Speaker 1: This is Masters in Business with Barry Ridholts on Bloomberg Radio.
Speaker 1: This week on Masters in Business, we have a very
Speaker 1: special foreign affairs edition of our podcast. You know, given
Speaker 1: everything that's been going on around the world, we have
Speaker 1: the Chinese currency devaluation, we have Russia invading Ukraine and
Speaker 1: annexting CRIMEA were normalizing relations with Cuba, where in the
Speaker 1: midst of an enormous policy negotiation about the Iran nuclear deal.
Speaker 1: I thought it would be a good good time to
Speaker 1: bring in somebody with a broad and deep expertise on
Speaker 1: foreign affairs, and I was fortunate enough to somehow talk
Speaker 1: Dr leslie Gelb into joining us. You know, if I
Speaker 1: read his his curriculum Vita on the air, it would
Speaker 1: take up the whole ninety minute podcast. He's just an
Speaker 1: incredibly storied guy. Well we get into some of the
Speaker 1: broader aspects of what he done. What he's done. UH
Speaker 1: started as a just a PhD professor at at a school,
Speaker 1: gets recruited by Senator Jacob Javits, was the you senator
Speaker 1: from New York State to the U. S. Senate, UH
Speaker 1: and from there the Department of Defense, the State Department
Speaker 1: to the New York Times to the Council of Farm
Speaker 1: Relations just he called it failing upwards, but let's be honest,
Speaker 1: the guy is just a fascinating, amazing person. UM. General
Speaker 1: McNamara appoints him to the head of the project that
Speaker 1: essentially produces the famous Pentagon Papers, which was a broad
Speaker 1: and deep look at the U S involvement in Vietnam
Speaker 1: while we're still in the midst of Vietnam. It was
Speaker 1: sort of a moment of reflection to figure out, Hey,
Speaker 1: what are we doing right and wrong and what lessons
Speaker 1: can we learn about this for future military entanglements. His
Speaker 1: concept of how to UM, how to interact with other countries,
Speaker 1: the limits and positives of projecting both military and economic
Speaker 1: power quite fascinating. What he has to say UM about
Speaker 1: China is amazing. He has some insights as to how
Speaker 1: their military works, UH and where it works and where
Speaker 1: they've purposefully avoided military entanglements is really quite quite fascinating. UM.
Speaker 1: He tells stories about dinners with Fidel Castro and and
Speaker 1: presenting to the UH generals of Cuba. Just really really
Speaker 1: amazing stuff. I found it absolutely interesting. He is not
Speaker 1: without controversy, UM, but usually it's for for good reasons
Speaker 1: because he says things that the powers that be don't
Speaker 1: like to hear, even though they're fact based and throw
Speaker 1: and time and again have turned out to be correct.
Speaker 1: Oh I left out in the middle of all these jobs.
Speaker 1: He takes a position um in The New York Time
Speaker 1: with The New York Times as a a foreign policies
Speaker 1: correspondent and ultimately wins a Pulitzer Prize for his work
Speaker 1: reporting on Ronald Reagan's strategic Defense Initiative in depth six
Speaker 1: part series. Ironically, here's a guy who never so much
Speaker 1: has written for a high school paper, rights for the Times.
Speaker 1: Wins of Pulitzer just just incredible, incredibly accomplished, unbelievably knowledgeable
Speaker 1: and insightful. Given all the things that are going on
Speaker 1: in the world, all the really major macro uh situations
Speaker 1: that are roiling countries and currencies and economies, and of
Speaker 1: course that impacts the market. Uh, what better time is
Speaker 1: there than today for a conversation with Dr les galp So,
Speaker 1: with no further ado, here's our discussion on foreign affairs
Speaker 1: with Leslie. Help. This is Masters in Business with Barry
Speaker 1: Ridholts on Bloomberg Radio. I have a very special guest
Speaker 1: and the timing could not be more opportune. Dr Leslie Gelb,
Speaker 1: whose curriculum Vitae, will take up the entire show if
Speaker 1: I read it, but I will just give you the
Speaker 1: brief overview as to why our guest is so perfect
Speaker 1: given everything that's happening in the world, uh these days.
Speaker 1: Dr Gelb got his b A and m A from
Speaker 1: Tough University before getting his PhD from Harvard in nine.
Speaker 1: He then taught government at Wesleyan before Jacob Javits recruited
Speaker 1: him to become his executive assistance. Javits was the senator
Speaker 1: from New York and one of my favorites. He ultimately
Speaker 1: ended up becoming the Director of Bureau of Political Mill
Speaker 1: at Terry Affairs. He was appointed by Secretary of Defense
Speaker 1: McNamara as director of the project that ultimately produced the
Speaker 1: Pentagon Papers. He then moved on to The New York Times,
Speaker 1: where he was a diplomatic correspondent, winning the Pulitzer Prize
Speaker 1: for Explanatory Journalism for a six part series on the
Speaker 1: Star Wars Strategic Defense Initiative. President of the Council of
Speaker 1: Foreign Relations, President Emeritus, and the rest of this list
Speaker 1: is too long to go into author of numerous books
Speaker 1: on foreign policy. Let me just stop there and say,
Speaker 1: Dr Gelb, welcome to Bloomberg. Could you be here? So
Speaker 1: the timing is really fortuitous. We've been talking about this
Speaker 1: some time ago, but here we are with all sorts
Speaker 1: of things happening in I ran Uh, Cuba, China. The
Speaker 1: world has just really been um just going through all
Speaker 1: sorts of of changes. Let's start with with your career
Speaker 1: from the beginning. How do you end up going from
Speaker 1: a professor out of college to essentially running the office
Speaker 1: of a US sender. It was a miracle. You get
Speaker 1: jobs initially based on connections who you know where, and
Speaker 1: when I was doing my PhD at Harvard, I met
Speaker 1: a lot of people. Some of these people were involved
Speaker 1: with Republican politics in Congress, and one of these guys
Speaker 1: heard that Javits was looking for an executive assistant to
Speaker 1: focus on foreign affairs, international economics, defense, so forth, and
Speaker 1: recommended me. I went to see Javits and then all
Speaker 1: the rest of the career kind of flowed from there
Speaker 1: because and this is something your your business people, financial
Speaker 1: people will appreciate, is actually justice. I think two jobs
Speaker 1: if you show you know how to get things done.
Speaker 1: You're in a one cent at the top, and everybody
Speaker 1: wants you because it means they don't have to worry
Speaker 1: about doing it themselves. They give you an assignment and
Speaker 1: it gets and it gets done and gets done at
Speaker 1: a decent quality. And I demonstrated that. So the rest
Speaker 1: of the career just flowed almost miraculously and without any planning.
Speaker 1: I mean, when The New York Times offered me the
Speaker 1: job is a diplomatic correspondent, I told A Rosenthal, who
Speaker 1: was the executive editor of The Times, I said, I've
Speaker 1: never even been on a junior high school newspaper, and
Speaker 1: that ultimately, so let's talk a little bit about the Times.
Speaker 1: Although there's a lot of career in between Javits's office
Speaker 1: and the Times. In between. Um Secretary of Defense McNamara
Speaker 1: was that his title at the time, sectors, he was
Speaker 1: a Secretary Defense. Appoint you to a committee. The person
Speaker 1: running the committee, if memory serves correctly, dies in a
Speaker 1: plane crash and you end up taking over the project
Speaker 1: or my misremembering, it didn't happen that way. My me,
Speaker 1: my immediate boss, Assistant Secretary Defense John McNaughton was promoted
Speaker 1: from that Assistant Secretary job to be Secretary of the Navy.
Speaker 1: A few days later, he and members of his family
Speaker 1: died in a crash. But I was at the time
Speaker 1: director of Policy Planning in the Pentagon and another office
Speaker 1: for which I was not qualified. I was thirty years
Speaker 1: old and I had that job. But then within weeks
Speaker 1: of having that job, I was also given the task
Speaker 1: of doing what became the Pentagon Papers, the history of
Speaker 1: US involvement in Vietnam. And we're going to definitely talk
Speaker 1: more about Vietnam a little later. You say you weren't qualified,
Speaker 1: but you were awarded from the State Department the Distinguished
Speaker 1: Honor Award, which is their highest recognition for the work
Speaker 1: you did. So when you say, okay, I went from
Speaker 1: Javits to the Defense Department, and I also got the
Speaker 1: highest award there too. So that suggests that perhaps you
Speaker 1: were somewhat qualified, or it suggests that they give away
Speaker 1: the awards. Okay. So that's the other side of the argument.
Speaker 1: I was trying to give you the benefit of the doubt,
Speaker 1: and um, well, I'm gonna have to go to Wikipedia
Speaker 1: and rewrite your bio. They give these awards out. How
Speaker 1: do I get one of those? Can I just apply
Speaker 1: or I don't think they give him out all that often.
Speaker 1: And to have one both from the Department of Defense
Speaker 1: and and from the State Department, that's a fairly respectable right.
Speaker 1: That's a fairly respectable achievement. So now you essentially oversee
Speaker 1: the creation of the Pentagon Papers, which details in tremendous
Speaker 1: specificity what happened in Vietnam, what the goals weren't, and
Speaker 1: where it went wrong. This was supposed to be an
Speaker 1: internal study, not released to the public. Correct And so
Speaker 1: there I believe there were fifteen copies, some of which
Speaker 1: were leaked, parts of which were leaked to the New
Speaker 1: York Times. That's right, Ellsberg. Daniel Ellsberg leaked almost a
Speaker 1: full set of The Times that he didn't include the
Speaker 1: four volumes on the Secret Negotiations. You're listening to Masters
Speaker 1: in Business on Bloomberg Radio. My special guest today is
Speaker 1: Dr leslie Gelb, an expert on foreign affairs and the
Speaker 1: projection of power and influence around the world. One of
Speaker 1: the things that you've written that I've always found fascinating
Speaker 1: is it's not necessarily just military strength, but it's the
Speaker 1: underlying economic strength that really has a giant impact on
Speaker 1: foreign policy. Let's start discussing that what is the role
Speaker 1: of of the fundamental economic power of a country to
Speaker 1: influence its foreign policy. Economics is really now central two
Speaker 1: power in foreign policy to power in international relations. Throughout
Speaker 1: history it was military power, military force that was the
Speaker 1: main arbiter of things. Big countries made demands on lesser ones.
Speaker 1: If they didn't obey, they got cracked, they got defeated
Speaker 1: on the battlefield. Now, isn't the underlying economic strength of
Speaker 1: go back to the Romans or the Greeks, or whoever
Speaker 1: we want to look to in history, the ability to
Speaker 1: field a large, well equipped, well fed, standing army. Isn't
Speaker 1: that a function of their underlying economy. The economy, of
Speaker 1: course was important in in in sustaining a large and
Speaker 1: effective army, but it wasn't a typical instrument of foreign affairs.
Speaker 1: When things came to be settled between tribes or nations,
Speaker 1: it was by force. If you look at most international
Speaker 1: transactions today, there is very very little force. Historically unprecedented
Speaker 1: little force between nations. They used to go out and
Speaker 1: fight each other all the time. Uh, it's very rare.
Speaker 1: Now you see one nation attack another nation. Almost all
Speaker 1: the wars are within nations, within Afghanistan, within Iraq, within Vietnam,
Speaker 1: and so forth. That's a huge positive development the amount
Speaker 1: of wars and and battlefield skirmishes between countries. So Russia
Speaker 1: and the Ukraine that that's an aberration. Well, Russia isn't
Speaker 1: in open conventional warfare. They sent in their special forces
Speaker 1: and they built up units of you of Russian speaking Ukrainians,
Speaker 1: and basically that's how the war is being fought rather
Speaker 1: than by main force Russian units. So it was really
Speaker 1: they sort of fomented a civil war. Interesting. So, so
Speaker 1: back to the economy. Here we are in the early
Speaker 1: decades of the twenty one century. Uh, the United States
Speaker 1: remains the largest, most significant economy in the world, but
Speaker 1: China is, despite their recent stock market issues and they're
Speaker 1: slow down in their economy, is soon to be the
Speaker 1: largest economy in the world. How does that play into
Speaker 1: their ability to project influence around the world. See, China
Speaker 1: is a perfect case of what I'm talking about, because
Speaker 1: China is the first global power, global great power not
Speaker 1: to be a global military power. China has no real
Speaker 1: military punch worldwide. China's military strength is restricted almost entire
Speaker 1: elite to its borders and to adjacent ceas. Now they're
Speaker 1: building up their air force. They're supposedly adding all these
Speaker 1: different carrier and submarine groups. They're taking a lot of
Speaker 1: their newfound economic wealth and directing some of it to
Speaker 1: the military. What does that meanthing more and more of
Speaker 1: it to the military. But it's almost entirely in the
Speaker 1: Asia Pacific region. To become a world military power, you
Speaker 1: need basis worldwide, and you need the capabilities to move
Speaker 1: navies and air units around the world. They don't begin
Speaker 1: to have this. What what does that say to us
Speaker 1: about China's aspirations that this doesn't seem to be a
Speaker 1: focus of theirs at least at present. Well, that's the
Speaker 1: necessary qualifier, at least at present. What they're doing is
Speaker 1: what China has done throughout its history, really uh to
Speaker 1: make sure that they were the strongest country on their borders,
Speaker 1: and they're shoring that right now. But they in the process,
Speaker 1: they are developing a capability to project their military power
Speaker 1: further than they ever did before. But there's still nowhere
Speaker 1: near it. There a decade or two away from having
Speaker 1: that kind of capability. Now I've seen urgent but just
Speaker 1: to finish the point. But China counts around the world,
Speaker 1: not because it can apply military force in the Middle
Speaker 1: East or Africa whatever. No one even thinks of China
Speaker 1: momentarily in those places, but because of its trade and investments.
Speaker 1: Is there a lesson there for the United States? They?
Speaker 1: They you look at how much we spend on our
Speaker 1: military depending on which study you look at, it's the
Speaker 1: next twelve or fifteen countries combined. Are we hurting ourselves
Speaker 1: by having uh an over emphasis on on military spending
Speaker 1: versus competitors like China. Yeah, it's not the next ten
Speaker 1: or fifteen total equal in the American total defense now
Speaker 1: it's about eight eight or so of the next most
Speaker 1: uh still a big number, Yeah, it is. It is
Speaker 1: a very big number. And you know, the Chinese military
Speaker 1: budget probably is in the neighborhood of a hundred fifty
Speaker 1: billion bucks, and we're still up around five hundred billion.
Speaker 1: But it's not just that. It's having experience and being
Speaker 1: able to control military technology to make it operational. We've
Speaker 1: been in wars, so our military knows how to use
Speaker 1: this stuff. China is much less proficient at it. So
Speaker 1: what does that mean going forward? Is China because what
Speaker 1: I'm hearing from you is China is obviously an economic competitor,
Speaker 1: but not really very much of a military threat to
Speaker 1: the United States interests. Yes, but China is ensuring that
Speaker 1: it controls its borders and the immediate UH water areas.
Speaker 1: And that does mean something because we have allies in
Speaker 1: that area, South Korea and so forth, Philippines, We have
Speaker 1: treaties with these countries, and they feel the threat coming
Speaker 1: from Chinese muscling, Chinese muscling into the islands in the
Speaker 1: South China Sea and claiming them as part of Chinese
Speaker 1: territory and the like. But you see, as much as
Speaker 1: the nations of Asia are turning more and more to
Speaker 1: the United States for security protection, they don't want to
Speaker 1: go too far. They don't want to anger China because
Speaker 1: China is still the most important factor in that part
Speaker 1: of the world when it comes to trade and investment.
Speaker 1: You're listening to mass there was in Business on Bloomberg Radio.
Speaker 1: My special guest today is Dr leslie Gelb, author of
Speaker 1: many books, winner of numerous awards, including the Pulitzer Prize,
Speaker 1: currently President Emeritus on the Council on Foreign Relations. Is
Speaker 1: that correct and an expert on all sorts of issues
Speaker 1: related to foreign affairs. Let's start with a really broad
Speaker 1: question in the segment. Are we entering a new era
Speaker 1: of diplomacy for the United States? It's a new era
Speaker 1: of foreign policy generally, because problems are becoming more and
Speaker 1: more difficult to solve, not just within our country domestically,
Speaker 1: but worldwide, because major powers don't have anywhere near the
Speaker 1: power they used to have, and we used to be
Speaker 1: able to combine with Europe and get a lot of
Speaker 1: things done. And now the problems, as I explained four,
Speaker 1: are less between nations where you can apply that power
Speaker 1: that leverage more within nations, they have their own political problems,
Speaker 1: they have their own civil wars, and it's much more
Speaker 1: difficult for the power of the United States or China
Speaker 1: or Russia or whatever to influence events within countries rather
Speaker 1: than between them. So so you mentioned Europe at one
Speaker 1: point in time, I always I thought of Europe as
Speaker 1: a great power. You look at the history at least
Speaker 1: of of Western civilization, and first it was Spain, and
Speaker 1: then it was France, and then it was England, and
Speaker 1: Europe seemed to be the center of the world. That's
Speaker 1: not really the case anymore, is it. For hundreds of years,
Speaker 1: Europe was the center of the world, and that's where
Speaker 1: power was located. And they went out and they in
Speaker 1: effect rule the world, conquered all these territories, created colonies
Speaker 1: and the like, including us here in the United States exactly.
Speaker 1: And now now Europe is a second tier power at best.
Speaker 1: It's military punch is far, far less than it has
Speaker 1: been historically. Uh. You know, Germany used to be one
Speaker 1: of the great powers of the world, Britain and so forth.
Speaker 1: But now they're all they're really all second tier. What
Speaker 1: about what about the EU as an economic power. It's
Speaker 1: one of the biggest economy is collectively it's one of
Speaker 1: the biggest, But it doesn't do a very good job
Speaker 1: of exercising economic power because the damn organization is so
Speaker 1: bureaucratic and it thinks less in terms of using power
Speaker 1: to accomplish difficult things and more in terms of just
Speaker 1: getting along without creating problems. Quite quite fascinating. Let let
Speaker 1: me shift gears a little bit on you and talk
Speaker 1: about oil. I understand the whole economic thesis that strong
Speaker 1: economy equals strong um projection of power. Let me ask
Speaker 1: a question this way, is the price of oil driving policy,
Speaker 1: or is policy driving the price of oil. Well, in
Speaker 1: the case of the Gulf States, let's say they have
Speaker 1: so much money they don't have to worry about five
Speaker 1: extra dollars per barrel, of extra dollars per bowl. They're loaded,
Speaker 1: So their primary concern is foreign policy. So why is
Speaker 1: the price of oil as low as it is. It's
Speaker 1: as low it is because they're keeping it that way,
Speaker 1: and they're keeping it that way in anticipation of Iran
Speaker 1: joining the oil market again in a major way, and
Speaker 1: they want to make sure that Iran can't put its
Speaker 1: hand on as many bucks as the Iranian leaders may
Speaker 1: may hope, so they're keeping it low. They realize that
Speaker 1: Iran is going to have more money and therefore more impact,
Speaker 1: but they want to lessen that blow. And Iran has
Speaker 1: been a little bit of a troublemaker in the Middle
Speaker 1: East to say the least. Yes, Iran has been a
Speaker 1: trouble amerker. But if you ask me, Saudi Arabia has
Speaker 1: caused the United States far more trouble over the last
Speaker 1: thirty forty years than Iran as So let's let's focus
Speaker 1: on that. That's fascinating. Let me let me just explain
Speaker 1: that because most Americans just aren't aware who on earth
Speaker 1: funded all these Jahadi's al qaeda isis al Nustra. Whore
Speaker 1: Where did these funds come from? Where did the arms
Speaker 1: they've been fighting with come from? They come mainly from
Speaker 1: Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries. They've been financing it,
Speaker 1: They've been creating the problem. Are our big partners there
Speaker 1: from that part of the world, uh for their own
Speaker 1: their own reasons, usually religious reasons, and their their opposition
Speaker 1: to Western values. And you see this most clearly in
Speaker 1: the thousands of madrasas He's are Islamic schools funded by
Speaker 1: the Saudis and other Gulf states around the world, and
Speaker 1: they preach extreme fundamental versions of Islam right and anti
Speaker 1: Americanism and anti American values. So in the last minute,
Speaker 1: we have in the segment why do we think of
Speaker 1: Saudi Arabia as our ally because our government lets them
Speaker 1: get away with it and doesn't make an issue of it.
Speaker 1: But you know, it's a fact that the arms that
Speaker 1: isis used at first came or financed by the Saudis
Speaker 1: and the other Gulf states. You're listening to Masters in
Speaker 1: Business on Bloomberg Radio, my special guest today is Dr
Speaker 1: Leslie Gelb, an expert on foreign policy and foreign affairs
Speaker 1: and the impact of a domestic economy and how it
Speaker 1: affects the country's ability to project power less segment. We
Speaker 1: talked a little bit about UH, this new era of
Speaker 1: diplomacy before before we go back to Iran, let's talk
Speaker 1: a little bit about Cuba, which I think was a
Speaker 1: surprise for a lot of people. No one really expected anything,
Speaker 1: uh from a lame duck president, and yet seems to
Speaker 1: be a lot of diplomatic initiatives that are starting to
Speaker 1: bear fruit. What what are your thoughts on our change
Speaker 1: of status with Cuba. I'm glad we're doing it. Overdue, Yeah, way, way,
Speaker 1: way overdue. And the only thing that prevented it really
Speaker 1: was the power of the Cuban American Foundation, group run
Speaker 1: by Cuban emigres, who really locked on Cuba policy in
Speaker 1: many ways like the American Jewish community locked on Middle
Speaker 1: East policy and on Israel. So they the Cuban American Foundation,
Speaker 1: prevented are doing any kind of opening with Cuba where
Speaker 1: it didn't make any sense. And here for fifty years
Speaker 1: we had economic sanctions against them. We tried to tighten
Speaker 1: the noose around them and every way possible. It doesn't work.
Speaker 1: Economic sanctions can hurt a country, and sure it's hurt
Speaker 1: Cuba a great deal, but it can't bring them to
Speaker 1: their knees. It can't make them capitulate. We face the
Speaker 1: same issue with Russia and Ukraine and we never learned
Speaker 1: the lesson. And when the economic sanctions don't work, people
Speaker 1: start talking about, well maybe we have to go to
Speaker 1: war now. Haven't the economic sanctions worked with I Ran,
Speaker 1: didn't we get them to really dramatically reduce their nuclear
Speaker 1: program or not? What? What's the take on that we
Speaker 1: got them to dramatically reduce it? Which is why I
Speaker 1: think this agreement is a good one. We can come
Speaker 1: back to that we did get them to dramatically reduce
Speaker 1: it UH for ten to fifteen years, unless there's cheating
Speaker 1: and there's a breakout or so forth. So so let's
Speaker 1: let's talk go back to the sanction issue. You have
Speaker 1: a group in America, the number of different Cuban American
Speaker 1: groups who don't want to see relations normalized is the
Speaker 1: reason for that. They have a degree of power and
Speaker 1: a voting block, and once this goes away, their power
Speaker 1: goes away. At what point did they just become a
Speaker 1: self defeating, self sustaining, for no more purpose political group.
Speaker 1: Thanks too long for that to happen. Well here it
Speaker 1: is half a century later. What what what do we
Speaker 1: to make of either of the Cuban American group or
Speaker 1: the Jewish Amerner group affecting these sort of policy negotiations.
Speaker 1: You know, uh In my wife and I were invited
Speaker 1: by del cast Vote to Cuba and we had dinner
Speaker 1: with him one night, the two of us, he and
Speaker 1: his foreign minister or whatever, and and we we were
Speaker 1: talking about what democracy was. And I interrupted him and
Speaker 1: I said, you know, you don't understand that democracy is
Speaker 1: minorities rule. The Jewish American groups of the primary influence
Speaker 1: on Middle East policy, the Greeks on Greek policy, the
Speaker 1: aged on elder elderly. Um. The that's fascinating. That's acting
Speaker 1: gun lobby, the gun hobby controlling guns. You look issued issue.
Speaker 1: Who controls financial legislation, it's Wall Street. And that American
Speaker 1: democracy is is minorities rule. What did he said? You see,
Speaker 1: that's what I'm talking about. You don't have a democracy. Yes,
Speaker 1: I said, what we do because we have the power
Speaker 1: to change the minorities who do rule, and that can't
Speaker 1: be done here in Cuba. You're the minority and you
Speaker 1: can't be changed. He's a minority of one versus versus
Speaker 1: an open That's a fascinating, fascinating insight. What what else
Speaker 1: took place in that conversation with Fidel Castro that was memorable, Well,
Speaker 1: I think almost almost all of it was memorable, but
Speaker 1: the sense that, look, he is a dictator and he's
Speaker 1: done some terrible things, and his brother running the country
Speaker 1: also a dictator. Yes, and they put a lot of
Speaker 1: innocent people away and there's no disregarding that. And they
Speaker 1: did foment revolutions and Latin America. Some people thought those
Speaker 1: revolutions were good, others thought they were terrible. They certainly
Speaker 1: weren't liked by the United States. So I'm not making
Speaker 1: any excuses for Castro, but they they are really afraid
Speaker 1: that the United States was going to conquer them, to
Speaker 1: come attack them, and they had plenty of reason to
Speaker 1: believe that. For Castro was well aware of all the
Speaker 1: attempts that we made on his life. Um. Another meeting
Speaker 1: we had was with the Cuban Chairman of the Joint
Speaker 1: Chiefs of their Joint chiefs Staff, who gave a long
Speaker 1: spiel to my wife and me about how they believe
Speaker 1: we were still going to attack them full scale Americans
Speaker 1: still still to this day. And when he finished, I said,
Speaker 1: I think there is no chance the United States of
Speaker 1: America is going to invade Cuba. And then I gave
Speaker 1: him the reasons why he started to cry. He stood
Speaker 1: up like we being like tears. Yes, and he came
Speaker 1: around the table to hug me. Really, you know, that's fascinating.
Speaker 1: I I don't believe that was an act. I believe
Speaker 1: he really thought the United States was going to invade Cuba.
Speaker 1: That that's absolutely amazing. So we're speaking with Dr leslie Gelb,
Speaker 1: expert on foreign affairs. Let's shift a little bit to Iran.
Speaker 1: I don't get the sense that any of the Mueller's
Speaker 1: are gonna be hugging anyone from the United States anytime.
Speaker 1: Own They won't. Molas are very dangerous guys, really sure
Speaker 1: they are. So who's driving the atomic desires in in Iran?
Speaker 1: I think that the Iranian people from everything we know,
Speaker 1: from all the reporting we have going on in that country,
Speaker 1: Iranian people support a peaceful nuclear program. Do they really
Speaker 1: need that given their vast oil reserves, well they think
Speaker 1: they do. Who we to say they don't. I think
Speaker 1: we could legitimately say, not only do you have vast
Speaker 1: oil reserves, you're in the middle of the desert near
Speaker 1: the equator. If you want to set up solar farms,
Speaker 1: you probably have more energy than you could ever consume
Speaker 1: in a thousand years. Why on Earth would you need
Speaker 1: a nuclear program except to build a bomb. They think
Speaker 1: this is a cheap form of energy. They can They're
Speaker 1: worried about being able to sell oil in the future
Speaker 1: as energy um sources change. That's a fifty year concerned.
Speaker 1: But they are concerned about it. Again, everything we know
Speaker 1: from the reporting countrywide is that there is considerable support
Speaker 1: for having these nuclear peaceful programs. Uh. Not that the
Speaker 1: people are calling for Iran to have nuclear weapon. There's
Speaker 1: no evidence of that at all. None, And even the Ayatollah,
Speaker 1: who we don't like it. It really is a troublemaker,
Speaker 1: keeps repeating they don't want to build a bomb. So
Speaker 1: what do we think. I don't believe them, by the way,
Speaker 1: I don't think a lot of people believe that claim.
Speaker 1: What do we think the odds of this treaty actually
Speaker 1: getting past doesn't require approval from the Senate. All they
Speaker 1: could do is stop it. Do we think that this
Speaker 1: is actually going to be put into effect, Chuck Schumer notwithstanding, Yeah,
Speaker 1: I think that before Schumer announced his opposition, that they
Speaker 1: did a vote count in the Senate and they came
Speaker 1: to the conclusion that a presidential veto two bring the
Speaker 1: treaty into force would be sustained. So Schumer's vote was
Speaker 1: not going to So there was a little political horse trading,
Speaker 1: and well, I don't know if there was horse trading,
Speaker 1: but Schumer could go ahead and make his announcement, which
Speaker 1: I think wasn't based on much substance, uh, without fearing
Speaker 1: that he was going to kill the treaty off. And
Speaker 1: and he's appealing to one of those minorities, the Jewish
Speaker 1: American lobby that's been very vocal about this deal. They've
Speaker 1: made it an enormous issue, and it's going to hurt
Speaker 1: Israel's standing here in the United States, really, including with
Speaker 1: people who oppose the agreement. It will because they've gone
Speaker 1: too far in interfering in American politics. Benjamin net and
Speaker 1: Yahoo speaking in the UN speaking to the on the
Speaker 1: floor of the Senate. You think that boomerang's back against
Speaker 1: Eventually it will hurt. Yes. So we talked briefly before
Speaker 1: about oil, and let me pose a different foreign affairs question.
Speaker 1: You know, the United States has been a huge importer
Speaker 1: of oil for a long time, and now between what
Speaker 1: we've found in the Gulf and fracking, and we're rapidly
Speaker 1: approaching the day where the US becomes energy independent. And
Speaker 1: I'm not talking a century or many many decades. Sometime
Speaker 1: in the next cold five to ten years, we're going
Speaker 1: to become a net exporter of energy. When that happens,
Speaker 1: what does that do to our interests in the Middle East?
Speaker 1: I hope, but lessons are interested in the Middle East
Speaker 1: because I don't, as you could tell from other things
Speaker 1: I've just said, place much hope or reliance on our
Speaker 1: Gulf state allies. They've done some great harm, and I
Speaker 1: think we've you. When you say Gulf state allies, you
Speaker 1: mean Saudi Arabia, Israel, and I don't mean Israel, just
Speaker 1: Saudi Arabidi Arabia, Guitar, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates and the like,
Speaker 1: the people who have funded these jihadis all over the world.
Speaker 1: Where do you think the Taliban got their arms and
Speaker 1: money from they got it from heaven. They didn't get
Speaker 1: it from heaven. So with friends like these, who needs enemies? Indeed,
Speaker 1: So if in the last thirty seconds we have if
Speaker 1: people want to find your writings, where's the best place
Speaker 1: for them to to see your your views in your perspectives?
Speaker 1: In two places. One is the Daily Beast. I've written
Speaker 1: a lot for them over the last eight or nine
Speaker 1: years or so. And in the National Interest magazine Fantastic,
Speaker 1: we've been speaking with Dr Leslie Gelb discussing foreign policy.
Speaker 1: If you enjoy this conversation, be sure and check out
Speaker 1: the podcast extras where we let the tape role and
Speaker 1: we continue the conversation. Uh. Check out my daily column
Speaker 1: at Bloomberg View dot com or follow me on Twitter
Speaker 1: at Ridhults. I'm Barry Ridhults. You've been listening to Masters
Speaker 1: in Business on Bloomberg Radio. Welcome to the podcast extras,
Speaker 1: Dr Galb or Less. As you've asked me, Nicole, you
Speaker 1: thank you so much for doing this. This is really
Speaker 1: absolutely fascinating to so many things I want to go over.
Speaker 1: We haven't even talked about what's happening with China. And
Speaker 1: their currency. We'll we'll get to that in a little bit.
Speaker 1: Let's go back to the Pentagon Papers, which we really
Speaker 1: just quickly touched on. Describe what that process was like
Speaker 1: creating that, what sort of hell broke loose when the
Speaker 1: Times got their hands on it, and what it meant
Speaker 1: for the Supreme Court to issue their no prior restraint decisions,
Speaker 1: if if if I'm remembering all those things, uh correctly. So,
Speaker 1: so let's start with creating the Pentagon Papers. What was
Speaker 1: that process like? Well, it's not like you hear about
Speaker 1: it because McNamara at first started the project to answer
Speaker 1: one questions that he and a few other people had
Speaker 1: set down about ten of those questions were historical and
Speaker 1: the others were about the pacification program, about the political
Speaker 1: process and Saigon and could at work and so forth.
Speaker 1: There were a hundred questions that one of his military
Speaker 1: aids wrote out by hand. Really yeah, and we were
Speaker 1: to answer them. Then I put together a small group
Speaker 1: and basically everyone agreed that we would give the same
Speaker 1: kind of bologny, superficial answers to these questions if we
Speaker 1: just sat down to to write them and to get
Speaker 1: some perspective on it. We ought to look at the
Speaker 1: history of our involvement, sent a memo into McMurray said,
Speaker 1: go do it. Let the chips for where they made.
Speaker 1: So we started to do these monographs, and basically the monographs,
Speaker 1: which very few people have read, are sort of straight
Speaker 1: recounting of the issue. There's one on pacification that sort
Speaker 1: of tells you, document by document, summarizing them what the
Speaker 1: history of how we handled pacification was, or why we
Speaker 1: made the decision to send in the Marines and March
Speaker 1: and so forth. And the only sort of analytical parts
Speaker 1: of the Pentagon papers were the brief summary statements at
Speaker 1: the beginning of each monograph, which I took the creditor
Speaker 1: blamed for in my transmission document. And I did so
Speaker 1: because most of our authors were military and they didn't
Speaker 1: want to get stuck with having an opinion on this
Speaker 1: and that to their superiors. So I took responsibility for
Speaker 1: writing all those analytical statements, which really weren't very analytical
Speaker 1: or very presumped she was they put more or less straightforward.
Speaker 1: So so within that, within the research and creation of
Speaker 1: depending on papers, the question that I mean. I was
Speaker 1: born in sixty one the Vietnam War as a kid
Speaker 1: was always a background there. And the question that to
Speaker 1: this day I still can't answer is, so, why do
Speaker 1: we really go in there? What? What was the point?
Speaker 1: That was the key question because it applies today too. Look,
Speaker 1: Ellsberg created the impression that we got in because our
Speaker 1: government lied to the American people about the stakes and
Speaker 1: what was involved and why it was important. But that's
Speaker 1: just false. It's plain wrong, including Ellsberg himself. Ellsberg himself
Speaker 1: was a big supporter of the war through a good
Speaker 1: chunk of the sixties. He joined the Marines, he went
Speaker 1: over there, and he fought. Uh. The reason we got
Speaker 1: involved in Vietnam, and it's critical that we understand it
Speaker 1: for what we get into trouble with today. The reason
Speaker 1: we got involved is we believed our way into the war.
Speaker 1: We saw Indo China as the cockpit of the war
Speaker 1: between Soviet Union, Chinese Communism against the United States of America.
Speaker 1: When you say we believed our way in, yes, we
Speaker 1: thought the biggest threat to the United States was from
Speaker 1: the from the Chinese Soviet Alliance and from World Communism.
Speaker 1: And just as we saw Berlin as the major focal
Speaker 1: point for this in Europe, we saw Indo China as
Speaker 1: the make major focal point in Asia, and people believe
Speaker 1: we had to stop. I hardly knew anybody in the
Speaker 1: foreign policy profession who differed with it, including Dan Ellsberg,
Speaker 1: including my buddy David Halperstan. His nineteen sixty four book
Speaker 1: The Making of a Quagmire ends with a chapter that
Speaker 1: is the best argument for the domino theory I've ever read. Really, Yeah,
Speaker 1: so we believed our way into the war. But wait,
Speaker 1: so he argues for the domino theory, meaning that if
Speaker 1: we don't stop them here, it'll be country after country
Speaker 1: until it's at our doorstep. And yet the book is
Speaker 1: about in ninety four. That's pretty early to say, hey,
Speaker 1: Vietnam is going to be a quagmire and and for
Speaker 1: the next decade it was. Indeed it was, and how
Speaker 1: important it was to win that David's views changed over time,
Speaker 1: David Albert stamps Uh has did mine. I was a
Speaker 1: supporter of the war. I didn't know anything about Vietnam,
Speaker 1: but to me, it was the crunch point in the
Speaker 1: battle against communism, and it took a long time for
Speaker 1: me to evolve. It took a very long time for
Speaker 1: my foreign policy profession to evolve because we believed in it.
Speaker 1: The same thing happened with how we fight Afghanistan or
Speaker 1: how we fight Iraq. We believe our way into these
Speaker 1: wars because we make these decisions without knowing about the
Speaker 1: countries were getting involved in. You know, on Vietnam, I
Speaker 1: had read one book. I wrote a good many of
Speaker 1: the memos of the Secretary Defense to the President of
Speaker 1: the United States when I was Director of Policy Planning
Speaker 1: in the Pentagon. And I had read one book on Vietnam,
Speaker 1: Bernard Falls the Two Vietnams, and that was more than
Speaker 1: most people they had read. We have no knowledge of
Speaker 1: the place. The same applied to Afghanistan. The same applied
Speaker 1: to Iraq. All of a sudden, we throw in the
Speaker 1: troops as if force is going to solve centuries of culture, politics,
Speaker 1: and internal problems, and it never does. So, so let's
Speaker 1: I want to come back to Iraq in a minute.
Speaker 1: Let's let's stay with Vietnam for a second. So if
Speaker 1: the theory is that we're containing communism and therefore we
Speaker 1: have to project power all around the world to prevent
Speaker 1: the domino theory, doesn't that say we really don't have
Speaker 1: a belief, a strong belief in our own system of
Speaker 1: capitalism and free markets and open trade isn't because that's
Speaker 1: how I always I am astonished at the stop communism argument. Well,
Speaker 1: if our system is so vastly superior, and I think
Speaker 1: history has shown that it is, why can't we allow
Speaker 1: the system itself to support itself. Why can't the benefits
Speaker 1: of free markets stand on their own without military invention?
Speaker 1: Interventions all around the world creating this very very different
Speaker 1: sort of battle. It's an economic battle, not a military battle.
Speaker 1: Or is that the wrong way to look at this? Well,
Speaker 1: it depends on the country. In the case of Vietnam,
Speaker 1: it was nationalism that we were fighting. That was the
Speaker 1: root cause of you know, I was very close to
Speaker 1: an army officer went out and commanded an air cavalry
Speaker 1: battalion in one of the main battles that was fought
Speaker 1: in the central highlands of Vietnam. When you say air cavalry,
Speaker 1: I think of apocalypse now, helicopters round troops. And he
Speaker 1: was the commander of a battalion who was a lieutenant
Speaker 1: colonel at the time, and he wrote me a note
Speaker 1: I was working for Javits at the time, Roman notes,
Speaker 1: saying we we just had first major battle with North
Speaker 1: Vietnamese forces in the central Highlands of South Vietnam. And
Speaker 1: I can't tell you how proud I was of of
Speaker 1: my troops, how well they fought, with such skill and
Speaker 1: such courage. There was only one problem. The North Vietnamese
Speaker 1: fought better. And there are only two explanations for this.
Speaker 1: One as they were on dope, and the other is
Speaker 1: they were on nationalism. And if they were on nationalism,
Speaker 1: boy are we going to have trouble. They're defending their
Speaker 1: own home country and there's an advantage to that. And
Speaker 1: Ho Chi Man was regarded by many Vietnamese as the
Speaker 1: father of Vietnamese nationalism. Uh you know, I don't like
Speaker 1: his communist system or anything like that, but he had
Speaker 1: the monopoly of nationalism not only in the North but
Speaker 1: in the south with the Vietnamese VIETNAMIN forces who were
Speaker 1: also backing him. And when that's what you have going
Speaker 1: for you, it's hard to deal with it. Look at
Speaker 1: at Syria today, you have these fanatics fighting and the
Speaker 1: people we trained for years in Iraq and armed with
Speaker 1: the best of armaments. As soon as the ISIS attacked them,
Speaker 1: they dropped their arms, they took their uniforms, off and
Speaker 1: ran away. So so let's supply the lessons of Vietnam
Speaker 1: to Iraq. First question is the same question as Vietnam.
Speaker 1: Why do we go into Iraq? Nobody really believes the
Speaker 1: weapons of mass destruction? That was well, I wouldn't say that.
Speaker 1: That's so, you know, I was. I was very friendly
Speaker 1: with George Tennant, who was the director of the CIA
Speaker 1: at the time, and I asked them outright at the time, Uh,
Speaker 1: do we have a smoking gun on the weapons of
Speaker 1: mass destruction? And he said, no, we don't have a
Speaker 1: smoking gun, but all of us very much believed that
Speaker 1: they do have these weapons of mass destruction programs. Believed
Speaker 1: our way into another war is that is that we
Speaker 1: just believe it because here Saddam had attacked Iran. We
Speaker 1: didn't like Iran, but they attacked them, and it was
Speaker 1: a seven year war, and they used chemical weapons against Iran.
Speaker 1: They've been using chemical weapons though for a long long time. Well,
Speaker 1: they did have a record of it. They also use
Speaker 1: chemical weapons against their own Kurdish people. And they had
Speaker 1: just invaded Kuwait and we had to fight to kick
Speaker 1: him out of Kuwait. George W. George H. Wright, so
Speaker 1: we knew he was hostile. We knew he was aggressive, right,
Speaker 1: and there was genuine concern that he had these weapons
Speaker 1: of mass destruction? Was their proof? No, but there was
Speaker 1: enough evidence floating around in combination with his behavior over
Speaker 1: the previous ten years plus to make people feel you
Speaker 1: had to go after him. Now, they didn't take the
Speaker 1: next step which they must must take in order to
Speaker 1: have a rational policy, and saying, then, what are we
Speaker 1: going to do? What are we going to conduct this war?
Speaker 1: Nobody doubts for a second that the United States military
Speaker 1: isn't gonna steamroll over the National Guard. But after that,
Speaker 1: and now, the current thesis that I keep hearing is
Speaker 1: ISIS is essentially the reconstituted uh Saddam troops and weaponry
Speaker 1: that laid low for a few We don't even know that,
Speaker 1: we know that some of Saddam's officers are involved with them,
Speaker 1: but that these are you know, Sunnis who escaped from
Speaker 1: Iraq and are now Syrians fighting for ISIS. I think
Speaker 1: that's exaggerated. So so this brings us back to the
Speaker 1: original question. September eleven happens in in two thousand and one,
Speaker 1: we go after Afghanistan, which is where these attacks um come.
Speaker 1: From By the way, you mentioned our friends, the Saudis
Speaker 1: funded a lot of the uh not only the Taliban,
Speaker 1: but a lot of the hijackers themselves were Saudies, so
Speaker 1: so they were very much involved. So we go into
Speaker 1: Afghanistan and then somehow not to by two thousand and
Speaker 1: three we tax some some how we change and shift
Speaker 1: our focus to Iraq. It was was that a prudent
Speaker 1: either foreign policy or military response to where we were
Speaker 1: at the time. It was dumb, and I endorsed it
Speaker 1: at the time. So you you you indorsed it, but
Speaker 1: now you're saying that was after three months, and I
Speaker 1: saw it. That's the fastest reversal of everybody was. It
Speaker 1: was fast. But I was for it initially, and when
Speaker 1: it was clear they didn't have the weapons of mass destruction,
Speaker 1: I opposed it. And on top of it, I saw
Speaker 1: we had no idea what we were doing. There been
Speaker 1: no plan for fighting the war. That that's so so
Speaker 1: it seems, you know, it's it's funny. There's a joke
Speaker 1: about people in finance and and it it's essentially says
Speaker 1: um no tour people in finance or notorious for refusing
Speaker 1: to learn from experience in history, But I it sounds
Speaker 1: like finance people don't really hold candle to military people,
Speaker 1: nothing like foreign policy people and making mistakes, the same
Speaker 1: mistakes over and again, which is why over time I
Speaker 1: developed the philosophy that guides me and thinking about foreign affairs,
Speaker 1: that you're going to make the mistakes, they're inevitable, podcasts
Speaker 1: smart you want because we're involved in various parts of
Speaker 1: the world where our knowledge is slight and where our
Speaker 1: power doesn't add up to our desires, and we're going
Speaker 1: to make mistakes. And the most important thing you can
Speaker 1: do is keep your mind open to the possibility that
Speaker 1: you did make a mistake, so that you can see
Speaker 1: it and fix it and not caused the blunders and
Speaker 1: the suffering that we do when we persist in our mistakes. So,
Speaker 1: speaking of persisting in mistakes, let me ask you a question,
Speaker 1: which was worse the errors in Vietnam or the errors
Speaker 1: in Iraq? Um? I think Vietnam really was. You know,
Speaker 1: we we lost over fifty thousand men killed ten times
Speaker 1: what we lost in Iraq. And people forget, but we
Speaker 1: had five hundred and fifty thousand troops in Vietnam and
Speaker 1: nearly old draftees not a whole lot of voluntary conscripts.
Speaker 1: That's a very different war than sending a hundred thousand
Speaker 1: people who were volunteers to another contra. Absolutely, and the
Speaker 1: ramifications domestically to the Vietnam War looks like it was very,
Speaker 1: very significant. Iraq has created some pushback, but nothing like
Speaker 1: what we saw in the nineteen sixties. I think that's right.
Speaker 1: Sixties really was a revolution inside the United States, and frankly,
Speaker 1: I think it caused a lot of people, two good people,
Speaker 1: to stay away from politics. I think the quality of
Speaker 1: people who run for office today hold office today are
Speaker 1: as good as were when I was a young man
Speaker 1: in Washington. You know, it's funny. Let's let's shift gears
Speaker 1: and talk about politics a little bit. So. I grew
Speaker 1: up in Nassau County out in Long Island, very Republican area,
Speaker 1: and Jacob Javits was my senator. And whenever I try
Speaker 1: and describe and and people on the left and right,
Speaker 1: none of my friends believe me. But it's absolutely true.
Speaker 1: I described myself as a Jacob Javits Republican all right,
Speaker 1: And four quick bullet points, low taxes, balance budgets, no
Speaker 1: overseas adventures, and keep the government out of people's bedrooms.
Speaker 1: It's pretty pretty fair statement those four uhs, because he
Speaker 1: actually was pretty much of a hawk on foreign policy.
Speaker 1: He was a big supporter of the Vietnam War. Well,
Speaker 1: when I got to when I learned who he was,
Speaker 1: he had reversed himself and following the Vietnam War, I
Speaker 1: recall him saying things like, look, if we're gonna project powerful,
Speaker 1: gonna go to war overs ease, it can't be for
Speaker 1: some abstract theory. It has to be to protect uh,
Speaker 1: the United States and not so I didn't. I was
Speaker 1: too young to know him when he was a hawk.
Speaker 1: I knew him as no overseas misadventures. Yeah, he became
Speaker 1: the author of the of the law that sort of
Speaker 1: gave Congress a chance to say no to momentary involvement
Speaker 1: after thirty days. That that's how I know him, as
Speaker 1: opposed to maybe how he began when I when I
Speaker 1: was a uch much younger child. But the funny thing
Speaker 1: about that corner of politics, that on the spectrum a
Speaker 1: fiscally conservative, socially progressive, call its center right political position.
Speaker 1: You can't find that amongst the Republicans anymore. The whole
Speaker 1: spectrum has shifted so much that what was once a
Speaker 1: center right possession position now seems like it's a left
Speaker 1: wing position. Uh so, what does that say? How much
Speaker 1: of that traces to the reaction the pushback to to
Speaker 1: Vietnam socially and just the parties becoming more extreme and
Speaker 1: from my perspective formally thinking I'm center right and suddenly
Speaker 1: finding myself center left. To me, it looks like the
Speaker 1: right wing has gotten the left wing has gotten some
Speaker 1: extreme elements, but the right wing looks like it's really
Speaker 1: tacked to an extreme um political position, some of which
Speaker 1: is the Reagan Coalition starting to fracture and people um
Speaker 1: really tacking to that far right base to to get
Speaker 1: we see it in the primary part. By the way,
Speaker 1: that's the most you're gonna hear me say about anything
Speaker 1: this whole interview. But I'm really curious as to your
Speaker 1: view on how the this political spectrum in the United
Speaker 1: States has shifted. We always had nuts on the left
Speaker 1: in the right. When I worked for for Javits, they
Speaker 1: were there, to be sure, but they were kind of marginals.
Speaker 1: The difference not that they were marginalized, it's that they
Speaker 1: were what I would call five or so national interest
Speaker 1: senators of both parties who if an issue were really important,
Speaker 1: would put politics aside and try to get something done.
Speaker 1: So if it was critical and you needed a law
Speaker 1: pass that in order to solve a problem, they would
Speaker 1: get together and do it. So what happened to that
Speaker 1: it disappeared. You see, they all left party first, so Bradley,
Speaker 1: Sam Nun etcetera, etcetera, youth, centrist, moderate, they all left
Speaker 1: the place because they got totally frustrated with American politics.
Speaker 1: And it began at the time of the Vietnam War.
Speaker 1: The people who unfortunately didn't get frustrated with the extremists,
Speaker 1: particularly on the right. Uh, they decided that this was
Speaker 1: their great opportunity to go in and control politics. And
Speaker 1: they've been fairly successful. Yeah, including in defeating moderate conservatives.
Speaker 1: Which is astonishing to think that that battle between the
Speaker 1: right and the far right is being won by the
Speaker 1: far right. That's not usually it's always been the center
Speaker 1: holds and and that's where the power lays, but that
Speaker 1: seems to be changing. They want it hands down, except
Speaker 1: for presidential nominees. Reagan being the exception people bring up,
Speaker 1: and in fact, Reagan was not a crazy right wing
Speaker 1: president at all. He was a conservative president. The argument
Speaker 1: is not by any means. The argument is that Reagan
Speaker 1: couldn't get nominated today. I don't think he could. That's
Speaker 1: an astonishing, that's an astonishing He raised repeatedly. Well, let's
Speaker 1: he first, he had a huge tax cut. He took
Speaker 1: that top rate way down. He got rid of all
Speaker 1: those crazy you know, tax shelters and real estate shelters
Speaker 1: and all those things, which is why some guy named
Speaker 1: Donald Trump was not happy with him way back when
Speaker 1: UM but slowly raised taxes to balance the budget. You know,
Speaker 1: today you have the pledge UM, you have Grover Norquest.
Speaker 1: You so that center right moderate or or even just
Speaker 1: ordinary conservative, they don't seem to really be finding a
Speaker 1: voice UM in politics today, interestingly divided on foreign policy
Speaker 1: national security, where you have the Tea Party guys like
Speaker 1: the Polls who tend to be touch isolationists very much.
Speaker 1: In fact, he isis caused Rand Paul to back off
Speaker 1: of that UM. But they're very much isolationists. And I
Speaker 1: respect the hey, we're spending way too much on the
Speaker 1: military argument from on Paul Um. Rand Paul seems to
Speaker 1: have less of a commitment to that than his father
Speaker 1: did less because he's running for president and he thinks
Speaker 1: he's got to modify it for that. I think for
Speaker 1: that reason is Dad ran for president and never changed anything.
Speaker 1: Dad was more of a true believer. So so let's
Speaker 1: see he's to say the least. So so let's come
Speaker 1: back to um, the Middle East policy. We we talked
Speaker 1: about Iraq, Um, what's going to happen with our relations
Speaker 1: going forward with Israel? Um? Are they going to be
Speaker 1: chasened by their overreaches there? Are they going to have
Speaker 1: a possible change of leadership? What what happens? There's no
Speaker 1: chance of a change in leadership position inside Israel, and
Speaker 1: there is overwhelming opposition within Israel through this agreement with Iran,
Speaker 1: and none of that is going to change. Obama has
Speaker 1: tried to compensate by offering Israel some arms, some high
Speaker 1: tech arms that he had previously denied them, but that's
Speaker 1: not going to change their mind about any of this.
Speaker 1: And we're going to go through a few years of
Speaker 1: just very nasty talk from Israeli leadership about Democrats because
Speaker 1: of their support for this. Hillary is trying to avoid
Speaker 1: it by as usual, not taking a position strong position
Speaker 1: on it, but you'll you'll get a lot of anti
Speaker 1: democratic feeling from Israelis as far as American Jews are concerned.
Speaker 1: The polls show SI are in favor of with Iran
Speaker 1: and about twenty are posted very much against it. So
Speaker 1: if you have six of US Jews disagreeing with Israeli's
Speaker 1: supporting President Obama, what does that mean for the odds
Speaker 1: of this policy, this, this um treaty actually becoming the
Speaker 1: law of the land. Well, I I think it will.
Speaker 1: At least the people who do the vote atting say
Speaker 1: that a presidential veto will be sustained in the Senate.
Speaker 1: I don't know about the House, but in the Senate
Speaker 1: that's really the only place that matters. If you can't
Speaker 1: override into both houses, that's it. This becomes law. Is
Speaker 1: there any chance down the road that there's a detant
Speaker 1: between Israel and Iran? Is that something that's possible not
Speaker 1: for a long time to come. Look, I've spent a
Speaker 1: good deal of my life working on arms control, even
Speaker 1: though I didn't believe arms control was arms control. I
Speaker 1: think arms control was managing relations with an adversary. And
Speaker 1: if you look at the history of all the arms
Speaker 1: control treaties we reached. They didn't solve the problems. They
Speaker 1: minimize the problems to varying degrees. They lessen the problem,
Speaker 1: or they put the most serious problems off into the
Speaker 1: future where there was a better chance of managing them.
Speaker 1: We've kind of forgotten that arms control agreements are not
Speaker 1: agreements of surrender by one party to another. You're you're
Speaker 1: trying to bargain with another state that has its own
Speaker 1: interests and it's not going to give certain things up,
Speaker 1: and you make agreements to lessen the threat, which this
Speaker 1: agreement absolutely does. Even the critics say the main point
Speaker 1: is well inten to fifteen years, they can decide they
Speaker 1: don't want to abide by this anymore. It's a long
Speaker 1: time as opposed to Tuesday exactly, And that's the central
Speaker 1: point to keep making the people. But it's hard to
Speaker 1: get through when the hysteria has reached the proportions it has.
Speaker 1: There certainly are histrionics coming out, and it's a coming
Speaker 1: up on a presidential election year, which just amplifies that
Speaker 1: even more. All Right, so let's let's shift gears and
Speaker 1: I'm gonna take you to a different part of the world.
Speaker 1: Let's talk about Russia and the Ukraine. So you had
Speaker 1: said previously that they had set up Russian Ukrainian speaking
Speaker 1: Russians and special forces within Ukraine, and we're fomenting civil
Speaker 1: descent the Russians. What's their endgame? What does Putin want?
Speaker 1: He got Crimea, what does he want from Ukraine? Yeah?
Speaker 1: I think what what he wants is to establish Russia
Speaker 1: again as a major power and wants to be treated
Speaker 1: as a as a major power. Is Putin not treated
Speaker 1: as a major power. I think that there's a lot
Speaker 1: to show from a Russian point of you that we
Speaker 1: diminished them, and we diminished them in all sorts of ways,
Speaker 1: certainly economically economically, including in Ukraine, where the Europeans made
Speaker 1: a proposal in effect to incorporate Ukraine into the European
Speaker 1: economy and push Russia aside. It's intolerable to give a
Speaker 1: caution history and to somebody like Putin. The central thing
Speaker 1: about Russians and foreign policy for hundreds of years is
Speaker 1: they like to flex their muscles. They like to be
Speaker 1: the great power, they like to be treated like the boss.
Speaker 1: And they lost the Cold War. The country was diminished
Speaker 1: in size and in power all these respects and then
Speaker 1: you know, here we do this with Ukraine. We bring
Speaker 1: the Baltic States into NATO. These are states that used
Speaker 1: to be part of the Soviet Union and now they're
Speaker 1: under NATO. Uh. It looked like we were going to
Speaker 1: bring in Georgia and Ukraine, and Tonedo was as well.
Speaker 1: And I think Putin has been fighting against all of this.
Speaker 1: Now I wouldn't give him the right. These countries don't
Speaker 1: belong to this, but as a great power, he has
Speaker 1: a right to a say in those countries and what
Speaker 1: happens there, just as we would have a right, uh
Speaker 1: to to what happens in our hemisphere. People have forgotten
Speaker 1: about the Monroe Doctrine, which is a pretty blatant assertion
Speaker 1: of US authority and rights in the hemisphere. What if
Speaker 1: China would open up military bases in Mexico, what do
Speaker 1: you think we would do about that? We would go insane.
Speaker 1: So you have to understand it from Putin's point of view.
Speaker 1: The second thing you have to understand is that on
Speaker 1: their western borders, Russia has military superiority over the United
Speaker 1: States and the West. You see, people don't know that though,
Speaker 1: um about World War two of Germans. If they weren't.
Speaker 1: If Hitler didn't attack Russia, the outcome could have been
Speaker 1: very different, There's no question about it. But here today
Speaker 1: people think, you know, Russia is on its knees on
Speaker 1: its borders western western borders with Ukraine. Yes, aircraft, air defenses, whatnot.
Speaker 1: A couple of months ago, the the Supreme Allied Commander
Speaker 1: for NATO, General Breedlove Americans. Sure. He was on Christian
Speaker 1: almanpor on CNN on CNN, and he was saying this
Speaker 1: to her, that they have a massive military on the
Speaker 1: border and they can trump us militarily whatever we do.
Speaker 1: We want to put a more eight to Ukraine, they
Speaker 1: can put in even more to their supporters in eastern Ukraine.
Speaker 1: You want to start shooting bullets, they can shoot more
Speaker 1: bullets right on their borders. Beyond their borders, we have
Speaker 1: the superiority. But on their borders they've got it. And
Speaker 1: Christian responded when he was finished, Wow, no idea, no idea,
Speaker 1: She said, wow if you if you know World War
Speaker 1: two history. And I don't call myself a military history buff,
Speaker 1: but I read Keegan's book, and I read a lot
Speaker 1: of the big um fascinating stories about what took place,
Speaker 1: not too long ago. I was in St. Petersburg, you know,
Speaker 1: you see some of the old memorials and what took
Speaker 1: place there. Russia always has had a massive European looking
Speaker 1: military force they have. Let me tell you the end
Speaker 1: of that conversation. Now she says, wow, and then she says,
Speaker 1: but then, what would you do about it? He said, well,
Speaker 1: of course we've got to keep up our military strength,
Speaker 1: but we need diplomacy. This is a general saying this
Speaker 1: to the general, And I've had loads of conversations with
Speaker 1: senior NATO generals. They all say the same thing. You
Speaker 1: need diplomacy. You need to work a kind of relationship
Speaker 1: with the Russians where they are treated like a major power.
Speaker 1: You don't give them the Baltic States or Ukraine, but
Speaker 1: you take their interest into account. Look, how do you
Speaker 1: how do you judge where the Russia matters? Russia is
Speaker 1: no longer a global superpower, but they are a great power.
Speaker 1: And how do you measure that? You measure it in
Speaker 1: terms of whether Russia can help or hurt us in
Speaker 1: various parts of the world, and they can. Who can
Speaker 1: help us more than any other country in dealing with
Speaker 1: what's happening in Syria and Iraq. It's Russia fighting terrorism.
Speaker 1: Russia has one of the best anti terrorist operations in
Speaker 1: the world. Intelligence in terms of nuclear proliferation, Russia is
Speaker 1: a major partner of ours. Look, they just didn't with Iran.
Speaker 1: They by the way, fascinating the Russian interest in Iran
Speaker 1: and how much they were really a key actor in
Speaker 1: helping that treaty move forward. They were there, were central
Speaker 1: to it. And in the case of their states on
Speaker 1: their western borders, they can hurt us unless you have
Speaker 1: some diplomacy that takes their interests into account, doesn't give
Speaker 1: them control of these countries, but gives them a say
Speaker 1: so that they're treated like a major power like we
Speaker 1: would expect to be treated on our borders. So given
Speaker 1: you know, if it would have been a president like
Speaker 1: George Bush who wasn't a big believer in in diplomatic efforts,
Speaker 1: I would say, well, of course we're not having any
Speaker 1: luck with Russia. But the present administration I ran Cuba elsewhere. Um,
Speaker 1: although we seem to not be very successful with China
Speaker 1: on certain diplomatic efforts, why isn't this an administration recognizing
Speaker 1: what generals like breed Love says, and and paying Look,
Speaker 1: no one expect the United States to pay homage to Putin,
Speaker 1: but it sounds like he's looking for some respects, some recognition,
Speaker 1: and some input into the decision making process. Given how
Speaker 1: helpful he was in Iran. Why aren't we having a
Speaker 1: better engagement and better relationship with Russia? A good question.
Speaker 1: There there are a lot of people inside even this administration,
Speaker 1: who think they can knock Russia to the floor. Well
Speaker 1: what's the upside of that? Why? Why? You know? I
Speaker 1: think they're just dead wrong. But there're people inside and
Speaker 1: people they consult on the outside who have this point
Speaker 1: of view, and not all generals agree with Breathlow, the
Speaker 1: new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and testifying before the
Speaker 1: Senate a few weeks ago, said the Russia is the
Speaker 1: biggest threat security threat of the United States. So you
Speaker 1: have people who say these things and then they don't
Speaker 1: say what they're going to do about it practically. Yeah,
Speaker 1: you know, the in St. Petersburg, there's a memorial to
Speaker 1: the civilians. During World War Two, the Germans encircled the city,
Speaker 1: which is really very much on the western border. It's
Speaker 1: long before they went deep into the Russian winter. Further
Speaker 1: further east, and they tried to starve the city out.
Speaker 1: And I'm trying to some ungodly number of civilians died
Speaker 1: in St. Petersburg, just insane, insane numbers. And the Russians,
Speaker 1: these are really tough people. They didn't it went a
Speaker 1: year or two. They didn't surrender, they didn't give up.
Speaker 1: They kept the Germans at bay. Not a lot of
Speaker 1: cities could have survived with the Germans put St. Petersburg through.
Speaker 1: Anyone who thinks that you're gonna just shove the Russians
Speaker 1: over and they're gonna topple, you just have to read
Speaker 1: military history. That ain't gonna happen. Do you need to
Speaker 1: go back to Napoleon. That's not gonna happen. But you see,
Speaker 1: it's not just it's not just to Russia. It's we
Speaker 1: thought we would do it with Cuba. We thought we
Speaker 1: could do it with Iran, and none of economic sanctions,
Speaker 1: political pressure, even military pressure did not bring these countries
Speaker 1: to their knees. And what do people want? Do they
Speaker 1: want to go to war with Iran? What do they
Speaker 1: think the consequences of that would be? Did we want
Speaker 1: to invade Cuba? Only some nuts wanted to invade Cuba.
Speaker 1: So I only have you for a couple more minutes.
Speaker 1: Let me go to some of my favorite few short
Speaker 1: questions that I ask all my guests, and then we'll
Speaker 1: we'll get you out of here on time. Um. So
Speaker 1: aside from Senator Javits, who were some of your early mentors, well,
Speaker 1: I would say Clark Clifford, who replaced McNamara's secretary Defense,
Speaker 1: was a a major influence in my life because he
Speaker 1: really brought home to me the importance of thinking through
Speaker 1: strategy before you made your first moves on any area
Speaker 1: of importance. And if it took two weeks to do
Speaker 1: it or whatever, you take that time to do it
Speaker 1: before you start moving. Otherwise you get you trap yourself.
Speaker 1: Sounds like it sounds like common sense, but it's pure
Speaker 1: common sense. But it isn't done. You can see it
Speaker 1: time and again and in decisions made by presidents after presidents.
Speaker 1: So aside from Clifford, let's let's talk a little more philosophy.
Speaker 1: What what thinkers influenced your approach to either foreign policy
Speaker 1: or or economics. Yeah, I would say the Realist school.
Speaker 1: Henry Kissinger was my PhD advisor, are really and I
Speaker 1: was his teaching fellow and his courses there. Uh. And
Speaker 1: and he's a realist. If if nothing, he's a realist.
Speaker 1: And I think that's basically the the framework I've adopted
Speaker 1: in dealing with the with the world. I believe in power.
Speaker 1: I don't think you get things done through what we
Speaker 1: like to call soft power. Uh, that we persuade people,
Speaker 1: we understand their interests better than they do. We think
Speaker 1: our values are going to get them to restrain themselves.
Speaker 1: It just doesn't happen. It doesn't happen. What happens is power,
Speaker 1: where you get people to do things or not to
Speaker 1: do things because you change their calculus about their interests,
Speaker 1: what they're gonna gain, what they're gonna lose. And if
Speaker 1: you can't affect that calculus, you're not going to be
Speaker 1: able to achieve what you want. Pure carrot and stick.
Speaker 1: It's pretty much that. Yes, So we talked about the
Speaker 1: shifts in in politics. What major shifts have you seen
Speaker 1: take place in diplomacy and are these a good thing
Speaker 1: or a bad thing? Yeah. I don't think we've adjusted
Speaker 1: to the world of the twenty one century US in
Speaker 1: the United States, our foreign policy mostly US really Yeah,
Speaker 1: because we have more responsibility than any anyone else. There's
Speaker 1: any any problem anywhere in the world, people immediately turned
Speaker 1: to the United States, and unfortunately, to often we try
Speaker 1: to go respond to it without knowing what they're doing,
Speaker 1: without thinking through a Clifford Clifford's approach, actually give it real,
Speaker 1: real thought. Um, what what are some of your favorite
Speaker 1: books that that have influenced either you're thinking or changed
Speaker 1: your mind about different aspects of FIGN policy. I think
Speaker 1: mainly history books. I try to immerse myself in history,
Speaker 1: mainly to see how things went wrong and on those
Speaker 1: few occasions, how they went right, to give myself more
Speaker 1: of a finger feel and intellectual appreciation of the difficulties
Speaker 1: of dealing with problems that you can't control, where you
Speaker 1: have to use your power, and the power can't make
Speaker 1: things in and in and of itself come out the
Speaker 1: way you want. Let me let me shift up my
Speaker 1: second to last question. I always ask people, um, what
Speaker 1: advice they'd give to a millennial or someone graduating college
Speaker 1: about their career. But let me ask you it slightly differently. Uh,
Speaker 1: someone comes to you just graduating career, graduating college and says,
Speaker 1: I'm interested in a career in in the State Department
Speaker 1: or foreign affairs or diplomacy. What sort of advice would
Speaker 1: you would you give them? I would say, first, demonstrate
Speaker 1: to your boss that you know how to get things done,
Speaker 1: which means you think through the strategy. I'm sensing a
Speaker 1: theme here. You think through his strategy and you figure
Speaker 1: out how to deal with people well enough to move
Speaker 1: the pieces along so that in whatever it takes a
Speaker 1: week or three months, your boss sees you've accomplished it.
Speaker 1: And if he sees that you're going to get ahead.
Speaker 1: LA question, what do you know today about foreign affairs, diplomacy,
Speaker 1: military power, economic might that you wish you knew when
Speaker 1: you began fifty years ago. I think, uh, that I
Speaker 1: should have had a better appreciation of what our power
Speaker 1: could accomplish in different places at different times, and what
Speaker 1: it could not accomplish. Limitations on the projection of and
Speaker 1: what you could do to what you could do what
Speaker 1: you couldn't do. Fantastic, Dr Gelb, thank you so much
Speaker 1: for being so generous with your time. There's so many
Speaker 1: things we didn't get to, but I know you have
Speaker 1: other places to go. Today we've been speaking with Dr
Speaker 1: Leslie Gelb on the impact of the economy and projections
Speaker 1: of power. If you enjoyed this conversation, look an inch
Speaker 1: high or lower on Apple iTunes and you'll see the
Speaker 1: other fifty or so shows we've done. Um be sure
Speaker 1: and check out my daily column on Bloomberg View dot com.
Speaker 1: Follow me on Twitter at rid Halts. I want to
Speaker 1: thank Mike bat Nick, my head of research, for helping
Speaker 1: us out. Charlie Volmer is our producer, and our engineer
Speaker 1: today is Matt Ryan. I'm Barry Rich Halts. You're listening
Speaker 1: to Masters in Business on Bloomberg Radio.