1
00:00:00,240 --> 00:00:04,680
Speaker 1: From UFOs to psychic powers and government conspiracies. History is

2
00:00:04,760 --> 00:00:09,080
Speaker 1: riddled with unexplained events. You can turn back now or

3
00:00:09,200 --> 00:00:12,079
Speaker 1: learn the stuff they don't want you to know. A

4
00:00:12,200 --> 00:00:25,640
Speaker 1: production of I Heart Radio. Hello, welcome back to the show.

5
00:00:25,760 --> 00:00:28,080
Speaker 1: My name is Matt, my name is Noel. They called

6
00:00:28,120 --> 00:00:31,080
Speaker 1: me Ben. We're joined as always with our super producer

7
00:00:31,200 --> 00:00:35,760
Speaker 1: Alexis code named Doc Holiday Jackson. Most importantly, you are you.

8
00:00:35,760 --> 00:00:38,559
Speaker 1: You are here, and that makes this the stuff they

9
00:00:38,680 --> 00:00:41,839
Speaker 1: don't want you to know. It is the top of

10
00:00:41,880 --> 00:00:45,960
Speaker 1: the week, which means it's time for more strange news.

11
00:00:46,200 --> 00:00:49,760
Speaker 1: And you know, I've been thinking at some point we're

12
00:00:50,159 --> 00:00:55,400
Speaker 1: going to we're gonna start experimenting with this, with this format, Matt.

13
00:00:55,440 --> 00:00:58,280
Speaker 1: A while back, you and I just started listing headlines

14
00:00:58,360 --> 00:01:00,880
Speaker 1: that didn't make it onto the show at the very

15
00:01:01,040 --> 00:01:04,480
Speaker 1: end and and peek behind the curtain. You know, while

16
00:01:04,480 --> 00:01:08,640
Speaker 1: we're getting rolling and preparing for strange news, we go

17
00:01:08,760 --> 00:01:11,160
Speaker 1: through a lot of stuff and we discuss, you know,

18
00:01:11,200 --> 00:01:14,920
Speaker 1: like cool stories, is this newsworthy? How do we we

19
00:01:15,000 --> 00:01:18,840
Speaker 1: try to find some variety. Uh, today we've got what

20
00:01:19,160 --> 00:01:24,080
Speaker 1: may be a case of sabotage, what maybe the financial

21
00:01:24,120 --> 00:01:27,880
Speaker 1: future of a nation state and uh. And then we've

22
00:01:27,880 --> 00:01:31,399
Speaker 1: got Mars. That's true. A guy got swallowed by a

23
00:01:31,400 --> 00:01:34,319
Speaker 1: whale this week, and we're also talking about Mars. It's

24
00:01:34,319 --> 00:01:37,640
Speaker 1: pretty event Yeah. Well yeah, we kind of had to

25
00:01:37,680 --> 00:01:39,320
Speaker 1: like do a little like, Hey, we said which one

26
00:01:39,319 --> 00:01:41,280
Speaker 1: should should we go with? And I think we ended

27
00:01:41,360 --> 00:01:44,960
Speaker 1: up with a pretty good crop. Fellas. Um, speaking of crops,

28
00:01:44,959 --> 00:01:50,520
Speaker 1: should we start with the fruit story? Yes? Yes, in

29
00:01:51,920 --> 00:01:57,800
Speaker 1: fruit space space space space. Yeah. So. The New York

30
00:01:57,800 --> 00:02:03,480
Speaker 1: Times recently reported about a week ago UM that they

31
00:02:03,520 --> 00:02:07,840
Speaker 1: published an article claiming that watermelons have been found on

32
00:02:07,880 --> 00:02:12,120
Speaker 1: Mars like fields and fields of watermelons. Uh. Here's the

33
00:02:12,160 --> 00:02:15,000
Speaker 1: quote from the article by Joe schmo as c H

34
00:02:15,160 --> 00:02:18,720
Speaker 1: m o E uh saying a fields of watermelons found

35
00:02:18,800 --> 00:02:24,320
Speaker 1: on Mars. Police said, okay. Authorities say rise of fruit

36
00:02:24,400 --> 00:02:30,320
Speaker 1: aliens is to blame for glut of outer space watermelons. Uh.

37
00:02:30,360 --> 00:02:33,760
Speaker 1: And then it concludes with the lines saying um. The

38
00:02:33,840 --> 00:02:36,960
Speaker 1: FBI declined to comment on reports of watermelons raining down,

39
00:02:37,200 --> 00:02:41,600
Speaker 1: but confirmed that Kiwi's have been intercepted. The story is

40
00:02:41,680 --> 00:02:47,000
Speaker 1: terribly boring. Watermelon taste good? Police say, what the hell

41
00:02:47,120 --> 00:02:51,480
Speaker 1: is happening? I feel like I'm tripping right now, yeah,

42
00:02:51,520 --> 00:02:55,120
Speaker 1: it's a weird one, guys. So essentially what happened is

43
00:02:55,360 --> 00:02:58,480
Speaker 1: the New York Times, Like, I guess it must have

44
00:02:58,560 --> 00:03:02,679
Speaker 1: been a taster some kind of like laurum ips some

45
00:03:03,000 --> 00:03:06,600
Speaker 1: you know, the blazy brown dog jumps over the picket

46
00:03:06,639 --> 00:03:10,960
Speaker 1: fence kind of thing to test layout, right like, because

47
00:03:10,960 --> 00:03:13,920
Speaker 1: there's there actually an archived version of it that I

48
00:03:14,000 --> 00:03:18,120
Speaker 1: found on UM what's it called here? It is called Yeah,

49
00:03:18,160 --> 00:03:21,720
Speaker 1: it's literally just called like archive dot i s and

50
00:03:21,760 --> 00:03:24,680
Speaker 1: it's like laid out with you know, measurements on each

51
00:03:24,680 --> 00:03:27,880
Speaker 1: side like you would, you know, see maybe a template

52
00:03:27,919 --> 00:03:31,720
Speaker 1: for a web page or you know print publication. UM.

53
00:03:32,040 --> 00:03:36,680
Speaker 1: And the New York Times very quickly withdrew the article,

54
00:03:36,720 --> 00:03:38,840
Speaker 1: which is why it now you know, has to live

55
00:03:38,920 --> 00:03:43,720
Speaker 1: on an archive page and printed some form of retraction.

56
00:03:44,120 --> 00:03:46,960
Speaker 1: I've gotta find that retraction here real quick. There's quite

57
00:03:46,960 --> 00:03:49,600
Speaker 1: a few articles about. The most substantial article is able

58
00:03:49,640 --> 00:03:52,560
Speaker 1: to find that I didn't have to pay or register

59
00:03:52,640 --> 00:03:55,480
Speaker 1: for was on the Indian Express um the rise of

60
00:03:55,560 --> 00:03:59,360
Speaker 1: fruit Aliens. New York Times retracts article claiming watermelons were

61
00:03:59,400 --> 00:04:04,960
Speaker 1: found on Mars. Netizens react with memes. Of course, Um,

62
00:04:05,040 --> 00:04:07,560
Speaker 1: so I guess the thing is interesting about this, you guys,

63
00:04:07,720 --> 00:04:11,120
Speaker 1: is that we've been seeing a lot of interesting space

64
00:04:11,160 --> 00:04:14,880
Speaker 1: news lately like that very much pertains to things that

65
00:04:15,000 --> 00:04:18,200
Speaker 1: could that maybe once we're completely unbelievable, but now are

66
00:04:18,200 --> 00:04:21,160
Speaker 1: possibly more entering the realm of believability, Like a lot

67
00:04:21,200 --> 00:04:24,520
Speaker 1: of this disclosure stuff, a lot of these um declassified

68
00:04:24,600 --> 00:04:28,040
Speaker 1: videos that we've seen through the to the Stars Academy

69
00:04:28,040 --> 00:04:31,000
Speaker 1: and all of that. So I could see how initially

70
00:04:31,040 --> 00:04:33,920
Speaker 1: a headline like this would be like, yeah, okay, maybe

71
00:04:34,640 --> 00:04:36,680
Speaker 1: maybe we missed this, because when I first heard it,

72
00:04:36,760 --> 00:04:39,800
Speaker 1: I was I was on board for a second. I

73
00:04:39,839 --> 00:04:42,440
Speaker 1: was like, what cool? Are they underground? Or something like

74
00:04:42,480 --> 00:04:45,080
Speaker 1: how come we haven't seen these before? Um? But yeah,

75
00:04:45,080 --> 00:04:48,080
Speaker 1: apparently what happened was according to a spokesperson for The

76
00:04:48,080 --> 00:04:50,640
Speaker 1: New York Times, um, this is what they settled as,

77
00:04:50,720 --> 00:04:54,080
Speaker 1: give them the the quote. Earlier today, a mock article

78
00:04:54,200 --> 00:04:57,400
Speaker 1: intended for a testing system was published on our site

79
00:04:57,480 --> 00:05:01,400
Speaker 1: in error. The article has since been removed moved, of course,

80
00:05:01,440 --> 00:05:04,200
Speaker 1: it has been you know, archived in multiple places and

81
00:05:04,200 --> 00:05:09,320
Speaker 1: and Google cashed it, so the memes abounded. Um. The

82
00:05:09,320 --> 00:05:12,599
Speaker 1: there's now a link to another page that reads this

83
00:05:12,720 --> 00:05:16,000
Speaker 1: article was published in error. Uh, kind of you know,

84
00:05:16,720 --> 00:05:18,719
Speaker 1: egg on the face. I would say, of of the

85
00:05:18,760 --> 00:05:22,320
Speaker 1: New York Times, who have certainly had a rough go

86
00:05:22,520 --> 00:05:25,800
Speaker 1: of it over the past administrations, constantly being you know

87
00:05:25,880 --> 00:05:28,440
Speaker 1: maligned and the fake news New York Times or the

88
00:05:28,440 --> 00:05:31,760
Speaker 1: failing New York Times or whatever, So probably not the

89
00:05:31,839 --> 00:05:36,040
Speaker 1: best pr uh move for them, But um, it's pretty

90
00:05:36,040 --> 00:05:39,640
Speaker 1: funny and uh, of course there's a lot you know,

91
00:05:39,640 --> 00:05:42,479
Speaker 1: when this initially came out, there were a lot of

92
00:05:42,520 --> 00:05:47,040
Speaker 1: conspiracy theory discussions taking place on Twitter. Watermelon and mars

93
00:05:47,120 --> 00:05:51,280
Speaker 1: began to trend all over Twitter and other social media platforms,

94
00:05:51,640 --> 00:05:54,599
Speaker 1: and um, there were you know, tweets like question, what

95
00:05:54,680 --> 00:05:56,920
Speaker 1: if the n y T watermelon melon story is their

96
00:05:57,000 --> 00:06:01,400
Speaker 1: pre right of the forthcoming UFO report? Um? Because I

97
00:06:01,480 --> 00:06:07,640
Speaker 1: think you guys know oftentimes, um, big journalistic organizations like

98
00:06:07,680 --> 00:06:11,719
Speaker 1: that will pre write obituaries for celebrities, say for example,

99
00:06:11,760 --> 00:06:14,200
Speaker 1: that are like, you know, maybe getting a little long

100
00:06:14,240 --> 00:06:17,320
Speaker 1: in the tooth. And they might also cash or pre

101
00:06:17,400 --> 00:06:19,920
Speaker 1: write um something based on a source that they have

102
00:06:20,120 --> 00:06:22,200
Speaker 1: or or who knows. Let's see if there are a

103
00:06:22,279 --> 00:06:25,160
Speaker 1: couple other ones. Um, we've got one thing going to

104
00:06:25,240 --> 00:06:28,440
Speaker 1: assume that the agents of the Watermelons on Mars got

105
00:06:28,480 --> 00:06:31,920
Speaker 1: in touch and let them know they weren't dead yet. Um,

106
00:06:32,040 --> 00:06:33,880
Speaker 1: let's see what we've got, if anything, if anything, I

107
00:06:33,920 --> 00:06:38,360
Speaker 1: thought it would be musk melons. Nice, you know why,

108
00:06:38,360 --> 00:06:40,120
Speaker 1: that's fine, it's so funny. I've never heard of a

109
00:06:40,200 --> 00:06:42,880
Speaker 1: musk melon. And the other day I was at this

110
00:06:43,160 --> 00:06:46,680
Speaker 1: very popular international grocery store here in Atlanta called Beefor

111
00:06:46,720 --> 00:06:50,919
Speaker 1: Highway Farmers Market, and I saw a big like carton

112
00:06:51,040 --> 00:06:53,560
Speaker 1: of musk melon juice. And then seeing it in print,

113
00:06:53,839 --> 00:06:55,920
Speaker 1: I realized that if you have removed the m from

114
00:06:55,960 --> 00:06:59,000
Speaker 1: melon and flip it around, you've got yourself elon musk

115
00:06:59,200 --> 00:07:03,640
Speaker 1: right there. Um. WHOA, I don't know if that's a

116
00:07:03,400 --> 00:07:08,480
Speaker 1: that's it's it's the thing that exists. We've got watermelon

117
00:07:08,760 --> 00:07:11,880
Speaker 1: taste so good, police say, looks like the n Y

118
00:07:11,960 --> 00:07:16,080
Speaker 1: t need the weekend as badly as me. Um, then

119
00:07:16,120 --> 00:07:19,640
Speaker 1: we've got is it bad? I wanted to read that story. No, no,

120
00:07:19,800 --> 00:07:22,800
Speaker 1: it's not. Um, the Mars rover can have one space

121
00:07:22,840 --> 00:07:27,080
Speaker 1: watermelon as a treat, just a treat that's from true Alvarez. Uh.

122
00:07:27,120 --> 00:07:30,120
Speaker 1: And then finally we've got one from John Christian saying,

123
00:07:30,400 --> 00:07:32,240
Speaker 1: you know what's happening in the New York Times. Uh,

124
00:07:32,320 --> 00:07:35,360
Speaker 1: the National Farmers Union even chimed in with we aren't

125
00:07:35,360 --> 00:07:40,120
Speaker 1: aware of any space watermelons, but we'll double check, um,

126
00:07:40,200 --> 00:07:42,760
Speaker 1: so that you know, it's a goofy story, but it's

127
00:07:42,760 --> 00:07:46,920
Speaker 1: a good example of what happens when are super instant

128
00:07:46,960 --> 00:07:52,320
Speaker 1: gratification news you know, sources get something mega wrong, uh,

129
00:07:52,480 --> 00:07:56,559
Speaker 1: in the most elaborately hilarious way possible. So yeah, well, well,

130
00:07:56,600 --> 00:08:00,240
Speaker 1: okay for a couple of things. The Perseverance Mission that's

131
00:08:00,240 --> 00:08:02,640
Speaker 1: happening right now on Mars with the Rover, I think

132
00:08:03,840 --> 00:08:07,960
Speaker 1: that has a lot to do with this seeming maybe

133
00:08:08,000 --> 00:08:12,240
Speaker 1: plausible in that first moment, even as strangely written as

134
00:08:12,280 --> 00:08:15,040
Speaker 1: the article was, because you guys remember, not long ago

135
00:08:15,280 --> 00:08:18,840
Speaker 1: there were some images released from the Persons Mission that

136
00:08:18,920 --> 00:08:22,800
Speaker 1: were mistaken for fungus by a lot of online reporting,

137
00:08:23,600 --> 00:08:27,040
Speaker 1: and you know, they made it made the rounds like crazy.

138
00:08:27,120 --> 00:08:30,800
Speaker 1: So then you know, I can imagine that this silly article,

139
00:08:30,880 --> 00:08:33,520
Speaker 1: even as a test article, was maybe written in just

140
00:08:34,360 --> 00:08:37,040
Speaker 1: for just like as an inside joke for some people, right,

141
00:08:37,559 --> 00:08:40,440
Speaker 1: and then it gets published. So that's one thing I

142
00:08:40,520 --> 00:08:44,680
Speaker 1: just I imagine, like that's why the lab person reader

143
00:08:44,880 --> 00:08:47,920
Speaker 1: may mistake it for being real. The second thing is

144
00:08:48,000 --> 00:08:54,200
Speaker 1: that it just reminds us. It reminds me how important

145
00:08:54,880 --> 00:08:59,000
Speaker 1: every little thing is that gets published by and an

146
00:08:59,000 --> 00:09:01,319
Speaker 1: outlet like the New York Times or the Washington Post

147
00:09:01,480 --> 00:09:04,760
Speaker 1: or the BBC or you know, the Guardian, anyone, any

148
00:09:04,840 --> 00:09:08,000
Speaker 1: small thing that gets published there, he has taken as

149
00:09:08,040 --> 00:09:11,199
Speaker 1: fact and and rightly should be, because that's what those

150
00:09:11,240 --> 00:09:15,160
Speaker 1: institutions are meant to do. It just I don't know

151
00:09:15,240 --> 00:09:19,200
Speaker 1: that I think this, this snaffoo kind of speaks speaks

152
00:09:19,240 --> 00:09:21,840
Speaker 1: directly to that. I'll tell you, man, the one thing

153
00:09:21,920 --> 00:09:24,560
Speaker 1: that I think a lot of reporting about this story

154
00:09:24,800 --> 00:09:28,920
Speaker 1: is ignoring is the work ethic of whomever is going

155
00:09:29,000 --> 00:09:31,680
Speaker 1: by the moniker Joe Schmo, because they could have just

156
00:09:31,800 --> 00:09:35,840
Speaker 1: Lauren ipsum the whole thing, but instead they created this

157
00:09:35,960 --> 00:09:39,880
Speaker 1: narrative with fruit aliens. It's pretty it's pretty compelling stuff.

158
00:09:39,880 --> 00:09:41,680
Speaker 1: And I was thinking the same thing you were, Matt.

159
00:09:41,800 --> 00:09:45,360
Speaker 1: This is not occurring in a vacuum. Obviously, people are

160
00:09:45,440 --> 00:09:49,560
Speaker 1: primed for news about Mars, and this reminds me to

161
00:09:49,760 --> 00:09:53,000
Speaker 1: a long time ago. Earlier in the show, we talked

162
00:09:53,000 --> 00:09:56,720
Speaker 1: about one of the problems with searching for life on

163
00:09:56,880 --> 00:10:01,120
Speaker 1: other planets, which goes down to the method ology of

164
00:10:01,200 --> 00:10:04,720
Speaker 1: the instruments used to detect stuff, like they vaporize things

165
00:10:04,800 --> 00:10:08,120
Speaker 1: as a way of testing for life. And so a

166
00:10:08,160 --> 00:10:13,280
Speaker 1: lot of people, especially the more conspiratorial forums, are already

167
00:10:13,320 --> 00:10:16,800
Speaker 1: certain that there has been something discovered that That's why

168
00:10:16,840 --> 00:10:20,760
Speaker 1: there's so much international attention on sending something to Mars.

169
00:10:20,800 --> 00:10:24,280
Speaker 1: So if you're already primed that way, and you already

170
00:10:24,480 --> 00:10:28,960
Speaker 1: know there's been so many like false starts or misreporting,

171
00:10:29,440 --> 00:10:34,880
Speaker 1: of misreporting and mundane events, then you would think logically

172
00:10:35,120 --> 00:10:37,920
Speaker 1: that there is going to be some weird stuff found

173
00:10:37,920 --> 00:10:42,120
Speaker 1: on Mars. Now, why Joe decided to pick watermelons, We're

174
00:10:42,160 --> 00:10:45,680
Speaker 1: not going to know unless that person comes forward. But

175
00:10:45,800 --> 00:10:51,120
Speaker 1: look editors of New York Times, shareholders, board members, what

176
00:10:51,280 --> 00:10:55,240
Speaker 1: have you, decision makers, find out who this is and

177
00:10:55,320 --> 00:10:59,960
Speaker 1: give them a raise because they are awesome. They are.

178
00:11:00,000 --> 00:11:02,160
Speaker 1: But also the thing kind of falls apart a little bit.

179
00:11:02,160 --> 00:11:03,959
Speaker 1: It's like they kind of gave up around the end,

180
00:11:04,040 --> 00:11:07,439
Speaker 1: you know, whereas sort of like police say, watermelon tastes good.

181
00:11:07,720 --> 00:11:09,880
Speaker 1: You know, it's like he just like he started in

182
00:11:10,000 --> 00:11:11,880
Speaker 1: or they started in with like, you know, a pretty

183
00:11:11,920 --> 00:11:15,920
Speaker 1: snappy piece of like onion worthy. Uh, sort of joke

184
00:11:16,240 --> 00:11:18,960
Speaker 1: journalism and then sort of lost steam there near the

185
00:11:19,040 --> 00:11:21,840
Speaker 1: end a little bit. But um is that it was

186
00:11:21,880 --> 00:11:25,880
Speaker 1: done in minutes, a few minutes. The whole thing was

187
00:11:25,960 --> 00:11:30,600
Speaker 1: just slashed it out, and I and I agree with you, Ben,

188
00:11:30,600 --> 00:11:33,880
Speaker 1: it does speak to the Uh, well, they's just the

189
00:11:33,920 --> 00:11:37,160
Speaker 1: work ethic and the quality of the talent at the

190
00:11:37,160 --> 00:11:39,480
Speaker 1: New York Times. If you're just gonna bash off what's

191
00:11:39,520 --> 00:11:42,440
Speaker 1: ultimately a pretty funny little joke as you know, literally

192
00:11:42,440 --> 00:11:44,160
Speaker 1: a test when you could have just you know, copied

193
00:11:44,200 --> 00:11:48,559
Speaker 1: and pasted some garbage nonsense text in there. Um, but

194
00:11:48,920 --> 00:11:51,600
Speaker 1: there was some other good I'd highly recommend folks, you know,

195
00:11:51,600 --> 00:11:54,400
Speaker 1: look for themselves at the memory around this. But there

196
00:11:54,440 --> 00:11:57,600
Speaker 1: was a few saying, you know, talking about kind of

197
00:11:57,600 --> 00:12:00,480
Speaker 1: historical New York Times things they do. We're saying, oh,

198
00:12:00,480 --> 00:12:02,400
Speaker 1: I was bummed that it wasn't a full length article

199
00:12:02,480 --> 00:12:05,080
Speaker 1: with like interactive visuals. You know a lot of Times

200
00:12:05,120 --> 00:12:10,200
Speaker 1: New York Times have like interactive infographics and things like that. Um,

201
00:12:10,280 --> 00:12:15,240
Speaker 1: let's see, there was one more really fun one. Oh.

202
00:12:15,320 --> 00:12:19,000
Speaker 1: Of course there was Charlie day Gift saying, giving rise

203
00:12:19,080 --> 00:12:22,680
Speaker 1: to the Martian watermelon truthers. Uh, there's a nice war

204
00:12:22,760 --> 00:12:24,959
Speaker 1: of the World's kind of meme where it's like the

205
00:12:25,280 --> 00:12:28,439
Speaker 1: three legged kind of like snaky walker things, only it's

206
00:12:28,440 --> 00:12:32,559
Speaker 1: a giant watermelon at the top. Um And then yep,

207
00:12:32,720 --> 00:12:35,679
Speaker 1: here's the one from Tony ho Tran. Honestly a bit

208
00:12:35,720 --> 00:12:38,520
Speaker 1: disappointed it's not a ten thousand word feature complete with

209
00:12:38,520 --> 00:12:41,120
Speaker 1: interactive visuals that would have been taken the test to

210
00:12:41,160 --> 00:12:44,160
Speaker 1: the next level. Fellas, there you go. Then I can't

211
00:12:44,160 --> 00:12:48,080
Speaker 1: get this image out of my head of perseverance, and

212
00:12:48,280 --> 00:12:50,480
Speaker 1: I think it was Opportunity and all these other rovers

213
00:12:50,520 --> 00:12:54,320
Speaker 1: on Mars where you like you said they vaporized material

214
00:12:54,400 --> 00:12:58,280
Speaker 1: to test for life. I'm imagining, uh, you know, an

215
00:12:58,280 --> 00:13:03,960
Speaker 1: extraterrestrial species that is like seven to one scale for

216
00:13:04,080 --> 00:13:07,640
Speaker 1: humans are like huge, like huge compared to humans, and

217
00:13:07,679 --> 00:13:12,120
Speaker 1: they build a machine that is, you know, in scale

218
00:13:12,200 --> 00:13:14,960
Speaker 1: in their scale, and then it somehow makes its way

219
00:13:14,960 --> 00:13:18,439
Speaker 1: to Earth. It's it's unmanned or aliened however you want

220
00:13:18,440 --> 00:13:21,920
Speaker 1: to put that, and then it just scoops up some

221
00:13:21,960 --> 00:13:24,839
Speaker 1: soil in a part of a house and just vaporizes

222
00:13:24,880 --> 00:13:27,720
Speaker 1: it to test it. Oh, there was some organic material

223
00:13:27,800 --> 00:13:31,320
Speaker 1: in there, all right, that's the That's one of the

224
00:13:31,360 --> 00:13:35,960
Speaker 1: big concerns, right, because you can have a you can

225
00:13:36,040 --> 00:13:40,240
Speaker 1: have a pretty good idea of what you might encounter,

226
00:13:40,559 --> 00:13:42,760
Speaker 1: right and get a wish list of stuff you would

227
00:13:43,120 --> 00:13:45,600
Speaker 1: want to encounter. But it's important to note that the

228
00:13:45,800 --> 00:13:50,840
Speaker 1: scientists who are conducting this research are very cautious about

229
00:13:50,920 --> 00:13:54,200
Speaker 1: getting anybody's hopes up or being misquoted, because they know

230
00:13:54,280 --> 00:13:59,800
Speaker 1: they'll inevitably be misquoted. Uh. They in their minds, the

231
00:14:00,040 --> 00:14:03,720
Speaker 1: best thing to do is to not necessarily look for life,

232
00:14:03,880 --> 00:14:07,200
Speaker 1: but to look for components that would be indicative of

233
00:14:07,800 --> 00:14:12,120
Speaker 1: a past possibility of life or maybe a future possibility

234
00:14:12,160 --> 00:14:14,480
Speaker 1: of life and other You know, once you get past

235
00:14:14,559 --> 00:14:17,040
Speaker 1: that point, they may feel like they're getting a little

236
00:14:17,080 --> 00:14:20,080
Speaker 1: to science fiction e. But I did want to add

237
00:14:20,080 --> 00:14:23,160
Speaker 1: on one last note for anybody's disappointed that there are

238
00:14:23,200 --> 00:14:27,680
Speaker 1: actually no watermelons on Mars. If you want space fruit,

239
00:14:28,120 --> 00:14:31,560
Speaker 1: you can try it here on Earth. Space fruit is

240
00:14:31,600 --> 00:14:36,040
Speaker 1: the name of the fruit centric dipping dots series available

241
00:14:36,080 --> 00:14:39,280
Speaker 1: at a tourists tourist trap. Can I say tourist trap

242
00:14:39,560 --> 00:14:44,440
Speaker 1: at a tourist uh venue near you? So it's not

243
00:14:44,520 --> 00:14:47,280
Speaker 1: white Mars, but you can you can get a taste

244
00:14:47,280 --> 00:14:51,760
Speaker 1: of space fruit. That's amazing. Yeah, I wonder what it

245
00:14:51,800 --> 00:14:55,840
Speaker 1: tastes like like cosmic so I don't know, cosmic dust.

246
00:14:56,000 --> 00:14:58,200
Speaker 1: Perhaps it seems like it would be dangerous. I wouldn't

247
00:14:58,200 --> 00:15:00,000
Speaker 1: want to eat something that was grown in an alien

248
00:15:00,120 --> 00:15:05,520
Speaker 1: planet and completely unknown, you know, conditions right to kill

249
00:15:05,560 --> 00:15:08,920
Speaker 1: you dead. Also, you know, watermelons like you think there

250
00:15:08,920 --> 00:15:11,480
Speaker 1: would be like some other like indigenous fruit to Mars,

251
00:15:12,160 --> 00:15:16,400
Speaker 1: unless maybe previous expeditions had planted seeds that had only

252
00:15:16,440 --> 00:15:18,680
Speaker 1: just now started to sprout because of the way time

253
00:15:18,720 --> 00:15:22,120
Speaker 1: moves in space. Um, just a theory, Just a theory.

254
00:15:22,560 --> 00:15:24,600
Speaker 1: But um, yeah, I don't know, guys, anything else. I

255
00:15:24,640 --> 00:15:26,880
Speaker 1: think we could probably move on. Just a shout out

256
00:15:26,960 --> 00:15:29,840
Speaker 1: to one of the it's I think he's the user

257
00:15:29,920 --> 00:15:33,080
Speaker 1: interface developer or one of the user interface developers there

258
00:15:33,200 --> 00:15:37,000
Speaker 1: at NASA. His name is Parker Apper Crumbie. What a name.

259
00:15:37,200 --> 00:15:39,080
Speaker 1: It's a great name. Just shout out to you, Parker.

260
00:15:41,320 --> 00:15:44,560
Speaker 1: You can just tell. Or he also can just wear

261
00:15:44,600 --> 00:15:48,160
Speaker 1: Abercrombie and Fitch clothes and it'll, you know, like it's monogramed,

262
00:15:48,520 --> 00:15:50,840
Speaker 1: like it's everything's got his name on it. Um, all right,

263
00:15:50,880 --> 00:15:52,840
Speaker 1: we're gonna take a quick break for a sponsor and

264
00:15:52,880 --> 00:16:04,000
Speaker 1: then be back with more strange news. And we have returned.

265
00:16:04,480 --> 00:16:07,840
Speaker 1: Before I take us to Central America, where our second

266
00:16:07,840 --> 00:16:11,120
Speaker 1: story takes place, I would like to make a public

267
00:16:11,160 --> 00:16:15,200
Speaker 1: service announcement for all our fellow conspiracy realists who are

268
00:16:15,320 --> 00:16:20,000
Speaker 1: not yet aware of this. Leonard dim Mooi is known

269
00:16:20,240 --> 00:16:25,280
Speaker 1: as an actor right famously playing Spock on the Star

270
00:16:25,320 --> 00:16:29,600
Speaker 1: Trek franchise, but he is also a musician. He doesn't

271
00:16:29,600 --> 00:16:31,520
Speaker 1: get enough credit. And I know there's a question on

272
00:16:31,560 --> 00:16:34,720
Speaker 1: a lot of people's minds right now, what is the

273
00:16:34,840 --> 00:16:39,080
Speaker 1: album Two Sides of Leonard Nimoy about. Well, let's dispel

274
00:16:39,160 --> 00:16:42,200
Speaker 1: the myths right here. It's not necessarily about him being Spot,

275
00:16:42,520 --> 00:16:45,920
Speaker 1: but it is a continuation of his earlier album, Spock

276
00:16:46,120 --> 00:16:50,200
Speaker 1: and Space, which is his debut album. Okay, so now

277
00:16:50,320 --> 00:16:54,040
Speaker 1: I think we've cleared that up right, everybody. Everybody could

278
00:16:54,040 --> 00:16:56,920
Speaker 1: breathe a little bit easier. Attentions were running high. I

279
00:16:57,000 --> 00:17:00,560
Speaker 1: was discussing this in the middle of film The End

280
00:17:00,600 --> 00:17:12,560
Speaker 1: of the Shire. It's been a weird weekend. Uh yes, wagons, Yes,

281
00:17:12,760 --> 00:17:18,639
Speaker 1: the Wildfront though it is closed sonically, uh so, do

282
00:17:18,840 --> 00:17:21,879
Speaker 1: check that out. It does ViRGE into levels of shot

283
00:17:21,920 --> 00:17:25,840
Speaker 1: and aresque rocketman greatness. But while you are checking that

284
00:17:25,880 --> 00:17:29,639
Speaker 1: out now, while you are feverishly downloading the album on

285
00:17:29,720 --> 00:17:34,520
Speaker 1: your platform of choice. Journey with us to something completely

286
00:17:34,600 --> 00:17:38,280
Speaker 1: unrelated as far as I know, which is El Salvador.

287
00:17:38,440 --> 00:17:43,399
Speaker 1: So previously we reported on some it's pretty horrific things

288
00:17:43,800 --> 00:17:46,800
Speaker 1: and El Salvador, and I realized that this country, being

289
00:17:46,800 --> 00:17:50,760
Speaker 1: a relatively small place, doesn't get a lot of news coverage,

290
00:17:50,920 --> 00:17:53,560
Speaker 1: so I didn't want to leave us all with this.

291
00:17:53,920 --> 00:17:58,280
Speaker 1: Um this skewed negative view of El Salvador, especially for

292
00:17:58,280 --> 00:18:01,960
Speaker 1: anybody who's never been there. So I'd like to to

293
00:18:02,000 --> 00:18:06,280
Speaker 1: explore this one. El Salvador maybe one of the one

294
00:18:06,320 --> 00:18:09,200
Speaker 1: of the vanguards, one of the heralds of a new

295
00:18:09,320 --> 00:18:13,600
Speaker 1: age in currency. As we record, El Salvador is set

296
00:18:13,680 --> 00:18:18,240
Speaker 1: to become the world's first nation to adopt bitcoin as

297
00:18:18,400 --> 00:18:21,960
Speaker 1: legal tender. This could be big, this could be weird.

298
00:18:22,359 --> 00:18:25,800
Speaker 1: But initially just off that headline, what do you guys think?

299
00:18:25,840 --> 00:18:29,080
Speaker 1: What are your what are your thoughts? I mean good,

300
00:18:29,160 --> 00:18:34,639
Speaker 1: good for beholders of bitcoin? Well yeah, sort of. I

301
00:18:34,640 --> 00:18:38,080
Speaker 1: mean it's so weird, the whole scene with the crypto thing,

302
00:18:38,200 --> 00:18:41,119
Speaker 1: like a word from Elon Musk can like take in

303
00:18:41,160 --> 00:18:43,800
Speaker 1: the day. You know, it's it's a little bit sketchy.

304
00:18:43,960 --> 00:18:47,080
Speaker 1: And news like this. You know, but what's the deal

305
00:18:47,119 --> 00:18:49,520
Speaker 1: with the government of El Salvador. Isn't it considers somewhat

306
00:18:49,680 --> 00:18:54,600
Speaker 1: uh corrupt? Or isn't there isn't that an issue? Well, yes,

307
00:18:54,720 --> 00:18:57,920
Speaker 1: that is correct, depending on especially if you listen to

308
00:18:58,000 --> 00:19:01,719
Speaker 1: the political opponents it. Then the more cynical of us

309
00:19:01,720 --> 00:19:04,479
Speaker 1: in the audience could easily argue that every government is

310
00:19:04,520 --> 00:19:08,240
Speaker 1: to a degree corrupt, even the really really squeaky clean

311
00:19:08,240 --> 00:19:13,040
Speaker 1: ones like Singapore. But in this case, what was not

312
00:19:13,119 --> 00:19:18,520
Speaker 1: a joke? Well, uh yeah, well no, kind of It

313
00:19:18,560 --> 00:19:21,000
Speaker 1: depends on what kind of corruption we're talking about. Are

314
00:19:21,000 --> 00:19:24,480
Speaker 1: you talking about a country where it's like accepted to

315
00:19:25,040 --> 00:19:28,040
Speaker 1: bribe police that's a standard operating procedure, or are we

316
00:19:28,080 --> 00:19:32,760
Speaker 1: talking about a country like the US where private contractors

317
00:19:32,800 --> 00:19:36,280
Speaker 1: make billions of dollars a year based entirely on nepotism

318
00:19:36,480 --> 00:19:41,719
Speaker 1: and the relationship with politicians. Now, and it's totally good point. Then,

319
00:19:41,760 --> 00:19:44,800
Speaker 1: I mean there's there every corruption as comes in many

320
00:19:45,200 --> 00:19:47,240
Speaker 1: shapes and flavors. And I guess when I think of

321
00:19:47,400 --> 00:19:51,000
Speaker 1: the types of corruption that exists in maybe some South

322
00:19:51,000 --> 00:19:53,120
Speaker 1: American countries like that, I think it's a little more

323
00:19:53,160 --> 00:19:57,080
Speaker 1: off the books, greasing palms people trying to enrich themselves

324
00:19:57,440 --> 00:19:59,520
Speaker 1: by making back room deals. But then you're right when

325
00:19:59,520 --> 00:20:01,880
Speaker 1: I say that, Allow, how is that any different than

326
00:20:01,920 --> 00:20:04,800
Speaker 1: just the more official version of it that happens here

327
00:20:04,800 --> 00:20:08,120
Speaker 1: in the United States, It's really not so uh point taken? Ben,

328
00:20:08,200 --> 00:20:11,159
Speaker 1: point taking? May I just jump back to you. You

329
00:20:11,160 --> 00:20:12,919
Speaker 1: asked that question earlier, Ben, and I'm sorry. I've been

330
00:20:12,920 --> 00:20:15,480
Speaker 1: thinking about it, um, Like, what do we actually think

331
00:20:15,560 --> 00:20:18,320
Speaker 1: about all of this? My initial thought was, how do

332
00:20:18,400 --> 00:20:21,920
Speaker 1: you get enough El Salvadorians or like just the citizens

333
00:20:21,920 --> 00:20:26,800
Speaker 1: of El Salvador to adopt bitcoin to make this I

334
00:20:26,800 --> 00:20:29,080
Speaker 1: don't know we're worthy of a major announcement, worthy of

335
00:20:29,080 --> 00:20:32,800
Speaker 1: a major push to incorporate bitcoin along with you know,

336
00:20:32,960 --> 00:20:36,800
Speaker 1: US dollars as their legal tender, Like, how how do

337
00:20:36,880 --> 00:20:39,400
Speaker 1: you do that? And it seems as though what you're

338
00:20:39,400 --> 00:20:41,399
Speaker 1: going to tell us here is that there's a partnership

339
00:20:41,440 --> 00:20:45,880
Speaker 1: of some kind that's happening beyond just announcing that, Hey,

340
00:20:45,960 --> 00:20:50,080
Speaker 1: we're going to accept bitcoin now as legal tender. Yeah,

341
00:20:50,119 --> 00:20:52,560
Speaker 1: that's that's a good question. In your spot on the

342
00:20:52,680 --> 00:20:57,199
Speaker 1: US dollar is legal tender in El Salvador And for

343
00:20:57,400 --> 00:21:01,200
Speaker 1: people who are supporting this plan, uh, a huge factor

344
00:21:01,680 --> 00:21:07,080
Speaker 1: in their logic is uh, the commission fees on remittances abroad,

345
00:21:07,800 --> 00:21:10,760
Speaker 1: So these if someone is sending money from a different

346
00:21:10,800 --> 00:21:13,880
Speaker 1: country to El Salvador, you know, just wiring it down,

347
00:21:14,240 --> 00:21:17,760
Speaker 1: then those commissions on just moving the money around can

348
00:21:17,800 --> 00:21:22,919
Speaker 1: cover like of the principal cost. So with this, with

349
00:21:23,000 --> 00:21:26,640
Speaker 1: a decentralized currency, the idea would be for the average

350
00:21:26,640 --> 00:21:29,239
Speaker 1: person that you can maybe cut down on some of

351
00:21:29,240 --> 00:21:32,080
Speaker 1: those fees and then you know, like you said, Nol

352
00:21:32,200 --> 00:21:36,760
Speaker 1: for the people who are more like alt coin enthusiasts,

353
00:21:36,760 --> 00:21:41,399
Speaker 1: they're very interested in the technological aspects of it. This

354
00:21:41,560 --> 00:21:45,520
Speaker 1: is a great science experiment. Now will it work out?

355
00:21:46,520 --> 00:21:49,160
Speaker 1: Goes back to how you feel about the government, because yes,

356
00:21:49,280 --> 00:21:53,560
Speaker 1: El Salvador has had a lot of criticism for the

357
00:21:53,640 --> 00:21:58,200
Speaker 1: current administration. And then also this is completely this is

358
00:21:58,280 --> 00:22:01,560
Speaker 1: completely new territory. It's kind of surprising that El Salvador

359
00:22:01,640 --> 00:22:05,240
Speaker 1: would be the first country to step into the future here.

360
00:22:05,240 --> 00:22:08,159
Speaker 1: And the question is are they going to be in

361
00:22:08,200 --> 00:22:11,800
Speaker 1: an advantageous position or are they going to be more

362
00:22:11,920 --> 00:22:14,800
Speaker 1: like guinea pigs. At this point, I guess that what

363
00:22:14,880 --> 00:22:17,080
Speaker 1: I was getting at the some of the criticism behind

364
00:22:17,880 --> 00:22:21,520
Speaker 1: adoption of bitcoin or cryptocurrencies in general, is that it's

365
00:22:21,560 --> 00:22:23,960
Speaker 1: so easy to use for like money laundering, it's so

366
00:22:24,000 --> 00:22:27,960
Speaker 1: easy to use for illegal activities, and that's I think

367
00:22:28,000 --> 00:22:30,320
Speaker 1: what I was asking. I'm sorry if if it's a

368
00:22:30,359 --> 00:22:33,119
Speaker 1: silly question, but I think I just wonder if is

369
00:22:33,160 --> 00:22:36,359
Speaker 1: that the impetus behind this, if there is corruption in

370
00:22:36,400 --> 00:22:39,879
Speaker 1: the government to accept it as legal tender, to muddy

371
00:22:39,920 --> 00:22:43,120
Speaker 1: the waters of currency so that it will be easier

372
00:22:43,160 --> 00:22:47,200
Speaker 1: to perpetrate these types of frauds and felonies. Yeah, I

373
00:22:47,200 --> 00:22:50,600
Speaker 1: mean that's valid for sure. There is a big piece

374
00:22:50,760 --> 00:22:53,760
Speaker 1: of this conversation that we have to give some air to,

375
00:22:54,640 --> 00:23:01,119
Speaker 1: which is El Salvador, like many other poorer country has

376
00:23:01,680 --> 00:23:05,600
Speaker 1: at times run into tensions with the world's monetary system

377
00:23:05,640 --> 00:23:08,920
Speaker 1: as it stands now, most particularly the i m F

378
00:23:09,200 --> 00:23:14,880
Speaker 1: International Monetary Fund, and Bitcoin could be seen as a

379
00:23:14,920 --> 00:23:19,760
Speaker 1: way to escape the policies of the i m F

380
00:23:19,920 --> 00:23:23,320
Speaker 1: because they're using a different currency. Just a few days

381
00:23:23,400 --> 00:23:28,080
Speaker 1: before we recorded this, believe over the weekend, the bitcoin

382
00:23:28,160 --> 00:23:31,399
Speaker 1: community itself spoke out and they may be planning to

383
00:23:31,560 --> 00:23:37,080
Speaker 1: loan El Salvador one billion dollars worth of bitcoin to

384
00:23:37,800 --> 00:23:41,639
Speaker 1: help them fully adopt this as a legal tender, and

385
00:23:41,680 --> 00:23:44,000
Speaker 1: they did this in response to the I m F

386
00:23:44,320 --> 00:23:47,159
Speaker 1: who said, We've got some concerns this will be a

387
00:23:47,200 --> 00:23:51,959
Speaker 1: banking nightmare. So what we may see happening is a

388
00:23:52,000 --> 00:23:56,719
Speaker 1: confrontation in Central America between the old financial guard you know,

389
00:23:56,840 --> 00:24:01,399
Speaker 1: the Black Monday murders types, and then the new you know,

390
00:24:02,000 --> 00:24:06,320
Speaker 1: a tech literati, tech garat, there's a word like that. Yeah,

391
00:24:06,400 --> 00:24:10,680
Speaker 1: And I'm really interested to see how this works out.

392
00:24:10,840 --> 00:24:15,720
Speaker 1: And I would be astonished if world leaders, an economists

393
00:24:15,800 --> 00:24:19,119
Speaker 1: or not also paying attention, because one of the ways

394
00:24:19,200 --> 00:24:24,240
Speaker 1: that you enforce serenity and hedgemoney is through having people

395
00:24:24,440 --> 00:24:28,520
Speaker 1: use your money. That's why the US is, That's why

396
00:24:28,600 --> 00:24:32,159
Speaker 1: the US is so into being a reserve currency, and

397
00:24:32,200 --> 00:24:37,480
Speaker 1: that's why France instigated the fall of Moonmar Gadaffi because

398
00:24:37,480 --> 00:24:41,119
Speaker 1: they wanted to control the African frank or keep control

399
00:24:41,200 --> 00:24:45,080
Speaker 1: of it. No, this is really interesting to me, Ben,

400
00:24:45,119 --> 00:24:46,840
Speaker 1: this is the first time I'm hearing about this. Thank

401
00:24:46,880 --> 00:24:49,600
Speaker 1: you for bringing this to our attention. I had no

402
00:24:49,720 --> 00:24:53,199
Speaker 1: idea that El Salvador had they are working with this

403
00:24:53,240 --> 00:24:57,520
Speaker 1: company Strike or this an app called strike with from

404
00:24:57,520 --> 00:25:02,840
Speaker 1: a different company. But when they introduced this um and

405
00:25:02,960 --> 00:25:08,520
Speaker 1: launched mobile payments in El Salvador, like specifically, according to CNBC,

406
00:25:08,680 --> 00:25:12,960
Speaker 1: Strike became the most downloaded app in the country, So

407
00:25:13,040 --> 00:25:16,439
Speaker 1: there's definitely an appetite for it within the city, you know,

408
00:25:16,480 --> 00:25:20,560
Speaker 1: amongst the citizens. Um and did you did you mention

409
00:25:20,640 --> 00:25:25,200
Speaker 1: the seventy number? We did not lay it us. According

410
00:25:25,240 --> 00:25:30,600
Speaker 1: to to c NBC SEV, roughly of l El Salvadorian

411
00:25:30,640 --> 00:25:33,879
Speaker 1: citizens do not have bank accounts and they operate in

412
00:25:33,960 --> 00:25:39,080
Speaker 1: cash only transactions. I can totally imagine that having you know,

413
00:25:39,400 --> 00:25:43,360
Speaker 1: a bitcoin account on your phone could in a lot

414
00:25:43,359 --> 00:25:46,919
Speaker 1: of ways seem more secure. And if you could, you know,

415
00:25:47,000 --> 00:25:51,720
Speaker 1: just perform daily transactions through your phone with your bitcoin,

416
00:25:51,760 --> 00:25:55,119
Speaker 1: then I can imagine that being a big deal and

417
00:25:55,119 --> 00:25:59,040
Speaker 1: people would actually enjoy it. Yeah, yeah, because you wouldn't

418
00:25:59,119 --> 00:26:02,960
Speaker 1: have to go through some of the hassles of that

419
00:26:03,040 --> 00:26:06,800
Speaker 1: you encounter with physical currency. Right. So, if you are

420
00:26:07,560 --> 00:26:10,760
Speaker 1: getting money wired in and you live in El Salvador,

421
00:26:10,880 --> 00:26:13,359
Speaker 1: then as we said, then you might get hit with

422
00:26:13,520 --> 00:26:17,800
Speaker 1: a ton of fees, like ten or more. Uh. These

423
00:26:17,920 --> 00:26:21,399
Speaker 1: transfers can take days to arrive and then sometimes you

424
00:26:21,440 --> 00:26:24,440
Speaker 1: have to go there in person to physically pick up

425
00:26:24,480 --> 00:26:28,240
Speaker 1: the cash. And just to set the stage a little

426
00:26:28,240 --> 00:26:32,320
Speaker 1: bit further, with statistics. One really important part of the

427
00:26:32,400 --> 00:26:36,719
Speaker 1: conversation here is just how much of El Salvador's g

428
00:26:36,840 --> 00:26:40,880
Speaker 1: d P is remittances. So people travel to other countries,

429
00:26:40,960 --> 00:26:43,159
Speaker 1: they work, they send money back to their families and

430
00:26:43,200 --> 00:26:46,880
Speaker 1: their loved ones. That that alone is twenty of El

431
00:26:46,920 --> 00:26:50,919
Speaker 1: Salvador's gross domestic product. Fascinating. There's a couple of other

432
00:26:51,000 --> 00:26:54,560
Speaker 1: interesting little size stories connected to this, Like, for one, UM,

433
00:26:54,760 --> 00:26:59,560
Speaker 1: since twenty nineteen, this one particular area in El Salvador

434
00:26:59,680 --> 00:27:04,840
Speaker 1: called alzonte Um has been using bitcoin as legal tender.

435
00:27:04,920 --> 00:27:08,920
Speaker 1: It's referred to Bitcoin Beach, referred to as bitcoin Beach uh.

436
00:27:08,920 --> 00:27:11,639
Speaker 1: And it was a program that was going to kind

437
00:27:11,680 --> 00:27:14,600
Speaker 1: of like almost pilot the idea of using bitcoin as

438
00:27:14,680 --> 00:27:17,080
Speaker 1: legal tender. They referred to it as a mission to

439
00:27:17,280 --> 00:27:21,639
Speaker 1: build a quote a sustainable bitcoin economic ecosystem on the

440
00:27:21,680 --> 00:27:24,760
Speaker 1: coast of El Salvador. Uh. There's more than fifty different

441
00:27:24,840 --> 00:27:28,280
Speaker 1: vendors that accept it. They're everything from hotels, restaurants to

442
00:27:28,720 --> 00:27:34,920
Speaker 1: surf instructor camps. Um too. Let's see uh, fruit stands,

443
00:27:34,960 --> 00:27:37,720
Speaker 1: hardware stores andthing you can think of pretty much. Um.

444
00:27:38,080 --> 00:27:40,480
Speaker 1: And I think my favorite little side story is the

445
00:27:40,520 --> 00:27:44,080
Speaker 1: current president of Salvador. He's only thirty nine years old.

446
00:27:44,160 --> 00:27:48,200
Speaker 1: His name is forgive me for butchering annunciation naive bucle

447
00:27:48,359 --> 00:27:51,199
Speaker 1: i believe um. He is kind of behind this and

448
00:27:51,240 --> 00:27:54,240
Speaker 1: he has done this thing where he is creating this

449
00:27:54,359 --> 00:28:00,320
Speaker 1: idea of mining sustainably and cheaply. Mining bitcoin, as we

450
00:28:00,359 --> 00:28:03,320
Speaker 1: know it uses lots of electricity, uh and causes lots

451
00:28:03,320 --> 00:28:07,159
Speaker 1: of you know, controversy in terms of the sustainability of

452
00:28:07,200 --> 00:28:10,000
Speaker 1: it and the effects on the environment. He wants to

453
00:28:10,119 --> 00:28:16,080
Speaker 1: use geothermal energy generated from volcanoes in El Salvador to

454
00:28:16,840 --> 00:28:20,680
Speaker 1: create clean this was his words, not mine percent renewable,

455
00:28:20,880 --> 00:28:26,640
Speaker 1: zero emissions energy, uh, to mine bitcoin with Yeah, which

456
00:28:26,720 --> 00:28:29,920
Speaker 1: is you know, it's an interesting idea, but we'll see

457
00:28:30,560 --> 00:28:34,879
Speaker 1: how how close it comes to being reality. There's there's

458
00:28:34,880 --> 00:28:37,840
Speaker 1: something else that has a lot of people worried, and

459
00:28:37,880 --> 00:28:40,000
Speaker 1: I'd love to hear I'd love to hear what the

460
00:28:40,040 --> 00:28:43,880
Speaker 1: bitcoin enthusiasts and the crowd today think about this. What

461
00:28:44,040 --> 00:28:47,760
Speaker 1: happens when bitcoin reaches its limit. So when we talk

462
00:28:47,840 --> 00:28:52,040
Speaker 1: about cryptocurrencies and bitcoin is you know, the gold standard,

463
00:28:52,080 --> 00:28:55,000
Speaker 1: by which I mean it's the it's the coin that

464
00:28:55,040 --> 00:28:57,920
Speaker 1: most people are going to be most familiar with We're

465
00:28:57,960 --> 00:29:03,240
Speaker 1: also talking about possibilities for risk, like the US dollar

466
00:29:03,880 --> 00:29:08,520
Speaker 1: has predictability because it's reserve currency, because everybody around the

467
00:29:08,520 --> 00:29:12,440
Speaker 1: world decided to agree with little or no backing that

468
00:29:12,560 --> 00:29:16,400
Speaker 1: those coupons count it for specific values. What happens if

469
00:29:16,560 --> 00:29:22,040
Speaker 1: bitcoin UH skyrockets and value. What happens if it plummets

470
00:29:22,080 --> 00:29:25,560
Speaker 1: in value? What will you know the average person in

471
00:29:25,680 --> 00:29:28,480
Speaker 1: El Salvador do? How will it affect them? Those are

472
00:29:28,520 --> 00:29:33,080
Speaker 1: really serious questions that I think bear some research. This

473
00:29:33,160 --> 00:29:37,680
Speaker 1: is definitely jumping into the deep water without putting your

474
00:29:37,720 --> 00:29:41,280
Speaker 1: toe in first. Aside from the village mentioned earlier, Well,

475
00:29:41,520 --> 00:29:43,520
Speaker 1: and we know it does do that thing, Ben like

476
00:29:43,840 --> 00:29:47,640
Speaker 1: I mean, it does. It can skyrocket, everyone gets really excited,

477
00:29:47,680 --> 00:29:51,080
Speaker 1: and it can absolutely plummet with just uh, like a

478
00:29:51,120 --> 00:29:54,200
Speaker 1: word from st Elon Musk on Saturday Night Live, you

479
00:29:54,240 --> 00:29:57,040
Speaker 1: know um. And the confidence in it uh is a

480
00:29:57,040 --> 00:29:59,400
Speaker 1: lot harder to measure, I would say than maybe the

481
00:29:59,400 --> 00:30:03,960
Speaker 1: stock mark it. But it's it's a fascinating development, I

482
00:30:03,960 --> 00:30:06,960
Speaker 1: would say, and very meaningful. And I think potentially a

483
00:30:07,040 --> 00:30:11,560
Speaker 1: political sort of mental finger to the United States, well

484
00:30:11,880 --> 00:30:14,240
Speaker 1: that that could be seen as part of it. And

485
00:30:14,920 --> 00:30:16,960
Speaker 1: but it's definitely I would say, if it's a middle

486
00:30:16,960 --> 00:30:20,680
Speaker 1: finger to someone, it's less the US because the US

487
00:30:20,760 --> 00:30:23,720
Speaker 1: dollar will still be used and accepted. It's more a

488
00:30:23,760 --> 00:30:29,200
Speaker 1: middle finger to those international banking institutions, which are themselves,

489
00:30:29,240 --> 00:30:33,920
Speaker 1: you know, enormously controversial. You'll hear critics, for instance, say

490
00:30:34,000 --> 00:30:37,200
Speaker 1: that the I m F is an instrument of resource

491
00:30:37,280 --> 00:30:42,640
Speaker 1: extraction or an instrument of financial enslavement. Again, those are

492
00:30:42,640 --> 00:30:46,360
Speaker 1: not our statements. Those are from the opponents of these outfits.

493
00:30:46,400 --> 00:30:49,840
Speaker 1: So to the opponents of these institutions, the argument is

494
00:30:49,880 --> 00:30:55,680
Speaker 1: something like there putting people putting entire countries in debt bondage,

495
00:30:56,480 --> 00:30:59,920
Speaker 1: and then they're using that as a tool of leverage

496
00:31:00,240 --> 00:31:03,200
Speaker 1: to influence the policies that get written in the direction

497
00:31:03,280 --> 00:31:06,880
Speaker 1: of the government and perhaps most importantly, how the government

498
00:31:06,960 --> 00:31:11,920
Speaker 1: interacts with international private corporations. That's that's where you get

499
00:31:12,080 --> 00:31:15,560
Speaker 1: into the deep water. So maybe El Salvador is able

500
00:31:15,680 --> 00:31:20,240
Speaker 1: to break what some see as global financial chains, but

501
00:31:20,320 --> 00:31:26,040
Speaker 1: then also El Salvador maybe putting itself in a profound

502
00:31:26,160 --> 00:31:32,080
Speaker 1: risk for instability. That's that's where the story stands now,

503
00:31:32,480 --> 00:31:34,960
Speaker 1: and you'll have a lot of people on either side

504
00:31:34,960 --> 00:31:36,880
Speaker 1: of the argument, but we would like to hear from

505
00:31:36,880 --> 00:31:38,880
Speaker 1: you if you've been to El Salvador, if you've traveled

506
00:31:38,880 --> 00:31:42,560
Speaker 1: around Central America, if you live in El Salvador, what

507
00:31:42,600 --> 00:31:46,640
Speaker 1: are people saying about this on the ground. Do people

508
00:31:46,680 --> 00:31:51,000
Speaker 1: believe that this is a conspiracy of sorts? I'm sure

509
00:31:51,040 --> 00:31:54,680
Speaker 1: they do. I just love to hear some firsthand reporting

510
00:31:54,800 --> 00:31:56,760
Speaker 1: of it. So hit us up as always one eight

511
00:31:56,760 --> 00:32:00,360
Speaker 1: three three std w y t k conspiracy at I

512
00:32:00,520 --> 00:32:03,680
Speaker 1: heeart media dot cop. We're gonna pause for a word

513
00:32:03,720 --> 00:32:06,360
Speaker 1: from our sponsors. Will be back with one more piece

514
00:32:06,520 --> 00:32:16,200
Speaker 1: of strange news. Okay, and we're back. You know, I

515
00:32:16,240 --> 00:32:18,600
Speaker 1: am not smart enough to fully understand this, but I'm

516
00:32:18,640 --> 00:32:22,480
Speaker 1: trying to imagine how you walk into a convenience store

517
00:32:22,560 --> 00:32:27,480
Speaker 1: with your bitcoin app and you pay to six hundreds

518
00:32:27,520 --> 00:32:30,840
Speaker 1: for a for a coke and a bag of chips

519
00:32:30,920 --> 00:32:34,040
Speaker 1: or something. It's all like based on exchangers, the way

520
00:32:34,040 --> 00:32:36,720
Speaker 1: it would be in any kind of other currency swap situation.

521
00:32:36,720 --> 00:32:39,959
Speaker 1: I would imagine, like if you're if you're going on exchanges,

522
00:32:40,160 --> 00:32:43,200
Speaker 1: you can exchange one type of coin for another, So

523
00:32:43,320 --> 00:32:46,320
Speaker 1: like they're these literally, you know, just exchanges where you

524
00:32:46,320 --> 00:32:50,280
Speaker 1: put in one dollar fifty and then it converts to bitcoin,

525
00:32:50,360 --> 00:32:53,080
Speaker 1: and that's like you know, point zero zero zero zero

526
00:32:53,360 --> 00:32:57,080
Speaker 1: zero zero one bitcoin, So just all these little calculations.

527
00:32:57,240 --> 00:32:59,000
Speaker 1: You absolutely can do it on papal And I don't

528
00:32:59,000 --> 00:33:00,920
Speaker 1: know if you guys have noticed ever seen in gas

529
00:33:00,920 --> 00:33:03,320
Speaker 1: stations even they've got these bitcoin A t M s.

530
00:33:04,000 --> 00:33:06,040
Speaker 1: Apparently the fees on those are exorbit and I really

531
00:33:06,040 --> 00:33:08,560
Speaker 1: don't understand the functionality of them. I've never seen anyone

532
00:33:08,680 --> 00:33:11,640
Speaker 1: use them. Um, but it's an interesting thing for sure.

533
00:33:12,040 --> 00:33:15,000
Speaker 1: Oh yeah, oh yeah, Well I'm gonna look more into

534
00:33:15,040 --> 00:33:18,760
Speaker 1: it because right now I'm just confused. Oh Matt, can

535
00:33:18,800 --> 00:33:21,720
Speaker 1: I can I set can I set you off? This year?

536
00:33:21,840 --> 00:33:25,680
Speaker 1: I'm super into this. Okay, So for some reason, I

537
00:33:25,720 --> 00:33:29,680
Speaker 1: was on a Breaking Bad rabbit hole. I get in

538
00:33:29,680 --> 00:33:31,960
Speaker 1: the rabbit holes all the time. This would happened to

539
00:33:32,000 --> 00:33:34,600
Speaker 1: be Breaking Bad because it's an amazing story with phenomenal

540
00:33:34,640 --> 00:33:39,920
Speaker 1: writing and acting. And I was watching the train episode.

541
00:33:40,040 --> 00:33:42,360
Speaker 1: If you've seen Breaking Bad, you know what I'm talking about.

542
00:33:43,080 --> 00:33:47,560
Speaker 1: You remember that, remember, No, we'll give me one more details.

543
00:33:48,800 --> 00:33:51,640
Speaker 1: Yes of course, yes, of course, with the liquid, the

544
00:33:51,640 --> 00:33:54,760
Speaker 1: stuff they're trying to get the precursor. Yeah right, yeah,

545
00:33:54,800 --> 00:33:58,920
Speaker 1: this is and then the little kid on the bike. Yeah,

546
00:33:59,520 --> 00:34:05,680
Speaker 1: that part of the train and Todd, the guy who

547
00:34:05,680 --> 00:34:10,320
Speaker 1: looks kind of like the Matt Damon is. It shows,

548
00:34:10,400 --> 00:34:12,560
Speaker 1: it shows the dark side of his character. But anyway,

549
00:34:12,680 --> 00:34:15,920
Speaker 1: I was really excited to learn about this story. You

550
00:34:16,040 --> 00:34:18,800
Speaker 1: chose Matt because I'm on this. I'm on a train

551
00:34:18,920 --> 00:34:23,480
Speaker 1: kick right now. But what's what's going on? Is there

552
00:34:23,560 --> 00:34:27,399
Speaker 1: is there something crooked or foot? Well, it's a this, Yes,

553
00:34:27,760 --> 00:34:34,879
Speaker 1: there's something crooked rail. So this story comes to comes

554
00:34:34,920 --> 00:34:39,040
Speaker 1: to us from December of last year, December, but it's

555
00:34:39,040 --> 00:34:41,160
Speaker 1: an update. That's why we're gonna talk about it now.

556
00:34:41,239 --> 00:34:44,640
Speaker 1: Last week there's an update that we're going to talk about.

557
00:34:45,280 --> 00:34:50,520
Speaker 1: So on December. This is what you need to know.

558
00:34:50,760 --> 00:34:56,880
Speaker 1: A train derailed in North Washington, like Washington state, north

559
00:34:56,880 --> 00:35:00,719
Speaker 1: of Seattle. And the problem him is that it was

560
00:35:00,760 --> 00:35:05,560
Speaker 1: carrying oil like crude oil and it caught on fire.

561
00:35:05,760 --> 00:35:09,480
Speaker 1: Was a big explosion. Uh, it was a big deal

562
00:35:09,600 --> 00:35:12,800
Speaker 1: for this small town where it explode. The actual place

563
00:35:12,840 --> 00:35:17,000
Speaker 1: where the train derailed and exploded called Custer, Washington. And

564
00:35:17,040 --> 00:35:19,000
Speaker 1: the reason why we're talking about the stories today is

565
00:35:19,040 --> 00:35:23,440
Speaker 1: because the FBI, Federal Railroad Administration, and the National Transportation

566
00:35:23,480 --> 00:35:26,640
Speaker 1: Safety Board are all still looking at this derailment and

567
00:35:26,719 --> 00:35:30,040
Speaker 1: trying to figure out exactly what happened. But there's some

568
00:35:30,080 --> 00:35:35,080
Speaker 1: new information that came out stating that the only way

569
00:35:35,239 --> 00:35:38,520
Speaker 1: that this train derailed, the only reason this could possibly

570
00:35:38,560 --> 00:35:43,640
Speaker 1: happen is through sabotage and the reeston. Why it's important

571
00:35:43,680 --> 00:35:47,960
Speaker 1: to us and to you is because any time the

572
00:35:48,080 --> 00:35:51,719
Speaker 1: United States railway system is under attack of any kind

573
00:35:51,800 --> 00:35:55,560
Speaker 1: or is at is being threatened in any way, it

574
00:35:55,680 --> 00:36:00,239
Speaker 1: threatens the entire system. It is impossible to over date

575
00:36:00,280 --> 00:36:02,840
Speaker 1: how important the railway system is to the United States

576
00:36:02,920 --> 00:36:07,919
Speaker 1: and to commerce in this country and internationally. Even it

577
00:36:08,040 --> 00:36:12,320
Speaker 1: is very, very important that we we the United States,

578
00:36:12,800 --> 00:36:16,520
Speaker 1: the FBI, all of these different you know, organizations, keep

579
00:36:16,560 --> 00:36:21,319
Speaker 1: the railways safe. Um, because if something did happen, it

580
00:36:21,360 --> 00:36:26,160
Speaker 1: could be as simple as one or two people walking

581
00:36:26,440 --> 00:36:30,200
Speaker 1: across some tracks that are just open, making two or

582
00:36:30,200 --> 00:36:33,680
Speaker 1: three small changes on a rail car and then leaving

583
00:36:34,239 --> 00:36:37,760
Speaker 1: and then causing almost a million dollars worth of damage

584
00:36:38,480 --> 00:36:43,719
Speaker 1: and causing massive explosions. Okay, that's a huge run up

585
00:36:43,719 --> 00:36:47,560
Speaker 1: to this, but let's talk about the details, guys. So

586
00:36:47,600 --> 00:36:51,440
Speaker 1: this is a b n s F train that was derailed.

587
00:36:51,760 --> 00:36:55,520
Speaker 1: B NSF has a really interesting history. It's two different

588
00:36:55,640 --> 00:36:59,840
Speaker 1: rail companies that kind of melded into one thing, the

589
00:37:00,000 --> 00:37:02,560
Speaker 1: Burlington Northern Ink and I think it's the Santa Fe

590
00:37:02,640 --> 00:37:07,400
Speaker 1: Pacific Corporation. Uh, they went together. They control a ton

591
00:37:07,560 --> 00:37:10,480
Speaker 1: of the railways in this country, along with a just

592
00:37:10,560 --> 00:37:13,880
Speaker 1: a handful of other large companies that control the railways,

593
00:37:14,200 --> 00:37:19,279
Speaker 1: and generally of the time, at least according to BNSF,

594
00:37:19,280 --> 00:37:22,560
Speaker 1: there's nothing like this that occurs. Those trains are running

595
00:37:22,680 --> 00:37:27,000
Speaker 1: all the time, taking things across the country, including crude oil,

596
00:37:27,120 --> 00:37:30,600
Speaker 1: including most of the stuff you buy on Amazon and

597
00:37:30,719 --> 00:37:33,880
Speaker 1: eBay and all these other places. They get on rail cars,

598
00:37:33,920 --> 00:37:37,359
Speaker 1: they go and everything's fine. Everybody gets what they need.

599
00:37:37,719 --> 00:37:42,760
Speaker 1: In this case, the rail cars were carrying something very different.

600
00:37:42,800 --> 00:37:46,040
Speaker 1: We said crude oil, but it's specific type of crude oil.

601
00:37:46,160 --> 00:37:48,960
Speaker 1: It's called bachin oil. So let's just take them in

602
00:37:49,040 --> 00:37:52,080
Speaker 1: and talk about baking crude oil. What this stuff is.

603
00:37:52,160 --> 00:37:56,279
Speaker 1: It's also known as North Dakota Sweet or North Dakota Light,

604
00:37:56,960 --> 00:37:59,720
Speaker 1: and it's called this because of its low sulfur content,

605
00:38:00,160 --> 00:38:03,480
Speaker 1: but that also means that it's high in other other

606
00:38:03,600 --> 00:38:08,560
Speaker 1: types of fuels, essentially like butane and some of these

607
00:38:08,600 --> 00:38:13,319
Speaker 1: other highly flammable substances. So unlike diesel fuel, if that

608
00:38:13,440 --> 00:38:16,319
Speaker 1: was being carried on one of these trucks. Uh, this

609
00:38:16,520 --> 00:38:21,319
Speaker 1: bach in oil when it's inside these pressurized containers, it

610
00:38:21,600 --> 00:38:27,239
Speaker 1: is essentially a bomb, like legitimately a massive bomb. It's

611
00:38:27,280 --> 00:38:30,520
Speaker 1: extremely dangerous. And this stuff is being just carded around

612
00:38:30,560 --> 00:38:32,759
Speaker 1: all the time. And we're not just talking about a

613
00:38:32,760 --> 00:38:35,760
Speaker 1: little bit. This train that derailed was carrying three million

614
00:38:35,840 --> 00:38:40,360
Speaker 1: gallons of this stuff on a hundred and six different

615
00:38:40,400 --> 00:38:43,279
Speaker 1: oil tanks like oil cars, I guess, I don't know

616
00:38:43,320 --> 00:38:46,319
Speaker 1: what you call them, containers of oil like the big

617
00:38:46,320 --> 00:38:49,200
Speaker 1: ones that you've you've probably seen before. They're very similar

618
00:38:49,239 --> 00:38:51,920
Speaker 1: to the ones that refuel your gas station. Okay, So

619
00:38:51,960 --> 00:38:54,360
Speaker 1: I've kind of jumped around a lot already in this

620
00:38:54,560 --> 00:38:58,000
Speaker 1: buried so many leads. Good god, I'm sorry. All let's

621
00:38:58,000 --> 00:39:00,319
Speaker 1: talk more about what exactly happens. So you got a

622
00:39:00,360 --> 00:39:05,319
Speaker 1: train coming from the North Dakota oil fields problem. I

623
00:39:05,360 --> 00:39:12,360
Speaker 1: was about to say the same thing, when here's the

624
00:39:12,400 --> 00:39:16,319
Speaker 1: crazy thing. The speed limit when it crashed was ten

625
00:39:16,400 --> 00:39:19,600
Speaker 1: miles per hour. It was only traveling at seven miles

626
00:39:19,640 --> 00:39:21,879
Speaker 1: per hour. He was like, WHOA, how in the heck

627
00:39:21,880 --> 00:39:25,000
Speaker 1: did that happen? Well, here's where the investigation comes in,

628
00:39:25,800 --> 00:39:27,600
Speaker 1: um and in order to tell you about it, we

629
00:39:27,640 --> 00:39:29,799
Speaker 1: have to add to the to the problem, to the

630
00:39:29,960 --> 00:39:39,839
Speaker 1: math problem. Um, okay, So imagine you are running. You're

631
00:39:39,880 --> 00:39:43,799
Speaker 1: an engineer on a train, and you've been running through

632
00:39:43,840 --> 00:39:47,040
Speaker 1: the night. You're on a twelve hour shift. It is

633
00:39:47,200 --> 00:39:50,360
Speaker 1: around eight thirty in the morning. Your shift is about

634
00:39:50,400 --> 00:39:53,760
Speaker 1: to end, and you hear that just a little ways

635
00:39:53,920 --> 00:39:57,040
Speaker 1: further down the down the rail there's a delay, so

636
00:39:57,080 --> 00:39:59,160
Speaker 1: you have to stop for a little bit for a while.

637
00:39:59,719 --> 00:40:01,560
Speaker 1: You know, you're you know you're coming up on time,

638
00:40:01,600 --> 00:40:03,880
Speaker 1: and the union says you can't go over that twelve hours,

639
00:40:03,880 --> 00:40:06,279
Speaker 1: so you're gonna have to just park that train there

640
00:40:06,320 --> 00:40:09,120
Speaker 1: for a while. So you have to check make sure

641
00:40:09,200 --> 00:40:13,880
Speaker 1: that you're six thousand five foot train isn't blocking an

642
00:40:13,920 --> 00:40:19,279
Speaker 1: intersection somewhere. And once you're clear of that, then you

643
00:40:19,320 --> 00:40:21,719
Speaker 1: can park your train, you can lock it up, and

644
00:40:21,760 --> 00:40:24,799
Speaker 1: you can you can leave, you can take essentially a

645
00:40:24,800 --> 00:40:28,520
Speaker 1: shuttle back home, or however you get however you get

646
00:40:28,560 --> 00:40:31,200
Speaker 1: home from there. Just imagine that's you. You did that

647
00:40:31,239 --> 00:40:36,600
Speaker 1: all right now, nol. You're you're the next shift guy,

648
00:40:37,160 --> 00:40:40,640
Speaker 1: you come in, you're the engineer. You wake up, let's say,

649
00:40:40,680 --> 00:40:42,239
Speaker 1: and you're like, oh, man, I gotta get over there.

650
00:40:42,719 --> 00:40:47,480
Speaker 1: So at eleven fifteen, you arrive via shuttle and you

651
00:40:47,719 --> 00:40:50,839
Speaker 1: unlock the train, you get back on, and you get

652
00:40:50,880 --> 00:40:54,200
Speaker 1: ready to take this train, uh, to continue along. By

653
00:40:54,200 --> 00:40:56,239
Speaker 1: the way, this is perfect. Do you guys know how

654
00:40:56,280 --> 00:40:59,400
Speaker 1: many human beings it takes to operate a massive mile

655
00:40:59,520 --> 00:41:05,439
Speaker 1: long train rain like this? You're correct? Yeah? And literally yes,

656
00:41:05,840 --> 00:41:08,880
Speaker 1: an engineer, a conductor, and what they call a brakeman

657
00:41:09,440 --> 00:41:13,640
Speaker 1: are a break person. Uh. That is a kind of

658
00:41:13,680 --> 00:41:17,280
Speaker 1: a weird position that I don't fully understand. In this case,

659
00:41:17,400 --> 00:41:20,520
Speaker 1: the brake person didn't even get on the train, so

660
00:41:20,640 --> 00:41:22,279
Speaker 1: one of the three people didn't get on the train.

661
00:41:22,400 --> 00:41:26,120
Speaker 1: They drove all the way over to the refinery, which

662
00:41:26,160 --> 00:41:29,040
Speaker 1: was just a couple of miles away, I think six,

663
00:41:29,120 --> 00:41:32,200
Speaker 1: six or seven miles away, to make sure that the

664
00:41:32,239 --> 00:41:35,040
Speaker 1: path is open for this huge rail car as it's

665
00:41:35,040 --> 00:41:38,080
Speaker 1: coming through. Um, so there are only two people to

666
00:41:38,280 --> 00:41:41,000
Speaker 1: human beings on this train running the whole thing. And

667
00:41:41,440 --> 00:41:45,200
Speaker 1: as the train departs, you know the coupling. Have you

668
00:41:45,239 --> 00:41:47,360
Speaker 1: ever seen this as a kid or maybe played with

669
00:41:47,400 --> 00:41:49,520
Speaker 1: a toy train or even been on an actual train

670
00:41:49,560 --> 00:41:55,920
Speaker 1: and operated it. The coupling between two cars, it's fairly unsophisticated,

671
00:41:56,000 --> 00:41:59,560
Speaker 1: but there are some very sophisticated mechanisms that are also

672
00:41:59,640 --> 00:42:03,359
Speaker 1: attack matched between the rail cars. Um not, it's not

673
00:42:03,480 --> 00:42:09,640
Speaker 1: just the connector, but this connector. Somehow, between the first

674
00:42:09,680 --> 00:42:13,279
Speaker 1: crew leaving and then Noel showing up, somehow one of

675
00:42:13,280 --> 00:42:18,160
Speaker 1: these big connectors got released. So as the train pulls away,

676
00:42:19,000 --> 00:42:21,480
Speaker 1: there's a couple of rail cars on the back that

677
00:42:21,520 --> 00:42:25,840
Speaker 1: are not fully attached anymore. So as the trains getting

678
00:42:25,880 --> 00:42:28,920
Speaker 1: up to speed, the rail cars behind the fully attached

679
00:42:28,920 --> 00:42:32,440
Speaker 1: train are are getting momentum, and then they detached and

680
00:42:32,440 --> 00:42:35,759
Speaker 1: then they're still going. So the problem occurs when the

681
00:42:35,800 --> 00:42:38,560
Speaker 1: rest of the train stops or has to slow down

682
00:42:38,680 --> 00:42:40,920
Speaker 1: to make this curve and go seven miles per hour.

683
00:42:41,360 --> 00:42:43,960
Speaker 1: The rest of that train speed is continuing along at

684
00:42:43,960 --> 00:42:47,359
Speaker 1: twenty one miles per hour, slams into the back cause

685
00:42:47,480 --> 00:42:50,240
Speaker 1: the whole thing to derail. So the big question here, guys,

686
00:42:50,640 --> 00:42:53,319
Speaker 1: you've seen train tracks around Atlanta. They're all over here

687
00:42:53,360 --> 00:42:56,640
Speaker 1: because of you know terminus. That's what Atlanta used to be,

688
00:42:56,800 --> 00:42:59,120
Speaker 1: and it still is in a lot of ways, a

689
00:42:59,239 --> 00:43:04,200
Speaker 1: giant rail terminal. Yeah, right, interesting fact about Atlanta. So

690
00:43:04,400 --> 00:43:09,440
Speaker 1: many cities of that size historically are located at bodies

691
00:43:09,520 --> 00:43:12,840
Speaker 1: of water for shipping purposes, and it's just easier to

692
00:43:12,920 --> 00:43:16,239
Speaker 1: keep a clean city. But I would argue that in

693
00:43:16,280 --> 00:43:20,520
Speaker 1: the case of Atlanta, uh, the rivers or the water

694
00:43:20,719 --> 00:43:23,680
Speaker 1: in this situation was replaced by rail and then later

695
00:43:23,760 --> 00:43:27,160
Speaker 1: by air, so they really are kind of the rivers

696
00:43:27,360 --> 00:43:29,680
Speaker 1: of the city. Can't ship a ton of stuff down

697
00:43:29,680 --> 00:43:32,719
Speaker 1: the Chattahoochie. You know, I wonder if you could. It

698
00:43:32,760 --> 00:43:35,160
Speaker 1: would be a fun thing to try. It would be

699
00:43:35,160 --> 00:43:38,600
Speaker 1: a fun thing to try. You know. One popular pastime

700
00:43:38,640 --> 00:43:41,920
Speaker 1: here in Atlanta is people people have a couple of beers,

701
00:43:42,400 --> 00:43:46,120
Speaker 1: hop on a tube and then ship themselves down the

702
00:43:46,239 --> 00:43:48,880
Speaker 1: river as about as far as as far as it

703
00:43:48,920 --> 00:43:51,000
Speaker 1: goes on a day to day basis, but a four

704
00:43:51,080 --> 00:43:54,680
Speaker 1: drink minimum for that. What where I'm going with this

705
00:43:55,080 --> 00:44:00,640
Speaker 1: is it is ridiculously easy in parts of Atlanta to

706
00:44:00,800 --> 00:44:05,080
Speaker 1: just access a rail car if it stopped. There's a

707
00:44:05,120 --> 00:44:09,480
Speaker 1: place where my my family and I get ice cream

708
00:44:09,520 --> 00:44:12,000
Speaker 1: that is over here where I live, and it is

709
00:44:12,080 --> 00:44:14,759
Speaker 1: immediately on the tracks and you can walk right out

710
00:44:14,760 --> 00:44:19,200
Speaker 1: to the tracks. And very often there are huge trains

711
00:44:19,800 --> 00:44:24,200
Speaker 1: of containers with sometimes I don't know how volatile the

712
00:44:24,200 --> 00:44:26,800
Speaker 1: materials are are I don't know all of the numbers.

713
00:44:26,840 --> 00:44:29,719
Speaker 1: I know the placards are designed to be identifiable from

714
00:44:29,719 --> 00:44:33,120
Speaker 1: far away and easily, but the specifics you have to know,

715
00:44:33,239 --> 00:44:36,799
Speaker 1: like a code a lot of times. But um, you

716
00:44:36,840 --> 00:44:38,480
Speaker 1: could just walk right up to them, and if I

717
00:44:38,560 --> 00:44:41,759
Speaker 1: knew what I was doing, I could detach one of

718
00:44:41,760 --> 00:44:44,279
Speaker 1: those cars or something and cause this very thing to

719
00:44:44,360 --> 00:44:47,239
Speaker 1: occur where you where it's like a soft detachment. It's

720
00:44:47,280 --> 00:44:50,239
Speaker 1: not fully detached, but the air brake system is still connected,

721
00:44:50,800 --> 00:44:53,640
Speaker 1: and there's there's enough to actually pull the train along

722
00:44:53,680 --> 00:44:56,799
Speaker 1: at least for a time before the other systems break

723
00:44:56,840 --> 00:44:59,640
Speaker 1: it apart. It's just I think it's just a little

724
00:44:59,640 --> 00:45:04,000
Speaker 1: scary to me personally, imagining that it's that fragile um.

725
00:45:04,040 --> 00:45:07,400
Speaker 1: And and while there are a ton of places, like

726
00:45:08,200 --> 00:45:10,759
Speaker 1: the most important part pieces of the infrastructure of the

727
00:45:10,840 --> 00:45:15,640
Speaker 1: railways are very highly protected, but there's all this open

728
00:45:15,760 --> 00:45:19,600
Speaker 1: space too, because that's how it functions. You can't you

729
00:45:19,640 --> 00:45:23,520
Speaker 1: can't have a giant tube, you know, covering safely covering

730
00:45:23,600 --> 00:45:27,160
Speaker 1: all of the railways. That's not possible. I guess, I

731
00:45:27,200 --> 00:45:28,719
Speaker 1: just I don't know. That's why I wanted to talk

732
00:45:28,719 --> 00:45:31,759
Speaker 1: about this today. It sabotaging a train feels like something

733
00:45:31,760 --> 00:45:35,400
Speaker 1: out of a Western movie and something that I wouldn't

734
00:45:35,400 --> 00:45:38,680
Speaker 1: expect to be happening right now. One of the big questions, too,

735
00:45:38,920 --> 00:45:43,920
Speaker 1: is the motivation. So first, this is not the official conclusion,

736
00:45:44,080 --> 00:45:46,520
Speaker 1: right If I understand correctly, this is a statement of

737
00:45:46,520 --> 00:45:50,320
Speaker 1: a rail union official. It was definitely, yes, an expert,

738
00:45:50,360 --> 00:45:54,000
Speaker 1: but they are not law enforcement. And I think because

739
00:45:54,040 --> 00:45:58,600
Speaker 1: of the unique position rail occupies in the US, there

740
00:45:58,640 --> 00:46:02,040
Speaker 1: are multiple agent scenes that have to finish an inquiry

741
00:46:02,200 --> 00:46:06,520
Speaker 1: before anybody can officially say this is sabotage or this

742
00:46:06,760 --> 00:46:10,799
Speaker 1: was This would be worse for the train companies if

743
00:46:10,800 --> 00:46:13,160
Speaker 1: they had to say this this was an error on

744
00:46:13,280 --> 00:46:15,520
Speaker 1: our part because they don't want to be liable for that.

745
00:46:15,560 --> 00:46:19,600
Speaker 1: There's a lot at stake. But here's the thing, so

746
00:46:19,719 --> 00:46:23,759
Speaker 1: this becomes an investigation the possible lacks of terrorism right

747
00:46:24,040 --> 00:46:28,360
Speaker 1: just by the nature of of trains themselves. But my

748
00:46:28,480 --> 00:46:31,719
Speaker 1: question to you, met is who would have done this

749
00:46:31,800 --> 00:46:35,040
Speaker 1: and why. I saw some anecdotal reports about two guys

750
00:46:35,080 --> 00:46:38,360
Speaker 1: apparently being seen walking away from the train, but I

751
00:46:38,400 --> 00:46:42,839
Speaker 1: don't think their identities have been released yet. No, they

752
00:46:43,160 --> 00:46:45,480
Speaker 1: have not, And that was just a person driving by

753
00:46:45,560 --> 00:46:49,000
Speaker 1: on the road that runs exactly parallel to the tracks there,

754
00:46:49,560 --> 00:46:52,239
Speaker 1: and it was seen in that window between the first

755
00:46:52,280 --> 00:46:55,239
Speaker 1: crew leaving in the second crew arriving. So there is

756
00:46:55,280 --> 00:46:58,120
Speaker 1: a possibility there that these two guys, maybe one of

757
00:46:58,160 --> 00:47:00,280
Speaker 1: them knew what they were doing, one of them. Ajor

758
00:47:00,360 --> 00:47:03,600
Speaker 1: things that was said at least in these conclusions. Are

759
00:47:03,600 --> 00:47:08,040
Speaker 1: these alleged conclusions by what did you say? The International

760
00:47:08,040 --> 00:47:13,160
Speaker 1: Association Sheet Metal Air Rail trans Yes, the the like

761
00:47:13,160 --> 00:47:17,320
Speaker 1: you said been that that union statement. Um, they're saying

762
00:47:17,360 --> 00:47:20,440
Speaker 1: that whoever did this, if it was sabotage, and they

763
00:47:20,440 --> 00:47:24,200
Speaker 1: are saying it probably was somebody knew at least to

764
00:47:24,239 --> 00:47:27,040
Speaker 1: an extent what they were doing, and they won't release

765
00:47:27,080 --> 00:47:29,759
Speaker 1: full details on that because again they don't want to

766
00:47:29,800 --> 00:47:31,879
Speaker 1: give people a handbook for how to sabotage a train

767
00:47:32,000 --> 00:47:34,640
Speaker 1: like this. But the other thing to note here been

768
00:47:34,800 --> 00:47:37,560
Speaker 1: is that in the past, pretty recently b NSF and

769
00:47:37,640 --> 00:47:40,840
Speaker 1: other rail companies have noticed that there have been attempts

770
00:47:40,840 --> 00:47:45,360
Speaker 1: to sabotage trains and sometimes successfully by people putting what

771
00:47:45,400 --> 00:47:50,719
Speaker 1: they call shunts on the railways. Two basically confuse the

772
00:47:50,760 --> 00:47:54,560
Speaker 1: systems on board the trains. So there are people attempting

773
00:47:54,640 --> 00:47:57,839
Speaker 1: to at least soft sabotage. If you want to call

774
00:47:57,880 --> 00:48:02,080
Speaker 1: it that trains. And the other thing to note is

775
00:48:02,120 --> 00:48:06,600
Speaker 1: that there may be reason to protest some of some

776
00:48:06,719 --> 00:48:10,320
Speaker 1: of this material. Like we said, these are high explosives

777
00:48:10,440 --> 00:48:14,440
Speaker 1: essentially that are being carded all over the United States.

778
00:48:15,000 --> 00:48:18,000
Speaker 1: And we're also talking about fracking here. We're talking about

779
00:48:18,080 --> 00:48:21,120
Speaker 1: shale oil essentially in a lot of these scenarios that's

780
00:48:21,120 --> 00:48:24,359
Speaker 1: being shipped. So you can imagine some groups that would

781
00:48:24,400 --> 00:48:29,080
Speaker 1: want to protest anyone profiting from that process that could

782
00:48:29,120 --> 00:48:33,480
Speaker 1: be causing irreparable damage to the environment and to any

783
00:48:33,560 --> 00:48:37,160
Speaker 1: individual or animal that needs to drink the water in

784
00:48:37,200 --> 00:48:40,680
Speaker 1: those areas. And there was a precedent for this too.

785
00:48:41,000 --> 00:48:45,040
Speaker 1: This spot is is nearby where two two folks have

786
00:48:45,160 --> 00:48:49,000
Speaker 1: been arrested just about a month before or so, and

787
00:48:49,120 --> 00:48:53,160
Speaker 1: they were accused of attempting a literal terrorist attack on

788
00:48:53,280 --> 00:48:58,080
Speaker 1: the train tracks to disrupt that pipeline plan. So there's

789
00:48:58,120 --> 00:49:00,520
Speaker 1: some kind of precedent, and of course you know we

790
00:49:00,600 --> 00:49:05,879
Speaker 1: can Yeah that's the shunts were talking about. Yeah, I mean,

791
00:49:06,040 --> 00:49:10,080
Speaker 1: it really is occurring in and other high profile recent

792
00:49:10,160 --> 00:49:14,040
Speaker 1: train derailments have not been about sabotage. They've been more

793
00:49:14,080 --> 00:49:17,799
Speaker 1: about at least there have been accusations thrown at some

794
00:49:17,920 --> 00:49:22,319
Speaker 1: of the companies for not maintaining the rail as well

795
00:49:22,360 --> 00:49:25,200
Speaker 1: as they should, and others a lot of times pointing

796
00:49:25,320 --> 00:49:29,040
Speaker 1: blame at the engineer, you know, the operators of the trains.

797
00:49:29,719 --> 00:49:32,400
Speaker 1: In this case, the train was going at the you know,

798
00:49:32,680 --> 00:49:36,520
Speaker 1: under the speed limit when it derailed. The problem is,

799
00:49:36,600 --> 00:49:40,440
Speaker 1: though the engineer and operator, when they switched teams the

800
00:49:40,440 --> 00:49:43,399
Speaker 1: way we mentioned they did, they didn't do a break check.

801
00:49:43,920 --> 00:49:48,160
Speaker 1: This is a huge thing. The engineer was very early

802
00:49:48,280 --> 00:49:50,200
Speaker 1: in their career as an engineer. You think is only

803
00:49:50,239 --> 00:49:53,640
Speaker 1: a month, there's a couple of months being an official engineer,

804
00:49:54,080 --> 00:49:57,120
Speaker 1: and they failed to run a break check before they

805
00:49:57,320 --> 00:50:00,279
Speaker 1: started up the train and started going down the track. X.

806
00:50:00,800 --> 00:50:04,319
Speaker 1: And it's an air brake system. It's complicated. We can

807
00:50:04,360 --> 00:50:06,440
Speaker 1: talk about that more later, but again that's not stuff

808
00:50:06,440 --> 00:50:08,040
Speaker 1: they don't want you to know. What they don't want

809
00:50:08,080 --> 00:50:11,439
Speaker 1: you to know is that no matter what the motivations,

810
00:50:11,840 --> 00:50:14,520
Speaker 1: even if they're noble in a lot of ways, no

811
00:50:14,560 --> 00:50:18,400
Speaker 1: matter what the motivations for wanting to disrupt the system

812
00:50:18,520 --> 00:50:21,600
Speaker 1: in this kind of way, there would be such a

813
00:50:21,640 --> 00:50:27,000
Speaker 1: disruption to everything if it were to happen frequently or

814
00:50:27,040 --> 00:50:30,400
Speaker 1: at scale. So I would just say, I don't know,

815
00:50:30,520 --> 00:50:36,040
Speaker 1: protect those rails. Uh, there's there is something you can

816
00:50:36,080 --> 00:50:38,880
Speaker 1: dig into if you want to. I don't know exactly

817
00:50:38,960 --> 00:50:44,239
Speaker 1: how you would categorize it, but there's a group that

818
00:50:44,400 --> 00:50:47,200
Speaker 1: is it's you can go to rail Security dot Org.

819
00:50:47,560 --> 00:50:49,040
Speaker 1: There's a group of people. I don't know if these

820
00:50:49,040 --> 00:50:52,000
Speaker 1: are lobbyists, I don't know what exactly this is, is

821
00:50:52,040 --> 00:50:55,880
Speaker 1: the Rail Security Alliance. Um. You can see all of

822
00:50:55,920 --> 00:50:58,520
Speaker 1: these different bills that are being put forward, all this

823
00:50:58,640 --> 00:51:03,520
Speaker 1: reporting that's happening relating to this group, and you know

824
00:51:03,640 --> 00:51:06,360
Speaker 1: what they want. But essentially they want to just protect

825
00:51:06,520 --> 00:51:10,840
Speaker 1: the rail systems. And you know, no matter where you

826
00:51:10,880 --> 00:51:12,960
Speaker 1: sit on the political spectrum, I think that's probably a

827
00:51:13,000 --> 00:51:16,120
Speaker 1: good idea. Yeah, I think everybody can agree. They liked

828
00:51:16,760 --> 00:51:20,640
Speaker 1: uh getting stuff and you need to have the you

829
00:51:20,920 --> 00:51:23,839
Speaker 1: need to have a rail system. There's a lot more

830
00:51:23,960 --> 00:51:25,960
Speaker 1: that the U s could do with its rail system

831
00:51:26,600 --> 00:51:29,359
Speaker 1: as well. But you know, it always brings me back

832
00:51:29,400 --> 00:51:34,720
Speaker 1: to the conversation we have about alternative transport in general,

833
00:51:34,920 --> 00:51:39,800
Speaker 1: like if people were better behaved, we could use dirigibles

834
00:51:39,920 --> 00:51:42,680
Speaker 1: much more often. And the problem with rail is that

835
00:51:42,719 --> 00:51:47,480
Speaker 1: it is also vulnerable in very unique ways to bad actors.

836
00:51:48,000 --> 00:51:53,040
Speaker 1: Because it's not as if you can suddenly turn left

837
00:51:53,360 --> 00:51:56,640
Speaker 1: in a trade. You can't know something is on the

838
00:51:56,719 --> 00:52:01,480
Speaker 1: horizon and take an alternate route. You go from points

839
00:52:01,520 --> 00:52:05,719
Speaker 1: A too points B with no real uh no real

840
00:52:05,800 --> 00:52:11,520
Speaker 1: chance of agility right maneuvering. So it's easy to predict

841
00:52:11,960 --> 00:52:14,839
Speaker 1: where a train will be. And that's why that's part

842
00:52:14,840 --> 00:52:18,920
Speaker 1: of why so much work goes into keeping them secure.

843
00:52:19,360 --> 00:52:22,920
Speaker 1: There is not an alternative at this point to ship

844
00:52:23,000 --> 00:52:26,279
Speaker 1: things the way that we can with trains, you know.

845
00:52:26,400 --> 00:52:29,439
Speaker 1: That's why there are so many regulatory bodies that are

846
00:52:30,520 --> 00:52:34,520
Speaker 1: super interested in anything going wrong on a train. That's

847
00:52:34,520 --> 00:52:38,720
Speaker 1: why the staff or the employees are unionized. Their jobs

848
00:52:38,760 --> 00:52:44,160
Speaker 1: are incredibly important to the vitality of the US. That

849
00:52:44,719 --> 00:52:47,760
Speaker 1: is right, And it's interesting that it's such a legacy,

850
00:52:48,000 --> 00:52:50,920
Speaker 1: you know technology. They haven't really figured out how to

851
00:52:50,960 --> 00:52:53,040
Speaker 1: improve upon, you know what I mean, Like all that

852
00:52:53,080 --> 00:52:57,319
Speaker 1: infrastructure still remains, and it's still absolutely kind of the

853
00:52:57,320 --> 00:52:59,959
Speaker 1: beating heart of moving all of these products around. Obvious,

854
00:53:00,120 --> 00:53:04,480
Speaker 1: there's also ships and shipping containers and and planes and freight,

855
00:53:04,560 --> 00:53:07,560
Speaker 1: you know planes, but rail really is the most efficient one.

856
00:53:07,600 --> 00:53:09,920
Speaker 1: And you can set your watch by all right, it's

857
00:53:09,960 --> 00:53:12,440
Speaker 1: because you're not really subject to the same kinds of

858
00:53:12,440 --> 00:53:16,280
Speaker 1: traffic issues that you would be, you know with um freight,

859
00:53:16,480 --> 00:53:19,320
Speaker 1: you know, with with teamsters and all. And there's a

860
00:53:19,400 --> 00:53:22,120
Speaker 1: huge political push in the United States right now for this,

861
00:53:22,640 --> 00:53:27,080
Speaker 1: you know, whatever the legislation finalizes as for this infrastructure

862
00:53:27,120 --> 00:53:30,319
Speaker 1: bill coming through, And I'd be interested to know. I

863
00:53:30,320 --> 00:53:32,160
Speaker 1: haven't looked at the nuts and bolts of it, but

864
00:53:32,200 --> 00:53:35,200
Speaker 1: I'm wondering if there is money being spent on the

865
00:53:35,280 --> 00:53:39,080
Speaker 1: rail system. Um, I don't know, God I am I

866
00:53:39,160 --> 00:53:42,080
Speaker 1: just being an old curmudge And now, like, watch out

867
00:53:42,080 --> 00:53:45,200
Speaker 1: for the train and we've gotta protective trains all the

868
00:53:45,239 --> 00:53:49,200
Speaker 1: crude oil. You should watch out for trains though, it's

869
00:53:49,200 --> 00:53:53,560
Speaker 1: like not for nothing. Once those things get going, uh,

870
00:53:53,680 --> 00:53:59,160
Speaker 1: they don't stop? Is a job right, Fried Green Tomatoes?

871
00:53:59,200 --> 00:54:04,160
Speaker 1: I mean heartbreaking? What could happen? I've been watching Handmaids Tale.

872
00:54:04,160 --> 00:54:06,440
Speaker 1: I've been watching this latest season. I know what happens,

873
00:54:06,840 --> 00:54:10,120
Speaker 1: so it all happens in slow motion for people. Tie

874
00:54:10,160 --> 00:54:12,960
Speaker 1: damsel's villains aren't as easy to spot anymore because they

875
00:54:12,960 --> 00:54:15,279
Speaker 1: don't tie damsels in distress to train tracks as much

876
00:54:15,280 --> 00:54:17,839
Speaker 1: as they used to. They don't have curly mustaches either,

877
00:54:17,880 --> 00:54:21,919
Speaker 1: which is a shame. Shout out to everybody. If you're

878
00:54:21,920 --> 00:54:25,520
Speaker 1: listening to this while you're operating a train, good on you.

879
00:54:26,200 --> 00:54:30,080
Speaker 1: Just be careful, have some coffee, stay stay away, stay

880
00:54:30,239 --> 00:54:34,720
Speaker 1: stay on your toes. This is going to conclude our

881
00:54:34,960 --> 00:54:38,279
Speaker 1: strange news for the week, but never fear, we will

882
00:54:38,360 --> 00:54:42,560
Speaker 1: return with more and in the meantime, we would love

883
00:54:42,640 --> 00:54:46,240
Speaker 1: to hear from you, whether you have proof that there

884
00:54:46,520 --> 00:54:50,000
Speaker 1: is indeed fruit on Mars uh and New York Times

885
00:54:50,000 --> 00:54:53,160
Speaker 1: got shut down by Big Space melon, whether you have

886
00:54:54,080 --> 00:54:58,200
Speaker 1: lived in El Salvador, or whether you're just a Bitcoin enthusiasts.

887
00:54:58,200 --> 00:55:01,080
Speaker 1: We'd love to hear your take on the or new policy,

888
00:55:01,880 --> 00:55:05,680
Speaker 1: whether or not it could be a conspiracy. And if

889
00:55:05,800 --> 00:55:09,440
Speaker 1: you are, as Matt said, working in the trade in

890
00:55:09,480 --> 00:55:12,040
Speaker 1: the rail industry, or if you were just hopping on

891
00:55:12,120 --> 00:55:16,200
Speaker 1: some freight, we'd like to hear from you. We'd especially

892
00:55:16,200 --> 00:55:19,520
Speaker 1: like to hear about the motivation for any possible sabotage.

893
00:55:20,000 --> 00:55:22,280
Speaker 1: We try to make it easy to find us online.

894
00:55:22,360 --> 00:55:24,799
Speaker 1: That's right. You can find us in the usual Internet locations.

895
00:55:24,840 --> 00:55:28,200
Speaker 1: Of note, we are on Facebook, where we are Conspiracy

896
00:55:28,239 --> 00:55:32,080
Speaker 1: Stuff or Conspiracy Stuff show on Twitter. You can also

897
00:55:32,200 --> 00:55:34,839
Speaker 1: find us on the telephone. UM that's the thing people

898
00:55:34,880 --> 00:55:36,839
Speaker 1: still use. We are one eight three three S T

899
00:55:36,920 --> 00:55:41,359
Speaker 1: d W y T K. Yes. Please leave us your name,

900
00:55:41,520 --> 00:55:42,799
Speaker 1: or at least the name you'd like for us to

901
00:55:42,800 --> 00:55:44,560
Speaker 1: refer to you as we. You know, we can call

902
00:55:44,560 --> 00:55:47,160
Speaker 1: you anything you want, doesn't matter, or you can just

903
00:55:47,160 --> 00:55:50,920
Speaker 1: be anonymous. It's fine. Once you get started. That time

904
00:55:51,000 --> 00:55:53,760
Speaker 1: is yours. You've got three minutes us of however you wish.

905
00:55:53,880 --> 00:55:56,279
Speaker 1: We recommend that you say anything you think should be

906
00:55:56,320 --> 00:55:58,239
Speaker 1: on air at the top, and then anything you want

907
00:55:58,280 --> 00:56:00,640
Speaker 1: to say to us personally, just say that at the

908
00:56:00,760 --> 00:56:04,239
Speaker 1: end of your message. Um, and if you've got way

909
00:56:04,239 --> 00:56:06,359
Speaker 1: too much to say, we ask that you don't call

910
00:56:06,520 --> 00:56:09,759
Speaker 1: multiple times for the same message. If you've got a

911
00:56:09,760 --> 00:56:12,239
Speaker 1: lot to say, just please please please send us a

912
00:56:12,280 --> 00:56:16,319
Speaker 1: good old fashioned email. We are conspiracy at i heeart

913
00:56:16,400 --> 00:56:37,480
Speaker 1: radio dot com. Stuff they don't want you to know

914
00:56:37,719 --> 00:56:40,680
Speaker 1: is a production of I Heart Radio. For more podcasts

915
00:56:40,719 --> 00:56:42,919
Speaker 1: from my Heart Radio, visit the i Heart Radio app,

916
00:56:43,000 --> 00:56:45,880
Speaker 1: Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to your favorite shows.