1 00:00:03,200 --> 00:00:08,000 Speaker 1: This is Bloomberg Law with June Brusso from Bloomberg Radio. 2 00:00:10,320 --> 00:00:14,600 Speaker 1: Johnson and Johnson first filed for bankruptcy in North Carolina, 3 00:00:15,000 --> 00:00:18,680 Speaker 1: then in New Jersey. Will the third time in Texas 4 00:00:18,880 --> 00:00:21,920 Speaker 1: be the charm. Jay and Jay is trying to resolve 5 00:00:22,079 --> 00:00:25,759 Speaker 1: tens of thousands of suits alleging its talk based baby 6 00:00:25,800 --> 00:00:30,200 Speaker 1: powder caused cancer by using special bankruptcy rules that allow 7 00:00:30,320 --> 00:00:35,000 Speaker 1: corporations facing financial turmoil to force an end to all 8 00:00:35,120 --> 00:00:39,320 Speaker 1: product liability lawsuits. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals in 9 00:00:39,400 --> 00:00:43,839 Speaker 1: Philadelphia nixed its first bankruptcy attempt, and a New Jersey 10 00:00:43,920 --> 00:00:46,720 Speaker 1: court nixed its second. Now it will be up to 11 00:00:46,760 --> 00:00:50,919 Speaker 1: a judge in Texas if the case remains there. Lawyers 12 00:00:50,960 --> 00:00:55,160 Speaker 1: representing TAUC claimants who opposed Jay and Jay's latest settlement 13 00:00:55,200 --> 00:01:00,800 Speaker 1: proposal are asking Texas Bankruptcy Judge Christopher Lopez to transfer 14 00:01:00,880 --> 00:01:03,760 Speaker 1: the case to New Jersey. Jay and j says it 15 00:01:03,800 --> 00:01:07,640 Speaker 1: has overwhelming support for the roughly eight billion dollar settlement 16 00:01:08,120 --> 00:01:12,080 Speaker 1: because eighty three percent of alleged victims voted for the deal. 17 00:01:12,440 --> 00:01:15,959 Speaker 1: Joining me is Anthony Casey, a business and corporate bankruptcy 18 00:01:16,000 --> 00:01:19,920 Speaker 1: professor at the University of Chicago Law School Tony tell 19 00:01:20,000 --> 00:01:23,920 Speaker 1: us about the history of Jay and Jay's bankruptcy attempts 20 00:01:23,959 --> 00:01:26,119 Speaker 1: and about the Texas two step. 21 00:01:26,760 --> 00:01:31,160 Speaker 2: So this goes back to twenty twenty one. Johnson and Johnson, 22 00:01:31,760 --> 00:01:36,320 Speaker 2: their consumer subsidiary, had been the defendant in suits alleging 23 00:01:36,560 --> 00:01:41,560 Speaker 2: ovarian cancer theoliomo being caused by mostly their baby products line, 24 00:01:41,560 --> 00:01:44,360 Speaker 2: although there's some other products involved containing CAUC and so 25 00:01:44,760 --> 00:01:48,880 Speaker 2: there was a bad judgment around that time, and this 26 00:01:49,120 --> 00:01:52,720 Speaker 2: leads to the decision in twenty twenty one to file 27 00:01:53,080 --> 00:01:55,840 Speaker 2: an entity into bankruptcy. And this is when people start 28 00:01:55,840 --> 00:01:58,320 Speaker 2: talking about the Texas two step. Now, the allegation is 29 00:01:58,320 --> 00:02:02,520 Speaker 2: that there's asbestos in the product, and so what they 30 00:02:02,560 --> 00:02:05,360 Speaker 2: looked to as a precedent where a few other companies 31 00:02:05,360 --> 00:02:09,320 Speaker 2: had filed what had become majoratively known is Texas two steps. 32 00:02:09,520 --> 00:02:12,600 Speaker 2: The idea of the Texas two step is Step one, 33 00:02:13,200 --> 00:02:18,000 Speaker 2: you divide the defendant entity into two entities, one that 34 00:02:18,120 --> 00:02:21,520 Speaker 2: houses the kind of ongoing business and one that houses 35 00:02:21,560 --> 00:02:26,560 Speaker 2: the liabilities. Step two, you put the liability company into bankruptcy. 36 00:02:26,560 --> 00:02:29,359 Speaker 2: And this, if you describe it that way, a lot 37 00:02:29,400 --> 00:02:31,240 Speaker 2: of people get worked up and say, oh, look that's 38 00:02:31,280 --> 00:02:34,280 Speaker 2: a fraud and transfer everyone kind of skips over. There's 39 00:02:34,280 --> 00:02:38,040 Speaker 2: an intermediate step, which is you also include a funding agreement, 40 00:02:38,080 --> 00:02:41,600 Speaker 2: and the funding agreement says, when the entity goes into bankruptcy, 41 00:02:42,200 --> 00:02:47,280 Speaker 2: the new liability company, the new asset company, guarantees to 42 00:02:47,320 --> 00:02:50,919 Speaker 2: make available the value of the assets that were available 43 00:02:50,919 --> 00:02:54,280 Speaker 2: before the division. And by doing that, you're saying, look, 44 00:02:54,360 --> 00:02:57,720 Speaker 2: we're actually making all the money available to the claimants 45 00:02:58,200 --> 00:03:00,760 Speaker 2: for whatever liability ends up the end of the day, 46 00:03:01,040 --> 00:03:04,119 Speaker 2: but we are separating the entity so that the bankruptcy 47 00:03:04,200 --> 00:03:09,520 Speaker 2: only involves those liabilities. And the idea behind this is 48 00:03:09,639 --> 00:03:12,160 Speaker 2: to streamline the bankruptcy. Now they said this kind of 49 00:03:12,160 --> 00:03:15,000 Speaker 2: maejoritavely became known as the Texas two step. Where did 50 00:03:15,040 --> 00:03:17,720 Speaker 2: that come from? Well, the statute under which you divide 51 00:03:17,720 --> 00:03:20,160 Speaker 2: the company in the first step is a Texas divisional 52 00:03:20,200 --> 00:03:22,800 Speaker 2: merger statute, and there have been a few of companies 53 00:03:22,800 --> 00:03:25,639 Speaker 2: who had done this previously, where they divided under the 54 00:03:25,720 --> 00:03:28,800 Speaker 2: Texas statute. Then they did step two. They filed in 55 00:03:28,840 --> 00:03:32,079 Speaker 2: North Carolina, a western district of North Carolina, and those 56 00:03:32,080 --> 00:03:36,680 Speaker 2: are still pending. Those cases. So Johnson and Johnson really 57 00:03:36,800 --> 00:03:39,520 Speaker 2: Johnson and Johnson Consumer Products. There is a consumer ink 58 00:03:39,600 --> 00:03:44,280 Speaker 2: JJCI was called that company does the divisional merger creates 59 00:03:44,320 --> 00:03:49,280 Speaker 2: the new JJCI and the LTL LTL files in the 60 00:03:49,320 --> 00:03:53,000 Speaker 2: Western District of North Carolina. There's a funding agreement that 61 00:03:53,160 --> 00:03:57,120 Speaker 2: says all of the assets that were available before the 62 00:03:57,160 --> 00:04:00,000 Speaker 2: division are still available. The value of those are available 63 00:04:00,280 --> 00:04:03,360 Speaker 2: guaranteed for whatever liabilities end up, and in case those 64 00:04:03,400 --> 00:04:07,880 Speaker 2: assets lose value, the parent company J and J guarantees 65 00:04:08,280 --> 00:04:10,480 Speaker 2: to make good on any change in value. That was 66 00:04:10,640 --> 00:04:15,320 Speaker 2: bankruptcy number one. Now that very quickly gets transferred from 67 00:04:15,640 --> 00:04:18,400 Speaker 2: the Western Dustry of North Carolina to the District of 68 00:04:18,440 --> 00:04:22,040 Speaker 2: New Jersey. There's a motion to dismiss in that case. 69 00:04:22,640 --> 00:04:25,719 Speaker 2: The bankruptcy court denies the motion to dismiss, says this 70 00:04:25,880 --> 00:04:29,239 Speaker 2: is a good use of bankruptcy. Bankruptcy is a tool 71 00:04:29,320 --> 00:04:32,440 Speaker 2: to solve collective action problems. You've got tens of thousands 72 00:04:32,440 --> 00:04:37,120 Speaker 2: of claims against this stutter. There's more coming in the future. 73 00:04:37,600 --> 00:04:40,600 Speaker 2: The only way to get a global settlement is through 74 00:04:40,600 --> 00:04:44,360 Speaker 2: a bankruptcy process. This is what bankruptcy is intended for. 75 00:04:44,560 --> 00:04:47,719 Speaker 2: That goes on appeal to the Third Circuit. The Third 76 00:04:47,800 --> 00:04:53,239 Speaker 2: Circuit says, no, you should have dismissed the case. Nothing 77 00:04:53,360 --> 00:04:56,400 Speaker 2: to do with the Texas two step other than the 78 00:04:56,400 --> 00:05:00,479 Speaker 2: funding agreement provided value, and the Third Circuit says, there's 79 00:05:00,520 --> 00:05:03,560 Speaker 2: too much money available here for you to claim that 80 00:05:03,600 --> 00:05:06,800 Speaker 2: you need to be in bankruptcy. You're too solvent, you're 81 00:05:06,839 --> 00:05:10,760 Speaker 2: not in immediate financial distress. There's an irony in that 82 00:05:11,200 --> 00:05:13,240 Speaker 2: is they said it was a bad faith filing or 83 00:05:13,360 --> 00:05:16,960 Speaker 2: not in good faith filing because the debtor provided too 84 00:05:17,000 --> 00:05:20,000 Speaker 2: much value for the creditors, which is normally the opposite 85 00:05:20,000 --> 00:05:21,400 Speaker 2: of what you think of when you're able, like what's 86 00:05:21,440 --> 00:05:24,360 Speaker 2: a bad faith debt are doing? They protected the setup 87 00:05:24,480 --> 00:05:26,640 Speaker 2: so that there was enough money to cover the claims, 88 00:05:27,240 --> 00:05:31,000 Speaker 2: and the division didn't change the amount of assets available. 89 00:05:31,480 --> 00:05:34,960 Speaker 2: Because of that, the Third Circuit said, you're not close 90 00:05:35,040 --> 00:05:37,920 Speaker 2: enough to financial distress. So that was an attempt one 91 00:05:38,000 --> 00:05:40,559 Speaker 2: and so that case gets dismissed. A couple hours after 92 00:05:40,600 --> 00:05:44,720 Speaker 2: the dismissal becomes effective, you have attempt to. 93 00:05:44,839 --> 00:05:48,440 Speaker 1: So J and J filed the second time in New Jersey, 94 00:05:48,680 --> 00:05:51,159 Speaker 1: which is the jurisdiction of the third Circuit. 95 00:05:51,440 --> 00:05:54,760 Speaker 2: So what they do following kind of the logic of 96 00:05:54,800 --> 00:05:58,279 Speaker 2: the opinion from that third circuit opinion is they reduced 97 00:05:58,279 --> 00:06:01,000 Speaker 2: the amount of money available, but they maintain enough so 98 00:06:01,040 --> 00:06:03,240 Speaker 2: that we're still a solvent entity, so that we're not 99 00:06:03,279 --> 00:06:06,039 Speaker 2: going to underpay creditors. Is the way that they the 100 00:06:06,240 --> 00:06:09,040 Speaker 2: second letter framed it, and they filed bankruptcy again, and 101 00:06:09,279 --> 00:06:11,919 Speaker 2: this time in the District of New Jersey. This time, 102 00:06:12,120 --> 00:06:14,640 Speaker 2: the bankruptcy judge says, well, I'm looking at the opinion 103 00:06:14,680 --> 00:06:17,960 Speaker 2: before I'm looking at what you did. There's still enough 104 00:06:18,000 --> 00:06:22,040 Speaker 2: money available that you're not close enough to financial distresses. 105 00:06:22,080 --> 00:06:25,480 Speaker 2: I understand the opinion from the Third Circuit, So I'm 106 00:06:25,480 --> 00:06:28,279 Speaker 2: going to have to dismiss this case that goes on 107 00:06:28,360 --> 00:06:32,520 Speaker 2: appeal to the Third Circuit. The Third Circuit says, that's right, affirms, 108 00:06:32,720 --> 00:06:36,040 Speaker 2: you know, essentially reiterating its opinion in the first case 109 00:06:36,080 --> 00:06:39,440 Speaker 2: and saying that the bankruptcy coredit had applied it correctly 110 00:06:39,880 --> 00:06:43,120 Speaker 2: in the second case. All right, So now we're on 111 00:06:43,279 --> 00:06:49,120 Speaker 2: round three. So in the third round Johnson and Johnson's announced, 112 00:06:49,680 --> 00:06:51,679 Speaker 2: I think back in May or earlier in the summer, 113 00:06:52,000 --> 00:06:55,240 Speaker 2: rather than file bankruptcy and then see what happens, we're 114 00:06:55,279 --> 00:06:57,960 Speaker 2: going to get the vote. First, we're going to go 115 00:06:58,040 --> 00:07:02,000 Speaker 2: out to all the claimants and try to build a settlement. Now, 116 00:07:02,040 --> 00:07:03,839 Speaker 2: the goal of the first to bankruptcies was to be 117 00:07:03,880 --> 00:07:06,400 Speaker 2: in bankruptcy and then build a settlement that creates a 118 00:07:06,440 --> 00:07:11,440 Speaker 2: fund that allows claimants both past and future to come 119 00:07:11,480 --> 00:07:14,360 Speaker 2: and collect against that fund, and the company to continue 120 00:07:14,360 --> 00:07:17,440 Speaker 2: operating separate from the fund. This time around, they're like, well, 121 00:07:17,480 --> 00:07:19,800 Speaker 2: let's get everyone on board on the fund first, So 122 00:07:19,840 --> 00:07:22,440 Speaker 2: they do what it's called a prepackaged bankruptcy. So we're 123 00:07:22,480 --> 00:07:25,320 Speaker 2: going to get a vote of all the potential claimants 124 00:07:25,440 --> 00:07:27,520 Speaker 2: and we've got to get a supermajority to get a 125 00:07:27,560 --> 00:07:29,760 Speaker 2: settlement through. That was true in the first two cases, 126 00:07:29,800 --> 00:07:32,080 Speaker 2: but we hadn't had the vote yet. This time, we're 127 00:07:32,120 --> 00:07:34,080 Speaker 2: going to do the vote. We're not stopping any of 128 00:07:34,120 --> 00:07:36,160 Speaker 2: the litigation while we're having the vote, because we're not 129 00:07:36,160 --> 00:07:38,600 Speaker 2: going to file unless we get to the point where 130 00:07:38,640 --> 00:07:41,920 Speaker 2: we have the vote in place. Now. During that time, 131 00:07:42,000 --> 00:07:45,400 Speaker 2: they apparently determined that they were going to use bankruptcy 132 00:07:45,520 --> 00:07:49,520 Speaker 2: to settle the ovarian cancer tout claims, but not them 133 00:07:49,520 --> 00:07:52,840 Speaker 2: as othelioma claim So they separate those off and they 134 00:07:52,880 --> 00:07:56,480 Speaker 2: have a vote among the ovarian cancer claimants over the summer, 135 00:07:56,960 --> 00:07:59,360 Speaker 2: and then at the end of that they now say 136 00:07:59,400 --> 00:08:02,200 Speaker 2: they have a rough eighty three percent of the potential 137 00:08:02,240 --> 00:08:06,440 Speaker 2: claimants voting for a settlement, and the settlement was kind 138 00:08:06,440 --> 00:08:08,920 Speaker 2: of laid out here. If you vote for this, here's 139 00:08:08,920 --> 00:08:11,440 Speaker 2: the plan we're going to put before the bankruptcy court. 140 00:08:11,960 --> 00:08:14,240 Speaker 2: Webb a vote when we go in. Are you on 141 00:08:14,280 --> 00:08:17,480 Speaker 2: board with this? Because if you are, this is prepackaged 142 00:08:17,480 --> 00:08:19,400 Speaker 2: in the sense of we know who's voted. You're the 143 00:08:19,400 --> 00:08:23,679 Speaker 2: only class of claimants because of the simplification and splitting off. 144 00:08:24,160 --> 00:08:27,280 Speaker 2: So what they did then was another divisional merger where 145 00:08:27,280 --> 00:08:30,280 Speaker 2: they separated the company into three entities. So there was 146 00:08:30,360 --> 00:08:34,760 Speaker 2: the holding company that existed. That company kind of swallows 147 00:08:34,840 --> 00:08:37,520 Speaker 2: up all the other entities that have been divided out 148 00:08:37,600 --> 00:08:40,880 Speaker 2: and then divided into three. The going forward company, the 149 00:08:41,440 --> 00:08:44,599 Speaker 2: mesothelioma company, which is going to settle outside of bankruptcy, 150 00:08:44,640 --> 00:08:47,600 Speaker 2: and the company that's kind of filed for bankruptcy, which 151 00:08:47,679 --> 00:08:50,320 Speaker 2: is the taut claimants. And that's the case that filed 152 00:08:50,760 --> 00:08:53,880 Speaker 2: last Friday, right, So this is the new entity filing, 153 00:08:53,920 --> 00:08:56,800 Speaker 2: and they file in Texas this time with the vote 154 00:08:56,800 --> 00:09:00,680 Speaker 2: in place, the plan drafted in line, hoping to get 155 00:09:00,720 --> 00:09:03,480 Speaker 2: the kind of approval through the Texas Bankruptcy Court. 156 00:09:03,720 --> 00:09:07,040 Speaker 1: So the opponents of this, some of the lawyers representing 157 00:09:07,080 --> 00:09:11,160 Speaker 1: claimants say that JJ is trying to game the system 158 00:09:11,240 --> 00:09:15,160 Speaker 1: because it's trying to get bankruptcy protections that are meant 159 00:09:15,200 --> 00:09:18,400 Speaker 1: for companies that can afford to pay their debts. Do 160 00:09:18,440 --> 00:09:20,320 Speaker 1: you agree with that, I mean no. 161 00:09:20,640 --> 00:09:23,560 Speaker 2: So this has been the debate from the beginning, with 162 00:09:23,840 --> 00:09:27,600 Speaker 2: the question of whether or not bankruptcy is the right 163 00:09:27,640 --> 00:09:30,360 Speaker 2: place for mass tortue claims to be resolved, whether or 164 00:09:30,400 --> 00:09:33,880 Speaker 2: not the Texas two step is a positive or negative. Now, 165 00:09:34,040 --> 00:09:37,040 Speaker 2: one thing to note is that bankruptcy in the US 166 00:09:37,160 --> 00:09:40,640 Speaker 2: Chapter eleven, I should say corporate bankruptcy has always been 167 00:09:40,679 --> 00:09:45,440 Speaker 2: a tool for resolving collective action problems among creditors where 168 00:09:45,480 --> 00:09:48,960 Speaker 2: their actions could destroy value. And the way that they 169 00:09:48,960 --> 00:09:51,920 Speaker 2: can destroy value is you ultimately get a race to 170 00:09:51,960 --> 00:09:54,559 Speaker 2: the courthouse. And so if you think about any of 171 00:09:54,640 --> 00:09:58,079 Speaker 2: these mass torque cases, you've got tens of thousands of claimants. 172 00:09:58,440 --> 00:10:01,200 Speaker 2: Some of them are going to go and get zero recovery, 173 00:10:01,240 --> 00:10:03,200 Speaker 2: some of them are going to get a billion dollar recovery. 174 00:10:03,200 --> 00:10:05,280 Speaker 2: And there was one large judgment for a group of 175 00:10:05,280 --> 00:10:08,679 Speaker 2: plaintiffs that was in the billions. And what happens is 176 00:10:08,720 --> 00:10:12,000 Speaker 2: that we don't know when these claims, particularly the asbestos 177 00:10:12,160 --> 00:10:15,920 Speaker 2: will end because asbestos shows up years later, and so 178 00:10:16,080 --> 00:10:20,200 Speaker 2: you have a decade long future of litigation that's costing. 179 00:10:20,559 --> 00:10:21,880 Speaker 2: You know, at one point, I think they said it 180 00:10:21,880 --> 00:10:24,320 Speaker 2: was costing a billion dollars a year to litigate these cases, 181 00:10:24,400 --> 00:10:29,040 Speaker 2: and that's destroying value. Now, the third circuitance first opinion said, look, 182 00:10:29,520 --> 00:10:31,960 Speaker 2: you're Johnson and Johnson. There's enough money for this to 183 00:10:32,000 --> 00:10:35,400 Speaker 2: go on for quite some time without it causing any problems. 184 00:10:35,559 --> 00:10:40,120 Speaker 2: Now that's true if these claims are actually valid. That 185 00:10:40,160 --> 00:10:42,280 Speaker 2: won't always be true. Right, If you have one hundred 186 00:10:42,280 --> 00:10:45,679 Speaker 2: thousand claims that are worth millions of dollars each, that'll 187 00:10:45,679 --> 00:10:48,400 Speaker 2: bankrupt any company in the world. Now, the irony was 188 00:10:48,440 --> 00:10:50,680 Speaker 2: that people say, well, yeah, but they're not really valid claims, 189 00:10:50,880 --> 00:10:53,120 Speaker 2: so they're not in that much financial trouble, which is 190 00:10:53,160 --> 00:10:55,680 Speaker 2: a weird argument. I mean, like everyone's arguing these from 191 00:10:55,800 --> 00:10:58,480 Speaker 2: like odd positions. The plaintiffs are arguing, yeah, but most 192 00:10:58,480 --> 00:11:00,400 Speaker 2: of the claims aren't any good, so you don't need 193 00:11:00,400 --> 00:11:02,760 Speaker 2: to worry about it, which is such an odd argument. 194 00:11:03,080 --> 00:11:06,680 Speaker 2: And what's really going on is stakeholders are losing value 195 00:11:07,400 --> 00:11:12,160 Speaker 2: in the current world because there's this endless litigation. If 196 00:11:12,200 --> 00:11:15,600 Speaker 2: money runs out, it'll be the case that the first 197 00:11:15,640 --> 00:11:18,959 Speaker 2: to come win and the later to come lose. And 198 00:11:19,400 --> 00:11:23,280 Speaker 2: bankruptcy has the only mechanism in our legal system that 199 00:11:23,400 --> 00:11:27,400 Speaker 2: can get parties to a global resolution that says, here's 200 00:11:27,440 --> 00:11:32,160 Speaker 2: the money available, let's stop destroying value. And that benefits 201 00:11:32,240 --> 00:11:34,960 Speaker 2: the debtor, but it also benefits the creditors because it 202 00:11:35,000 --> 00:11:39,720 Speaker 2: gets the money put aside and available sooner rather than later. 203 00:11:39,840 --> 00:11:42,680 Speaker 2: So if you're in line, if you're one of the 204 00:11:43,040 --> 00:11:46,680 Speaker 2: current eighty thousand claimants or so, when is your trial 205 00:11:46,760 --> 00:11:48,800 Speaker 2: going to happen? When is yourself am not going to 206 00:11:48,840 --> 00:11:51,200 Speaker 2: happen outside of bankruptcy. And if you're someone who doesn't 207 00:11:51,240 --> 00:11:53,480 Speaker 2: even know that they're sick yet, you know, the timing 208 00:11:53,559 --> 00:11:57,320 Speaker 2: of when the value gets put aside for you is 209 00:11:57,679 --> 00:12:00,839 Speaker 2: years or decades away. So bankruptcy, the way I look 210 00:12:00,880 --> 00:12:03,680 Speaker 2: at it, is intended to solve those kind of problems. 211 00:12:03,720 --> 00:12:03,880 Speaker 1: Right. 212 00:12:03,920 --> 00:12:06,199 Speaker 2: It says, Look, when you have a pool of assets 213 00:12:06,240 --> 00:12:10,280 Speaker 2: and you have a group of creditors who collectively want 214 00:12:10,320 --> 00:12:13,800 Speaker 2: the same thing, but individually have incentives to kind of 215 00:12:14,040 --> 00:12:16,000 Speaker 2: try to cut in line, get ahead of each other 216 00:12:16,080 --> 00:12:19,040 Speaker 2: and get the big payouts. We want to solve that problem. 217 00:12:19,080 --> 00:12:21,720 Speaker 2: That's what bankruptcy is supposed to do. The critics as 218 00:12:21,760 --> 00:12:23,560 Speaker 2: you say, no, no, no, it's only supposed to be 219 00:12:23,640 --> 00:12:26,080 Speaker 2: when you're running out of money. And if you look 220 00:12:26,120 --> 00:12:29,240 Speaker 2: around the world, there are jurisdictions that have said you 221 00:12:29,280 --> 00:12:33,440 Speaker 2: can't file for bankruptcy until you're totally insolvent. And what 222 00:12:33,520 --> 00:12:36,959 Speaker 2: you see is that companies fail because they don't file 223 00:12:37,040 --> 00:12:39,640 Speaker 2: soon enough. And there's been a trend around the world 224 00:12:39,640 --> 00:12:44,600 Speaker 2: of things called pre insolvency proceedings, which our countries realizing that, wait, 225 00:12:44,920 --> 00:12:47,679 Speaker 2: it's too late if we start helping them when they're insolvent. 226 00:12:48,240 --> 00:12:50,079 Speaker 2: We should do what the US does and help them 227 00:12:50,120 --> 00:12:52,400 Speaker 2: before they're insolvent. But we can't do it because our 228 00:12:52,440 --> 00:12:54,760 Speaker 2: system requires them to be insolvent. So let's create a 229 00:12:54,760 --> 00:12:58,120 Speaker 2: whole other system, a pre insolvency system. If you look 230 00:12:58,120 --> 00:13:01,360 Speaker 2: at Chapter eleven, it's both says you can file early, 231 00:13:01,520 --> 00:13:04,600 Speaker 2: you can file before you're insolvent, and file when you're insolvent, 232 00:13:04,600 --> 00:13:07,040 Speaker 2: and you want to encourage you to use it as 233 00:13:07,080 --> 00:13:09,760 Speaker 2: soon as you've become aware of the potential to preserve 234 00:13:09,880 --> 00:13:12,920 Speaker 2: value through coordination. Now, it is true if there was 235 00:13:12,960 --> 00:13:17,160 Speaker 2: a debt that like had zero possibility of ever having 236 00:13:17,200 --> 00:13:21,120 Speaker 2: financial problems. Bankruptcy is not made for that debtor. And 237 00:13:21,120 --> 00:13:24,360 Speaker 2: that was what the first bankruptcy opinion in New Jersey 238 00:13:24,440 --> 00:13:26,720 Speaker 2: said it. So listen, if you do the math, there's 239 00:13:26,760 --> 00:13:29,720 Speaker 2: a possibility here, a real one. But this is going 240 00:13:29,760 --> 00:13:32,120 Speaker 2: to eat up a lot of value for people. Now, 241 00:13:32,200 --> 00:13:34,679 Speaker 2: the Third Circuit says it is not immediate enough. They 242 00:13:34,679 --> 00:13:37,760 Speaker 2: didn't define that, but they said it has to be, 243 00:13:38,240 --> 00:13:42,679 Speaker 2: you know, somehow, like imminent or on the horizon. And 244 00:13:43,200 --> 00:13:45,280 Speaker 2: my view, and I think the view of a lot 245 00:13:45,320 --> 00:13:48,920 Speaker 2: of lawyers and some mac bankruptcy scholars, is that just 246 00:13:48,960 --> 00:13:52,240 Speaker 2: makes people wait too long. And an engender's litigation of 247 00:13:52,520 --> 00:13:55,080 Speaker 2: am I close enough? Am I close enough? And you 248 00:13:55,080 --> 00:13:58,520 Speaker 2: have weird cases where American Airlines and Hurts, for example, 249 00:13:58,559 --> 00:14:01,239 Speaker 2: everyone thought they were insolvent when they files for bankruptcy, 250 00:14:01,400 --> 00:14:03,320 Speaker 2: but at the end of their bankruptcies they were solvent. 251 00:14:03,400 --> 00:14:05,679 Speaker 2: Does that mean that you need to undo everything because 252 00:14:05,720 --> 00:14:08,000 Speaker 2: they shouldn't have been there. You don't want to be 253 00:14:08,080 --> 00:14:10,240 Speaker 2: litigating that every day, like do you have enough money? 254 00:14:10,280 --> 00:14:12,559 Speaker 2: Do not have enough money? And that's why mighty is 255 00:14:12,559 --> 00:14:14,520 Speaker 2: the Third Circuit rule, which is the only court that 256 00:14:14,559 --> 00:14:18,360 Speaker 2: has that immediate financial distress rule, is too onerous on 257 00:14:18,440 --> 00:14:23,080 Speaker 2: debtors and discourages filing the colorful metaphor people uses. It 258 00:14:23,120 --> 00:14:25,000 Speaker 2: tells them to call the fire department after the house 259 00:14:25,040 --> 00:14:26,760 Speaker 2: burned down, Right, you want to do it earlier. You 260 00:14:26,800 --> 00:14:29,520 Speaker 2: want to do it when there's some potential danger or 261 00:14:29,680 --> 00:14:32,440 Speaker 2: value destruction that you're trying to stop. 262 00:14:32,520 --> 00:14:35,680 Speaker 1: Coming up Next, will the judge transfer the case to 263 00:14:35,760 --> 00:14:41,800 Speaker 1: New Jersey? You're listening to Bloomberg, Johnson and Johnson's third 264 00:14:41,840 --> 00:14:46,680 Speaker 1: bankruptcy filing to resolve tens of thousands of lawsuits alleging 265 00:14:46,720 --> 00:14:51,520 Speaker 1: its talk based baby powder cost Cancer is facing familiar 266 00:14:51,680 --> 00:14:57,200 Speaker 1: challenges by opposing lawyers, including its new choice of venue Texas. 267 00:14:57,720 --> 00:15:00,400 Speaker 1: I've been talking to Anthony Casey, a bit business in 268 00:15:00,400 --> 00:15:04,400 Speaker 1: corporate bankruptcy professor at the University of Chicago Law School. 269 00:15:05,080 --> 00:15:08,720 Speaker 1: So why did Jay and Jay pick Houston for the 270 00:15:08,760 --> 00:15:10,160 Speaker 1: third bankruptcy filing. 271 00:15:10,600 --> 00:15:13,560 Speaker 2: I don't know why exactly, a big Houston. There's a 272 00:15:13,560 --> 00:15:16,200 Speaker 2: couple of things going on. One is, when they filed 273 00:15:16,240 --> 00:15:19,240 Speaker 2: in North Carolina, the court said, well, you created this 274 00:15:19,400 --> 00:15:21,360 Speaker 2: entity in Texas and the next day you filed in 275 00:15:21,400 --> 00:15:23,800 Speaker 2: North Carolina. So we're going to venue chance you to 276 00:15:23,880 --> 00:15:28,280 Speaker 2: New Jersey. So to do this structure where you simplify 277 00:15:28,480 --> 00:15:32,440 Speaker 2: and say, look, we're only putting into bankruptcy the claimants 278 00:15:32,600 --> 00:15:36,120 Speaker 2: whose claims were trying to resolve and the ones who 279 00:15:36,200 --> 00:15:39,160 Speaker 2: overwhelmingly want to resolve it, right, they voted they want 280 00:15:39,160 --> 00:15:41,280 Speaker 2: to resolve this. In order to do that, you need 281 00:15:41,320 --> 00:15:44,000 Speaker 2: to do this divisional merger, which requires you to be 282 00:15:44,040 --> 00:15:46,560 Speaker 2: a Texas entity when you do it. So one reason 283 00:15:46,560 --> 00:15:49,200 Speaker 2: they might have filed in Texas. They're like, look, we're 284 00:15:49,200 --> 00:15:51,800 Speaker 2: not going to venue shop this time. Everyone criticized this 285 00:15:51,960 --> 00:15:55,320 Speaker 2: for it, So we'll do a Texas divisional merger and 286 00:15:55,360 --> 00:15:58,920 Speaker 2: then we'll file in Texas. Right, So that's one argument 287 00:15:59,000 --> 00:16:02,040 Speaker 2: for why to file time. You know, I don't think 288 00:16:02,120 --> 00:16:05,200 Speaker 2: it's lost on people that if they have filed again 289 00:16:06,000 --> 00:16:09,520 Speaker 2: in New Jersey, right, they would have faced the same standard. 290 00:16:09,640 --> 00:16:13,240 Speaker 2: And so New Jersey, because of the third Circuit rule, 291 00:16:13,360 --> 00:16:16,240 Speaker 2: puts in place a block that says you can't restructure 292 00:16:16,280 --> 00:16:19,920 Speaker 2: this until it's too late. And so I think those 293 00:16:19,960 --> 00:16:24,240 Speaker 2: two things together made Texas the obvious venue to file, right. 294 00:16:24,320 --> 00:16:27,880 Speaker 2: So the third circuit, which would be Pennsylvania, New Jersey 295 00:16:27,920 --> 00:16:31,240 Speaker 2: and Delaware, right, that's off the table because you'd have 296 00:16:31,320 --> 00:16:36,320 Speaker 2: to make the company so close to insolvency, you know, dangerously, 297 00:16:36,400 --> 00:16:39,680 Speaker 2: so that you might be taking something away from the claimants. Right, 298 00:16:39,800 --> 00:16:44,640 Speaker 2: this entity is just money and a settlement for the victims. 299 00:16:45,200 --> 00:16:47,600 Speaker 2: And so if the requirement in the Third Circuit is 300 00:16:47,720 --> 00:16:51,200 Speaker 2: you need to make that entity insolvent, the requirement is 301 00:16:51,200 --> 00:16:53,240 Speaker 2: you need to make sure you're not paying the claimants 302 00:16:53,280 --> 00:16:55,240 Speaker 2: in full. Right, So you don't want to do that, 303 00:16:55,520 --> 00:16:58,240 Speaker 2: and if you go that far, you run into a 304 00:16:58,280 --> 00:17:01,800 Speaker 2: fraudent transfer problem. Really, if you want to resolve this, 305 00:17:01,960 --> 00:17:04,840 Speaker 2: you can't file in the third Circuit. Now, no other 306 00:17:04,960 --> 00:17:07,680 Speaker 2: circuit in the country has that rule, so that opens 307 00:17:07,800 --> 00:17:11,000 Speaker 2: up the possibility of other places. And again like when 308 00:17:11,000 --> 00:17:12,960 Speaker 2: they filed in North Carolina the first time, they got 309 00:17:13,040 --> 00:17:16,640 Speaker 2: venue transferred. But filing in Texas, well, your Texas entities 310 00:17:16,640 --> 00:17:18,920 Speaker 2: you have to be Texas entities because that's what was 311 00:17:18,960 --> 00:17:23,280 Speaker 2: required for you to do this structure. So yeah, inferring here, Okay, 312 00:17:23,320 --> 00:17:27,520 Speaker 2: well we'll just file in Texas, which also is a 313 00:17:27,640 --> 00:17:30,840 Speaker 2: very experienced, known jurisdiction. This dealt with a lot of 314 00:17:30,920 --> 00:17:33,280 Speaker 2: large cases. You're not going to overload the court in 315 00:17:33,280 --> 00:17:35,520 Speaker 2: that way, which some people thought maybe that was happening 316 00:17:35,520 --> 00:17:38,919 Speaker 2: in North Carolina. So those would be. I think the 317 00:17:38,960 --> 00:17:41,320 Speaker 2: reasons they're in Texas. But that's why I don't think 318 00:17:41,320 --> 00:17:42,800 Speaker 2: there's any venue transfer coming. 319 00:17:43,359 --> 00:17:46,560 Speaker 1: And that was my next question, because the attorneys for 320 00:17:46,600 --> 00:17:51,960 Speaker 1: the tel climates, who oppose the latest settlement proposal, are 321 00:17:52,000 --> 00:17:55,000 Speaker 1: trying to get it transferred out of Texas, and the 322 00:17:55,240 --> 00:18:00,760 Speaker 1: Justice Department's Bankruptcy Monitor, the US Trustees Office filed in 323 00:18:00,840 --> 00:18:03,680 Speaker 1: New Jersey to get it transferred to that. 324 00:18:03,680 --> 00:18:07,320 Speaker 2: State, and that already failed, right, so the New Jersey motion, 325 00:18:07,920 --> 00:18:11,280 Speaker 2: I didn't quite understand why you're trying to file it there. 326 00:18:11,400 --> 00:18:14,800 Speaker 2: There's lots of legal problems with trying to get the 327 00:18:14,840 --> 00:18:19,800 Speaker 2: New Jersey court to take the case from Texas. Partly, 328 00:18:20,040 --> 00:18:23,200 Speaker 2: you know, there is a bankruptcy rule that says if 329 00:18:23,240 --> 00:18:27,560 Speaker 2: a debtor with a pending case files somewhere else, the 330 00:18:27,600 --> 00:18:29,959 Speaker 2: court with the pending petition can bring it in. But 331 00:18:30,000 --> 00:18:32,679 Speaker 2: the New Jersey court dismissed the case. Right, there's no 332 00:18:32,720 --> 00:18:36,840 Speaker 2: petition pending there, so it's not clear that that court 333 00:18:36,840 --> 00:18:39,560 Speaker 2: would even have the power. There's all kinds of weird 334 00:18:39,640 --> 00:18:41,960 Speaker 2: questions that arise if the New Jersey court tries to 335 00:18:42,000 --> 00:18:44,880 Speaker 2: take it. So one, it's not clear the court could 336 00:18:44,960 --> 00:18:48,679 Speaker 2: take it, but two, the Court has the discretion not to, 337 00:18:49,000 --> 00:18:52,600 Speaker 2: and I can't imagine would want to open up all 338 00:18:52,640 --> 00:18:55,600 Speaker 2: those questions, which I think is why it already denied 339 00:18:55,600 --> 00:18:58,520 Speaker 2: that motion yesterday afternoon, saying you know, for now I'm 340 00:18:58,560 --> 00:19:00,720 Speaker 2: not taking the case. I think it's a without prejudice 341 00:19:00,760 --> 00:19:03,199 Speaker 2: and they might try it again. Go okay, So then 342 00:19:03,240 --> 00:19:05,800 Speaker 2: the right place to bring a venue transfer motion is 343 00:19:05,840 --> 00:19:08,160 Speaker 2: in the court where the case that you want transferred 344 00:19:08,200 --> 00:19:10,600 Speaker 2: is pending, Like that's what the statute says. That would 345 00:19:10,640 --> 00:19:14,240 Speaker 2: be the Texas Court. But what's the argument for transferring it? 346 00:19:14,680 --> 00:19:17,680 Speaker 2: So the argument for the New Jersey Court to take it, 347 00:19:17,840 --> 00:19:21,640 Speaker 2: generally that rule in bankruptcy is, in order to make 348 00:19:21,680 --> 00:19:25,600 Speaker 2: administration easier and more coherent, we should bring the cases together. 349 00:19:26,000 --> 00:19:28,560 Speaker 2: The New Jersey case has been dismissed, so there's nothing 350 00:19:28,640 --> 00:19:33,320 Speaker 2: to administratively bring it together with. So there's not that argument. 351 00:19:33,560 --> 00:19:37,719 Speaker 2: So then you know, if someone really egregiously manufactures venue, 352 00:19:38,160 --> 00:19:42,200 Speaker 2: courts can transfer venue. Now this would be the court 353 00:19:42,280 --> 00:19:44,720 Speaker 2: where you file to the Texas Court. But go back 354 00:19:44,760 --> 00:19:48,240 Speaker 2: to well why is their venue in Texas? Well, it's 355 00:19:48,240 --> 00:19:51,280 Speaker 2: a Texas entity. Why is it a Texas entity? Because 356 00:19:51,320 --> 00:19:53,199 Speaker 2: the only way to structure this thing this way was 357 00:19:53,240 --> 00:19:56,840 Speaker 2: to make it a Texas entity, and so Texas actually 358 00:19:56,920 --> 00:20:00,760 Speaker 2: is the first and obvious place to file for a 359 00:20:00,840 --> 00:20:05,560 Speaker 2: company that has used the Texas Statute to structure itself 360 00:20:05,680 --> 00:20:08,320 Speaker 2: in this way where we simplify the bankruptcy and think 361 00:20:08,359 --> 00:20:13,480 Speaker 2: about it the simplification, the mesothelioma claimants aren't voting for 362 00:20:13,480 --> 00:20:19,560 Speaker 2: a bankruptcy settlement. The ovarian claimants are, and so the 363 00:20:19,640 --> 00:20:22,280 Speaker 2: value of the separation, just to use an example, is 364 00:20:22,760 --> 00:20:25,800 Speaker 2: we're going to put the ovarian claimants into the bankruptcy process, 365 00:20:25,800 --> 00:20:28,720 Speaker 2: which overwhelming they voted in favor of, and we're not 366 00:20:28,760 --> 00:20:31,560 Speaker 2: going to put the mesotheliomal claimants. We're also not going 367 00:20:31,600 --> 00:20:34,600 Speaker 2: to put all the other creditors of the operations of 368 00:20:34,640 --> 00:20:37,520 Speaker 2: the business. We're not going to have them subject to 369 00:20:37,520 --> 00:20:39,480 Speaker 2: the bankruptcy and we're not going to have them able 370 00:20:39,560 --> 00:20:43,240 Speaker 2: to step in and make objections. So we're really simplifying 371 00:20:43,320 --> 00:20:46,520 Speaker 2: so that the only way that a plan gets confirmed 372 00:20:46,960 --> 00:20:49,879 Speaker 2: in the Texas Bankruptcy is if there is a valid 373 00:20:49,920 --> 00:20:52,960 Speaker 2: vote of a supermajority of these claimants. No one else 374 00:20:52,960 --> 00:20:56,160 Speaker 2: can affect that. It's really just about whether or not 375 00:20:56,760 --> 00:21:00,760 Speaker 2: they want this settlement, and that's the simplification that the 376 00:21:00,800 --> 00:21:04,000 Speaker 2: Texas two step allows, and if to get there you 377 00:21:04,119 --> 00:21:07,080 Speaker 2: have to become a Texas entity. That makes Texas in 378 00:21:07,119 --> 00:21:10,040 Speaker 2: my mind, the obvious venue. Now, some people are going 379 00:21:10,080 --> 00:21:11,440 Speaker 2: to say, some critics are going to say, but you 380 00:21:11,480 --> 00:21:13,919 Speaker 2: should never have been able to do the divisional merger 381 00:21:14,359 --> 00:21:17,080 Speaker 2: in the first place. The only problem with that argument 382 00:21:17,160 --> 00:21:20,440 Speaker 2: is no court has ever said that. And importantly, the 383 00:21:20,480 --> 00:21:23,199 Speaker 2: Third Circuit when they dismissed the case, it was not 384 00:21:23,480 --> 00:21:26,119 Speaker 2: because of the structure. It was because too much money 385 00:21:26,119 --> 00:21:28,720 Speaker 2: was available. That was the only reason. And if you 386 00:21:28,840 --> 00:21:32,600 Speaker 2: read it, the opinion applies to any debtor who isn't 387 00:21:32,640 --> 00:21:36,359 Speaker 2: close enough to financial distress, regardless of how they're structured. 388 00:21:36,359 --> 00:21:38,399 Speaker 2: And so as I read the opinion, it would have 389 00:21:38,440 --> 00:21:43,640 Speaker 2: applied to old JJCI, the old Johnston, Johnson and Consumer Company, 390 00:21:43,920 --> 00:21:47,200 Speaker 2: had it filed without ever dividing. The Third Circuit rationale 391 00:21:47,200 --> 00:21:49,760 Speaker 2: suggests it would have dismissed that case has nothing to 392 00:21:49,800 --> 00:21:52,199 Speaker 2: do with the Texas divisional merger. And so at that 393 00:21:52,240 --> 00:21:54,600 Speaker 2: point you're like, well, state law says you can do this. 394 00:21:54,800 --> 00:21:57,800 Speaker 2: They did this under state law, and now they're Texas entities. 395 00:21:57,920 --> 00:22:00,960 Speaker 2: The first time. They then moved to North Carolina and 396 00:22:01,000 --> 00:22:03,680 Speaker 2: got a venue transfer. So this time they didn't do that. 397 00:22:03,720 --> 00:22:06,879 Speaker 2: They stuck with Texas and they file in Texas. I 398 00:22:06,920 --> 00:22:10,720 Speaker 2: don't see how what the argument to the court is 399 00:22:10,760 --> 00:22:14,119 Speaker 2: for venue transfer. Where should this case be. It should 400 00:22:14,160 --> 00:22:17,800 Speaker 2: be where the parent company is. I guess that would 401 00:22:17,800 --> 00:22:21,160 Speaker 2: be the argument for sending it back to New Jersey. 402 00:22:21,520 --> 00:22:25,040 Speaker 2: But as long as we're allowing the divisional merger, it's 403 00:22:25,080 --> 00:22:27,560 Speaker 2: not clear why that has any benefit to anybody, right, 404 00:22:27,600 --> 00:22:29,879 Speaker 2: It doesn't make the case smoother, it doesn't make the 405 00:22:29,920 --> 00:22:32,719 Speaker 2: case easier. There's nothing to consolidate it with. So the 406 00:22:32,720 --> 00:22:35,440 Speaker 2: only reason I would see to transfer it is if 407 00:22:35,440 --> 00:22:37,800 Speaker 2: you went as far as saying you can't do the 408 00:22:37,840 --> 00:22:41,080 Speaker 2: Texas divisional merger, which would be a shocking thing for 409 00:22:41,160 --> 00:22:43,800 Speaker 2: a federal bankruptcy court to say that a state law 410 00:22:43,960 --> 00:22:46,040 Speaker 2: transaction is just out of bound. 411 00:22:46,200 --> 00:22:48,679 Speaker 1: So then you think that there is almost no way 412 00:22:48,760 --> 00:22:53,400 Speaker 1: that the Houston judge will transfer venue to New Jersey. 413 00:22:53,800 --> 00:22:56,320 Speaker 2: Correct. Yeah, I didn't think there was any chance that the 414 00:22:56,400 --> 00:22:59,119 Speaker 2: New Jersey judge would take it, and we saw that, 415 00:22:59,200 --> 00:23:02,239 Speaker 2: and I think there's no way that'll change. And I 416 00:23:02,240 --> 00:23:06,639 Speaker 2: think there's very little chance that the Texas judge will 417 00:23:06,840 --> 00:23:09,360 Speaker 2: send it somewhere else, because I just don't see the 418 00:23:09,480 --> 00:23:11,159 Speaker 2: You know, if you look at the statute, read the 419 00:23:11,240 --> 00:23:14,040 Speaker 2: language of the statue, where's your principal's business, where's your headquarters, 420 00:23:14,080 --> 00:23:16,840 Speaker 2: where you incorporated? Those are the things you look for. 421 00:23:16,880 --> 00:23:19,879 Speaker 2: And here we have that. We have a business that 422 00:23:20,000 --> 00:23:23,119 Speaker 2: is a Texas entity. And so this isn't a mailbox case, 423 00:23:23,160 --> 00:23:26,040 Speaker 2: This isn't anything, and it wasn't on the ev either, right, 424 00:23:26,119 --> 00:23:29,440 Speaker 2: So these transactions were announced months ago, right, and voted 425 00:23:29,480 --> 00:23:32,640 Speaker 2: on by the majority of creditors and claimants. So all 426 00:23:32,720 --> 00:23:35,560 Speaker 2: the formal things are there. And then if you get 427 00:23:35,560 --> 00:23:38,920 Speaker 2: the discretion, what's the discretionary reason to send the case 428 00:23:38,960 --> 00:23:43,280 Speaker 2: somewhere else when you've got a supermajority of the claimants 429 00:23:43,320 --> 00:23:46,639 Speaker 2: in favor of it, when you've got the venue. The 430 00:23:46,760 --> 00:23:50,680 Speaker 2: move to Texas was very open. The reasons for it 431 00:23:50,720 --> 00:23:53,359 Speaker 2: are very clear. I'm just trying to think, like, what's 432 00:23:53,440 --> 00:23:56,240 Speaker 2: the hook for sending this case somewhere else. 433 00:23:56,800 --> 00:23:59,960 Speaker 1: I can see that the lawyers for the cancer victim 434 00:24:00,119 --> 00:24:03,040 Speaker 1: who want to try their cases, why they want it moved, 435 00:24:03,560 --> 00:24:07,760 Speaker 1: But why does the Justice Department want it moved? 436 00:24:08,440 --> 00:24:13,240 Speaker 2: So I think the Trustees Office has taken a negative 437 00:24:13,320 --> 00:24:20,159 Speaker 2: view of a lot of the mass tort bankruptcy structures. 438 00:24:20,320 --> 00:24:22,560 Speaker 2: Maybe there is a view that, like you said, that 439 00:24:23,000 --> 00:24:25,520 Speaker 2: you know, you need to truly be insolvent. You know, 440 00:24:25,560 --> 00:24:28,440 Speaker 2: this is partly why they appealed to the Supreme Court 441 00:24:28,440 --> 00:24:31,080 Speaker 2: in the Purdue case. You know, they had a policy 442 00:24:31,160 --> 00:24:34,160 Speaker 2: view that you're not supposed to use third party releases 443 00:24:34,359 --> 00:24:37,080 Speaker 2: in master bankruptcy cases. I'm a little surprised in their 444 00:24:37,160 --> 00:24:39,879 Speaker 2: motion in New Jersey because the Office tends to be 445 00:24:40,320 --> 00:24:43,479 Speaker 2: kind of textualless and formalists, and if you look at 446 00:24:43,480 --> 00:24:46,040 Speaker 2: the rule, I don't see how the New Jersey Court 447 00:24:46,119 --> 00:24:48,760 Speaker 2: had the power, and so they were asking it to 448 00:24:48,800 --> 00:24:52,439 Speaker 2: do something I think that would be not formalist beyond 449 00:24:52,440 --> 00:24:54,280 Speaker 2: the power of the statute, which is not the way 450 00:24:54,320 --> 00:24:56,960 Speaker 2: I normally think of their positions. That said, I think 451 00:24:57,000 --> 00:24:59,639 Speaker 2: that they view themselves as the watchdog of bankruptcy process, 452 00:24:59,680 --> 00:25:02,240 Speaker 2: which I think is a good thing. But they have 453 00:25:02,280 --> 00:25:05,760 Speaker 2: a view that what large companies are doing to reach 454 00:25:05,880 --> 00:25:09,520 Speaker 2: mass towards settlements and bankruptcy is problematic. I think that's 455 00:25:09,520 --> 00:25:13,159 Speaker 2: an incorrect view, but I think that's what's driving this. 456 00:25:13,760 --> 00:25:16,760 Speaker 2: As you say, it's not their views are put out 457 00:25:16,800 --> 00:25:19,879 Speaker 2: there even when they conflict with the majority views of 458 00:25:19,920 --> 00:25:22,240 Speaker 2: the claimants. And that was true in Purdue for sure, 459 00:25:22,320 --> 00:25:25,240 Speaker 2: and it seems to be true here as well. They're 460 00:25:25,280 --> 00:25:27,359 Speaker 2: just like, but this is the way it should be done, 461 00:25:27,960 --> 00:25:30,240 Speaker 2: and that's why they want it, I guess in New Jersey. 462 00:25:30,240 --> 00:25:32,440 Speaker 2: I mean the weird thing about wanting it in New Jersey. 463 00:25:32,480 --> 00:25:35,080 Speaker 2: If your a claimant, why is New Jersey any different? 464 00:25:35,119 --> 00:25:37,359 Speaker 2: So the claimants are everywhere, so it's not clear, like 465 00:25:37,480 --> 00:25:41,040 Speaker 2: why New Jersey is better for a claimant than anywhere else. Now, 466 00:25:41,040 --> 00:25:44,359 Speaker 2: maybe their view is you've already been dismissed in New Jersey, 467 00:25:44,400 --> 00:25:47,159 Speaker 2: you should stay there. You shouldn't be able to try 468 00:25:47,800 --> 00:25:51,440 Speaker 2: to change things. And that view, if you go down 469 00:25:51,440 --> 00:25:54,440 Speaker 2: the road, gets really problematic because how long would you 470 00:25:54,480 --> 00:25:58,399 Speaker 2: be bound by the company's circumstances change over time? So 471 00:25:58,400 --> 00:26:00,840 Speaker 2: how long do they think they're bound the fact that 472 00:26:00,920 --> 00:26:03,119 Speaker 2: they had a ruling in one court at one time 473 00:26:03,280 --> 00:26:06,960 Speaker 2: and then a year later company files again even after 474 00:26:07,040 --> 00:26:10,320 Speaker 2: there was dismissed, Like, are they bound into infinity to 475 00:26:10,359 --> 00:26:13,040 Speaker 2: never file anywhere ever? Again? It can't be right. So 476 00:26:13,080 --> 00:26:16,080 Speaker 2: I'm not totally sure the theory that the Trustee's office has, 477 00:26:16,119 --> 00:26:18,960 Speaker 2: but it seems to be that they don't like what's 478 00:26:19,000 --> 00:26:22,440 Speaker 2: going on in a kind of a vague sense, and they'll. 479 00:26:22,200 --> 00:26:26,840 Speaker 1: Be basically nothing going on until October eleventh. Judge Lopez 480 00:26:26,920 --> 00:26:30,480 Speaker 1: ruled that no talk litigation can proceed against Jay and 481 00:26:30,600 --> 00:26:34,800 Speaker 1: Jay until that date while he considers whether the bankruptcy 482 00:26:34,840 --> 00:26:38,240 Speaker 1: case should proceed in the Houston court or not, so 483 00:26:38,280 --> 00:26:41,360 Speaker 1: he could find out fairly quickly whether the bankruptcy will 484 00:26:41,400 --> 00:26:44,160 Speaker 1: proceed in Texas or not. Thanks so much for being 485 00:26:44,200 --> 00:26:47,439 Speaker 1: on the show, Tony. That's Professor Anthony Casey of the 486 00:26:47,520 --> 00:26:50,639 Speaker 1: University of Chicago Law School coming up next on The 487 00:26:50,640 --> 00:26:56,320 Speaker 1: Bloomberg Lawn Show. With AI Supercharging the Threat of Election Disinformation, 488 00:26:56,800 --> 00:27:00,480 Speaker 1: California's governor has signed three bills to crack down on 489 00:27:00,560 --> 00:27:04,639 Speaker 1: the use of AI to create false images or videos 490 00:27:04,640 --> 00:27:08,240 Speaker 1: in political ads ahead of November. I'm June Grosso and 491 00:27:08,240 --> 00:27:13,919 Speaker 1: you're listening to Bloomberg with Artificial Intelligence Supercharging the Threat 492 00:27:13,920 --> 00:27:18,600 Speaker 1: of Election disinformation. Lawmakers across the country have raised to 493 00:27:18,680 --> 00:27:23,760 Speaker 1: address the issue over concerns the manipulated materials could erode 494 00:27:23,760 --> 00:27:27,560 Speaker 1: the public's trust in what they see and hear. California 495 00:27:27,600 --> 00:27:31,000 Speaker 1: has been on the cutting edge of regulating AI, and 496 00:27:31,040 --> 00:27:35,000 Speaker 1: Governor Gavin Newsom signed three bills last week to crack 497 00:27:35,040 --> 00:27:38,679 Speaker 1: down on the use of artificial intelligence to create false 498 00:27:38,760 --> 00:27:42,119 Speaker 1: images or videos in political ads ahead of the election. 499 00:27:42,640 --> 00:27:45,920 Speaker 1: Joining me is Joanna rosen Forster, a partner at Crowell. 500 00:27:46,400 --> 00:27:50,120 Speaker 1: So Joanna start by telling us about the rising concerns 501 00:27:50,240 --> 00:27:53,440 Speaker 1: about AI and deep fakes in particular. 502 00:27:54,320 --> 00:27:56,920 Speaker 3: Yeah, I think that there has been a rise at 503 00:27:56,960 --> 00:28:00,240 Speaker 3: the state and at the federal level of concerns learn 504 00:28:00,320 --> 00:28:04,040 Speaker 3: with respect to what we're calling deep fakes, which is 505 00:28:04,200 --> 00:28:08,440 Speaker 3: passing off somebody's image or voice as authentic even though 506 00:28:08,480 --> 00:28:13,359 Speaker 3: it's been manipulated or as artificial and using AI, or 507 00:28:13,400 --> 00:28:16,040 Speaker 3: not even using AI, just using photoshops to do it, 508 00:28:16,480 --> 00:28:19,800 Speaker 3: and the concern being that, on one hand, is it 509 00:28:19,920 --> 00:28:25,760 Speaker 3: deceptive to consumers? Is it deceptive to voters or their 510 00:28:26,240 --> 00:28:31,400 Speaker 3: votes being manipulated or procured through false means or pretenses, 511 00:28:31,800 --> 00:28:34,800 Speaker 3: And to a degree also with respect to actors and 512 00:28:34,880 --> 00:28:39,520 Speaker 3: personalities and celebrities their likeness. I think the big issue 513 00:28:39,520 --> 00:28:42,160 Speaker 3: that we all are thinking about on this is the 514 00:28:42,240 --> 00:28:45,120 Speaker 3: Taylor Swift deep fake that was a few weeks ago. 515 00:28:45,480 --> 00:28:48,560 Speaker 3: So I think there's been a big concern about the 516 00:28:48,680 --> 00:28:53,040 Speaker 3: use of AI to manipulate images in elections, in particular 517 00:28:53,280 --> 00:28:57,040 Speaker 3: because of the concern that it could falsely procure votes 518 00:28:57,280 --> 00:29:01,840 Speaker 3: or put undue influence on voters. And the concern has 519 00:29:01,840 --> 00:29:04,680 Speaker 3: also risen with respect to AI tools because the AI 520 00:29:04,840 --> 00:29:08,400 Speaker 3: tools make it so easy to make the deep fakes, 521 00:29:08,840 --> 00:29:12,160 Speaker 3: and to make the deep fakes so convincing such that 522 00:29:12,520 --> 00:29:16,360 Speaker 3: it's almost imperceptible to the naked eye or indiscernible to 523 00:29:16,520 --> 00:29:20,760 Speaker 3: humans that it is indeed a deep fake. So Congress 524 00:29:20,760 --> 00:29:24,840 Speaker 3: has been considering this for a while. Congress, for federal 525 00:29:24,880 --> 00:29:27,520 Speaker 3: or for worse, has been unable really to put together 526 00:29:27,600 --> 00:29:30,720 Speaker 3: any type of real truth federal statue or federal mandate 527 00:29:30,760 --> 00:29:33,400 Speaker 3: on this, leading it to the states to start to 528 00:29:33,440 --> 00:29:36,160 Speaker 3: regulate on this. I think when I last looked at it, 529 00:29:36,200 --> 00:29:40,800 Speaker 3: over forty states have now in some stage of legislation, 530 00:29:41,400 --> 00:29:46,080 Speaker 3: whether it be introduced to enacted, or addressing this. And 531 00:29:46,240 --> 00:29:50,400 Speaker 3: last week Governor Newsom in California passed into law a 532 00:29:50,520 --> 00:29:54,400 Speaker 3: set of landmark with being called first in the nation 533 00:29:54,680 --> 00:30:00,400 Speaker 3: type laws that really address not only celebrity likeness control 534 00:30:00,520 --> 00:30:04,200 Speaker 3: for celebrities in deep fake, which is with respect to elections, 535 00:30:04,280 --> 00:30:07,480 Speaker 3: or not just in general. Heart blaunched the use of 536 00:30:07,520 --> 00:30:11,040 Speaker 3: a personalities image or likeness in a deep fake. And 537 00:30:11,080 --> 00:30:14,280 Speaker 3: then separately, a series of bills that were passed in 538 00:30:14,320 --> 00:30:18,719 Speaker 3: California he signed into law that specifically addressed the threat 539 00:30:19,120 --> 00:30:24,400 Speaker 3: of using manipulated or artificial images and sound recordings in elections. 540 00:30:24,800 --> 00:30:29,120 Speaker 3: And it's been hailed as an effort to really try 541 00:30:29,160 --> 00:30:33,080 Speaker 3: to safeguard the election process, make it safer, more secure, 542 00:30:33,320 --> 00:30:36,800 Speaker 3: and be more fair and equitable. And those laws went 543 00:30:36,840 --> 00:30:39,760 Speaker 3: into effect immediately, so they are in effect right now. 544 00:30:40,200 --> 00:30:44,479 Speaker 3: I think the concern that you see from industry in 545 00:30:44,520 --> 00:30:47,520 Speaker 3: a lot of ways is that one of the laws 546 00:30:47,840 --> 00:30:52,000 Speaker 3: AB two six fifty five is directed almost entirely at 547 00:30:52,080 --> 00:30:56,240 Speaker 3: social media companies and puts a lot of obligation in 548 00:30:56,320 --> 00:30:59,520 Speaker 3: burden on the shoulders of social media companies operating in 549 00:30:59,560 --> 00:31:06,720 Speaker 3: Californi to identify, route out, address, takedown, deep fakes, or 550 00:31:06,760 --> 00:31:10,080 Speaker 3: things that they think might be deep fakes. And it's 551 00:31:10,080 --> 00:31:13,680 Speaker 3: caused quite a scramble for social media companies as a results. 552 00:31:14,120 --> 00:31:16,040 Speaker 1: How would these laws be enforced? 553 00:31:16,480 --> 00:31:19,360 Speaker 3: Yeah, it's a great question. So there's three different sets 554 00:31:19,400 --> 00:31:22,920 Speaker 3: of laws with respect to the electoral process. So two 555 00:31:23,000 --> 00:31:27,120 Speaker 3: out of the three can be enforced by average citizens, 556 00:31:27,600 --> 00:31:31,320 Speaker 3: can be enforced by the elected officials themselves or by 557 00:31:31,360 --> 00:31:34,600 Speaker 3: the attorney general. And what they do is they create 558 00:31:35,040 --> 00:31:39,040 Speaker 3: a private cause of action and or the ability for 559 00:31:39,120 --> 00:31:42,719 Speaker 3: the attorney general or for a state enforcer to file 560 00:31:43,120 --> 00:31:46,120 Speaker 3: an action in court that takes precedence, so they get 561 00:31:46,160 --> 00:31:49,560 Speaker 3: to the top of the docket for injunctive relief or 562 00:31:49,640 --> 00:31:54,360 Speaker 3: other remedies. So there's not really much of a financial stick. 563 00:31:54,800 --> 00:31:59,840 Speaker 3: You know, in California, we have the Fair Political Practices Commission, 564 00:32:00,040 --> 00:32:05,000 Speaker 3: and for decades now it has had the power to 565 00:32:05,120 --> 00:32:10,080 Speaker 3: enforce violations in the electoral process for pecuniary violations right 566 00:32:10,080 --> 00:32:13,680 Speaker 3: for five thousand dollars per violation. These other laws really 567 00:32:13,840 --> 00:32:19,240 Speaker 3: more give power to individuals, to the elected official itself 568 00:32:19,720 --> 00:32:23,120 Speaker 3: or the candidate, and to enforcers of the law in 569 00:32:23,120 --> 00:32:27,160 Speaker 3: California to bring civil actions and to seek injunctive relief. 570 00:32:27,960 --> 00:32:31,400 Speaker 1: Without these kinds of laws, how difficult is it to 571 00:32:31,520 --> 00:32:37,080 Speaker 1: get social media companies to take down content when someone 572 00:32:37,160 --> 00:32:38,640 Speaker 1: says that's a deep fake. 573 00:32:39,640 --> 00:32:41,920 Speaker 3: Yeah, So that's I think the real question. And I 574 00:32:41,960 --> 00:32:44,200 Speaker 3: think you're going to get different answers depending on who 575 00:32:44,240 --> 00:32:46,080 Speaker 3: you're talking to. And I think if you talk to 576 00:32:46,200 --> 00:32:50,280 Speaker 3: legislators and Sacramento, the reason why they passed twenty six 577 00:32:50,440 --> 00:32:55,040 Speaker 3: fifty five. What their argument is, it's almost impossible to 578 00:32:55,080 --> 00:32:57,480 Speaker 3: do it. I think if you were to talk to 579 00:32:57,520 --> 00:33:01,080 Speaker 3: social media companies or talk to those within the ambit 580 00:33:01,160 --> 00:33:05,320 Speaker 3: of the definition of social media, which in California could 581 00:33:05,400 --> 00:33:10,760 Speaker 3: also embrace potentially certain e commerce companies and others, it 582 00:33:10,840 --> 00:33:14,600 Speaker 3: was really defined to be companies that have outward facing 583 00:33:14,680 --> 00:33:18,600 Speaker 3: websites or applications to consumers or end users, and have 584 00:33:18,720 --> 00:33:22,320 Speaker 3: at least a million users in California in the preceding 585 00:33:22,360 --> 00:33:26,560 Speaker 3: twelve months. So we're not talking only about YouTube and 586 00:33:26,600 --> 00:33:30,200 Speaker 3: Google and x. It's a much broader sweep. So I 587 00:33:30,240 --> 00:33:32,680 Speaker 3: think that if you talk to the social media companies, 588 00:33:32,680 --> 00:33:36,040 Speaker 3: they would say, we're doing this already with respect to 589 00:33:36,080 --> 00:33:38,360 Speaker 3: the tools that we have and with the powers that 590 00:33:38,400 --> 00:33:42,440 Speaker 3: we have and the contractual obligations that we have under 591 00:33:42,480 --> 00:33:45,720 Speaker 3: our terms and conditions. And that's really I think the 592 00:33:45,720 --> 00:33:48,120 Speaker 3: crux of the issue is that the legislators are saying, 593 00:33:48,120 --> 00:33:51,680 Speaker 3: you're not doing enough. The social media companies are saying, 594 00:33:52,000 --> 00:33:54,959 Speaker 3: we're doing what we can when it violates our terms 595 00:33:54,960 --> 00:33:58,360 Speaker 3: and conditions, our rules of play to being on our platform. 596 00:33:58,800 --> 00:34:01,200 Speaker 3: And I think they would also say, you know, frankly, 597 00:34:01,840 --> 00:34:04,320 Speaker 3: there's a limit to what we actually have to do, 598 00:34:04,680 --> 00:34:09,480 Speaker 3: that this legislation abrogates our rights under the First Amendment. 599 00:34:10,000 --> 00:34:14,600 Speaker 3: It is potentially preempted by the Communications Decency Acts section 600 00:34:14,719 --> 00:34:18,120 Speaker 3: two thirty. So I think there's conflict there about what 601 00:34:18,360 --> 00:34:21,719 Speaker 3: social media companies actually have to do and whether that 602 00:34:21,840 --> 00:34:23,239 Speaker 3: stute can require them to do it. 603 00:34:23,280 --> 00:34:27,160 Speaker 1: Also, and did the social media companies lobby against the bill? 604 00:34:27,920 --> 00:34:28,440 Speaker 2: They did. 605 00:34:28,560 --> 00:34:30,600 Speaker 3: You know, if you look at the legislative history and 606 00:34:30,640 --> 00:34:34,080 Speaker 3: the letters that were submitted, you see a fair number 607 00:34:34,200 --> 00:34:38,560 Speaker 3: of letters that were submitted by institutions like the First 608 00:34:38,600 --> 00:34:43,200 Speaker 3: Amendment Coalition, which was arguing exactly what I said, that 609 00:34:43,280 --> 00:34:47,239 Speaker 3: these laws abrogate social media companies First Amendment rights and 610 00:34:47,719 --> 00:34:51,240 Speaker 3: us preempted by section two thirty. You had net Choice, 611 00:34:51,520 --> 00:34:56,040 Speaker 3: which is a trade group that represents many social media 612 00:34:56,160 --> 00:35:00,399 Speaker 3: companies and Internet players. They also lobbied and and wrote 613 00:35:00,480 --> 00:35:04,080 Speaker 3: letters in and protests to the law. You know, in 614 00:35:04,120 --> 00:35:08,120 Speaker 3: the amendment process, some of their concerns were addressed a 615 00:35:08,160 --> 00:35:11,200 Speaker 3: little bit, and then an urgency measure that was also 616 00:35:11,600 --> 00:35:15,120 Speaker 3: adopted and enacted with twenty six fifty five, which is 617 00:35:15,200 --> 00:35:19,160 Speaker 3: AB twenty eight thirty nine, addressed some of the I 618 00:35:19,200 --> 00:35:22,040 Speaker 3: would say some of the social media company's concerns. But 619 00:35:22,280 --> 00:35:25,399 Speaker 3: the root issue here, you know, the first principle here 620 00:35:25,480 --> 00:35:28,879 Speaker 3: that the social media companies are concerned about is hey, 621 00:35:29,440 --> 00:35:34,000 Speaker 3: this is government intrusion. And the Supreme Court, in what 622 00:35:34,920 --> 00:35:37,080 Speaker 3: you know, those of us who work in the space, 623 00:35:37,160 --> 00:35:41,080 Speaker 3: considered landmark. On July first, issued a case called Moody 624 00:35:41,280 --> 00:35:44,840 Speaker 3: versus Net Choice, and in that decision, a majority of 625 00:35:44,880 --> 00:35:51,279 Speaker 3: the justices said that Texas and Florida laws essentially requiring 626 00:35:51,360 --> 00:35:56,840 Speaker 3: social media companies to curate or not curate political speech 627 00:35:57,280 --> 00:36:01,239 Speaker 3: implicated the First Amendment. And you had majority ruling, and 628 00:36:01,280 --> 00:36:05,720 Speaker 3: then you had concurring justices essentially saying that social media 629 00:36:05,840 --> 00:36:09,400 Speaker 3: companies and the way they present information to end users 630 00:36:09,840 --> 00:36:14,680 Speaker 3: and their selection the feed are expressive compilations which are 631 00:36:14,680 --> 00:36:19,320 Speaker 3: worthy of First Amendment protection. So you have this tension 632 00:36:19,400 --> 00:36:24,400 Speaker 3: now between what legislators think might be right for people 633 00:36:25,360 --> 00:36:29,040 Speaker 3: and what first principles of our of our country are 634 00:36:29,080 --> 00:36:30,320 Speaker 3: with respect to First Amendment. 635 00:36:30,960 --> 00:36:34,880 Speaker 1: Now there's a battle over SB ten forty seven, which 636 00:36:34,920 --> 00:36:39,239 Speaker 1: is California's first of its kind AI safety bill, and 637 00:36:39,280 --> 00:36:42,719 Speaker 1: there's a question about whether Governor Newsome will even sign it. 638 00:36:42,800 --> 00:36:46,000 Speaker 1: He has until September thirtieth, to do that. Why is 639 00:36:46,000 --> 00:36:48,440 Speaker 1: that bill so much more controversial than the ones he 640 00:36:48,520 --> 00:36:49,040 Speaker 1: did sign. 641 00:36:49,840 --> 00:36:52,759 Speaker 3: The bills that were passed were really more focused on 642 00:36:52,800 --> 00:36:58,000 Speaker 3: the electoral process, and the AI bill is pretend not 643 00:36:58,200 --> 00:37:01,920 Speaker 3: just potentially, but it's far more wide sweeping and would 644 00:37:01,960 --> 00:37:05,680 Speaker 3: create disclosures or requirements with respect to the use of 645 00:37:05,719 --> 00:37:10,080 Speaker 3: AI is in nearly everything and every aspect of a 646 00:37:10,160 --> 00:37:15,799 Speaker 3: California citizen residents experience with AI. The three bills that 647 00:37:15,800 --> 00:37:19,560 Speaker 3: were passed last week solely deal with the electoral process. 648 00:37:20,160 --> 00:37:22,880 Speaker 3: So something a note about AB two six fifty five 649 00:37:23,120 --> 00:37:26,960 Speaker 3: is it really is also time constraint, So this burden 650 00:37:27,080 --> 00:37:30,960 Speaker 3: on social media companies and in general labeling or disclosing 651 00:37:31,360 --> 00:37:35,480 Speaker 3: deep fakes or otherwise taking them down. For the most part, 652 00:37:35,960 --> 00:37:38,080 Speaker 3: it's in relation to an election, So it's one hundred 653 00:37:38,080 --> 00:37:41,279 Speaker 3: and twenty days before the election is when the obligation 654 00:37:41,400 --> 00:37:46,160 Speaker 3: kicks in and runs in some instances, depending on the 655 00:37:46,200 --> 00:37:49,040 Speaker 3: section of the statute, runs for sixty days after the election. 656 00:37:49,520 --> 00:37:51,759 Speaker 3: So in an election year, when you've got a primary 657 00:37:52,080 --> 00:37:55,040 Speaker 3: and a general, you know it may be in place 658 00:37:55,360 --> 00:37:58,319 Speaker 3: for most of the year, but outside of the electoral 659 00:37:58,360 --> 00:37:59,680 Speaker 3: process it has no effects. 660 00:38:00,400 --> 00:38:03,680 Speaker 1: So someone has to sue to enforce these laws to 661 00:38:03,760 --> 00:38:07,799 Speaker 1: get a deep fake in a political advertisement taken down. 662 00:38:07,880 --> 00:38:11,880 Speaker 1: Let's say the election is in what less than six weeks? 663 00:38:12,560 --> 00:38:15,480 Speaker 1: So how fast can that be done in California's courts. 664 00:38:16,320 --> 00:38:20,360 Speaker 3: Yeah, so all three of the laws create precedence for 665 00:38:20,440 --> 00:38:24,520 Speaker 3: these lawsuits, and in twenty six fifty five, the one 666 00:38:24,560 --> 00:38:27,359 Speaker 3: that regulates social media companies, the cause of action can 667 00:38:27,400 --> 00:38:30,759 Speaker 3: arise very quickly. So what you know, the general process 668 00:38:31,040 --> 00:38:34,920 Speaker 3: is that the social media companies have to have some 669 00:38:35,040 --> 00:38:40,120 Speaker 3: type of mechanism or repository or interfaith on their sites now, 670 00:38:40,200 --> 00:38:43,359 Speaker 3: or some type of email address where a consumer, an 671 00:38:43,520 --> 00:38:46,960 Speaker 3: end user, a citizen, even a candidate or a committee 672 00:38:47,200 --> 00:38:51,200 Speaker 3: could say, hey, this image of you know, candidate X 673 00:38:51,320 --> 00:38:53,399 Speaker 3: is a deep fake. You need to take it down. 674 00:38:53,840 --> 00:38:57,439 Speaker 3: And the social media companies have thirty six hours it's 675 00:38:57,480 --> 00:38:59,160 Speaker 3: not very long, you know, a day and a half 676 00:38:59,239 --> 00:39:02,680 Speaker 3: to reply that and say we've taken it down or 677 00:39:02,719 --> 00:39:05,400 Speaker 3: here's what we're going to do. In some instances they 678 00:39:05,400 --> 00:39:08,160 Speaker 3: have seventy two hours. But that cause of action arises 679 00:39:08,360 --> 00:39:11,600 Speaker 3: very quickly from the time that they are unnoticed, and 680 00:39:11,640 --> 00:39:15,120 Speaker 3: then once that time period elapses, ostensibly the cause of 681 00:39:15,160 --> 00:39:18,680 Speaker 3: action is complete if the action hasn't been taken or 682 00:39:18,719 --> 00:39:22,919 Speaker 3: no action has been taken, and the claimant can run 683 00:39:22,920 --> 00:39:26,800 Speaker 3: into court and their case pursuant to the statute gets priority, 684 00:39:26,880 --> 00:39:28,480 Speaker 3: so they go to the front of the line. And 685 00:39:28,520 --> 00:39:32,000 Speaker 3: so what I would envision, because it fors injunctive relief, 686 00:39:32,480 --> 00:39:35,200 Speaker 3: is that you would see lit against filing for tros 687 00:39:35,280 --> 00:39:39,600 Speaker 3: or preliminary injunctions which also get heard and ruled on 688 00:39:39,640 --> 00:39:40,760 Speaker 3: a fast track basis. 689 00:39:41,040 --> 00:39:45,560 Speaker 1: Thanks so much, Joanna. That's Joanna Rosenforster, a partner at Crowell. 690 00:39:46,000 --> 00:39:48,640 Speaker 1: And that's it for this edition of the Bloomberg Law Podcast. 691 00:39:49,000 --> 00:39:51,359 Speaker 1: Remember you can always get the latest legal news by 692 00:39:51,400 --> 00:39:55,239 Speaker 1: subscribing and listening to the show on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, 693 00:39:55,520 --> 00:39:59,359 Speaker 1: and at Bloomberg dot com, slash podcast, slash Law. I'm 694 00:39:59,440 --> 00:40:01,840 Speaker 1: June gross So, and this is Bloomberg