v Speaker 1>if you do check out Jonathan's earlier appearance on spoiler Alerts,

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<v Speaker 1>some of those predictions that you and I made are

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<v Speaker 1>not that far off. Yeah yeah, And in fact that

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<v Speaker 1>again we don't We still don't have all the details.

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<v Speaker 1>We still have some conflicting information out there, stuff that

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<v Speaker 1>conflicts with the theories we have. It still hasn't changed

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<v Speaker 1>my theories yet, but I do acknowledge the fact that

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<v Speaker 1>I the thing that I believe may not be true,

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<v Speaker 1>and in fact is being said to be untrue by

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<v Speaker 1>certain entities that go by three letter initialisms like the FBI.

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<v Speaker 1>Uh So let's start at the beginning. A very good

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<v Speaker 1>place to start. On November that was the day that

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<v Speaker 1>the Sony hack was revealed, and I say revealed because

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<v Speaker 1>the extent of this hack, the incredible amount of information

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<v Speaker 1>that was stolen as part of this hack was so

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<v Speaker 1>huge as to require months of time. I mean, you're

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<v Speaker 1>talking about the initial story we got and was that

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<v Speaker 1>the the hackers responsible claim to have stolen one terabytes

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<v Speaker 1>of data. A terabyte of data is a huge amount, right,

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<v Speaker 1>And if you're thinking of a hacker that's accessing a

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<v Speaker 1>system remotely, so we're assuming that this person did not

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<v Speaker 1>dress themselves up as a Sony employee infiltrate the company.

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<v Speaker 1>If you're talking about remotely accessing this and siphoning off

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<v Speaker 1>that data. Guys, you know, if you've ever downloaded a

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<v Speaker 1>big file, you know it takes time. Even if you

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<v Speaker 1>have a fast internet connection, it could take a while.

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<v Speaker 1>You know, if you're trying to download let's say a

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<v Speaker 1>really big computer game that's maybe thirty or forty gigabytes,

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<v Speaker 1>that takes time. Terabytes are enormous, A hundred terabytes is huge.

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<v Speaker 1>Would take months to download that much information, and only

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<v Speaker 1>if the faucet is always on. Yeah, you and also

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<v Speaker 1>to be able to do it without raising anyone's attention, right,

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<v Speaker 1>because people would see the activity over the connection. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>you would think at least someone would figure out something

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<v Speaker 1>in that time. So all of this is to say

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<v Speaker 1>that it's the While November twenty was when we became

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<v Speaker 1>aware of it, the actual activity had to have been

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<v Speaker 1>happening for at least a few months, if not longer. Right,

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<v Speaker 1>So what what exactly happens? I love this description because

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<v Speaker 1>it's so cinematic. Yeah, so imagine you are an employee

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<v Speaker 1>of Sony Pictures Entertainment, because we always say the Sony hack,

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<v Speaker 1>but we're specifically referring to Sony Pictures, so the movie

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<v Speaker 1>industry arm of Sony. So you're an employee of Sony

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<v Speaker 1>Pictures Entertainment. You go into work on November. It's the

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<v Speaker 1>week of Thanksgiving. You're looking forward to having dinner with

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<v Speaker 1>your family, having a few days off. You come in,

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<v Speaker 1>you turn on your computer to get your little work,

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<v Speaker 1>you work done, type of, type of, type of, and

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<v Speaker 1>then all of a sudden, like it was a nineteen

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<v Speaker 1>eighties computer thriller, a skull stylized skull pops up on

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<v Speaker 1>your screen, and this feels like it it feels like

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<v Speaker 1>a stupid movie already. Like you think about those movies

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<v Speaker 1>like The Net, you know, any movie where Hollywood is

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<v Speaker 1>trying to get across the idea of what hacking is like,

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<v Speaker 1>and they they visualize it where it's not someone saying

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<v Speaker 1>that a computer typing in code. No, it's creeping through

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<v Speaker 1>a dungeon. And then you see a skull and crossbones.

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<v Speaker 1>That's a firewall. That's what this was in real life.

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<v Speaker 1>The skulls pop up on everyone's screen and it has

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<v Speaker 1>a phrase that essentially says, this is just the beginning.

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<v Speaker 1>We've obtained all your internal data, and it went on

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<v Speaker 1>to warn that if the company did not quote obey

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<v Speaker 1>the hackers demands end quote, that the internal information would

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<v Speaker 1>be shared with the world. And this had this included

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<v Speaker 1>every thing from well, they didn't even know what it

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<v Speaker 1>included yet, right, so they didn't have any idea of

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<v Speaker 1>the extent of that personal information that I that that

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<v Speaker 1>sensitive info. As it turns out, it was incredibly sensitive information.

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<v Speaker 1>And those demands we're going to get back to because

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<v Speaker 1>the demands are one of the keys I think to

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<v Speaker 1>this mystery, which is still sort is okay. So the way,

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<v Speaker 1>the way it works out, the news spreads quickly. Eleven

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<v Speaker 1>am same day November, it hits the media, right, that's right,

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<v Speaker 1>and so this is where, uh, different media outlets start

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<v Speaker 1>to cover the story. Uh, the employees of Sony Pictures

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<v Speaker 1>have no access to their computers. Also, their email servers

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<v Speaker 1>are completely down, and even their phone systems because they

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<v Speaker 1>were using networked phones, which is you know, we we've

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<v Speaker 1>had network phones in this office in the past, so

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<v Speaker 1>it's one of those things that if your internet goes down,

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<v Speaker 1>suddenly you don't have phone service either, and that's kind

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<v Speaker 1>of creepsy out a little bit. So they literally couldn't

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<v Speaker 1>do any work. They couldn't access any of their files,

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<v Speaker 1>any of those important documents, contracts, all that kind of stuff.

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<v Speaker 1>All of that was inaccessible. And uh, meanwhile, as the

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<v Speaker 1>story would go on that I'm gonna skip ahead a

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<v Speaker 1>little bit, but we're gonna go through a timeline that'll

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<v Speaker 1>lit'll detail this stuff as we go through. But eventually

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<v Speaker 1>the hackers refer to themselves as Guardians of Peace or

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<v Speaker 1>go OP. Yeah, also amuses me because to think when

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<v Speaker 1>we're talking about the GOP and this, since it's not

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<v Speaker 1>the Grand Old Party, the Guardians of peace. Um, this

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<v Speaker 1>is when they claim to have stolen one hundred terabytes

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<v Speaker 1>of data. Ten terabytes is enough for all the information

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<v Speaker 1>in the Library of Congress. So they stole ten libraries

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<v Speaker 1>of Congress. Yes, they stole the Library of Congress ten

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<v Speaker 1>times now right. Yeah, I used to use um. I

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<v Speaker 1>used to use uh conquistadors as an element as a

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<v Speaker 1>unit of measurement for everything. But now I'm I'm willing

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<v Speaker 1>to go and swim to the Library of Congress at

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<v Speaker 1>least when it comes to data. So yeah, this and

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<v Speaker 1>and of course some of that information was in the

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<v Speaker 1>form of high resolution digital film files. We'll talk more

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<v Speaker 1>about that in just a second. So on top of

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<v Speaker 1>all that, this is this is another like you know,

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<v Speaker 1>kick once you're down. You've already been knocked down because

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<v Speaker 1>you've had your this hack stop your work. You've been

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<v Speaker 1>told that a lot of your information has been stolen.

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<v Speaker 1>On top of all that, they also the hackers also

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<v Speaker 1>installed malware called Wiper And you can probably guess what

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<v Speaker 1>this does just based on the name. It starts to

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<v Speaker 1>erase all the data on these various machines. So not

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<v Speaker 1>only did you have all this information stolen, but now

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<v Speaker 1>it's truly inaccessible. It's been white from your computers. I'm

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<v Speaker 1>sure some of it was probably um. You were probably

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<v Speaker 1>able to get back at some of it using some

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<v Speaker 1>I T. Expertise, like deleting a file after your computer

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<v Speaker 1>doesn't mean it's gone forever. Overwriting it does so unless

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<v Speaker 1>wiper and it may very well do this. Unless wiper

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<v Speaker 1>over was overwriting all the data as it was erasing it,

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<v Speaker 1>then you could in theory at least get back some

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<v Speaker 1>of that. But at any rate, Uh, there were even

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<v Speaker 1>that um reports that Sony account Twitter feeds were being compromised,

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<v Speaker 1>and so the Guardians of Peace were able to tweet

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<v Speaker 1>out using that. We actually saw something similar to that

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<v Speaker 1>recently here in the United States with the Central Command

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<v Speaker 1>Twitter feed. Did you see that? Yeah, yeah, yeah. The

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<v Speaker 1>The thing is that Twitter is uh, from what I understand,

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<v Speaker 1>much easier to compromise than something that would be a

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<v Speaker 1>well protected corporate level system of of this magnitude. But

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<v Speaker 1>it does tell us something really important, Jonathan, because it

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<v Speaker 1>tells us that this would have been a multi tiered attack,

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<v Speaker 1>even if even if or rather a multifront attacked, even

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<v Speaker 1>if Twitter was just uh, the sprinkle on the cupcake.

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<v Speaker 1>This still shows us that this was well thought out.

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<v Speaker 1>It was established in advance, so it doesn't seem to

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<v Speaker 1>be an impulsive thing at all. Just just going back

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<v Speaker 1>to how much memory and how much time it would

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<v Speaker 1>take to steal a hundred terabytes. Yeah, I mean obviously,

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<v Speaker 1>like you wouldn't be able to do that all on

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<v Speaker 1>a single day. So Novem was essentially the day that

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<v Speaker 1>the hackers decided, Okay, now we let them know what

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<v Speaker 1>we have done. Like, we've already done it. It's it's

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<v Speaker 1>that parts. So we're we're already scott away, scott free,

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<v Speaker 1>you know. Now we're just gonna set the the we're

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<v Speaker 1>gonna make the world burn, and we're gonna walk away

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<v Speaker 1>in slow motion. But Sony still has no idea what's

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<v Speaker 1>going on? For like a week? Right? Yeah? Well, I

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<v Speaker 1>mean again, it happened during Thanksgiving weeks, so this was

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<v Speaker 1>a time when a lot of people were planning on

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<v Speaker 1>being on vacation and suddenly, now you've got this amazing

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<v Speaker 1>crisis to deal with. Uh. And it would take more

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<v Speaker 1>than a week for for executives to start even getting

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<v Speaker 1>a hint at how bad this attack was. So on

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<v Speaker 1>December one, that's when executives became aware that the stolen

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<v Speaker 1>data included personal information about employees and their dependents, such

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<v Speaker 1>as Social Security numbers and financial information, as well as

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<v Speaker 1>health information like one of the leaks of documents gave

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<v Speaker 1>details to employees who had sought treatment for things like

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<v Speaker 1>cirrhosis or cancer or there or had dependents who had

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<v Speaker 1>to seek treatments for such things. And so, I mean,

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<v Speaker 1>that's a huge breach. Are we talking? Uh? In terms

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<v Speaker 1>of for sent injured numbers? How many employees? About fifty

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<v Speaker 1>thousand social Security numbers were stolen? Actually around forty seven thousand.

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<v Speaker 1>I rounded up round, I rounded up for forty seven

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<v Speaker 1>thousand and fifty. But yeah, more than forty seven thousand

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<v Speaker 1>social Security numbers were stolen. Now, these were both current

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<v Speaker 1>and former Sony employees, because it was just it was

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<v Speaker 1>databasis full of information of the aious employees who had

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<v Speaker 1>either worked there in the past or were currently working.

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<v Speaker 1>Not to downplay the gravity of this, because it is

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<v Speaker 1>very dangerous and it's an absolute nutter violation and privacy.

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<v Speaker 1>But not only is that not the end of what

0:13:13.679 --> 0:13:16.320
<v Speaker 1>they stole, but they stole so much that if you're okay,

0:13:16.400 --> 0:13:19.400
<v Speaker 1>I'd like to infomercial this and maybe chime in with

0:13:19.480 --> 0:13:23.280
<v Speaker 1>some But wait, there's more. Yeah. In fact, that is

0:13:23.600 --> 0:13:26.600
<v Speaker 1>well warranted, right because the first one the one that's

0:13:26.640 --> 0:13:31.120
<v Speaker 1>probably the easiest for people to latch onto, because it's

0:13:31.160 --> 0:13:34.280
<v Speaker 1>a simple it's a simple story the idea of stolen

0:13:34.960 --> 0:13:39.880
<v Speaker 1>intellectual property, in this case, stolen movies. Right, So the

0:13:40.320 --> 0:13:45.720
<v Speaker 1>theft included five movies that were scheduled for Sony release,

0:13:45.800 --> 0:13:49.640
<v Speaker 1>one which had already been released, which was a fury

0:13:49.840 --> 0:13:52.480
<v Speaker 1>that one had already come out. But then there was

0:13:52.600 --> 0:13:57.640
<v Speaker 1>also Annie Mr Turner, Still Alice and to Write Love

0:13:57.720 --> 0:14:00.439
<v Speaker 1>on Her Arms. Those had all been stolen as well.

0:14:01.200 --> 0:14:06.200
<v Speaker 1>Uh okay, yeah, so so those are the easy ones

0:14:06.240 --> 0:14:08.079
<v Speaker 1>for people to latch onto. But then there was all

0:14:08.080 --> 0:14:12.880
<v Speaker 1>the internal communications, right, this is where you had information

0:14:13.120 --> 0:14:18.960
<v Speaker 1>about salary for top executives, like the top seventeen executives,

0:14:19.200 --> 0:14:22.800
<v Speaker 1>not to mention I think six thousand other Sony employees.

0:14:22.800 --> 0:14:26.520
<v Speaker 1>Their information got leaked as well. Uh. There was also

0:14:27.120 --> 0:14:32.400
<v Speaker 1>internal documents that that were the records of people having

0:14:32.400 --> 0:14:35.800
<v Speaker 1>complaints about Sony. Yeah, and there were there were some

0:14:36.000 --> 0:14:44.960
<v Speaker 1>fairly undiplomatic internal communications regarding regarding coworkers or talent yeah,

0:14:45.120 --> 0:14:49.960
<v Speaker 1>or the President of the United States. There were Yeah, no,

0:14:50.080 --> 0:14:52.520
<v Speaker 1>there's we'll we'll touch on that again in a moment.

0:14:52.600 --> 0:14:55.120
<v Speaker 1>But out of all these, you probably heard the most

0:14:55.120 --> 0:14:58.800
<v Speaker 1>about Adam Sandler. He got he got raped over the

0:14:58.840 --> 0:15:03.440
<v Speaker 1>coals quite a it in the internal communications. A lot

0:15:03.440 --> 0:15:05.480
<v Speaker 1>of in place that they just didn't like the direction

0:15:05.680 --> 0:15:08.680
<v Speaker 1>that the movie studio was going in, and they wanted

0:15:08.680 --> 0:15:12.160
<v Speaker 1>to see if you were Adam Sandler comedies, which is

0:15:12.240 --> 0:15:14.840
<v Speaker 1>I guess okay, because Netflix picked him up so for

0:15:14.880 --> 0:15:19.680
<v Speaker 1>four films. Yeah, so Sony might be free of him,

0:15:20.600 --> 0:15:23.520
<v Speaker 1>we're not. Uh, And that's not the only stuff that

0:15:23.600 --> 0:15:26.880
<v Speaker 1>got leaked. Still, no, no, there's still more, right, I mean,

0:15:27.080 --> 0:15:31.000
<v Speaker 1>there's tons of information that got taken from this. Uh,

0:15:31.280 --> 0:15:37.400
<v Speaker 1>personal information about talent was leaked. Stuff like passports and visas,

0:15:37.440 --> 0:15:40.800
<v Speaker 1>like copies of this stuff that people needed to do. Uh.

0:15:40.840 --> 0:15:43.680
<v Speaker 1>There were so much things that so many things that

0:15:43.720 --> 0:15:46.680
<v Speaker 1>were stolen as a result of this. And uh, we're

0:15:46.680 --> 0:15:49.240
<v Speaker 1>going to go through the rest of the timeline to

0:15:49.320 --> 0:15:51.000
<v Speaker 1>kind of give you an idea of how this all

0:15:51.080 --> 0:15:54.760
<v Speaker 1>unfolded and what extent we began to learn more and

0:15:54.800 --> 0:15:58.920
<v Speaker 1>more about the damages. Uh. Meanwhile, one other thing to

0:15:58.960 --> 0:16:03.560
<v Speaker 1>mention is that Sony employees have many of them have

0:16:03.680 --> 0:16:08.960
<v Speaker 1>filed lawsuits against the company for not protecting their personal

0:16:09.000 --> 0:16:13.840
<v Speaker 1>information well enough to prevent this from happening. So there

0:16:13.840 --> 0:16:16.960
<v Speaker 1>are several class action lawsuits have been leveled against the

0:16:16.960 --> 0:16:20.280
<v Speaker 1>company as a result of this. Because people's lives have

0:16:20.360 --> 0:16:23.000
<v Speaker 1>been really impacted. We're not just talking about you know,

0:16:23.120 --> 0:16:26.440
<v Speaker 1>celebrities here. I mean that their lives have been impacted too,

0:16:26.480 --> 0:16:30.400
<v Speaker 1>and it's not I personally don't think that that means

0:16:30.440 --> 0:16:33.360
<v Speaker 1>that celebrities should be expected to deal with more crap

0:16:33.400 --> 0:16:36.400
<v Speaker 1>than the rest of us. I mean, sometimes that happens

0:16:36.400 --> 0:16:38.400
<v Speaker 1>because it's just one of those things that goes along

0:16:38.400 --> 0:16:43.120
<v Speaker 1>with all the fame and everything else. But regular employees,

0:16:43.160 --> 0:16:46.480
<v Speaker 1>people just normal folks like me and you who go

0:16:46.600 --> 0:16:48.920
<v Speaker 1>in to do their job every day and it may

0:16:48.920 --> 0:16:51.880
<v Speaker 1>not be glamorous, but it's it's an important part of

0:16:51.920 --> 0:16:55.960
<v Speaker 1>the function of the company. They were impacted too, just

0:16:56.200 --> 0:17:00.080
<v Speaker 1>regular folks, and they will tend not to have the

0:17:00.240 --> 0:17:04.600
<v Speaker 1>uh financial wherewithal or the social safety net to help

0:17:04.680 --> 0:17:08.600
<v Speaker 1>protect themselves in the aftermath of such an event, right right,

0:17:08.640 --> 0:17:11.439
<v Speaker 1>They don't have the benefit of that safety net like

0:17:11.680 --> 0:17:15.440
<v Speaker 1>people who might have a lawyer on retainer or enormous

0:17:15.520 --> 0:17:18.600
<v Speaker 1>sums of money to lay in when you go to

0:17:18.600 --> 0:17:21.560
<v Speaker 1>sleep at night. You know, I have a have a

0:17:21.640 --> 0:17:25.439
<v Speaker 1>very particular fantasy in my head of what Hollywood celebrities like,

0:17:25.480 --> 0:17:29.320
<v Speaker 1>how they live. It's mostly Scrooge McDuck oriented. Yeah, yeah,

0:17:29.359 --> 0:17:31.840
<v Speaker 1>did you see that? This is totally unrelated? But did

0:17:31.920 --> 0:17:34.720
<v Speaker 1>you did you ever see the study of what what

0:17:34.760 --> 0:17:36.840
<v Speaker 1>would happen if you tried to swim through a vault

0:17:36.880 --> 0:17:39.560
<v Speaker 1>full of gold? I imagine that you would not feel

0:17:39.640 --> 0:17:42.639
<v Speaker 1>very good. Yeah, it will. It will break you in

0:17:43.080 --> 0:17:46.800
<v Speaker 1>numerous ways. So maybe it's good that you were talking

0:17:46.840 --> 0:17:49.440
<v Speaker 1>about sleeping on paper money probably better for your back.

0:17:50.080 --> 0:17:53.000
<v Speaker 1>And speaking of back, you wanna let's see where where

0:17:53.000 --> 0:17:55.600
<v Speaker 1>should we go next? Let's look at November twenty eight,

0:17:55.840 --> 0:17:58.880
<v Speaker 1>because we've been talking a lot about this hack. The

0:17:58.880 --> 0:18:04.920
<v Speaker 1>The initial messages from the hackers didn't identify any particular

0:18:05.040 --> 0:18:08.280
<v Speaker 1>motivation for the attack. They it was more of almost

0:18:08.280 --> 0:18:11.560
<v Speaker 1>like an extortion thing, like do what we tell you,

0:18:11.840 --> 0:18:14.760
<v Speaker 1>or you're gonna get it. You know. It was like

0:18:15.080 --> 0:18:19.119
<v Speaker 1>and it essentially sounded like pay us off or we

0:18:19.200 --> 0:18:22.639
<v Speaker 1>will ruin you. Now. They didn't name a specific amount

0:18:22.640 --> 0:18:25.679
<v Speaker 1>of money at that initial point, they just said, do

0:18:25.800 --> 0:18:30.080
<v Speaker 1>what we say, yea, So they The reason why this

0:18:30.160 --> 0:18:32.840
<v Speaker 1>is important is because a lot of the discussion that

0:18:32.880 --> 0:18:36.000
<v Speaker 1>has followed has centered around a very specific topic that

0:18:36.040 --> 0:18:39.520
<v Speaker 1>we're about to touch on. But that all came after

0:18:39.640 --> 0:18:44.119
<v Speaker 1>the fact, which makes me a little cautious in actually

0:18:44.240 --> 0:18:46.680
<v Speaker 1>saying that that was the reason for the whole thing,

0:18:46.720 --> 0:18:49.480
<v Speaker 1>the whole time. So November twenty eight, this is four

0:18:49.560 --> 0:18:53.720
<v Speaker 1>days after the initial attack was discovered. That's the first

0:18:53.800 --> 0:18:57.080
<v Speaker 1>time anyone floats the possibility that the attack was in

0:18:57.160 --> 0:19:00.760
<v Speaker 1>response to Sony's plans to release the film the interview,

0:19:00.920 --> 0:19:03.240
<v Speaker 1>which I have we both seen it at this point.

0:19:03.359 --> 0:19:04.879
<v Speaker 1>I have not seen it. Did you watch it? I

0:19:04.920 --> 0:19:08.440
<v Speaker 1>did see it. What did you think? Uh? Well, I

0:19:08.520 --> 0:19:13.480
<v Speaker 1>will I will say that uh I enjoy uh Seth

0:19:13.560 --> 0:19:15.960
<v Speaker 1>Rogan and James Franco a bit more than you, which

0:19:16.000 --> 0:19:19.560
<v Speaker 1>is which is something we've talked about before. Yeah, And

0:19:19.600 --> 0:19:22.480
<v Speaker 1>it's not hard to enjoy Seth Rogan and James Franco

0:19:22.560 --> 0:19:25.440
<v Speaker 1>more than you do. No offense, I have a very

0:19:25.480 --> 0:19:27.760
<v Speaker 1>low you own it. You own it though, and I

0:19:27.800 --> 0:19:31.520
<v Speaker 1>respect that. Um, you know, I'll be I'll be candid here.

0:19:31.920 --> 0:19:35.800
<v Speaker 1>It was not my favorite film. Because I think that

0:19:36.720 --> 0:19:40.880
<v Speaker 1>while I I enjoy a lot of a lot of

0:19:40.920 --> 0:19:45.359
<v Speaker 1>what might be termed lowbrow comedy, I'm not above it.

0:19:45.480 --> 0:19:49.080
<v Speaker 1>You know. One thing that I noticed sometimes is that

0:19:49.400 --> 0:19:54.639
<v Speaker 1>it is very convenient to conflate satire and racism, and

0:19:54.680 --> 0:19:58.000
<v Speaker 1>I think there's UH to me. There were moments in

0:19:58.040 --> 0:20:00.520
<v Speaker 1>the film that I that I thought were sist and

0:20:00.640 --> 0:20:03.679
<v Speaker 1>I and also was talking with my girlfriend about this

0:20:04.119 --> 0:20:07.600
<v Speaker 1>and said, okay, well check me here, like my am

0:20:07.640 --> 0:20:11.439
<v Speaker 1>I being two PC and I am I getting my

0:20:11.640 --> 0:20:16.399
<v Speaker 1>jim socks all bunched up over something unnecessarily And she

0:20:16.560 --> 0:20:18.960
<v Speaker 1>came in and watched part of it and she said, no,

0:20:19.200 --> 0:20:22.639
<v Speaker 1>I think that's pretty very racist. Yeah. Now, there is

0:20:22.680 --> 0:20:28.080
<v Speaker 1>definitely a difference between using satire in order to point

0:20:28.160 --> 0:20:33.879
<v Speaker 1>out things that you see as being important or unequal

0:20:34.080 --> 0:20:36.560
<v Speaker 1>or whatever. It's something that you are actually commenting on

0:20:36.640 --> 0:20:39.679
<v Speaker 1>and bringing attention to and starting a discussion over, and

0:20:39.680 --> 0:20:42.840
<v Speaker 1>then there's a totally different type where you're just making

0:20:42.880 --> 0:20:48.160
<v Speaker 1>fun of something or or you know, especially in hurtful ways. Well,

0:20:48.160 --> 0:20:49.639
<v Speaker 1>here's a here's a question I have for you. I

0:20:49.640 --> 0:20:53.400
<v Speaker 1>don't want to derailist, but the question would be then uh,

0:20:53.520 --> 0:20:57.479
<v Speaker 1>in comparison to let's say the south Park film also

0:20:57.520 --> 0:21:02.439
<v Speaker 1>a work of satire in any ways, uh so, what

0:21:02.840 --> 0:21:06.320
<v Speaker 1>makes these two different? You know? Is it because the

0:21:06.359 --> 0:21:09.520
<v Speaker 1>south Park film is animated? I think part of it

0:21:09.560 --> 0:21:13.679
<v Speaker 1>is that south Park is really about pointing out the

0:21:13.680 --> 0:21:18.919
<v Speaker 1>the the absolute ridiculousness of things like racism. I mean,

0:21:18.960 --> 0:21:23.960
<v Speaker 1>south Park used the movie used Canadians as the the

0:21:24.200 --> 0:21:26.480
<v Speaker 1>great big enemy, you know, that's what all the people

0:21:26.600 --> 0:21:30.640
<v Speaker 1>they blame Canada. There's a whole song about it. It's yeah,

0:21:30.680 --> 0:21:33.080
<v Speaker 1>it's a good song. It actually was nominated for an

0:21:33.080 --> 0:21:36.600
<v Speaker 1>Academy Award. But at any rate, the you know, that

0:21:36.680 --> 0:21:40.000
<v Speaker 1>was really to kind of poke fun saying like this

0:21:40.080 --> 0:21:44.119
<v Speaker 1>is literally there's no difference between people like you know,

0:21:44.160 --> 0:21:47.120
<v Speaker 1>you look at Canadians and Americans. There's no difference there,

0:21:47.320 --> 0:21:50.120
<v Speaker 1>just as there's no difference with any people of any

0:21:50.240 --> 0:21:56.480
<v Speaker 1>two nations. And therefore the concept of racism itself is

0:21:57.359 --> 0:22:00.880
<v Speaker 1>utterly ridiculous. I see what you're saying. There's there's a

0:22:00.920 --> 0:22:03.000
<v Speaker 1>method to the prat falls, as you would say. But

0:22:03.200 --> 0:22:05.800
<v Speaker 1>the I don't know if anyone's ever said that before.

0:22:05.920 --> 0:22:09.600
<v Speaker 1>But the thing about the interview, despite that, I think

0:22:09.640 --> 0:22:12.440
<v Speaker 1>it was enjoyable. I definitely laughed out loud a couple

0:22:12.480 --> 0:22:15.600
<v Speaker 1>of times. But I believe it's received much much more,

0:22:16.080 --> 0:22:19.920
<v Speaker 1>much more international attention than ever would have had it

0:22:20.080 --> 0:22:24.520
<v Speaker 1>not been associated with this. And also, you know, for

0:22:24.600 --> 0:22:27.760
<v Speaker 1>people who aren't familiar with it, Uh, the the entire

0:22:27.880 --> 0:22:32.879
<v Speaker 1>film is about people traveling to assassinate Kim Jong un,

0:22:33.000 --> 0:22:35.880
<v Speaker 1>the current leader of North Korea. Right. The whole idea

0:22:35.920 --> 0:22:40.919
<v Speaker 1>about a host of a celebrity talk show type program

0:22:40.960 --> 0:22:44.040
<v Speaker 1>and his producer heading over to North Korea because it

0:22:44.119 --> 0:22:46.600
<v Speaker 1>turns out Kim Jong un is a big fan of

0:22:46.640 --> 0:22:51.280
<v Speaker 1>the program, and then being told by is that the CIA, Yeah, yea,

0:22:51.440 --> 0:22:55.560
<v Speaker 1>the CIA to take this opportunity to assassinate Kim Jong un,

0:22:56.119 --> 0:23:00.359
<v Speaker 1>and uh and of course, uh spoiler alert, the leader

0:23:00.560 --> 0:23:06.360
<v Speaker 1>is killed in the film. Uh. So this was November

0:23:06.359 --> 0:23:09.479
<v Speaker 1>twenty was the first time anyone had even mentioned this

0:23:09.640 --> 0:23:15.119
<v Speaker 1>as a possibility of a motivator, and they said, yeah,

0:23:15.280 --> 0:23:18.520
<v Speaker 1>there was. This was not from the attackers at all.

0:23:18.600 --> 0:23:20.920
<v Speaker 1>This was all just kind of a I wonder if

0:23:20.960 --> 0:23:23.560
<v Speaker 1>this thing that's coming out later this month had anything

0:23:23.600 --> 0:23:25.320
<v Speaker 1>to do with our actually next month, because this was

0:23:25.359 --> 0:23:28.280
<v Speaker 1>still in November. Um so, yeah, we didn't really have

0:23:28.320 --> 0:23:31.119
<v Speaker 1>any evidence here. And now there was a North Korean

0:23:31.160 --> 0:23:33.600
<v Speaker 1>website that had referred to the interview as quote an

0:23:33.640 --> 0:23:38.080
<v Speaker 1>evil act of provocation end quote. So you could say, well,

0:23:38.119 --> 0:23:40.200
<v Speaker 1>they said that it was an evil act of provocation.

0:23:40.359 --> 0:23:42.840
<v Speaker 1>We were they were provoked, so maybe this was the

0:23:42.880 --> 0:23:46.320
<v Speaker 1>act they were provoked into doing. But you know, yeah,

0:23:46.400 --> 0:23:48.560
<v Speaker 1>I mean, like I said, the the attack itself must

0:23:48.640 --> 0:23:52.600
<v Speaker 1>have gone on for months, and it was only in

0:23:52.720 --> 0:23:55.240
<v Speaker 1>those last few months that the interview was even getting

0:23:55.280 --> 0:23:58.520
<v Speaker 1>the promotion of here's a movie that's coming out soon,

0:23:58.560 --> 0:24:01.600
<v Speaker 1>and here's what it's all about. So that would have

0:24:01.600 --> 0:24:03.720
<v Speaker 1>meant that North Korea was just paying attention to this

0:24:03.800 --> 0:24:07.600
<v Speaker 1>film for longer than the American public was, and that

0:24:07.600 --> 0:24:11.919
<v Speaker 1>that the attack began months in advance, in anticipation for

0:24:11.960 --> 0:24:16.040
<v Speaker 1>this December release. All that being said, December one, that's

0:24:16.080 --> 0:24:19.840
<v Speaker 1>when the top seventeen Sony executive salaries were leaked. Uh,

0:24:19.880 --> 0:24:22.560
<v Speaker 1>the information had already been stolen, but the information that

0:24:22.640 --> 0:24:25.760
<v Speaker 1>had then been leaked publicly. A lot of these leaks

0:24:25.760 --> 0:24:30.120
<v Speaker 1>happened on an app that allows for anonymous text dumps,

0:24:30.520 --> 0:24:33.840
<v Speaker 1>so you can just put things up on that app

0:24:33.920 --> 0:24:36.879
<v Speaker 1>and not leave a trace of who you are. And

0:24:36.920 --> 0:24:39.600
<v Speaker 1>that's how a lot of this information got distributed. Also,

0:24:39.640 --> 0:24:42.080
<v Speaker 1>including that same file were the salaries of more than

0:24:42.119 --> 0:24:44.359
<v Speaker 1>six thousand Sony employees. One of the big things that

0:24:44.400 --> 0:24:48.960
<v Speaker 1>came out about this was a disparity in pay depending

0:24:49.000 --> 0:24:55.159
<v Speaker 1>upon gender and race. And so this also makes me

0:24:55.240 --> 0:24:58.440
<v Speaker 1>think the nature of the leak. The first stuff that's

0:24:58.520 --> 0:25:02.920
<v Speaker 1>leaked here, here's bread crumb, bread crumb later on, the

0:25:03.000 --> 0:25:06.919
<v Speaker 1>nature of the stuff that was leaked first was incredibly

0:25:07.240 --> 0:25:13.320
<v Speaker 1>harmful to Sony the company uh in an industry perspective,

0:25:14.600 --> 0:25:19.040
<v Speaker 1>but had nothing to do with any sort of like

0:25:19.040 --> 0:25:22.280
<v Speaker 1>it didn't have anything to do with the interview directly anyway.

0:25:22.320 --> 0:25:26.200
<v Speaker 1>So that to me suggests that there's a very specific

0:25:26.240 --> 0:25:28.439
<v Speaker 1>motivation behind the attack. But we'll get into that when

0:25:28.480 --> 0:25:31.520
<v Speaker 1>we get towards the end. So December three was when

0:25:31.560 --> 0:25:35.280
<v Speaker 1>the Adam Sandler PDF dump happened. There's a big dump

0:25:35.880 --> 0:25:40.200
<v Speaker 1>of Adam Sandler information. And I'm using that word in

0:25:40.240 --> 0:25:44.639
<v Speaker 1>a couple of different ways, are you There could have

0:25:44.640 --> 0:25:48.680
<v Speaker 1>been a little bit of editorializing. This is also when

0:25:49.200 --> 0:25:53.520
<v Speaker 1>the data including a passport information, visa information, other private

0:25:53.600 --> 0:25:58.960
<v Speaker 1>information about celebrities who had worked on various Sony films, actors, actresses, directors,

0:25:59.000 --> 0:26:01.840
<v Speaker 1>that kind of thing leaked. So this is where people

0:26:01.880 --> 0:26:06.840
<v Speaker 1>were getting copies of Angelina Jolie's passport for example. Um

0:26:06.920 --> 0:26:11.320
<v Speaker 1>they also included confidential information about film contracts and budgets,

0:26:11.400 --> 0:26:16.320
<v Speaker 1>so again very industry specific stuff and very very damaging

0:26:16.400 --> 0:26:20.560
<v Speaker 1>because Okay, first off, this breeds such dissension amidst the

0:26:20.600 --> 0:26:23.840
<v Speaker 1>employees you know, each other's salaries, and huge morale issue.

0:26:24.080 --> 0:26:28.359
<v Speaker 1>Huge and then also the idea about finding numbers and

0:26:28.400 --> 0:26:32.120
<v Speaker 1>film contracts and budgets, that's a massive amount of leverage

0:26:32.200 --> 0:26:35.200
<v Speaker 1>lost on Sony's part. Well, and it's you know, these

0:26:35.240 --> 0:26:38.560
<v Speaker 1>are industry secrets, like if you've ever heard stories about

0:26:38.680 --> 0:26:44.840
<v Speaker 1>how miraculously no movie ever released makes money, like you know,

0:26:44.880 --> 0:26:46.879
<v Speaker 1>if you have, if you have the inside look on

0:26:46.960 --> 0:26:50.840
<v Speaker 1>these budgets, the actual numbers, the real thing, then suddenly

0:26:50.840 --> 0:26:55.160
<v Speaker 1>you know how much actual money was being spent producing

0:26:55.160 --> 0:26:58.240
<v Speaker 1>it versus how much was made in revenue. And then

0:26:58.240 --> 0:27:01.400
<v Speaker 1>you've got some really tough tack questions that you need

0:27:01.480 --> 0:27:05.760
<v Speaker 1>to answer. So again, very much a very savvy attack.

0:27:06.040 --> 0:27:09.000
<v Speaker 1>This is going to be trouble for Sony down the road. Yeah,

0:27:09.119 --> 0:27:11.800
<v Speaker 1>it's gonna be trolled for a while. So December four,

0:27:12.480 --> 0:27:16.000
<v Speaker 1>that's when the associated press reports that cybersecurity experts found

0:27:16.000 --> 0:27:19.199
<v Speaker 1>similarities in the code used in the Sony hacks of

0:27:20.920 --> 0:27:24.399
<v Speaker 1>with another attack that targeted South Korean companies in two

0:27:24.440 --> 0:27:28.800
<v Speaker 1>thoush And you remember the name of that attack, right, Oh,

0:27:28.920 --> 0:27:31.600
<v Speaker 1>I do remember reading it. What was it? Dark Soul?

0:27:31.920 --> 0:27:35.480
<v Speaker 1>Dark spelled like the capital of South Korea. Oh, that's

0:27:35.520 --> 0:27:38.480
<v Speaker 1>so brilliant. Nah. I was thinking of something else too,

0:27:38.520 --> 0:27:40.680
<v Speaker 1>so I didn't. I didn't even hear of it called

0:27:40.760 --> 0:27:44.879
<v Speaker 1>dark Soul. That's awesome, but it's so again. This was

0:27:44.920 --> 0:27:49.080
<v Speaker 1>sort of a a uh a hint that perhaps North

0:27:49.119 --> 0:27:52.680
<v Speaker 1>Korea was behind it, because North Korea was was very

0:27:52.760 --> 0:27:55.080
<v Speaker 1>much believed to be behind the two thousand thirteen attacks

0:27:55.119 --> 0:27:58.760
<v Speaker 1>against South Korea, right yeah, so uh, but no one's

0:27:58.800 --> 0:28:01.480
<v Speaker 1>come out and said anything. Yeah. December five was when

0:28:01.480 --> 0:28:05.480
<v Speaker 1>messages allegedly from Guardians of Peace threatened Sony executives that

0:28:05.560 --> 0:28:09.320
<v Speaker 1>they don't condemn their own company, but they're really poorly constructed.

0:28:09.359 --> 0:28:12.440
<v Speaker 1>They actually don't read the same way as the initial

0:28:12.520 --> 0:28:17.560
<v Speaker 1>messages did in the attack reveal back on Noyo. So

0:28:17.800 --> 0:28:19.240
<v Speaker 1>one of the things we need to keep in mind

0:28:19.280 --> 0:28:23.720
<v Speaker 1>is that the various communications to Sony and to others

0:28:24.320 --> 0:28:26.840
<v Speaker 1>may or may not have come from the hackers. We

0:28:26.920 --> 0:28:30.000
<v Speaker 1>don't necessarily know. It's kind of like when you hear

0:28:30.040 --> 0:28:36.000
<v Speaker 1>about Anonymous targeting someone, you don't know what to what extent.

0:28:36.160 --> 0:28:40.120
<v Speaker 1>The the overall group of Anonymous feels that way, right,

0:28:40.160 --> 0:28:44.040
<v Speaker 1>because Anonymous is made up of a huge number of

0:28:44.080 --> 0:28:50.000
<v Speaker 1>people with different ideologies, different motivations. Uh, sometimes a splinter

0:28:50.160 --> 0:28:53.040
<v Speaker 1>group will end up targeting somebody, whereas the rest of

0:28:53.040 --> 0:28:56.200
<v Speaker 1>the group either doesn't care actively saying hey, don't do that.

0:28:57.320 --> 0:28:59.280
<v Speaker 1>But that's the thing is that it's impossible that, like

0:28:59.360 --> 0:29:02.880
<v Speaker 1>you say, I got a message from Anonymous, and maybe

0:29:02.880 --> 0:29:04.800
<v Speaker 1>technically that's true, but you're going to have people in

0:29:04.880 --> 0:29:07.920
<v Speaker 1>Anonymous saying, hey, whoa dude, I'm totally not That was

0:29:08.000 --> 0:29:10.800
<v Speaker 1>not us, right, that was not us, That was up sec. No,

0:29:10.960 --> 0:29:14.080
<v Speaker 1>that wasn't us, that was lull set. People create factions

0:29:14.200 --> 0:29:19.120
<v Speaker 1>within Anonymous that are oriented towards a specific project of

0:29:19.280 --> 0:29:21.040
<v Speaker 1>some sort. And I think we even mentioned it, or

0:29:21.040 --> 0:29:22.720
<v Speaker 1>I think I might have brought it up in our

0:29:23.400 --> 0:29:25.800
<v Speaker 1>Sony Heck episodes for stuff they don't want you to

0:29:25.840 --> 0:29:28.160
<v Speaker 1>know that. This reminds me a lot of the Jack

0:29:28.200 --> 0:29:31.960
<v Speaker 1>the Ripper letters, because when Jack the Ripper was active

0:29:32.080 --> 0:29:36.400
<v Speaker 1>there were letters written to the police, the London police

0:29:36.800 --> 0:29:40.200
<v Speaker 1>that was there were essentially taunting the police, and a

0:29:40.280 --> 0:29:45.840
<v Speaker 1>lot of ripperologists experts in the field believe that many

0:29:45.920 --> 0:29:49.040
<v Speaker 1>of those, if not all of them, are fakes. They

0:29:49.080 --> 0:29:52.160
<v Speaker 1>weren't written by the killer, and it could be that

0:29:52.240 --> 0:29:54.800
<v Speaker 1>some of the messages that are attributed to Guardians the

0:29:54.840 --> 0:29:58.520
<v Speaker 1>piece we're not written at all by anyone remotely involved.

0:29:58.520 --> 0:30:01.640
<v Speaker 1>We don't know, right, because there's a way to verify.

0:30:02.280 --> 0:30:05.040
<v Speaker 1>We'll be back with more about the Sony Pictures Entertainment

0:30:05.080 --> 0:30:17.320
<v Speaker 1>hack after these messages now. On December seven, North Korea

0:30:17.520 --> 0:30:20.600
<v Speaker 1>officially says they had nothing to do with this attack.

0:30:21.040 --> 0:30:24.360
<v Speaker 1>On December eight, another alleged Guardians of Peace message demands

0:30:24.360 --> 0:30:28.400
<v Speaker 1>that Sony stop immediately showing the movie of terrorism, which

0:30:28.440 --> 0:30:36.520
<v Speaker 1>can break regional peace and caused the war. Um they

0:30:36.520 --> 0:30:39.880
<v Speaker 1>don't specifically name the interview, although I guess, you know,

0:30:40.040 --> 0:30:41.920
<v Speaker 1>I don't know what other film. I don't think they

0:30:41.960 --> 0:30:45.880
<v Speaker 1>were talking about Annie, so if they did, it was

0:30:45.880 --> 0:30:48.640
<v Speaker 1>The Hard Knock Life for us. But uh no, I

0:30:48.680 --> 0:30:51.400
<v Speaker 1>think they met the interview, but it wasn't specifically named,

0:30:52.080 --> 0:30:56.760
<v Speaker 1>right and uh These events continue though, because the hackers

0:30:56.840 --> 0:31:01.080
<v Speaker 1>now after a little bit of silence, are communicating semi

0:31:01.120 --> 0:31:05.080
<v Speaker 1>regularly or at least leaking information there, there's someone is

0:31:05.120 --> 0:31:08.760
<v Speaker 1>communicating semi regularly. Whether it's the actual hackers or not,

0:31:08.960 --> 0:31:11.960
<v Speaker 1>we don't really know. Um. Also, it was kind of

0:31:12.000 --> 0:31:15.720
<v Speaker 1>interesting that, uh that you know, we had that that

0:31:15.840 --> 0:31:19.680
<v Speaker 1>previous message supposedly from the Guardians of Peace saying, you know,

0:31:19.880 --> 0:31:23.480
<v Speaker 1>condemn your own company, which is a very odd request.

0:31:24.320 --> 0:31:28.200
<v Speaker 1>It's that's another breadcrumb force, I think, Yeah, to say, like,

0:31:28.480 --> 0:31:31.560
<v Speaker 1>please sign a paper that says your company stinks. That's

0:31:31.640 --> 0:31:33.880
<v Speaker 1>essentially what they were saying. And it just seems seems

0:31:33.880 --> 0:31:36.880
<v Speaker 1>a little odd. It seems a bit childish and personal. Yeah,

0:31:36.960 --> 0:31:39.720
<v Speaker 1>it's a little weird, alright. So Decemmer night through eleventh

0:31:39.800 --> 0:31:43.000
<v Speaker 1>now we get a little bit more activity with more

0:31:43.080 --> 0:31:46.280
<v Speaker 1>leaked material. The hackers release emails that reveal some pretty

0:31:46.480 --> 0:31:50.880
<v Speaker 1>ugly conversations about various actors, directors, and even the President

0:31:50.880 --> 0:31:54.040
<v Speaker 1>of the United States, including some remarks that you could

0:31:54.040 --> 0:31:57.520
<v Speaker 1>at least say are racially insensitive, if not out right racist.

0:31:57.920 --> 0:32:01.960
<v Speaker 1>Uh and Son executive Scott Ruden actually with an issue

0:32:01.960 --> 0:32:06.080
<v Speaker 1>an apology on the on December eleven for the messages

0:32:06.120 --> 0:32:09.320
<v Speaker 1>that he claims were written in just with no offense intended,

0:32:10.080 --> 0:32:13.760
<v Speaker 1>and um, yeah saying that was just a joke. I

0:32:13.800 --> 0:32:15.960
<v Speaker 1>didn't mean any offense. It really meant like I didn't

0:32:15.960 --> 0:32:18.360
<v Speaker 1>expect any one of that race to ever read this

0:32:18.440 --> 0:32:20.920
<v Speaker 1>email that I wrote. That's what it comes across to me.

0:32:22.080 --> 0:32:25.840
<v Speaker 1>I'm sorry I got caught. Yeah, I love I love

0:32:25.840 --> 0:32:28.760
<v Speaker 1>the I'm sorry. I'm sorry if I offended you. Not

0:32:28.960 --> 0:32:31.600
<v Speaker 1>I'm sorry I offended you not. I'm sorry I said

0:32:31.640 --> 0:32:34.560
<v Speaker 1>that thing, but I'm sorry that you felt this way

0:32:34.760 --> 0:32:37.320
<v Speaker 1>in response to something I said. Well, I'm sorry that

0:32:37.360 --> 0:32:40.640
<v Speaker 1>you're upset. Yeah, exactly. I'm like, well, you can just

0:32:40.720 --> 0:32:43.760
<v Speaker 1>keep your apologies then, Mr. Now, this isn't This is

0:32:43.800 --> 0:32:46.360
<v Speaker 1>an interesting thing that comes next, because this is something

0:32:46.440 --> 0:32:49.520
<v Speaker 1>I did not know about until you told me. Yeah. So, December,

0:32:50.440 --> 0:32:53.520
<v Speaker 1>Aaron Sorkin publishes an open editorial column in The New

0:32:53.600 --> 0:32:56.640
<v Speaker 1>York Times. Now, Sorkin had had some of his emails

0:32:56.680 --> 0:32:59.600
<v Speaker 1>revealed in a process of this, some of which ended

0:32:59.680 --> 0:33:03.640
<v Speaker 1>up having Sorkin being a little uh uncharitable towards certain

0:33:04.280 --> 0:33:08.600
<v Speaker 1>Hollywood personalities. Yeah, like saying that certain actors are not

0:33:08.680 --> 0:33:11.040
<v Speaker 1>a draw and therefore there's no reason to ever have

0:33:11.120 --> 0:33:14.000
<v Speaker 1>them in one of his movies, that kind of thing. Anyway,

0:33:14.040 --> 0:33:16.640
<v Speaker 1>in the open editorial, he did not say that, because

0:33:16.960 --> 0:33:20.600
<v Speaker 1>how would be crazy. Uh. Instead, he actually said that

0:33:20.680 --> 0:33:26.320
<v Speaker 1>journalists were being just as uh, just as destructive as

0:33:26.320 --> 0:33:32.440
<v Speaker 1>the hackers were by sharing this confidential information, that they

0:33:32.440 --> 0:33:35.760
<v Speaker 1>were essentially enabling the hackers in their attack to cause

0:33:35.880 --> 0:33:40.120
<v Speaker 1>damage to the company by taking that same info. He says,

0:33:40.160 --> 0:33:43.040
<v Speaker 1>you know, I imagine that the hackers are sorting through

0:33:43.360 --> 0:33:46.000
<v Speaker 1>that mountain of information they stole looking for the most

0:33:46.000 --> 0:33:49.440
<v Speaker 1>harmful pieces of information. Meanwhile, the journalists are next door

0:33:49.480 --> 0:33:51.920
<v Speaker 1>doing the exact same thing with all the stuff that's

0:33:51.920 --> 0:33:56.320
<v Speaker 1>been leaked. And he drew a differentiation, however, between the two. Well, yeah,

0:33:56.360 --> 0:33:57.959
<v Speaker 1>I mean he was saying that the hackers are at

0:33:58.000 --> 0:34:00.120
<v Speaker 1>least doing it out of the sense of ideology, but

0:34:00.200 --> 0:34:02.200
<v Speaker 1>the journalists are just doing it to make a make

0:34:02.200 --> 0:34:04.280
<v Speaker 1>a nickel is essentially what I said. He actually did

0:34:04.280 --> 0:34:06.800
<v Speaker 1>say make a nickel. Uh, no word if he was

0:34:06.840 --> 0:34:09.719
<v Speaker 1>walking and talking as he wrote this. Um, that's the

0:34:09.760 --> 0:34:13.840
<v Speaker 1>only way I imagined, Sorkin. We can only assume. But anyway,

0:34:14.000 --> 0:34:17.319
<v Speaker 1>so it's an interesting point, and honestly, one of the

0:34:17.360 --> 0:34:20.480
<v Speaker 1>things that's really important to me reporting on this stuff

0:34:20.920 --> 0:34:23.560
<v Speaker 1>is that we're reporting on the incidents, but we're not

0:34:23.800 --> 0:34:26.600
<v Speaker 1>sharing any of that information that was leaked. I haven't

0:34:26.600 --> 0:34:29.359
<v Speaker 1>sought it out, I haven't downloaded in of it. I'm

0:34:29.400 --> 0:34:33.440
<v Speaker 1>not interested in the contents. Uh Like, I'm not interested

0:34:33.440 --> 0:34:38.680
<v Speaker 1>in the specifics. I'm interested in the impact. I agree

0:34:38.719 --> 0:34:45.080
<v Speaker 1>with you partially, I'm ultimately interested in the big mystery

0:34:45.120 --> 0:34:51.319
<v Speaker 1>and in the final answer, the stuff about people's salaries,

0:34:51.600 --> 0:34:55.600
<v Speaker 1>people's medical records, things like that. As strange as it

0:34:55.680 --> 0:34:58.719
<v Speaker 1>is to say, it comes down to an issue of

0:34:59.640 --> 0:35:04.279
<v Speaker 1>you know, your personal opinion of what is what is

0:35:04.360 --> 0:35:05.960
<v Speaker 1>right and wrong to look at because a lot of

0:35:06.000 --> 0:35:09.319
<v Speaker 1>people nowadays, with the cost of information and communication being

0:35:09.400 --> 0:35:11.960
<v Speaker 1>so low, there are a lot of people who will

0:35:12.000 --> 0:35:15.920
<v Speaker 1>simply hoard information to collect it. You know, um I

0:35:16.760 --> 0:35:21.920
<v Speaker 1>because I would not really want anybody reading my medical records.

0:35:21.960 --> 0:35:25.680
<v Speaker 1>Not that I'm like secretly awarewolf or something. No, I'm

0:35:25.719 --> 0:35:27.960
<v Speaker 1>pretty open about it. Where you're like henther part on

0:35:28.000 --> 0:35:31.080
<v Speaker 1>your sleeve when you when you're able to wear sleeves,

0:35:31.360 --> 0:35:33.880
<v Speaker 1>when I'm able to wear sleeves indeed. But but the

0:35:33.920 --> 0:35:36.840
<v Speaker 1>point is that, uh, you know, I think both you

0:35:36.880 --> 0:35:39.640
<v Speaker 1>and I kind of go on a golden rule basis

0:35:39.680 --> 0:35:43.400
<v Speaker 1>for this stuff. I'm very much a proponent of compassion

0:35:43.400 --> 0:35:46.680
<v Speaker 1>and understanding as much as possible in general, not just

0:35:46.760 --> 0:35:49.279
<v Speaker 1>in this case. But yeah, I mean, I think it's

0:35:49.320 --> 0:35:53.520
<v Speaker 1>newsworthy that it happened. I think taking that information and

0:35:53.560 --> 0:35:57.920
<v Speaker 1>actually disseminating what was inside it apart from a generalization

0:35:57.960 --> 0:36:01.680
<v Speaker 1>like you could say it was sal or information without

0:36:01.719 --> 0:36:05.360
<v Speaker 1>going into the details of what that salary information was. Right,

0:36:05.520 --> 0:36:08.319
<v Speaker 1>So Sorkin was specifically pointing out the journalists who are

0:36:08.320 --> 0:36:11.279
<v Speaker 1>sharing this information and essentially doing what the hackers wanted

0:36:11.320 --> 0:36:14.319
<v Speaker 1>them to do in the first place, essentially making the

0:36:14.360 --> 0:36:19.200
<v Speaker 1>hackers threats work. Yeah. Yeah, it's like, now you guys

0:36:19.200 --> 0:36:23.680
<v Speaker 1>are carrying out the second part of that plan essentially. Um.

0:36:23.719 --> 0:36:27.040
<v Speaker 1>So you know, on the other hand, there are some

0:36:27.200 --> 0:36:29.880
<v Speaker 1>very important issues that have been talked about, like the

0:36:29.920 --> 0:36:35.439
<v Speaker 1>pay disparity that clearly should be addressed. Uh. And so

0:36:35.560 --> 0:36:38.759
<v Speaker 1>it's hard to just be completely like hands off on

0:36:38.760 --> 0:36:40.560
<v Speaker 1>this because there are some things that have come out

0:36:40.560 --> 0:36:42.719
<v Speaker 1>of this that, you know, you want to say, like,

0:36:42.800 --> 0:36:46.360
<v Speaker 1>all right, some of you, some of you may be

0:36:46.560 --> 0:36:49.680
<v Speaker 1>terrible people, and some of your policies may be very

0:36:49.800 --> 0:36:52.080
<v Speaker 1>terrible as well, and maybe we need to take a

0:36:52.080 --> 0:36:54.160
<v Speaker 1>look at that. This is not the way I would

0:36:54.160 --> 0:36:57.440
<v Speaker 1>have preferred us to have this conversation. Absolutely, that's a

0:36:57.480 --> 0:37:01.239
<v Speaker 1>really good point. And uh, it's weird because although the

0:37:01.280 --> 0:37:06.440
<v Speaker 1>Guardians of Peace do not directly respond, I guess to

0:37:06.600 --> 0:37:11.080
<v Speaker 1>media members, Yeah, we do see that they are clearly

0:37:11.320 --> 0:37:15.320
<v Speaker 1>listening to as much as I loathe the term Jonathan

0:37:15.440 --> 0:37:20.399
<v Speaker 1>to the narrative. Yes, So December sixteenth, that narrative gets

0:37:20.400 --> 0:37:23.960
<v Speaker 1>pushed forward with another message allegedly from Guardians of Peace

0:37:24.400 --> 0:37:28.240
<v Speaker 1>that specifically mentions the interview. This is the first time

0:37:28.719 --> 0:37:32.359
<v Speaker 1>the interview is mentioned by name December sixteen. November twenty

0:37:32.400 --> 0:37:35.520
<v Speaker 1>four was when the attack was revealed. December sixteenth is

0:37:35.520 --> 0:37:38.000
<v Speaker 1>when the interview is mentioned by name, and the message

0:37:38.000 --> 0:37:39.920
<v Speaker 1>contains threats saying that if the film is allowed to

0:37:40.000 --> 0:37:42.960
<v Speaker 1>run in theaters, there will be a September eleventh style

0:37:43.120 --> 0:37:47.040
<v Speaker 1>terrorist attack as a response specifically against the New York

0:37:47.080 --> 0:37:50.960
<v Speaker 1>theater where it would have premiered, but also uh nationwide

0:37:51.640 --> 0:37:55.680
<v Speaker 1>um incidents if it were to run in local theaters.

0:37:55.840 --> 0:37:58.359
<v Speaker 1>Sony ends up canceling the premiere and pulls the film

0:37:58.400 --> 0:38:01.560
<v Speaker 1>from theaters, but they really pull the film for theaters

0:38:01.600 --> 0:38:04.040
<v Speaker 1>after several theater chains have already said that they will

0:38:04.120 --> 0:38:06.680
<v Speaker 1>not show the movie, right, and these are the big

0:38:07.080 --> 0:38:12.080
<v Speaker 1>the big names. Yeah, so these are that's exactly right.

0:38:12.160 --> 0:38:15.080
<v Speaker 1>So once, I mean, if if the major chains say

0:38:15.080 --> 0:38:18.200
<v Speaker 1>we're not going to show your movie, then canceling it

0:38:18.280 --> 0:38:21.000
<v Speaker 1>kind of makes sense. So we'll come back to that

0:38:21.239 --> 0:38:25.840
<v Speaker 1>because Sony story about this removing of the movie and

0:38:25.880 --> 0:38:33.160
<v Speaker 1>then returning the film is not totally coherent, right, Yeah,

0:38:33.200 --> 0:38:35.840
<v Speaker 1>that's and it's a charitable way to put it. So

0:38:36.000 --> 0:38:39.239
<v Speaker 1>at this time, people say, well, you should release it

0:38:39.640 --> 0:38:43.839
<v Speaker 1>in video on demand somehow, right, or independent theaters, right,

0:38:43.920 --> 0:38:47.719
<v Speaker 1>And Sony says, nope, dada, We're not releasing it in

0:38:47.840 --> 0:38:51.200
<v Speaker 1>any form. Now, this is an important thing to remember

0:38:51.280 --> 0:38:53.960
<v Speaker 1>that Sony has said they do not want to release

0:38:54.000 --> 0:38:57.840
<v Speaker 1>the movie in any format. And uh So, December seventeenth,

0:38:57.920 --> 0:39:00.920
<v Speaker 1>the U. S Government, in the form mostly of the FBI,

0:39:01.040 --> 0:39:04.319
<v Speaker 1>stated that they believe North Korea was centrally involved in

0:39:04.360 --> 0:39:06.520
<v Speaker 1>the hacking, although the FBI has not officially said that

0:39:06.560 --> 0:39:09.120
<v Speaker 1>at this point, it was really a government official saying

0:39:09.560 --> 0:39:12.799
<v Speaker 1>we believe that North Korea was involved. Uh this was

0:39:12.840 --> 0:39:15.720
<v Speaker 1>not when the FBI specifically came out, but on December

0:39:15.760 --> 0:39:19.920
<v Speaker 1>eighteen messages, again allegedly from Guardians of Peace, went to

0:39:19.960 --> 0:39:22.560
<v Speaker 1>Sony executives and said that if the film was never

0:39:22.640 --> 0:39:26.480
<v Speaker 1>released in any format, then Guardians of Peace would not

0:39:26.640 --> 0:39:30.200
<v Speaker 1>release any more damaging information stolen in the hack. So

0:39:30.280 --> 0:39:33.799
<v Speaker 1>presumably they still had some that was at least as

0:39:33.880 --> 0:39:36.719
<v Speaker 1>damaging as the mountain of stuff they had already released,

0:39:37.239 --> 0:39:39.080
<v Speaker 1>but they were holding it in check, and if that

0:39:39.160 --> 0:39:41.759
<v Speaker 1>movie didn't come out at all, it would never see

0:39:41.800 --> 0:39:44.560
<v Speaker 1>the light of day. But a second message on the

0:39:44.600 --> 0:39:47.120
<v Speaker 1>web application paste band that's the one I was talking

0:39:47.120 --> 0:39:52.359
<v Speaker 1>about that it's supposedly also was from Guardians of Peace

0:39:52.400 --> 0:39:55.080
<v Speaker 1>and had a different message in it, saying that Sony

0:39:55.160 --> 0:39:58.440
<v Speaker 1>had suffered enough and the company could release the movie

0:39:58.520 --> 0:40:01.680
<v Speaker 1>if Kim Jong UN's death isn't quote too happy and

0:40:01.760 --> 0:40:05.000
<v Speaker 1>what does that even mean? I guess that if it

0:40:05.080 --> 0:40:09.440
<v Speaker 1>wasn't like a big emotionally uplifting moment in the film,

0:40:09.480 --> 0:40:12.719
<v Speaker 1>like you weren't supposed to stand up and cheer and

0:40:12.760 --> 0:40:15.439
<v Speaker 1>go yea when Kim jong un dies, and that would

0:40:15.480 --> 0:40:21.200
<v Speaker 1>be okay. I feel fairly confident and saying that this

0:40:21.280 --> 0:40:24.359
<v Speaker 1>is not the same group, or at least it's not

0:40:24.440 --> 0:40:27.839
<v Speaker 1>a group representing North Korea, because that seems completely antithetical

0:40:27.880 --> 0:40:31.279
<v Speaker 1>to everything else that's been said. It's even antithetical to

0:40:31.320 --> 0:40:34.640
<v Speaker 1>the other message that was released that very day, Like

0:40:34.719 --> 0:40:37.320
<v Speaker 1>one message says, never released the movie and we'll stop,

0:40:37.360 --> 0:40:39.319
<v Speaker 1>and the other message says, go ahead and release the

0:40:39.320 --> 0:40:42.000
<v Speaker 1>movie as long as it's not celebrating the death of

0:40:42.040 --> 0:40:44.960
<v Speaker 1>Kim Jong un. Then you you've suffered enough and you've

0:40:45.040 --> 0:40:48.040
<v Speaker 1>learned a lesson. Clearly, these can't be the same people

0:40:49.200 --> 0:40:51.719
<v Speaker 1>unless they're just message with Sony in that case that

0:40:51.920 --> 0:40:53.479
<v Speaker 1>it could be in the same people, but now they're

0:40:53.480 --> 0:40:57.200
<v Speaker 1>cruel mischief makers. Now there's one other thing though, that's

0:40:57.360 --> 0:41:02.040
<v Speaker 1>that's a pretty big deal that was unearthed during the

0:41:02.160 --> 0:41:04.400
<v Speaker 1>leaks of the Sony hacks. Yeah, this is one that

0:41:04.520 --> 0:41:07.399
<v Speaker 1>has become a separate issue all on its own, and

0:41:07.560 --> 0:41:09.800
<v Speaker 1>it's one that I would really need to look into

0:41:09.880 --> 0:41:12.960
<v Speaker 1>further to to do a full rundown on it. But

0:41:14.520 --> 0:41:17.120
<v Speaker 1>the future, I think so. Yeah, I've been trying to

0:41:17.120 --> 0:41:19.359
<v Speaker 1>give it some more space so I can get more

0:41:19.400 --> 0:41:22.640
<v Speaker 1>information on it. But this was where we also saw

0:41:22.719 --> 0:41:25.200
<v Speaker 1>as part of the leaked information that came out that

0:41:26.040 --> 0:41:30.320
<v Speaker 1>there was this um kind of a conspiracy really among

0:41:30.360 --> 0:41:36.200
<v Speaker 1>movie studios about Project Goliath, which everyone is pretty sure

0:41:36.400 --> 0:41:39.759
<v Speaker 1>means Google and Google in the mp a A the

0:41:39.880 --> 0:41:44.279
<v Speaker 1>Motion Picture Association of America ended up having some some

0:41:44.520 --> 0:41:48.839
<v Speaker 1>very public spats about the information contained in the leak

0:41:49.080 --> 0:41:52.879
<v Speaker 1>regarding Project Goliath, Google saying that the m p A

0:41:53.080 --> 0:41:56.480
<v Speaker 1>was essentially trying to reinstate policies that were under the

0:41:56.719 --> 0:42:02.240
<v Speaker 1>SOAPA umbrella but had been defeated because HOPO was not adopted. Meanwhile,

0:42:02.280 --> 0:42:05.160
<v Speaker 1>the m p a A is saying Google being talking

0:42:05.200 --> 0:42:09.120
<v Speaker 1>about self as a champion of free speech is a joke, right, Yeah,

0:42:09.480 --> 0:42:14.040
<v Speaker 1>it got brutal. Uh yeah, very ugly. It's definitely worth

0:42:14.120 --> 0:42:16.400
<v Speaker 1>looking further into, but we won't, you know, I just

0:42:16.400 --> 0:42:18.560
<v Speaker 1>wanted to mention it because again, it's like, that's not

0:42:18.640 --> 0:42:21.160
<v Speaker 1>that this story wasn't big enough, but other big stories

0:42:21.200 --> 0:42:24.680
<v Speaker 1>came up to like because of it. December nineteenth, that's

0:42:24.680 --> 0:42:27.920
<v Speaker 1>when the FBI announces it has connected the North Korean

0:42:27.920 --> 0:42:31.520
<v Speaker 1>government to the attacks, citing unreleased evidence as well as

0:42:31.520 --> 0:42:34.239
<v Speaker 1>clues such as hacking tools that have been used by

0:42:34.239 --> 0:42:37.160
<v Speaker 1>North Korean hackers in the past. They also cite that

0:42:37.200 --> 0:42:41.399
<v Speaker 1>the attacks seemed to originate from IP addresses within North Korea,

0:42:41.520 --> 0:42:44.040
<v Speaker 1>and later stated that they believed it would have been

0:42:44.160 --> 0:42:47.080
<v Speaker 1>really difficult for anyone else to have used or spoofed

0:42:47.120 --> 0:42:50.759
<v Speaker 1>those particular IP addresses. Is my favorite party coming up? Yeah,

0:42:50.760 --> 0:42:53.360
<v Speaker 1>and then North Korea says it was not involved in

0:42:53.400 --> 0:42:56.279
<v Speaker 1>the hacks, but praises the hackers as sympathizers and that

0:42:56.320 --> 0:42:59.879
<v Speaker 1>the hack was quote a righteous deed. They basically said,

0:43:00.080 --> 0:43:03.080
<v Speaker 1>we didn't do it, but we should have. Yeah. I

0:43:03.200 --> 0:43:04.600
<v Speaker 1>like that they say it was a righteous deed. But

0:43:04.640 --> 0:43:05.880
<v Speaker 1>I like to think of him saying it was a

0:43:06.080 --> 0:43:08.839
<v Speaker 1>righteous deed, you know, like kind of surfer Yeah. Yeah,

0:43:08.880 --> 0:43:12.120
<v Speaker 1>I hope mutant Ninja Turtles version of righteous. I don't

0:43:12.120 --> 0:43:14.319
<v Speaker 1>know how popular Hawaiian shirts are there, but that would

0:43:14.320 --> 0:43:17.160
<v Speaker 1>have been good, good costume. If they're really popular, then

0:43:17.200 --> 0:43:19.800
<v Speaker 1>I've got my wardrobe. Should I ever visit North Korea,

0:43:20.360 --> 0:43:23.600
<v Speaker 1>I've got a ton of those. President Obama also on

0:43:23.640 --> 0:43:26.279
<v Speaker 1>December nineteenth, spoke out about the hack and said he

0:43:26.320 --> 0:43:29.399
<v Speaker 1>felt that Sony made a mistake pulling the movie from theaters,

0:43:29.480 --> 0:43:32.560
<v Speaker 1>and also said that the US would respond proportionately to

0:43:32.760 --> 0:43:36.080
<v Speaker 1>the attack. What that specifically meant, no one was really

0:43:36.080 --> 0:43:38.640
<v Speaker 1>sure at the time. Yeah, I've even got a I

0:43:38.680 --> 0:43:40.320
<v Speaker 1>forgot to put the note in, but I'll mention it

0:43:40.320 --> 0:43:43.520
<v Speaker 1>when we get a little further in about the something

0:43:43.560 --> 0:43:46.840
<v Speaker 1>that happened in North Korea that some wonder perhaps was

0:43:46.920 --> 0:43:50.720
<v Speaker 1>the proportionate attack. We don't write the response now that

0:43:50.719 --> 0:43:54.640
<v Speaker 1>that same day, Sony came out and this is where

0:43:54.719 --> 0:43:59.279
<v Speaker 1>the this is where their message evolves. Yeah, evolves is

0:43:59.320 --> 0:44:07.120
<v Speaker 1>good chain just make degree turn. So this is the CEO,

0:44:07.239 --> 0:44:09.680
<v Speaker 1>Michael Lynton came out and said that the decision to

0:44:09.719 --> 0:44:12.920
<v Speaker 1>cancel the film was merely in response to theaters refusing

0:44:12.960 --> 0:44:15.760
<v Speaker 1>to show it, and not a sign that the company

0:44:15.800 --> 0:44:19.239
<v Speaker 1>was bowing to terrorist threats. If that's the case, I

0:44:19.320 --> 0:44:22.960
<v Speaker 1>don't know why they refused to release it in any format.

0:44:23.080 --> 0:44:26.640
<v Speaker 1>If they said we're never releasing this movie. Ever, how

0:44:26.680 --> 0:44:30.200
<v Speaker 1>could that be only because the theater's refused to show it,

0:44:30.480 --> 0:44:33.279
<v Speaker 1>Because you would assume that the company wouldn't want to

0:44:33.320 --> 0:44:37.680
<v Speaker 1>just eat the expenses of producing and marketing a film.

0:44:37.840 --> 0:44:42.960
<v Speaker 1>The Gigantic expenses many millions of dollars, So if you

0:44:43.000 --> 0:44:45.600
<v Speaker 1>want to recapture at least some of that, you could

0:44:45.680 --> 0:44:48.840
<v Speaker 1>release it online. I mean, if you're truly not scared

0:44:49.120 --> 0:44:53.840
<v Speaker 1>of the threats, then why not why not release it

0:44:53.920 --> 0:44:58.160
<v Speaker 1>online or allow independent theaters that say, look, we'll still

0:44:58.160 --> 0:45:00.719
<v Speaker 1>show it. Why not allow them to do it? And

0:45:00.760 --> 0:45:03.360
<v Speaker 1>that was that was the thing, is that this response

0:45:03.400 --> 0:45:07.239
<v Speaker 1>to me did not ring true because the actions that

0:45:07.320 --> 0:45:10.440
<v Speaker 1>Sony had taken just a couple of days earlier spoke

0:45:10.600 --> 0:45:13.359
<v Speaker 1>very differently than what they were saying. However, of course

0:45:13.360 --> 0:45:15.080
<v Speaker 1>they want to say face, they want to say, hey,

0:45:15.080 --> 0:45:17.839
<v Speaker 1>we weren't scared. It's just that there was no place

0:45:17.880 --> 0:45:20.560
<v Speaker 1>to show it. So that's why we pulled it, which

0:45:20.640 --> 0:45:26.239
<v Speaker 1>is patent lee false. Because there were several theater in

0:45:26.280 --> 0:45:30.239
<v Speaker 1>the city of Atlanta that was ready to show it. Uh.

0:45:30.400 --> 0:45:33.520
<v Speaker 1>There are two theaters in general that are specific, rather

0:45:33.640 --> 0:45:37.760
<v Speaker 1>too specific theaters that said they wanted to show the film.

0:45:37.800 --> 0:45:40.839
<v Speaker 1>One is in Atlanta called the Plaza, which is just

0:45:40.920 --> 0:45:43.640
<v Speaker 1>down the street from where I live. Independent theater, yeah,

0:45:43.640 --> 0:45:46.839
<v Speaker 1>a little tiny independent theater. Uh, and they said we'll

0:45:46.880 --> 0:45:49.240
<v Speaker 1>show it. And then there was other one in Texas

0:45:49.320 --> 0:45:53.040
<v Speaker 1>Alamo Drafthouse Yeah yeah, yeah, which are which are too

0:45:53.760 --> 0:45:58.440
<v Speaker 1>um unforeseen champions there. We we do know though. This

0:45:58.520 --> 0:46:01.680
<v Speaker 1>is another thing that's really interesting thing to me because

0:46:01.719 --> 0:46:04.840
<v Speaker 1>all this stuff takes place after you and I and

0:46:04.960 --> 0:46:09.040
<v Speaker 1>Matt did the earlier show. So what happens on December twenty.

0:46:09.200 --> 0:46:11.239
<v Speaker 1>That's when North Korea offers to take part in a

0:46:11.360 --> 0:46:15.120
<v Speaker 1>joint investigation of the hack, and the U. S Government declines.

0:46:15.960 --> 0:46:18.600
<v Speaker 1>So North Korea says, hey, we weren't responsible, but we

0:46:18.640 --> 0:46:20.880
<v Speaker 1>will totally help you try and track down who was

0:46:20.960 --> 0:46:24.040
<v Speaker 1>responsible for this thing that we approve of but totally

0:46:24.120 --> 0:46:28.680
<v Speaker 1>didn't do. And the United States said, uh, Here's what's

0:46:28.760 --> 0:46:31.719
<v Speaker 1>interesting to mean though, If North Korea is telling the truth, right,

0:46:31.800 --> 0:46:35.440
<v Speaker 1>and if they were in no way involved in that hack, right,

0:46:35.920 --> 0:46:40.919
<v Speaker 1>this this, uh, these bits of code that somehow could

0:46:40.960 --> 0:46:45.400
<v Speaker 1>have come from them, I'm wondering if maybe maybe their

0:46:45.520 --> 0:46:50.960
<v Speaker 1>willingness to investigate was seen as uh disingenuous. Maybe they

0:46:50.960 --> 0:46:55.359
<v Speaker 1>were looking to find out how their how their work

0:46:55.440 --> 0:46:57.840
<v Speaker 1>got out there or how it got found, or maybe

0:46:57.840 --> 0:47:00.880
<v Speaker 1>they were It could also possibly be that North Korea

0:47:00.920 --> 0:47:04.320
<v Speaker 1>is saying, hey, you know, we didn't um, we didn't

0:47:04.440 --> 0:47:07.239
<v Speaker 1>allow for this to happen. We didn't we didn't designate

0:47:07.360 --> 0:47:10.160
<v Speaker 1>someone to go and do this on our behalf. We

0:47:10.200 --> 0:47:12.760
<v Speaker 1>would like to track down the person responsible for reasons

0:47:12.760 --> 0:47:17.000
<v Speaker 1>of our own exactly. Or it could be that they

0:47:17.080 --> 0:47:19.080
<v Speaker 1>totally did it. It could be they totally did it.

0:47:19.960 --> 0:47:21.759
<v Speaker 1>And that's one thing that we should point out, Like

0:47:21.800 --> 0:47:26.720
<v Speaker 1>I have pretty strong skepticism about this, but they totally

0:47:26.719 --> 0:47:29.520
<v Speaker 1>could have done it right. It's just not enough information.

0:47:29.520 --> 0:47:32.240
<v Speaker 1>We'll get to we'll get to the biggest, the biggest

0:47:32.280 --> 0:47:35.359
<v Speaker 1>problem in the information gap here pretty soon, I think.

0:47:35.440 --> 0:47:38.000
<v Speaker 1>But then on that same day, December twentie that's when

0:47:38.000 --> 0:47:40.799
<v Speaker 1>North Korea also warned that there would be serious consequences

0:47:40.800 --> 0:47:44.080
<v Speaker 1>should the United States attack North Korea if this retaliation

0:47:44.120 --> 0:47:47.320
<v Speaker 1>were to happen, right, whatever that would be. Yeah, So

0:47:47.520 --> 0:47:51.400
<v Speaker 1>essentially like whatever proportionate response you're thinking of, better not

0:47:51.480 --> 0:47:55.239
<v Speaker 1>be against us, because boy heality, we will we and

0:47:55.239 --> 0:47:58.960
<v Speaker 1>and they were very like, very militant. Not big surprise,

0:47:59.000 --> 0:48:01.880
<v Speaker 1>I mean, North Korea is very angry. North Korea has

0:48:01.920 --> 0:48:06.000
<v Speaker 1>got a long history of of you know, beating the

0:48:06.080 --> 0:48:10.600
<v Speaker 1>drama and saying that they will take severe action without

0:48:10.600 --> 0:48:13.520
<v Speaker 1>backing it up. Not that you would ever want them

0:48:13.520 --> 0:48:16.000
<v Speaker 1>to back it up. But the United States in North

0:48:16.040 --> 0:48:19.319
<v Speaker 1>Korea remember still technically in a ceasefire with the war

0:48:19.400 --> 0:48:22.319
<v Speaker 1>that never ended. Yes, North Korea has never acknowledged the

0:48:22.400 --> 0:48:25.919
<v Speaker 1>end of the war. So December twenty three, Sony would

0:48:25.960 --> 0:48:29.160
<v Speaker 1>authorize three theaters to show the interview on Christmas Day,

0:48:29.320 --> 0:48:33.200
<v Speaker 1>and they also released the film to streaming options late

0:48:33.239 --> 0:48:36.680
<v Speaker 1>on the Christmas Eve, and there were no further attacks.

0:48:37.280 --> 0:48:40.000
<v Speaker 1>Despite that fact that you know, you had those messages

0:48:40.040 --> 0:48:42.400
<v Speaker 1>earlier saying that if you ever show this, we will

0:48:42.440 --> 0:48:45.960
<v Speaker 1>attack more, there weren't any. There were no real life

0:48:46.680 --> 0:48:51.360
<v Speaker 1>violent consequences. December seven, North Korea condemns the release of

0:48:51.400 --> 0:48:56.000
<v Speaker 1>the film, and they're real jerks about it. They used

0:48:56.040 --> 0:49:01.040
<v Speaker 1>a racially insensitive term to describe our president it, which

0:49:01.200 --> 0:49:04.520
<v Speaker 1>was pretty ugly, and I got a lot of people

0:49:04.600 --> 0:49:07.399
<v Speaker 1>up in arms. But I mean, the most important thing

0:49:07.520 --> 0:49:11.000
<v Speaker 1>is obviously that there wasn't any kind of physical retaliation

0:49:11.200 --> 0:49:13.680
<v Speaker 1>for the release of the movie. It was just a

0:49:13.719 --> 0:49:19.040
<v Speaker 1>really nasty worded message from people who were upset about

0:49:19.080 --> 0:49:23.360
<v Speaker 1>it well and the film itself. Of course, given we

0:49:23.440 --> 0:49:25.960
<v Speaker 1>talked about this a little bit, but given the political

0:49:26.080 --> 0:49:31.399
<v Speaker 1>environment and ideology of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

0:49:31.520 --> 0:49:35.640
<v Speaker 1>or North Korea, this is this is a profoundly offensive thing.

0:49:35.800 --> 0:49:41.000
<v Speaker 1>It's it's similar to a film that came out featuring

0:49:41.160 --> 0:49:47.359
<v Speaker 1>Mohammed from you know, from the Muslim faith, uh which

0:49:47.480 --> 0:49:50.880
<v Speaker 1>depicting Mohammed is already supposed to be a profound defense

0:49:51.640 --> 0:49:55.160
<v Speaker 1>and then having him killed. It's similar to that because

0:49:55.160 --> 0:49:58.759
<v Speaker 1>of the deification of the leadership of North Korea. Sure, yeah,

0:49:58.800 --> 0:50:02.040
<v Speaker 1>it's it's it's a very much a kind of divine

0:50:02.160 --> 0:50:04.239
<v Speaker 1>right sort of thing. Yeah, that's a good phase. And

0:50:04.480 --> 0:50:10.440
<v Speaker 1>so a nastily worded statement, Uh, with added racism. I

0:50:10.480 --> 0:50:14.760
<v Speaker 1>guess just to make it really pop is the least

0:50:14.800 --> 0:50:18.919
<v Speaker 1>you could expect. Yeah, that's true. Uh. Sony also has

0:50:18.960 --> 0:50:22.560
<v Speaker 1>threatened media companies that are covering the hack with legal action,

0:50:22.600 --> 0:50:26.319
<v Speaker 1>saying they will sue companies that specifically companies that are

0:50:26.400 --> 0:50:30.440
<v Speaker 1>sharing the leaked information. I mean, reporting on something is

0:50:30.440 --> 0:50:33.840
<v Speaker 1>one thing. Obviously, Sony suing a company for reporting on

0:50:33.880 --> 0:50:38.120
<v Speaker 1>the story would be pretty difficult to win. I mean,

0:50:38.280 --> 0:50:40.399
<v Speaker 1>you know, no one wants to get sued. It's an

0:50:40.400 --> 0:50:44.799
<v Speaker 1>expensive endeavor. But you know, most most media outlets are

0:50:44.800 --> 0:50:46.839
<v Speaker 1>going to say, like, well, we're just covering the news.

0:50:46.920 --> 0:50:49.319
<v Speaker 1>This is news, and that's what we do. You're not

0:50:49.440 --> 0:50:53.200
<v Speaker 1>a government. You can't claim that this is a national

0:50:53.320 --> 0:50:56.359
<v Speaker 1>security issue. Yeah. Now, if if in fact they were

0:50:56.440 --> 0:51:00.719
<v Speaker 1>releasing private like corporate secrets that kind of thing, then

0:51:00.760 --> 0:51:03.160
<v Speaker 1>you get into a sort of a murky ground. And

0:51:03.480 --> 0:51:06.520
<v Speaker 1>I can see why Sony definitely wanted to to try

0:51:06.560 --> 0:51:10.759
<v Speaker 1>and cut down on people sharing this information and disseminating

0:51:10.760 --> 0:51:14.440
<v Speaker 1>it further, which is another reason why I report about

0:51:14.480 --> 0:51:20.000
<v Speaker 1>the story, but go into it. Uh, there's not always altruistic.

0:51:20.840 --> 0:51:22.360
<v Speaker 1>We've got a little bit more to talk about with

0:51:22.400 --> 0:51:25.279
<v Speaker 1>the Sony Pictures Entertainment hack, but first let's take this

0:51:25.360 --> 0:51:35.440
<v Speaker 1>quick break. Now, there's one other thing you that you

0:51:35.480 --> 0:51:38.600
<v Speaker 1>were going to mention as well about this, which is

0:51:39.320 --> 0:51:42.800
<v Speaker 1>something funny happened in North Korea's internet. Yeah, their internet

0:51:43.120 --> 0:51:47.000
<v Speaker 1>um had a real slow down and eventually just a

0:51:47.040 --> 0:51:52.200
<v Speaker 1>complete halt of operations in late December, and there was

0:51:52.239 --> 0:51:54.120
<v Speaker 1>some question about whether or not that was in fact

0:51:54.200 --> 0:51:57.120
<v Speaker 1>the proportionate response that the United States was going to

0:51:57.160 --> 0:52:02.239
<v Speaker 1>take against whomever perpetrated the ac UM, And we don't know,

0:52:02.480 --> 0:52:04.480
<v Speaker 1>we don't know if it was. In fact. There's so

0:52:04.680 --> 0:52:10.799
<v Speaker 1>few nodes in North Korea, and it's all stuff that

0:52:10.840 --> 0:52:13.160
<v Speaker 1>the government and military can have access to, but no

0:52:13.200 --> 0:52:16.800
<v Speaker 1>one else outside of those organizations has access to the Internet.

0:52:17.560 --> 0:52:22.200
<v Speaker 1>So but those those nodes that all the connections were

0:52:22.320 --> 0:52:25.960
<v Speaker 1>essentially shut down, like the Internet went dark in North Korea. Uh.

0:52:26.080 --> 0:52:28.360
<v Speaker 1>It led some people to wonder if perhaps there was

0:52:28.400 --> 0:52:31.239
<v Speaker 1>an attack, if it was a state sponsored attack like

0:52:31.280 --> 0:52:34.560
<v Speaker 1>the United States proportionate response, if that was it, or

0:52:34.560 --> 0:52:39.680
<v Speaker 1>if it was just as an example of infrastructure breaking down,

0:52:39.840 --> 0:52:41.640
<v Speaker 1>which could have been the case. It could have been

0:52:41.680 --> 0:52:43.719
<v Speaker 1>that it was as simple as someone needed to go

0:52:43.760 --> 0:52:47.120
<v Speaker 1>and reboot a machine in order for it to reconnect

0:52:47.160 --> 0:52:50.160
<v Speaker 1>to the Internet at large. So, uh, there just wasn't

0:52:50.200 --> 0:52:52.399
<v Speaker 1>any answer to that. Of course, you know, you had

0:52:52.400 --> 0:52:55.520
<v Speaker 1>a lot of speculation around it, but since there's not

0:52:55.640 --> 0:52:59.040
<v Speaker 1>enough information, I don't want to speculate right the We're

0:52:59.080 --> 0:53:02.880
<v Speaker 1>just saying that the issue of antiquated or malfunctioning equipment

0:53:03.200 --> 0:53:06.719
<v Speaker 1>is at least as likely a culprit as a state

0:53:06.760 --> 0:53:10.879
<v Speaker 1>sponsored attack, if not more likely in my opinion. But so,

0:53:11.280 --> 0:53:15.600
<v Speaker 1>happy New Year, Sony. You made it to uh the

0:53:15.960 --> 0:53:19.880
<v Speaker 1>and that's January second. There's a funny thing, Jonathan, You

0:53:19.920 --> 0:53:21.880
<v Speaker 1>and I have talked about this off air before, but

0:53:21.960 --> 0:53:26.680
<v Speaker 1>there's this funny way that stories drop, Uh, some big

0:53:26.719 --> 0:53:30.880
<v Speaker 1>stories drop on Friday afternoon. Listeners will recall that January

0:53:30.960 --> 0:53:35.000
<v Speaker 1>two was a Friday. There's a great subreddit about important

0:53:35.000 --> 0:53:38.359
<v Speaker 1>news that drops on Friday. Yeah. The hope that there

0:53:38.400 --> 0:53:41.640
<v Speaker 1>are a lot of companies that will release like unpleasant

0:53:41.719 --> 0:53:44.080
<v Speaker 1>news on a Friday, hoping that it just gets buried

0:53:44.640 --> 0:53:46.719
<v Speaker 1>and then by the time everyone's ready to talk about

0:53:46.719 --> 0:53:48.680
<v Speaker 1>it again on Monday, it's old news, so no one

0:53:48.719 --> 0:53:52.440
<v Speaker 1>talks about it, right, Yeah, exactly, And so this is, uh,

0:53:52.480 --> 0:53:56.839
<v Speaker 1>this is a pretty big Friday to drop some disappearing

0:53:56.880 --> 0:53:59.920
<v Speaker 1>news because it's the day after New Year's Day. Every

0:54:00.040 --> 0:54:02.520
<v Speaker 1>once hungover, no one can no one can remember what

0:54:02.560 --> 0:54:05.560
<v Speaker 1>their name is, let alone read a press release right right,

0:54:05.840 --> 0:54:08.719
<v Speaker 1>and like, you don't drink, and you're probably just hungover

0:54:08.760 --> 0:54:11.319
<v Speaker 1>from having to deal with all the people drinking. It's

0:54:11.320 --> 0:54:14.160
<v Speaker 1>mostly made dealing with the immense frustration of all my

0:54:14.239 --> 0:54:18.000
<v Speaker 1>drunk friends who are who are texting me as they're like, dude,

0:54:18.000 --> 0:54:19.960
<v Speaker 1>did I call you last night? And if I did,

0:54:20.120 --> 0:54:23.799
<v Speaker 1>don't remember the things I said? Don't check the message. Yes,

0:54:23.920 --> 0:54:25.920
<v Speaker 1>you know your your co host Matt Frederick has done

0:54:25.920 --> 0:54:29.480
<v Speaker 1>that to me. Yeah, at one thirty in the morning,

0:54:29.680 --> 0:54:31.680
<v Speaker 1>I got a call from him. That was a few

0:54:31.760 --> 0:54:33.840
<v Speaker 1>years ago, though that was not this year. That was

0:54:33.880 --> 0:54:37.200
<v Speaker 1>in his checkered past. So here's what happens. On January second.

0:54:37.200 --> 0:54:40.200
<v Speaker 1>The White House announces a new round of sanctions on

0:54:40.280 --> 0:54:43.959
<v Speaker 1>North Korea and they do this via executive order. We've

0:54:44.000 --> 0:54:48.440
<v Speaker 1>got a quotation here, uh, which we should say also

0:54:48.640 --> 0:54:53.000
<v Speaker 1>that as the US is releasing these new sanctions, people

0:54:53.400 --> 0:55:01.240
<v Speaker 1>are already raising um skeptical concern about this North Korea allegations.

0:55:01.920 --> 0:55:04.480
<v Speaker 1>And they're saying, you know, the FBI or the CIA

0:55:04.719 --> 0:55:08.239
<v Speaker 1>or the rest of the alphabet soup seems convinced that

0:55:08.360 --> 0:55:12.000
<v Speaker 1>North Korea was involved. And they're saying that due to

0:55:12.160 --> 0:55:16.359
<v Speaker 1>information we have, we know it was North Korea. And

0:55:16.400 --> 0:55:21.520
<v Speaker 1>people are saying, but how and why what is this

0:55:21.560 --> 0:55:25.560
<v Speaker 1>information that you have that's such a convincing smoking gun, right,

0:55:25.760 --> 0:55:30.200
<v Speaker 1>and uh, they that's why we've got the exact quotation

0:55:30.440 --> 0:55:34.640
<v Speaker 1>of why they are sanctioning this. Uh if if you

0:55:34.640 --> 0:55:37.920
<v Speaker 1>could probably do a better voice thanich. The response. So,

0:55:38.400 --> 0:55:43.280
<v Speaker 1>it's a response to ongoing provocative, destabilizing, and repressive actions

0:55:43.280 --> 0:55:46.719
<v Speaker 1>and policies. Particularly it's destructive and coercive cyber attacks on

0:55:46.760 --> 0:55:53.160
<v Speaker 1>Sony Pictures Entertainment. So specifically, not not just specifically cyber crime,

0:55:53.440 --> 0:55:58.400
<v Speaker 1>but specifically Sony Pictures Entertainment. They're saying, not only do

0:55:58.480 --> 0:56:02.000
<v Speaker 1>we think he did it, this is our official response

0:56:02.040 --> 0:56:04.480
<v Speaker 1>to that. Yeah. So in this case, I mean it's

0:56:04.520 --> 0:56:08.400
<v Speaker 1>essentially saying like cases closed, guys, this is they did it,

0:56:09.120 --> 0:56:12.719
<v Speaker 1>and Uh, we're gonna kind of segue into sort of

0:56:12.719 --> 0:56:16.960
<v Speaker 1>the skepticism about this, including my own personal skepticism, but

0:56:17.000 --> 0:56:19.879
<v Speaker 1>I want to preface it with saying, and we said

0:56:19.880 --> 0:56:21.600
<v Speaker 1>this on on the stuff they don't want you to

0:56:21.640 --> 0:56:24.400
<v Speaker 1>know episode as well, that this is based upon the

0:56:24.440 --> 0:56:27.360
<v Speaker 1>information that we have available to us. And it could

0:56:27.400 --> 0:56:31.239
<v Speaker 1>be that the US government hasn't its possession information that

0:56:31.440 --> 0:56:35.960
<v Speaker 1>is damning evidence that proves that North Korea's government was

0:56:36.000 --> 0:56:39.520
<v Speaker 1>in fact behind the attacks. Uh, And it's just that

0:56:39.560 --> 0:56:42.080
<v Speaker 1>we don't have access to that information, and therefore that's

0:56:42.120 --> 0:56:46.120
<v Speaker 1>why things look a little hokey to us. Uh. That

0:56:46.280 --> 0:56:50.319
<v Speaker 1>being said, things look a little hokey to us. How So,

0:56:50.400 --> 0:56:52.879
<v Speaker 1>what what are some of the points that make this

0:56:53.600 --> 0:56:58.120
<v Speaker 1>not an ironclad theory? All right? So, first, it's odd

0:56:58.320 --> 0:57:00.960
<v Speaker 1>to have a state sponsored tech where you have a

0:57:01.000 --> 0:57:06.960
<v Speaker 1>hacker group claiming responsibility and giving itself a cool name. Yes. So,

0:57:06.960 --> 0:57:08.719
<v Speaker 1>so having a group come out and say, hey, we're

0:57:08.760 --> 0:57:10.920
<v Speaker 1>guardians of peace, were the ones who did this, this

0:57:11.000 --> 0:57:12.759
<v Speaker 1>is the reason we did it, here's how you can

0:57:12.800 --> 0:57:15.239
<v Speaker 1>stop it from happening, is a lot different from a

0:57:15.280 --> 0:57:19.000
<v Speaker 1>state sponsored attack. A state sponsored attack usually one thing

0:57:19.080 --> 0:57:20.960
<v Speaker 1>is they don't want to leave any trace of who

0:57:21.040 --> 0:57:23.880
<v Speaker 1>it was that did it. You know, this is if

0:57:23.920 --> 0:57:27.400
<v Speaker 1>you remember the episodes we've done about stucks Net, then

0:57:27.480 --> 0:57:29.760
<v Speaker 1>you know this is the case. Like you want, you

0:57:29.800 --> 0:57:33.920
<v Speaker 1>want to have the effect without having it be autographed.

0:57:34.000 --> 0:57:38.360
<v Speaker 1>You know, love North Korea. Next, the amount of data

0:57:38.400 --> 0:57:41.640
<v Speaker 1>stolen was huge, so we mentioned this earlier. It takes

0:57:41.680 --> 0:57:44.480
<v Speaker 1>a really long time to siphon off a hundred terabytes

0:57:44.520 --> 0:57:49.800
<v Speaker 1>of data, particularly if you're not on site. So that

0:57:50.000 --> 0:57:53.120
<v Speaker 1>is an enormous undertaking. It's not impossible. It is something

0:57:53.120 --> 0:57:57.240
<v Speaker 1>that could happen, but it would take months. Well, it

0:57:57.240 --> 0:57:59.240
<v Speaker 1>would suggest to me that if in fact this is

0:57:59.240 --> 0:58:04.880
<v Speaker 1>North Korea that behind it, that they targeted Sony essentially

0:58:06.520 --> 0:58:10.560
<v Speaker 1>sometime mid two thousand and fourteen for a movie that

0:58:10.600 --> 0:58:13.040
<v Speaker 1>wasn't going to come out for six months the latest,

0:58:14.280 --> 0:58:16.160
<v Speaker 1>because that's how long it's going to take to steal

0:58:16.200 --> 0:58:19.440
<v Speaker 1>that much information. Also, that they were able to identify

0:58:19.480 --> 0:58:21.680
<v Speaker 1>the information that would be most harmful to the company,

0:58:22.240 --> 0:58:26.360
<v Speaker 1>target it, take it and not ever be noticed. Now granted,

0:58:26.360 --> 0:58:28.560
<v Speaker 1>when they're taking it, they're making copies. It's not like

0:58:28.720 --> 0:58:31.760
<v Speaker 1>stealing from a store where suddenly there's there's an empty

0:58:31.760 --> 0:58:35.360
<v Speaker 1>space where a TV used to be. Right, So it's

0:58:35.400 --> 0:58:38.320
<v Speaker 1>a little different from physical theft, but still you could

0:58:38.400 --> 0:58:40.400
<v Speaker 1>end up being caught, you know, you could at leave,

0:58:40.440 --> 0:58:44.160
<v Speaker 1>people could see unusual traffic in the Internet servers, that

0:58:44.240 --> 0:58:49.520
<v Speaker 1>kind of thing. Um, So it's unusual. Also the fact

0:58:49.560 --> 0:58:53.120
<v Speaker 1>that the information that was released to harm the company

0:58:53.360 --> 0:58:58.240
<v Speaker 1>was incredibly savvy, Like this speaks of someone who has

0:58:58.280 --> 0:59:02.880
<v Speaker 1>a real under a standing of what is going to

0:59:02.960 --> 0:59:08.720
<v Speaker 1>make a company, specifically a media company vulnerable. Right, how

0:59:08.760 --> 0:59:12.520
<v Speaker 1>do I strike at the morale of the employees, how

0:59:12.560 --> 0:59:16.240
<v Speaker 1>do I strike at the relationship between the production company

0:59:16.360 --> 0:59:19.680
<v Speaker 1>and the other big players in the industry, How do

0:59:19.720 --> 0:59:23.240
<v Speaker 1>I strike at the American public's perception of that company?

0:59:23.280 --> 0:59:27.280
<v Speaker 1>This is incredibly savvy stuff. Not to say that there

0:59:27.320 --> 0:59:30.000
<v Speaker 1>are there aren't people in North Korea who are aware

0:59:30.000 --> 0:59:32.960
<v Speaker 1>of this. They very well maybe, but it seems to

0:59:33.000 --> 0:59:38.120
<v Speaker 1>me like it's a real insider's insight to what is

0:59:38.160 --> 0:59:44.480
<v Speaker 1>important within the film industry in general and Sony in particular. Yeah,

0:59:46.960 --> 0:59:49.960
<v Speaker 1>it was a little clunky myself, but okay. Also, the

0:59:50.040 --> 0:59:52.640
<v Speaker 1>threats to obey the hackers had nothing to do with

0:59:52.840 --> 0:59:56.400
<v Speaker 1>the interview for a really long time. Like, so essentially

0:59:56.440 --> 0:59:59.280
<v Speaker 1>they were saying, obey us, do what we say, but

0:59:59.280 --> 1:00:03.080
<v Speaker 1>they weren't say they weren't giving instructions, Like they didn't

1:00:03.120 --> 1:00:06.320
<v Speaker 1>give Sony the chance to pull the interview. It was

1:00:06.360 --> 1:00:10.960
<v Speaker 1>only after leaking the information that the demand was even made.

1:00:11.480 --> 1:00:14.640
<v Speaker 1>So it's really odd that if the interview was in

1:00:14.680 --> 1:00:17.960
<v Speaker 1>fact the reason for the attack, and if the goal

1:00:18.080 --> 1:00:20.600
<v Speaker 1>of the attack was to have the interview pulled from

1:00:20.640 --> 1:00:24.480
<v Speaker 1>film from theaters, why not actually give the company a

1:00:24.560 --> 1:00:28.360
<v Speaker 1>chance to do that rather than just slash and burn

1:00:28.840 --> 1:00:31.640
<v Speaker 1>because the film was released anyway. Yeah, to me, that's

1:00:31.800 --> 1:00:34.440
<v Speaker 1>that's one of the most important parts. Let alone the

1:00:34.480 --> 1:00:41.120
<v Speaker 1>fact that UH, states don't typically attack other states for

1:00:41.640 --> 1:00:45.880
<v Speaker 1>media like private films, you know, private sector films. Uh.

1:00:46.480 --> 1:00:49.920
<v Speaker 1>We've already talked about. You know something that ties into

1:00:50.000 --> 1:00:53.439
<v Speaker 1>that earlier point you just made, which is, uh, how

1:00:53.480 --> 1:00:56.160
<v Speaker 1>to attribute who said what? How do you how can

1:00:56.200 --> 1:00:59.240
<v Speaker 1>you be sure that a message supposedly from the hackers

1:00:59.320 --> 1:01:02.360
<v Speaker 1>was actually from the hackers? And you can't know, I mean,

1:01:02.920 --> 1:01:05.320
<v Speaker 1>you know, you might as well sit there and go

1:01:05.480 --> 1:01:09.320
<v Speaker 1>to four chan and try and say this particular message

1:01:09.360 --> 1:01:11.400
<v Speaker 1>was from this particular person. It's all supposed to be

1:01:11.440 --> 1:01:15.000
<v Speaker 1>anonymously protected, so you don't know. We've got a bit

1:01:15.040 --> 1:01:17.760
<v Speaker 1>more to say about the Sony Pictures Entertainment hack before

1:01:17.760 --> 1:01:28.400
<v Speaker 1>we wrap up, but first let's take another quick break. Also,

1:01:28.480 --> 1:01:33.560
<v Speaker 1>security firm Norse identified six former Sony employees who had

1:01:33.600 --> 1:01:37.280
<v Speaker 1>the skills necessary to pull off something like this and

1:01:37.320 --> 1:01:41.240
<v Speaker 1>had participated in chat room discussions revealing their negative feelings

1:01:41.280 --> 1:01:44.560
<v Speaker 1>towards the company, which wasn't anything incriminating, but they were

1:01:44.600 --> 1:01:48.280
<v Speaker 1>clearly disgruntled. They were former employees, they were part of

1:01:48.320 --> 1:01:51.560
<v Speaker 1>a layoff that happened in two thousand fourteen UM and

1:01:51.640 --> 1:01:56.680
<v Speaker 1>the FBI rejected this information, which is interesting because one

1:01:56.840 --> 1:02:00.360
<v Speaker 1>other thing that I believe it was Norse found when

1:02:00.480 --> 1:02:03.960
<v Speaker 1>North submitted their stuff to the FBI. They they are

1:02:04.080 --> 1:02:07.960
<v Speaker 1>big proponents of this insider job argument because within the

1:02:08.000 --> 1:02:11.040
<v Speaker 1>code they found the credentials that you would need to

1:02:11.160 --> 1:02:15.720
<v Speaker 1>access some of these uh some of these compartmentalized basis

1:02:15.760 --> 1:02:19.440
<v Speaker 1>of information, right. Yeah. It seemed to a lot of

1:02:19.480 --> 1:02:24.840
<v Speaker 1>cybersecurity experts that whomever pulled off this attack had access

1:02:25.000 --> 1:02:30.280
<v Speaker 1>to passwords and other verification UH criteria that would allow

1:02:30.320 --> 1:02:34.720
<v Speaker 1>them access to these very sensitive areas of information that

1:02:34.800 --> 1:02:39.480
<v Speaker 1>would be challenging for an outsider to identify and use.

1:02:39.720 --> 1:02:42.520
<v Speaker 1>But if you're if you were familiar with the system already,

1:02:42.600 --> 1:02:44.720
<v Speaker 1>then you would know what you needed before you did

1:02:44.760 --> 1:02:48.000
<v Speaker 1>your attack. So it's it's one of those things where

1:02:48.000 --> 1:02:51.080
<v Speaker 1>you're like, yeah, it's not impossible for someone outside the

1:02:51.120 --> 1:02:54.320
<v Speaker 1>group to have figured this out, but it's far more

1:02:54.440 --> 1:02:58.520
<v Speaker 1>likely that there was at least some insider assistance because

1:02:59.400 --> 1:03:03.000
<v Speaker 1>you know, they are able to target specific pieces of information,

1:03:03.480 --> 1:03:07.240
<v Speaker 1>and perhaps it's unwitting insider assistance too. It could be Yeah,

1:03:07.240 --> 1:03:09.400
<v Speaker 1>it could just very well be a case of social

1:03:09.440 --> 1:03:15.240
<v Speaker 1>engineering where uh, an outside hacker gets unwitting participation and

1:03:15.440 --> 1:03:18.160
<v Speaker 1>the people who handed over the information or the the

1:03:18.240 --> 1:03:21.000
<v Speaker 1>access the keys to the kingdom weren't aware of what

1:03:21.040 --> 1:03:23.880
<v Speaker 1>they were doing at the time. That's possible. Um I

1:03:23.960 --> 1:03:29.520
<v Speaker 1>still think that the insider hypothesis is the most compelling

1:03:29.680 --> 1:03:33.800
<v Speaker 1>based upon what was stolen, how it was leaked, and

1:03:34.040 --> 1:03:37.280
<v Speaker 1>the effect it had. But and also the fact that

1:03:37.400 --> 1:03:40.200
<v Speaker 1>the demand for the film thing didn't come until after

1:03:40.680 --> 1:03:44.960
<v Speaker 1>the leaks had happened. But again, that's that's just based

1:03:44.960 --> 1:03:46.960
<v Speaker 1>on the information have available to me. So what do

1:03:47.000 --> 1:03:50.640
<v Speaker 1>you think then about one of the early things presented

1:03:50.640 --> 1:03:55.600
<v Speaker 1>as smoking gun evidence. The idea that uh, certain pieces

1:03:55.600 --> 1:03:59.160
<v Speaker 1>of code that have been used in the attacks were

1:03:59.200 --> 1:04:02.080
<v Speaker 1>present in these most recent attacks. Well, ben, as you

1:04:02.120 --> 1:04:05.760
<v Speaker 1>and I know, on the internet, um, all code is

1:04:06.840 --> 1:04:10.960
<v Speaker 1>incredibly proprietary and can't be spread around or tweaked or

1:04:11.040 --> 1:04:15.240
<v Speaker 1>changed or altered or added to or taken away from.

1:04:15.240 --> 1:04:18.400
<v Speaker 1>I mean, if only we lived in a world where

1:04:18.440 --> 1:04:22.120
<v Speaker 1>you could take existing programs, change them and make them

1:04:22.120 --> 1:04:26.400
<v Speaker 1>do things for your on your own behalf, then we

1:04:26.400 --> 1:04:29.360
<v Speaker 1>would live in a world where you can't attribute a

1:04:29.520 --> 1:04:32.160
<v Speaker 1>source for a particular attack simply because of the code

1:04:32.160 --> 1:04:33.960
<v Speaker 1>that was Oh wait, that is the world we live in.

1:04:35.720 --> 1:04:38.160
<v Speaker 1>So yeah, here's the problem is that just because the

1:04:38.200 --> 1:04:42.560
<v Speaker 1>code was found in attacks from a previous instance doesn't

1:04:42.600 --> 1:04:47.040
<v Speaker 1>mean that that code only belongs to one group. A

1:04:47.080 --> 1:04:51.360
<v Speaker 1>lot of these tools get distributed through various channels online hackers.

1:04:51.600 --> 1:04:54.760
<v Speaker 1>When they create a really powerful tool, sometimes they love

1:04:54.840 --> 1:04:57.040
<v Speaker 1>to share it. Not all the time. Some of them

1:04:57.080 --> 1:04:59.600
<v Speaker 1>are very jealous with what they create and they keep

1:04:59.640 --> 1:05:02.960
<v Speaker 1>it from the selves. But some will go and say, hey,

1:05:03.000 --> 1:05:06.160
<v Speaker 1>I made this tool, it's perfect for cracking passwords. Have

1:05:06.360 --> 1:05:09.800
<v Speaker 1>at it, and then the people who downloaded and use it.

1:05:09.840 --> 1:05:12.280
<v Speaker 1>We often called script kiddies. They aren't the ones who

1:05:12.320 --> 1:05:14.640
<v Speaker 1>developed the code. They're just making use of code that

1:05:14.720 --> 1:05:19.680
<v Speaker 1>was built to do a specific thing. So I hesitate

1:05:19.800 --> 1:05:25.440
<v Speaker 1>to attribute an attack to us specific group simply because

1:05:25.480 --> 1:05:29.120
<v Speaker 1>the code that was included. Yeah, I agree with you there,

1:05:29.480 --> 1:05:34.160
<v Speaker 1>because it's strange too. It's strange to think that someone

1:05:34.280 --> 1:05:39.640
<v Speaker 1>could own a process, and especially when there's so much

1:05:40.320 --> 1:05:46.800
<v Speaker 1>sharing in the toolbox. And uh, if this code was recognized,

1:05:47.240 --> 1:05:51.360
<v Speaker 1>right then that already inherently tells us that other people

1:05:51.400 --> 1:05:54.640
<v Speaker 1>have seen it, which also means they could replicate it.

1:05:54.640 --> 1:05:58.440
<v Speaker 1>It would be I think it's a little bit movie

1:05:58.520 --> 1:06:02.960
<v Speaker 1>thriller right now to say, uh, that someone purposely put

1:06:03.000 --> 1:06:05.560
<v Speaker 1>it in his red herring. But wouldn't that be cool? No,

1:06:05.720 --> 1:06:09.200
<v Speaker 1>I just think it's also movie thriller to say I

1:06:09.280 --> 1:06:12.520
<v Speaker 1>recognize this code. It could only come from one place

1:06:13.760 --> 1:06:17.280
<v Speaker 1>and that's totally yeah, And and you're right about that.

1:06:17.480 --> 1:06:20.360
<v Speaker 1>And one thing that we should also list that I

1:06:20.680 --> 1:06:23.479
<v Speaker 1>think is important to note here is that I've seen

1:06:23.880 --> 1:06:28.480
<v Speaker 1>several journalists um reciting these u S statements of North

1:06:28.560 --> 1:06:34.480
<v Speaker 1>Korean involvement as fact, and it is true. The problem

1:06:34.520 --> 1:06:36.320
<v Speaker 1>with this is something that you and I have have

1:06:36.440 --> 1:06:39.240
<v Speaker 1>touched upon already in the show, which is that we

1:06:39.440 --> 1:06:43.040
<v Speaker 1>know that the United States and some of its cooperative

1:06:43.120 --> 1:06:46.800
<v Speaker 1>countries have this vast array of sophisticated and in many

1:06:46.840 --> 1:06:52.720
<v Speaker 1>plate cases classified collection methods, right, and this means that

1:06:52.800 --> 1:06:55.560
<v Speaker 1>it is fair to assume that the United States has

1:06:55.640 --> 1:06:59.840
<v Speaker 1>access to information that civilians and journalists may not be

1:07:00.000 --> 1:07:04.040
<v Speaker 1>able to analyze. So so, yeah, that leads you to

1:07:04.080 --> 1:07:07.600
<v Speaker 1>the conclusion that again there could be a smoking gun

1:07:07.960 --> 1:07:12.160
<v Speaker 1>sure that I am completely unaware of that says No,

1:07:12.440 --> 1:07:15.840
<v Speaker 1>it was North Korea. It was not some insider, it

1:07:15.920 --> 1:07:19.600
<v Speaker 1>was not it wasn't a disgruntled employee. This was a

1:07:19.760 --> 1:07:23.320
<v Speaker 1>very effective attack. Which if that is here's the thing.

1:07:23.560 --> 1:07:26.080
<v Speaker 1>If that's the real answer, If that really is the

1:07:26.120 --> 1:07:29.919
<v Speaker 1>real answer, that's terrifying, because not only does it mean

1:07:29.920 --> 1:07:33.600
<v Speaker 1>that you have a country that has created an incredibly effective,

1:07:33.680 --> 1:07:38.600
<v Speaker 1>invasive attack into a major corporation, but they understand the

1:07:38.680 --> 1:07:42.360
<v Speaker 1>culture and the impact that corporation has and how to

1:07:42.520 --> 1:07:47.680
<v Speaker 1>best attack it. It just doesn't make sense though to

1:07:47.960 --> 1:07:51.040
<v Speaker 1>do so. I would be surprised to do something of

1:07:51.080 --> 1:07:57.080
<v Speaker 1>that magnitude for a work of fiction that honestly, honestly,

1:07:57.120 --> 1:07:59.840
<v Speaker 1>and I see this as as a fan of seth Row. Again,

1:08:00.280 --> 1:08:02.640
<v Speaker 1>it's not it's not going to be his Oscar winning film.

1:08:02.760 --> 1:08:07.680
<v Speaker 1>I had said that, um when Sony first pulled the film,

1:08:07.760 --> 1:08:11.240
<v Speaker 1>I said, listen, I don't plan to see the interview,

1:08:12.120 --> 1:08:14.520
<v Speaker 1>but I want that to be my option, that I

1:08:14.640 --> 1:08:16.760
<v Speaker 1>don't see the interview, right, you want it to be

1:08:16.800 --> 1:08:19.200
<v Speaker 1>your choice. I don't don't want the choice made for

1:08:19.320 --> 1:08:21.960
<v Speaker 1>me that I don't see the interview. And see, that's

1:08:21.960 --> 1:08:23.760
<v Speaker 1>the thing is that they released it and again we

1:08:23.800 --> 1:08:26.280
<v Speaker 1>didn't see more attacks, at least not yet. I mean

1:08:26.400 --> 1:08:28.320
<v Speaker 1>it could be by the time this podcast goes out

1:08:28.360 --> 1:08:30.960
<v Speaker 1>that in fact, more has developed the story, which we

1:08:31.000 --> 1:08:33.400
<v Speaker 1>do have to be conscious of. But going back to

1:08:33.400 --> 1:08:36.320
<v Speaker 1>that point in the missing information, this also means that

1:08:36.360 --> 1:08:40.040
<v Speaker 1>without access to it, there's no way for someone to

1:08:40.160 --> 1:08:46.599
<v Speaker 1>independently verify the accuracy of the statements on the part

1:08:46.640 --> 1:08:49.559
<v Speaker 1>of Uncle Sam, and it's been it's being used as

1:08:49.960 --> 1:08:53.599
<v Speaker 1>the proof and the fact that their further sanctions really

1:08:53.640 --> 1:08:56.720
<v Speaker 1>does show I think it indicates that there is some

1:08:56.760 --> 1:08:59.960
<v Speaker 1>sort of belief. Yeah, I I am at least hopeful

1:09:00.040 --> 1:09:03.639
<v Speaker 1>that they are sincere in the statement that they fully

1:09:03.680 --> 1:09:06.800
<v Speaker 1>believe North Korea to be behind it, because otherwise We're

1:09:06.800 --> 1:09:11.960
<v Speaker 1>talking about a very bizarre clancy like thriller where the

1:09:12.080 --> 1:09:16.839
<v Speaker 1>US government is taking advantage of an insane hacking attack

1:09:17.040 --> 1:09:20.280
<v Speaker 1>on a media company as an excuse to step up

1:09:20.320 --> 1:09:26.120
<v Speaker 1>sanctions against a hostile foreign power, which is such a

1:09:26.160 --> 1:09:29.559
<v Speaker 1>weird thing to even say. But what I love about

1:09:29.600 --> 1:09:36.639
<v Speaker 1>the plan is that it's so straightforward. Right, step three profit. Yeah. So,

1:09:36.640 --> 1:09:38.920
<v Speaker 1>so where does this leave us, Well, it pretty much

1:09:39.000 --> 1:09:41.040
<v Speaker 1>leaves us in the same place we were at the beginning.

1:09:41.040 --> 1:09:45.040
<v Speaker 1>We don't really know you and I certainly don't know

1:09:45.120 --> 1:09:48.280
<v Speaker 1>who is behind Yeah, and it may very well be

1:09:48.400 --> 1:09:50.839
<v Speaker 1>like we said that, in fact, it is North Korea.

1:09:51.760 --> 1:09:56.439
<v Speaker 1>And it's just that that's such it's it stretches my

1:09:56.520 --> 1:09:59.120
<v Speaker 1>belief so much. That's why I really have trouble with it.

1:09:59.320 --> 1:10:02.200
<v Speaker 1>But it could very well be true. Yeah, I'm curious

1:10:02.240 --> 1:10:04.800
<v Speaker 1>what our listeners think. Guys, if you have any suggestions,

1:10:04.800 --> 1:10:07.320
<v Speaker 1>if you if you have an opinion on this, or

1:10:07.360 --> 1:10:09.400
<v Speaker 1>you have a suggestion for a future episode, you should

1:10:09.400 --> 1:10:12.320
<v Speaker 1>write in the addresses tech stuff at how stuff works

1:10:12.320 --> 1:10:15.759
<v Speaker 1>dot com or drop us a line on Facebook or Twitter.

1:10:15.880 --> 1:10:18.639
<v Speaker 1>They handle us tech stuff hs w ben. Where can

1:10:18.640 --> 1:10:22.720
<v Speaker 1>they find you? Ah? Yes, well you can find Jonathan

1:10:22.800 --> 1:10:26.000
<v Speaker 1>and I hanging out on several shows where I'm brain

1:10:26.080 --> 1:10:28.599
<v Speaker 1>stuff together on YouTube and What the Stuff. We've got

1:10:28.560 --> 1:10:31.840
<v Speaker 1>an upcoming episode of brain Stuff. Where were we both

1:10:31.880 --> 1:10:34.640
<v Speaker 1>appear in the same episode. Oh, we do. Only one

1:10:34.680 --> 1:10:37.880
<v Speaker 1>of us talks and that's why. Yeah, you know, on

1:10:37.880 --> 1:10:40.240
<v Speaker 1>on that is What the Stuff. I believe it's Uh,

1:10:40.439 --> 1:10:46.720
<v Speaker 1>it is What the Stuff. Technology spoilers bad, It's it's that.

1:10:46.880 --> 1:10:49.080
<v Speaker 1>That was a strange shoot. I hope listeners enjoy it.

1:10:49.120 --> 1:10:51.080
<v Speaker 1>You can find my co host Matt and I on

1:10:51.200 --> 1:10:54.240
<v Speaker 1>Stuff they don't want you to know. Uh. You can

1:10:54.360 --> 1:10:58.679
<v Speaker 1>find uh a former guest host or recurring guest host

1:10:58.720 --> 1:11:02.000
<v Speaker 1>of tech Stuff, Scott ben Jamn Yes, who works works

1:11:02.040 --> 1:11:05.360
<v Speaker 1>with me on car Stuff next to me. Yeah, yeah,

1:11:05.400 --> 1:11:07.839
<v Speaker 1>he does. You guys have some of the most interesting

1:11:07.880 --> 1:11:10.280
<v Speaker 1>conversations in the office. Yeah, you know, Scott. I was

1:11:10.400 --> 1:11:12.880
<v Speaker 1>peg Scott as the super quiet guy in the office,

1:11:12.880 --> 1:11:17.560
<v Speaker 1>but he really does enjoy a fun, bizarre, thoughtful conversation.

1:11:18.040 --> 1:11:20.360
<v Speaker 1>He's a big true crime fan too, by the way.

1:11:20.439 --> 1:11:23.160
<v Speaker 1>That's good to know. It's good to know. It's more

1:11:23.280 --> 1:11:26.519
<v Speaker 1>more risks for the mill, my friend. Uh and if somebody,

1:11:26.840 --> 1:11:30.760
<v Speaker 1>if somebody wants to learn more about let's see the

1:11:30.840 --> 1:11:33.479
<v Speaker 1>future of technology, and they haven't heard of your other show.

1:11:33.520 --> 1:11:36.040
<v Speaker 1>Where would they go, Well, they would go to fw

1:11:36.160 --> 1:11:40.040
<v Speaker 1>thinking dot com for Forward Thinking. That's where Lauren Vogelbaum,

1:11:40.160 --> 1:11:43.879
<v Speaker 1>Joe McCormick, and I will end up talking at nauseum

1:11:43.920 --> 1:11:46.680
<v Speaker 1>about all sorts of things from the future. Uh. It's

1:11:46.680 --> 1:11:49.200
<v Speaker 1>also the video series Forward Thinking. I am the soul

1:11:49.400 --> 1:11:54.840
<v Speaker 1>host of that show and sometimes the writer. Uh. But

1:11:54.880 --> 1:11:56.519
<v Speaker 1>you should definitely check that out. If you haven't listened

1:11:56.520 --> 1:11:59.439
<v Speaker 1>to that podcast, you gotta check out the episodes that

1:11:59.560 --> 1:12:02.200
<v Speaker 1>just went live so you can find them. In the

1:12:02.240 --> 1:12:05.599
<v Speaker 1>most recent ones. We did back to Back to the

1:12:05.600 --> 1:12:09.519
<v Speaker 1>Future to part one, and then we did back to

1:12:09.640 --> 1:12:12.639
<v Speaker 1>Back to the Future to Part two, where we looked

1:12:12.640 --> 1:12:15.920
<v Speaker 1>at the technology that Marty McFly encounters when he travels

1:12:15.960 --> 1:12:18.680
<v Speaker 1>to two thousand fifteen and see how it measures up

1:12:18.720 --> 1:12:22.679
<v Speaker 1>to the actual two thousand fifteen technology of today. So

1:12:23.000 --> 1:12:26.120
<v Speaker 1>the general consensus, at least on the U S side,

1:12:26.400 --> 1:12:30.519
<v Speaker 1>was that in fact, this was a state backed attack,

1:12:31.479 --> 1:12:36.920
<v Speaker 1>North Korea sponsored attack on Sony Pictures, And UM, I

1:12:36.920 --> 1:12:42.120
<v Speaker 1>mean that's entirely possible. It's also possible that it wasn't. Uh,

1:12:42.160 --> 1:12:45.800
<v Speaker 1>there's still some questions about that, But generally speaking, the

1:12:46.520 --> 1:12:50.240
<v Speaker 1>consensus appears to be, at least within the law enforcement

1:12:50.240 --> 1:12:52.880
<v Speaker 1>community of the United States that this was in fact

1:12:52.960 --> 1:12:56.439
<v Speaker 1>an attack that originated out of and was supported by

1:12:56.520 --> 1:13:01.880
<v Speaker 1>North Korea. UH. Like I said, there were other consequences

1:13:01.920 --> 1:13:06.120
<v Speaker 1>to this attack. For example, the entertainment industry took it

1:13:06.280 --> 1:13:11.240
<v Speaker 1>as a UH instigator to really go after file sharing

1:13:11.320 --> 1:13:15.320
<v Speaker 1>services again, and sites like the Pirate Bay got targeted

1:13:15.400 --> 1:13:20.439
<v Speaker 1>for UH, for government UH takedowns and things of that nature.

1:13:21.240 --> 1:13:25.519
<v Speaker 1>And so yeah, it's one of those elements where you

1:13:25.680 --> 1:13:29.559
<v Speaker 1>start to see ripple effects beyond just the attack itself.

1:13:30.200 --> 1:13:35.440
<v Speaker 1>Of course, we're still seeing cyber attacks throughout various industries

1:13:35.479 --> 1:13:39.920
<v Speaker 1>to this day, with companies often having to deal with

1:13:39.960 --> 1:13:43.280
<v Speaker 1>the repercussions of those attacks. You would think that we

1:13:43.320 --> 1:13:47.120
<v Speaker 1>would see much better security these days, but it's a

1:13:47.120 --> 1:13:49.960
<v Speaker 1>reminder that security is only as good as the people

1:13:50.160 --> 1:13:52.479
<v Speaker 1>who are put in charge of it. You can easily

1:13:52.520 --> 1:13:55.760
<v Speaker 1>have a weak link. If someone is, you know, vulnerable

1:13:55.800 --> 1:14:01.240
<v Speaker 1>to a social networking kind of attack, a social engineering approach,

1:14:01.840 --> 1:14:04.639
<v Speaker 1>then it doesn't really matter how good your passwords are,

1:14:05.040 --> 1:14:09.200
<v Speaker 1>you know. So I hope you enjoyed that classic episode.

1:14:09.479 --> 1:14:12.080
<v Speaker 1>Remember if you have suggestions for future topics of tech

1:14:12.120 --> 1:14:15.240
<v Speaker 1>Stuff episodes. Reach out to me on Twitter to handle

1:14:15.280 --> 1:14:17.960
<v Speaker 1>for the show is tech Stuff H s W and

1:14:18.000 --> 1:14:25.960
<v Speaker 1>I'll talk to you again really soon. Text Stuff is

1:14:26.000 --> 1:14:29.120
<v Speaker 1>an I Heart Radio production. For more podcasts from my

1:14:29.240 --> 1:14:32.880
<v Speaker 1>Heart Radio, visit the i Heart Radio app, Apple Podcasts,

1:14:33.000 --> 1:14:34.960
<v Speaker 1>or wherever you listen to your favorite shows.