1 00:00:00,280 --> 00:00:04,720 Speaker 1: From UFOs to psychic powers and government conspiracies. History is 2 00:00:04,800 --> 00:00:09,119 Speaker 1: riddled with unexplained events. You can turn back now or 3 00:00:09,240 --> 00:00:12,079 Speaker 1: learn the stuff they don't want you to know. A 4 00:00:12,240 --> 00:00:25,360 Speaker 1: production of I Heart Radio. Hello, welcome back to the show. 5 00:00:25,400 --> 00:00:27,720 Speaker 1: My name is Matt, my name is Noel. They called 6 00:00:27,720 --> 00:00:30,880 Speaker 1: me Ben. We're joined as always with our super producer 7 00:00:30,960 --> 00:00:34,839 Speaker 1: Paul mission controlled decads. Most importantly, you are you. You 8 00:00:34,920 --> 00:00:37,800 Speaker 1: are here, and that makes this the stuff they don't 9 00:00:37,840 --> 00:00:40,839 Speaker 1: want you to know. It is Thursday if you're listening 10 00:00:40,840 --> 00:00:43,720 Speaker 1: to this on the day it comes out, which means 11 00:00:44,040 --> 00:00:47,080 Speaker 1: I'd like to officially welcome you to our weekly listener 12 00:00:47,240 --> 00:00:51,760 Speaker 1: Male segment. We dive into the nooks and crannies of 13 00:00:51,880 --> 00:00:57,600 Speaker 1: social media. We hunt down strange, mysterious voices on the 14 00:00:57,640 --> 00:01:02,639 Speaker 1: phone across the planet. Uh. We read every single email 15 00:01:02,760 --> 00:01:05,920 Speaker 1: we get, and we, once again every week, face the 16 00:01:05,959 --> 00:01:11,560 Speaker 1: herculean task of finding just three stories to share with you. 17 00:01:11,800 --> 00:01:15,120 Speaker 1: The best part of our show, our fellow conspiracy realists. 18 00:01:15,120 --> 00:01:18,039 Speaker 1: We're gonna talk about nuclear weapons, we're gonna talk about 19 00:01:18,040 --> 00:01:20,960 Speaker 1: the center of the universe. We're gonna talk about some 20 00:01:21,120 --> 00:01:25,520 Speaker 1: of the arithmetic of fraud. And we're doing it all 21 00:01:25,640 --> 00:01:28,319 Speaker 1: with your help. Where would you guys like to be 22 00:01:28,360 --> 00:01:30,560 Speaker 1: getting I want to know about the secrets of the 23 00:01:30,640 --> 00:01:34,280 Speaker 1: universe personally, but that's just me. Well, it's not the 24 00:01:34,319 --> 00:01:37,039 Speaker 1: secrets of the universe. But we can start here as 25 00:01:37,080 --> 00:01:44,080 Speaker 1: it is the center apparently of it. Center Tomato Clamado. Yes, 26 00:01:44,400 --> 00:01:47,800 Speaker 1: let us begin there, and to travel there, we have 27 00:01:47,880 --> 00:01:52,000 Speaker 1: to go to an email sent to us by ram 28 00:01:52,080 --> 00:01:55,640 Speaker 1: J J Ram. No, no, I'm supposed to say it, 29 00:01:55,760 --> 00:02:01,320 Speaker 1: ram J J. Ram. It's like a Bond James Bond situation. Yeah, yeah, 30 00:02:01,360 --> 00:02:04,840 Speaker 1: that's it. That's it, Ram J J. Ram says, Hey, guys, 31 00:02:04,880 --> 00:02:07,280 Speaker 1: love the show. Curious if you've ever covered a location 32 00:02:07,320 --> 00:02:10,600 Speaker 1: in Tulsa, Oklahoma, referred to as quote, the center of 33 00:02:10,639 --> 00:02:13,880 Speaker 1: the Universe. It's apparently an urban site which possesses a 34 00:02:13,960 --> 00:02:17,280 Speaker 1: strange acoustic anomaly. I've read up on a lot of 35 00:02:17,320 --> 00:02:20,160 Speaker 1: speculation as to why, but I'm very curious to hear 36 00:02:20,200 --> 00:02:22,600 Speaker 1: your thoughts. I've never been there, but it seems to 37 00:02:22,600 --> 00:02:26,959 Speaker 1: be quite a fantastic place to experience. Keep the awesomeness flowing, guys. 38 00:02:27,440 --> 00:02:31,360 Speaker 1: Then there's the ram J J rampart. Uh. So let 39 00:02:31,480 --> 00:02:34,160 Speaker 1: us travel there to Tulsa, Oklahoma, to the center of 40 00:02:34,160 --> 00:02:37,519 Speaker 1: the universe. You may think, oh, there's probably some kind 41 00:02:37,520 --> 00:02:40,679 Speaker 1: of monument here, some kind of big sign that says, hey, 42 00:02:40,720 --> 00:02:43,000 Speaker 1: you're at the center of the universe, some kind of 43 00:02:43,200 --> 00:02:46,640 Speaker 1: really important structure that lets you know this is where 44 00:02:46,639 --> 00:02:50,280 Speaker 1: you are. But alas, no, you kind of just have 45 00:02:50,360 --> 00:02:52,760 Speaker 1: to find it. It's not like that place where you're 46 00:02:52,760 --> 00:02:55,839 Speaker 1: standing in four states and once. It is not like that. 47 00:02:56,160 --> 00:03:01,280 Speaker 1: It is it tells you where to stand. Perhaps there 48 00:03:01,360 --> 00:03:04,680 Speaker 1: is some signage. I haven't seen an actual picture of 49 00:03:04,720 --> 00:03:07,480 Speaker 1: the sign if there is one. I've just seen the 50 00:03:07,560 --> 00:03:12,560 Speaker 1: center of the universe, which is a round collection of 51 00:03:12,919 --> 00:03:17,240 Speaker 1: bricks that it's in a circular form here, and it 52 00:03:17,320 --> 00:03:20,760 Speaker 1: kind of goes out from one centerpiece, which is kind 53 00:03:20,760 --> 00:03:25,080 Speaker 1: of green. And supposedly, if you stand right at the 54 00:03:25,080 --> 00:03:28,960 Speaker 1: center of this circle and you speak or you whisper, 55 00:03:29,560 --> 00:03:34,240 Speaker 1: a weird thing happens. Your voice becomes kind of like 56 00:03:34,280 --> 00:03:37,000 Speaker 1: an echo chamber. And you may think, Okay, well, then 57 00:03:37,160 --> 00:03:39,920 Speaker 1: there's got to be some kind of surrounding buildings or 58 00:03:40,000 --> 00:03:42,640 Speaker 1: walls or something in the immediate area that's going to 59 00:03:42,720 --> 00:03:46,040 Speaker 1: reflect that sound of your voice when you're standing right there. 60 00:03:46,680 --> 00:03:52,080 Speaker 1: But again, no, this thing is open. It's very very open. 61 00:03:52,760 --> 00:03:55,839 Speaker 1: It's on a pedestrian bridge if you want to get there. 62 00:03:56,120 --> 00:03:59,200 Speaker 1: It's in the corner of West Archer Street and North 63 00:03:59,320 --> 00:04:01,960 Speaker 1: Boston a new that's at least the way you can 64 00:04:02,000 --> 00:04:03,920 Speaker 1: go across the bridge to get to the center of 65 00:04:03,960 --> 00:04:09,119 Speaker 1: the universe. And it's this, according to Atlas Obscura, directly 66 00:04:09,240 --> 00:04:12,600 Speaker 1: northwest of the old Union Train depot, which is now 67 00:04:12,600 --> 00:04:16,479 Speaker 1: the Oklahoma Jazz Hall of Fame. Pretty cool. So what 68 00:04:16,520 --> 00:04:19,760 Speaker 1: do you think, guys, I don't understand how this functions. 69 00:04:19,800 --> 00:04:22,640 Speaker 1: It must be buildings that are some far away or 70 00:04:22,680 --> 00:04:27,560 Speaker 1: some surface that's some distance away from this center that 71 00:04:27,760 --> 00:04:31,240 Speaker 1: is causing the reflection, because it doesn't seem there doesn't 72 00:04:31,279 --> 00:04:34,120 Speaker 1: seem to be anything, at least immediately apparent that would 73 00:04:34,160 --> 00:04:36,240 Speaker 1: cause the kind of reflection. Do you think it might 74 00:04:36,279 --> 00:04:38,640 Speaker 1: have something to do with some sort of wave anomaly, 75 00:04:38,880 --> 00:04:43,320 Speaker 1: like some electromagnetic interference that's literally, you know, interfering. I mean, 76 00:04:43,320 --> 00:04:47,279 Speaker 1: as we know, all sound are waves that are just 77 00:04:47,440 --> 00:04:49,800 Speaker 1: vibrations that we're picking up with our ears that can 78 00:04:49,839 --> 00:04:54,120 Speaker 1: be intercepted, They can be bounced, they can be manipulated 79 00:04:54,839 --> 00:04:57,880 Speaker 1: by lots of things, whether it be surfaces or you know, 80 00:04:58,520 --> 00:05:01,440 Speaker 1: actual interference. I wonder ring if it might be that 81 00:05:01,520 --> 00:05:04,160 Speaker 1: are people conjecturing as to what it might be. I 82 00:05:04,240 --> 00:05:08,200 Speaker 1: haven't seen any major conjecture on what exactly is causing it, 83 00:05:08,560 --> 00:05:11,359 Speaker 1: because it doesn't It doesn't appear that you have to 84 00:05:11,400 --> 00:05:13,280 Speaker 1: stand in a certain direction. You don't have to face 85 00:05:13,360 --> 00:05:15,520 Speaker 1: east or west or anything like that to get the 86 00:05:15,520 --> 00:05:18,599 Speaker 1: anomaly to occur. It has something to do with the 87 00:05:18,640 --> 00:05:23,120 Speaker 1: sound like originating from that circle. There are no speakers 88 00:05:23,200 --> 00:05:25,920 Speaker 1: around or anything like that where sound is being taken 89 00:05:25,920 --> 00:05:27,920 Speaker 1: in by a microphone and then played back at least 90 00:05:27,920 --> 00:05:31,920 Speaker 1: to my knowledge, Well, this may be interesting to Ram 91 00:05:32,000 --> 00:05:35,680 Speaker 1: J J. Ram At least for my money, there's an 92 00:05:35,760 --> 00:05:39,160 Speaker 1: explanation that takes us. It starts with science, but then 93 00:05:39,200 --> 00:05:43,520 Speaker 1: also takes us to some cool esoteric places. Shane would, 94 00:05:43,600 --> 00:05:48,480 Speaker 1: the director of the Tulsa Foundation of Architecture, notes something 95 00:05:48,560 --> 00:05:51,560 Speaker 1: similar to what you said earlier, Matt, which is that 96 00:05:51,960 --> 00:05:54,919 Speaker 1: when you are hearing this distortion, you would think you 97 00:05:54,920 --> 00:05:58,680 Speaker 1: would be surrounded by buildings, and there are structures that 98 00:05:58,720 --> 00:06:01,440 Speaker 1: are probably creating this, but they're not buildings. There the 99 00:06:01,600 --> 00:06:06,800 Speaker 1: concrete benches and planters and not to jump ahead, but 100 00:06:06,839 --> 00:06:09,000 Speaker 1: I assume that's why you're talking a little more about 101 00:06:09,000 --> 00:06:12,920 Speaker 1: the layout. There's also not an ancient anomaly. It's not 102 00:06:13,000 --> 00:06:16,719 Speaker 1: like the first founders of what would be called Tulsa 103 00:06:16,960 --> 00:06:21,520 Speaker 1: arrived and then saw some you know, standing stones. It 104 00:06:21,600 --> 00:06:25,880 Speaker 1: was once a bridge for before it was a pedestrian path. 105 00:06:25,920 --> 00:06:29,719 Speaker 1: It was once a bridge for motor vehicles, and it 106 00:06:29,839 --> 00:06:32,560 Speaker 1: burned down in the eighties and that's when the circular 107 00:06:33,000 --> 00:06:36,120 Speaker 1: design was put in when it was rebuilt. So what 108 00:06:36,160 --> 00:06:39,599 Speaker 1: you're what you're hearing is your voice bouncing back off 109 00:06:39,640 --> 00:06:43,200 Speaker 1: of those concrete walls, similar to what you might hear 110 00:06:43,600 --> 00:06:45,760 Speaker 1: if you are in an enclosed parking deck or an 111 00:06:45,839 --> 00:06:48,800 Speaker 1: underground parking deck, or in a cave. You know what 112 00:06:48,839 --> 00:06:53,359 Speaker 1: I mean. Uh, it's it's fascinating, it's great marketing. It 113 00:06:53,480 --> 00:06:59,640 Speaker 1: also is not necessarily unique. Chichen Itza had a whispering gallery, 114 00:07:00,040 --> 00:07:03,039 Speaker 1: and I think there's a cathedral as well. St. Paul's. Maybe, 115 00:07:03,240 --> 00:07:06,000 Speaker 1: but Matt, you said, I'm sorry, Maybe I misunderstood that 116 00:07:06,080 --> 00:07:08,440 Speaker 1: this was an open area where there were no visible 117 00:07:08,520 --> 00:07:13,920 Speaker 1: surfaces for the sound to be bouncing off of. Yeah, 118 00:07:14,000 --> 00:07:16,119 Speaker 1: it is an open area. It's on a pedestrian bridge, 119 00:07:16,120 --> 00:07:18,920 Speaker 1: and it's not covered or anything like that. But what 120 00:07:18,920 --> 00:07:20,920 Speaker 1: what Ben is speaking about it is the I mean 121 00:07:20,920 --> 00:07:23,520 Speaker 1: it's a pedestrian bridge, so there is stuff like that 122 00:07:23,640 --> 00:07:26,480 Speaker 1: right the walls that would prevent anyone from going over 123 00:07:26,520 --> 00:07:28,400 Speaker 1: the bridge or something like that. There are a bunch 124 00:07:28,440 --> 00:07:32,640 Speaker 1: of benches and other like little small pillars or pylons 125 00:07:32,640 --> 00:07:35,640 Speaker 1: that are there. Um, so I'm I'm guessing that is 126 00:07:35,680 --> 00:07:38,400 Speaker 1: what is actually causing it, as as Ben is saying, 127 00:07:38,640 --> 00:07:40,320 Speaker 1: I guess it would make sense if there's a similar 128 00:07:40,360 --> 00:07:42,600 Speaker 1: spot in Lake George that has the same thing. You 129 00:07:42,600 --> 00:07:45,200 Speaker 1: can look that up the Lake George Mystery Spot. I 130 00:07:45,240 --> 00:07:47,480 Speaker 1: think if you search for the Center of the Universe, 131 00:07:47,480 --> 00:07:49,560 Speaker 1: you will also find your way to the Lake George 132 00:07:49,560 --> 00:07:54,000 Speaker 1: Mystery Spot. It's very similar, very very similar, same kind 133 00:07:54,000 --> 00:07:57,800 Speaker 1: of deal open, but there are benches and concrete walls 134 00:07:57,840 --> 00:08:02,520 Speaker 1: and things around they're probably causing the same anomaly. I'd 135 00:08:02,520 --> 00:08:05,520 Speaker 1: like to also recommend something that I want to make 136 00:08:05,800 --> 00:08:09,040 Speaker 1: recurring uh if if I'm if I'm allowed to do it, 137 00:08:09,080 --> 00:08:11,720 Speaker 1: I would love to shout out a weird wiki page 138 00:08:11,840 --> 00:08:14,880 Speaker 1: every time we two listener mail, because this will lead 139 00:08:14,920 --> 00:08:18,440 Speaker 1: you to who doesn't love a good Wikipedia rabbit hole? 140 00:08:18,720 --> 00:08:22,520 Speaker 1: This will lead you to a site, a wiki page 141 00:08:22,560 --> 00:08:25,680 Speaker 1: called list of Places referred to as the Center of 142 00:08:25,720 --> 00:08:28,320 Speaker 1: the Universe, which also sounds like a good title for 143 00:08:28,440 --> 00:08:32,840 Speaker 1: postmodern novel. But but be ready for it because it 144 00:08:33,000 --> 00:08:37,520 Speaker 1: is a time vampire. Like my bedroom is the center 145 00:08:37,559 --> 00:08:40,360 Speaker 1: of the universe because that's where I sleep, and I 146 00:08:40,400 --> 00:08:42,839 Speaker 1: am the center of No I'm kidding, um, but now 147 00:08:42,840 --> 00:08:46,280 Speaker 1: this is why I'm really obviously interested in acoustic anomalies 148 00:08:46,360 --> 00:08:50,480 Speaker 1: and just acoustic uh behavior. Just again, it's sound is 149 00:08:50,520 --> 00:08:53,679 Speaker 1: all waves. If you really dig deep into like synthesis 150 00:08:53,679 --> 00:08:56,560 Speaker 1: and things like that, you realize that a synthesizer isn't 151 00:08:57,480 --> 00:09:01,440 Speaker 1: it's using electricity to recreate the waves that are our 152 00:09:01,600 --> 00:09:04,880 Speaker 1: voices or things that you would strike, you know, um, 153 00:09:04,920 --> 00:09:07,000 Speaker 1: in in the environment or in the world, would make 154 00:09:07,360 --> 00:09:10,200 Speaker 1: that that creates certain shapes if you like analyze them 155 00:09:10,200 --> 00:09:13,679 Speaker 1: on ociloscope. And this type of stuff has been exploited, 156 00:09:13,720 --> 00:09:17,079 Speaker 1: you know, for since the beginning of recorded music. Um, 157 00:09:17,080 --> 00:09:19,400 Speaker 1: early recorded music, it would have been more like you know, 158 00:09:19,440 --> 00:09:21,600 Speaker 1: just a room and getting the sound of a live 159 00:09:21,720 --> 00:09:24,920 Speaker 1: kind of room. But then in like early recording studios, 160 00:09:25,160 --> 00:09:27,920 Speaker 1: you know, Capitol Records, for example, still has these um 161 00:09:27,960 --> 00:09:30,880 Speaker 1: they have these kind of parking garage situations like Ben 162 00:09:30,960 --> 00:09:34,600 Speaker 1: was describing underneath the building, which is if you've been 163 00:09:34,640 --> 00:09:37,080 Speaker 1: to l A, it's this kind of like record shaped, 164 00:09:37,080 --> 00:09:40,240 Speaker 1: stacked building and those are some of the most sought 165 00:09:40,280 --> 00:09:44,080 Speaker 1: after reverb sounds in recorded music. But they're literally just 166 00:09:44,240 --> 00:09:48,560 Speaker 1: a uh an enclosure um with a speaker that's connected 167 00:09:48,600 --> 00:09:51,240 Speaker 1: to you know, the soundboard that is sending out whatever 168 00:09:51,280 --> 00:09:54,400 Speaker 1: source you want to reverberate, and that speaker is playing 169 00:09:54,440 --> 00:09:57,600 Speaker 1: that source into the chamber, and then a microphone is 170 00:09:57,679 --> 00:10:00,480 Speaker 1: in there far enough away from it that it's capturing 171 00:10:00,600 --> 00:10:03,560 Speaker 1: the sound of that sound reverberating in that room, and 172 00:10:03,600 --> 00:10:05,839 Speaker 1: you can send multiple things to that speaker, and that's 173 00:10:05,840 --> 00:10:08,480 Speaker 1: how you get like, you know, drum reverb, revocal reverb, 174 00:10:08,520 --> 00:10:10,319 Speaker 1: and they have several that are all set up a 175 00:10:10,360 --> 00:10:12,640 Speaker 1: little bit differently in size, a little bit differently. So 176 00:10:12,840 --> 00:10:16,200 Speaker 1: if you've ever like felt compelled to say, oh, you know, 177 00:10:16,280 --> 00:10:18,560 Speaker 1: in like a parking garage, it's a very human thing 178 00:10:18,600 --> 00:10:20,760 Speaker 1: to want to do because it's it's a pleasant sound 179 00:10:20,880 --> 00:10:22,840 Speaker 1: and it's a sound that you know happens in nature. 180 00:10:23,080 --> 00:10:25,560 Speaker 1: And even my little home studio I have these panels. 181 00:10:26,080 --> 00:10:28,280 Speaker 1: I don't want my room to have those reflections. I 182 00:10:28,320 --> 00:10:32,840 Speaker 1: want to hear the most accurate sound from my studio monitors, 183 00:10:32,880 --> 00:10:36,600 Speaker 1: and if you introduce those kinds of reflections, it cuts 184 00:10:36,600 --> 00:10:38,920 Speaker 1: into that and it tricks your ear and thinking. It 185 00:10:38,960 --> 00:10:41,959 Speaker 1: emphasizes certain frequencies over others and makes it hard to 186 00:10:42,000 --> 00:10:44,320 Speaker 1: kind of really hone in on what the actual sound 187 00:10:44,360 --> 00:10:47,440 Speaker 1: that you're hearing is. That's why, more than soundproofing, people 188 00:10:47,440 --> 00:10:50,600 Speaker 1: treat studios is to make it sound a certain way 189 00:10:50,600 --> 00:10:54,960 Speaker 1: by eliminating things like standing waves or you know, reflections 190 00:10:55,000 --> 00:10:57,880 Speaker 1: like we're talking about here. Yeah. Absolutely, It's why you 191 00:10:57,960 --> 00:11:02,400 Speaker 1: sound great in the shower, no matter who you are exactly. Well, 192 00:11:02,400 --> 00:11:04,360 Speaker 1: that's why people what reverb on vocals because it sort 193 00:11:04,360 --> 00:11:07,840 Speaker 1: of hides the imperfections of the performance, you know, because 194 00:11:07,840 --> 00:11:09,600 Speaker 1: it's sort of smears it a little bit. So it 195 00:11:09,640 --> 00:11:12,000 Speaker 1: makes it where, you know, even if you're not the 196 00:11:12,040 --> 00:11:14,840 Speaker 1: most amazing singer, it still sounds cool because you're hearing 197 00:11:14,880 --> 00:11:17,000 Speaker 1: that sound that just kind of makes it sound larger 198 00:11:17,040 --> 00:11:20,400 Speaker 1: than life and like the sort of ethereal shimmery echo. 199 00:11:20,600 --> 00:11:24,559 Speaker 1: You know. So thank you so much m J. J. 200 00:11:24,800 --> 00:11:27,400 Speaker 1: Ram for sending us that message. If you know of 201 00:11:27,520 --> 00:11:30,680 Speaker 1: a place like that near you, not necessarily an acoustic anomaly, 202 00:11:30,880 --> 00:11:33,720 Speaker 1: but maybe just a place that's a little mysterious or weird, 203 00:11:33,880 --> 00:11:38,120 Speaker 1: something strange happens when you look at something or shout something. 204 00:11:38,600 --> 00:11:40,360 Speaker 1: We want to hear from you. You know, our number 205 00:11:40,360 --> 00:11:43,760 Speaker 1: one eight three three std w y t K and 206 00:11:43,840 --> 00:11:46,760 Speaker 1: also conspiracy at I heart radio dot com. And with that, 207 00:11:46,760 --> 00:11:48,719 Speaker 1: we're gonna take a quick break and come back for 208 00:11:48,880 --> 00:11:58,559 Speaker 1: more stories from you. And we're back with more stories 209 00:11:58,640 --> 00:12:03,760 Speaker 1: from you. That's right you. This one comes from a 210 00:12:03,800 --> 00:12:08,559 Speaker 1: listener with another amazing kind of bond like bond adjacent 211 00:12:08,880 --> 00:12:13,160 Speaker 1: um name, Ernie Ernie Powers. He didn't print it like that, 212 00:12:13,200 --> 00:12:15,000 Speaker 1: but I'm choosing to say it to keep us, you know, 213 00:12:15,040 --> 00:12:18,040 Speaker 1: on brand um. And Ernie is a c p A 214 00:12:18,520 --> 00:12:21,280 Speaker 1: and he he had this to say, Hey, guys, love 215 00:12:21,320 --> 00:12:23,319 Speaker 1: the show. I'm a c p A uh and I've 216 00:12:23,360 --> 00:12:26,120 Speaker 1: been exposed to a couple of instances of fraud over 217 00:12:26,120 --> 00:12:28,839 Speaker 1: the course of my career. And the ways an individual 218 00:12:29,000 --> 00:12:32,240 Speaker 1: might find his or herself committing fraud is very similar 219 00:12:32,280 --> 00:12:35,640 Speaker 1: to Matt's takeaway on the way the Marines would have 220 00:12:35,679 --> 00:12:39,360 Speaker 1: gotten involved in smuggling. It's called the ten ten eighty rule, 221 00:12:39,440 --> 00:12:41,520 Speaker 1: and it states that ten percent of people will always 222 00:12:41,520 --> 00:12:44,559 Speaker 1: look for a way to steal or game the system. Um, 223 00:12:44,880 --> 00:12:47,120 Speaker 1: this is me. I guess you could qualify those as 224 00:12:47,200 --> 00:12:50,600 Speaker 1: like pure career criminals, right. Uh. Ten percent of people 225 00:12:50,600 --> 00:12:52,720 Speaker 1: are the opposite and would never do such a thing, 226 00:12:53,000 --> 00:12:56,080 Speaker 1: and the other eight percent can go either way depending 227 00:12:56,120 --> 00:13:01,720 Speaker 1: on the circumstances. If opportunity, rationalization, and incentive referred to 228 00:13:01,800 --> 00:13:05,079 Speaker 1: as the fraud triangle exists, they are capable of committing 229 00:13:05,120 --> 00:13:08,920 Speaker 1: fraud or a similarly nefarious act. When you consider sixty 230 00:13:08,920 --> 00:13:11,960 Speaker 1: four percent of Americans are living paycheck to paycheck, the 231 00:13:12,000 --> 00:13:16,120 Speaker 1: incentive can be very easy to find. Matt nailed the rationalization. 232 00:13:16,200 --> 00:13:19,800 Speaker 1: I believe with that same comparison, um as someone generally 233 00:13:19,840 --> 00:13:22,600 Speaker 1: just needs to feel like they were promised something that 234 00:13:22,679 --> 00:13:27,200 Speaker 1: hasn't been delivered. Uh. Since those two factors are so prevalent, 235 00:13:27,240 --> 00:13:30,240 Speaker 1: we stress the importance of managing the opportunity employees have 236 00:13:30,440 --> 00:13:33,920 Speaker 1: to commit fraud. The components of the fraud triangle are 237 00:13:33,960 --> 00:13:37,800 Speaker 1: often compared to the components necessary to create fire. Oxygen 238 00:13:37,920 --> 00:13:40,440 Speaker 1: is always present, It's not difficult to find some type 239 00:13:40,440 --> 00:13:42,760 Speaker 1: of fuel, so when a source of heat is applied, 240 00:13:43,000 --> 00:13:46,040 Speaker 1: nobody is surprised that a fire breaks out. We may 241 00:13:46,040 --> 00:13:48,679 Speaker 1: be shocked that certain types of people can commit these acts, 242 00:13:48,720 --> 00:13:51,360 Speaker 1: but sometimes it truly just boils down to someone seeing 243 00:13:51,400 --> 00:13:54,080 Speaker 1: an opportunity to make life a little better for his 244 00:13:54,240 --> 00:13:57,040 Speaker 1: or her family. There are obviously people that are seeking 245 00:13:57,040 --> 00:14:00,000 Speaker 1: financial gain to take vacations or improve their financial staf 246 00:14:00,000 --> 00:14:03,720 Speaker 1: at us through close vehicles, etcetera. But oftentimes that's not 247 00:14:03,760 --> 00:14:06,120 Speaker 1: how these things start, or at least in my experience. 248 00:14:06,320 --> 00:14:08,240 Speaker 1: I don't know how useful any of this is very 249 00:14:08,320 --> 00:14:10,800 Speaker 1: useful learning, and I'm probably just giving you guys, and 250 00:14:10,880 --> 00:14:13,720 Speaker 1: so you already know no, not at all, but feel 251 00:14:13,760 --> 00:14:15,680 Speaker 1: free to share this if you want. They call me 252 00:14:15,840 --> 00:14:19,640 Speaker 1: Ernie Powers. Yeah, I was not aware of the fraud triangle. Um, 253 00:14:19,720 --> 00:14:22,760 Speaker 1: it makes perfect sense when I looked it up. It 254 00:14:22,960 --> 00:14:27,240 Speaker 1: is almost entirely attributed to like accounting like that, but 255 00:14:27,320 --> 00:14:30,680 Speaker 1: it applies so much broader than that. It's such an 256 00:14:30,680 --> 00:14:33,560 Speaker 1: interesting thing that, like, this is a concept that is 257 00:14:33,680 --> 00:14:37,040 Speaker 1: very much taught in business school and taught to, you know, 258 00:14:37,080 --> 00:14:39,560 Speaker 1: people that are professional c p as or accountants in 259 00:14:39,680 --> 00:14:44,320 Speaker 1: order to understand and mitigate fraud. But yet it really 260 00:14:44,400 --> 00:14:46,640 Speaker 1: is something that applies to just kind of I guess 261 00:14:46,680 --> 00:14:49,440 Speaker 1: you call it white collar crime, right, the kinds of 262 00:14:49,480 --> 00:14:53,440 Speaker 1: things that maybe you might argue are victimless crimes, you know, 263 00:14:53,520 --> 00:14:55,360 Speaker 1: But but if you drill down deep enough, I mean, 264 00:14:55,400 --> 00:14:58,160 Speaker 1: there's always a victim. Yeah. And one thing I really 265 00:14:58,200 --> 00:15:00,760 Speaker 1: appreciate about you taking the time to write in Ernie 266 00:15:00,960 --> 00:15:04,360 Speaker 1: is that the difference between like a Strange News or 267 00:15:04,480 --> 00:15:08,960 Speaker 1: listener mail segment versus an actual episode is that we 268 00:15:09,040 --> 00:15:12,880 Speaker 1: want to bring kind of a woman's sampler of different 269 00:15:13,080 --> 00:15:16,800 Speaker 1: different stories to you, and then we often explore these 270 00:15:16,880 --> 00:15:19,920 Speaker 1: in full episodes. I believe we talked about it on 271 00:15:20,080 --> 00:15:23,120 Speaker 1: that on that Strange News. It broke down some of 272 00:15:23,120 --> 00:15:26,040 Speaker 1: the process, so we did have to spend some time 273 00:15:26,400 --> 00:15:29,120 Speaker 1: talking about the specifics of the instance. And that is 274 00:15:29,120 --> 00:15:33,320 Speaker 1: why it's awesome that you are sharing this information about 275 00:15:33,320 --> 00:15:36,200 Speaker 1: the fraud triangle. Uh No, I would go on. I 276 00:15:36,200 --> 00:15:40,920 Speaker 1: would say that it goes past that, not just past accounting, 277 00:15:41,000 --> 00:15:45,200 Speaker 1: but but past you know, so called victimless crimes as well, 278 00:15:45,280 --> 00:15:49,440 Speaker 1: because the human mind has long been capable of cognitive 279 00:15:49,520 --> 00:15:55,760 Speaker 1: parkour of rationalization, and it's something that knows no threshold 280 00:15:55,920 --> 00:15:59,400 Speaker 1: of intelligence or lack thereof. People are very good at 281 00:15:59,480 --> 00:16:03,920 Speaker 1: rationalized see things. People are opportunists, of course, most all 282 00:16:04,000 --> 00:16:08,600 Speaker 1: living things are. And I think it's it's a rubric 283 00:16:08,880 --> 00:16:12,080 Speaker 1: or an idea that one can apply to many, many, 284 00:16:12,160 --> 00:16:16,080 Speaker 1: many many things. Uh, there are a lot of interesting 285 00:16:16,160 --> 00:16:21,200 Speaker 1: social experiments that you can conduct that also present cases 286 00:16:21,200 --> 00:16:24,280 Speaker 1: where this triangle goes into play, for sure. And I 287 00:16:24,320 --> 00:16:27,520 Speaker 1: found a really neat article on the website of the 288 00:16:27,600 --> 00:16:30,400 Speaker 1: Business School in ced to the guts House pronounced I 289 00:16:30,600 --> 00:16:34,119 Speaker 1: N S E A D and Manfred F. R. Cats 290 00:16:34,320 --> 00:16:39,320 Speaker 1: Devise the distinguished Clinical Professor of Leadership Development and Organizational 291 00:16:39,400 --> 00:16:42,720 Speaker 1: Change and in seed also possesses an amazing name and 292 00:16:42,720 --> 00:16:45,520 Speaker 1: an even more amazing headshot. Um. You can find on 293 00:16:45,560 --> 00:16:49,640 Speaker 1: this article he described the concept of white collar crime. Um, 294 00:16:49,680 --> 00:16:53,200 Speaker 1: it's not it's not a purely like intuitive thing. I mean, 295 00:16:53,200 --> 00:16:55,640 Speaker 1: even the concept of like blue collar jobs versus white 296 00:16:55,640 --> 00:16:58,880 Speaker 1: collar jobs. Like I don't fully know that the etymology 297 00:16:58,960 --> 00:17:01,240 Speaker 1: or the history of those, but the term white color 298 00:17:01,360 --> 00:17:04,960 Speaker 1: crime was coined in nineteen thirty nine by a criminologist 299 00:17:05,040 --> 00:17:08,600 Speaker 1: named Edwin Sutherland. Um. And I'm getting this from that article. 300 00:17:08,720 --> 00:17:11,720 Speaker 1: And uh. He refers to white collar crime as being 301 00:17:11,760 --> 00:17:15,800 Speaker 1: associated with the educated and affluent and refers to them 302 00:17:15,840 --> 00:17:20,240 Speaker 1: as a financially motivated, nonviolent wrongdoing that takes place in 303 00:17:20,240 --> 00:17:23,560 Speaker 1: the office environment and involves the manipulation of accounting and 304 00:17:23,600 --> 00:17:28,720 Speaker 1: finance systems, so you know, insider trading, embezzlement, for example, 305 00:17:28,800 --> 00:17:31,600 Speaker 1: things like that. It's a crime of opportunity UM. And 306 00:17:31,640 --> 00:17:34,480 Speaker 1: as Ernie points out, opportunity is one of the most 307 00:17:34,520 --> 00:17:38,840 Speaker 1: important you know, components of the uh, the fraud triangle UM. 308 00:17:38,880 --> 00:17:41,240 Speaker 1: The other one is motivation. So it could be motivated 309 00:17:41,280 --> 00:17:44,600 Speaker 1: by say, like you know, drug addiction, or let's say 310 00:17:44,640 --> 00:17:47,439 Speaker 1: you have a family member quote unquote benevolent versions of this. 311 00:17:47,760 --> 00:17:49,959 Speaker 1: Let's say you have a child or a family member 312 00:17:50,000 --> 00:17:52,639 Speaker 1: that is, you know, very ill, and you can't afford 313 00:17:52,640 --> 00:17:54,879 Speaker 1: to pay the hospital bills, and you see this thing 314 00:17:55,000 --> 00:17:57,960 Speaker 1: present itself to you, and you are able to rationalize, well, 315 00:17:58,000 --> 00:18:01,760 Speaker 1: I need this. I'm not being taken care of. I mean, especially, 316 00:18:01,880 --> 00:18:04,240 Speaker 1: as Ernie pointed out, with people living paycheck to paycheck 317 00:18:04,640 --> 00:18:06,760 Speaker 1: and living in a country like ours, where you know, 318 00:18:06,960 --> 00:18:10,359 Speaker 1: healthcare is absolutely not a right uh and most people 319 00:18:11,760 --> 00:18:14,880 Speaker 1: don't have healthcare that's good enough to cover some sort 320 00:18:14,920 --> 00:18:17,720 Speaker 1: of catastrophic event like that. You see this as the 321 00:18:17,760 --> 00:18:20,600 Speaker 1: plot of movies all the time. You know, someone like 322 00:18:20,920 --> 00:18:23,600 Speaker 1: Walter White. It's not a white collar crime that he commits. 323 00:18:23,640 --> 00:18:26,520 Speaker 1: He decides to cook meth using the skills that he has, 324 00:18:26,520 --> 00:18:29,760 Speaker 1: but he's doing it for what seemed to be at 325 00:18:29,760 --> 00:18:32,040 Speaker 1: the time a benevolent reason. He wants to leave his 326 00:18:32,080 --> 00:18:34,560 Speaker 1: family with some money after he dies because he's been 327 00:18:34,560 --> 00:18:37,320 Speaker 1: diagnosed with terminal cancer. It's it's really like a plot 328 00:18:37,359 --> 00:18:40,360 Speaker 1: device you see all over the place, UM. But as 329 00:18:40,400 --> 00:18:44,400 Speaker 1: I pointed out earlier, there often is a victim UM 330 00:18:44,480 --> 00:18:46,280 Speaker 1: at some point in the chain, and it's usually not 331 00:18:46,359 --> 00:18:49,840 Speaker 1: the big guys. It's usually someone else because, as the 332 00:18:49,880 --> 00:18:53,800 Speaker 1: same article points out, white collar crime UM costs the 333 00:18:53,840 --> 00:18:58,760 Speaker 1: global economy around five trillion dollars a year UM. And 334 00:18:58,760 --> 00:19:01,960 Speaker 1: and that's you know, that's a big hit, uh in 335 00:19:02,000 --> 00:19:04,439 Speaker 1: a way that I think would probably affect others that 336 00:19:04,480 --> 00:19:07,520 Speaker 1: are connected to the global economy who aren't the hedge 337 00:19:07,520 --> 00:19:10,560 Speaker 1: fund types, you know, or the CEO types. Well, at 338 00:19:10,600 --> 00:19:13,520 Speaker 1: least according to this rule, we know that only people 339 00:19:13,640 --> 00:19:19,720 Speaker 1: can be committing fraud at any given time. Because yeah, 340 00:19:20,400 --> 00:19:24,000 Speaker 1: but it's not always the same ten. It depends on 341 00:19:24,080 --> 00:19:28,080 Speaker 1: what the rationalizations and the opportunities are that are presented 342 00:19:28,200 --> 00:19:30,959 Speaker 1: in each particular case. But it is a it is 343 00:19:31,000 --> 00:19:34,560 Speaker 1: a nice thought in this case. One thing that's really 344 00:19:34,600 --> 00:19:37,440 Speaker 1: interesting about what you're bringing up, Ernie. One thing that 345 00:19:37,440 --> 00:19:42,199 Speaker 1: I really appreciate is that this also presents us with 346 00:19:42,240 --> 00:19:46,119 Speaker 1: the case that I didn't I didn't tease out the 347 00:19:46,280 --> 00:19:49,600 Speaker 1: entirety of to bring it back to Marines and human trafficking, 348 00:19:49,960 --> 00:19:52,960 Speaker 1: which is simply this. Those guys were not the ring 349 00:19:53,080 --> 00:19:57,240 Speaker 1: leaders by any any stretch, right, There was there was 350 00:19:57,320 --> 00:20:00,480 Speaker 1: coordination on the other side of the border by somewhat 351 00:20:00,640 --> 00:20:05,919 Speaker 1: coyote are Cartel's, someone who was higher up in the 352 00:20:06,000 --> 00:20:09,800 Speaker 1: chain orchestrating this, And you have to wonder at that 353 00:20:09,880 --> 00:20:16,159 Speaker 1: point what their motivation set looks like, what their rationalization 354 00:20:16,240 --> 00:20:21,000 Speaker 1: set looks like. Humans are fascinating mechanisms for sure, But 355 00:20:21,240 --> 00:20:24,199 Speaker 1: I do think, UM, I do think it's important to 356 00:20:24,240 --> 00:20:30,120 Speaker 1: remember that in this case, um human traffic, any kind 357 00:20:30,119 --> 00:20:35,640 Speaker 1: of illegal border movement activity, contains both what you would 358 00:20:35,640 --> 00:20:39,600 Speaker 1: call street level crime and white collar crime. So that 359 00:20:39,880 --> 00:20:43,640 Speaker 1: we could apply this fraud motivation triangle. We could apply 360 00:20:43,680 --> 00:20:46,359 Speaker 1: to this fraud triangle to people at the top of 361 00:20:46,400 --> 00:20:51,040 Speaker 1: the pyramid and people uh second from the bottom, because 362 00:20:51,080 --> 00:20:53,560 Speaker 1: of course, the people who are at the bottom are 363 00:20:53,600 --> 00:20:57,280 Speaker 1: the folks who often disadvantaged, if not outright helpless, who 364 00:20:57,280 --> 00:21:02,480 Speaker 1: have valuable human lives, who are being exploited uh by 365 00:21:02,480 --> 00:21:04,760 Speaker 1: by criminals, you know, and it's it's tough to know 366 00:21:04,800 --> 00:21:08,920 Speaker 1: the motivations, but I think it is especially valuable, Ernie, 367 00:21:09,000 --> 00:21:12,600 Speaker 1: for all our fellow conspiracy realists, to know that a 368 00:21:12,800 --> 00:21:18,520 Speaker 1: framework exists through which you can determine to a degree 369 00:21:19,480 --> 00:21:23,960 Speaker 1: a person's motivations for an action or activity, as well 370 00:21:24,000 --> 00:21:28,440 Speaker 1: as a little bit of their future likelihood share you 371 00:21:28,600 --> 00:21:32,480 Speaker 1: commit things like fraud in particular in the future. One 372 00:21:32,560 --> 00:21:34,399 Speaker 1: one point that I found in that insde article but 373 00:21:34,440 --> 00:21:36,439 Speaker 1: I thought was interesting, um, when it comes to the 374 00:21:36,480 --> 00:21:40,439 Speaker 1: pressure component of the fraud triangle, is they reference the 375 00:21:40,480 --> 00:21:44,040 Speaker 1: Wells Fargo account fraud scandal, where like, you know, employees 376 00:21:44,080 --> 00:21:47,400 Speaker 1: that are like you know, lower level employees are making 377 00:21:47,400 --> 00:21:49,639 Speaker 1: all these duplicate accounts so they can like hit their 378 00:21:49,720 --> 00:21:52,880 Speaker 1: quotas of you know, these fees and all of that. Um. 379 00:21:53,440 --> 00:21:55,800 Speaker 1: The article points out that if the employee believes that 380 00:21:55,840 --> 00:21:58,080 Speaker 1: they are being ordered to do something wrong, they might 381 00:21:58,080 --> 00:22:01,680 Speaker 1: not feel personally responsible, which is something we've seen and 382 00:22:01,760 --> 00:22:05,560 Speaker 1: what was that study been experiment where you know, your 383 00:22:05,760 --> 00:22:08,439 Speaker 1: your order to torture somebody, you're able to kind of 384 00:22:08,480 --> 00:22:12,760 Speaker 1: like you know, um off lay that responsibility to your 385 00:22:12,800 --> 00:22:15,920 Speaker 1: supervisor and therefore start to look at yourself more as 386 00:22:15,920 --> 00:22:18,040 Speaker 1: a tool of that person. And maybe you're in this 387 00:22:18,119 --> 00:22:20,520 Speaker 1: situation because this is your job and you therefore you 388 00:22:20,560 --> 00:22:23,320 Speaker 1: need the job, so it's easier to kind of justify 389 00:22:23,440 --> 00:22:26,639 Speaker 1: your actions because you're attributing them to somebody that's, you know, 390 00:22:26,800 --> 00:22:30,240 Speaker 1: telling you what to do. Um and another video I 391 00:22:30,240 --> 00:22:33,720 Speaker 1: think I watched pointed out that one way to mitigate 392 00:22:33,760 --> 00:22:36,720 Speaker 1: this is to make sure that you know corporations are 393 00:22:36,880 --> 00:22:41,800 Speaker 1: establishing clear ethical lines, you know, where there isn't there 394 00:22:41,880 --> 00:22:45,480 Speaker 1: is a framework of ethics at every level of leadership. 395 00:22:45,840 --> 00:22:48,919 Speaker 1: Because if you think that your bosses are perpetrating fraud 396 00:22:49,000 --> 00:22:51,200 Speaker 1: or asking you to perpetrate fraud, chances are you're not 397 00:22:51,240 --> 00:22:54,200 Speaker 1: gonna feel bad at all about doing it for yourself 398 00:22:54,320 --> 00:22:58,040 Speaker 1: and taking a little piece. So on that note, uh, 399 00:22:58,160 --> 00:23:00,600 Speaker 1: let us take a little pause, and then we're back 400 00:23:00,600 --> 00:23:10,400 Speaker 1: with some more messages from you. And we've returned with 401 00:23:10,600 --> 00:23:15,840 Speaker 1: one more piece of correspondence. So Biker Girl takes the 402 00:23:15,960 --> 00:23:19,600 Speaker 1: email route and writes to us at conspiracy at iHeart 403 00:23:19,680 --> 00:23:23,159 Speaker 1: radio dot com, saying the following, Hi guys, the current 404 00:23:23,240 --> 00:23:26,399 Speaker 1: situation in Ukraine has me thinking about the US is 405 00:23:26,480 --> 00:23:30,320 Speaker 1: nuclear arsenal? What weapons do we have? What can each 406 00:23:30,359 --> 00:23:32,520 Speaker 1: of them do how many of them do we have? 407 00:23:32,920 --> 00:23:36,320 Speaker 1: What does Russia have? Of course some of this is 408 00:23:36,359 --> 00:23:40,160 Speaker 1: probably secret, but what is known. I just don't think 409 00:23:40,200 --> 00:23:42,600 Speaker 1: the common joe knows this stuff, and it would be 410 00:23:42,640 --> 00:23:47,800 Speaker 1: informative to know given current events. Stay cool, Biker Girl, 411 00:23:48,240 --> 00:23:52,000 Speaker 1: Well thanks b G. I never was particularly cool, but 412 00:23:52,160 --> 00:23:56,160 Speaker 1: I do appreciate it. So this is this is interesting 413 00:23:56,280 --> 00:24:00,679 Speaker 1: because when I see this talked about off and just 414 00:24:00,880 --> 00:24:03,960 Speaker 1: in base terms or whatever they call it, high level 415 00:24:04,000 --> 00:24:08,000 Speaker 1: conversations and mass media, they don't talk about some of 416 00:24:08,040 --> 00:24:10,480 Speaker 1: the exceptions. So what I'd like to do is just 417 00:24:10,680 --> 00:24:15,440 Speaker 1: very briefly breakdown the numbers and then also break down 418 00:24:15,560 --> 00:24:17,959 Speaker 1: some of the stuff they don't want you to know. 419 00:24:18,600 --> 00:24:23,600 Speaker 1: That loopholes, candidly loopholes the ever loving out of some 420 00:24:23,680 --> 00:24:29,280 Speaker 1: of those numbers. So first, there are a ton of 421 00:24:29,480 --> 00:24:33,159 Speaker 1: nuclear well I mentioned tons earlier. It's it's it's a 422 00:24:33,200 --> 00:24:35,480 Speaker 1: great idiom, but it's not the best unit of measurement 423 00:24:36,119 --> 00:24:39,920 Speaker 1: for these types of mega tons. There we go, Yeah, 424 00:24:40,000 --> 00:24:44,560 Speaker 1: it's uh, there are quite a few. There are thousands, thousands, uh. 425 00:24:45,320 --> 00:24:48,760 Speaker 1: As you see if you look at reputable places like 426 00:24:48,800 --> 00:24:53,639 Speaker 1: the Federation of American Scientists, they've estimated that due to 427 00:24:54,240 --> 00:25:00,560 Speaker 1: treaties regarding partial nuclear dismantlement. Right now, as of early 428 00:25:02,359 --> 00:25:08,960 Speaker 1: they are estimated twelve thousand, seven hundred warheads possessed by 429 00:25:09,560 --> 00:25:14,880 Speaker 1: a group, a consortium of about nine countries. Of all 430 00:25:15,119 --> 00:25:19,000 Speaker 1: nuclear warheads on the planet and probably in space that 431 00:25:19,280 --> 00:25:24,159 Speaker 1: happens are owned by Russia and the United States. That 432 00:25:24,280 --> 00:25:28,240 Speaker 1: makes them the nuclear superpowers. But nuclear weaponry is a 433 00:25:28,280 --> 00:25:31,800 Speaker 1: great and dangerous equalizer. You know, if you are a 434 00:25:31,880 --> 00:25:35,960 Speaker 1: state positioned in the right place and you have one nuke, 435 00:25:36,880 --> 00:25:41,359 Speaker 1: you still have a terrible Wonka esque golden ticket to 436 00:25:41,560 --> 00:25:44,760 Speaker 1: start World War three. It's not the same as one 437 00:25:44,880 --> 00:25:49,920 Speaker 1: machine gun versus thirty. So what happens here is that 438 00:25:50,240 --> 00:25:53,520 Speaker 1: we're looking these numbers. You're gonna see variants in estimates. 439 00:25:54,040 --> 00:25:59,320 Speaker 1: You're going to see things like, uh, the way Federation 440 00:25:59,320 --> 00:26:03,000 Speaker 1: Americans side to split is that Russian the US have 441 00:26:03,320 --> 00:26:08,639 Speaker 1: around four thousand warheads and their military stockpiles. The issue 442 00:26:08,720 --> 00:26:12,920 Speaker 1: is warheads have a couple of different states. So if 443 00:26:12,960 --> 00:26:17,160 Speaker 1: a warhead or a nuclear armament is in storage, then 444 00:26:17,400 --> 00:26:21,359 Speaker 1: you can't whip it out. It's not like hopping in 445 00:26:22,160 --> 00:26:25,080 Speaker 1: the garage on the weekend and taking your jag out 446 00:26:25,080 --> 00:26:27,320 Speaker 1: for a spin. You gotta do a lot of stuff 447 00:26:27,640 --> 00:26:30,440 Speaker 1: to make sure it works, and you have to be 448 00:26:30,560 --> 00:26:35,080 Speaker 1: very careful because it's a nuclear weapon, so it's it's uh, 449 00:26:35,240 --> 00:26:37,679 Speaker 1: there are high state consequences. What I'm saying, is it 450 00:26:37,720 --> 00:26:41,840 Speaker 1: an issue been of the degrading over time or leakage 451 00:26:41,960 --> 00:26:44,240 Speaker 1: or problems with maintenance, or is it more just a 452 00:26:44,280 --> 00:26:47,280 Speaker 1: procedural thing like you really gotta you know, get it 453 00:26:47,440 --> 00:26:49,560 Speaker 1: hooked up to the right gear to make it go. 454 00:26:50,320 --> 00:26:53,400 Speaker 1: H E all of the above, I would say on 455 00:26:53,440 --> 00:26:57,359 Speaker 1: that on that ELSAC question. Yeah, there there are a 456 00:26:57,400 --> 00:27:00,840 Speaker 1: ton of things you have to check right, and there's 457 00:27:00,920 --> 00:27:03,679 Speaker 1: a lot of it is estimates, honestly, biker girl, because 458 00:27:03,800 --> 00:27:06,600 Speaker 1: you're you nailed it. About the secrecy. The exact number 459 00:27:06,600 --> 00:27:10,920 Speaker 1: of nuclear weapons in each country's possession is a closely 460 00:27:11,000 --> 00:27:14,679 Speaker 1: held national secret. You want all your cards on the 461 00:27:14,680 --> 00:27:19,200 Speaker 1: table because then you are putting yourself in a disadvantageous 462 00:27:19,200 --> 00:27:24,640 Speaker 1: position in the game. Most nuclear armed states don't really 463 00:27:24,880 --> 00:27:27,159 Speaker 1: give you a ton of information about the size of 464 00:27:27,240 --> 00:27:32,520 Speaker 1: their nuclear stockpiles, but they do have varying degrees of secrecy. 465 00:27:32,720 --> 00:27:38,040 Speaker 1: As a matter of fact, between the US disclosed it's 466 00:27:38,160 --> 00:27:42,560 Speaker 1: total stockpile size and they did this routinely and if 467 00:27:42,600 --> 00:27:46,520 Speaker 1: you believe them, then that's all well and good. Uh. 468 00:27:46,560 --> 00:27:52,399 Speaker 1: In under the Trump administration, the US stopped that practice. 469 00:27:53,040 --> 00:27:58,399 Speaker 1: This was called nuclear transparency. So if you if you 470 00:27:58,440 --> 00:28:01,439 Speaker 1: look at a table, you will see that there are 471 00:28:01,440 --> 00:28:03,640 Speaker 1: a couple of different ways to break these down. Not 472 00:28:03,680 --> 00:28:05,320 Speaker 1: all of them, as I said, are in the state 473 00:28:05,720 --> 00:28:09,160 Speaker 1: in the same state, and some of them can't get there. 474 00:28:10,080 --> 00:28:13,840 Speaker 1: Like total number of warheads is not really the answer 475 00:28:13,840 --> 00:28:17,240 Speaker 1: you're looking for. Like if you say, okay, if you 476 00:28:17,320 --> 00:28:22,080 Speaker 1: look at everything a total inventory, Russia actually has more 477 00:28:22,200 --> 00:28:26,320 Speaker 1: nuclear armaments officially than the US. If you look at everything, 478 00:28:26,600 --> 00:28:29,879 Speaker 1: they have about five thousand, nine hundred and seventy seven 479 00:28:30,280 --> 00:28:33,560 Speaker 1: to the US is five thousand, four hundred and twenty eight. 480 00:28:34,400 --> 00:28:39,520 Speaker 1: But some of those are reserve, they're in storage, they're 481 00:28:39,560 --> 00:28:44,480 Speaker 1: in military stockpiles. They're not non deployed it's called or 482 00:28:44,640 --> 00:28:49,240 Speaker 1: they are waiting in line essentially to be safely dismantled. 483 00:28:49,800 --> 00:28:53,760 Speaker 1: What you really want to look at is what the warheads. 484 00:28:53,760 --> 00:28:59,800 Speaker 1: They are considered deployed strategic warheads. Russia has about one thousand, 485 00:29:00,000 --> 00:29:03,880 Speaker 1: five hundred and the US has about one thousand, six 486 00:29:04,000 --> 00:29:07,760 Speaker 1: hundred and forty four. They are by far the biggest 487 00:29:07,840 --> 00:29:11,600 Speaker 1: numbers in the game. There's no like Shamalan plot twists 488 00:29:12,000 --> 00:29:14,920 Speaker 1: with all of a sudden, you know, Namibia having six 489 00:29:14,960 --> 00:29:19,120 Speaker 1: thousand warheads just out in subs somewhere. I would say, 490 00:29:19,120 --> 00:29:24,000 Speaker 1: also more importantly, for people who have to think about 491 00:29:24,040 --> 00:29:28,000 Speaker 1: the possibility of nuclear war, we have to consider that 492 00:29:28,360 --> 00:29:32,640 Speaker 1: the amount of warheads total. While it's a fun number 493 00:29:32,680 --> 00:29:36,080 Speaker 1: to know, fun, uh, Well, I would say a number 494 00:29:36,160 --> 00:29:38,600 Speaker 1: that's important to know. You need to know how many 495 00:29:38,640 --> 00:29:42,760 Speaker 1: are strategically deployed, and perhaps more importantly, you need to 496 00:29:42,880 --> 00:29:48,440 Speaker 1: know their locations. So it's it's well and good to 497 00:29:48,520 --> 00:29:52,080 Speaker 1: know Russia has x amount of nuclear armament. Uh, and 498 00:29:52,720 --> 00:29:58,160 Speaker 1: of those X amounts are actually deployed somewhere. But the 499 00:29:58,320 --> 00:30:01,120 Speaker 1: real the sauce, you know what I mean, the real 500 00:30:01,400 --> 00:30:06,440 Speaker 1: juicy stuff is to know where they are deployed, what 501 00:30:06,680 --> 00:30:09,760 Speaker 1: state they are in, are they at high alert so odd. So, 502 00:30:09,960 --> 00:30:13,160 Speaker 1: for instance, if you take subs out of the equation, 503 00:30:13,560 --> 00:30:17,240 Speaker 1: which you definitely should not, the country of Russia has 504 00:30:17,280 --> 00:30:23,040 Speaker 1: about twenty five I C B M launch sites, right Uh, 505 00:30:23,080 --> 00:30:29,040 Speaker 1: those can theoretically be negated by the US is twenty 506 00:30:29,120 --> 00:30:32,840 Speaker 1: B two stealth bombers, stealth bombers are tough to catch. 507 00:30:33,520 --> 00:30:36,120 Speaker 1: They can they can do that drive by, you know 508 00:30:36,160 --> 00:30:41,320 Speaker 1: what I mean. So those could theoretically be rendered inoperative. 509 00:30:42,440 --> 00:30:44,800 Speaker 1: The danger, the real danger for a lot of folks, 510 00:30:45,040 --> 00:30:51,080 Speaker 1: is the submarine fleet. Because submarines, both the nuclear powered 511 00:30:51,120 --> 00:30:55,160 Speaker 1: ones and the diesel electric as they're called, are very 512 00:30:55,360 --> 00:30:58,440 Speaker 1: very good at being quiet. They're very very good at 513 00:30:58,520 --> 00:31:02,640 Speaker 1: sneaking around. They're very good at not being caught, were 514 00:31:02,720 --> 00:31:07,200 Speaker 1: being seen until they want to be. And when we 515 00:31:07,280 --> 00:31:12,960 Speaker 1: talk about the danger of nuclear deployment of first strike capability, 516 00:31:13,360 --> 00:31:16,640 Speaker 1: then we're talking in a very real way about the 517 00:31:16,720 --> 00:31:22,240 Speaker 1: possibility of a submarine surfacing just like that Chinese sub 518 00:31:22,280 --> 00:31:25,080 Speaker 1: did during a US military exercise a few years back, 519 00:31:25,640 --> 00:31:31,440 Speaker 1: and totally catching everyone unawares. That means that no matter 520 00:31:31,520 --> 00:31:35,720 Speaker 1: how quickly people scramble to put in whatever contingencies they have, 521 00:31:36,760 --> 00:31:40,959 Speaker 1: the missile could already launch and not to be alarmists. 522 00:31:41,000 --> 00:31:43,800 Speaker 1: But that's that's a real thing. Um. As we talked 523 00:31:43,800 --> 00:31:48,680 Speaker 1: about last week, Ukraine did have its own nukes for 524 00:31:48,720 --> 00:31:53,200 Speaker 1: a while in the nineties. They d nuclearized. We also, 525 00:31:53,280 --> 00:31:55,520 Speaker 1: let's see what weapons do we have. We gave you 526 00:31:55,600 --> 00:31:59,040 Speaker 1: some of those numbers we said they're not all created equal, uh, 527 00:31:59,080 --> 00:32:03,560 Speaker 1: in terms of what they can each do, and uh, 528 00:32:03,640 --> 00:32:08,120 Speaker 1: you know the different let's call them genres of nuclear weaponry. 529 00:32:08,520 --> 00:32:12,360 Speaker 1: That feels like a full episode. I do want to 530 00:32:12,400 --> 00:32:17,720 Speaker 1: point out that, given the relatively decrepit state of a 531 00:32:17,720 --> 00:32:21,680 Speaker 1: lot of Russian hardware, I would not be surprised if 532 00:32:21,760 --> 00:32:25,400 Speaker 1: some of their stuff just needs to be mothballed like 533 00:32:25,520 --> 00:32:28,800 Speaker 1: in Ukraine. One of the reasons, uh, they may have 534 00:32:28,840 --> 00:32:33,800 Speaker 1: been using that Z on different vehicles right to indicate, hey, 535 00:32:33,840 --> 00:32:37,240 Speaker 1: we're friends, is because a lot of their communication is 536 00:32:37,280 --> 00:32:43,680 Speaker 1: on unencrypted analog radio. Yeah, so they're not perhaps as 537 00:32:44,440 --> 00:32:48,600 Speaker 1: capable as a lot of Cold War hawks wanted us 538 00:32:48,840 --> 00:32:52,880 Speaker 1: to believe once upon a time. UM. I don't know 539 00:32:53,080 --> 00:32:56,440 Speaker 1: how much further we want to go into this before 540 00:32:57,360 --> 00:33:01,680 Speaker 1: doing an episode audit, but I do want to note 541 00:33:01,760 --> 00:33:06,600 Speaker 1: that there are loopholes or problems with the big daddy 542 00:33:06,880 --> 00:33:11,840 Speaker 1: of nuclear dismantlement agreements, the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty, which 543 00:33:11,840 --> 00:33:13,760 Speaker 1: we've mentioned on the show in the past. It's been 544 00:33:13,760 --> 00:33:18,280 Speaker 1: in play for like thirty five years. Hundred and eighty 545 00:33:18,360 --> 00:33:22,920 Speaker 1: nine countries signed it. For the record, uh, think of 546 00:33:22,960 --> 00:33:27,360 Speaker 1: it like every country in the world, but around three basically, uh, 547 00:33:27,400 --> 00:33:32,800 Speaker 1: it is almost always at a crisis point, and it's 548 00:33:32,840 --> 00:33:36,440 Speaker 1: not perfect. It does have loopholes. Some things that the 549 00:33:36,480 --> 00:33:41,040 Speaker 1: average person would consider nuclear weapons don't necessarily apply under 550 00:33:41,080 --> 00:33:44,440 Speaker 1: that treaty because the treaty is by nature and exercise 551 00:33:44,520 --> 00:33:49,520 Speaker 1: and compromise. Right parton the accidental rhyme hashtag accidental rhyme. 552 00:33:50,240 --> 00:33:51,600 Speaker 1: But you need to know right now is that we 553 00:33:51,640 --> 00:33:56,239 Speaker 1: will work on an episode exploring as in depth as 554 00:33:56,280 --> 00:34:03,520 Speaker 1: possible the actual deliverable nuclear capability of both Russia and 555 00:34:03,640 --> 00:34:07,240 Speaker 1: the US. A lot of the estimates that you're going 556 00:34:07,280 --> 00:34:11,560 Speaker 1: to read again very because they are estimates. They are 557 00:34:11,640 --> 00:34:18,080 Speaker 1: based on sometimes propagandistic leaks, sometimes good faith insider leaks, 558 00:34:18,120 --> 00:34:22,960 Speaker 1: sometimes just guesses from people in the industry. But what 559 00:34:23,000 --> 00:34:26,160 Speaker 1: you should know in terms of deployed nuclear weapons right now, 560 00:34:26,920 --> 00:34:31,200 Speaker 1: if you're looking at the warheads, the warheads are like 561 00:34:31,280 --> 00:34:35,319 Speaker 1: the tip of the arrow. Okay, they're They're like the 562 00:34:35,360 --> 00:34:40,440 Speaker 1: needle of the dart and intercontinental ballistic missile itself is 563 00:34:40,480 --> 00:34:43,480 Speaker 1: just sort of a delivery system for the warhead. Right 564 00:34:43,880 --> 00:34:46,920 Speaker 1: The bombers, the submarines, those are the things you have 565 00:34:46,960 --> 00:34:50,000 Speaker 1: to watch out for. And right now, Russia does have 566 00:34:51,000 --> 00:34:54,640 Speaker 1: a ton of those that are deployed that are active. 567 00:34:54,719 --> 00:34:57,440 Speaker 1: You heard the statement a while back where Ladimir Putin 568 00:34:57,560 --> 00:35:01,880 Speaker 1: put them on high alert. The US is also playing 569 00:35:01,920 --> 00:35:06,560 Speaker 1: this game I C b MS, submarine payloads, bombers and 570 00:35:06,640 --> 00:35:11,200 Speaker 1: this this is a scary situation because going back to 571 00:35:11,200 --> 00:35:15,160 Speaker 1: the importance of location Biker girl. UH. One thing that 572 00:35:15,760 --> 00:35:18,440 Speaker 1: has long been a very sore point for the Russian 573 00:35:18,480 --> 00:35:22,719 Speaker 1: government is that the US nuclear weapons that are deployed, 574 00:35:23,200 --> 00:35:26,479 Speaker 1: they're not all just in a state or readiness out 575 00:35:26,480 --> 00:35:29,759 Speaker 1: there in the hinter lands of this continent. They're not 576 00:35:29,880 --> 00:35:35,720 Speaker 1: all just in subs. There are about a hundred around 577 00:35:35,719 --> 00:35:39,719 Speaker 1: a hundred nuclear weapons US made, US owned stored in 578 00:35:39,800 --> 00:35:44,320 Speaker 1: Europe and they are at wait for it, NATO basis 579 00:35:44,680 --> 00:35:47,840 Speaker 1: because NATO allows Uncle Sam to build a house in 580 00:35:47,880 --> 00:35:53,200 Speaker 1: your backyard there in Italy, Germany, Turkey, the Netherlands, Belgium. Uh. 581 00:35:53,239 --> 00:35:55,560 Speaker 1: And one of the big things from the Russian perspective 582 00:35:55,600 --> 00:35:59,400 Speaker 1: they're pushing against is the idea of NATO bases being 583 00:35:59,560 --> 00:36:04,000 Speaker 1: in new NATO countries like further and further east, because 584 00:36:04,320 --> 00:36:07,560 Speaker 1: for them, that is the same thing as nuclear weapons 585 00:36:07,640 --> 00:36:13,520 Speaker 1: getting closer and closer to the Russian border. UM. There 586 00:36:13,760 --> 00:36:17,360 Speaker 1: is a thing called the Start Treaty, which has a 587 00:36:17,360 --> 00:36:20,480 Speaker 1: lot of information about this, mainly phrased as ways to 588 00:36:20,520 --> 00:36:23,760 Speaker 1: put caps on how many nuclear warheads can be deployed. 589 00:36:24,880 --> 00:36:29,280 Speaker 1: But there are multiple very dangerous ways that this could 590 00:36:29,280 --> 00:36:32,320 Speaker 1: go wrong. I want to pause here to ask you, guys, 591 00:36:32,360 --> 00:36:34,799 Speaker 1: do you think it would be worthwhile to do an 592 00:36:34,840 --> 00:36:39,640 Speaker 1: episode on actual nuclear capabilities? Absolutely? Yeah, I mean there's 593 00:36:39,680 --> 00:36:42,480 Speaker 1: got to be, you know, details out there that we 594 00:36:42,520 --> 00:36:45,280 Speaker 1: could sort of puzzle piece together and kind of figure 595 00:36:45,320 --> 00:36:47,560 Speaker 1: out largely what the score is. And I know how 596 00:36:47,640 --> 00:36:50,759 Speaker 1: important secrecy is, but you made some really good points, Ben, 597 00:36:51,080 --> 00:36:53,720 Speaker 1: I think it'd be worth kind of sessing out bigger picture. 598 00:36:53,960 --> 00:36:57,320 Speaker 1: There were rumors recently, I believe, coming out of Russian 599 00:36:57,320 --> 00:36:59,719 Speaker 1: and crect me if I'm wrong here, guys that you 600 00:37:00,160 --> 00:37:03,359 Speaker 1: Ene was at least according to their intelligence, preparing to 601 00:37:03,480 --> 00:37:08,360 Speaker 1: detonate some kind of dirty nuclear bomb or weapon. And 602 00:37:08,400 --> 00:37:10,640 Speaker 1: again these are these are rumors coming out and it 603 00:37:10,760 --> 00:37:13,200 Speaker 1: just it makes me want to know exactly how many 604 00:37:13,280 --> 00:37:18,040 Speaker 1: ballistic missile submarines exist around the globe that could potentially 605 00:37:18,120 --> 00:37:21,680 Speaker 1: launch an attack if there if a nuke was you know, 606 00:37:21,719 --> 00:37:24,480 Speaker 1: detected by some of these systems that are aging that 607 00:37:24,520 --> 00:37:27,040 Speaker 1: are supposed to let countries know if a nuke has 608 00:37:27,080 --> 00:37:29,040 Speaker 1: gone off, and in the case of a dirty bomb, 609 00:37:29,080 --> 00:37:32,000 Speaker 1: it wouldn't be the same obviously, but it's still just 610 00:37:32,520 --> 00:37:36,719 Speaker 1: scary to imagine some small nuclear explosion could occur and 611 00:37:36,760 --> 00:37:42,239 Speaker 1: then like automated systems could get triggered or most tying 612 00:37:42,320 --> 00:37:45,360 Speaker 1: dead hand. Yeah, or I would like to point out 613 00:37:45,520 --> 00:37:51,080 Speaker 1: again the nation of Israel has officially never confirmed that 614 00:37:51,160 --> 00:37:54,480 Speaker 1: they have nuclear weapons, but they do have the the 615 00:37:54,560 --> 00:38:00,000 Speaker 1: government of Israel does have a policy that is uh. 616 00:37:59,840 --> 00:38:02,400 Speaker 1: I'm laughing because I'm a fan of Gallos humor, but 617 00:38:02,400 --> 00:38:05,399 Speaker 1: the policies I understand it is essentially that if any 618 00:38:05,520 --> 00:38:09,920 Speaker 1: nation fires for any reason at the at the Middle 619 00:38:09,960 --> 00:38:12,920 Speaker 1: Eastern nation of Israel, then they're just gonna fire everything, 620 00:38:13,400 --> 00:38:16,279 Speaker 1: you know what I mean, Cowabunga style. Uh and no, 621 00:38:16,520 --> 00:38:19,520 Speaker 1: And that's a nobody wants nuclear Cowabunga. No one wants 622 00:38:19,560 --> 00:38:22,680 Speaker 1: to see that. But that's where we're at. So we'll 623 00:38:22,719 --> 00:38:26,200 Speaker 1: do Biker Girl is uh. We will we'll call it 624 00:38:26,239 --> 00:38:28,719 Speaker 1: today for now we are going to return with an 625 00:38:28,760 --> 00:38:33,879 Speaker 1: episode asking how many nukes actually exists. Thank you so 626 00:38:34,000 --> 00:38:37,320 Speaker 1: very much. Also, of course, thank you to Mr Ernie Powers. 627 00:38:37,400 --> 00:38:41,040 Speaker 1: First of his name. Thank you to ROMs J J. ROMs, 628 00:38:41,080 --> 00:38:43,600 Speaker 1: and thank you to all of our fellow conspiracy realists 629 00:38:43,600 --> 00:38:47,360 Speaker 1: who have wrote in today. If you would like to 630 00:38:47,400 --> 00:38:51,319 Speaker 1: continue the conversation, you can always find us online where 631 00:38:51,320 --> 00:38:55,120 Speaker 1: on Facebook at here's where it gets crazy. We're on Instagram. 632 00:38:55,160 --> 00:38:57,400 Speaker 1: You can find us as individuals if you want to 633 00:38:57,400 --> 00:39:00,880 Speaker 1: reach out that way. Uh and if you don't sip 634 00:39:00,920 --> 00:39:04,840 Speaker 1: those social meats, have no fear. I can't wait to 635 00:39:04,960 --> 00:39:08,440 Speaker 1: hear your opinions via a telephone. We have a number 636 00:39:08,520 --> 00:39:11,239 Speaker 1: and everything that's right. Our number is one eight three 637 00:39:11,320 --> 00:39:13,799 Speaker 1: three s T d w y t K. When you 638 00:39:13,880 --> 00:39:16,640 Speaker 1: call in, please give yourself a cool nickname. Let us 639 00:39:16,640 --> 00:39:18,680 Speaker 1: know if we can use your name and message, and 640 00:39:18,719 --> 00:39:21,520 Speaker 1: then you've got three minutes use them however you wish. 641 00:39:21,760 --> 00:39:23,399 Speaker 1: We'd love to hear from you. Please, do you call 642 00:39:23,480 --> 00:39:26,279 Speaker 1: in one eight three three s T d w y 643 00:39:26,320 --> 00:39:28,760 Speaker 1: t K. If you don't want to use your phone 644 00:39:28,840 --> 00:39:31,520 Speaker 1: for that purpose, maybe use it for a different one 645 00:39:31,880 --> 00:39:34,960 Speaker 1: and the old fashioned one. You can send us an email. 646 00:39:35,080 --> 00:39:56,440 Speaker 1: We are conspiracy at iHeart radio dot com. Stuff they 647 00:39:56,480 --> 00:39:58,360 Speaker 1: Don't want you to Know is a production of I 648 00:39:58,520 --> 00:40:01,600 Speaker 1: Heart Radio. For more podcasts from my Heart Radio visit 649 00:40:01,640 --> 00:40:04,400 Speaker 1: the I heart Radio app, Apple podcasts, or wherever you 650 00:40:04,440 --> 00:40:05,600 Speaker 1: listen to your favorite shows.