Speaker 1: All Zone Media.
Speaker 2: Hello and welcome to Better Offline. I'm your host ed Zetron.
Speaker 2: This is a weekly tech show where I walk you
Speaker 2: through the good, the bad, and the stupid of a
Speaker 2: multi trillion dollar industry that's changed and monetized almost every
Speaker 2: part of our lives. So you're likely aware of the
Speaker 2: tale of Sam Bankman Free, the curly haired fraudster who
Speaker 2: conned millions of people out of billions of dollars, crushing
Speaker 2: the cryptocurrency markets in the process. He did so by
Speaker 2: creating a cryptocurrency exchange called ftx, where people could buy
Speaker 2: things like bitcoin and ethereum, except it had one little catch.
Speaker 2: He was stealing the customer funds, keeping only a little
Speaker 2: around at any given time for people to withdraw. This
Speaker 2: meant that when hundreds of thousands of people went to
Speaker 2: withdraw their funds at once, the entire scheme fell apart
Speaker 2: and FTX collapsed. Bankman Fried currently sits in prison awaiting
Speaker 2: sentencing after being convicted and several counts of fraud, including
Speaker 2: wirefraud and wirefraud conspiracy, which is appropriate as him and
Speaker 2: his co conspirators at one point genuinely used their group
Speaker 2: called wirefraud Chat and I am not kidding yet. This
Speaker 2: isn't about SBF. There are actually two other villains in
Speaker 2: this story, two villains of the recent crypto crash that
Speaker 2: you might have missed, despite the fact that they're both
Speaker 2: six foot five and lost their customers over a billion dollars.
Speaker 2: I'm talking about Cameron and Tyler Winklevoss, two brothers, both
Speaker 2: alike in dignity and appearance, the gay notoriety by suing
Speaker 2: Mark Zuckerberg of Facebook now known as Metta in the
Speaker 2: early days of the social network back in two thousand
Speaker 2: and four. In the Winklevi's defense, Zuckerberg dig screw them
Speaker 2: as a student at Harvard, where he pretended to work
Speaker 2: on the Winklevoss's social network, Harvard Connect while actually working
Speaker 2: on the earliest version of Facebook, effectively sabotaging the competition
Speaker 2: from within. When Facebook finally launched the identical Moist, Riverboat
Speaker 2: Giants alleged that Zuckerberg had stolen their idea for a
Speaker 2: social network and used their code, resulting in a year's
Speaker 2: long back and forth and a sixty five million dollar
Speaker 2: settlement that the Winklevosses were forced by a court to accept.
Speaker 2: In twenty eleven, I think the had Zuckerberg kept his
Speaker 2: filthy little hands to himself, we'd likely never have heard
Speaker 2: of Tyler and Cameron Winkelvoss, and I believe the world
Speaker 2: would have been a better place if they weren't already.
Speaker 2: The Winklevoss twins were now millionaires. In twenty ten, Aaron
Speaker 2: Sorkin's Oscar nominated retelling of the Facebook origin story the
Speaker 2: social network would raise their profiles even further, portraying them
Speaker 2: as victims of a calculated, misanthropic opportunist, Mark Zuckerberg. Of course,
Speaker 2: you could almost feel sorry for them, even if they
Speaker 2: were portrayed by Armie Hammer, the famous cannibalism fan and
Speaker 2: potentially perverted in enjoyer of other things too. But you
Speaker 2: really shouldn't feel sorry for Army Hammer. But you definitely
Speaker 2: shouldn't for the Winklevosses either. In the years following their
Speaker 2: legal dust up with Mark Zuckerberg, the Winklevoss twins remained
Speaker 2: active in the tech scene, launching an investment fund in
Speaker 2: twenty twelve that focused on early stage, consumer centric startups.
Speaker 2: A year later, they acquired eleven million dollars of bitcoin,
Speaker 2: and while it's unclear exactly how much they bought. A
Speaker 2: New York Times article about their acquisition, which of course
Speaker 2: featured no verification of that actual purchase, ran on April eleventh,
Speaker 2: twenty thirteen, when bitcoin was around one hundred and fourteen
Speaker 2: dollars apiece, meaning that the Winklevoss brothers likely bought somewhere
Speaker 2: in the region of ninety thousand bitcoin. Based on today's valuation,
Speaker 2: those holdings would be worth an excess of three point
Speaker 2: eight billion dollars. It was a big, stupid bet, and
Speaker 2: it absolutely paid off. In the same year, they'd pursue
Speaker 2: creating a bitcoin exchange traded fund also known as an ETF,
Speaker 2: a thing that allows you to invest in something, in
Speaker 2: this case bitcoin, much like you would trading a stock,
Speaker 2: without all of the complexity and risk associated with actually
Speaker 2: owning the thing in question, in this case bitcoin. While
Speaker 2: this never materialized, the winklevoss Is cozied up with New
Speaker 2: York's Department of Financial Services and realized they could found
Speaker 2: their own cryptocurrency exchange to rival the other American rival, Coinbased,
Speaker 2: which had launched two years earlier. A cryptocurrency exchange, as
Speaker 2: I've discussed, is a place where you can buy and
Speaker 2: sell your crypto using generally a credit card or a
Speaker 2: debit card. At the time very focused on debit cards,
Speaker 2: though in twenty fifteen they launched Gemini, what would eventually
Speaker 2: become a major and highly respected cryptocurrency exchange that from
Speaker 2: the very beginning tried to swaddle its ugly and often
Speaker 2: fraudulent industry in a blanket of legitimacy, winning approval from
Speaker 2: New York state regulators to provide certain financial services. Gemini
Speaker 2: now sits as one of the top ten largest cryptocurrency
Speaker 2: exchanges in the world and one of the few remaining
Speaker 2: American exchange. One might be forgiven for thinking they were trustworthy,
Speaker 2: and they'd be wrong. Toward the end of twenty twenty,
Speaker 2: the price of cryptocurrencies began to climb rapidly, with bitcoin
Speaker 2: climbing from nineteen thousand dollars in December to over forty
Speaker 2: thousand dollars in January, cresting over fifty thousand dollars a
Speaker 2: bitcoin by March twenty twenty one. The cryptocurrency industry would
Speaker 2: see more venture investment in the first quarter of twenty
Speaker 2: twenty one than it had in the entirety of twenty twenty,
Speaker 2: with one hundred and twenty nine crypto and blockchain startups
Speaker 2: receiving two point six billion dollars in the space of
Speaker 2: three months, compared to three hundred and forty one cryptocurrencies
Speaker 2: receiving two point three billion in the entirety of twenty twenty.
Speaker 2: As an explanation for those listeners that don't know, venture
Speaker 2: capital investments are generally investing inequacy in the companies. They
Speaker 2: buy a piece of the company for a certain amount
Speaker 2: of money, venture capitalists, of course, taking the risk that
Speaker 2: the company will fall apart. What differs with a lot
Speaker 2: of these companies is that they will sometimes sell you
Speaker 2: a token. This isn't necessarily relevant for this story. I
Speaker 2: just want you to know the fact that this industry
Speaker 2: at its core is based on the idea of basically
Speaker 2: selling securities, you know, like stocks, but hiding from the
Speaker 2: law and conning people. That's not how the Winklevosses fucked
Speaker 2: people over, though, no. So another thing to realize about
Speaker 2: these crypto companies is that they didn't really do anything.
Speaker 2: They'd sell tokens. They would claim that they would build
Speaker 2: something in the future on something called a roadmap. They
Speaker 2: would sometimes have a white paper which would describe some
Speaker 2: underlying technological stuff. But there are really none of them
Speaker 2: that had a feature or a function. They were mostly
Speaker 2: just nonentities that promise things. But because you could trade
Speaker 2: their tokens, which much like a stock, should have been
Speaker 2: regulated by the government, but were not because they were
Speaker 2: such new financial devices and objects. Well, this whole market
Speaker 2: was growing and growing and growing, and along with it,
Speaker 2: the Winklevosses were getting even richer. Then they got greedy.
Speaker 2: To understand how the Winklevosses bungled a billion dollars, I
Speaker 2: have to give you a little bit of background on
Speaker 2: the last few years of hell in the cryptocurrency industry.
Speaker 2: In February twenty twenty one, Gemini, that's their cryptocurrency exchange
Speaker 2: where you could buy and sell different cryptocurrency began something
Speaker 2: called Earn, their Earn program. It was an interest earning
Speaker 2: program where users could feed their cryptocurrency like Bitcoin, for example,
Speaker 2: into Gemini through a few clicks and earn interest. And
Speaker 2: you should put quotation marks around those so you would
Speaker 2: get a percentage return on the crypto that you put
Speaker 2: into Gemini Earn. One might be forgiven for believing that
Speaker 2: as a result, they were putting money into some sort
Speaker 2: of secure protected account like a certificate of deposit. They
Speaker 2: really were not, I must be clear, how not like
Speaker 2: a bank. This was Gemini, a New York based trust
Speaker 2: company that promised to security protocols on par with those
Speaker 2: offered by top financial institutions. Claimed to generate this interest
Speaker 2: by working with and I quote institutional borrowers who were
Speaker 2: partners who had been vetted through Gemini's and I quote
Speaker 2: again risk management framework. What's also important to know is
Speaker 2: that none of what you're about to hear was the
Speaker 2: security issue. It was entirely the result of two greedy
Speaker 2: riverboat giants pissing away money because they were greedy little pigs.
Speaker 2: And as a result of trusting this company that was
Speaker 2: a trust company, a New York based trust company, a
Speaker 2: regulated one allegedly, but not regulated for the thing that
Speaker 2: I'm about to tell you, people trusted them, and as
Speaker 2: a result, customers deposited somewhere between seven hundred million and
Speaker 2: a billion dollars of funds into Gemini Earn, believing that
Speaker 2: Gemini was offering something akin to an interest generating savings account.
Speaker 2: After all, Gemini had institutional partners, and that is plural.
Speaker 2: That's what they said and they had vetted said partners
Speaker 2: through their collateralization management process, which means, in the case
Speaker 2: of a loan, you collateralize the loan, you give them something.
Speaker 2: For example, you would collateralize the loan for a house
Speaker 2: by giving them a down payment of twenty percent. In
Speaker 2: the case of a loan, you might borrow a certain
Speaker 2: amount of money, but put some money down so they
Speaker 2: have something in the event that you default on the loan.
Speaker 2: In plain English, they were claiming to work with institutional
Speaker 2: investors like banks and hedge funds that would pull Gemini
Speaker 2: earn customers, so people giving them their Bitcoin ethereum and
Speaker 2: all that they would pull those resources to allow them
Speaker 2: to get involved in big trades with better returns than
Speaker 2: users will be able to get on their own. Indeed,
Speaker 2: classical financial markets have larger loans that have preferential rates
Speaker 2: and get involved in deals that the regular customer would
Speaker 2: not be able to. That's what people thought they were getting.
Speaker 2: The other suggestion was that Gemini had diversified its risk
Speaker 2: and there's actually an archived version of the Gemini earned
Speaker 2: Patron twenty twenty one that said that Gemini worked with
Speaker 2: multiple accredited party borrowers to do so. As a result,
Speaker 2: as a customer, you may believe, well, if one fails,
Speaker 2: that won't be the end of the world. Right. It's
Speaker 2: also important explaining that the way that a lot of
Speaker 2: these companies in crypto made their money was by loaning
Speaker 2: it to others in the form of margin trading, where investors,
Speaker 2: both retail and institutional, borrowed a massive amount of cryptocurrency
Speaker 2: in returned for collateral which was usually less than the
Speaker 2: amount they were borrowing. As I mentioned, kind of like
Speaker 2: putting a damn payment for a house, except the asset
Speaker 2: is a token on a blockchain like bitcoin. In fact,
Speaker 2: as you'll find out, most of the cryptocurrency industry was
Speaker 2: held up by these loans. Now, all of this supposedly
Speaker 2: legal and cool and normal stuff. All this sounded very trustworthy.
Speaker 2: This was, of course not the case. Neither was it
Speaker 2: the case that Gemini had diversified their investments at all,
Speaker 2: or actually really any risk management of any kind. Although
Speaker 2: Gemini had the outward appearance of being a highly diversified,
Speaker 2: sophisticated and well run financial services business, it actually wasn't.
Speaker 2: They placed the vast majority of their eggs in one
Speaker 2: single basket, and that was a cryptocurrency brokerage called Genesis.
Speaker 2: Genesis provided a variety of cryptocurrency related services for large
Speaker 2: institutional investors and high net worth individuals. Their money was
Speaker 2: made by offering these institutions and individuals loans leveraged by
Speaker 2: their cryptocurrency, which Genesis would in turn invest, theoretically profiting
Speaker 2: in the process through their access to large deals. As
Speaker 2: I previously mentioned, when I say leverage, I mean the
Speaker 2: very simple thing of I give you some money and
Speaker 2: then you lend me money in return, and there is
Speaker 2: usually some sort of interest deal, or there is some
Speaker 2: way where both parties benefit. Sometimes it will be that
Speaker 2: they are borrowing an asset like bitcoin. The price can change,
Speaker 2: then the collateral they give maybe an excess of the
Speaker 2: amount they're borrowing in dollars, but the price of bitcoin
Speaker 2: may go down. Thus, as a result, if I loaned
Speaker 2: somebody a billion dollars a bitcoin, but the price of
Speaker 2: bitcoin went down and they gave me, I don't know,
Speaker 2: one point something billion in return, They're gambling the idea
Speaker 2: that bitcoin will go up from there, and I'm gambling
Speaker 2: that it will go down, and I would have made
Speaker 2: money on that loan. This is a messy stupid assholes
Speaker 2: industry one built on sand and you're about to find
Speaker 2: out how badly it can go. So Genesis was also
Speaker 2: part of a huge empire called the Digital Currency Group,
Speaker 2: a holding company for multiple different parts of the cryptocurrency ecosystem,
Speaker 2: including cryptocurrency news outlet coin Desk, which ironically was a
Speaker 2: large part of the reason that Sam Bankman Freed has
Speaker 2: gone to prison. I could do an entire episode on
Speaker 2: this company, but all you really need to know is
Speaker 2: that they own Genesis, and while Genesis was meant to
Speaker 2: be independent, it absolutely was not. And what's really important
Speaker 2: to know is how stupidly Genesis was run. They weren't
Speaker 2: simply bad at investing. They were so bad at investing
Speaker 2: that they somehow managed to invest in not one, but
Speaker 2: two of the entities that brought down the entire cryptocurrency
Speaker 2: industry in twenty twenty two. Their first mistake was investing
Speaker 2: two point four billion dollars in Three Arrows Capital, a
Speaker 2: major cryptocurrency hedge fund that ended up being a significant
Speaker 2: scam that also led to the collapse of FTX, the
Speaker 2: other entity that Genesis had trusted with its capital, and
Speaker 2: again that's the subject of another episode. Three Arrows Capital
Speaker 2: was a Singapore based cryptocurrency hedge fund with over a
Speaker 2: decade worth of history. Run by two guys. It started
Speaker 2: life in arbitrage, essentially making money on the differences in
Speaker 2: prices of products in two separate locations, with a niche
Speaker 2: in smaller traditional currencies like the ty bart and the
Speaker 2: Indonesian Rupia. This business model often relied on a healthy
Speaker 2: relationship with legacy banks. We had some success on that front.
Speaker 2: It's relationship soured in twenty seventeen, forcing the company to
Speaker 2: pivot to the wild West of cryptocurrency. It started investing
Speaker 2: its client's money in early stage crypto projects, hoping for
Speaker 2: a big return when their values went up. One of
Speaker 2: these projects was terror Lunar, an algorithmic stable coin which,
Speaker 2: in plain English is meant to be a cocoon on
Speaker 2: the Ethereum blockchain that is always related to the price
Speaker 2: of a dollar, except in this case. You may have
Speaker 2: heard that word algorithmic. You know what The problem with
Speaker 2: algorithms is they need to be perfect in they almost
Speaker 2: never are. But this bit kind of requires some explanation,
Speaker 2: so bear with me. Cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin and Ethereum, they're
Speaker 2: wildly volatile, which is bad if you want to actually
Speaker 2: transact with them. If a currency could be twenty five
Speaker 2: percent more or less the next day, how do you
Speaker 2: actually know what to charge for something? And that's where
Speaker 2: stable coins come in. These are cryptocurrencies that aim to
Speaker 2: fix their value to that of a traditional fiat currency
Speaker 2: like the US dollar or the Euro. Most stable coins have,
Speaker 2: or say they have, at least a cash reserve equivalent
Speaker 2: to the amount of tokens in circulation. Terror Lunar differed
Speaker 2: using an algorithm to maintain price parity rather than any reserves.
Speaker 2: The algorithm worked until it suddenly and violently did not.
Speaker 2: On May third, twenty twenty two, a Terror stable coin
Speaker 2: was worth one dollar. A few days later, it was
Speaker 2: worth a fraction of a penny. The Bearre offline theme
Speaker 2: song by Mattasowski will be dropping this Friday, March first,
Speaker 2: on all streaming platforms. You can find the Spotify presab
Speaker 2: link in the episode notes. Terr Luna collapsed in May
Speaker 2: twenty twenty two with the loss of forty five billion
Speaker 2: dollars in market capitalization, meaning the total value of all
Speaker 2: of the tokens on the blockchain. Three arrows capital's entire
Speaker 2: five hundred million dollar position in Lunar was now effectively worthless.
Speaker 2: This collapse also shaved off and estimated one trillion dollar
Speaker 2: value from the wider crypto market. Three Arrows Capital, the
Speaker 2: so called hedge fund to quote research firm fs insight,
Speaker 2: was an old fashioned, made off style Ponzi scheme where
Speaker 2: founders Suzo and Carl Davis would use client funds to
Speaker 2: borrow from basically anywhere that would let them in the
Speaker 2: entire crypto ecosystem. And because Three Arrows didn't bother collateralizing
Speaker 2: these loans sufficiently or managing the risk behind them, there
Speaker 2: was very little money to turn to customers. The failure
Speaker 2: of Three Arrows Capital left a multi billion dollar hole
Speaker 2: in Genesis balance sheet that if paypered over with a
Speaker 2: one point one billion dollar promissory note from its holding company,
Speaker 2: Digital Currency Group that was due in twenty thirty two.
Speaker 2: This sounds like it would be helpful, right. The problem
Speaker 2: is this maneuver never appeared to involve the conveyance of
Speaker 2: any actual money. It pretty much existed only to pretend
Speaker 2: that Genesis had another one point one billion dollars on
Speaker 2: the books. To be abundantly clear, no money actually ever
Speaker 2: got sent to anybody. This promissory note only existed to
Speaker 2: mislead creditors about the financial health of Genesis. As you
Speaker 2: can understand, those creditors would probably want to know, well, okay,
Speaker 2: do you have enough money in case we need our
Speaker 2: money back? Little bit of a spoiler for you, they didn't.
Speaker 2: The Terror Lunar and Three Arrows capital fiasco trash the
Speaker 2: value of cryptocurrencies, with Bitcoin dropping from around thirty thousand
Speaker 2: in mad twenty twenty two to less than twenty grand
Speaker 2: in October. And in November twenty twenty two, ftx collapsed
Speaker 2: as a result of the coin Desk article, again owned
Speaker 2: by DCG, that revealed that most of ftx's assets were
Speaker 2: held in FTT, a token that they owned the majority
Speaker 2: of and could never sell because doing so would crash
Speaker 2: the FTT market, making said asset worthless. Indeed, in cryptocurrency,
Speaker 2: this is a big problem. If you have a big
Speaker 2: market and say there's twenty billion dollars of a token
Speaker 2: out there, but one person owns a billion of it,
Speaker 2: they actually can't sell it because in doing so, the
Speaker 2: market would suddenly think, oh, this is worthless because someone
Speaker 2: wants to dump him. The results of this revelation that
Speaker 2: FTX was holding most of the world's FTT and thus
Speaker 2: could never sell it, and indeed that in the process
Speaker 2: made their company pretty much insolvent. This left both retail
Speaker 2: investors and institutional investors out to dry. Now eager ide
Speaker 2: and eager eared listeners may have probably guessed by this
Speaker 2: point that Genesis was inexhoribly entangled in this disaster, quickly
Speaker 2: going from saying that they had no material exposure to
Speaker 2: FDx on November eight, twenty twenty two, to then saying
Speaker 2: they had seven million dollars of exposure on November tenth,
Speaker 2: to saying that they had one hundred and seventy five
Speaker 2: million dollars in exposure a day later, to saying that
Speaker 2: they needed to freeze all customer withdrawals and new loans
Speaker 2: entirely and that they would likely be going bankrupt, which
Speaker 2: they said on November eighteenth, twenty twenty two. They entered
Speaker 2: Chapter eleven bankruptcy. In the early twenty twenty three. The
Speaker 2: Digital Currency Group, which of course owns Genesis, had also
Speaker 2: borrowed five hundred and seventy five million dollars from them,
Speaker 2: which has since led to the hilarious situation of Genesis,
Speaker 2: suing the company that owns it as part of its
Speaker 2: own bankruptcy proceedings. This is the company that the Wingovoss
Speaker 2: twins and Gemini their cryptocurrency exchange, had allegedly run through
Speaker 2: their risk management framework and despite allegedly reviewing the collateralization
Speaker 2: management process that Genesis underwent, which means how they lateralized
Speaker 2: the loans, what money they took in to make sure
Speaker 2: that the loans did not just fall apart if something
Speaker 2: bad happened. Well, Gemini hadn't diversified their investments at all.
Speaker 2: They put over a billion dollars of customer funds into Genesis,
Speaker 2: money which is most likely gone now. In many respects,
Speaker 2: Gemini was the cryptocurrency equivalent of Green Seal Capital, a
Speaker 2: company that at one point was the highest profile lender
Speaker 2: in the supply chain financing space, touting former British Prime
Speaker 2: Minister David Cameron as one of its advisors. Like Gemini,
Speaker 2: green Seal Capital pretended to be a diversified business, when
Speaker 2: in reality it borrowed money from large institutional investors to
Speaker 2: lend to a handful of companies. The circumstances behind its
Speaker 2: collapse are slightly more complicated than those of Genesis, but
Speaker 2: not by much. Green Sill's implosion in twenty twenty one
Speaker 2: rippled throughout the industry, contributing to the demise of the
Speaker 2: already troubled credit sueese which were acquired really they were
Speaker 2: rescued by UBS in early twenty twenty three for the
Speaker 2: bargain price of just three point twenty five million dollars.
Speaker 2: Since November twenty twenty two, when Gemini froze, withdrawals from
Speaker 2: Gemini earned the interest bearing account, the Winklevosses and Barry Silbert,
Speaker 2: CEO of Digital Currency Group, who, as I've mentioned, are
Speaker 2: technical owners of Genesis, have engaged in an embarrassing back
Speaker 2: and forth publicly on Twitter, where the Winklevosses have attempted
Speaker 2: to frame themselves as victims of a scam rather than
Speaker 2: bad actors acting badly. If they were remotely competent, they
Speaker 2: could have yanked their customers' funds the ones loaned to
Speaker 2: Genesis from the Gemini ern program. When it was revealed
Speaker 2: that Genesis loaned two point four billion dollars for three
Speaker 2: hourrows capital in July of twenty twenty two, call it
Speaker 2: what you want. Prudent's diligence or just risk management, but
Speaker 2: it would have been the sensible thing to do, unless,
Speaker 2: of course, they didn't believe they'd be able to get
Speaker 2: the money out. On October nineteenth, twenty twenty three, New
Speaker 2: York Attorney General Letitia James filed a massive fraud suit
Speaker 2: against Gemini, Genesis Global Capital, and Digital Currency Group, ring
Speaker 2: a conspiracy to mislead customers and cover up of rebillion
Speaker 2: dollars of losses. The Attorney General's office found that the
Speaker 2: twin brothers named Cameron and Tyler Winklevoss had misled investors
Speaker 2: about the risks associated with Genesis, and that Genesis not
Speaker 2: only failed to disclose its losses, but took steps to
Speaker 2: actively hide them from their clients and the public. The
Speaker 2: New York Attorney General's suit is damning and shows that
Speaker 2: Gemini was well aware of the rotten condition of Genesis
Speaker 2: from the launch of the program in twenty twenty one.
Speaker 2: With Gemini and I quote the Attorney General suit here
Speaker 2: their internal risk analysis showing that Genesis Capital's loan book
Speaker 2: was undercollateralized, which means that they did not have enough
Speaker 2: money to give back the money that they owed to
Speaker 2: their customers and that only a year into the program,
Speaker 2: Gemini revised its estimate of Genesis Capital's credit rating, which
Speaker 2: is the way in which you measure whether a creditor
Speaker 2: or someone who is borrowed or loaning money whether they're
Speaker 2: worthy of doing so. They provised its testiment of their
Speaker 2: credit rating from an investment grade of BBB to a
Speaker 2: non investment or junk grade of CCC. Don't need to
Speaker 2: get too technical here, just know that's pretty bad. Genesis
Speaker 2: also routinely reported to Gemini from May twenty twenty two
Speaker 2: through November twenty twenty two that he had failed its
Speaker 2: own internal loan book risk assessments, to the point that
Speaker 2: in July twenty twenty two, a Gemini board member compared
Speaker 2: Genesis Capital to Layman Brothers prior to the financial collapse
Speaker 2: of two thousand and seven and two thousand and eight.
Speaker 2: At this point, you're probably thinking, so all the money's
Speaker 2: gone and your raim. Gemini and the Winklevosses decided they
Speaker 2: would terminate the EARN program on September second, twenty twenty two,
Speaker 2: but only decided to inform Genesis that it would do
Speaker 2: so on October thirteenth, twenty twenty two. It continued to
Speaker 2: send customer funds to Genesis throughout this period until an
Speaker 2: indeterminate time, with all of this information coming from the
Speaker 2: Attorney General's suit, and they failed to let customers know
Speaker 2: that the program was fully terminated until January twenty twenty three,
Speaker 2: though I should add that they froze with drawals in
Speaker 2: November twenty twenty two. All of these dates are very confusing,
Speaker 2: but the important facts to know is that Gemini knew
Speaker 2: from twenty twenty one that they were sending customer funds
Speaker 2: into an unreliable, unstable, undercollateralized lender for years, and indeed,
Speaker 2: even when they froze their own program when they decided
Speaker 2: that the party had to stop in September twenty twenty two,
Speaker 2: they were still taking customer funds and putting it in
Speaker 2: Genesis's hands. They didn't freeze the withdrawal process, the way
Speaker 2: in which customers have withdrawn their funds, until November twenty
Speaker 2: twenty two, So that's months of throwing customer money into
Speaker 2: the toilet and aggressively flushing it like you're trying to
Speaker 2: get rid of a basketball. They knew. Cameron and Tyler
Speaker 2: Winklevos knew. They knew what they were doing. They knew
Speaker 2: they were losing customers money, and they didn't care. Two
Speaker 2: American billionaires put a billion dollars of customer funds into
Speaker 2: deeply questionable lenders' hands, then proceeded to obfuscate the risks involved.
Speaker 2: They claimed that Genesis had appropriate risk ratios and healthy
Speaker 2: financial condition as recently as November fourteenth, twenty twenty two,
Speaker 2: a full month after it had formerly terminated their agreement
Speaker 2: with Genesis, who was the company that they were lending
Speaker 2: this too. This wasn't a casual fling with a risky
Speaker 2: asset class. It was a near billion dollar swindle of
Speaker 2: and I quote Cameron Winklevoss in his abominable letter to
Speaker 2: Barry Silbert, a swindle of a single mother who lent
Speaker 2: her son's education money to them, a father who lent
Speaker 2: his sons by me for money to Gemini earn, a
Speaker 2: husband and a wife who lent their life savings. A
Speaker 2: school teacher who lent his children's college funds. Cameron and
Speaker 2: Tyler Winklevoss, as well as Barry Silbert, who runs Digital
Speaker 2: Currency Group and by proxy, Genesis, have defrauded investors at
Speaker 2: a similar scale to Sam Bankman freed. As I mentioned
Speaker 2: the disgraced and now incarcerated CEO of FTX, They convinced
Speaker 2: customers that they were putting money into an interest generating account,
Speaker 2: tricking them into believing that this was a stable, risk
Speaker 2: managed investment, one that was continually liquid, and they indeed
Speaker 2: advertised that you could withdraw your assets instantly, as opposed
Speaker 2: to the reality that Cameron and Tyler Winklevoss knowingly funneled
Speaker 2: customer funds into an unstable undercollateralized lender. They intentionally and
Speaker 2: repeatedly misled customers, claiming to an Earn investor on June
Speaker 2: twenty seven, twenty twenty two, that they periodically would conduct
Speaker 2: an analysis of their partner's cash flow, balance sheet, and
Speaker 2: financial statements to ensure that appropriate risk ratios and healthy
Speaker 2: financial condition of their partners happened, and that they said
Speaker 2: their partners were vetted through a risk management process, heavily
Speaker 2: implying that said process would protect their customers. And on
Speaker 2: October twentieth, twenty twenty two, less than a month before,
Speaker 2: the winklevoss Is frozen withdrawals from Gemini Earn, leaving their
Speaker 2: customers unable to access their funds or their interest digital
Speaker 2: currency groups. CEO Barry Silbert, also the owners of Genesis,
Speaker 2: met with Cameron Winklevoss and told him that Gemini was
Speaker 2: Genesis Capital's largest and most important source of capital, and
Speaker 2: that they couldn't withdraw Gemini earned customers funds without bankrupting
Speaker 2: the firm. Cameron and Tyler Winklevoss not only deceived customers,
Speaker 2: but turned their assets into a load bearing part of
Speaker 2: Genesis's balance sheet so that they could funnel them into
Speaker 2: billions of dollars of loans, which would then go into
Speaker 2: places like Three Arrows Capital and FDx. And the Winklevosses
Speaker 2: have spent the best part of a year playing the
Speaker 2: victim with pathetic open letters that they post on Twitter
Speaker 2: to Barry Silbert, demanding the returns of funds that they
Speaker 2: knew were gone, claiming that Silbert hid in his ivory
Speaker 2: tower and he should take responsibility and do the right thing,
Speaker 2: as Cameron and his brother continued to mislead the world
Speaker 2: about what actually happened. While I'd never refer to the
Speaker 2: Winklevosses as victims, one cannot ignore how thoroughly fraudulent Barry
Speaker 2: Silbert's empire had become. On January twenty fourth, twenty twenty two,
Speaker 2: Genesis Capital loaned one hundred million dollars to DCG, the
Speaker 2: company that owned it, due on July twenty fourth, twenty
Speaker 2: twenty two, only for Digital Currency Group to tell them
Speaker 2: that they and I quote the suit literally did not
Speaker 2: have the money. Barry Silbert's solution was to and I
Speaker 2: quote repaper the loan, delaying its due date by ten
Speaker 2: months to May twenty twenty three, and you'll be surprised
Speaker 2: to hear that they never actually paid it back, along
Speaker 2: with several other loans that were either unpaid or paid
Speaker 2: back in shares of another part of Digital Currency Group
Speaker 2: called Greyscale Bitcoin Trust, another enterprise involved in crypto. According
Speaker 2: to Sam Bankman Freed's testimony during his own criminal fraud
Speaker 2: and conspiracy trial, Barry Silbert begged him for help, which
Speaker 2: he declined to provide, despite Genesis Capital having loaned FDx
Speaker 2: billions of dollars in the past, which trustees agreed to
Speaker 2: settle for a puzzling one hundred and seventy five million dollars.
Speaker 2: And just to be clear, the bankruptcy trustee just was
Speaker 2: just like, I'll take one hundred and seventy five million.
Speaker 2: I don't need the billion back, and one can really
Speaker 2: see where they misled Gemini and the Winklevoss brothers. The
Speaker 2: one point one billion dollar promisory note from Digital Currency
Speaker 2: Group to Genesis, the one that was completely fake and
Speaker 2: was literally just words on paper, was marked in genesis
Speaker 2: balance sheet, which Gemini was occasionally shown as one point
Speaker 2: one b billion dollars in receivables from related parties, with
Speaker 2: no designation of what it was or how it was amortized.
Speaker 2: In plain English, that just means to any financial analysis
Speaker 2: that would appear as just money in the bank. We
Speaker 2: are receiving cash from someone one point one billion dollars actually,
Speaker 2: and that's good. That would make you a little bit calmer. However,
Speaker 2: one cannot ignore the fact that Gemini knew that something
Speaker 2: was up. In a March fifth, twenty twenty one email
Speaker 2: to an earn investor, Gemini claimed that Genesis was and
Speaker 2: I quote only lending assets to posited it inter earned
Speaker 2: to institutional borrowers in an overcollateralized way. Overcollateralization meaning that
Speaker 2: they were loaning more money than they were borrowing. How
Speaker 2: does that work? It doesn't. Gemini never sought to correct
Speaker 2: a coin Desk article from February twenty twenty one that claimed,
Speaker 2: and I quote that the Genesis loans are overcollateralized, the
Speaker 2: loans in question being the ones where Gemini earned funds.
Speaker 2: The funds that people put into Gemini earned to earn
Speaker 2: interest were going It's all just a big pile of
Speaker 2: dog shit. In May twenty twenty one, Gemini's risk management
Speaker 2: team determined that Genesis Capital was and I quote highly leveraged,
Speaker 2: with an over ninety five percent debt to asset ratio,
Speaker 2: meaning that most of their money was in debt rather
Speaker 2: than things they actually had, and that Genesis has low
Speaker 2: liquidity and that the business is just able to cover
Speaker 2: its short term obligations. Think of it like living paycheck
Speaker 2: to paycheck to the tune of billions. By August twenty
Speaker 2: twenty one, Gemini Earn had placed three billion dollars of
Speaker 2: customer assets in Genesis's hands, and this whole situation enrages me.
Speaker 2: This is one of the largest and most gratuitous acts
Speaker 2: of negligence in the history of finance, a craven and
Speaker 2: deliberate swindle that flowed through every vein of the organization.
Speaker 2: Gemini intentionally and repeatedly misled customers into investing in an
Speaker 2: undercollateralized and risky lender by dressing their fraud in the
Speaker 2: trappings of conventional retail banking. Gemini was well aware and
Speaker 2: continually reminded of how unstable and disorganized Genesis was and
Speaker 2: how risky its customer's assets were held, and yet it
Speaker 2: continued to hype the scheme in the hopes that nothing
Speaker 2: would ever change. They put billions of dollars into an
Speaker 2: entity that from the very beginning they knew was rotten.
Speaker 2: They knew could barely cover their bills. They could have
Speaker 2: predicted this, and indeed they tried to. They just wanted
Speaker 2: to keep the party going. Cameron and Tyler Winklevos are villains,
Speaker 2: and while they didn't outright steal customer funds, they intentionally
Speaker 2: and willfully misled customers into investing in Genesis Capital, an
Speaker 2: unstable and recklessly managed lender. They were fully aware of
Speaker 2: these dangers, yet they chose to launch a program that
Speaker 2: their own risk management team believed was riskier than other
Speaker 2: partners that Gemini had considered loaning that money to, saying
Speaker 2: in February twenty twenty two, the Genesis Finances were weaker,
Speaker 2: with a higher leverage ratio and low liquidity ratio, meaning
Speaker 2: that they were more risky and they had less money
Speaker 2: to give back to customers when they need it. And indeed,
Speaker 2: they worried that a market downturn would mean that a
Speaker 2: fifty to sixty percent default rate for Genesis was an
Speaker 2: appropriate assumption, meaning that more than half of their loans
Speaker 2: would go under, and that a market downturn would mean
Speaker 2: that a fifty to sixty percent default rate for Genesis
Speaker 2: loans was an appropriate assumption, meaning that more than half
Speaker 2: of their loans default in the event that there was
Speaker 2: a change in the cryptocurrency market. The risk management team
Speaker 2: repeated this language several times, and it took until May
Speaker 2: twenty twenty two for Cameron Winklevoss to personally ask for
Speaker 2: a one pager on the risk profile of Gemini Earn
Speaker 2: and Genesis, the company that they had lent at that
Speaker 2: time of rebillion dollars two and indeed whether Ern adequately
Speaker 2: compensated Gemini for the risk. In plain English, they were saying,
Speaker 2: in a war, is it really worth it for us
Speaker 2: to risk all of this customer money? And when they
Speaker 2: said worth it, they mean is it making us enough
Speaker 2: money for the pain in the ass we're creating. I
Speaker 2: hope it wasn't. I hope they burned for this one.
Speaker 2: Having read the entire New York Attorney General suit, I
Speaker 2: cannot find a single instance of concern for the hundreds
Speaker 2: of thousands of people the Gemini and Cameron and Tyler
Speaker 2: Winklevoss failed despite Gemini's pledge to uphold and I quote,
Speaker 2: the highest level of fiduciary obligations. The Winklevosses represent their
Speaker 2: position as the trusted stewards of the digital currency industry,
Speaker 2: claiming to live by a policy of asking for permission
Speaker 2: rather than forgiveness, as they brazenly funneled billions of dollars
Speaker 2: of customer funds into a lender that they clearly didn't trust.
Speaker 2: They ignored the science, they ignored the risk management profiles,
Speaker 2: they ignored the worries, and they continually rambled about being
Speaker 2: licensed and regulated by the New York Department of Financial Services,
Speaker 2: which means absolutely nothing. As Gemini earned deposits were being
Speaker 2: loaned to Genesis for the terms of Gemini Earns agreement,
Speaker 2: which in turn took them out of the regulation of
Speaker 2: the mydfs. The Winklevosses, the so called self regulators of crypto,
Speaker 2: according to Paul Vinya of The Wall Street Journal, built
Speaker 2: a reputation as the trustworthy party in a lawless industry,
Speaker 2: only to use it as a means of making twenty
Speaker 2: two million dollars in agent fees and ten million dollars
Speaker 2: in commission from risking billions of dollars of customer funds
Speaker 2: and in this case Gemini earned customers are likely going
Speaker 2: to lose forty to fifty percent of their holdings if
Speaker 2: they get anything back at all. A good comparison point
Speaker 2: here is the creditors related to Voyager, which was another
Speaker 2: cryptoponzi scheme, only got back thirty five percent of their holdings.
Speaker 2: Now I have to get into some more annoying financial stuff.
Speaker 2: You'll forgive me. I just want you to know how
Speaker 2: loathsome these wet river giants are. These boat boys have
Speaker 2: really buggered this up. In October twenty twenty three, the
Speaker 2: Winklevosses filed something called an adversary proceeding in court against
Speaker 2: Genesis in bankruptcy court to be specific, seeking to recover
Speaker 2: one point six billion dollars in value for the benefit
Speaker 2: of earned users in an attempt to paper over their
Speaker 2: financial mismanagement. On August fifteenth, twenty twenty two, Gemini accepted
Speaker 2: over thirty point nine million shares of Greyscale Bitcoin Trust,
Speaker 2: a STOG tied to the price of bitcoin, with the
Speaker 2: minimum investment of fifty thousand dollars and the ticker of GBTC.
Speaker 2: They accepted this as collateral for customer funds invested in
Speaker 2: Gemini Earn, valued at the time at around fifteen bucks apiece,
Speaker 2: somehow taking on what they call an and I quote
Speaker 2: initial collateral stake over a year after the program started,
Speaker 2: just to be clear, no collateral when they learned the
Speaker 2: money out. It was worth around four hundred and sixty
Speaker 2: three million dollars at the time, and the Winklevosses for
Speaker 2: some reason decided to foreclose upon it on November sixteenth,
Speaker 2: twenty twenty two, selling it when its price was around
Speaker 2: nine dollars a share. This left them with two hundred
Speaker 2: and eighty four million dollars a little bit over that,
Speaker 2: or roughly sixty four point one percent of its original value.
Speaker 2: They didn't have to sell it, and indeed, one might
Speaker 2: argue they legally shouldn't have because it was collateral from alone,
Speaker 2: in the same way that the bank can't immediately foreclose
Speaker 2: in your home when you're in it and you've missed
Speaker 2: a few payments. They probably weren't meant to do so,
Speaker 2: But I continue now. The Winklevosses are claiming that they
Speaker 2: should be considered oded. The difference between two hundred and
Speaker 2: eighty four million dollars and the amount oede to earns creditors.
Speaker 2: Genesis argues, I should say, the bankruptcy trustee of Genesis,
Speaker 2: which has no interest in anything to do what Genesis
Speaker 2: is doing other than getting money back for the creditors,
Speaker 2: most of which are institutional customers, come last. That trustee
Speaker 2: is arguing that it actually didn't give Gemini two hundred
Speaker 2: and eighty four million dollars in credit. They gave them
Speaker 2: thirty million, nine hundred and five thousand, seven hundred and
Speaker 2: eighty two shares of GPTC, and that the collateral should
Speaker 2: be valued at the price of GBTC today, which would
Speaker 2: value the stake that they had given them at eight
Speaker 2: hundred million. This is confusing, but what you need to
Speaker 2: realize is Gemini earned customers have lost somewhere between eight
Speaker 2: hundred million and a billion dollars. Had the Winklevosses not
Speaker 2: sold their shares, they would have got a lot more back.
Speaker 2: In essence, the Winklevosses rushed to sell these shares for
Speaker 2: effectively no reason, potentially flaunting very basic foreclosure rule, and
Speaker 2: Genesis argument is that they shouldn't have to make up
Speaker 2: the difference for their massive fuck up. Interestingly, Gemini was
Speaker 2: also meant to receive another thirty one million shares of
Speaker 2: GPTC on November tenth, twenty twenty two, and Genesis just
Speaker 2: didn't send it. And guess what the bankruptcy court isn't
Speaker 2: going to help with that. Let's be clear, both of
Speaker 2: these parties are scum, and in a just society, they'd
Speaker 2: rotten the depths of the worst jails under the terms
Speaker 2: of genesis reorganization plan. Under bankruptcy, Gemini earn customers those people,
Speaker 2: regular people, the people's college funds, the bar mits for funds,
Speaker 2: the single mothers who had lost their money. They'd be
Speaker 2: considered Class four unsecured creditors getting paid out behind Genesis
Speaker 2: institutional creditors, secured creditors and priority claims, which is why
Speaker 2: Genesis had to pay one hundred and seventy five million
Speaker 2: dollars to fdx's bankruptcy. A single mothers waited to retrieve
Speaker 2: their son's college funds. Yet there may be hope that
Speaker 2: Gemini Earned customers will be made whole. Mere hours after
Speaker 2: the original broadcast of this podcast, the New York State
Speaker 2: Department of Financial Services announced that Gemini had committed to
Speaker 2: return at least one point one billion dollars to EARNS customers,
Speaker 2: though only after the resolution of Genesis Global Capital's bankruptcy.
Speaker 2: Assuming that the bankruptcy courts approved the settlement, Gemini Earned
Speaker 2: customers can, according to Gemini, expect to receive approximately ninety
Speaker 2: seven percent of their assets in kind within two months
Speaker 2: of February twenty eight, twenty twenty four, and the rest
Speaker 2: about ten months after that. Unlike the proposed FTX settlement,
Speaker 2: customers will also receive the actual crypto they committed. In
Speaker 2: the case of FTX, they're getting the dollar equivalent on
Speaker 2: the day that FTX went bankrupt, which means they're getting
Speaker 2: much less than they'd make if they were selling their
Speaker 2: crypto today. This means that these customers might actually make
Speaker 2: money because on the day that Gemini Earned shut down,
Speaker 2: bitcoin was somewhere between eleven and fifteen thousand dollars. This
Speaker 2: means that they're actually going to make a profit somehow,
Speaker 2: which is pretty good. It's rare to find good news here,
Speaker 2: and don't get too excited yet, though all of this
Speaker 2: is dependent on the tedious pace of bankruptcy courts that
Speaker 2: in this case especially, we've kind of considered Gemini Earns
Speaker 2: customers second class citizens. This landmark settlement is being spun
Speaker 2: by the Winkelvoss brothers as and I quote a successful
Speaker 2: resolution of Gemini Earn that was reached and I quote
Speaker 2: again with Genesis and other creditors, one in which these
Speaker 2: identical River twins are considered. And I can't believe they're
Speaker 2: willing to say this responsible stewards of the crypto ecosystem.
Speaker 2: This couldn't be further from the truth. Superintendent Adrian Harris
Speaker 2: of New York State's Department of Financial Services said in
Speaker 2: a statement that Gemini had failed to conduct due diligence
Speaker 2: on an unregulated third party later accused of massive fraud,
Speaker 2: harming EARNED customers who were suddenly unable to access their assets.
Speaker 2: The nydfs IS investigation revealed and I quote that Gemini
Speaker 2: engaged in unsafe and unsound practices that ultimately threatened the
Speaker 2: financial health of the company, and they collected hundreds of
Speaker 2: millions of dollars in fees from Gemini customers that could
Speaker 2: have gone to Gemini, substantially weakening Gemini's financial condition. The
Speaker 2: Winklevosses are not responsible stuarts. They're towering con artists that
Speaker 2: got core and they were forced to pay up only
Speaker 2: because they ran a foul of one of the few
Speaker 2: responsible regulators left in America. While I'm hopeful to earn
Speaker 2: customer as a main whole, I also fear that the
Speaker 2: bankruptcy courts may drag their feet, and even if they don't,
Speaker 2: kind of just want more here. The Winklevosses aren't even
Speaker 2: the ones paying the fines. Their company is. Gemini will
Speaker 2: pay the thirty seven million dollar fine from the NYDFS,
Speaker 2: and I think they're going to pay the one point
Speaker 2: one billion dollars in cryptocurrency too. What's weird is I
Speaker 2: can find no evidence about where that money is coming from.
Speaker 2: I'm also worried that Genesis, as they have multiple times,
Speaker 2: will kind of stone wall this deal. They want to
Speaker 2: get out of this. They recently settled with the SEC
Speaker 2: for twenty one million dollars, so they have a reason
Speaker 2: to do well with the US government. But I fear
Speaker 2: for this. All of this is condentent on bankruptcy. Courts
Speaker 2: don't really care regardless of this landmark settlement. It is great,
Speaker 2: it's great that the regulator has got the customer's money back,
Speaker 2: but my blood is still boiling. Cameron and Tyler Winklevoss
Speaker 2: will continue to run Gemini, which is a multi billion
Speaker 2: dollar financial services company, despite the fact that it's very
Speaker 2: clear that they really didn't do any due diligence, and
Speaker 2: that due diligence which they did they completely ignored. They
Speaker 2: knew that this was a bad deal. They sent tens
Speaker 2: hundreds over a billion dollars to a company that they
Speaker 2: knew as early as twenty twenty one was bordering on insolvent.
Speaker 2: Yet they're still allowed to walk around as free men
Speaker 2: and stewards of the financial industry. It's kind of taken
Speaker 2: the piss and even though the New York Attorney General's
Speaker 2: sue is still out there, it's not over yet, and
Speaker 2: they're still seeking three billion dollars in restitution. They're doing
Speaker 2: so from Gemini and digital currency group, the Winklevosses are
Speaker 2: still left unscathed. These are craven fraudsters that continued again
Speaker 2: and again to operate without oversight or restrain, and now
Speaker 2: they're going to profit handsomely off of an industry built
Speaker 2: on the back of manipulating and conning people. And despite
Speaker 2: how good this settlement is, these guys are still billionaire
Speaker 2: boat boys. They're unscathed. They robbed their own company, they
Speaker 2: robbed their customers, They laughed in our faces. And at
Speaker 2: this time in society, when tens of thousands of people
Speaker 2: are being laid off, when people can't get houses, when
Speaker 2: the regular person that cannot seek wealth, people that go
Speaker 2: out and fuck over customers again and again and again
Speaker 2: in broad daylight, lying to us, lying to you and
Speaker 2: me in a way that is so craven, nothing happens
Speaker 2: to them. Oh god, they got slightly embarrassed. They can't
Speaker 2: be kicked out of Gemini. They own the bloody thing.
Speaker 2: The crypto industry isn't attacking them, despite the fact that
Speaker 2: two of your so called stewards are fucking con artists.
Speaker 2: Anyone who's listening to this, who's a big fan of crypto,
Speaker 2: who believes that these guys are good people, or indeed
Speaker 2: that really there are any good people in this industry.
Speaker 2: Should read the New York Attorney General suit. They should
Speaker 2: read everything that the Winklevosses did. They should listen to
Speaker 2: this podcast again, perhaps, and recount the many ways, the
Speaker 2: manifold ways in which these two giant freaks shat all
Speaker 2: over their customers, lied to them, lied to regulators, lied
Speaker 2: to their own company, and sat there with their thumbs up,
Speaker 2: their asses not digging into their own personal piggybanks, making
Speaker 2: the dumbest calls again and again, and nothing has happened
Speaker 2: to them. I pray Letitia James and then New York
Speaker 2: Attorney General's Office finds a way to exile these two
Speaker 2: bastards from this goddamn financial services industry. But I'm gonna
Speaker 2: be honest, I'm not holding my breath. Thank you for
Speaker 2: listening to Better Offline. It's a weekly tech podcast. You
Speaker 2: can find it on iheartradios, app or anywhere else you
Speaker 2: find podcasts. The editor and composer of the Better Offline
Speaker 2: theme song is Matasowski. You can check out more of
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Speaker 2: A T T O s o w Ski dot com.
Speaker 2: If you want to get in touch with me, email
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