1 00:00:03,560 --> 00:00:07,080 Speaker 1: Welcome to the Bloomberg Law Podcast. I'm June Grosso. Every 2 00:00:07,120 --> 00:00:09,720 Speaker 1: day we bring you insight and analysis into the most 3 00:00:09,760 --> 00:00:12,239 Speaker 1: important legal news of the day. You can find more 4 00:00:12,240 --> 00:00:16,200 Speaker 1: episodes of the Bloomberg Law Podcast on Apple podcast, SoundCloud 5 00:00:16,280 --> 00:00:19,920 Speaker 1: and on Bloomberg dot com slash podcast. It's the largest 6 00:00:20,000 --> 00:00:22,680 Speaker 1: jury award in the US so far this year, and 7 00:00:22,720 --> 00:00:26,280 Speaker 1: the third consecutive legal defeat for Buyer. A jury has 8 00:00:26,280 --> 00:00:29,400 Speaker 1: awarded more than two billion dollars to a California couple 9 00:00:29,400 --> 00:00:32,480 Speaker 1: who claimed they got cancer as a result of using 10 00:00:32,520 --> 00:00:35,720 Speaker 1: its round up weed killer for about three decades. Will 11 00:00:35,760 --> 00:00:39,720 Speaker 1: Buyer reevaluate its legal strategy of fighting every case and 12 00:00:39,760 --> 00:00:43,240 Speaker 1: appealing every verdict? Joining me is Robert Hocket, a professor 13 00:00:43,280 --> 00:00:46,879 Speaker 1: at Cornell Law School. So Bob Buyer is three and 14 00:00:46,920 --> 00:00:50,360 Speaker 1: oh in jury trials. It could be liable for hundreds 15 00:00:50,400 --> 00:00:53,600 Speaker 1: of billions of dollars in damages if these jury verdicts 16 00:00:53,640 --> 00:00:57,560 Speaker 1: are repeated. How should it be weighing the importance of 17 00:00:57,600 --> 00:01:01,960 Speaker 1: this third loss? Hi? Do I think they should probably 18 00:01:02,040 --> 00:01:04,400 Speaker 1: view this as a kind of a perverse version of 19 00:01:04,440 --> 00:01:07,000 Speaker 1: three times as a charm, right, or third times a charm? 20 00:01:07,480 --> 00:01:08,960 Speaker 1: In other words, they should pack it in now this 21 00:01:09,080 --> 00:01:11,160 Speaker 1: is sort of you know, three strikes and you're out. 22 00:01:11,319 --> 00:01:15,080 Speaker 1: They really ought to start looking seriously into a settlement, right. 23 00:01:15,280 --> 00:01:16,560 Speaker 1: You and I have talked about this a couple of 24 00:01:16,600 --> 00:01:19,479 Speaker 1: times before they keep losing. It's not at all surprising 25 00:01:19,600 --> 00:01:22,560 Speaker 1: that they're losing. The merits of the plaintiffs cases look 26 00:01:22,760 --> 00:01:25,480 Speaker 1: very very strong, and the basis that buyer keeps giving 27 00:01:25,800 --> 00:01:28,680 Speaker 1: for continuing to hold out is very flimsy looking. So 28 00:01:29,040 --> 00:01:30,679 Speaker 1: it's beginning to look to me like the height of 29 00:01:30,680 --> 00:01:34,880 Speaker 1: foolishness or foolhardiness for buyer to continue to sort of 30 00:01:34,880 --> 00:01:37,600 Speaker 1: contest these particular cases. They really ought to be looking 31 00:01:37,600 --> 00:01:40,720 Speaker 1: in the settlement now. When the company's lawyer asked a 32 00:01:40,880 --> 00:01:43,800 Speaker 1: juror after the verdict what the jury wanted to hear 33 00:01:43,840 --> 00:01:46,840 Speaker 1: from Buyer, the juror said he wanted proof the chemical 34 00:01:46,959 --> 00:01:49,280 Speaker 1: was safe. Quote, I wanted you to get up and 35 00:01:49,400 --> 00:01:52,800 Speaker 1: drink it now, buyer want. Buyer wanted to tell the 36 00:01:52,880 --> 00:01:56,360 Speaker 1: jury that the e p A concluded last month that 37 00:01:56,600 --> 00:02:00,200 Speaker 1: roundups active ingredient is non carson a j and it 38 00:02:00,240 --> 00:02:04,200 Speaker 1: imposes no risk to the public health. Will that lead 39 00:02:04,280 --> 00:02:08,160 Speaker 1: to a reversal on appeal? Not? There's not a chance 40 00:02:08,200 --> 00:02:10,960 Speaker 1: in heydays of that, I don't think. I mean, the 41 00:02:11,000 --> 00:02:13,000 Speaker 1: thing to keep in mind here is that the you know, 42 00:02:13,200 --> 00:02:15,760 Speaker 1: the controversy around round up has been going on for 43 00:02:15,840 --> 00:02:19,280 Speaker 1: literally decades now, and there's just rutles and rutles of evidence, 44 00:02:19,840 --> 00:02:22,360 Speaker 1: you know, to the effect that it does have a 45 00:02:22,400 --> 00:02:26,359 Speaker 1: tendency to elevate your likelihood of acquiring some form of cancer. Right, 46 00:02:26,720 --> 00:02:31,000 Speaker 1: And so one last minute addition to the evidentiary pool, 47 00:02:31,520 --> 00:02:35,120 Speaker 1: in a pool that has hundreds of documents already, and 48 00:02:35,320 --> 00:02:38,560 Speaker 1: from the Trump e p A of all things, the 49 00:02:38,639 --> 00:02:42,320 Speaker 1: thought that that itself would suffice to overturn all of 50 00:02:42,360 --> 00:02:44,960 Speaker 1: this and change the course of history just on a dime. 51 00:02:45,320 --> 00:02:47,680 Speaker 1: I think it's just again the height of rule heartiness. 52 00:02:48,480 --> 00:02:52,359 Speaker 1: The verdict will likely be reduced the punitives, it's practically 53 00:02:52,360 --> 00:02:57,320 Speaker 1: all punitives, two billion im punitives compared to the rest. Now. 54 00:02:58,320 --> 00:03:00,880 Speaker 1: It also parts of that they're going to be appeals 55 00:03:01,000 --> 00:03:05,720 Speaker 1: in in the three cases. If buyer should win those appeals, 56 00:03:06,480 --> 00:03:09,919 Speaker 1: should that factor into its decision to settle or not 57 00:03:11,320 --> 00:03:13,920 Speaker 1: um it would it would definitely make sense for it 58 00:03:14,000 --> 00:03:16,240 Speaker 1: to factory in where that to happen, but it wouldn't 59 00:03:16,240 --> 00:03:19,080 Speaker 1: be dispositive. And it's also I think highly unlikely that 60 00:03:19,080 --> 00:03:22,200 Speaker 1: it's going to happen. The only the only ground on 61 00:03:22,200 --> 00:03:24,639 Speaker 1: which are the only sort of element of the most 62 00:03:24,680 --> 00:03:27,400 Speaker 1: recent decision that could be changed would be that the 63 00:03:27,400 --> 00:03:29,799 Speaker 1: punitive damages might be lowered by a bit. Right, there's 64 00:03:29,840 --> 00:03:32,359 Speaker 1: a kind of a rough benchmarker guideline at the courts 65 00:03:32,880 --> 00:03:35,520 Speaker 1: apply sometimes now to the effect that the punitives are 66 00:03:35,560 --> 00:03:39,720 Speaker 1: about ten times the compensatory um. That would mean in 67 00:03:39,760 --> 00:03:42,800 Speaker 1: this particular case, maybe cutting it back from two billion 68 00:03:42,880 --> 00:03:46,880 Speaker 1: to one billion, that would still be hardly chump change. Uh. 69 00:03:46,960 --> 00:03:51,080 Speaker 1: And again, given the apparent egregiousness with which Buyer seems 70 00:03:51,120 --> 00:03:54,360 Speaker 1: to have tried to conceal the controversy around round of 71 00:03:54,480 --> 00:03:57,720 Speaker 1: itself from people, the punitives are really prompted by that 72 00:03:57,840 --> 00:04:00,280 Speaker 1: right by a determination that Buyer is not that good 73 00:04:00,280 --> 00:04:02,400 Speaker 1: faith that has been acting a bit like the tobacco 74 00:04:02,480 --> 00:04:08,280 Speaker 1: companies did, as revealed in the suits around tobacco litigation. Right, 75 00:04:08,800 --> 00:04:11,160 Speaker 1: So you know, they might get a little bit of 76 00:04:11,160 --> 00:04:14,280 Speaker 1: a cut in that punitive damage award, but I really 77 00:04:14,320 --> 00:04:17,320 Speaker 1: doubt that they're going to see overturnings of the verdicts 78 00:04:17,320 --> 00:04:20,120 Speaker 1: on the marriage or you know, elimination or cutting of 79 00:04:20,160 --> 00:04:23,279 Speaker 1: the other commensatory damages in these cases. How do you 80 00:04:23,320 --> 00:04:27,760 Speaker 1: get plaintiffs to settle when they see that people in 81 00:04:28,040 --> 00:04:32,039 Speaker 1: cases are winning billions and that might be reduced to 82 00:04:32,560 --> 00:04:36,080 Speaker 1: a hundred million, but it's still a huge verdict. Why 83 00:04:36,080 --> 00:04:39,239 Speaker 1: would they want to settle? Well, that's that's a really 84 00:04:39,240 --> 00:04:41,560 Speaker 1: important question, Jim, that I don't think has actually been 85 00:04:41,640 --> 00:04:44,080 Speaker 1: posed enough out there in the press. But with every 86 00:04:44,160 --> 00:04:47,800 Speaker 1: loss that buyer suffers, the more recount, the more sort 87 00:04:47,800 --> 00:04:51,320 Speaker 1: of reluctant future plaintiffs are going to be to settle. 88 00:04:51,760 --> 00:04:53,920 Speaker 1: And that means that in a sense, time is kind 89 00:04:53,920 --> 00:04:57,320 Speaker 1: of running out on the opportunity to settle, which if 90 00:04:57,360 --> 00:05:00,440 Speaker 1: buyer indeed takes advantage of that opportunity, could save it 91 00:05:01,000 --> 00:05:03,919 Speaker 1: literally millions, if not billions of dollars. So this is 92 00:05:03,960 --> 00:05:06,799 Speaker 1: another reason for them really to start getting serious about 93 00:05:06,839 --> 00:05:10,839 Speaker 1: possibly settling. Here. As for why plaintiffs might nevertheless settle, 94 00:05:11,080 --> 00:05:14,000 Speaker 1: notwithstanding the string of victories that they've racked up so far, 95 00:05:14,480 --> 00:05:16,520 Speaker 1: it just sort of depends on how quickly you need 96 00:05:16,560 --> 00:05:18,320 Speaker 1: the money, so to speak, or how quickly you'd want 97 00:05:18,360 --> 00:05:20,200 Speaker 1: the money. Right, it does take a while to litigate 98 00:05:20,360 --> 00:05:23,840 Speaker 1: to get those bigger UH damages awards UH and so 99 00:05:23,920 --> 00:05:26,520 Speaker 1: you can imagine plenty of plaintiffs being willing to take 100 00:05:26,520 --> 00:05:29,520 Speaker 1: a settlement now rather than having to litigate, even though 101 00:05:29,680 --> 00:05:31,599 Speaker 1: they know that their prospects of winning are higher and 102 00:05:31,680 --> 00:05:34,560 Speaker 1: higher with each new suit that buyer loses in the 103 00:05:34,640 --> 00:05:39,720 Speaker 1: years of appeals. Now is reaching a settlement also complicated 104 00:05:39,720 --> 00:05:43,520 Speaker 1: by the fact that this product is continuing to be sold, 105 00:05:44,040 --> 00:05:48,080 Speaker 1: So as days go on, buyer maybe adding new plaintiffs 106 00:05:48,080 --> 00:05:51,480 Speaker 1: to this pool of plaintiffs. Yeah, I mean, I think 107 00:05:51,520 --> 00:05:53,920 Speaker 1: that's that's that's definitely true, right, I mean, they're more 108 00:05:54,000 --> 00:05:57,080 Speaker 1: potential plaintiffs with each passing month that the product is sold. 109 00:05:57,440 --> 00:06:00,640 Speaker 1: I'm sure that buyer is banking on the proposit that maybe, 110 00:06:00,720 --> 00:06:03,720 Speaker 1: somehow or another, after all of these years, the product 111 00:06:03,720 --> 00:06:07,520 Speaker 1: will nevertheless be quote unquote proven to be safe. But 112 00:06:07,640 --> 00:06:10,400 Speaker 1: that's again, that's that would be quite a hail, Mary Hope. 113 00:06:10,680 --> 00:06:13,400 Speaker 1: It seems to me and the juror whom you quoted before, 114 00:06:13,440 --> 00:06:14,840 Speaker 1: I think it is just the you know, the kind 115 00:06:14,839 --> 00:06:17,040 Speaker 1: of the poster child for the attitude that people have now, 116 00:06:17,040 --> 00:06:19,719 Speaker 1: which is that after all these years, the presumption is 117 00:06:19,800 --> 00:06:23,160 Speaker 1: definitely to the effect that this is a dangerous product. 118 00:06:23,200 --> 00:06:24,800 Speaker 1: And what that means is that the burden of proof 119 00:06:24,880 --> 00:06:28,120 Speaker 1: is now on buy or to show that it's not unsafe, 120 00:06:28,880 --> 00:06:31,120 Speaker 1: whereas you know, way back when the burden would have 121 00:06:31,120 --> 00:06:33,080 Speaker 1: been on the plaintiffs to show that it is unsafe. 122 00:06:33,120 --> 00:06:35,680 Speaker 1: But again, the fact that the presumption is shifted in 123 00:06:35,760 --> 00:06:38,640 Speaker 1: this way, I think makes it even more surprising that 124 00:06:38,720 --> 00:06:44,080 Speaker 1: buyer is not looking into um settling. So um, this 125 00:06:44,200 --> 00:06:48,560 Speaker 1: verdict is coming about two weeks after shareholders expressed their 126 00:06:48,760 --> 00:06:53,200 Speaker 1: disapproval of the way the CEO has handled this month 127 00:06:53,240 --> 00:06:57,840 Speaker 1: Santo acquisition. Does that put pressure on them to put 128 00:06:57,880 --> 00:07:02,560 Speaker 1: aside more money for litigation loss or to settle? I 129 00:07:02,560 --> 00:07:05,080 Speaker 1: think it puts a great deal of pressure on them 130 00:07:05,800 --> 00:07:08,760 Speaker 1: actually to settle, uh, and if anything, maybe to set 131 00:07:08,800 --> 00:07:11,840 Speaker 1: aside money for possible shareholder suits that might ultimately be 132 00:07:11,920 --> 00:07:15,200 Speaker 1: brought against the board and the officers at the firm. Right, 133 00:07:15,240 --> 00:07:19,280 Speaker 1: because at this point it really is beginning to look reckless. Um, 134 00:07:19,320 --> 00:07:21,920 Speaker 1: you know what what the management of buyer is doing 135 00:07:22,320 --> 00:07:25,800 Speaker 1: in continuing to refuse to settle and continuing to sort 136 00:07:25,800 --> 00:07:29,160 Speaker 1: of hemorrhage money in the form of damages that are 137 00:07:29,160 --> 00:07:32,120 Speaker 1: awarded to various plaintiffs. At some point, the duty to 138 00:07:32,160 --> 00:07:35,200 Speaker 1: the shareholders begins to be um. You know, kind of 139 00:07:35,240 --> 00:07:39,080 Speaker 1: come into question here whether the the whether the board 140 00:07:39,560 --> 00:07:43,200 Speaker 1: UH is actually conforming to or acting in importance with 141 00:07:43,200 --> 00:07:46,280 Speaker 1: its duty to shareholders begins to come into questions. So 142 00:07:46,480 --> 00:07:48,280 Speaker 1: if they're going to set aside money, it seems to 143 00:07:48,280 --> 00:07:49,840 Speaker 1: me that they might want to set it aside a 144 00:07:50,040 --> 00:07:53,320 Speaker 1: for an actual settlement and be maybe for shareholder suits 145 00:07:53,360 --> 00:07:56,840 Speaker 1: down the pike. All right, Thanks so much, Bob. As always, 146 00:07:56,840 --> 00:07:59,840 Speaker 1: that's Robert Hocket. He's a professor at Cornell Law School. 147 00:08:00,440 --> 00:08:04,200 Speaker 1: Now a note, analyst at Bloomberg Intelligence have raised their 148 00:08:04,360 --> 00:08:07,760 Speaker 1: estimate for a settlement value for these lawsuits to as 149 00:08:07,840 --> 00:08:10,960 Speaker 1: much as ten billion dollars. That's up from a peak 150 00:08:11,120 --> 00:08:14,040 Speaker 1: of two billion dollars. Thanks for listening to the Bloomberg 151 00:08:14,160 --> 00:08:17,239 Speaker 1: Law Podcast. You can subscribe and listen to the show 152 00:08:17,280 --> 00:08:21,960 Speaker 1: on Apple Podcasts, SoundCloud, and on Bloomberg dot com slash podcast. 153 00:08:22,360 --> 00:08:25,120 Speaker 1: I'm June Brasso. This is Bloomberg