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Speaker 1: Welcome to tech Stuff, a production from I Heart Radio.

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Speaker 1: Hey there, and welcome to tech Stuff. I'm your host,

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Speaker 1: Jonathan Strickland. I'm an executive producer with iHeart Radio and

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Speaker 1: I love all things tech. This time for a tech

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Speaker 1: Stuff classic episode. This episode originally published on January two

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Speaker 1: thousand fifteen. It is titled the Sony Pictures Entertainment Hack,

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Speaker 1: which I have talked about more recently in a few podcasts.

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Speaker 1: Because the repercussions of that of that attack extended far

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Speaker 1: beyond just Sony Pictures ended up having a big impact

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Speaker 1: on multiple streams of media, and uh, I thought it

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Speaker 1: would be interesting to go back now. We keep in

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Speaker 1: mind this episode aired a couple of months after the

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Speaker 1: hack actually happened, so we had limited information. But when

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Speaker 1: we come back at the end, I'll talk a little

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Speaker 1: bit more about some other stuff we know. But first

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Speaker 1: let's sit back and listen to this classic episode. Ben

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Speaker 1: also had me on his show Stuff They Don't Want

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Speaker 1: You To Know, to talk about today's topic, the Sony Hack,

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Speaker 1: And at the time when we were recording, it was

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Speaker 1: still in December and the story was still unfolding. In fact,

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Speaker 1: you could say that's still unfolding now, although the news

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Speaker 1: has certainly slowed down significantly since the end of December,

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Speaker 1: but we ended up talking about the story as far

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Speaker 1: as we could at that point and even made some

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Speaker 1: predictions of our own, some some theories of our own. So, uh,

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Speaker 1: in order to return the favor, Ben's joined me for

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Speaker 1: this episode so that we can revisit that topic, talk

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Speaker 1: about the Sony hack, maybe talk a little bit about

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Speaker 1: some of the information that came out after we had

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Speaker 1: already recorded the episode, and uh, just kind of explain

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Speaker 1: what happened and how it's different from some of the

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Speaker 1: other big stories we've heard, Like you know, all the

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Speaker 1: stories about the Sony PlayStation network and the Xbox Live

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Speaker 1: network getting brought down, those were done through direct denial

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Speaker 1: of service attacks or distributed denial of service attacks, I

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Speaker 1: should say. So they were distributed denial of service attacks,

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Speaker 1: which is really a brute force way of shutting up

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Speaker 1: a server, completely different in comparison to the original Sony hacks,

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Speaker 1: wherein the various films were downloaded. But before we go

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Speaker 1: inting further, I just have to say I really appreciate

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Speaker 1: what you're saying here, Jonathan. I'm blushing. Thank God, I

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Speaker 1: grew this beard out so you can see it and

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Speaker 1: thank God as an audio podcast. But this is not

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Speaker 1: entirely all truism on my part. I come here also

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Speaker 1: as a representative of my co host Matt Frederick. Um.

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Speaker 1: We had such a great time doing this two part

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Speaker 1: episode on Sony for Stuff they Want, you know, and

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Speaker 1: we we actually went back and listened to it because

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Speaker 1: we liked some of the jokes that the three of

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Speaker 1: us were doing. But we really wanted another crack at

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Speaker 1: this just because other information is emerged and listeners out there,

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Speaker 1: if you do check out Jonathan's earlier appearance on spoiler Alerts,

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Speaker 1: some of those predictions that you and I made are

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Speaker 1: not that far off. Yeah yeah, And in fact that

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Speaker 1: again we don't We still don't have all the details.

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Speaker 1: We still have some conflicting information out there, stuff that

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Speaker 1: conflicts with the theories we have. It still hasn't changed

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Speaker 1: my theories yet, but I do acknowledge the fact that

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Speaker 1: I the thing that I believe may not be true,

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Speaker 1: and in fact is being said to be untrue by

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Speaker 1: certain entities that go by three letter initialisms like the FBI.

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Speaker 1: Uh So let's start at the beginning. A very good

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Speaker 1: place to start. On November that was the day that

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Speaker 1: the Sony hack was revealed, and I say revealed because

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Speaker 1: the extent of this hack, the incredible amount of information

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Speaker 1: that was stolen as part of this hack was so

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Speaker 1: huge as to require months of time. I mean, you're

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Speaker 1: talking about the initial story we got and was that

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Speaker 1: the the hackers responsible claim to have stolen one terabytes

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Speaker 1: of data. A terabyte of data is a huge amount, right,

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Speaker 1: And if you're thinking of a hacker that's accessing a

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Speaker 1: system remotely, so we're assuming that this person did not

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Speaker 1: dress themselves up as a Sony employee infiltrate the company.

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Speaker 1: If you're talking about remotely accessing this and siphoning off

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Speaker 1: that data. Guys, you know, if you've ever downloaded a

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Speaker 1: big file, you know it takes time. Even if you

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Speaker 1: have a fast internet connection, it could take a while.

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Speaker 1: You know, if you're trying to download let's say a

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Speaker 1: really big computer game that's maybe thirty or forty gigabytes,

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Speaker 1: that takes time. Terabytes are enormous, A hundred terabytes is huge.

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Speaker 1: Would take months to download that much information, and only

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Speaker 1: if the faucet is always on. Yeah, you and also

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Speaker 1: to be able to do it without raising anyone's attention, right,

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Speaker 1: because people would see the activity over the connection. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: you would think at least someone would figure out something

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Speaker 1: in that time. So all of this is to say

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Speaker 1: that it's the While November twenty was when we became

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Speaker 1: aware of it, the actual activity had to have been

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Speaker 1: happening for at least a few months, if not longer. Right,

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Speaker 1: So what what exactly happens? I love this description because

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Speaker 1: it's so cinematic. Yeah, so imagine you are an employee

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Speaker 1: of Sony Pictures Entertainment, because we always say the Sony hack,

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Speaker 1: but we're specifically referring to Sony Pictures, so the movie

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Speaker 1: industry arm of Sony. So you're an employee of Sony

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Speaker 1: Pictures Entertainment. You go into work on November. It's the

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Speaker 1: week of Thanksgiving. You're looking forward to having dinner with

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Speaker 1: your family, having a few days off. You come in,

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Speaker 1: you turn on your computer to get your little work,

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Speaker 1: you work done, type of, type of, type of, and

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Speaker 1: then all of a sudden, like it was a nineteen

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Speaker 1: eighties computer thriller, a skull stylized skull pops up on

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Speaker 1: your screen, and this feels like it it feels like

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Speaker 1: a stupid movie already. Like you think about those movies

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Speaker 1: like The Net, you know, any movie where Hollywood is

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Speaker 1: trying to get across the idea of what hacking is like,

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Speaker 1: and they they visualize it where it's not someone saying

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Speaker 1: that a computer typing in code. No, it's creeping through

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Speaker 1: a dungeon. And then you see a skull and crossbones.

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Speaker 1: That's a firewall. That's what this was in real life.

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Speaker 1: The skulls pop up on everyone's screen and it has

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Speaker 1: a phrase that essentially says, this is just the beginning.

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Speaker 1: We've obtained all your internal data, and it went on

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Speaker 1: to warn that if the company did not quote obey

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Speaker 1: the hackers demands end quote, that the internal information would

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Speaker 1: be shared with the world. And this had this included

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Speaker 1: every thing from well, they didn't even know what it

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Speaker 1: included yet, right, so they didn't have any idea of

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Speaker 1: the extent of that personal information that I that that

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Speaker 1: sensitive info. As it turns out, it was incredibly sensitive information.

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Speaker 1: And those demands we're going to get back to because

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Speaker 1: the demands are one of the keys I think to

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Speaker 1: this mystery, which is still sort is okay. So the way,

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Speaker 1: the way it works out, the news spreads quickly. Eleven

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Speaker 1: am same day November, it hits the media, right, that's right,

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Speaker 1: and so this is where, uh, different media outlets start

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Speaker 1: to cover the story. Uh, the employees of Sony Pictures

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Speaker 1: have no access to their computers. Also, their email servers

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Speaker 1: are completely down, and even their phone systems because they

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Speaker 1: were using networked phones, which is you know, we we've

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Speaker 1: had network phones in this office in the past, so

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Speaker 1: it's one of those things that if your internet goes down,

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Speaker 1: suddenly you don't have phone service either, and that's kind

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Speaker 1: of creepsy out a little bit. So they literally couldn't

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Speaker 1: do any work. They couldn't access any of their files,

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Speaker 1: any of those important documents, contracts, all that kind of stuff.

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Speaker 1: All of that was inaccessible. And uh, meanwhile, as the

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Speaker 1: story would go on that I'm gonna skip ahead a

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Speaker 1: little bit, but we're gonna go through a timeline that'll

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Speaker 1: lit'll detail this stuff as we go through. But eventually

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Speaker 1: the hackers refer to themselves as Guardians of Peace or

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Speaker 1: go OP. Yeah, also amuses me because to think when

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Speaker 1: we're talking about the GOP and this, since it's not

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Speaker 1: the Grand Old Party, the Guardians of peace. Um, this

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Speaker 1: is when they claim to have stolen one hundred terabytes

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Speaker 1: of data. Ten terabytes is enough for all the information

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Speaker 1: in the Library of Congress. So they stole ten libraries

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Speaker 1: of Congress. Yes, they stole the Library of Congress ten

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Speaker 1: times now right. Yeah, I used to use um. I

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Speaker 1: used to use uh conquistadors as an element as a

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Speaker 1: unit of measurement for everything. But now I'm I'm willing

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Speaker 1: to go and swim to the Library of Congress at

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Speaker 1: least when it comes to data. So yeah, this and

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Speaker 1: and of course some of that information was in the

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Speaker 1: form of high resolution digital film files. We'll talk more

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Speaker 1: about that in just a second. So on top of

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Speaker 1: all that, this is this is another like you know,

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Speaker 1: kick once you're down. You've already been knocked down because

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Speaker 1: you've had your this hack stop your work. You've been

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Speaker 1: told that a lot of your information has been stolen.

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Speaker 1: On top of all that, they also the hackers also

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Speaker 1: installed malware called Wiper And you can probably guess what

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Speaker 1: this does just based on the name. It starts to

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Speaker 1: erase all the data on these various machines. So not

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Speaker 1: only did you have all this information stolen, but now

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Speaker 1: it's truly inaccessible. It's been white from your computers. I'm

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Speaker 1: sure some of it was probably um. You were probably

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Speaker 1: able to get back at some of it using some

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Speaker 1: I T. Expertise, like deleting a file after your computer

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Speaker 1: doesn't mean it's gone forever. Overwriting it does so unless

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Speaker 1: wiper and it may very well do this. Unless wiper

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Speaker 1: over was overwriting all the data as it was erasing it,

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Speaker 1: then you could in theory at least get back some

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Speaker 1: of that. But at any rate, Uh, there were even

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Speaker 1: that um reports that Sony account Twitter feeds were being compromised,

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Speaker 1: and so the Guardians of Peace were able to tweet

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Speaker 1: out using that. We actually saw something similar to that

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Speaker 1: recently here in the United States with the Central Command

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Speaker 1: Twitter feed. Did you see that? Yeah, yeah, yeah. The

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Speaker 1: The thing is that Twitter is uh, from what I understand,

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Speaker 1: much easier to compromise than something that would be a

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Speaker 1: well protected corporate level system of of this magnitude. But

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Speaker 1: it does tell us something really important, Jonathan, because it

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Speaker 1: tells us that this would have been a multi tiered attack,

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Speaker 1: even if even if or rather a multifront attacked, even

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Speaker 1: if Twitter was just uh, the sprinkle on the cupcake.

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Speaker 1: This still shows us that this was well thought out.

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Speaker 1: It was established in advance, so it doesn't seem to

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Speaker 1: be an impulsive thing at all. Just just going back

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Speaker 1: to how much memory and how much time it would

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Speaker 1: take to steal a hundred terabytes. Yeah, I mean obviously,

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Speaker 1: like you wouldn't be able to do that all on

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Speaker 1: a single day. So Novem was essentially the day that

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Speaker 1: the hackers decided, Okay, now we let them know what

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Speaker 1: we have done. Like, we've already done it. It's it's

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Speaker 1: that parts. So we're we're already scott away, scott free,

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Speaker 1: you know. Now we're just gonna set the the we're

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Speaker 1: gonna make the world burn, and we're gonna walk away

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Speaker 1: in slow motion. But Sony still has no idea what's

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Speaker 1: going on? For like a week? Right? Yeah? Well, I

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Speaker 1: mean again, it happened during Thanksgiving weeks, so this was

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Speaker 1: a time when a lot of people were planning on

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Speaker 1: being on vacation and suddenly, now you've got this amazing

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Speaker 1: crisis to deal with. Uh. And it would take more

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Speaker 1: than a week for for executives to start even getting

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Speaker 1: a hint at how bad this attack was. So on

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Speaker 1: December one, that's when executives became aware that the stolen

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Speaker 1: data included personal information about employees and their dependents, such

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Speaker 1: as Social Security numbers and financial information, as well as

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Speaker 1: health information like one of the leaks of documents gave

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Speaker 1: details to employees who had sought treatment for things like

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Speaker 1: cirrhosis or cancer or there or had dependents who had

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Speaker 1: to seek treatments for such things. And so, I mean,

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Speaker 1: that's a huge breach. Are we talking? Uh? In terms

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Speaker 1: of for sent injured numbers? How many employees? About fifty

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Speaker 1: thousand social Security numbers were stolen? Actually around forty seven thousand.

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Speaker 1: I rounded up round, I rounded up for forty seven

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Speaker 1: thousand and fifty. But yeah, more than forty seven thousand

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Speaker 1: social Security numbers were stolen. Now, these were both current

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Speaker 1: and former Sony employees, because it was just it was

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Speaker 1: databasis full of information of the aious employees who had

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Speaker 1: either worked there in the past or were currently working.

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Speaker 1: Not to downplay the gravity of this, because it is

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Speaker 1: very dangerous and it's an absolute nutter violation and privacy.

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Speaker 1: But not only is that not the end of what

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Speaker 1: they stole, but they stole so much that if you're okay,

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Speaker 1: I'd like to infomercial this and maybe chime in with

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Speaker 1: some But wait, there's more. Yeah. In fact, that is

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Speaker 1: well warranted, right because the first one the one that's

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Speaker 1: probably the easiest for people to latch onto, because it's

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Speaker 1: a simple it's a simple story the idea of stolen

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Speaker 1: intellectual property, in this case, stolen movies. Right, So the

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Speaker 1: theft included five movies that were scheduled for Sony release,

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Speaker 1: one which had already been released, which was a fury

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Speaker 1: that one had already come out. But then there was

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Speaker 1: also Annie Mr Turner, Still Alice and to Write Love

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Speaker 1: on Her Arms. Those had all been stolen as well.

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Speaker 1: Uh okay, yeah, so so those are the easy ones

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Speaker 1: for people to latch onto. But then there was all

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Speaker 1: the internal communications, right, this is where you had information

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Speaker 1: about salary for top executives, like the top seventeen executives,

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Speaker 1: not to mention I think six thousand other Sony employees.

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Speaker 1: Their information got leaked as well. Uh. There was also

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Speaker 1: internal documents that that were the records of people having

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Speaker 1: complaints about Sony. Yeah, and there were there were some

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Speaker 1: fairly undiplomatic internal communications regarding regarding coworkers or talent yeah,

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Speaker 1: or the President of the United States. There were Yeah, no,

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Speaker 1: there's we'll we'll touch on that again in a moment.

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Speaker 1: But out of all these, you probably heard the most

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Speaker 1: about Adam Sandler. He got he got raped over the

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Speaker 1: coals quite a it in the internal communications. A lot

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Speaker 1: of in place that they just didn't like the direction

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Speaker 1: that the movie studio was going in, and they wanted

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Speaker 1: to see if you were Adam Sandler comedies, which is

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Speaker 1: I guess okay, because Netflix picked him up so for

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Speaker 1: four films. Yeah, so Sony might be free of him,

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Speaker 1: we're not. Uh, And that's not the only stuff that

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Speaker 1: got leaked. Still, no, no, there's still more, right, I mean,

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Speaker 1: there's tons of information that got taken from this. Uh,

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Speaker 1: personal information about talent was leaked. Stuff like passports and visas,

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Speaker 1: like copies of this stuff that people needed to do. Uh.

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Speaker 1: There were so much things that so many things that

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Speaker 1: were stolen as a result of this. And uh, we're

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Speaker 1: going to go through the rest of the timeline to

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Speaker 1: kind of give you an idea of how this all

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Speaker 1: unfolded and what extent we began to learn more and

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Speaker 1: more about the damages. Uh. Meanwhile, one other thing to

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Speaker 1: mention is that Sony employees have many of them have

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Speaker 1: filed lawsuits against the company for not protecting their personal

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Speaker 1: information well enough to prevent this from happening. So there

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Speaker 1: are several class action lawsuits have been leveled against the

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Speaker 1: company as a result of this. Because people's lives have

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Speaker 1: been really impacted. We're not just talking about you know,

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Speaker 1: celebrities here. I mean that their lives have been impacted too,

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Speaker 1: and it's not I personally don't think that that means

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Speaker 1: that celebrities should be expected to deal with more crap

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Speaker 1: than the rest of us. I mean, sometimes that happens

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Speaker 1: because it's just one of those things that goes along

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Speaker 1: with all the fame and everything else. But regular employees,

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Speaker 1: people just normal folks like me and you who go

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Speaker 1: in to do their job every day and it may

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Speaker 1: not be glamorous, but it's it's an important part of

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Speaker 1: the function of the company. They were impacted too, just

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Speaker 1: regular folks, and they will tend not to have the

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Speaker 1: uh financial wherewithal or the social safety net to help

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Speaker 1: protect themselves in the aftermath of such an event, right right,

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Speaker 1: They don't have the benefit of that safety net like

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Speaker 1: people who might have a lawyer on retainer or enormous

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Speaker 1: sums of money to lay in when you go to

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Speaker 1: sleep at night. You know, I have a have a

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Speaker 1: very particular fantasy in my head of what Hollywood celebrities like,

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Speaker 1: how they live. It's mostly Scrooge McDuck oriented. Yeah, yeah,

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Speaker 1: did you see that? This is totally unrelated? But did

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Speaker 1: you did you ever see the study of what what

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Speaker 1: would happen if you tried to swim through a vault

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Speaker 1: full of gold? I imagine that you would not feel

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Speaker 1: very good. Yeah, it will. It will break you in

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Speaker 1: numerous ways. So maybe it's good that you were talking

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Speaker 1: about sleeping on paper money probably better for your back.

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Speaker 1: And speaking of back, you wanna let's see where where

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Speaker 1: should we go next? Let's look at November twenty eight,

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Speaker 1: because we've been talking a lot about this hack. The

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Speaker 1: The initial messages from the hackers didn't identify any particular

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Speaker 1: motivation for the attack. They it was more of almost

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Speaker 1: like an extortion thing, like do what we tell you,

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Speaker 1: or you're gonna get it. You know. It was like

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Speaker 1: and it essentially sounded like pay us off or we

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Speaker 1: will ruin you. Now. They didn't name a specific amount

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Speaker 1: of money at that initial point, they just said, do

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Speaker 1: what we say, yea, So they The reason why this

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Speaker 1: is important is because a lot of the discussion that

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Speaker 1: has followed has centered around a very specific topic that

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Speaker 1: we're about to touch on. But that all came after

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Speaker 1: the fact, which makes me a little cautious in actually

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Speaker 1: saying that that was the reason for the whole thing,

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Speaker 1: the whole time. So November twenty eight, this is four

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Speaker 1: days after the initial attack was discovered. That's the first

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Speaker 1: time anyone floats the possibility that the attack was in

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Speaker 1: response to Sony's plans to release the film the interview,

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Speaker 1: which I have we both seen it at this point.

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Speaker 1: I have not seen it. Did you watch it? I

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Speaker 1: did see it. What did you think? Uh? Well, I

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Speaker 1: will I will say that uh I enjoy uh Seth

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Speaker 1: Rogan and James Franco a bit more than you, which

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Speaker 1: is which is something we've talked about before. Yeah, And

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Speaker 1: it's not hard to enjoy Seth Rogan and James Franco

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Speaker 1: more than you do. No offense, I have a very

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Speaker 1: low you own it. You own it though, and I

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Speaker 1: respect that. Um, you know, I'll be I'll be candid here.

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Speaker 1: It was not my favorite film. Because I think that

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Speaker 1: while I I enjoy a lot of a lot of

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Speaker 1: what might be termed lowbrow comedy, I'm not above it.

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Speaker 1: You know. One thing that I noticed sometimes is that

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Speaker 1: it is very convenient to conflate satire and racism, and

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Speaker 1: I think there's UH to me. There were moments in

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Speaker 1: the film that I that I thought were sist and

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Speaker 1: I and also was talking with my girlfriend about this

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Speaker 1: and said, okay, well check me here, like my am

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Speaker 1: I being two PC and I am I getting my

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Speaker 1: jim socks all bunched up over something unnecessarily And she

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Speaker 1: came in and watched part of it and she said, no,

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Speaker 1: I think that's pretty very racist. Yeah. Now, there is

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Speaker 1: definitely a difference between using satire in order to point

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Speaker 1: out things that you see as being important or unequal

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Speaker 1: or whatever. It's something that you are actually commenting on

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Speaker 1: and bringing attention to and starting a discussion over, and

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Speaker 1: then there's a totally different type where you're just making

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Speaker 1: fun of something or or you know, especially in hurtful ways. Well,

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Speaker 1: here's a here's a question I have for you. I

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Speaker 1: don't want to derailist, but the question would be then uh,

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Speaker 1: in comparison to let's say the south Park film also

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Speaker 1: a work of satire in any ways, uh so, what

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Speaker 1: makes these two different? You know? Is it because the

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Speaker 1: south Park film is animated? I think part of it

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Speaker 1: is that south Park is really about pointing out the

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Speaker 1: the the absolute ridiculousness of things like racism. I mean,

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Speaker 1: south Park used the movie used Canadians as the the

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Speaker 1: great big enemy, you know, that's what all the people

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Speaker 1: they blame Canada. There's a whole song about it. It's yeah,

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Speaker 1: it's a good song. It actually was nominated for an

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Speaker 1: Academy Award. But at any rate, the you know, that

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Speaker 1: was really to kind of poke fun saying like this

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Speaker 1: is literally there's no difference between people like you know,

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Speaker 1: you look at Canadians and Americans. There's no difference there,

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Speaker 1: just as there's no difference with any people of any

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Speaker 1: two nations. And therefore the concept of racism itself is

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Speaker 1: utterly ridiculous. I see what you're saying. There's there's a

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Speaker 1: method to the prat falls, as you would say. But

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Speaker 1: the I don't know if anyone's ever said that before.

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Speaker 1: But the thing about the interview, despite that, I think

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Speaker 1: it was enjoyable. I definitely laughed out loud a couple

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Speaker 1: of times. But I believe it's received much much more,

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Speaker 1: much more international attention than ever would have had it

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Speaker 1: not been associated with this. And also, you know, for

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Speaker 1: people who aren't familiar with it, Uh, the the entire

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Speaker 1: film is about people traveling to assassinate Kim Jong un,

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Speaker 1: the current leader of North Korea. Right. The whole idea

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Speaker 1: about a host of a celebrity talk show type program

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Speaker 1: and his producer heading over to North Korea because it

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Speaker 1: turns out Kim Jong un is a big fan of

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Speaker 1: the program, and then being told by is that the CIA, Yeah, yea,

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Speaker 1: the CIA to take this opportunity to assassinate Kim Jong un,

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Speaker 1: and uh and of course, uh spoiler alert, the leader

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Speaker 1: is killed in the film. Uh. So this was November

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Speaker 1: twenty was the first time anyone had even mentioned this

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Speaker 1: as a possibility of a motivator, and they said, yeah,

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Speaker 1: there was. This was not from the attackers at all.

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Speaker 1: This was all just kind of a I wonder if

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Speaker 1: this thing that's coming out later this month had anything

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Speaker 1: to do with our actually next month, because this was

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Speaker 1: still in November. Um so, yeah, we didn't really have

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Speaker 1: any evidence here. And now there was a North Korean

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Speaker 1: website that had referred to the interview as quote an

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Speaker 1: evil act of provocation end quote. So you could say, well,

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Speaker 1: they said that it was an evil act of provocation.

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Speaker 1: We were they were provoked, so maybe this was the

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Speaker 1: act they were provoked into doing. But you know, yeah,

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Speaker 1: I mean, like I said, the the attack itself must

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Speaker 1: have gone on for months, and it was only in

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Speaker 1: those last few months that the interview was even getting

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Speaker 1: the promotion of here's a movie that's coming out soon,

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Speaker 1: and here's what it's all about. So that would have

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Speaker 1: meant that North Korea was just paying attention to this

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00:24:03,800 --> 00:24:07,600
Speaker 1: film for longer than the American public was, and that

404
00:24:07,600 --> 00:24:11,919
Speaker 1: that the attack began months in advance, in anticipation for

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Speaker 1: this December release. All that being said, December one, that's

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Speaker 1: when the top seventeen Sony executive salaries were leaked. Uh,

407
00:24:19,880 --> 00:24:22,560
Speaker 1: the information had already been stolen, but the information that

408
00:24:22,640 --> 00:24:25,760
Speaker 1: had then been leaked publicly. A lot of these leaks

409
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Speaker 1: happened on an app that allows for anonymous text dumps,

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Speaker 1: so you can just put things up on that app

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Speaker 1: and not leave a trace of who you are. And

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Speaker 1: that's how a lot of this information got distributed. Also,

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Speaker 1: including that same file were the salaries of more than

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Speaker 1: six thousand Sony employees. One of the big things that

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Speaker 1: came out about this was a disparity in pay depending

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Speaker 1: upon gender and race. And so this also makes me

417
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Speaker 1: think the nature of the leak. The first stuff that's

418
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Speaker 1: leaked here, here's bread crumb, bread crumb later on, the

419
00:25:03,000 --> 00:25:06,919
Speaker 1: nature of the stuff that was leaked first was incredibly

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Speaker 1: harmful to Sony the company uh in an industry perspective,

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Speaker 1: but had nothing to do with any sort of like

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Speaker 1: it didn't have anything to do with the interview directly anyway.

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Speaker 1: So that to me suggests that there's a very specific

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Speaker 1: motivation behind the attack. But we'll get into that when

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Speaker 1: we get towards the end. So December three was when

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Speaker 1: the Adam Sandler PDF dump happened. There's a big dump

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Speaker 1: of Adam Sandler information. And I'm using that word in

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Speaker 1: a couple of different ways, are you There could have

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Speaker 1: been a little bit of editorializing. This is also when

430
00:25:49,200 --> 00:25:53,520
Speaker 1: the data including a passport information, visa information, other private

431
00:25:53,600 --> 00:25:58,960
Speaker 1: information about celebrities who had worked on various Sony films, actors, actresses, directors,

432
00:25:59,000 --> 00:26:01,840
Speaker 1: that kind of thing leaked. So this is where people

433
00:26:01,880 --> 00:26:06,840
Speaker 1: were getting copies of Angelina Jolie's passport for example. Um

434
00:26:06,920 --> 00:26:11,320
Speaker 1: they also included confidential information about film contracts and budgets,

435
00:26:11,400 --> 00:26:16,320
Speaker 1: so again very industry specific stuff and very very damaging

436
00:26:16,400 --> 00:26:20,560
Speaker 1: because Okay, first off, this breeds such dissension amidst the

437
00:26:20,600 --> 00:26:23,840
Speaker 1: employees you know, each other's salaries, and huge morale issue.

438
00:26:24,080 --> 00:26:28,359
Speaker 1: Huge and then also the idea about finding numbers and

439
00:26:28,400 --> 00:26:32,120
Speaker 1: film contracts and budgets, that's a massive amount of leverage

440
00:26:32,200 --> 00:26:35,200
Speaker 1: lost on Sony's part. Well, and it's you know, these

441
00:26:35,240 --> 00:26:38,560
Speaker 1: are industry secrets, like if you've ever heard stories about

442
00:26:38,680 --> 00:26:44,840
Speaker 1: how miraculously no movie ever released makes money, like you know,

443
00:26:44,880 --> 00:26:46,879
Speaker 1: if you have, if you have the inside look on

444
00:26:46,960 --> 00:26:50,840
Speaker 1: these budgets, the actual numbers, the real thing, then suddenly

445
00:26:50,840 --> 00:26:55,160
Speaker 1: you know how much actual money was being spent producing

446
00:26:55,160 --> 00:26:58,240
Speaker 1: it versus how much was made in revenue. And then

447
00:26:58,240 --> 00:27:01,400
Speaker 1: you've got some really tough tack questions that you need

448
00:27:01,480 --> 00:27:05,760
Speaker 1: to answer. So again, very much a very savvy attack.

449
00:27:06,040 --> 00:27:09,000
Speaker 1: This is going to be trouble for Sony down the road. Yeah,

450
00:27:09,119 --> 00:27:11,800
Speaker 1: it's gonna be trolled for a while. So December four,

451
00:27:12,480 --> 00:27:16,000
Speaker 1: that's when the associated press reports that cybersecurity experts found

452
00:27:16,000 --> 00:27:19,199
Speaker 1: similarities in the code used in the Sony hacks of

453
00:27:20,920 --> 00:27:24,399
Speaker 1: with another attack that targeted South Korean companies in two

454
00:27:24,440 --> 00:27:28,800
Speaker 1: thoush And you remember the name of that attack, right, Oh,

455
00:27:28,920 --> 00:27:31,600
Speaker 1: I do remember reading it. What was it? Dark Soul?

456
00:27:31,920 --> 00:27:35,480
Speaker 1: Dark spelled like the capital of South Korea. Oh, that's

457
00:27:35,520 --> 00:27:38,480
Speaker 1: so brilliant. Nah. I was thinking of something else too,

458
00:27:38,520 --> 00:27:40,680
Speaker 1: so I didn't. I didn't even hear of it called

459
00:27:40,760 --> 00:27:44,879
Speaker 1: dark Soul. That's awesome, but it's so again. This was

460
00:27:44,920 --> 00:27:49,080
Speaker 1: sort of a a uh a hint that perhaps North

461
00:27:49,119 --> 00:27:52,680
Speaker 1: Korea was behind it, because North Korea was was very

462
00:27:52,760 --> 00:27:55,080
Speaker 1: much believed to be behind the two thousand thirteen attacks

463
00:27:55,119 --> 00:27:58,760
Speaker 1: against South Korea, right yeah, so uh, but no one's

464
00:27:58,800 --> 00:28:01,480
Speaker 1: come out and said anything. Yeah. December five was when

465
00:28:01,480 --> 00:28:05,480
Speaker 1: messages allegedly from Guardians of Peace threatened Sony executives that

466
00:28:05,560 --> 00:28:09,320
Speaker 1: they don't condemn their own company, but they're really poorly constructed.

467
00:28:09,359 --> 00:28:12,440
Speaker 1: They actually don't read the same way as the initial

468
00:28:12,520 --> 00:28:17,560
Speaker 1: messages did in the attack reveal back on Noyo. So

469
00:28:17,800 --> 00:28:19,240
Speaker 1: one of the things we need to keep in mind

470
00:28:19,280 --> 00:28:23,720
Speaker 1: is that the various communications to Sony and to others

471
00:28:24,320 --> 00:28:26,840
Speaker 1: may or may not have come from the hackers. We

472
00:28:26,920 --> 00:28:30,000
Speaker 1: don't necessarily know. It's kind of like when you hear

473
00:28:30,040 --> 00:28:36,000
Speaker 1: about Anonymous targeting someone, you don't know what to what extent.

474
00:28:36,160 --> 00:28:40,120
Speaker 1: The the overall group of Anonymous feels that way, right,

475
00:28:40,160 --> 00:28:44,040
Speaker 1: because Anonymous is made up of a huge number of

476
00:28:44,080 --> 00:28:50,000
Speaker 1: people with different ideologies, different motivations. Uh, sometimes a splinter

477
00:28:50,160 --> 00:28:53,040
Speaker 1: group will end up targeting somebody, whereas the rest of

478
00:28:53,040 --> 00:28:56,200
Speaker 1: the group either doesn't care actively saying hey, don't do that.

479
00:28:57,320 --> 00:28:59,280
Speaker 1: But that's the thing is that it's impossible that, like

480
00:28:59,360 --> 00:29:02,880
Speaker 1: you say, I got a message from Anonymous, and maybe

481
00:29:02,880 --> 00:29:04,800
Speaker 1: technically that's true, but you're going to have people in

482
00:29:04,880 --> 00:29:07,920
Speaker 1: Anonymous saying, hey, whoa dude, I'm totally not That was

483
00:29:08,000 --> 00:29:10,800
Speaker 1: not us, right, that was not us, That was up sec. No,

484
00:29:10,960 --> 00:29:14,080
Speaker 1: that wasn't us, that was lull set. People create factions

485
00:29:14,200 --> 00:29:19,120
Speaker 1: within Anonymous that are oriented towards a specific project of

486
00:29:19,280 --> 00:29:21,040
Speaker 1: some sort. And I think we even mentioned it, or

487
00:29:21,040 --> 00:29:22,720
Speaker 1: I think I might have brought it up in our

488
00:29:23,400 --> 00:29:25,800
Speaker 1: Sony Heck episodes for stuff they don't want you to

489
00:29:25,840 --> 00:29:28,160
Speaker 1: know that. This reminds me a lot of the Jack

490
00:29:28,200 --> 00:29:31,960
Speaker 1: the Ripper letters, because when Jack the Ripper was active

491
00:29:32,080 --> 00:29:36,400
Speaker 1: there were letters written to the police, the London police

492
00:29:36,800 --> 00:29:40,200
Speaker 1: that was there were essentially taunting the police, and a

493
00:29:40,280 --> 00:29:45,840
Speaker 1: lot of ripperologists experts in the field believe that many

494
00:29:45,920 --> 00:29:49,040
Speaker 1: of those, if not all of them, are fakes. They

495
00:29:49,080 --> 00:29:52,160
Speaker 1: weren't written by the killer, and it could be that

496
00:29:52,240 --> 00:29:54,800
Speaker 1: some of the messages that are attributed to Guardians the

497
00:29:54,840 --> 00:29:58,520
Speaker 1: piece we're not written at all by anyone remotely involved.

498
00:29:58,520 --> 00:30:01,640
Speaker 1: We don't know, right, because there's a way to verify.

499
00:30:02,280 --> 00:30:05,040
Speaker 1: We'll be back with more about the Sony Pictures Entertainment

500
00:30:05,080 --> 00:30:17,320
Speaker 1: hack after these messages now. On December seven, North Korea

501
00:30:17,520 --> 00:30:20,600
Speaker 1: officially says they had nothing to do with this attack.

502
00:30:21,040 --> 00:30:24,360
Speaker 1: On December eight, another alleged Guardians of Peace message demands

503
00:30:24,360 --> 00:30:28,400
Speaker 1: that Sony stop immediately showing the movie of terrorism, which

504
00:30:28,440 --> 00:30:36,520
Speaker 1: can break regional peace and caused the war. Um they

505
00:30:36,520 --> 00:30:39,880
Speaker 1: don't specifically name the interview, although I guess, you know,

506
00:30:40,040 --> 00:30:41,920
Speaker 1: I don't know what other film. I don't think they

507
00:30:41,960 --> 00:30:45,880
Speaker 1: were talking about Annie, so if they did, it was

508
00:30:45,880 --> 00:30:48,640
Speaker 1: The Hard Knock Life for us. But uh no, I

509
00:30:48,680 --> 00:30:51,400
Speaker 1: think they met the interview, but it wasn't specifically named,

510
00:30:52,080 --> 00:30:56,760
Speaker 1: right and uh These events continue though, because the hackers

511
00:30:56,840 --> 00:31:01,080
Speaker 1: now after a little bit of silence, are communicating semi

512
00:31:01,120 --> 00:31:05,080
Speaker 1: regularly or at least leaking information there, there's someone is

513
00:31:05,120 --> 00:31:08,760
Speaker 1: communicating semi regularly. Whether it's the actual hackers or not,

514
00:31:08,960 --> 00:31:11,960
Speaker 1: we don't really know. Um. Also, it was kind of

515
00:31:12,000 --> 00:31:15,720
Speaker 1: interesting that, uh that you know, we had that that

516
00:31:15,840 --> 00:31:19,680
Speaker 1: previous message supposedly from the Guardians of Peace saying, you know,

517
00:31:19,880 --> 00:31:23,480
Speaker 1: condemn your own company, which is a very odd request.

518
00:31:24,320 --> 00:31:28,200
Speaker 1: It's that's another breadcrumb force, I think, Yeah, to say, like,

519
00:31:28,480 --> 00:31:31,560
Speaker 1: please sign a paper that says your company stinks. That's

520
00:31:31,640 --> 00:31:33,880
Speaker 1: essentially what they were saying. And it just seems seems

521
00:31:33,880 --> 00:31:36,880
Speaker 1: a little odd. It seems a bit childish and personal. Yeah,

522
00:31:36,960 --> 00:31:39,720
Speaker 1: it's a little weird, alright. So Decemmer night through eleventh

523
00:31:39,800 --> 00:31:43,000
Speaker 1: now we get a little bit more activity with more

524
00:31:43,080 --> 00:31:46,280
Speaker 1: leaked material. The hackers release emails that reveal some pretty

525
00:31:46,480 --> 00:31:50,880
Speaker 1: ugly conversations about various actors, directors, and even the President

526
00:31:50,880 --> 00:31:54,040
Speaker 1: of the United States, including some remarks that you could

527
00:31:54,040 --> 00:31:57,520
Speaker 1: at least say are racially insensitive, if not out right racist.

528
00:31:57,920 --> 00:32:01,960
Speaker 1: Uh and Son executive Scott Ruden actually with an issue

529
00:32:01,960 --> 00:32:06,080
Speaker 1: an apology on the on December eleven for the messages

530
00:32:06,120 --> 00:32:09,320
Speaker 1: that he claims were written in just with no offense intended,

531
00:32:10,080 --> 00:32:13,760
Speaker 1: and um, yeah saying that was just a joke. I

532
00:32:13,800 --> 00:32:15,960
Speaker 1: didn't mean any offense. It really meant like I didn't

533
00:32:15,960 --> 00:32:18,360
Speaker 1: expect any one of that race to ever read this

534
00:32:18,440 --> 00:32:20,920
Speaker 1: email that I wrote. That's what it comes across to me.

535
00:32:22,080 --> 00:32:25,840
Speaker 1: I'm sorry I got caught. Yeah, I love I love

536
00:32:25,840 --> 00:32:28,760
Speaker 1: the I'm sorry. I'm sorry if I offended you. Not

537
00:32:28,960 --> 00:32:31,600
Speaker 1: I'm sorry I offended you not. I'm sorry I said

538
00:32:31,640 --> 00:32:34,560
Speaker 1: that thing, but I'm sorry that you felt this way

539
00:32:34,760 --> 00:32:37,320
Speaker 1: in response to something I said. Well, I'm sorry that

540
00:32:37,360 --> 00:32:40,640
Speaker 1: you're upset. Yeah, exactly. I'm like, well, you can just

541
00:32:40,720 --> 00:32:43,760
Speaker 1: keep your apologies then, Mr. Now, this isn't This is

542
00:32:43,800 --> 00:32:46,360
Speaker 1: an interesting thing that comes next, because this is something

543
00:32:46,440 --> 00:32:49,520
Speaker 1: I did not know about until you told me. Yeah. So, December,

544
00:32:50,440 --> 00:32:53,520
Speaker 1: Aaron Sorkin publishes an open editorial column in The New

545
00:32:53,600 --> 00:32:56,640
Speaker 1: York Times. Now, Sorkin had had some of his emails

546
00:32:56,680 --> 00:32:59,600
Speaker 1: revealed in a process of this, some of which ended

547
00:32:59,680 --> 00:33:03,640
Speaker 1: up having Sorkin being a little uh uncharitable towards certain

548
00:33:04,280 --> 00:33:08,600
Speaker 1: Hollywood personalities. Yeah, like saying that certain actors are not

549
00:33:08,680 --> 00:33:11,040
Speaker 1: a draw and therefore there's no reason to ever have

550
00:33:11,120 --> 00:33:14,000
Speaker 1: them in one of his movies, that kind of thing. Anyway,

551
00:33:14,040 --> 00:33:16,640
Speaker 1: in the open editorial, he did not say that, because

552
00:33:16,960 --> 00:33:20,600
Speaker 1: how would be crazy. Uh. Instead, he actually said that

553
00:33:20,680 --> 00:33:26,320
Speaker 1: journalists were being just as uh, just as destructive as

554
00:33:26,320 --> 00:33:32,440
Speaker 1: the hackers were by sharing this confidential information, that they

555
00:33:32,440 --> 00:33:35,760
Speaker 1: were essentially enabling the hackers in their attack to cause

556
00:33:35,880 --> 00:33:40,120
Speaker 1: damage to the company by taking that same info. He says,

557
00:33:40,160 --> 00:33:43,040
Speaker 1: you know, I imagine that the hackers are sorting through

558
00:33:43,360 --> 00:33:46,000
Speaker 1: that mountain of information they stole looking for the most

559
00:33:46,000 --> 00:33:49,440
Speaker 1: harmful pieces of information. Meanwhile, the journalists are next door

560
00:33:49,480 --> 00:33:51,920
Speaker 1: doing the exact same thing with all the stuff that's

561
00:33:51,920 --> 00:33:56,320
Speaker 1: been leaked. And he drew a differentiation, however, between the two. Well, yeah,

562
00:33:56,360 --> 00:33:57,959
Speaker 1: I mean he was saying that the hackers are at

563
00:33:58,000 --> 00:34:00,120
Speaker 1: least doing it out of the sense of ideology, but

564
00:34:00,200 --> 00:34:02,200
Speaker 1: the journalists are just doing it to make a make

565
00:34:02,200 --> 00:34:04,280
Speaker 1: a nickel is essentially what I said. He actually did

566
00:34:04,280 --> 00:34:06,800
Speaker 1: say make a nickel. Uh, no word if he was

567
00:34:06,840 --> 00:34:09,719
Speaker 1: walking and talking as he wrote this. Um, that's the

568
00:34:09,760 --> 00:34:13,840
Speaker 1: only way I imagined, Sorkin. We can only assume. But anyway,

569
00:34:14,000 --> 00:34:17,319
Speaker 1: so it's an interesting point, and honestly, one of the

570
00:34:17,360 --> 00:34:20,480
Speaker 1: things that's really important to me reporting on this stuff

571
00:34:20,920 --> 00:34:23,560
Speaker 1: is that we're reporting on the incidents, but we're not

572
00:34:23,800 --> 00:34:26,600
Speaker 1: sharing any of that information that was leaked. I haven't

573
00:34:26,600 --> 00:34:29,359
Speaker 1: sought it out, I haven't downloaded in of it. I'm

574
00:34:29,400 --> 00:34:33,440
Speaker 1: not interested in the contents. Uh Like, I'm not interested

575
00:34:33,440 --> 00:34:38,680
Speaker 1: in the specifics. I'm interested in the impact. I agree

576
00:34:38,719 --> 00:34:45,080
Speaker 1: with you partially, I'm ultimately interested in the big mystery

577
00:34:45,120 --> 00:34:51,319
Speaker 1: and in the final answer, the stuff about people's salaries,

578
00:34:51,600 --> 00:34:55,600
Speaker 1: people's medical records, things like that. As strange as it

579
00:34:55,680 --> 00:34:58,719
Speaker 1: is to say, it comes down to an issue of

580
00:34:59,640 --> 00:35:04,279
Speaker 1: you know, your personal opinion of what is what is

581
00:35:04,360 --> 00:35:05,960
Speaker 1: right and wrong to look at because a lot of

582
00:35:06,000 --> 00:35:09,319
Speaker 1: people nowadays, with the cost of information and communication being

583
00:35:09,400 --> 00:35:11,960
Speaker 1: so low, there are a lot of people who will

584
00:35:12,000 --> 00:35:15,920
Speaker 1: simply hoard information to collect it. You know, um I

585
00:35:16,760 --> 00:35:21,920
Speaker 1: because I would not really want anybody reading my medical records.

586
00:35:21,960 --> 00:35:25,680
Speaker 1: Not that I'm like secretly awarewolf or something. No, I'm

587
00:35:25,719 --> 00:35:27,960
Speaker 1: pretty open about it. Where you're like henther part on

588
00:35:28,000 --> 00:35:31,080
Speaker 1: your sleeve when you when you're able to wear sleeves,

589
00:35:31,360 --> 00:35:33,880
Speaker 1: when I'm able to wear sleeves indeed. But but the

590
00:35:33,920 --> 00:35:36,840
Speaker 1: point is that, uh, you know, I think both you

591
00:35:36,880 --> 00:35:39,640
Speaker 1: and I kind of go on a golden rule basis

592
00:35:39,680 --> 00:35:43,400
Speaker 1: for this stuff. I'm very much a proponent of compassion

593
00:35:43,400 --> 00:35:46,680
Speaker 1: and understanding as much as possible in general, not just

594
00:35:46,760 --> 00:35:49,279
Speaker 1: in this case. But yeah, I mean, I think it's

595
00:35:49,320 --> 00:35:53,520
Speaker 1: newsworthy that it happened. I think taking that information and

596
00:35:53,560 --> 00:35:57,920
Speaker 1: actually disseminating what was inside it apart from a generalization

597
00:35:57,960 --> 00:36:01,680
Speaker 1: like you could say it was sal or information without

598
00:36:01,719 --> 00:36:05,360
Speaker 1: going into the details of what that salary information was. Right,

599
00:36:05,520 --> 00:36:08,319
Speaker 1: So Sorkin was specifically pointing out the journalists who are

600
00:36:08,320 --> 00:36:11,279
Speaker 1: sharing this information and essentially doing what the hackers wanted

601
00:36:11,320 --> 00:36:14,319
Speaker 1: them to do in the first place, essentially making the

602
00:36:14,360 --> 00:36:19,200
Speaker 1: hackers threats work. Yeah. Yeah, it's like, now you guys

603
00:36:19,200 --> 00:36:23,680
Speaker 1: are carrying out the second part of that plan essentially. Um.

604
00:36:23,719 --> 00:36:27,040
Speaker 1: So you know, on the other hand, there are some

605
00:36:27,200 --> 00:36:29,880
Speaker 1: very important issues that have been talked about, like the

606
00:36:29,920 --> 00:36:35,439
Speaker 1: pay disparity that clearly should be addressed. Uh. And so

607
00:36:35,560 --> 00:36:38,759
Speaker 1: it's hard to just be completely like hands off on

608
00:36:38,760 --> 00:36:40,560
Speaker 1: this because there are some things that have come out

609
00:36:40,560 --> 00:36:42,719
Speaker 1: of this that, you know, you want to say, like,

610
00:36:42,800 --> 00:36:46,360
Speaker 1: all right, some of you, some of you may be

611
00:36:46,560 --> 00:36:49,680
Speaker 1: terrible people, and some of your policies may be very

612
00:36:49,800 --> 00:36:52,080
Speaker 1: terrible as well, and maybe we need to take a

613
00:36:52,080 --> 00:36:54,160
Speaker 1: look at that. This is not the way I would

614
00:36:54,160 --> 00:36:57,440
Speaker 1: have preferred us to have this conversation. Absolutely, that's a

615
00:36:57,480 --> 00:37:01,239
Speaker 1: really good point. And uh, it's weird because although the

616
00:37:01,280 --> 00:37:06,440
Speaker 1: Guardians of Peace do not directly respond, I guess to

617
00:37:06,600 --> 00:37:11,080
Speaker 1: media members, Yeah, we do see that they are clearly

618
00:37:11,320 --> 00:37:15,320
Speaker 1: listening to as much as I loathe the term Jonathan

619
00:37:15,440 --> 00:37:20,399
Speaker 1: to the narrative. Yes, So December sixteenth, that narrative gets

620
00:37:20,400 --> 00:37:23,960
Speaker 1: pushed forward with another message allegedly from Guardians of Peace

621
00:37:24,400 --> 00:37:28,240
Speaker 1: that specifically mentions the interview. This is the first time

622
00:37:28,719 --> 00:37:32,359
Speaker 1: the interview is mentioned by name December sixteen. November twenty

623
00:37:32,400 --> 00:37:35,520
Speaker 1: four was when the attack was revealed. December sixteenth is

624
00:37:35,520 --> 00:37:38,000
Speaker 1: when the interview is mentioned by name, and the message

625
00:37:38,000 --> 00:37:39,920
Speaker 1: contains threats saying that if the film is allowed to

626
00:37:40,000 --> 00:37:42,960
Speaker 1: run in theaters, there will be a September eleventh style

627
00:37:43,120 --> 00:37:47,040
Speaker 1: terrorist attack as a response specifically against the New York

628
00:37:47,080 --> 00:37:50,960
Speaker 1: theater where it would have premiered, but also uh nationwide

629
00:37:51,640 --> 00:37:55,680
Speaker 1: um incidents if it were to run in local theaters.

630
00:37:55,840 --> 00:37:58,359
Speaker 1: Sony ends up canceling the premiere and pulls the film

631
00:37:58,400 --> 00:38:01,560
Speaker 1: from theaters, but they really pull the film for theaters

632
00:38:01,600 --> 00:38:04,040
Speaker 1: after several theater chains have already said that they will

633
00:38:04,120 --> 00:38:06,680
Speaker 1: not show the movie, right, and these are the big

634
00:38:07,080 --> 00:38:12,080
Speaker 1: the big names. Yeah, so these are that's exactly right.

635
00:38:12,160 --> 00:38:15,080
Speaker 1: So once, I mean, if if the major chains say

636
00:38:15,080 --> 00:38:18,200
Speaker 1: we're not going to show your movie, then canceling it

637
00:38:18,280 --> 00:38:21,000
Speaker 1: kind of makes sense. So we'll come back to that

638
00:38:21,239 --> 00:38:25,840
Speaker 1: because Sony story about this removing of the movie and

639
00:38:25,880 --> 00:38:33,160
Speaker 1: then returning the film is not totally coherent, right, Yeah,

640
00:38:33,200 --> 00:38:35,840
Speaker 1: that's and it's a charitable way to put it. So

641
00:38:36,000 --> 00:38:39,239
Speaker 1: at this time, people say, well, you should release it

642
00:38:39,640 --> 00:38:43,839
Speaker 1: in video on demand somehow, right, or independent theaters, right,

643
00:38:43,920 --> 00:38:47,719
Speaker 1: And Sony says, nope, dada, We're not releasing it in

644
00:38:47,840 --> 00:38:51,200
Speaker 1: any form. Now, this is an important thing to remember

645
00:38:51,280 --> 00:38:53,960
Speaker 1: that Sony has said they do not want to release

646
00:38:54,000 --> 00:38:57,840
Speaker 1: the movie in any format. And uh So, December seventeenth,

647
00:38:57,920 --> 00:39:00,920
Speaker 1: the U. S Government, in the form mostly of the FBI,

648
00:39:01,040 --> 00:39:04,319
Speaker 1: stated that they believe North Korea was centrally involved in

649
00:39:04,360 --> 00:39:06,520
Speaker 1: the hacking, although the FBI has not officially said that

650
00:39:06,560 --> 00:39:09,120
Speaker 1: at this point, it was really a government official saying

651
00:39:09,560 --> 00:39:12,799
Speaker 1: we believe that North Korea was involved. Uh this was

652
00:39:12,840 --> 00:39:15,720
Speaker 1: not when the FBI specifically came out, but on December

653
00:39:15,760 --> 00:39:19,920
Speaker 1: eighteen messages, again allegedly from Guardians of Peace, went to

654
00:39:19,960 --> 00:39:22,560
Speaker 1: Sony executives and said that if the film was never

655
00:39:22,640 --> 00:39:26,480
Speaker 1: released in any format, then Guardians of Peace would not

656
00:39:26,640 --> 00:39:30,200
Speaker 1: release any more damaging information stolen in the hack. So

657
00:39:30,280 --> 00:39:33,799
Speaker 1: presumably they still had some that was at least as

658
00:39:33,880 --> 00:39:36,719
Speaker 1: damaging as the mountain of stuff they had already released,

659
00:39:37,239 --> 00:39:39,080
Speaker 1: but they were holding it in check, and if that

660
00:39:39,160 --> 00:39:41,759
Speaker 1: movie didn't come out at all, it would never see

661
00:39:41,800 --> 00:39:44,560
Speaker 1: the light of day. But a second message on the

662
00:39:44,600 --> 00:39:47,120
Speaker 1: web application paste band that's the one I was talking

663
00:39:47,120 --> 00:39:52,359
Speaker 1: about that it's supposedly also was from Guardians of Peace

664
00:39:52,400 --> 00:39:55,080
Speaker 1: and had a different message in it, saying that Sony

665
00:39:55,160 --> 00:39:58,440
Speaker 1: had suffered enough and the company could release the movie

666
00:39:58,520 --> 00:40:01,680
Speaker 1: if Kim Jong UN's death isn't quote too happy and

667
00:40:01,760 --> 00:40:05,000
Speaker 1: what does that even mean? I guess that if it

668
00:40:05,080 --> 00:40:09,440
Speaker 1: wasn't like a big emotionally uplifting moment in the film,

669
00:40:09,480 --> 00:40:12,719
Speaker 1: like you weren't supposed to stand up and cheer and

670
00:40:12,760 --> 00:40:15,439
Speaker 1: go yea when Kim jong un dies, and that would

671
00:40:15,480 --> 00:40:21,200
Speaker 1: be okay. I feel fairly confident and saying that this

672
00:40:21,280 --> 00:40:24,359
Speaker 1: is not the same group, or at least it's not

673
00:40:24,440 --> 00:40:27,839
Speaker 1: a group representing North Korea, because that seems completely antithetical

674
00:40:27,880 --> 00:40:31,279
Speaker 1: to everything else that's been said. It's even antithetical to

675
00:40:31,320 --> 00:40:34,640
Speaker 1: the other message that was released that very day, Like

676
00:40:34,719 --> 00:40:37,320
Speaker 1: one message says, never released the movie and we'll stop,

677
00:40:37,360 --> 00:40:39,319
Speaker 1: and the other message says, go ahead and release the

678
00:40:39,320 --> 00:40:42,000
Speaker 1: movie as long as it's not celebrating the death of

679
00:40:42,040 --> 00:40:44,960
Speaker 1: Kim Jong un. Then you you've suffered enough and you've

680
00:40:45,040 --> 00:40:48,040
Speaker 1: learned a lesson. Clearly, these can't be the same people

681
00:40:49,200 --> 00:40:51,719
Speaker 1: unless they're just message with Sony in that case that

682
00:40:51,920 --> 00:40:53,479
Speaker 1: it could be in the same people, but now they're

683
00:40:53,480 --> 00:40:57,200
Speaker 1: cruel mischief makers. Now there's one other thing though, that's

684
00:40:57,360 --> 00:41:02,040
Speaker 1: that's a pretty big deal that was unearthed during the

685
00:41:02,160 --> 00:41:04,400
Speaker 1: leaks of the Sony hacks. Yeah, this is one that

686
00:41:04,520 --> 00:41:07,399
Speaker 1: has become a separate issue all on its own, and

687
00:41:07,560 --> 00:41:09,800
Speaker 1: it's one that I would really need to look into

688
00:41:09,880 --> 00:41:12,960
Speaker 1: further to to do a full rundown on it. But

689
00:41:14,520 --> 00:41:17,120
Speaker 1: the future, I think so. Yeah, I've been trying to

690
00:41:17,120 --> 00:41:19,359
Speaker 1: give it some more space so I can get more

691
00:41:19,400 --> 00:41:22,640
Speaker 1: information on it. But this was where we also saw

692
00:41:22,719 --> 00:41:25,200
Speaker 1: as part of the leaked information that came out that

693
00:41:26,040 --> 00:41:30,320
Speaker 1: there was this um kind of a conspiracy really among

694
00:41:30,360 --> 00:41:36,200
Speaker 1: movie studios about Project Goliath, which everyone is pretty sure

695
00:41:36,400 --> 00:41:39,759
Speaker 1: means Google and Google in the mp a A the

696
00:41:39,880 --> 00:41:44,279
Speaker 1: Motion Picture Association of America ended up having some some

697
00:41:44,520 --> 00:41:48,839
Speaker 1: very public spats about the information contained in the leak

698
00:41:49,080 --> 00:41:52,879
Speaker 1: regarding Project Goliath, Google saying that the m p A

699
00:41:53,080 --> 00:41:56,480
Speaker 1: was essentially trying to reinstate policies that were under the

700
00:41:56,719 --> 00:42:02,240
Speaker 1: SOAPA umbrella but had been defeated because HOPO was not adopted. Meanwhile,

701
00:42:02,280 --> 00:42:05,160
Speaker 1: the m p a A is saying Google being talking

702
00:42:05,200 --> 00:42:09,120
Speaker 1: about self as a champion of free speech is a joke, right, Yeah,

703
00:42:09,480 --> 00:42:14,040
Speaker 1: it got brutal. Uh yeah, very ugly. It's definitely worth

704
00:42:14,120 --> 00:42:16,400
Speaker 1: looking further into, but we won't, you know, I just

705
00:42:16,400 --> 00:42:18,560
Speaker 1: wanted to mention it because again, it's like, that's not

706
00:42:18,640 --> 00:42:21,160
Speaker 1: that this story wasn't big enough, but other big stories

707
00:42:21,200 --> 00:42:24,680
Speaker 1: came up to like because of it. December nineteenth, that's

708
00:42:24,680 --> 00:42:27,920
Speaker 1: when the FBI announces it has connected the North Korean

709
00:42:27,920 --> 00:42:31,520
Speaker 1: government to the attacks, citing unreleased evidence as well as

710
00:42:31,520 --> 00:42:34,239
Speaker 1: clues such as hacking tools that have been used by

711
00:42:34,239 --> 00:42:37,160
Speaker 1: North Korean hackers in the past. They also cite that

712
00:42:37,200 --> 00:42:41,399
Speaker 1: the attacks seemed to originate from IP addresses within North Korea,

713
00:42:41,520 --> 00:42:44,040
Speaker 1: and later stated that they believed it would have been

714
00:42:44,160 --> 00:42:47,080
Speaker 1: really difficult for anyone else to have used or spoofed

715
00:42:47,120 --> 00:42:50,759
Speaker 1: those particular IP addresses. Is my favorite party coming up? Yeah,

716
00:42:50,760 --> 00:42:53,360
Speaker 1: and then North Korea says it was not involved in

717
00:42:53,400 --> 00:42:56,279
Speaker 1: the hacks, but praises the hackers as sympathizers and that

718
00:42:56,320 --> 00:42:59,879
Speaker 1: the hack was quote a righteous deed. They basically said,

719
00:43:00,080 --> 00:43:03,080
Speaker 1: we didn't do it, but we should have. Yeah. I

720
00:43:03,200 --> 00:43:04,600
Speaker 1: like that they say it was a righteous deed. But

721
00:43:04,640 --> 00:43:05,880
Speaker 1: I like to think of him saying it was a

722
00:43:06,080 --> 00:43:08,839
Speaker 1: righteous deed, you know, like kind of surfer Yeah. Yeah,

723
00:43:08,880 --> 00:43:12,120
Speaker 1: I hope mutant Ninja Turtles version of righteous. I don't

724
00:43:12,120 --> 00:43:14,319
Speaker 1: know how popular Hawaiian shirts are there, but that would

725
00:43:14,320 --> 00:43:17,160
Speaker 1: have been good, good costume. If they're really popular, then

726
00:43:17,200 --> 00:43:19,800
Speaker 1: I've got my wardrobe. Should I ever visit North Korea,

727
00:43:20,360 --> 00:43:23,600
Speaker 1: I've got a ton of those. President Obama also on

728
00:43:23,640 --> 00:43:26,279
Speaker 1: December nineteenth, spoke out about the hack and said he

729
00:43:26,320 --> 00:43:29,399
Speaker 1: felt that Sony made a mistake pulling the movie from theaters,

730
00:43:29,480 --> 00:43:32,560
Speaker 1: and also said that the US would respond proportionately to

731
00:43:32,760 --> 00:43:36,080
Speaker 1: the attack. What that specifically meant, no one was really

732
00:43:36,080 --> 00:43:38,640
Speaker 1: sure at the time. Yeah, I've even got a I

733
00:43:38,680 --> 00:43:40,320
Speaker 1: forgot to put the note in, but I'll mention it

734
00:43:40,320 --> 00:43:43,520
Speaker 1: when we get a little further in about the something

735
00:43:43,560 --> 00:43:46,840
Speaker 1: that happened in North Korea that some wonder perhaps was

736
00:43:46,920 --> 00:43:50,720
Speaker 1: the proportionate attack. We don't write the response now that

737
00:43:50,719 --> 00:43:54,640
Speaker 1: that same day, Sony came out and this is where

738
00:43:54,719 --> 00:43:59,279
Speaker 1: the this is where their message evolves. Yeah, evolves is

739
00:43:59,320 --> 00:44:07,120
Speaker 1: good chain just make degree turn. So this is the CEO,

740
00:44:07,239 --> 00:44:09,680
Speaker 1: Michael Lynton came out and said that the decision to

741
00:44:09,719 --> 00:44:12,920
Speaker 1: cancel the film was merely in response to theaters refusing

742
00:44:12,960 --> 00:44:15,760
Speaker 1: to show it, and not a sign that the company

743
00:44:15,800 --> 00:44:19,239
Speaker 1: was bowing to terrorist threats. If that's the case, I

744
00:44:19,320 --> 00:44:22,960
Speaker 1: don't know why they refused to release it in any format.

745
00:44:23,080 --> 00:44:26,640
Speaker 1: If they said we're never releasing this movie. Ever, how

746
00:44:26,680 --> 00:44:30,200
Speaker 1: could that be only because the theater's refused to show it,

747
00:44:30,480 --> 00:44:33,279
Speaker 1: Because you would assume that the company wouldn't want to

748
00:44:33,320 --> 00:44:37,680
Speaker 1: just eat the expenses of producing and marketing a film.

749
00:44:37,840 --> 00:44:42,960
Speaker 1: The Gigantic expenses many millions of dollars, So if you

750
00:44:43,000 --> 00:44:45,600
Speaker 1: want to recapture at least some of that, you could

751
00:44:45,680 --> 00:44:48,840
Speaker 1: release it online. I mean, if you're truly not scared

752
00:44:49,120 --> 00:44:53,840
Speaker 1: of the threats, then why not why not release it

753
00:44:53,920 --> 00:44:58,160
Speaker 1: online or allow independent theaters that say, look, we'll still

754
00:44:58,160 --> 00:45:00,719
Speaker 1: show it. Why not allow them to do it? And

755
00:45:00,760 --> 00:45:03,360
Speaker 1: that was that was the thing, is that this response

756
00:45:03,400 --> 00:45:07,239
Speaker 1: to me did not ring true because the actions that

757
00:45:07,320 --> 00:45:10,440
Speaker 1: Sony had taken just a couple of days earlier spoke

758
00:45:10,600 --> 00:45:13,359
Speaker 1: very differently than what they were saying. However, of course

759
00:45:13,360 --> 00:45:15,080
Speaker 1: they want to say face, they want to say, hey,

760
00:45:15,080 --> 00:45:17,839
Speaker 1: we weren't scared. It's just that there was no place

761
00:45:17,880 --> 00:45:20,560
Speaker 1: to show it. So that's why we pulled it, which

762
00:45:20,640 --> 00:45:26,239
Speaker 1: is patent lee false. Because there were several theater in

763
00:45:26,280 --> 00:45:30,239
Speaker 1: the city of Atlanta that was ready to show it. Uh.

764
00:45:30,400 --> 00:45:33,520
Speaker 1: There are two theaters in general that are specific, rather

765
00:45:33,640 --> 00:45:37,760
Speaker 1: too specific theaters that said they wanted to show the film.

766
00:45:37,800 --> 00:45:40,839
Speaker 1: One is in Atlanta called the Plaza, which is just

767
00:45:40,920 --> 00:45:43,640
Speaker 1: down the street from where I live. Independent theater, yeah,

768
00:45:43,640 --> 00:45:46,839
Speaker 1: a little tiny independent theater. Uh, and they said we'll

769
00:45:46,880 --> 00:45:49,240
Speaker 1: show it. And then there was other one in Texas

770
00:45:49,320 --> 00:45:53,040
Speaker 1: Alamo Drafthouse Yeah yeah, yeah, which are which are too

771
00:45:53,760 --> 00:45:58,440
Speaker 1: um unforeseen champions there. We we do know though. This

772
00:45:58,520 --> 00:46:01,680
Speaker 1: is another thing that's really interesting thing to me because

773
00:46:01,719 --> 00:46:04,840
Speaker 1: all this stuff takes place after you and I and

774
00:46:04,960 --> 00:46:09,040
Speaker 1: Matt did the earlier show. So what happens on December twenty.

775
00:46:09,200 --> 00:46:11,239
Speaker 1: That's when North Korea offers to take part in a

776
00:46:11,360 --> 00:46:15,120
Speaker 1: joint investigation of the hack, and the U. S Government declines.

777
00:46:15,960 --> 00:46:18,600
Speaker 1: So North Korea says, hey, we weren't responsible, but we

778
00:46:18,640 --> 00:46:20,880
Speaker 1: will totally help you try and track down who was

779
00:46:20,960 --> 00:46:24,040
Speaker 1: responsible for this thing that we approve of but totally

780
00:46:24,120 --> 00:46:28,680
Speaker 1: didn't do. And the United States said, uh, Here's what's

781
00:46:28,760 --> 00:46:31,719
Speaker 1: interesting to mean though, If North Korea is telling the truth, right,

782
00:46:31,800 --> 00:46:35,440
Speaker 1: and if they were in no way involved in that hack, right,

783
00:46:35,920 --> 00:46:40,919
Speaker 1: this this, uh, these bits of code that somehow could

784
00:46:40,960 --> 00:46:45,400
Speaker 1: have come from them, I'm wondering if maybe maybe their

785
00:46:45,520 --> 00:46:50,960
Speaker 1: willingness to investigate was seen as uh disingenuous. Maybe they

786
00:46:50,960 --> 00:46:55,359
Speaker 1: were looking to find out how their how their work

787
00:46:55,440 --> 00:46:57,840
Speaker 1: got out there or how it got found, or maybe

788
00:46:57,840 --> 00:47:00,880
Speaker 1: they were It could also possibly be that North Korea

789
00:47:00,920 --> 00:47:04,320
Speaker 1: is saying, hey, you know, we didn't um, we didn't

790
00:47:04,440 --> 00:47:07,239
Speaker 1: allow for this to happen. We didn't we didn't designate

791
00:47:07,360 --> 00:47:10,160
Speaker 1: someone to go and do this on our behalf. We

792
00:47:10,200 --> 00:47:12,760
Speaker 1: would like to track down the person responsible for reasons

793
00:47:12,760 --> 00:47:17,000
Speaker 1: of our own exactly. Or it could be that they

794
00:47:17,080 --> 00:47:19,080
Speaker 1: totally did it. It could be they totally did it.

795
00:47:19,960 --> 00:47:21,759
Speaker 1: And that's one thing that we should point out, Like

796
00:47:21,800 --> 00:47:26,720
Speaker 1: I have pretty strong skepticism about this, but they totally

797
00:47:26,719 --> 00:47:29,520
Speaker 1: could have done it right. It's just not enough information.

798
00:47:29,520 --> 00:47:32,240
Speaker 1: We'll get to we'll get to the biggest, the biggest

799
00:47:32,280 --> 00:47:35,359
Speaker 1: problem in the information gap here pretty soon, I think.

800
00:47:35,440 --> 00:47:38,000
Speaker 1: But then on that same day, December twentie that's when

801
00:47:38,000 --> 00:47:40,799
Speaker 1: North Korea also warned that there would be serious consequences

802
00:47:40,800 --> 00:47:44,080
Speaker 1: should the United States attack North Korea if this retaliation

803
00:47:44,120 --> 00:47:47,320
Speaker 1: were to happen, right, whatever that would be. Yeah, So

804
00:47:47,520 --> 00:47:51,400
Speaker 1: essentially like whatever proportionate response you're thinking of, better not

805
00:47:51,480 --> 00:47:55,239
Speaker 1: be against us, because boy heality, we will we and

806
00:47:55,239 --> 00:47:58,960
Speaker 1: and they were very like, very militant. Not big surprise,

807
00:47:59,000 --> 00:48:01,880
Speaker 1: I mean, North Korea is very angry. North Korea has

808
00:48:01,920 --> 00:48:06,000
Speaker 1: got a long history of of you know, beating the

809
00:48:06,080 --> 00:48:10,600
Speaker 1: drama and saying that they will take severe action without

810
00:48:10,600 --> 00:48:13,520
Speaker 1: backing it up. Not that you would ever want them

811
00:48:13,520 --> 00:48:16,000
Speaker 1: to back it up. But the United States in North

812
00:48:16,040 --> 00:48:19,319
Speaker 1: Korea remember still technically in a ceasefire with the war

813
00:48:19,400 --> 00:48:22,319
Speaker 1: that never ended. Yes, North Korea has never acknowledged the

814
00:48:22,400 --> 00:48:25,919
Speaker 1: end of the war. So December twenty three, Sony would

815
00:48:25,960 --> 00:48:29,160
Speaker 1: authorize three theaters to show the interview on Christmas Day,

816
00:48:29,320 --> 00:48:33,200
Speaker 1: and they also released the film to streaming options late

817
00:48:33,239 --> 00:48:36,680
Speaker 1: on the Christmas Eve, and there were no further attacks.

818
00:48:37,280 --> 00:48:40,000
Speaker 1: Despite that fact that you know, you had those messages

819
00:48:40,040 --> 00:48:42,400
Speaker 1: earlier saying that if you ever show this, we will

820
00:48:42,440 --> 00:48:45,960
Speaker 1: attack more, there weren't any. There were no real life

821
00:48:46,680 --> 00:48:51,360
Speaker 1: violent consequences. December seven, North Korea condemns the release of

822
00:48:51,400 --> 00:48:56,000
Speaker 1: the film, and they're real jerks about it. They used

823
00:48:56,040 --> 00:49:01,040
Speaker 1: a racially insensitive term to describe our president it, which

824
00:49:01,200 --> 00:49:04,520
Speaker 1: was pretty ugly, and I got a lot of people

825
00:49:04,600 --> 00:49:07,399
Speaker 1: up in arms. But I mean, the most important thing

826
00:49:07,520 --> 00:49:11,000
Speaker 1: is obviously that there wasn't any kind of physical retaliation

827
00:49:11,200 --> 00:49:13,680
Speaker 1: for the release of the movie. It was just a

828
00:49:13,719 --> 00:49:19,040
Speaker 1: really nasty worded message from people who were upset about

829
00:49:19,080 --> 00:49:23,360
Speaker 1: it well and the film itself. Of course, given we

830
00:49:23,440 --> 00:49:25,960
Speaker 1: talked about this a little bit, but given the political

831
00:49:26,080 --> 00:49:31,399
Speaker 1: environment and ideology of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

832
00:49:31,520 --> 00:49:35,640
Speaker 1: or North Korea, this is this is a profoundly offensive thing.

833
00:49:35,800 --> 00:49:41,000
Speaker 1: It's it's similar to a film that came out featuring

834
00:49:41,160 --> 00:49:47,359
Speaker 1: Mohammed from you know, from the Muslim faith, uh which

835
00:49:47,480 --> 00:49:50,880
Speaker 1: depicting Mohammed is already supposed to be a profound defense

836
00:49:51,640 --> 00:49:55,160
Speaker 1: and then having him killed. It's similar to that because

837
00:49:55,160 --> 00:49:58,759
Speaker 1: of the deification of the leadership of North Korea. Sure, yeah,

838
00:49:58,800 --> 00:50:02,040
Speaker 1: it's it's it's a very much a kind of divine

839
00:50:02,160 --> 00:50:04,239
Speaker 1: right sort of thing. Yeah, that's a good phase. And

840
00:50:04,480 --> 00:50:10,440
Speaker 1: so a nastily worded statement, Uh, with added racism. I

841
00:50:10,480 --> 00:50:14,760
Speaker 1: guess just to make it really pop is the least

842
00:50:14,800 --> 00:50:18,919
Speaker 1: you could expect. Yeah, that's true. Uh. Sony also has

843
00:50:18,960 --> 00:50:22,560
Speaker 1: threatened media companies that are covering the hack with legal action,

844
00:50:22,600 --> 00:50:26,319
Speaker 1: saying they will sue companies that specifically companies that are

845
00:50:26,400 --> 00:50:30,440
Speaker 1: sharing the leaked information. I mean, reporting on something is

846
00:50:30,440 --> 00:50:33,840
Speaker 1: one thing. Obviously, Sony suing a company for reporting on

847
00:50:33,880 --> 00:50:38,120
Speaker 1: the story would be pretty difficult to win. I mean,

848
00:50:38,280 --> 00:50:40,399
Speaker 1: you know, no one wants to get sued. It's an

849
00:50:40,400 --> 00:50:44,799
Speaker 1: expensive endeavor. But you know, most most media outlets are

850
00:50:44,800 --> 00:50:46,839
Speaker 1: going to say, like, well, we're just covering the news.

851
00:50:46,920 --> 00:50:49,319
Speaker 1: This is news, and that's what we do. You're not

852
00:50:49,440 --> 00:50:53,200
Speaker 1: a government. You can't claim that this is a national

853
00:50:53,320 --> 00:50:56,359
Speaker 1: security issue. Yeah. Now, if if in fact they were

854
00:50:56,440 --> 00:51:00,719
Speaker 1: releasing private like corporate secrets that kind of thing, then

855
00:51:00,760 --> 00:51:03,160
Speaker 1: you get into a sort of a murky ground. And

856
00:51:03,480 --> 00:51:06,520
Speaker 1: I can see why Sony definitely wanted to to try

857
00:51:06,560 --> 00:51:10,759
Speaker 1: and cut down on people sharing this information and disseminating

858
00:51:10,760 --> 00:51:14,440
Speaker 1: it further, which is another reason why I report about

859
00:51:14,480 --> 00:51:20,000
Speaker 1: the story, but go into it. Uh, there's not always altruistic.

860
00:51:20,840 --> 00:51:22,360
Speaker 1: We've got a little bit more to talk about with

861
00:51:22,400 --> 00:51:25,279
Speaker 1: the Sony Pictures Entertainment hack, but first let's take this

862
00:51:25,360 --> 00:51:35,440
Speaker 1: quick break. Now, there's one other thing you that you

863
00:51:35,480 --> 00:51:38,600
Speaker 1: were going to mention as well about this, which is

864
00:51:39,320 --> 00:51:42,800
Speaker 1: something funny happened in North Korea's internet. Yeah, their internet

865
00:51:43,120 --> 00:51:47,000
Speaker 1: um had a real slow down and eventually just a

866
00:51:47,040 --> 00:51:52,200
Speaker 1: complete halt of operations in late December, and there was

867
00:51:52,239 --> 00:51:54,120
Speaker 1: some question about whether or not that was in fact

868
00:51:54,200 --> 00:51:57,120
Speaker 1: the proportionate response that the United States was going to

869
00:51:57,160 --> 00:52:02,239
Speaker 1: take against whomever perpetrated the ac UM, And we don't know,

870
00:52:02,480 --> 00:52:04,480
Speaker 1: we don't know if it was. In fact. There's so

871
00:52:04,680 --> 00:52:10,799
Speaker 1: few nodes in North Korea, and it's all stuff that

872
00:52:10,840 --> 00:52:13,160
Speaker 1: the government and military can have access to, but no

873
00:52:13,200 --> 00:52:16,800
Speaker 1: one else outside of those organizations has access to the Internet.

874
00:52:17,560 --> 00:52:22,200
Speaker 1: So but those those nodes that all the connections were

875
00:52:22,320 --> 00:52:25,960
Speaker 1: essentially shut down, like the Internet went dark in North Korea. Uh.

876
00:52:26,080 --> 00:52:28,360
Speaker 1: It led some people to wonder if perhaps there was

877
00:52:28,400 --> 00:52:31,239
Speaker 1: an attack, if it was a state sponsored attack like

878
00:52:31,280 --> 00:52:34,560
Speaker 1: the United States proportionate response, if that was it, or

879
00:52:34,560 --> 00:52:39,680
Speaker 1: if it was just as an example of infrastructure breaking down,

880
00:52:39,840 --> 00:52:41,640
Speaker 1: which could have been the case. It could have been

881
00:52:41,680 --> 00:52:43,719
Speaker 1: that it was as simple as someone needed to go

882
00:52:43,760 --> 00:52:47,120
Speaker 1: and reboot a machine in order for it to reconnect

883
00:52:47,160 --> 00:52:50,160
Speaker 1: to the Internet at large. So, uh, there just wasn't

884
00:52:50,200 --> 00:52:52,399
Speaker 1: any answer to that. Of course, you know, you had

885
00:52:52,400 --> 00:52:55,520
Speaker 1: a lot of speculation around it, but since there's not

886
00:52:55,640 --> 00:52:59,040
Speaker 1: enough information, I don't want to speculate right the We're

887
00:52:59,080 --> 00:53:02,880
Speaker 1: just saying that the issue of antiquated or malfunctioning equipment

888
00:53:03,200 --> 00:53:06,719
Speaker 1: is at least as likely a culprit as a state

889
00:53:06,760 --> 00:53:10,879
Speaker 1: sponsored attack, if not more likely in my opinion. But so,

890
00:53:11,280 --> 00:53:15,600
Speaker 1: happy New Year, Sony. You made it to uh the

891
00:53:15,960 --> 00:53:19,880
Speaker 1: and that's January second. There's a funny thing, Jonathan, You

892
00:53:19,920 --> 00:53:21,880
Speaker 1: and I have talked about this off air before, but

893
00:53:21,960 --> 00:53:26,680
Speaker 1: there's this funny way that stories drop, Uh, some big

894
00:53:26,719 --> 00:53:30,880
Speaker 1: stories drop on Friday afternoon. Listeners will recall that January

895
00:53:30,960 --> 00:53:35,000
Speaker 1: two was a Friday. There's a great subreddit about important

896
00:53:35,000 --> 00:53:38,359
Speaker 1: news that drops on Friday. Yeah. The hope that there

897
00:53:38,400 --> 00:53:41,640
Speaker 1: are a lot of companies that will release like unpleasant

898
00:53:41,719 --> 00:53:44,080
Speaker 1: news on a Friday, hoping that it just gets buried

899
00:53:44,640 --> 00:53:46,719
Speaker 1: and then by the time everyone's ready to talk about

900
00:53:46,719 --> 00:53:48,680
Speaker 1: it again on Monday, it's old news, so no one

901
00:53:48,719 --> 00:53:52,440
Speaker 1: talks about it, right, Yeah, exactly, And so this is, uh,

902
00:53:52,480 --> 00:53:56,839
Speaker 1: this is a pretty big Friday to drop some disappearing

903
00:53:56,880 --> 00:53:59,920
Speaker 1: news because it's the day after New Year's Day. Every

904
00:54:00,040 --> 00:54:02,520
Speaker 1: once hungover, no one can no one can remember what

905
00:54:02,560 --> 00:54:05,560
Speaker 1: their name is, let alone read a press release right right,

906
00:54:05,840 --> 00:54:08,719
Speaker 1: and like, you don't drink, and you're probably just hungover

907
00:54:08,760 --> 00:54:11,319
Speaker 1: from having to deal with all the people drinking. It's

908
00:54:11,320 --> 00:54:14,160
Speaker 1: mostly made dealing with the immense frustration of all my

909
00:54:14,239 --> 00:54:18,000
Speaker 1: drunk friends who are who are texting me as they're like, dude,

910
00:54:18,000 --> 00:54:19,960
Speaker 1: did I call you last night? And if I did,

911
00:54:20,120 --> 00:54:23,799
Speaker 1: don't remember the things I said? Don't check the message. Yes,

912
00:54:23,920 --> 00:54:25,920
Speaker 1: you know your your co host Matt Frederick has done

913
00:54:25,920 --> 00:54:29,480
Speaker 1: that to me. Yeah, at one thirty in the morning,

914
00:54:29,680 --> 00:54:31,680
Speaker 1: I got a call from him. That was a few

915
00:54:31,760 --> 00:54:33,840
Speaker 1: years ago, though that was not this year. That was

916
00:54:33,880 --> 00:54:37,200
Speaker 1: in his checkered past. So here's what happens. On January second.

917
00:54:37,200 --> 00:54:40,200
Speaker 1: The White House announces a new round of sanctions on

918
00:54:40,280 --> 00:54:43,959
Speaker 1: North Korea and they do this via executive order. We've

919
00:54:44,000 --> 00:54:48,440
Speaker 1: got a quotation here, uh, which we should say also

920
00:54:48,640 --> 00:54:53,000
Speaker 1: that as the US is releasing these new sanctions, people

921
00:54:53,400 --> 00:55:01,240
Speaker 1: are already raising um skeptical concern about this North Korea allegations.

922
00:55:01,920 --> 00:55:04,480
Speaker 1: And they're saying, you know, the FBI or the CIA

923
00:55:04,719 --> 00:55:08,239
Speaker 1: or the rest of the alphabet soup seems convinced that

924
00:55:08,360 --> 00:55:12,000
Speaker 1: North Korea was involved. And they're saying that due to

925
00:55:12,160 --> 00:55:16,359
Speaker 1: information we have, we know it was North Korea. And

926
00:55:16,400 --> 00:55:21,520
Speaker 1: people are saying, but how and why what is this

927
00:55:21,560 --> 00:55:25,560
Speaker 1: information that you have that's such a convincing smoking gun, right,

928
00:55:25,760 --> 00:55:30,200
Speaker 1: and uh, they that's why we've got the exact quotation

929
00:55:30,440 --> 00:55:34,640
Speaker 1: of why they are sanctioning this. Uh if if you

930
00:55:34,640 --> 00:55:37,920
Speaker 1: could probably do a better voice thanich. The response. So,

931
00:55:38,400 --> 00:55:43,280
Speaker 1: it's a response to ongoing provocative, destabilizing, and repressive actions

932
00:55:43,280 --> 00:55:46,719
Speaker 1: and policies. Particularly it's destructive and coercive cyber attacks on

933
00:55:46,760 --> 00:55:53,160
Speaker 1: Sony Pictures Entertainment. So specifically, not not just specifically cyber crime,

934
00:55:53,440 --> 00:55:58,400
Speaker 1: but specifically Sony Pictures Entertainment. They're saying, not only do

935
00:55:58,480 --> 00:56:02,000
Speaker 1: we think he did it, this is our official response

936
00:56:02,040 --> 00:56:04,480
Speaker 1: to that. Yeah. So in this case, I mean it's

937
00:56:04,520 --> 00:56:08,400
Speaker 1: essentially saying like cases closed, guys, this is they did it,

938
00:56:09,120 --> 00:56:12,719
Speaker 1: and Uh, we're gonna kind of segue into sort of

939
00:56:12,719 --> 00:56:16,960
Speaker 1: the skepticism about this, including my own personal skepticism, but

940
00:56:17,000 --> 00:56:19,879
Speaker 1: I want to preface it with saying, and we said

941
00:56:19,880 --> 00:56:21,600
Speaker 1: this on on the stuff they don't want you to

942
00:56:21,640 --> 00:56:24,400
Speaker 1: know episode as well, that this is based upon the

943
00:56:24,440 --> 00:56:27,360
Speaker 1: information that we have available to us. And it could

944
00:56:27,400 --> 00:56:31,239
Speaker 1: be that the US government hasn't its possession information that

945
00:56:31,440 --> 00:56:35,960
Speaker 1: is damning evidence that proves that North Korea's government was

946
00:56:36,000 --> 00:56:39,520
Speaker 1: in fact behind the attacks. Uh, And it's just that

947
00:56:39,560 --> 00:56:42,080
Speaker 1: we don't have access to that information, and therefore that's

948
00:56:42,120 --> 00:56:46,120
Speaker 1: why things look a little hokey to us. Uh. That

949
00:56:46,280 --> 00:56:50,319
Speaker 1: being said, things look a little hokey to us. How So,

950
00:56:50,400 --> 00:56:52,879
Speaker 1: what what are some of the points that make this

951
00:56:53,600 --> 00:56:58,120
Speaker 1: not an ironclad theory? All right? So, first, it's odd

952
00:56:58,320 --> 00:57:00,960
Speaker 1: to have a state sponsored tech where you have a

953
00:57:01,000 --> 00:57:06,960
Speaker 1: hacker group claiming responsibility and giving itself a cool name. Yes. So,

954
00:57:06,960 --> 00:57:08,719
Speaker 1: so having a group come out and say, hey, we're

955
00:57:08,760 --> 00:57:10,920
Speaker 1: guardians of peace, were the ones who did this, this

956
00:57:11,000 --> 00:57:12,759
Speaker 1: is the reason we did it, here's how you can

957
00:57:12,800 --> 00:57:15,239
Speaker 1: stop it from happening, is a lot different from a

958
00:57:15,280 --> 00:57:19,000
Speaker 1: state sponsored attack. A state sponsored attack usually one thing

959
00:57:19,080 --> 00:57:20,960
Speaker 1: is they don't want to leave any trace of who

960
00:57:21,040 --> 00:57:23,880
Speaker 1: it was that did it. You know, this is if

961
00:57:23,920 --> 00:57:27,400
Speaker 1: you remember the episodes we've done about stucks Net, then

962
00:57:27,480 --> 00:57:29,760
Speaker 1: you know this is the case. Like you want, you

963
00:57:29,800 --> 00:57:33,920
Speaker 1: want to have the effect without having it be autographed.

964
00:57:34,000 --> 00:57:38,360
Speaker 1: You know, love North Korea. Next, the amount of data

965
00:57:38,400 --> 00:57:41,640
Speaker 1: stolen was huge, so we mentioned this earlier. It takes

966
00:57:41,680 --> 00:57:44,480
Speaker 1: a really long time to siphon off a hundred terabytes

967
00:57:44,520 --> 00:57:49,800
Speaker 1: of data, particularly if you're not on site. So that

968
00:57:50,000 --> 00:57:53,120
Speaker 1: is an enormous undertaking. It's not impossible. It is something

969
00:57:53,120 --> 00:57:57,240
Speaker 1: that could happen, but it would take months. Well, it

970
00:57:57,240 --> 00:57:59,240
Speaker 1: would suggest to me that if in fact this is

971
00:57:59,240 --> 00:58:04,880
Speaker 1: North Korea that behind it, that they targeted Sony essentially

972
00:58:06,520 --> 00:58:10,560
Speaker 1: sometime mid two thousand and fourteen for a movie that

973
00:58:10,600 --> 00:58:13,040
Speaker 1: wasn't going to come out for six months the latest,

974
00:58:14,280 --> 00:58:16,160
Speaker 1: because that's how long it's going to take to steal

975
00:58:16,200 --> 00:58:19,440
Speaker 1: that much information. Also, that they were able to identify

976
00:58:19,480 --> 00:58:21,680
Speaker 1: the information that would be most harmful to the company,

977
00:58:22,240 --> 00:58:26,360
Speaker 1: target it, take it and not ever be noticed. Now granted,

978
00:58:26,360 --> 00:58:28,560
Speaker 1: when they're taking it, they're making copies. It's not like

979
00:58:28,720 --> 00:58:31,760
Speaker 1: stealing from a store where suddenly there's there's an empty

980
00:58:31,760 --> 00:58:35,360
Speaker 1: space where a TV used to be. Right, So it's

981
00:58:35,400 --> 00:58:38,320
Speaker 1: a little different from physical theft, but still you could

982
00:58:38,400 --> 00:58:40,400
Speaker 1: end up being caught, you know, you could at leave,

983
00:58:40,440 --> 00:58:44,160
Speaker 1: people could see unusual traffic in the Internet servers, that

984
00:58:44,240 --> 00:58:49,520
Speaker 1: kind of thing. Um, So it's unusual. Also the fact

985
00:58:49,560 --> 00:58:53,120
Speaker 1: that the information that was released to harm the company

986
00:58:53,360 --> 00:58:58,240
Speaker 1: was incredibly savvy, Like this speaks of someone who has

987
00:58:58,280 --> 00:59:02,880
Speaker 1: a real under a standing of what is going to

988
00:59:02,960 --> 00:59:08,720
Speaker 1: make a company, specifically a media company vulnerable. Right, how

989
00:59:08,760 --> 00:59:12,520
Speaker 1: do I strike at the morale of the employees, how

990
00:59:12,560 --> 00:59:16,240
Speaker 1: do I strike at the relationship between the production company

991
00:59:16,360 --> 00:59:19,680
Speaker 1: and the other big players in the industry, How do

992
00:59:19,720 --> 00:59:23,240
Speaker 1: I strike at the American public's perception of that company?

993
00:59:23,280 --> 00:59:27,280
Speaker 1: This is incredibly savvy stuff. Not to say that there

994
00:59:27,320 --> 00:59:30,000
Speaker 1: are there aren't people in North Korea who are aware

995
00:59:30,000 --> 00:59:32,960
Speaker 1: of this. They very well maybe, but it seems to

996
00:59:33,000 --> 00:59:38,120
Speaker 1: me like it's a real insider's insight to what is

997
00:59:38,160 --> 00:59:44,480
Speaker 1: important within the film industry in general and Sony in particular. Yeah,

998
00:59:46,960 --> 00:59:49,960
Speaker 1: it was a little clunky myself, but okay. Also, the

999
00:59:50,040 --> 00:59:52,640
Speaker 1: threats to obey the hackers had nothing to do with

1000
00:59:52,840 --> 00:59:56,400
Speaker 1: the interview for a really long time. Like, so essentially

1001
00:59:56,440 --> 00:59:59,280
Speaker 1: they were saying, obey us, do what we say, but

1002
00:59:59,280 --> 01:00:03,080
Speaker 1: they weren't say they weren't giving instructions, Like they didn't

1003
01:00:03,120 --> 01:00:06,320
Speaker 1: give Sony the chance to pull the interview. It was

1004
01:00:06,360 --> 01:00:10,960
Speaker 1: only after leaking the information that the demand was even made.

1005
01:00:11,480 --> 01:00:14,640
Speaker 1: So it's really odd that if the interview was in

1006
01:00:14,680 --> 01:00:17,960
Speaker 1: fact the reason for the attack, and if the goal

1007
01:00:18,080 --> 01:00:20,600
Speaker 1: of the attack was to have the interview pulled from

1008
01:00:20,640 --> 01:00:24,480
Speaker 1: film from theaters, why not actually give the company a

1009
01:00:24,560 --> 01:00:28,360
Speaker 1: chance to do that rather than just slash and burn

1010
01:00:28,840 --> 01:00:31,640
Speaker 1: because the film was released anyway. Yeah, to me, that's

1011
01:00:31,800 --> 01:00:34,440
Speaker 1: that's one of the most important parts. Let alone the

1012
01:00:34,480 --> 01:00:41,120
Speaker 1: fact that UH, states don't typically attack other states for

1013
01:00:41,640 --> 01:00:45,880
Speaker 1: media like private films, you know, private sector films. Uh.

1014
01:00:46,480 --> 01:00:49,920
Speaker 1: We've already talked about. You know something that ties into

1015
01:00:50,000 --> 01:00:53,439
Speaker 1: that earlier point you just made, which is, uh, how

1016
01:00:53,480 --> 01:00:56,160
Speaker 1: to attribute who said what? How do you how can

1017
01:00:56,200 --> 01:00:59,240
Speaker 1: you be sure that a message supposedly from the hackers

1018
01:00:59,320 --> 01:01:02,360
Speaker 1: was actually from the hackers? And you can't know, I mean,

1019
01:01:02,920 --> 01:01:05,320
Speaker 1: you know, you might as well sit there and go

1020
01:01:05,480 --> 01:01:09,320
Speaker 1: to four chan and try and say this particular message

1021
01:01:09,360 --> 01:01:11,400
Speaker 1: was from this particular person. It's all supposed to be

1022
01:01:11,440 --> 01:01:15,000
Speaker 1: anonymously protected, so you don't know. We've got a bit

1023
01:01:15,040 --> 01:01:17,760
Speaker 1: more to say about the Sony Pictures Entertainment hack before

1024
01:01:17,760 --> 01:01:28,400
Speaker 1: we wrap up, but first let's take another quick break. Also,

1025
01:01:28,480 --> 01:01:33,560
Speaker 1: security firm Norse identified six former Sony employees who had

1026
01:01:33,600 --> 01:01:37,280
Speaker 1: the skills necessary to pull off something like this and

1027
01:01:37,320 --> 01:01:41,240
Speaker 1: had participated in chat room discussions revealing their negative feelings

1028
01:01:41,280 --> 01:01:44,560
Speaker 1: towards the company, which wasn't anything incriminating, but they were

1029
01:01:44,600 --> 01:01:48,280
Speaker 1: clearly disgruntled. They were former employees, they were part of

1030
01:01:48,320 --> 01:01:51,560
Speaker 1: a layoff that happened in two thousand fourteen UM and

1031
01:01:51,640 --> 01:01:56,680
Speaker 1: the FBI rejected this information, which is interesting because one

1032
01:01:56,840 --> 01:02:00,360
Speaker 1: other thing that I believe it was Norse found when

1033
01:02:00,480 --> 01:02:03,960
Speaker 1: North submitted their stuff to the FBI. They they are

1034
01:02:04,080 --> 01:02:07,960
Speaker 1: big proponents of this insider job argument because within the

1035
01:02:08,000 --> 01:02:11,040
Speaker 1: code they found the credentials that you would need to

1036
01:02:11,160 --> 01:02:15,720
Speaker 1: access some of these uh some of these compartmentalized basis

1037
01:02:15,760 --> 01:02:19,440
Speaker 1: of information, right. Yeah. It seemed to a lot of

1038
01:02:19,480 --> 01:02:24,840
Speaker 1: cybersecurity experts that whomever pulled off this attack had access

1039
01:02:25,000 --> 01:02:30,280
Speaker 1: to passwords and other verification UH criteria that would allow

1040
01:02:30,320 --> 01:02:34,720
Speaker 1: them access to these very sensitive areas of information that

1041
01:02:34,800 --> 01:02:39,480
Speaker 1: would be challenging for an outsider to identify and use.

1042
01:02:39,720 --> 01:02:42,520
Speaker 1: But if you're if you were familiar with the system already,

1043
01:02:42,600 --> 01:02:44,720
Speaker 1: then you would know what you needed before you did

1044
01:02:44,760 --> 01:02:48,000
Speaker 1: your attack. So it's it's one of those things where

1045
01:02:48,000 --> 01:02:51,080
Speaker 1: you're like, yeah, it's not impossible for someone outside the

1046
01:02:51,120 --> 01:02:54,320
Speaker 1: group to have figured this out, but it's far more

1047
01:02:54,440 --> 01:02:58,520
Speaker 1: likely that there was at least some insider assistance because

1048
01:02:59,400 --> 01:03:03,000
Speaker 1: you know, they are able to target specific pieces of information,

1049
01:03:03,480 --> 01:03:07,240
Speaker 1: and perhaps it's unwitting insider assistance too. It could be Yeah,

1050
01:03:07,240 --> 01:03:09,400
Speaker 1: it could just very well be a case of social

1051
01:03:09,440 --> 01:03:15,240
Speaker 1: engineering where uh, an outside hacker gets unwitting participation and

1052
01:03:15,440 --> 01:03:18,160
Speaker 1: the people who handed over the information or the the

1053
01:03:18,240 --> 01:03:21,000
Speaker 1: access the keys to the kingdom weren't aware of what

1054
01:03:21,040 --> 01:03:23,880
Speaker 1: they were doing at the time. That's possible. Um I

1055
01:03:23,960 --> 01:03:29,520
Speaker 1: still think that the insider hypothesis is the most compelling

1056
01:03:29,680 --> 01:03:33,800
Speaker 1: based upon what was stolen, how it was leaked, and

1057
01:03:34,040 --> 01:03:37,280
Speaker 1: the effect it had. But and also the fact that

1058
01:03:37,400 --> 01:03:40,200
Speaker 1: the demand for the film thing didn't come until after

1059
01:03:40,680 --> 01:03:44,960
Speaker 1: the leaks had happened. But again, that's that's just based

1060
01:03:44,960 --> 01:03:46,960
Speaker 1: on the information have available to me. So what do

1061
01:03:47,000 --> 01:03:50,640
Speaker 1: you think then about one of the early things presented

1062
01:03:50,640 --> 01:03:55,600
Speaker 1: as smoking gun evidence. The idea that uh, certain pieces

1063
01:03:55,600 --> 01:03:59,160
Speaker 1: of code that have been used in the attacks were

1064
01:03:59,200 --> 01:04:02,080
Speaker 1: present in these most recent attacks. Well, ben, as you

1065
01:04:02,120 --> 01:04:05,760
Speaker 1: and I know, on the internet, um, all code is

1066
01:04:06,840 --> 01:04:10,960
Speaker 1: incredibly proprietary and can't be spread around or tweaked or

1067
01:04:11,040 --> 01:04:15,240
Speaker 1: changed or altered or added to or taken away from.

1068
01:04:15,240 --> 01:04:18,400
Speaker 1: I mean, if only we lived in a world where

1069
01:04:18,440 --> 01:04:22,120
Speaker 1: you could take existing programs, change them and make them

1070
01:04:22,120 --> 01:04:26,400
Speaker 1: do things for your on your own behalf, then we

1071
01:04:26,400 --> 01:04:29,360
Speaker 1: would live in a world where you can't attribute a

1072
01:04:29,520 --> 01:04:32,160
Speaker 1: source for a particular attack simply because of the code

1073
01:04:32,160 --> 01:04:33,960
Speaker 1: that was Oh wait, that is the world we live in.

1074
01:04:35,720 --> 01:04:38,160
Speaker 1: So yeah, here's the problem is that just because the

1075
01:04:38,200 --> 01:04:42,560
Speaker 1: code was found in attacks from a previous instance doesn't

1076
01:04:42,600 --> 01:04:47,040
Speaker 1: mean that that code only belongs to one group. A

1077
01:04:47,080 --> 01:04:51,360
Speaker 1: lot of these tools get distributed through various channels online hackers.

1078
01:04:51,600 --> 01:04:54,760
Speaker 1: When they create a really powerful tool, sometimes they love

1079
01:04:54,840 --> 01:04:57,040
Speaker 1: to share it. Not all the time. Some of them

1080
01:04:57,080 --> 01:04:59,600
Speaker 1: are very jealous with what they create and they keep

1081
01:04:59,640 --> 01:05:02,960
Speaker 1: it from the selves. But some will go and say, hey,

1082
01:05:03,000 --> 01:05:06,160
Speaker 1: I made this tool, it's perfect for cracking passwords. Have

1083
01:05:06,360 --> 01:05:09,800
Speaker 1: at it, and then the people who downloaded and use it.

1084
01:05:09,840 --> 01:05:12,280
Speaker 1: We often called script kiddies. They aren't the ones who

1085
01:05:12,320 --> 01:05:14,640
Speaker 1: developed the code. They're just making use of code that

1086
01:05:14,720 --> 01:05:19,680
Speaker 1: was built to do a specific thing. So I hesitate

1087
01:05:19,800 --> 01:05:25,440
Speaker 1: to attribute an attack to us specific group simply because

1088
01:05:25,480 --> 01:05:29,120
Speaker 1: the code that was included. Yeah, I agree with you there,

1089
01:05:29,480 --> 01:05:34,160
Speaker 1: because it's strange too. It's strange to think that someone

1090
01:05:34,280 --> 01:05:39,640
Speaker 1: could own a process, and especially when there's so much

1091
01:05:40,320 --> 01:05:46,800
Speaker 1: sharing in the toolbox. And uh, if this code was recognized,

1092
01:05:47,240 --> 01:05:51,360
Speaker 1: right then that already inherently tells us that other people

1093
01:05:51,400 --> 01:05:54,640
Speaker 1: have seen it, which also means they could replicate it.

1094
01:05:54,640 --> 01:05:58,440
Speaker 1: It would be I think it's a little bit movie

1095
01:05:58,520 --> 01:06:02,960
Speaker 1: thriller right now to say, uh, that someone purposely put

1096
01:06:03,000 --> 01:06:05,560
Speaker 1: it in his red herring. But wouldn't that be cool? No,

1097
01:06:05,720 --> 01:06:09,200
Speaker 1: I just think it's also movie thriller to say I

1098
01:06:09,280 --> 01:06:12,520
Speaker 1: recognize this code. It could only come from one place

1099
01:06:13,760 --> 01:06:17,280
Speaker 1: and that's totally yeah, And and you're right about that.

1100
01:06:17,480 --> 01:06:20,360
Speaker 1: And one thing that we should also list that I

1101
01:06:20,680 --> 01:06:23,479
Speaker 1: think is important to note here is that I've seen

1102
01:06:23,880 --> 01:06:28,480
Speaker 1: several journalists um reciting these u S statements of North

1103
01:06:28,560 --> 01:06:34,480
Speaker 1: Korean involvement as fact, and it is true. The problem

1104
01:06:34,520 --> 01:06:36,320
Speaker 1: with this is something that you and I have have

1105
01:06:36,440 --> 01:06:39,240
Speaker 1: touched upon already in the show, which is that we

1106
01:06:39,440 --> 01:06:43,040
Speaker 1: know that the United States and some of its cooperative

1107
01:06:43,120 --> 01:06:46,800
Speaker 1: countries have this vast array of sophisticated and in many

1108
01:06:46,840 --> 01:06:52,720
Speaker 1: plate cases classified collection methods, right, and this means that

1109
01:06:52,800 --> 01:06:55,560
Speaker 1: it is fair to assume that the United States has

1110
01:06:55,640 --> 01:06:59,840
Speaker 1: access to information that civilians and journalists may not be

1111
01:07:00,000 --> 01:07:04,040
Speaker 1: able to analyze. So so, yeah, that leads you to

1112
01:07:04,080 --> 01:07:07,600
Speaker 1: the conclusion that again there could be a smoking gun

1113
01:07:07,960 --> 01:07:12,160
Speaker 1: sure that I am completely unaware of that says No,

1114
01:07:12,440 --> 01:07:15,840
Speaker 1: it was North Korea. It was not some insider, it

1115
01:07:15,920 --> 01:07:19,600
Speaker 1: was not it wasn't a disgruntled employee. This was a

1116
01:07:19,760 --> 01:07:23,320
Speaker 1: very effective attack. Which if that is here's the thing.

1117
01:07:23,560 --> 01:07:26,080
Speaker 1: If that's the real answer, If that really is the

1118
01:07:26,120 --> 01:07:29,919
Speaker 1: real answer, that's terrifying, because not only does it mean

1119
01:07:29,920 --> 01:07:33,600
Speaker 1: that you have a country that has created an incredibly effective,

1120
01:07:33,680 --> 01:07:38,600
Speaker 1: invasive attack into a major corporation, but they understand the

1121
01:07:38,680 --> 01:07:42,360
Speaker 1: culture and the impact that corporation has and how to

1122
01:07:42,520 --> 01:07:47,680
Speaker 1: best attack it. It just doesn't make sense though to

1123
01:07:47,960 --> 01:07:51,040
Speaker 1: do so. I would be surprised to do something of

1124
01:07:51,080 --> 01:07:57,080
Speaker 1: that magnitude for a work of fiction that honestly, honestly,

1125
01:07:57,120 --> 01:07:59,840
Speaker 1: and I see this as as a fan of seth Row. Again,

1126
01:08:00,280 --> 01:08:02,640
Speaker 1: it's not it's not going to be his Oscar winning film.

1127
01:08:02,760 --> 01:08:07,680
Speaker 1: I had said that, um when Sony first pulled the film,

1128
01:08:07,760 --> 01:08:11,240
Speaker 1: I said, listen, I don't plan to see the interview,

1129
01:08:12,120 --> 01:08:14,520
Speaker 1: but I want that to be my option, that I

1130
01:08:14,640 --> 01:08:16,760
Speaker 1: don't see the interview, right, you want it to be

1131
01:08:16,800 --> 01:08:19,200
Speaker 1: your choice. I don't don't want the choice made for

1132
01:08:19,320 --> 01:08:21,960
Speaker 1: me that I don't see the interview. And see, that's

1133
01:08:21,960 --> 01:08:23,760
Speaker 1: the thing is that they released it and again we

1134
01:08:23,800 --> 01:08:26,280
Speaker 1: didn't see more attacks, at least not yet. I mean

1135
01:08:26,400 --> 01:08:28,320
Speaker 1: it could be by the time this podcast goes out

1136
01:08:28,360 --> 01:08:30,960
Speaker 1: that in fact, more has developed the story, which we

1137
01:08:31,000 --> 01:08:33,400
Speaker 1: do have to be conscious of. But going back to

1138
01:08:33,400 --> 01:08:36,320
Speaker 1: that point in the missing information, this also means that

1139
01:08:36,360 --> 01:08:40,040
Speaker 1: without access to it, there's no way for someone to

1140
01:08:40,160 --> 01:08:46,599
Speaker 1: independently verify the accuracy of the statements on the part

1141
01:08:46,640 --> 01:08:49,559
Speaker 1: of Uncle Sam, and it's been it's being used as

1142
01:08:49,960 --> 01:08:53,599
Speaker 1: the proof and the fact that their further sanctions really

1143
01:08:53,640 --> 01:08:56,720
Speaker 1: does show I think it indicates that there is some

1144
01:08:56,760 --> 01:08:59,960
Speaker 1: sort of belief. Yeah, I I am at least hopeful

1145
01:09:00,040 --> 01:09:03,639
Speaker 1: that they are sincere in the statement that they fully

1146
01:09:03,680 --> 01:09:06,800
Speaker 1: believe North Korea to be behind it, because otherwise We're

1147
01:09:06,800 --> 01:09:11,960
Speaker 1: talking about a very bizarre clancy like thriller where the

1148
01:09:12,080 --> 01:09:16,839
Speaker 1: US government is taking advantage of an insane hacking attack

1149
01:09:17,040 --> 01:09:20,280
Speaker 1: on a media company as an excuse to step up

1150
01:09:20,320 --> 01:09:26,120
Speaker 1: sanctions against a hostile foreign power, which is such a

1151
01:09:26,160 --> 01:09:29,559
Speaker 1: weird thing to even say. But what I love about

1152
01:09:29,600 --> 01:09:36,639
Speaker 1: the plan is that it's so straightforward. Right, step three profit. Yeah. So,

1153
01:09:36,640 --> 01:09:38,920
Speaker 1: so where does this leave us, Well, it pretty much

1154
01:09:39,000 --> 01:09:41,040
Speaker 1: leaves us in the same place we were at the beginning.

1155
01:09:41,040 --> 01:09:45,040
Speaker 1: We don't really know you and I certainly don't know

1156
01:09:45,120 --> 01:09:48,280
Speaker 1: who is behind Yeah, and it may very well be

1157
01:09:48,400 --> 01:09:50,839
Speaker 1: like we said that, in fact, it is North Korea.

1158
01:09:51,760 --> 01:09:56,439
Speaker 1: And it's just that that's such it's it stretches my

1159
01:09:56,520 --> 01:09:59,120
Speaker 1: belief so much. That's why I really have trouble with it.

1160
01:09:59,320 --> 01:10:02,200
Speaker 1: But it could very well be true. Yeah, I'm curious

1161
01:10:02,240 --> 01:10:04,800
Speaker 1: what our listeners think. Guys, if you have any suggestions,

1162
01:10:04,800 --> 01:10:07,320
Speaker 1: if you if you have an opinion on this, or

1163
01:10:07,360 --> 01:10:09,400
Speaker 1: you have a suggestion for a future episode, you should

1164
01:10:09,400 --> 01:10:12,320
Speaker 1: write in the addresses tech stuff at how stuff works

1165
01:10:12,320 --> 01:10:15,759
Speaker 1: dot com or drop us a line on Facebook or Twitter.

1166
01:10:15,880 --> 01:10:18,639
Speaker 1: They handle us tech stuff hs w ben. Where can

1167
01:10:18,640 --> 01:10:22,720
Speaker 1: they find you? Ah? Yes, well you can find Jonathan

1168
01:10:22,800 --> 01:10:26,000
Speaker 1: and I hanging out on several shows where I'm brain

1169
01:10:26,080 --> 01:10:28,599
Speaker 1: stuff together on YouTube and What the Stuff. We've got

1170
01:10:28,560 --> 01:10:31,840
Speaker 1: an upcoming episode of brain Stuff. Where were we both

1171
01:10:31,880 --> 01:10:34,640
Speaker 1: appear in the same episode. Oh, we do. Only one

1172
01:10:34,680 --> 01:10:37,880
Speaker 1: of us talks and that's why. Yeah, you know, on

1173
01:10:37,880 --> 01:10:40,240
Speaker 1: on that is What the Stuff. I believe it's Uh,

1174
01:10:40,439 --> 01:10:46,720
Speaker 1: it is What the Stuff. Technology spoilers bad, It's it's that.

1175
01:10:46,880 --> 01:10:49,080
Speaker 1: That was a strange shoot. I hope listeners enjoy it.

1176
01:10:49,120 --> 01:10:51,080
Speaker 1: You can find my co host Matt and I on

1177
01:10:51,200 --> 01:10:54,240
Speaker 1: Stuff they don't want you to know. Uh. You can

1178
01:10:54,360 --> 01:10:58,679
Speaker 1: find uh a former guest host or recurring guest host

1179
01:10:58,720 --> 01:11:02,000
Speaker 1: of tech Stuff, Scott ben Jamn Yes, who works works

1180
01:11:02,040 --> 01:11:05,360
Speaker 1: with me on car Stuff next to me. Yeah, yeah,

1181
01:11:05,400 --> 01:11:07,839
Speaker 1: he does. You guys have some of the most interesting

1182
01:11:07,880 --> 01:11:10,280
Speaker 1: conversations in the office. Yeah, you know, Scott. I was

1183
01:11:10,400 --> 01:11:12,880
Speaker 1: peg Scott as the super quiet guy in the office,

1184
01:11:12,880 --> 01:11:17,560
Speaker 1: but he really does enjoy a fun, bizarre, thoughtful conversation.

1185
01:11:18,040 --> 01:11:20,360
Speaker 1: He's a big true crime fan too, by the way.

1186
01:11:20,439 --> 01:11:23,160
Speaker 1: That's good to know. It's good to know. It's more

1187
01:11:23,280 --> 01:11:26,519
Speaker 1: more risks for the mill, my friend. Uh and if somebody,

1188
01:11:26,840 --> 01:11:30,760
Speaker 1: if somebody wants to learn more about let's see the

1189
01:11:30,840 --> 01:11:33,479
Speaker 1: future of technology, and they haven't heard of your other show.

1190
01:11:33,520 --> 01:11:36,040
Speaker 1: Where would they go, Well, they would go to fw

1191
01:11:36,160 --> 01:11:40,040
Speaker 1: thinking dot com for Forward Thinking. That's where Lauren Vogelbaum,

1192
01:11:40,160 --> 01:11:43,879
Speaker 1: Joe McCormick, and I will end up talking at nauseum

1193
01:11:43,920 --> 01:11:46,680
Speaker 1: about all sorts of things from the future. Uh. It's

1194
01:11:46,680 --> 01:11:49,200
Speaker 1: also the video series Forward Thinking. I am the soul

1195
01:11:49,400 --> 01:11:54,840
Speaker 1: host of that show and sometimes the writer. Uh. But

1196
01:11:54,880 --> 01:11:56,519
Speaker 1: you should definitely check that out. If you haven't listened

1197
01:11:56,520 --> 01:11:59,439
Speaker 1: to that podcast, you gotta check out the episodes that

1198
01:11:59,560 --> 01:12:02,200
Speaker 1: just went live so you can find them. In the

1199
01:12:02,240 --> 01:12:05,599
Speaker 1: most recent ones. We did back to Back to the

1200
01:12:05,600 --> 01:12:09,519
Speaker 1: Future to part one, and then we did back to

1201
01:12:09,640 --> 01:12:12,639
Speaker 1: Back to the Future to Part two, where we looked

1202
01:12:12,640 --> 01:12:15,920
Speaker 1: at the technology that Marty McFly encounters when he travels

1203
01:12:15,960 --> 01:12:18,680
Speaker 1: to two thousand fifteen and see how it measures up

1204
01:12:18,720 --> 01:12:22,679
Speaker 1: to the actual two thousand fifteen technology of today. So

1205
01:12:23,000 --> 01:12:26,120
Speaker 1: the general consensus, at least on the U S side,

1206
01:12:26,400 --> 01:12:30,519
Speaker 1: was that in fact, this was a state backed attack,

1207
01:12:31,479 --> 01:12:36,920
Speaker 1: North Korea sponsored attack on Sony Pictures, And UM, I

1208
01:12:36,920 --> 01:12:42,120
Speaker 1: mean that's entirely possible. It's also possible that it wasn't. Uh,

1209
01:12:42,160 --> 01:12:45,800
Speaker 1: there's still some questions about that, But generally speaking, the

1210
01:12:46,520 --> 01:12:50,240
Speaker 1: consensus appears to be, at least within the law enforcement

1211
01:12:50,240 --> 01:12:52,880
Speaker 1: community of the United States that this was in fact

1212
01:12:52,960 --> 01:12:56,439
Speaker 1: an attack that originated out of and was supported by

1213
01:12:56,520 --> 01:13:01,880
Speaker 1: North Korea. UH. Like I said, there were other consequences

1214
01:13:01,920 --> 01:13:06,120
Speaker 1: to this attack. For example, the entertainment industry took it

1215
01:13:06,280 --> 01:13:11,240
Speaker 1: as a UH instigator to really go after file sharing

1216
01:13:11,320 --> 01:13:15,320
Speaker 1: services again, and sites like the Pirate Bay got targeted

1217
01:13:15,400 --> 01:13:20,439
Speaker 1: for UH, for government UH takedowns and things of that nature.

1218
01:13:21,240 --> 01:13:25,519
Speaker 1: And so yeah, it's one of those elements where you

1219
01:13:25,680 --> 01:13:29,559
Speaker 1: start to see ripple effects beyond just the attack itself.

1220
01:13:30,200 --> 01:13:35,440
Speaker 1: Of course, we're still seeing cyber attacks throughout various industries

1221
01:13:35,479 --> 01:13:39,920
Speaker 1: to this day, with companies often having to deal with

1222
01:13:39,960 --> 01:13:43,280
Speaker 1: the repercussions of those attacks. You would think that we

1223
01:13:43,320 --> 01:13:47,120
Speaker 1: would see much better security these days, but it's a

1224
01:13:47,120 --> 01:13:49,960
Speaker 1: reminder that security is only as good as the people

1225
01:13:50,160 --> 01:13:52,479
Speaker 1: who are put in charge of it. You can easily

1226
01:13:52,520 --> 01:13:55,760
Speaker 1: have a weak link. If someone is, you know, vulnerable

1227
01:13:55,800 --> 01:14:01,240
Speaker 1: to a social networking kind of attack, a social engineering approach,

1228
01:14:01,840 --> 01:14:04,639
Speaker 1: then it doesn't really matter how good your passwords are,

1229
01:14:05,040 --> 01:14:09,200
Speaker 1: you know. So I hope you enjoyed that classic episode.

1230
01:14:09,479 --> 01:14:12,080
Speaker 1: Remember if you have suggestions for future topics of tech

1231
01:14:12,120 --> 01:14:15,240
Speaker 1: Stuff episodes. Reach out to me on Twitter to handle

1232
01:14:15,280 --> 01:14:17,960
Speaker 1: for the show is tech Stuff H s W and

1233
01:14:18,000 --> 01:14:25,960
Speaker 1: I'll talk to you again really soon. Text Stuff is

1234
01:14:26,000 --> 01:14:29,120
Speaker 1: an I Heart Radio production. For more podcasts from my

1235
01:14:29,240 --> 01:14:32,880
Speaker 1: Heart Radio, visit the i Heart Radio app, Apple Podcasts,

1236
01:14:33,000 --> 01:14:34,960
Speaker 1: or wherever you listen to your favorite shows.